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Wednesday, June 30, 1993 **Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples**

Ottawa, Ontario

--- Upon resuming on Wednesday, June 30, 1993 at 9:11 a.m.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: We are ready to proceed, ladies and gentlemen.

Today's hearing is with Mr. Robert Williamson. Mr. Williamson, please.

ROBERT WILLIAMSON: Good morning.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Good morning.

ROBERT WILLIAMSON: Mesdames et messieurs, commissionaires, je m'appelle Williamson. My name is Williamson. I am a Professor of Anthropology at the University of Saskatchewan.

I do not have a prepared text for you insofar as I received your invitation to appear before you fairly recently and was already over-committed with other matters. Therefore, I am going to read from notes that I prepared in the hotel room since I got here.

By way of introduction, I may mention that since the early fifties, I have worked in the Northwest Territories and other parts of the northern part of Canada, beginning with travels of the length of the Mackenzie, from Great Slave Lake to the Beaufort Sea, followed by

a period of wintering in the Mackenzie, research that produced my first anthropological publication.

However, I always wanted to go to the eastern Arctic and was able to do so the following year when I was given an opportunity to go to Pangnirtung on eastern Baffin Island and spent some considerable time doing my own work until it was possible to build a mission house that I was asked to help with the following summer. In the process, I was able to begin learning the Inuktitut language.

It was on the way to this period of my work in the north that I travelled on the C.D. Howe on that voyage that carried the Inukjuak people from their home area to the High Arctic. I may point out that I was very young at the time and not a skilled and trained observer.

I did, however, begin to learn from people like Leo Manning who has been mentioned several times as the interpreter for the government and, most particularly, from the Reverend Donald Whitbred who was the Anglican missionary at Port Harrison from about 1947 until 1952, covering the period of crucial significance in this inquiry, and who then went on to work at Pond Inlet

where, again, he had responsibility for those same people where they were settled in Ellesmere Island and Cornwallis.

I went on to do anthropological work with the National Museum and ultimately, as you have heard, became the head of the Eskimology Section of the Department of Northern Affairs, an applied anthropologist, in fact, where I was responsible for development of a correspondence service with the people and doing various kinds of troubleshooting and also began the publication of the first Eskimo language journal, first Inuktitut journal called "Inuktitut". I brought it into Inuit hands as quickly as possible.

I was responsible for the rehabilitation and welfare in the Keewatin district based in Rankin Inlet and encountered people who were the results of starvation experiences, starvation to death in some cases amongst their people, and relocation. It was a significant experience of privation, death and relocation.

After a period of independent living, supported by research grants, living still in the Arctic, I joined the University of Saskatchewan helping to build up the newly-formed institute for Northern Studies and returned to the Arctic as head of the Arctic Research and

Training Centre, the first university owned and operated, a year around academic facility, in the Northwest Territories and, indeed, in the circumpolar world.

My studies have been various. I have published a study of the adaptation of hunting people to the mining life and this was as a result of my Ph.D. work at the Royal University of Uppsala in Sweden.

Later, I was at Spence Bay for a year and a half and learned, again, about the results of relocation amongst the people who had been transported from Cape Dorset to the High Arctic before World War II and after a long odyssey had ended in the Territory of Latilingmute (PH.) in the Boothia Peninsula area.

My recent studies have been more concerned with urbanization and macro search of organization. I have been particularly interested in the Inuit Circumpolar Conference but also in matters concerned with law and cultural ecology most recently.

I returned with my wife who is also an applied anthropologist at the University of Saskatchewan in the College of Education to study cultural ecology and land relatedness and child-raising in the Cumberland Sound area and, in the process, having encountered some very

1 revealing insights.
2 On the subject of insights, I would
3 commend to the Commission a book of a very modern kind
4 which was published by a scholar from Scott Polar Research
5 Institute, Dr. Mark Nuttal, a book that I commend to
6 everyone who is interested in land-relatedness and its
7 implications, the study of a very modern part of the
8 circumpolar world, Greenland. Nuttal's book was called
9 "Arctic Homeland: Community Relatedness in Greenland".
10 I bring this to your attention because it is relevant
11 to the discussion that we have been hearing during your
12 inquiry here.
13 The focus for all of us is what the Inuit
14 call "Nuna" (PH.) which is very often translated as land,
15 but in fact really means habitat. It means the totality
16 of the environment, the physical environment as well as
17 the human environment.
18 It is something which has connotations
19 going beyond that of landscape and seascape and icescape.
20 In fact, Nuttal calls it "memoryscape". This was a notion
21 that he and I discussed in Cambridge, but I have developed
22 my own term for the way in which the Inuit relate still
23 with their traditional environment. I call it the

"namescape" because despite the fact that in recent years the "nouveau arrivées", white people, have produced maps, when I was first in the Arctic, maps of the Northwest Territories had areas of dotted lines where they felt that they did not know enough about the country or didn't know it. They called it "Terra Incognita" which was presumptuous. They didn't know about the country, but the indigenous people knew it intimately.

The intimacy of their relationship with their traditional environment is discerned through the naming of that environment. Each geographical feature has at least one name, sometimes more than one name depending on which angle of approach it is discerned from or what time of the year or even the state of the tide.

This namescape is a very important context of reality for the people within their own environment. The individual dialect groups are identified by the geographical names which they use as well as identifying themselves in their habitat. The attention to this habitat is as strong as the attachment of kinship. It is a love of a very profound kind.

Every geographic feature -- headlands, islands, turns of the river -- has names and the name is

a metaphor for the totality of group remembrance of all forms of land relatedness, of the successes and failures in hunting. It recalls births, deaths, childhood, marriage, death, adventure. It recalls the narrations and the ancient sanctified myths.

The sense of belonging, the sense of participation in a network is extended through the relationship of kin because the kinsfolk are seen to be part of this physical and metaphysical environment. Those who have seeded bones in the land are recalled into vivid existence by the naming system. People who have been archaeologically known to have inhabited this territory for more than 5,000 years recall this long experience of relatedness with their environment through their naming, whereby the name is the soul and the soul is the name and the live in a matrix of inter-relatedness with each other, whereby people never felt alone or in unfamiliar circumstances or surroundings.

This belief system persists though, perhaps, reinterpreted in modern circumstances. But I was very struck by our findings at Pangnirtung, a bastion of Arctic Anglicanism, to find these facts still discernable, facts which affect the value system. All

of these things are integrated and the point I would leave with you this morning is that we must think integratedly and not isolate our perspective to a point of non-reality on any one element in the totality of the experience.

I would point out that the values very strongly emphasize family commitments, family loyalties, the love of family, the significance of the family.

The bonds are emotional and they form physical and metaphysical links with little network of a society. Into this highly integrated relationship, not so very long ago came the people who I have called the "nouveau arrivées", the Europeans from the south.

Firstly, explorers, so-called, a term that I find offensive and we will not use that word again. When we hear people talking about the whites being the explorers of the north or the discoverers of the north, we are not giving credit to the people who have explored, discovered, lived their lives, lived their generations for thousands of years in that environment and have named it intimately.

But the people who came looking for passage through the northern waters to the riches of Cathay, looking for commercial opportunities or, in the

1 case of the Royal Navy, looking for promotion and for new
2 experience and looking for each other -- these people began
3 the process of what I have called exteriorization of the
4 life of the Inuit, a process whereby the indigenous
5 population becomes more and more subject to influences
6 far distant from their habitat. This was most
7 particularly noticeable when the wintering whalers began
8 the process of growing interdependency, indeed, symbiosis,
9 between the Inuit population and the commercial interests
10 of the rest of the world.
11 It was the whalers, particularly the
12 wintering whalers, particularly as they hunted out the
13 great whales, who paved the way for the fur trade. These
14 were influences which were circularizing of the life that
15 heretofore had been highly spiritually undergirded
16 existence.
17 Coming along with the fur trade came the
18 mission influence. They came very shortly after the fur
19 trade began to establish their permanent posts along the
20 Arctic coasts. Sometimes people say in the north that
21 HBC stands for the Hudson Bay Company, but it also standards
22 for "Here before Christ". But overly just.
23 Indeed, the fur trade and the missions

and the RCMP formed what Jameson Bond called a "power troika", people sharing the same values and the same intentions in terms of their relationship with the indigenous environment -- one of control, one of a paternalistic form of relationship, well meant, but benefiting from the increasing dependency of the relationship between the Inuit and these powers.

There is a paradox in the influence of the missions insofar as to some extent their message replaced the "lacunae" -- it has been seen this way -- left by the cyclicization process. However, at the same time, in fact, we found that the mission influence revitalized some of the basic beliefs of the traditional type amongst the Inuit, reinforcing the values, because there are very strong parallels in terms of the notions of soul, the notions of a great creative power and the values that accompany these religious systems were strongly parallel.

Nevertheless, over the period from the whaling times in the last century and early this century throughout the life of the fur trade whereby the people were totally dependent on the exteriorized economic forces represented by the fur trade. They developed a debt cycle

pattern which meant that they were bound to honour the debts that they were encouraged to develop in order to maintain their relationship with the fur trade and acquire the goods they needed.

But from whaling times onwards, the Inuit had developed a sense of wariness, of uncertainty about the unpredictable white people, though, in many cases, the whites were dependent upon them, too. I mentioned this symbiotic relationship. They realized that the whites had enormous power. They were "inariutuk" (PH.). Very often people would say, "I like that person." "Kishany inaritupugna (PH.)." "I have a sense of awe. I have a sense of that person's power which makes me uneasy."

The result of this habituated relationship, which often was quite affable but never quite certain, was a set of responses interrelated with each other which I have called the social protection response. This is manifested in a variety of ways and I won't mention them all. I do not intend to spend 50 minutes of lecture time with you this morning if I can help it. I do trust that you will find that by comparison with a test of eternity of last evening, I am perhaps a little more

1 loquacious, but I will try not to take too much of your
2 time.
3 The social protection response meant
4 that, amongst other things, when under some pressure, when
5 feeling some sort of pressure, people appeared to agree
6 in order to take the pressure off, in order to give them
7 some time to mull over what they were being called upon
8 to do, in order to talk amongst themselves, in order to
9 try to come to some conclusion, there would be some
10 appearance of agreement. People do this in many societies
11 and it is part of the social protection response dynamics
12 of Inuit society.
13 There is what I have called the "amia
14 screen" or the "amiasu screen". This is where when people
15 feel some sense of pressure, they say, "I don't know."
16 They don't want to commit themselves until they know, to
17 some extent, what the implications of what they are being
18 pressed to do may turn out to be.
19 There is also the patent of the use of
20 inter-cultural brokers, people who are somewhat familiar
21 with the incursive society and also with the indigenous
22 society. These brokers may have been people with some
23 knowledge of the language of the incursive society.

Often they were seen by the power troika as the spokespeople and called "camp bosses" and this sort of thing. But in some cases, they were essentially spokespeople, not necessarily leaders. Leadership in forging societies of this kind, certainly amongst the Inuit, traditionally was something that was not permanently institutionalized in one person or one family.

There is one thing that I don't think has been noted in your discussion so far which I think is very significant, and that is the influence of women in Inuit society. This derives from the soul system belief whereby every person is named and perpetuated by the name being passed on from one person to another at birth. The name stands for a personality for an intellect, a character beloved in this society, but not associated with gender.

All most important values in the value system, the interrelated values of the Inuit, is the importance of intelligence. One of the most damning things one can say about a person in the Inuit society is "Shelikdaluna" (PH.), "He or she is lacking in intelligence." One of the most warm compliments one can pay is to say, "Shelatuya. Ishabacktuyu." "Has good

intelligence, thinks well."

"Shelak" (PH.) is the root for a concept of power which embraces all aspects of existence and there is a direct relationship between power and intelligence in the value system and the cosmology of the Inuit.

In order to perpetuate the names and the souls of people important to the group, names were given without reference to gender and any one person at any one manifestation of their lives, of their life in a body, was seen essentially as the vehicle of a valued soul, a valued intellect.

Although age is seen as an important quality insofar as people who have survived for many years in the vicissitudes of Arctic life and seem to be the repositories of knowledge and wisdom that is important, anyone of intellect is respected and listened to irrespective of sex, irrespective of gender. This is manifested in Inuit society to this very day if we just look around this room. In fact, quite generally, I might say I sometimes tell my students that if one wishes to truly understand human motivation, "toujours cherché la femme".

This is an important factor in

1 understanding what happened in Port Harrison and what
2 happened after Port Harrison or Inukjuak for some part
3 of that population. I find that even after the lengthy
4 discussions before you, there are still people quite
5 understandably saying, "What really happened in Inukjuak?
6 What were the circumstances?"
7 There are various views quite obviously.
8 We have heard the views of the RCMP and of the Government
9 of Canada through the Department of Northern Affairs and
10 of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada. We have heard someone
11 from the Hudson Bay Company telling us about the situation
12 in the region at the time of the late forties, early
13 fifties.
14 I spoke recently to Mrs. Freddie Knight
15 who grew up in Inukjuak and learned the language from
16 childhood very well. She spoke about that period not in
17 wholesale terms that we have heard where we have heard
18 one side saying that the Inukjuak people lived in poverty
19 and privation of the worst kind. Others have said they
20 lived well.
21 Mrs. Knight told me that there were
22 patches of poverty, some camps where people were not living
23 terribly well or having a very hard time and some hunting

1 groups or bands or camps where people were doing rather
2 better. I think this is what we shall find throughout
3 this inquiry, that we should not be believing that the
4 situations are to be understood in black and white terms.
5 That is very rarely the reality in any situation.
6 I must say that I have listened with
7 regret to the way in which these hearings have almost become
8 a debate, a tennis match where people who have worked side
9 by side for lifetimes in the north are becoming
10 politicized. I regret hearing the outbursts of the
11 parties' own nature in what in a Royal Commission situation
12 should be a search for truth and a resolution of conflict.
13 Clearly, there were problems that needed
14 resolution in the Inukjuak situation. I have been told
15 that it was from the camps where people were having the
16 greatest difficulty that the relocatees were chosen for
17 transportation to the High Arctic. But many questions
18 still remained to be answered, I think, and I think some
19 of these questions should be asked or perhaps re-asked.
20
21 Rigour is needed against this background
22 of speculation, hearsay by all sides and I don't know how
23 well the records have been examined. In some cases,

1 although some of these reports that we shall hear about
2 later show a great deal of assiduous concern with
3 documentation and documents, written documents -- and I
4 must say that culturally we are impelled in western society
5 to take a great deal of respect to events for anything
6 that is written on paper, particularly if it is typed and
7 even more if it is printed. It is in black and white then
8 and it is impelling, whereas oral tradition is dismissed
9 or taken less seriously as hearsay.
10 I have experienced in the Arctic
11 evidence of the enormous accuracy of oral remembrance.
12 I am talking about the traditional society, the
13 traditionalistic society. I am not talking about
14 necessarily the contemporary times where some revisionism
15 is entirely possible.
16 More and more the scientific world is
17 coming to see some real value in Inuit traditional
18 scientific knowledge. I happen, for example, to be on
19 the committee of a Ph.D. student in biology who is working
20 on population dynamics of caribou in the Baffin Island.
21 The reason why I am sitting on a biology Ph.D. committee
22 is because he is using Inuit traditional knowledge about
23 population dynamics and migrations of caribou, and this

is being taken very seriously.

I am inclined to ask other questions in terms of the rigour of the inquiry. I wonder if in the context of Inuit scientific knowledge there has been any graph or other trend over time data analyzed using Inuit scientific knowledge indicating the relative economic decline or stability or growth in the Inukjuak situation. What are the population statistics for Port Harrison or Inukjuak specifically?

I know from the reports that some global statistics have been used for the entire Inuit population, but specifically through the records of the sub-registrars of vital statistics, the RCMP, through the parish records, through Hudson Bay's quite extensive records which are kept archivally in Winnipeg. It should be possible to find out what the population statistics are for Inukjuak in the 1950s to get down to the recorded facts about births, infant mortality, about the age pyramid, about mid-life deaths, about mobility. I would like to know what the proportion of population distribution along the coasts in terms of the number of people known, game-bearing square mile or linear coastal mile. What was the carrying capacity in terms of resources and consumers? In other

words, how does one prove or disprove statements as to the relative deprivation or over-population or the relative foraging culture level of affluence or poverty and how these are defined in absolute terms, if one can find absolute terms, where we are already realizing that we are talking about different sets of evaluation according to the historic era we are examining?

I wonder if questions have been asked about the way in which the relocation was initiated. This relocation has obviously become much more than one small incident in the inquiries of this Commission. It has become a major issue.

I am impelled to ask at this point, because it has become a major issue, if the Commission has considered going to Grise Fiord as a group and talking to all of the people there as a group and to Repulse Bay and, of course, to Inukjuak to meet all of the people and hear from all of the people.

I would like to know who did the interpreting for whoever talked with the Inukjuak people in the first place. Was it Elijah Minerik (PH.), in which case, he had great competence in the quality of communication? How well prepared were the interpreters

before they were plunged into the interviewing situation? How fully did they understand the assumptions on the part of the people communicating this idea of relocation? Who chose the interpreters and on what criteria of competence were they chosen?

I would like to know how many people in total were interviewed as individuals and as families and how many times they were interviewed and were they only interviewed as families or as individuals or as whole groups, and was there some list of possible recruits to whom the initiators went to develop this idea? What were the criteria for selection for recruitment? Was it the extent and the duration of more than usual poverty amongst individual families? Was it their location or their family relationships to others recruited? Was it concerned with qualities of leadership or acquired independence or maybe notable submissiveness? I want to know what the criteria was for the selection of this group.

Who suggested who should be approached and to what extent was the Hudson Bay Company and the mission brought into the matter locally? Was this entirely government or was this under some co-operation even at an informal local level? The pattern was, after

all, in the north that the members of the troika worked together very frequently. Individuals occasionally were opposed to each other, but insofar as their values and objectives, they were very similar overall. There was much discussion often and consultation between the company, the police and the mission.

So to what extent were the local mission and Hudson Bay Company, people involved along with the RCMP. One wonders, indeed, how much the RCMP and the government and the missions and the fur trade were involved in this whole enterprise in the first place. There was, after all, the existence of the Eskimo Affairs Committee which met in Ottawa once a year for as long as a day. It was made up of the senior civil servants responsible for northern activities and administration, the Bishops of the two churches, the Anglican Bishop and the Roman Catholic Bishop, the Commissioner of the RCMP, later on the Chief Superintendent of G Division and the head of the fur trade of the Hudson Bay Company For many years, it was Mr. P.A.C. Nichols.

They proposed and disposed matters concerning policy and planning for the north for many years. Ultimately, someone had the revolutionary idea

of inviting Eskimo to the Eskimo Affairs Committee and indeed that was done at the initiative of Mr. Sivertz and people who became very well known in the development of northern politics like Abraham Okpik, John Ayaruak and Simeone Michel (PH.) . George Koniak appeared with this committee in its declining days I might say.

One thing that has intrigued me is the lack of reporting from the records left or that should have been left by one of the people who was a crucial influence in affairs in Inukjuak and that was the Anglican missionary. Mr. Whitbred was one of the few Anglican missionaries who spoke the language really well without accent and without awkwardness and with considerably fluency. He was there during the whole of this period.

I, in fact, called recently when I knew I was going to come here a few days ago the archivist of the Anglican Church to see if they had records of this period concerning the observations of Mr. Whitbred. I know from sharing a cabin with him on the C.D. Howe on the way to the High Arctic and back to Pond Inlet and ultimately to Pangnirtung that he kept a copious journal. I know also that his Bishop D.B. Marsh required of all of his missionaries extensive reporting in detail, I think

1 quarterly, even though some of the mail couldn't get out
2 for a year at a time. There should have been a considerable
3 body of local observations about living conditions, about
4 the life of the Inuit on file in the archives of the Anglican
5 Church.
6 To my astonishment, the archivist told
7 me -- and I have a copy of a letter -- that there was nothing
8 of Whitbred's writing in the archives either in his time
9 in Inukjuak or Metimatalick (PH.), Pond Inlet from which
10 Basse (PH.) was also responsible for these same people
11 in their resettled settings in Ellesmere Island and
12 Cornwallis. There were in fact 74 items mainly circular
13 letters, newsletters. Important data have been lost and
14 a central figure in the investigation now appears to be
15 uninvestigateable.
16 Let me terminate my remarks with some
17 further suggestions for questions that should have been
18 asked. Of all the people interviewed in Inukjuak, how
19 many were interviewed and how many went? How many did
20 not go and why did they not go? I would like to know the
21 details of the medical examinations which took place before
22 they went and what records were transferred from the
23 nursing station to go with the people or the conducting

officer. Did these records indicate long-term debilitation over previous years which we believe should be apparent as affecting most of the relocatees?

In other words, I think there is a lot of factual data that needs to be pursued to support the speculative statements that we have heard so much of during this inquiry. One needs detail. One needs specificity. One needs rigour.

Now, the word that I think you have been waiting to hear from me, finally, let me emphasize again what has been said about that period during the relocation. It was an era. We talk about eras. There was the World War II era. We were talking about the southern urban western world in the sixties as an era. There was an era in the Canadian Arctic in the forties and fifties which must be seen also as a sub-culture, sub-culture with its own sets of values, its own anticipations, its own acceptances and its own criteria for judgment.

This was an era during which the fur trade was discernably in decline. Although there may have been good years, prices were steadily declining. It was an era that was characterized by a change from a century of neglect by the government. This was admitted by Louis

St. Laurent as the Prime Minister during the debate on the act creating the problem of Northern Affairs, later to be headed by Jean Lesage who became subsequently the leader of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec.

One wonders: Was it not so much the small relocation plan as a sovereignty assertion as much as the whole creation of the new department of Northern Affairs was an act of sovereignty association? One wonders about that.

Certainly R.A.J. Phillips said that early on in the fifties when it was apprehended by our own diplomatic people that the Americans were planning a major development of the DEW line two or three years hence, it was seen necessary for Canada to make its own presence felt in the Arctic, probably more impressively than by moving a dozen families from one part of the north to the other.

Indeed, one probably would conclude that the creation of the Department of Northern Affairs as a whole was indeed partly motivated by sovereignty ideas, but not entirely. Let's give credit to the Canadian people for some conscience, some good will, some desire to make up for the years of neglect. Certainly, they had a liberal

budget for this department although it was never enough. It was an era when this department was created where there was a sense of urgency. Was it for making up for past neglect?

Certainly, the Canadian conscience began pounding its brow about the north like a drum. There was an influx of people. There were bureaucrats. There were old hands. There were opportunists. There were quick money makers and recruited into this new department there were also a significant number of idealists, many of whom went into the north and burned themselves out in a year or two at the most usually.

Turgor (PH.) suddenly discovered its north in that era and like the hero of Leacock rode off on a white horse across the north in all directions. A senior administrator who has been heard from was discernable to some as a principle-driven man leading the charge of the Light Horse Brigade across the north. It was something that was needed and in the urgency of the times and in the nature of the state of knowledge of the times by all people, it was a period of earnest amateurism because many of the old hands were people whose knowledge of the Inuit and of the north couldn't be measured in the

number of years that they had been there because in many cases they simply replicated in their own memory the experience of their first two or three years. It was an amateur band of earnest workers.

This was also an era that should be seen in its totality as one of the most tragic and widespread dislocations in Canadian Native history; the seperation of whole families, husbands from wives, children from their parents, by the epidemic proportions of pulmonary disease across the Arctic. The way it was tackled added to the tragedy.

Medical people from the south were committed ultimately to doing something about this epidemic, but in many cases they were remarkably insensitive, remarkably mechanistic. They had racial double standards. They were concerned with a condition, not with the totality of the person who had the condition.

I saw myself on several voyages on the C.D. Howe the agony of these kinds of situations whereby people coming into the settlement to unload the ship, an annual event of some importance which often left behind an epidemic in its own right, were brought onto the ship,

1 x-rayed. Their x-rays were read immediately by a
2 radiologist and those that showed signs of having active
3 pulmonary tuberculosis were then sent to another part of
4 the ship. In some cases, they had no chance to say their
5 farewells. People sometimes even discovered that as the
6 ship sailed away, some father or mother or child was sailing
7 away with it.
8 In the early days of the discovery of
9 the disease, often it was far advanced before people were
10 sent south and inevitably they died. So going onto the
11 ship and being x-rayed was a fearful experience and sailing
12 away was synonymous with going to one's death in a foreign
13 environment in the south.
14 I have participated in this process in
15 trying to diminish its impact myself. I remember when
16 things were much improved and when the Department of
17 Northern Affairs was working on these problems. I was
18 asked by a doctor at Iqaluit to explain to a mother that
19 her baby had tuberculosis and would most certainly die
20 within the year. She had already lost two children who
21 had died with tuberculosis. There was tuberculosis in
22 the family in a widespread way.
23 I was asked to explain to this mother

that yet another child was threatened with death and the child should be taken south. This was a dreadful decision that she was being asked to make and I was given 20 minutes to explain this. I insisted that the helicopter should leave me there for an hour, an hour during which she had to decide whether she would let her baby go and, in all her experience, probably never to come back, or whether she would keep and cherish and love the child for as long as it may live.

She talked with her husband and her mother and after an hour, she decided that she would let the child go to be treated, but it was a dreadful decision. When the helicopter came, I was asked to take the baby out of the amoutick (PH.) packing area in her parka. She nuzzled the baby and of course she cried and of course I did. I sat in the helicopter and the pilot rose very slowly keeping the bubble in a way in which we could still see the mother looking up as the helicopter travelled away. I will never forget her face. I will never forget her face.

Those sorts of agonies happened hundreds and thousands of times during that era and into this situation came the Department of Northern Affairs and

1 people like Leo Manning and Walter Rudnicki and Annie Padlo
2 and social workers whose job it was to try to restore some
3 order out of this chaos and bring some compassion and some
4 organization replacing this therapeutic heavy handedness.
5
6 This was the era of another form of
7 dislocation. It was the beginning of the awful period
8 of another form of loss of children. The cultural
9 dislocation occasioned by the approach of another band
10 of culturally-insensitive but earnest toilers -- the
11 educators. Exile institutionalization for children going
12 to hostel schools became widespread with a curriculum that
13 was entirely alien, the alienation of the generations
14 developed.
15 Children were lost to their parents and
16 to their grandparents not only for physically for a good
17 part of the year, but culturally and socially and in values
18 and the capacity to communicate together. It was an era
19 of the implementation of southern law where the policeman,
20 who had been seen as companions of some stability, became
21 someone more to fear and resent.
22 It was also the era of settlement growth,
23 of the development of co-operatives and through the

1 co-operatives, people learned the techniques for the first
2 time of macro-social organization and politicization which
3 led to the development of local government and
4 self-determination.
5 It was the era of some quiet planning
6 for the implementation of new concepts of northern
7 governance and local responsibility, leading to the
8 ultimate emergence on the ground in the north of the
9 Government of the Northwest Territories. This plan and
10 its inception developed under the guidance of its
11 architect. Commissioner B.G. Sivertz -- in his very own
12 independence and determined way, Sivertz, who is a person
13 of contention, nevertheless stands in terms of the work
14 of the development of the Government of the Northwest
15 Territories in his own way, visionary and the pivotal
16 figure in whatever way one wants to evaluate in the
17 development of the history of the modern Northwest
18 Territories and driven by principle.
19 So taken all together -- and I have
20 started out by saying that this era must be seen in its
21 totality and not just on the focus of this one incident.
22 It must be seen as people felt it, as people experienced
23 it in its totality. It was an era of despair, of agony,

of tragedy, of misunderstanding and hurt. It was also the era of the beginnings of some hopes, still in some cases yet to be achieved.

So the Government of Canada must be pressed and pressed hard if it is ever to stand fully shriven in the international forums as the honest broker between the old colonial powers and the newly self-determining nations of the world. This Commission, showing its commitment as it already has, now has taken upon itself inevitably by the process that has developed of its own volition in this discussions a role of reconciliation, of conflict and of doing this on the basis of total truth. The inquiry must be pursued thoroughly and rigorously to its ultimate satisfaction of real truth.

Perhaps this High Arctic relocation issue is more than an historic event isolated in its own right, but given the momentum of the bitter old feelings and losses mourned, it is in the younger leaders' hearts symbolic of the sense of wrongs they felt and their lonely hostel school nights and the emotionally bleak sanatoria of the south and in all the pained memories of their elders. There is no doubt that the public will with its typically Canadian goodwill favour the action of a government which

1 has the insight and the heart to speak for the Crown in
2 the right of Canada and express its regret for these deep
3 Inuit sadnesses.
4 Ten million dollars, $100 million, any
5 figure, any figure will not compensate any one Inuk person
6 or all who feel the hurt and the anger, but let the people
7 specify in detail their need, whatever it may be -- an
8 advanced learning scholarship for Inuit of all of Canada,
9 a structured trust, a money bridge administered by an Inuit
10 Committee to link families who lost their ancient land
11 base in the shuffle.
12 Perhaps it should be a larger longer term
13 and more meaningful commitment to the Inuit Circumpolar
14 Conference, the Inuit international forum where they share
15 their problems and ideas and tried solutions and
16 experiences they have learned from.
17 Canada is a major circumpolar nation
18 with a special role and a call to lead and here creating
19 something good upon this issue and its broader implications
20 and background. We have an opportunity. Let us
21 understand it intellectually. Let us make real our
22 regrets and take that opportunity with good heart.
23 **CO-CHAIR RENE DUSSAULT:** Thank you very

much for presenting us with so many insights of the era, of the conditions and also of the cultural aspects.

At this point, I would like to see whether my colleagues have any questions. We could discuss your presentation the whole morning.

Maybe I would like to start with one question that has to do with these insights on Inuit culture that you have provided us with, the Inuit culture in the fifties. My question will be to know whether these insights are now generally accepted in the anthropological community and when did they come to be accepted where they were probably not realized at the time or were they?

Could you expand on that?

ROBERT WILLIAMSON: Having heard quite frequently during these last two days the phrases "the cultural gap", I am by no means sure, sir, that there is a wide enough acceptance in the society of Canada as a whole and in the circumpolar world as a whole of these cultural realities which are not only historic and traditional but persistent, though maybe not as readily discernible as they might have been in those days when we lived with the language and with the people more intimately.

1 They are still real. They are real and
2 as modern and Europeanized part of the world as Greenland
3 as I indicated when I spoke about these cultural realities
4 as documented by Dr. Nuttal. They are real in my
5 experience and recent research on Baffin Island. The
6 cultural persistence and reinterpretation of innovation
7 given an Inuktitut perspective is still very significant
8 and needs to be respected and more thoroughly known and
9 certainly accepted.
10 **CO-CHAIR RENE DUSSAULT:** So I
11 understand that what you say is that the relationship with
12 the land, the relationship with all the elements that you
13 brought about the intimacy and very tightly-knit
14 relationship it was at the time, those elements that you
15 gave us are those that are recognized by the scientific
16 community as valid.
17 In fact, my question is: This knowledge
18 about the Inuit cultures that we know have -- when was
19 it realized that this cultural gap, this different culture
20 was as deep as we know it is now and we know it was at
21 the time 40 years ago?
22 **ROBERT WILLIAMSON:** I think all that we
23 have heard in the land agreement negotiations, in the

1 statements of the indigenous leaders over recent years
2 and in the statements of people before, bodies like the
3 Berger Commission, bodies like the special Standing
4 Committee on Indigenous Affairs and in many other forums
5 and contexts, the leaders are still asserting with enormous
6 power, enormous commitment the importance of their
7 traditional land as a source not only of their economic
8 survival, but their social and cultural survival, the
9 meaningfullness of their lives totally is still tied up
10 with the reality of their kinship with the land.
11 It is no less than it ever was. In fact,
12 in many ways, it is more important because it is no longer
13 something that was taken for granted as it was in the past.
14 It has become symbolic in many ways of people's own
15 personal identity. Identity and the problems of loss of
16 identity are very much tied up with their feelings that
17 have been expressed toward you in the hearings of this
18 Commission.
19 The feeling for land then, I already
20 pointed out, is not just that all important relationship
21 with the traditions and the family histories, but also
22 as a source of identity into the future.
23 Does this answer your question, sir?

1 **CO-CHAIR RENE DUSSAULT:** Thank you.
2 Georges Erasmus, please.
3 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Could you
4 tell me if you think the statement, "The Inuit would never
5 have moved to the High Arctic under force, that they went
6 of their own free will" -- the way you described the awe
7 of some non-Aboriginal people, the white man -- is it
8 possible that that kind of a relationship could create
9 a situation where a police person comes to a camp and
10 suggests to people that, if they are willing, they could
11 be moved to a place where hunting is much better? Does
12 that create a situation of obligation on some Inuit to
13 agree?
14 **ROBERT WILLIAMSON:** The relationship
15 between the Inuit society and the most long-established
16 and genuinely liked white was nevertheless also affected
17 by the knowledge that
18

the whites that one met on the ground were, in many cases, part of this process of exteriorization.

However much one came to like and trust and joke with and travel with and have sociability with one of the local whites, be he a Mounted policeman or a trader or a missionary, one never lost sight of the fact that they were the end of a long line of distant authorities with objectives and agenda which were perhaps not fully known and not entirely predictable. Therefore, people had to be approached with caution.

Some people were in their very personality not easy to understand. Much of the discussions of the most serious nature in Inuit society are conducted with a vein of humour. Some of the ponderous and serious people were Inariutuk (PH.). Their seriousness was something which carried further awe and uncertainty.

This was dealt with, as I pointed out, very often by simply delaying the decision by saying, "I don't know," or by appearing to agree while one thought out what one was going to do. In this specific situation, we don't know -- I at least don't know -- exactly how this idea was moded, exactly how this idea was conveyed and

by whom and to whom and to how many and over how many interviews and how it was interpreted, but the tendency usually, by and large, in those days was for an inference of intention, an exploratory inquiry to be interpreted by the Inuit as something rather more executively impelled having more the power of, if not an order, at least a desire that it would be in one's best interests to take very seriously and, if at all possible, accept.

However assiduously the inquiries into this situation tried to establish free will, it remains to be found out how people really did interpret these initiatives. As I say, some of the records that would have been very useful appear to have been lost or at least not pursued as far as they still have to be.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: I would like to ask you about a situation. I don't remember which report right now, but in one of the reports there is a description in Grise Fiord -- the end of the first winter.

It is nearly spring 1994 and the Inuit are all asked -- and the report describes the kind of harsh winter they had just gone through -- not enough supplies, et cetera. The Inuit are all asked whether they want to

stay on or not and they all acknowledge one way or another that they are prepared to, all except one individual and that person was kind of silent and non-committal and so forth. He says he will think about it or something like this. Later this same individual dies.

From the testimony we had heard earlier in April, it is not hard to figure out. Not that many people died in this community. We were told from the Inuit when we heard it from the Inuit that this particular person had been wanting to go back from virtually the time he landed.

Is it possible from your understanding of the difference in perception that living in the same community with these non-Inuit RCMP, that the RCMP would not be able to actually know the strong feeling that was being felt within the Inuit community and this outward appearance of simply not acknowledging that, "I am prepared to stay," and kind of shrugging and saying, "I will let you know later," to that effect?

ROBERT WILLIAMSON: I think it is all too easy in any cross-cultural situation, particularly where interpretation is necessary, for there to be some degree of diminished understanding of what is actually

being communicated, what is actually intended.

In that spring situation where presumably the member of the RCMP was making this inquiry, we don't know who actually conveyed the inquiry to the Inuit. Was it the member himself? If it was Bob Pilot, he speaks the language well to this day. Clayton Fryer had --

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: I don't think Bob Pilot was there at that time.

ROBERT WILLIAMSON: Not in the first spring, that's right, but Clayton Fryer was, I think. We are talking about 40 years ago and I am sufficiently stricken in years not to be very assertive about every detail of my memory.

I do remember the people on the ship. I do remember them being put ashore. I do remember what they took with them, what they had with them, such as they had. However, as to your question specifically, it would be speculative to make any firm statement about the quality of their communication and how it was understood.

I would, if you want me to, guess that the process that I spoke about earlier took place whereby people did their best to satisfy the inquiry of the Mounty

while they thought more about what was implied by the inquiry. One person, a little more confident, was able to be a little more committal about his desire to go south.

Perhaps he already felt the end of his years coming and the commitment to family is enormously strong and it was very often this matter of family and the need to turn to family or to at least be able to relate with family in a close way which was the main expression of feeling of not only this one man, but anyone who expressed their feelings on the subject in Grise Fiord or Resolute Bay.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: This attachment to family where it would work both ways, wouldn't it? A person being there with family members that, for one reason or another, are prepared to stay on, family members back in northern Quebec.

So if the family members that are there for whatever reason want to continue to stay on, then the person wanting to return would be torn between loyalties of family members you are with and family members that are in northern Quebec. Would this seem logical?

ROBERT WILLIAMSON: Yes, indeed. That

is absolutely correct and I think you interpret it very well and it highlights the terrible feelings of being torn that people felt -- the commitment to the family immediately surrounding them in their relocated place, whether it be Grise Fiord or Resolute Bay, and the commitment to other members of the extended family still back home in Arctic Quebec, particularly where there were these mixed feelings, these complex sets of feelings.

It is understandable that people's responses are going to be also complex and not black and white. I am not saying definitely I, personally, individually want to go home or I, personally, am committed to staying here. The choices involved agonies in each instance and it is quite likely that the answers would lead to further uncertainty on the part of the hearer, in this case, the Mounted policeman in the spring.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: In relation to the way that the Inuit had to live in the community with very few non-Aboriginal people like in Grise Fiord or even in Resolute Bay, they were isolated and the RCMP played kind of a custodian role. It put an interesting kind of power relationship at play here that it seems to me, perhaps, augmented the normal awe that Inuit would

have of non-Native people generally.

What is your view on the kind of relationship that was created where things went through the RCMP in and out? For instance, in Resolute, they couldn't go to the base without an escort. If other non-Native people were to visit with them, they had to be accompanied by the RCMP. They weren't allowed to go to the dump. Everything was more or less -- even letters out would go through the RCMP. It is kind of reminiscent of the reservation system in Canada with the Indian agent at the door, the gatekeeper, where you couldn't leave the reserve without a pass.

There are many Aboriginal people in southern Canada who would understand that particular situation. But in relation to the perception that Inuit generally had of the non-Native people, did this not create yet even an accented, warped kind of relationship? Would this not create a situation where anything that was a suggestion from these people in control would seem like a command?

ROBERT WILLIAMSON: If you mean by "warped" unnatural, awkward, difficult to handle by one's own precepts and values in one's own culture, certainly

because there were two cultures interacting here from very widely desperate sets of values and expectations and particularly the members of the RCMP who, by their training, are inclined to favour a situation of order, a situation of hierarchical power. That is the system in which they are trained and institutionalized in the perception of their own organization and the society as a whole.

Let me point out that the RCMP in the old G division days under Superintendent Larsen were a very special kind of people. Larsen himself was, let us remember, recruited into the RCMP mainly because of his enormous skill and reputation as an ice pilot. He rose in the ranks as a result, first of all, of his successful navigation of the Northwest Passage, and he gathered into G Division a rather exceptional group of people, trained, as I just said, to above all value, order to live in a hierarchical power situation, to want to have control. That was the right way of doing one's duty to one citizen and society as a policeman.

In those days, Larsen kept in G Division for many years people who became much more veteran northern order keepers than people responsible for the criminal

law, for example. People like Glen Sargent spent almost his entire career in the Arctic and was much more a professional northerner of the police background than he was a regular policeman.

He had a sense of great loyalty to his men and to the people that he saw them and himself as serving. But from the point of view of the people themselves, they still represented power. They still represented the capacity to punish, to apprehend and to control under the law of the land in a way that was much more direct and clearly delivered than the manipulations of the fur trade or the missionary.

Therefore, indications of desire or some form of action on their part had particular weight because of the directness of the power that they had the capacity to exert.

Does this come anywhere near to answering your question?

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: No, not at all.

ROBERT WILLIAMSON: I suspected so.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: In Canadian society today, if you were going to take a policeman and

1 give him this kind of power, it wouldn't really make much
2 difference who you were, whether you were an Inuit or
3 Anglo-Saxon or a Quebecois. If you had to deal with
4 somebody that both was a policeman plus had all of this
5 kind of power and had that kind of control over your life,
6 you would be intimidated, I would think, into thinking
7 everything they said was command. But the added emphasis
8 I am trying to get on here is what you say the Inuit --
9 generally their view in relation to non-Aboriginal people.
10 So I am asking: Was there not yet even
11 a further distortion than it would be for normal people
12 in relation to the Inuit? If they had a view that because
13 they didn't understand non-Native people and they had a
14 general sense of awe of these people, to put somebody that
15 is also an RCMP, to have this kind of administrative power
16 and a gateway in and out to the rest of the world, did
17 that not create an unusual circumstance where virtually
18 anything they would suggest would seem like a word from
19 God?
20 **ROBERT WILLIAMSON:** That, in fact, was
21 what I was saying, that the RCMP had a special power.
22 Not only the power delivered to them by the law, but in
23 this isolated Arctic situation where this power was held

without the checks and controls of a society of equal balancing capacity.

Yes, indeed, knowing, as I said the first time in my response to you, that the RCMP had this extraordinary legal power and this extraordinary reputation for being able to deliver the results of this legal power, anything they said had to be respected inordinately carefully.

So the inference of your question that the most mild inquiry delivered from such a source would have extra weight beyond that of this society in the south where people are all of the same culture, indeed, is, I think, a correct inference for that era.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Yes.

Thank you.

CO-CHAIR RENE DUSSAULT: Bertha Wilson, please.

COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON: My question is a more general one and really goes beyond the specific issue of the relocation of the Inuit, but I raise it because of the fact that you pointed out that the perception of the way of life at Inukjuak may have been quite different looked at from a non-Aboriginal

1 perspective as opposed to an Aboriginal perspective. The
2 people living there may have felt that they were living
3 quite a good life, whereas the government and other people
4 may have thought, as was indicated, that they were living
5 a starvation existence.
6 This is something that has come up in
7 our hearings all across the country and in all kinds of
8 issues. This business of the application of white
9 standards to Aboriginal people -- we have heard it in
10 relation to education, in relation to health, in relation
11 to the placement of Native children in white homes because
12 the Native foster homes were not viewed as appropriate
13 for placements.
14 This a constantly recurring problem --
15 the application of white standards to Native people and
16 it is quite clear that some of the Native leaders see
17 self-government as the only way to address this problem.
18 I think that we have been approaching this problem as
19 a Commission on the basis of the need for public education
20 and the hope that a massive public education would lead
21 to reconciliation between the two groups, Native and
22 non-Native.
23 I am wondering if you have -- having

regard to the fact that by and large the Native people in Canada are, in effect, politically powerless, do you have any thoughts on how this problem of white standards impacting of Native people can be addressed? It is a large question, I realize, but I want to take advantage of your expertise.

ROBERT WILLIAMSON: I think the very fact that in traditional political terms the indigenous people of Canada are relatively powerless has impelled their development of other techniques to reach the public, to reach through the public to the legislators and ultimately to the administrators.

I take well your point that there are differing ways of measuring things in the indigenous society and the environing white society. I remember a very wise man called Unaluk (PH.) who was talking to me during a storm-stayed rest in an igloo where we were travelling between two camps. He said, "I think we should call the white socuncutloona (PH.)," which refers to eyebrows, perhaps. Cupshunimute (PH.), the how many people.

He said, "In the last camp we visited, we were there for three days and by the time we left we

1 knew all about that camp's quality of life, the
2 availability of the food, the relationships between the
3 people, the movement of the game, who was going to have
4 a baby, who would like to." We had some feeling about
5 the -- considerable feeling -- totality of life in that
6 community, but if a white man came to that camp, his
7 approach would be different to the way we conversed and
8 listened.
9 Immediately getting off of the airplane,
10 go out there and say, "How many people? How many tents?
11 How many dogs? How many seals? How many caribou? How
12 many this? How many that?" That is the only way he can
13 find out reality in his terms. He said, "I believe if
14 a white man got lost in the Arctic, he would sit down on
15 a rock and count all the other rocks around him."
16 But, as I said, this form of calculative
17 appreciation of reality is a result of an industrialized
18 society, a large society with a large number of people
19 and a large amount of mechanization. That form of
20 measurement makes sense in that cultural context and
21 documentation makes sense in that kind of context.
22 There are other ways, however, of
23 appreciating the same reality which are just as valid in

1 the context of the culture. So I take your point very
2 well and these forms of valid reality appreciate are still
3 not sufficiently bridging toward each other.
4 Politically, the capacity for the
5 indigenous people to influence administration through
6 legislation is highly limited by the number of members
7 of Parliament or members of Legislatures that they can
8 bring under their influence. Two members of Parliament
9 for the whole of the Northwest Territories.
10 So what has happened is that the Inuit
11 particularly, I think, have been remarkably successful
12 in the development of what I call para-political
13 endeavours, the formation of national representation
14 organizations -- the Inuit Tapirisat, the TFN, the Original
15 Committee for original peoples entitlement in the
16 Mackenzie Delta. They have been brilliant in their
17 capacity to communicate the reality of the world as they
18 see it today and against the background of their past
19 through the general public and through the goodwill and
20 growing understanding of the general public, they have
21 been able to influence the political process to a degree
22 beyond that which could be expected by votes in the
23 legislature.

They have been impelled to do this by this reality of relative political powerlessness, by their numbers and by their capacity for representation in the legislatures. They have every reason given the history of their relationship with the colonial and post-colonial society to develop this form of national representation and international representation.

The reality of Canada as a major circumpolar power has been perceived by the Inuit and they have joined in the creation of the International Inuit Circumpolar Conference whereby they now bring to bear their influences on the world through a four-nation forum wherein they can help each other and at the same time represent themselves at senior levels or broad levels of appreciation.

This also means that they have realized that there has been a great deal of inertia in Canada, in the United States and very much in what was the Soviet Union in taking an interest in and responding to the needs of the indigenous population. Therefore, they have worked very hard to get the attention of the general public through the work of these organizations and through the brilliant leadership of people like Zebedee Nungak and John Amaloik

1 and Mary Simon and Mary Sillett and Nellie Cournyea.
2 You will notice the emergence of the
3 persistence of a traditional value there, the primary
4 importance for intelligence as a selection criterion for
5 leadership. I was able to predict a few years ago that
6 women would not be by any means excluded from leadership
7 of the indigenous organizations, particularly the Inuit,
8 and this has indeed proved to the case.
9 I think that the rest of the country and
10 particularly the administrators who are by definition
11 people in the defensive role, who write defensively, who
12 write in support of their job as stewards of the public
13 purse and living in the special kind of world of the
14 administration are inevitably likely to be at odds with
15 the representatives of the indigenous organizations whose
16 history has been one of suffering as a result of this
17 cultural gap that has been referred to so frequently.
18 However, they need to be listened to and
19 they have now succeeded in getting people's attention and
20 it is now expected of Canada in its international context
21 as a circumpolar nation that Canada does more than just
22 listen but take effective action in respecting the
23 perspectives and aspirations of the indigenous people,

which, as they have seen it from their own experience, is probably our best likelihood to be manifested and carried out by self-determination within the context of the larger constitution.

COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON: Thank you very much.

CO-CHAIR RENE DUSSAULT: Thank you.

I would like to thank you again on behalf of all Commissioners for your presentation and sharing with us the information and knowledge that you have.

We are running behind on our schedule. We will have a short break and we will resume with the presentation by Shelagh Grant.

--- Short recess at 10:53 a.m.

--- Upon resuming at 11:15 a.m.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Could everyone get a set. We are resuming the hearing with the presentation of Shelagh Grant.

Ms Grant, proceed whenever you are ready. Thank you.

SHELAGH GRANT: Thank you. I will proceed right now.

I want to thank the Commission for

1 inviting me here. In a funny way, I appreciate having
2 a chance to verbally say what I have been writing over
3 a long time, probably in the same way that the Inuit
4 appreciated having a live audience to listen to their side
5 of the story.
6 Right off, I teach part-time at Trent
7 University history and Canadian studies, but research and
8 writing has been a primary goal and my studies have been
9 in northern public policy and history since 1978 in
10 archival research. It has been the total focus of my
11 research and I have been fortunate and blessed with Dr.
12 Hugh Keenleyside back in 1982 giving me a lot of clues
13 on what happened in the forties.
14 Professor John Holmes, who was with
15 External Affairs, has actually been my mentor and guide
16 right through the publication of my first book and also
17 in actually helping me translate and understand the
18 diplomatic language of External Affairs, and he was also
19 my hardest critic. "No, that's not right, Shelagh." I
20 can still remember that.
21 So I am taking this very -- a lot of
22 people have had written full-length presentations that
23 they are reading and for the Commission, I wish to apologize

because you have a document that is in the most unconventional, unorthodox form that any academic ever presented, and it is partially because of the problem. It is so complex and my role as a historian has been trying to interface all of the issues and all of the things in chronological order so that you have a chronology that is annotated at the back so you can see where each issue fit in to when it happened.

For purposes here, I would like you to actually move -- I will say one more thing about methodology, but then I would like you to move right into -- no, just hold on a minute. If you want to follow, what I have done is given you a road map with that chronology because you have also two other volumes that are the actual documents.

I have done this because there has been in the past the potential of being "criticized" or someone saying, "That isn't true. That's not what the document says." I think we are all very intelligent, literate people and I have put the documents right there. So you can translate whether I have made selective use of it or whether that is indeed what they said. That is one way that everybody stops and has second thoughts about this.

1 My outline plan and my introductory
2 remarks were, first, changed after yesterday. I have a
3 lot of empathy for the Inuit because I think in December
4 of last year, when I opened a report and was told that
5 this was all nonsense what I had said, I all of a sudden
6 realized how it feels when you know you are accurate and
7 correct and being told that you are not. It is a very
8 basic feeling of shock. "Well, how do you explain this
9 again as to what happened?"
10 I think they can only explain what
11 happened. Observers, even the police -- there are still
12 distance and language barriers. They are not living with
13 them day to day, but you were hearing how they felt and
14 how they responded to an experience. Some of the others
15 are peripherally themselves trying to explain what
16 happened or why it happened in their own minds, and I think
17 there are a couple of documents that may cast some light
18 on what happened.
19 I started out with Mencken's quote of:
20 "Nine times out of ten...there is no truth to be discovered,
21 there is only error to be exposed."
22
23 And I guess my introductory remarks are: Instead of

1 personalizing those errors and pointing to this person
2 and that person, which I think is one of the reasons there
3 has been so much of an attempt not to accept or acknowledge
4 some of the problems going back to 1953, actually, that
5 we shouldn't look at success or failure in terms of people
6 but in terms of a responsibility of government so we can
7 get on to the next phase and find a really honest reason
8 to resolve this problem.
9 From there, I want to jump -- methodology. All right,
10 there has been some question. Why did I use archival
11 sources? Number one, that is my expertise. Number two,
12 I purposely did not interview either Inuit -- and did not
13 know any before 1991, by the way -- or government officials
14 on this issue. Partially, I didn't want to absorb the
15 emotion of two sides that felt very strongly about it and
16 because what I was looking for, they couldn't answer --
17 well, the government officials might per se, but I wanted
18 to be as objective and neutral as possible.
19 In 1991, I was asked if I would write
20 a story coming from the sovereignty side by a contact and
21 a friend who happened to be on the Board of Canadian Arctic
22 Resources Committee, and that's quite simply: I started
23 out of academic curiosity. Very simple. Asking, "Why

1 was the Inuit position so different from the government
2 position?" because, in fact, I was sitting at that time
3 with the Greenland files in Ottawa going through the
4 sovereignty aspect. I don't want to get into that right
5 now.
6 In 1991, I realized that you can't write
7 an academic-based report in 27 pages with people accepting
8 it. So then I began right then to examine why my position
9 was so different from the government's, why they were
10 coming from they were and why I would be coming from where
11 I was coming reading the government records.
12 I covered a wide variety. On the
13 sovereignty issue, it involved Washington. It involved
14 External Affairs. It involved Cabinet and Privy Council
15 Office records. But in the final analysis today, that
16 is only, to my mind, secondary to the real problem.
17 Then the second biggest problem was that
18 the Northern Affairs administration records are a problem
19 in the fact that they are official statements, wonderful
20 memos explaining to somebody who is inquiring about. They
21 are all the official statements and there is a sketch of
22 sort of what goes through and what happens.
23 But the real problems are not there.

1 NWT Council minutes are not helpful from 1950 to 1953.
2 They were from 1948 to 1950. The Stevenson papers in the
3 Northwest Territories Archives have got all those missing
4 memos, and I have picked up just a few selective ones.
5 The other measure of putting those
6 pieces together were the RCMP records, but it had to go
7 -- Larsen would confirm something that was in the Stevenson
8 papers, but it might have only been a sentence of Larsen's
9 concern. But if you didn't put them together, you couldn't
10 see that one confirmed the other.
11 Then we also have a problem of what we
12 are talking about which is a very small issue in the whole
13 problem of what was happening in Northern Affairs,
14 supposedly, in 1953. The relocation issue was probably
15 in Arctic Services. It took a lot of time. But in upper
16 level officials, they had a lot of things to worry about
17 at that time and this was only one small issue. But that
18 does not forgive or explain the impact it would have on
19 the Inuit people.
20 So you can ask me any further questions
21 you might have on methodology, except I do want to say
22 at the outset: I have received no reimbursement for this
23 or for any other reason and over the last two years, I

have not been aligned to either side. In fact, I met some of the Inuit relocatees for the first time yesterday. John Amagoualik was the only one and I only met him once for two minutes two years ago that I knew before.

As far as the last two years of research -- let's put a little humour in this. It is called academic stubbornness. Out of curiosity and stubbornness -- and you can probably define part of my personality that my family know better than anyone.

You have to be stubborn to cope with this because, in fact, it is so complicated. That's why I gave you the road map of the chronology which was the only way I started to make sense of the whole thing.

Also, the previous government studies that were done in the sixties, seventies and eighties tell you what things were admitted to and what were not, and I think that tells you in itself something else.

The significance of the sovereignty benefit -- if that plan had been successful, I will argue that sovereignty would not have been a bad thing. It would have been an effective plan, but it would have had to have been a much different plan than the plan in 1953.

So when you really look at it, the

1 sovereignty was only related to the selection of the sites
2 and I think there was more wrong with the plan than the
3 selection of the sites.
4 So sovereignty was involved in that and
5 if the Commission wishes, I will explain some of the
6 intricacies of the vulnerability of a portion of Ellesmere
7 and any other -- actually, it also applied to any unoccupied
8 islands.
9 However, I want to say at this point that
10 it was not one that was international-law based. It was
11 based on political problems with the U.S. and those
12 intelligence reports in External Affairs -- some of the
13 U.S. reports -- John Holmes -- were leaked on purpose to
14 pressure Canada to moving. They all relate to uninhabited
15 islands and to the fact that the U.S. publicly would not
16 admit the right to sovereignty of uninhabited islands.
17 The fact that our discovery claims were
18 weak was the fact that Americans actually could declare
19 sovereignty or discovery claims on northern Ellesmere --
20 not as far as Nares in 1875. Nares was right up at Alert,
21 but there is a midsection in there that is weak from Cape
22 Sabine north to the area which is Alert.
23 We can argue that an island -- there are

1 a lot of political arguments -- the east Greenland case
2 I think you probably heard on Monday and I am not going
3 into that.
4 But I can show you very quickly what the
5 American plans were, where the weak spot was and why
6 Americans tended to still react as they did in the war.
7 Do first and ask later. That happened in Tuli, Greenland.
8 They had an airstrip there in 1949 on a map that was put
9 in accidentally in front of a weather station, handwritten
10 notes in the permanent Joint Board of Defence, but the
11 intelligent reports come from Tuli, Greenland in 1950 and
12 they weren't supposed to build that airstrip until 1951,
13 nor did they have approval for it until 1951.
14 So these are the sorts of thing that
15 people on the ground were aware of and this is not
16 anti-American. This is the reality of what happened and
17 I don't think it is a political problem. I think it is
18 a problem only in understanding the pressures at the time.
19 The pressures did not come down from
20 External Affairs or from the Privy Council Office to have
21 a relocation. The pressures came for re-Canadianization
22 of various areas and that meant employment of Native people
23 where possible at the joint weather stations.

1 So every employment question of using
2 Inuit people -- and, yes, you could also qualify it by
3 the factor of its benefit to them because they are getting
4 wage employment. But every employment of Inuit people
5 during that period of 1953 to the early DEW line was based
6 on re-Canadianization of the north which was a protection
7 of sovereignty interests and has to do with a lot of
8 post-Inuit relocations in total. I think that factor for
9 the Commission is probably important.
10 So I am throwing out the Arctic
11 sensitivities. If you want to ask me that as a question,
12 I will cover it in detail.
13 One concept, though -- I think it was
14 disputed, the so-called MacDonald Report which you may
15 have heard about. The government study missed the whole
16 significance of the MacDonald Report. It was initially
17 requested --and it is in the Northwest Territories Council
18 -- as an authoritarian outside report so it would be
19 submitted to Villemars Stefanssen's and the Arctic
20 Encyclopedia at his request.
21 Dr. Keenleyside's covering note on that
22 report -- it was immediately put in secret guard with a
23 very limited number of distribution. The conclusions

1 aren't the problem except that effective occupation is
2 the only criteria that should be followed. The problem
3 was under discovery and there it is dangerous. There are
4 two paragraphs and they are in your volume -- the two
5 paragraphs about the discovery claims being dangerous.
6 "Don't touch it. Don't mention what you have discovered
7 because other people might claim their discoveries."
8 East Greenland -- Ellesmere is a
9 contained island and that is why the East Greenland case
10 was suspicious, a problem, and that is why Craig Harbour
11 had a sovereignty reason -- because it put a settlement
12 on Ellesmere Island which made the East Greenland case
13 feasible.
14 I want to go to the problems because in
15 the whole issue here, we have a factor of -- and I have
16 outlined the issues for you after methodology. It must
17 be on page 11 or 12.
18 I want to add one issue. This was
19 written very quickly, 36 hours without sleep, when I
20 realized what I had to do. So there are typos in this
21 -- lovely ones -- because it had to get to the binders.
22 So it wasn't proofread, but there is a one issue missing
23 and that is whether there was a basic flaw in the design

1 or concept. I have three issues and there was a fourth.
2 Mr. Chartrand, you are still looking.
3 I am sorry. It is page 8. There are three issues there.
4 The second one is basic flaws in the design or concept.
5
6 Now, I obviously government motivations
7 are purpose behind the relocation and the basic flaws in
8 the design or concept I am leaving because I think you
9 first have to determine that there was something wrong
10 with the actions. I am going to introduce two issues,
11 three mentioned, and then I am going to bring the document
12 that I think may be of importance to you.
13 There is the question of, first of all,
14 wages which is not on there. June 2, 1954, from Henry
15 Larsen to the Director of the Northern Administration:
16 "There was one matter which I am not clear about and that
17 is the disposal of wages earned by
18 the Resolute Bay Eskimos for their
19 employment with, for instance, the
20 geological survey on Prince
21 Patrick, the RCAF, the DOT at
22 Resolute Bay. This related to
23 Eskimo and Amagoualik and family

where their employment was at $5 a day. I get the impression Amagoualik and his wife do not actually receive their wages either in cash or goods from the Eskimo trading store, but that the whole of their wages goes to your department."

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: I am sorry, could you tell us if we have this document in order that we could follow.

SHELAGH GRANT: No. I am just about finished.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: We are a bit lost.

SHELAGH GRANT: It is in your green book, June 2, 1954. Your green book is relocation and it is chronologically in order.

COMMISSIONER PAUL CHARTRAND: What is the date?

SHELAGH GRANT: June 2, 1954. Actually, do you want to follow the chronology instead, then? That is quicker than the actual document, if you

want to, and then you can go back to the actual document from the date.

In the chronology at the back of your yellow book, go to June 2, 1954.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Where are you? There are many documents and it is difficult to find it.

SHELAGH GRANT: Mr. Dussault, if you go to the yellow one, to the chronology, I think I have probably referred to it there. But the document is in there. I can give it to you.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: If it is in our material, it would be useful for all of us to get a hold of it.

SHELAGH GRANT: Yes.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: It is on page --

SHELAGH GRANT: They couldn't be paged because they were the actual documents I have copied.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: I have February, May and then July. I don't have a June.

SHELAGH GRANT: June 2, 1954.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: You go from May to July.

SHELAGH GRANT: Uh, oh. I was cleaning up the chronology. I may have left it out.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: This is page 88.

SHELAGH GRANT: I am going to have to beg a little deference on here. You're right. It is in the green book.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: We have it now. It was not easy to find.

SHELAGH GRANT: I want to move from there because I think if you go from there to 1956 -- and I will put this in order for the Commission if they particularly -- in specific order.

Henry Larsen again in his inspection report states:

"The Inuit demanded to know how their account stood and stated that they wished to purchase suitable boats. Several of the Natives had good accounts with the Department Native Loan Fund"

He said:

"All the money earned by working for the RCAF is paid by cheque right into the department."

At this point, Larsen does not know how those credits get back into the account and he is confused himself, and he says:

"Mr. Jackson promised he would look into this matter."

This is three years after they went.

Another factor on wages and -- this is fur credits. This is the 14 of June 1957. We are jumping to 1957. This is by the Chief of the Arctic Division and it is to the Inspector of the RCMP.

"This is in reference to a telephone conversation yesterday between Sergeant Abraham and Mr. Stevenson of our Arctic Division.

Please advise number of fox pelts each Native shipped from Resolute during 1956 and 1957 and the amount to be paid for each fox. Accounts have not been credited here and no records of this information on file."

We are talking about either a year and a half or two years -- it is unclear -- of no credits for furs. Now, they may have been rectified, but there is a period of time lag when people could have been buying

1 equipment and things that they weren't credited for.
2 Again, in 1956, the detachment says:
3 "Pay cheques will arrive at Resolute for signature by the
4 Natives and forwarded in the proper
5 manner to the department."
6 Those files are impossible to get behind
7 and they knew there was a problem at Resolute. The memos
8 tell you that. Mr. Gould was put in charge sorting it
9 out.
10 I will get to the problem of -- well,
11 maybe no. No. I want to go to supplies next because I
12 am still trying to keep chronological.
13 In 1956:
14 "In the summer, the annual supplies did not arrive at
15 Resolute. The did at Craig
16 Harbour. Inspector Larsen in his
17 report talked of the profound
18 disappointment of the Inuit who had
19 ordered the boats and equipment.
20 As it turned out, the
21 administration had placed the
22 order too late."
23 In your green volume, there are nine

1 memos -- the first one that says that for reasons of
2 circumstances, the order went in too late and it missed
3 the supply boat. Then there was a negotiation and a series
4 of memos, eight more, that really was a matter of cost.
5 This cost factor -- I think you will have to look into
6 it.
7 To air freight it, it was going to cost
8 over $6,000 to send up less than half of the 18.5 tons
9 and the Department was unwilling to pay for that -- it
10 says in your memos -- because, in fact, it wasn't in their
11 budget. They asked the RCAF, the asked Air transport.
12 Air Transport did suggest that maybe perhaps they should
13 charter an air freight.
14 This went on. This was not settled.
15 The RCMP officer at the time said that it was urgent for
16 the welfare of the Inuit people. It is in the memos.
17 It was finally settled. When they arrived, I don't know.
18 But the last memo saying that it was settled was January
19 29th of the next year, and then it was only one ton of
20 supplies.
21 I am talking about responsibility.
22 That was not transportation admitted in that first memo.
23 It was ordered too late.

1 Then I want to go to whose the economic
2 benefit and this is probably the crux of the report and
3 it is on -- I had the yellow ones tabbed at one time and
4 I guess the tabs got removed, but that memo I have put
5 right at the back of -- you have a tab. Is it in the right
6 place? No. Okay, move it over one more. Take it
7 forward. The first one is Grise Fiord. It is right behind
8 the -- it is Appendix A. Have you got it?
9 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** At this point,
10 I would like maybe if you could give us a clearer picture
11 of the points you want to make and the documents that you
12 refer to. Some of us -- we are a bit lost on your
13 presentation at this point.
14 **SHELAGH GRANT:** The points I am making
15 right at the moment --
16 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** It is not clear
17 enough.
18 **SHELAGH GRANT:** All right. The points
19 I am making right at the moment are the problems. So the
20 first document was the wages that I was covering, supplies
21 and now I want you to go to this document because it covers
22 three major issues. I will read it out.
23 "Grise Fiord - August 27, 1950"

1 You have to go to page -- again, the order is backwards
2 -- 6 under "Food Shortages".
3 "Shortly after the Howe arrived at Grise Fiord, the
4 storekeeper --"
5 I have whited out names for privacy.
6 " who was ostensibly the operator of the trading store
7 came to see me regarding this
8 problem. He said that the Eskimos
9 had come to Craig Harbour five
10 years before and although the
11 hunting had been good there and at
12 Grise Fiord, there had never been
13 enough tea, coal, oil, tobacco,
14 flour, sugar, milk, 30-30
15 ammunition and duck for the tents
16 and the store. He said that when
17 the store had run out of food --"
18 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** Sorry, my
19 colleagues still have to find the document. It is six
20 pages before the blue tag in the yellow book and it is
21 at page 6 of this particular document.
22 **SHELAGH GRANT:** When you are running out
23 of time, even the binder can't get his pages in order.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: And you are reading Item g.

SHELAGH GRANT: Under "Food Shortages", Item g under page 6.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Yes.

SHELAGH GRANT: And then you have to go back over to the next page.

"He said that if the police did not given them more food this winter that they would all wish to leave Grise Fiord next year.

I tried to explain the --"

And I believe the food was increased in a load, but I am not sure whether it was not for another year.

" .....that it was not the police who were at fault but that there was only a limited amount of money available in Ottawa to buy food and when this was used up no more food could be bought."

That was the excuse given. He had said that when the store ran out of food, heating and hunting supplies, the Eskimos did not like leaving the camp to go on hunts because the hardship caused to their wives and children by the food

shortages and because of the cold in their houses.

He goes on:

"I said the police had tried to get them more food this year and I believed there was more and that the situation should be better. I said I would discuss the problem in Ottawa to see whether something could be done next year so that there would be a no danger whatsoever of food shortages.

This problem is a serious one because it not only affects the Eskimos at Grise Fiord but also the reputation of the Mounted Police. When I was in Resolute Bay I was talking with two Eskimos who had been at Grise Fiord and who were going back there on the 'Howe'. They did not wish to return but there was no space for them at Resolute and they had to be transported on the 'Howe' last year from Port Harrison specifically at their request to

1 go to Grise, we told them that they
2 would have to go. They were most
3 unhappy about this, not because
4 they disliked the situation as far
5 as the community, or the game
6 resources were concerned, but
7 because they could not buy the
8 things they needed at the store.
9 They had told the Resolute Eskimos
10 about this and the blame was
11 directed at the police. If we were
12 going to operate trading stores in
13 the north --"
14 And this is written by a Northern Administration Office
15 who is head of the Eastern Arctic Patrol.
16 "for the benefit of the Eskimos these should not be set
17 up, if as in the case of Grise
18 Fiord, they cause hardship to the
19 Eskimos and blacken the reputation
20 of the police in the eyes of the
21 Eskimo people."
22 This report is written July -- sorry,
23 the name is on the end. I was trying to save time or money,

1 actually. It was written on September, I believe, from
2 the chronology, 1958.
3 "I discussed the interview with....with
4 Constable Pilot and Corporal
5 Sargent. Corporal Sargent said
6 that when boat time had come around
7 this year all of the Eskimos had
8 talked to him about leaving Grise
9 Fiord because of the food
10 shortages."
11 Not just one or two, all of them.
12 "He said he tried to explain the intricacies of the
13 loan but this was most difficult
14 to explain to explain to a fairly
15 primitive people such as the
16 Eskimos.
17 One of the factors which complicated the loan was
18 that individual Eskimos ordered
19 large items and this depleted the
20 amount available for purchasing
21 necessities from the Loan Fund.
22 Corporal Sargent felt the problem of shortage of
23 supplies could not be rectified

1 unless a second loan was taken out
2 for the store. He suggested that
3 the establishment of a cooperative
4 might also provide a solution to
5 this problem."
6 So there were food shortages. There as
7 hunger. There was cold. There were requests to return
8 all in 1958.
9 Out of that, Bishop Marsh actually had
10 suggested that the trading practices and the store system
11 be changed back in 1956, and it was said that it would
12 be looked into right away. In 1958, it hadn't been.
13 From the police reports, it looks like
14 they got extra food the next year and that the Inuit were
15 pleased with that. But again we have that
16 misunderstanding of whether they can go home, who can go
17 home, how they can go home because they were discouraged
18 from going home, basically.
19 We move into the problem of what was
20 wrong. Why was there not enough food in the store? For
21 that, I want you to go to the next page. You will see
22 a report there. Now we are two years later.
23 This is in your yellow book, Mr.

1 Chartrand.
2 This is a memo from Constable Warner at
3 Grise Fiord to the Sergeant. Constable Warner was
4 obviously at Herschel before because is comparing what
5 happened in Herschel where he was before to what happened
6 at Grise Fiord. This is 1960, but he is going back to
7 the 1958/59 trapping season. He is claiming that the
8 Eskimos themselves received only credits valued at a total
9 of $6,140 for their pelts but that the Department had
10 actually sold them at a fur auction for the value of
11 $17,963.65. He has the exact number for some reason, which
12 is almost three times as much as the Eskimo were paid for
13 it, Inuit for paid for it.
14 But he goes on and he says:
15 "As you are aware the tariff for furs bought at the
16 Trading Stores under R.C.M. Police
17 supervision is set out by the
18 Department of Northern Affairs."
19 They don't create them. They just set them per pelt.
20 "The writer knows from personal
21 experience that fur taken at the
22 Trading Store at Herschel Island
23 --"

1 Which is in the western Arctic.
2 "-- has been sold to the Hudson's Bay Company at Aklavik
3 by our members. In this way, the
4 trapper received an extra $10.00
5 to $15.00 per pelt."
6 As compared to what the Grise Fiord Inuit got.
7 That memo must have rang bells because
8 if you flip over to the next, just turn the next page --
9 and there are several memos involved in between there,
10 but this is the final decision to go for a co-operative.
11 The discussion was that summer between Alex Stevenson
12 of Northern Affairs and the author of this report who is
13 Paul Godt, Supervisor of Co-operatives.
14 The decision then is by January 1961 that
15 the co-operative would be set up. That is eight years
16 since they arrived.
17 But if you notice on "The Problem", the
18 problem was that all of the profits from the stores and
19 all the profits from the fur sales went into the Eskimo
20 Loan Fund. Even as of 1958, the government was still
21 restricting how much of that Eskimo Loan Fund each year
22 could be used to buy government stores.
23 You're right, it wasn't the RCMP that

1 did that. It was the Northern Adminstration that set the
2 amount that could be used for ordering from the government
3 stores.
4 Mr. Godt sets out that the problem was:
5 "One of the stores with an initial loan of $5000 had made
6 exceptional fine progress under
7 supervision and assistance of the
8 local RCMP authorities. The loan
9 has been repaid and substantial
10 savings have been realized to
11 provide sufficient working capital
12 for the steady increasing volume
13 of business which now amounts to
14 $30,000 - $35,000 per year. These
15 earnings have been derived from
16 operating profits, with a rather
17 small overhead, and from profits
18 realized from fur sales during a
19 number of good fur years with
20 increasing prices. Under the
21 present system, where the original
22 loan works like a revolving fund,
23 it has not been impossible to pass

on to Eskimos any savings realized from the fur sales."

My argument here is that the economic success which was proclaimed by the Department and measured in the number of pelts and the number of furs that were obtained at both stores, that much of that economic success went into what I call the government loan fund, rather than the Inuit Loan Fund, in 1958, as an example, to the detriment or adversity of the Inuit experiencing cold and hunger.

According to Professor Soberman who was asking me if I had more information, knew where that information on the loan fund went to, he hadn't been able to track down the accounts. They have disappeared. I am going to go into this. There are other incidents of slow to respond to action. It was set up that way. Why couldn't it have been set up the way Herschel Island was where the police sold them to the Hudson's Bay Company? The question right from the beginning.

There has been a question raised on the moral issue before I go into what happened to the plan of why it happened. In 1951, an Eastern Arctic Patrol again, there was a curious item under something called

1 "Justice: A Philosophical Thought by Alex Stevenson".
2 He was talking about punishment for
3 capital offenses. In discussing punishment, he says that
4 some people -- and you have that document in your green
5 volume eventually -- considered it sufficient punishment
6 if a Native is removed from his home region and banished
7 permanently to another part of the Arctic.
8 Equally illuminating if you jump back
9 to 1954, the Inuit have already been there for a year.
10 Under Pangnirtung, there is reference to two -- I believe
11 one might have been a murderer -- who were banished from
12 Pangnirtung from their home communities for offenses and
13 they have asked for clemency for one man and his wife to797
14

1 'n because of homesickness. It was felt that they had
2 served out his time. It was four to five years.
3 Commissioners, I have picked up a lot
4 of the questions that have come through. You had asked
5 questions of -- I believe the Inuit had an expectation
6 and had agreed to go. The only thing I want to ask is
7 a question -- that two Inuit families or Inuk hunters were
8 mentioned in the winter report of that year as being a
9 problem of hanging around the post. Those two names end
10 up in Grise Fiord the next year. I am just quoting
11 circumstance on top of freedom of offering to go, and I
12 think that is something that nobody knows and can answer
13 specifically. I am just lazing it as questions of
14 coincidence.
15 A dreamed turn into a nightmare and this
16 was the missing link. What happened? In 1948, the first
17 Advisory Committee on Northern Development, the whole
18 issue of re-Canadianization. The Chairman of the
19 Committee, Dr. Keenleyside, urged using Native employment
20 at the military bases as part of re-Canadianizing the
21 military establishments.
22 There are discussions that go on over
23 that period regarding using Native employment, mostly at

the military bases. Then:

"I knew personally there was another idea, another vision. We never talked about the relocation.

All he had said is that he was incredibly disappointed that his whole plans or thoughts of what might have happened and he included health, education, economic development that never came to fruition.

I knew he had purposely hired Mr. Sivertz in December of 1949 and I knew in the NWT Council minutes, it was set out in detail as far as why Mr. Cantley was hired. It was only the position at that time.

There were two programs, ideas going consistently. I want you to go where the tab, I think, is sitting in your yellow book, if it didn't get mixed up.

This individual was hired as a special assistant for a short period of time in the Department of Mines and Resources. This report was submitted to the Transportation Sub-Committee or the Advisory Committee of Development, but was part and parcel of a discussion at the Northwest Territories Council. It gets referred to in a 1964 published account by the author who was very

1 upset at what happened in 1953.
2 Future developments in the Arctic. It
3 is written by D. Jenness. I actually had somebody try
4 to tell me that it was not Dr. Diamond Jenness, and then
5 I had Dr. Bill Taylor check with Stew Jenness and he said
6 that fit. That's where his dad was at the time. If it
7 is not Diamond Jenness, it is still Dr. D. Jenness who
8 sat on the Transportation Committee.
9 He saw U.S. government policy. He saw
10 that Canada was going to have to assume some load. He
11 also saw that there was going to be mineral development,
12 and you will notice that graph. He also saw the Greenland
13 model. It is all based on the Greenland model. He saw
14 a population explosion as a result of better health and
15 medical care, and what were these people going to do?
16 Where were they going to be?
17 His idea -- and he puts it in a form of
18 a question. This is a geographer's solution and there
19 were two other plans involved.
20 "Staff the Inuit, staff the administrative and scientific
21 stations in the Arctic. Exploit
22 the local resources of minerals,
23 furs and fish. Supply all local

1 surface transportation."
2 He actually believed in getting economic grants to build
3 boats and for the Inuit to run the whole shipping in the
4 Arctic islands, the small shipping.
5 "Colonize those areas now uninhabited in which it may be
6 advisable to establish permanent
7 settlements in order to assert and
8 vindicate Canadian sovereignty."
9 Out of that, he admits -- this is a dread
10 -- it will cost a lot of money. It will involve schools,
11 day schools and then vocational schools -- vocational
12 schools at Aklavik, Churchill or Coppermine and Frobisher
13 Bay. The vocational school at Frobisher Bay would finally
14 get built in 1969. This is 1948.
15 Everything according to Keenleyside's
16 philosophy should be done in advance to prepare the Inuit
17 for gradual assimilation into development of their own
18 northern homelands. His plan was a 25-year plan. He
19 started the schools at Fort Harrison, Fort Chimo, South
20 Hampton or Coral Harbour on South Hampton Island and
21 Coppermine in 1950.
22 As a result, James Cantley was hired to
23 look into the economics. He was supposed to be a

1 businessman with experience in the fur trade and one of
2 his mandates was to look at the subsidies of furs. In
3 other words, put a price platform so that you could buffer
4 the rise and fall of the price of furs.
5 He also advised taking over the Hudson's
6 Bay Company and/or doing a gradual intergrade, the two
7 of them, so that you would actually have a government store
8 or a co-operative store handling the fur trade. Henry
9 Larsen picked up on this. He believed, for whatever
10 reasons, that the Hudson's Bay Company did exploit the
11 Inuit and his reports claim so. He saw government stores
12 or co-operatives as the answer. Unfortunately, people
13 in Arctic Services ended up supporting the Hudson's Bay
14 Company against private enterprise.
15 Dr. Keenleyside left. Diamond Jenness
16 left and you have some people left who with the Korean
17 war, a new set of principles, a budget that was restricted,
18 left over to do something, as Professor Diabaldo said,
19 and a lot of excitement.
20 You have a report that we are opening
21 a weather station at Eureka and the request to do wildlife
22 studies up there. The Chief of Arctic Division says, "No,
23 no. Go slow because we don't have to put an Inuit Eskimo

1 settlement there." He says:
2 "In case in point, I do not think we should stress any
3 immediate requirement for Eskimos.
4 In any mass movement of Eskimos,
5 we shall use more accessible areas
6 first. However, if these Arctic
7 weather stations prove to be a
8 continuing project, we may find it
9 advisable to place one or two
10 Eskimo families at certain
11 stations."
12 In 1950, they didn't know whether they
13 were going to be permanent. Alert wasn't established
14 until the summer of 1950.
15 So what happened to the plan? I guess
16 that is where I come into -- the economic benefit I have
17 covered -- the reality of a dream turned into maybe a bit
18 of a nightmare for the Inuit people -- not to the planners
19 in Ottawa. They saw sovereignty could be established in
20 a much different way, and I haven't pulled out all the
21 figures, but the other reason Diamond Jenness used -- and
22 he also talked about moving Inuit north in 1944 and 1945,
23 but he also said there was another reason of establishing

1 sovereignty and this was to the RCAF. That was by setting
2 up scientific stations and enormous expenditure went into
3 Arctic science development.
4 Just as an example, when there are memos
5 showing that the request for an extension of $250,000 to
6 the Inuit or the Eskimo Loan Fund in 1954 was restricted,
7 that is too much. In 1955, the transportation costs alone
8 of operation of Franklin -- only the transportation costs,
9 not the freight of the equipment. Transportation was
10 $130,000.
11 So, consequently, you have an idea that
12 started as maybe a part of a whole dream, what did it get
13 added on to this dream? It is a different one.
14 A 1952 report, L.A.C.O. Hunt
15 Administrator of the western Arctic -- he gives only one
16 reason. He doesn't talk. The dual concept of benefit
17 to the Eskimo or Inuit, Arctic sovereignty or benefit to
18 somebody else has always been inherent since 1920 when
19 they first talked about moving Eskimos north for
20 sovereignty reasons. You still had to benefit the Inuit.
21 In other words, you didn't just move any of them. You
22 had to give them a reason to go. Thank goodness we weren't
23 that callous.

1 But L.A.C.O. Hunt in 1952 is explaining
2 the whole relocation policy and he is talking about Banks
3 Island. On your Eskimo Loan Fund, that is no. 4 on the
4 list that we don't talk about because it wasn't High Arctic.
5 He said:
6 "The N.W.T. Administration which is responsible for Eskimo
7 affairs was anxious to eliminate
8 large scale relief among the Eskimo
9 on the mainland, and all efforts
10 were in consequence directed
11 towards their rehabilitation to
12 the Arctic Islands."
13 And there is the word "rehabilitation".
14 You are asking me as a person what went
15 wrong. If you look at the Eskimo Loan Funds, the original
16 document, it wasn't an experiment or a pilot study to see
17 if they could adapt. For that reason, they didn't put
18 any money into it. It was to pay for itself. Other than
19 the transportation up there, it was to pay for itself out
20 of this revolving Eskimo Loan and the profits and it has
21 continued to pay for itself out of the Eskimo Loan Fund
22 to an excess of profits going into the Department's fund
23 until 1960 or 1961 when it became a co-operative and when

1 the decision is to build schools, educational facilities,
2 in other words all of the facilities that were left in
3 Port Harrison. So there is something wrong with the whole
4 plan, the whole concept.
5 Then I do want to say this and I want
6 to say it very earnestly: That the approval process is
7 also at fault. The Eskimo Affairs Conference in 1952 was
8 not a policy body forum. It was a forum for discussion.
9 Every representative group by the instructions on the
10 initial part were allowed five minutes to talk on each
11 issue. The consensus -- and if you look at the
12 proceedings, there are no minutes. There is just
13 proceedings.
14 It was felt that -- and there were two
15 agreeds. One was on education and one was setting up an
16 Eskimo Affairs Committee and that Eskimo Affairs Committee
17 did meet for the first time in October 1952. Under
18 relocation policy, they agreed
19

1 generally to maybe move people from overpopulated areas,
2 but on policy, there was only one paragraph involved.
3 That relates to: It should be investigated the places
4 of Cape Sabine, which was the northern part of Ellesmere,
5 and Craig Harbour. Nothing on Resolute.
6 By the next Eskimo Affairs meeting the
7 next May, the decision has been approved. It has gone
8 ahead and it is in force. In other words, something in
9 the system fell through the cracks. The input of the
10 Commissioner of the RCMP, the input of the churches, the
11 missionary people involved with the Inuit didn't have a
12 say on the approval.
13 The other problem on that approval
14 process was that there were complaints almost immediately,
15 even before they got up there. The NWT Council, where
16 the RCMP did have a voice, had said, "Stop. You can't
17 move," and this was regarding Resolute. The Resolute
18 issue is complicated because Larsen's reports -- it becomes
19 evidently clear and from the ACND that they thought only
20 trained people from Fort Chimo -- because that telegram
21 to Fort Chimo is looking for trained truck drivers, machine
22 operators and it is specifically to go to one place one,
23 and that is Resolute.

The telegram to Port Harrison was to go to Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine on Ellesmere. It got shifted in a change of plans that occurred from March to June when it was decided that the Fort Chimo people had lived in homes already. The government said, "This is only an experiment. We are not putting any amount into accommodation at this point."

So we have an experiment that was supposed to be part of a plan. The RCMP approved it. The question and the talk of Eskimo -- in fact, the Director of the Northern Administration does say in the Advisory Committee on Northern Development that there were three men that may be available for work in the north. That may have been something else. The minutes are too vague to tell who was available for what. That is in May.

In other words, the whole process of this plan may not have been important to the people in Ottawa, but it was to the people who went. Simple terms.

The process of getting back down, as I said, is another problem because I believe from that 1958 report, which, by the way -- in some files, I found that 1958 special report and there is one for Resolute and one for Grise. In some files, it is missing, the interim pages

that talk about of the food shortages. The ones that are in the Department files just go page 1 and then to the people who were transported. Somebody had removed the problems. I maintain in total that mentally somebody has removed the fact of people reporting -- mentally ignored the fact or denied that there were problems.

Sometimes it comes through vaguely, "Well, there may be social problems," or, "We are working this out." But in the official statements, it is talked about as a success. The Montreal Gazette, "Eskimo homes in the Arctic said to be a success," and all of a sudden we are into the process of trying to live up to an expectation.

But the people in Ottawa are not aware exactly -- Grise Fiord really is out of the way. If you are not on the patrol boat, you don't visit it. The RCAF officers see Resolute, but Grise is really out of the way or visual.

I guess, in a sense, I am saying that I didn't realize Diamond Jenness was that much involved and I could never understand why his book was said to be said inaccurate, why government studies picked quotes out of it that were unrelated to the relocation section, which

he calls "steering without a compass", by the way, and I think he is looking at the dates between 1955 and 1953. He has a lot of admiration for when Gordon Robertson comes in and what he is trying to do.

I think it is a problem from the top knowing what is happening at the bottom within a department of that size. I think it is a problem with Arctic Services knowing exactly what is happening, its divided authority.

What is really wrong with the policy? Diamond Jenness says it much better than I and because he was part of the original idea, maybe he more than I could tell you exactly what he wrote in 1964. He attacks the policy being a three-point policy. I wondered how he knew.

He says:

"The advocate of these three programs --"

He quotes the policy.

"-- did not realize apparently that he was deliberately reviving a policy which Canada had adopted with their Indians more than two centuries before and that he was perpetuating her racial problems by rejecting the Eskimos

as equal partners with the whites in developing Canada's northlands.

By segregating them not in carefully surveyed reservations adjacent to white settlements but in remote regions, for the moment not too exploitable by white man, where he expected them to support themselves without becoming a drag chain on the rest of Canada -- he is talking about the welfare payments.

Unconsciously, he was advocating a form of apartheid, the creation of a Canada Bantustan. He was following in the footsteps of that spokesman for the Northwest Territories Council in the 1930s who believed that Eskimos could be useful servants at police and trading posts to furnish a pool of unskilled labour for any construction that might arise in the north and could supply a few of the furs that adorn our ladies

in Paris and New York, but that in race in culture they differ from the white man and fall far behind of their knowledge and skills. Kennedy agreed -- must carry the white man's burden. She must protect and sucker her Eskimos and Indians whenever they need her help.

Her missionaries must instill into them the comforts of the Christian faith, but she is not obligated, like Abraham, to take them to her bosom. She should shelter them in her own homeland where benevolently ruled by government officials they can pursue the same life as their forefathers without obstructing in any way the progress of their white county men."

There is one very angry man. He had a dream, as many others did in the adminstration, from 1948 to 1950 and it fell apart.

1 Dr. Keenleyside left partly out of the
2 delusion that his budget was going to be totally cut of
3 the plans that he had for health and education in the north,
4 but there was also another opportunity. He said that when
5 you are hurt in one way, there is opportunity that opens
6 the other and when he couldn't do what he wanted to do
7 in Canada, the Korean War intervening was the excuse.
8 He took a position at the United Nations where he thought
9 he could further his commitment to mankind and humanity.
10 There was one very angry Diamond Jenness
11 because he thought the Inuit could be really a part of
12 what was happening in the development of the north. He
13 had worked with them and he honestly believed in their
14 ability and that all they needed was training.
15 Unfortunately, that training needed money. So that was
16 my dream that turned into a nightmare.
17 The approval process, I think, went on.
18 There was a problem and on page 21, you have a quote of
19 how the Department was still getting around approvals of
20 the Eskimo Affairs Committee. It was not until 1959,
21 actually, in the Conservative government that there was
22 an insistence that the Inuit should be asked to sit in
23 on the Eskimo Affairs Committee.

1 It was an attitude of how to get around
2 questioning decisions made by the Northern Administration.
3
4 "This is the attitude I have instructed our Northern
5 Service Officers to adopt in their
6 dealings in the field with
7 missionaries and traders, so that
8 we always reserve our position, and
9 our right and duty to act
10 independently of their wishes, and
11 possibly on some occasions against
12 their interests which may not be
13 public or general."
14 That is a failure of a government system
15 to work because the checks and balances have been removed.
16 That is maybe why people didn't react as fast as they
17 could. Communication and distance was definitely a
18 problem and culture of why the Inuit couldn't get their
19 problems translated over into action.
20 But the bottom line I want to talk about
21 in one page are my comments because I feel what has happened
22 -- and I have a lot of empathy for what Bob Williamson
23 said. I have enormous empathy for the Inuit people when

I realized nothing was going to come through the system to get them back. I have empathy for the women and children. It was real -- hunger and cold. There were other little -- the police tried to do something. They tried to get one Inuit hunter to stay back with them when they went hunting so that the women wouldn't be alone and cold and frozen. At Grise Fiord, for a number of years, they were sixty miles away from the police post.

I am asking the Commission to look at the situation as a failure of process which belongs in government accountability and government responsibility because I maintain it has become so personalized as far as people personally feeling they are being attacked. Maybe they are responsible here and there, but in a system that had worked properly, those checks and balances should have been there to prevent it happening.

Perhaps the people involved became too convinced of their infallibility and that the success and failure was theirs instead of the projects or the development of the north, its success and failure, was theirs instead of the governments, and somehow you get mixed up in what is what. Instead of only being part of something, of a dream that didn't happen, of a relocation

1 plan that you thought or expected to happen, it didn't
2 happen that way.
3 A government official said this to me
4 privately: that the problem was not 1953, but as what
5 would be considered a scandal of the cover-up that went
6 on since. Now, what started as a bent truth or a little
7 white lie to create an image of success hoping that the
8 success would catch up to the expectation all of a sudden
9 becomes something that has to be defended at all costs.
10 I think we have to erase that right now in going through
11 those studies.
12 In 1968, they did note that you do not
13 move Inuit at a distance from family and kin unless you
14 financially support means of returning them and means of
15 them having going back to visit. But no such conditions
16 or no such offerings were made for those Inuit at Grise
17 Fiord or Resolute. That is a meeting held in 1968 and
18 is covered by a covering letter in 1969. Again, the
19 Stevenson papers came up with a lot of interesting things
20 that they knew about.
21 Another issue at the time was to give
22 them proper information in advance to what they were going
23 to so that they wouldn't have undue expectations. It gives

1 you a signal of maybe what happened before.
2 By 1968, they knew the problems. By
3 1977, they started officially continuing the denial
4 process that there was a problem. They had another study
5 in 1982 to prove what actually Alex Stevenson told them
6 in 1977, that there were indeed promises. He should know;
7 he verified them. He switched them from one year to two
8 years, it looks like from his patrol report, but he also
9 admitted to sovereignty. He also twice -- on two incidents
10 -- admitted to other factors.
11 Rumours of requests. He didn't say that
12 there was anything specific and if you are going to get
13 into a game of semantics, whether it is planned or proposals
14 or general or whether there was a request that you had
15 the actual police request on a piece of paper handed in
16 to Ottawa, no requests came through that system. But that
17 does not mean that people didn't know that they wanted
18 to return. And to the Inuit, that was their request to
19 return and they were discouraged to.
20 In 1966, George Wenzel brought through
21 a rather disturbing report that the government Coastguard
22 had said that they would not return Inuit or take them
23 back on visits. This was not the quotes in my general

comments and he has the document. The government was not in the business of transporting Inuit, but they would transport supplies and the government personnel.

So we created a plan without a means of following through on it. It would have been expensive, but the plan was created.

So I am going to say over the past two years of my research that I provided a lot of answers I didn't like finding. It adds new factors for consideration as far as the written and unwritten objectives, and that's why all of a sudden the sovereignty issue was of no consequence whatsoever. In fact, if the first dream had happened, it wouldn't have been a problem.

Members of the Department, I believe, had full knowledge of the sovereignty intention, but if you want to use semantic words and say, "Re-Canadianization hasn't got a sovereignty issue," fine. You can use that game. We all know the real world.

There were a number of government-funded field studies that did have the answers and they are very difficult to find. There are two that I haven't had a chance to read and I think Bob Williamson was part writer of one of them. It just arrived last Saturday. I am

pulling them all in. I am getting the names and starting to pull them all in, plus the meetings that were held to discuss them. They are in the Stevenson report.

Is it not doubly dishonourable to penalize those who first took part in an experiment to see if they can adapt? I am asking that because it was only set up as an experiment, but the experiment went on for seven years before it was financially funded into something else.

Did the Inuit know they were part of an experiment, an experiment that involved placing them away from the government store so that they would become more independent and not rely on hand-outs? I don't think that was explained to them.

Did they know that they couldn't get close to -- pablum, by the way, and powdered milk were important to young babies at the time. Did they know there was that distance? I don't think they did and I don't think the people in Ottawa really understood the problems of the simple idea and what was really happening out in the field.

I think somehow the RCMP at the detachment were caught right in the middle with the

1 responsibility on one side and some of those reports going
2 to their superiors. They are not going to tell of the
3 problems that they should have solved or should have
4 prevented. They are going to report that everything is
5 going well and hopefully by the time the boat arrives,
6 it has gone well. The incredible onus on them in that
7 sense is just a broad plan that shouldn't have been approved
8 and probably wouldn't have been approved if it had gone
9 through the right process.
10 I think we have to depersonalize it.
11 My heart goes out to the Inuit. My heart goes out to
12 80-year old former officials who have done a lot in a lot
13 of other fields in Canada government, that they should
14 think that they are personally responsible.
15 I think we have to depersonalize the
16 individual responsibility and I think we have to put it
17 into the reality of a breakdown of a little part of our
18 government process that had enormously adverse effects
19 on Inuit people and that that adversity had grown because
20 we refused to believe their story. If it had been resolved
21 back in 1966, 1973 when they asked to go back, we wouldn't
22 be here. It is much of that reluctance.
23 Finally, two lines. Can we dispel the

notion of infallibility of government for once? Can apologize? I do in my heart. Can we admit to the truth of what may have happened on both sides or are we just going to continue to expose the errors?

I am sorry to have made such a complicated issue more complicated, but I can honestly say all the factors are incredibly complicated and to try to sort them together, it is not just one piece of paper and it is not just one general problem. It is everything put together that is the problem.

Thank you.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Thank you.

I would like to ask you as a start: To repeat your views on the August 27, 1958 memo --

SHELAGH GRANT: I will give you the full memo with the signature at the bottom which is on page 11, I think.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Thank you.

But this memo is an interview with Corporal Sargent and others.

SHELAGH GRANT: It is the --

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: In fact, what I would like you to concentrate on is -- you read the excerpt

on the left-hand side about the desire of people to leave Grise Fiord. So I want to know if your view is what is said there that the whole group in Grise Fiord wanted to be returned back to Port Harrison because of the difficulty to get things in the store? Is this your view in reading this?

SHELAGH GRANT: I think the emphasis they wanted to leave -- now, leaving where?

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: That is my question. I read the text and I wanted to know --

SHELAGH GRANT: In 1956, there was one Inuk from Pond Inlet who wanted to leave and couldn't, but then he got permission to go because of sick relatives the following year. So there is already a precedent that when you request it, there is a whole year that passes before you are allowed to.

I don't think the Inuit understood the process of getting a request to the police, the police to the Northern Administration, the Northern Administration back. I believe, in all fairness, that they were told they were to go to Montreal. It wasn't that easy.

If you get to Resolute -- by 1959 and

1960, they wanted to go to Resolute because you were at least closer to friends or there are planes there. People had visited -- two men had gone and looked for wives at Resolute. I mean, there is logic rationale in there, but at Grise they were totally isolated and if you are hungry and you are cold -- there was period there that they felt that way obviously and this officer in charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol reported that.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: I understand from your answer that it is quite obvious they wanted to leave for somewhere, but that being said, your point of view is that it is -- from your reading of the text and the whole context --

SHELAGH GRANT: I think they wanted to go home.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Yes. That's your point of view.

SHELAGH GRANT: Yes. Resolute would be the other option because family and friends were there.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: And this was the only document that you found relating specifically as this to the fact that the community wanted to leave Grise Fiord? You didn't come across --

SHELAGH GRANT: In 1956, there was talk of -- and I believe Alan Marcus has the full one, but there was discussion of leaving. Again, what gets reported as discussion of leaving and what gets reported within -- I think you have that communication gap -- between there -- there is no question -- on the feeling that you can't go right away or you can't go for another year or we will discuss it in another year. The police report said, "Some believe they may wish to return." The police reports say, "May wish to return in another year." That is the way it is put in the police report.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Thank you.

Commissioner Chartrand, please.

COMMISSIONER PAUL CHARTRAND: Thank you for your presentation, Dr. Grant.

I would like to ask you a question about the standards for the assessment of the policy in its implementation that you would recommend to us.

You have indicated that issues have to be depersonalized. I think we recognize our own eyes are subjective. It then becomes necessary to craft some objective lenses using which we might appropriately for our purposes look at the policies and the manner in which

1 these policies were implemented.
2 We have to ask: Did they do the right
3 thing or did they not do the right thing? As you have
4 indicated, we cannot do that with our subjective eyes.
5 We need an objective standard.
6 I am searching in both your document --
7 I looked at methodology on page 4 in particular and I
8 listened to your oral presentation, and I would like to
9 ask this question to obtain your assistance in assisting
10 me to understand the objective standard, what you apply
11 in your work for the assessment of this policy.
12 I think it will be generally agreed that
13 one cannot rely on the facts speaking for themselves res
14 ipso loquitur. We need, it seems, some interpretative
15 rules against which to assess the facts perhaps against,
16 for our purposes, an intended reason or an intended goal
17 for looking at them in the first place.
18 Let me refer to one or two very brief
19 examples to illustrate the difficulty which arises for
20 us who are required to look at conflicting views in
21 different reports. I will just refer very briefly to two
22 illustrations of the difficulty.
23 **SHELAGH GRANT:** All right.

1 **COMMISSIONER PAUL CHARTRAND:** In your
2 earlier work or in an earlier work that I have seen, you
3 have made some references to the unavailability of marriage
4 partners, if I may put the issue that way, and that received
5 -- you referred, I think, to the United Nations Declaration
6 on Human Rights as a standard by which that particular
7 hardship might be measured.
8 One of your critics admitted on the facts
9 of hardship, but, again, there is no standard available
10 against which one can measure. Was there a hardship or
11 was there not a hardship? One could go on forever that
12 way and call into aid the old tune, "Duelling Banjos,"
13 but I think we could never get anywhere unless we have
14 a standard.
15 If one looks at standards such as human
16 rights standards as an example and we might provide answers
17 to some of the questions that you have put -- who is
18 responsible? The people at the top or the people at the
19 bottom? International standards, for example, put the
20 responsibility on state and its institutions through which
21 it acts and its agents and so on.
22 I wonder if you have discarded those
23 standards which we saw in your earlier work and, in

1 particular, what objective standards are you urging us
2 to adopt now? You have suggested that this issue be looked
3 at as a matter of process, but the question is still
4 outstanding: By what standards are we going to assess
5 the process to determine whether it was good or bad?
6 **SHELAGH GRANT:** That is an excellent
7 point and a well-appreciated one. When I wrote it in
8 1991, there had been no Canadian Human Rights Commission
9 study into the issue and I think a lot of those factors
10 of the problem of how do you evaluate it -- and, as I said
11 at the outset today, I am no legal expert. So I was not
12 making specific recommendations of what to recommend.
13 However, I support Dan Soberman's view
14 completely and if you want to look at the values, I have
15 to follow a legal interpretation that comes from the
16 Canadian Human Rights Commission interpretation. I
17 believe it belonged to a moral right, an ethical right
18 because the United Nations had criticized Canada on Inuit
19 policy during the 1950s. That is mentioned in the Stead
20 Report specifically. Dr. Gordon Stead was part of the
21 Advisory Committee on Northern Development and he actually
22 had stated that it was an issue that had been brought up
23 in the United Nations.

We are still digging up as to whether it was in minutes or whether it was something that they brought up and it came back from a committee. But as to what moral right or ethical right, I think Dan Soberman covered that last night.

COMMISSIONER PAUL CHARTRAND: I am sorry, I may not have understood the purpose of your study.

It is an historical analysis, but, again, is it intended to throw some light on the question as to whether this was a bad thing or this was a good thing? If that is a purpose, then we must have a standard. I am not urging a legal standard upon you. I am only asking what standard you might adopt. What standard do you adopt, an historical standard to assess the morality of an issue? Perhaps you are indicating it here. So I am searching for the standard that you apply in coming to the conclusion that some things were good or they were bad, whichever one you might conclude.

SHELAGH GRANT: All right. When I threw away my notes and decided to ad lib, I left out the fact that I saw myself here as an investigator rather than an essayist or a professor giving a final paper. I was

reporting on my findings because I think there has been so many added layers of interpretation on top of the actual documents and what actually really happened. I was really trying to play the investigative role and give you what had happened.

Out of what had happened -- and that is under "Methodology" -- I guess I am asking the Commission to evaluate that in two theorems whether it was appropriate to the time and whether the refusal to acknowledge and cast the blame that the Inuit maybe weren't telling the whole story is equally inappropriate, is less inappropriate.

I think there are two issues at stake, quite frankly. I think one happened then and one happened since then.

Does that answer your question?

COMMISSIONER PAUL CHARTRAND: Yes, I think it does very well. Thank you. I will repeat it to make sure I have it right.

I think you are indicating that you sought to dig up the facts and to present them and you did not assume that the facts speak for themselves, but you wished to present these facts to us in order to urge

1 this Commission to evaluate for itself whether what was
2 done was appropriate to the time, to use your expression,
3 and that, ergo, you are concluding that there is still
4 that work to be done on the part of this Commission.
5 Do I understand that correctly?
6 **SHELAGH GRANT:** Yes. One point. I had
7 a recommendation in there and then I took it out, but
8 personally -- and I don't have a reason to believe that
9 my personal opinion is important in this stage because
10 I think the Commission's opinion is more important -- I
11 would like to see a team taskforce that involved legal,
12 Inuit, cultural, sociological, maybe history, but it is
13 a multitude of issues that are involved that are important.
14 I don't think one person can do it totally and do it well
15 -- not just to look into it, but I would like to see them
16 as getting the basis and then step one in negotiating.
17 I would like to see it moved out of the Department which,
18 for whatever reason, feels it is personally responsible
19 and put in to a mediation process of a solution quietly
20 without threateningly all by itself.
21 Maybe that is just Shelagh Grant who
22 wants to facilitate something happening sooner rather than
23 later, and maybe that doesn't fit with the legal process

or the government process, but that is what I would like to recommend.

COMMISSIONER PAUL CHARTRAND: Thank you again.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Thank you.

Mary Sillett, please.

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: Thank you very much.

Without preamble, I am just going to ask these questions and I hope you can understand why.

We were told, I guess, of one of the objectives of the federal government in relocating the Inukjuak Inuit to Resolute and Grise Fiord was to make the Inuit as self-sufficient as possible and not to depend upon the RCMP posts, not to depend upon the equivalent of HBC posts, not to depend upon old age pensions, et cetera.

I was wondering: In your research, did you think about how able the Inuit that were relocated -- how able were they to meet that objective? I asked that thinking that, for example, if you were to put me in Ukuk (PH.) where my grandfather lived and said, "Live," I don't know if I would be able to do it considering that

I have lived in the south for a long time.

I am wondering: In your opinion, did the Inuit have the abilities to be able to meet that government objectivity?

SHELAGH GRANT: That is a good question because I have debated that with Dr. Diabaldo and I have actually talked to an RCMP constable about it.

The fact that they survived is a credit to their ability and probably to the police in some respects, but certainly to their ability. But if you look at Diamond Jenness' perspective, they didn't agree to go out to survive.

What they were trying to do by placing them back in time was to reincarnate all of their prior abilities and you could say that they weren't totally -- primitive is the wrong word for it. They had already been influenced by the whalers, by the fur traders for a long time and depended on that ability of other goods from whalers and Hudson's Bay posts and traders, unless you were going to talk about some of them who had literally no contact in the centre. There were little pockets that had less contact with traders.

Were they capable? They were capable.

1 They proved themselves capable, but did they know that
2 was part of their project when they were going up?
3 **COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT:** I guess one
4 thing that you said surprised me based on what we had heard
5 in the previous days. We had heard that the Inukjuak Inuit
6 were used to living in tents, were used to living in igloos
7 and for them to move to Grise Fiord or Resolute Bay to
8 live in the same kind of conditions was not extraordinary.
9 You were saying, for example, that some
10 Gujuak (PH.) Inuit -- I don't know if the Inukjuak Inuit
11 were included in that -- had already lived in homes. Were
12 there any Inukjuak Inuit who had used --
13 **COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT:** There was
14 an old U.S. Airforce base. These people were actually
15 employed with the U.S. AAF during World War II and when
16 the base was shut down, which was about 1947/48, it was
17 perceived that they had lost their hunting skills or the
18 independence and they did increase their welfare payments
19 all of a sudden, supposedly, out of that.
20 But there was the perception that here
21 they were trained already as truck drivers, as machine
22 operators and that maybe at Resolute -- and certainly the
23 Department of Transport had assumed that there was this

fit. But as I said, the communications in those days from the memos, the disproportionate connection of those memos and the timing of them was absolutely extraordinary between the time that it was thought of.

The proposal went through in March and they were gone in July. The proposal was first put down in rough form before it was approved and that was the end of November, the 1st of December. At the end of December, it was still debatable as to whether there were problems with society.

So we are talking about something that was really in physical terms put together for those locations -- very quickly.

Yes, they had, but would they survive? The other options were to put them near a fur trading post and the Hudson's Bay Company -- there is a memo that is not in there unfortunately. It is December 1951, Nichols to Cheshire that is the proposal of relocating to elsewhere or to Ellesmere because of the earlier thought.

No, the Hudson's Bay Company did not want to go to Ellesmere. They said, "But we need more trappers here in the Pond Inlet/Arctic Bay/Clyde River area." That

is why I say there were other choices out there.

The 1952 Hudson Eastern Arctic Patrol report also mentions about the availability at the Arctic Bay area. It could take 40 more families. Clyde River could take more people.

No, this is where the sovereignty-driven part comes into it of the locations.

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: Could you tell me what employment opportunities were there in Grise Fiord? I think we are fairly clear on the employment opportunities there were in --

SHELAGH GRANT: The police post.

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: All right.

SHELAGH GRANT: I think there was a thought as to whether -- there was a thought eventually that scientific expeditions would use people from Grise Fiord as well as Resolute, whether on Northern Ellesmere or that, as guides. But when you just arrive there for one or two years, you are not exactly an expert and the argument was made that the Defence Research Board, for instance, could continue using their Greenlander guides because only they knew Northern Ellesmere.

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: My final

1 question is: We have heard some presentations which say
2 that there was no hardship. There certainly was no hunger
3 in the High Arctic and certainly there was lots of game.
4 Then we hear other people, especially in April, saying
5 that there was a lot of hunger.
6 I was wondering: Based on your
7 research, could you explain these real differences?
8 **SHELAGH GRANT:** This is where I must
9 admit I was looking in the government records. I tried
10 not to even relate to synthesize it with what the Inuit
11 story was because I don't think any Inuit, from what I
12 have studied and learned of their culture -- I have been
13 up myself to the Arctic and I have talked to them. I don't
14 think they complain of hunger the way we do. They can
15 go one or two days without food and that is sort of normal.
16 Hunger is something that is not having food period.
17 Specifically, I think the problem in
18 1958 -- and may have been right from the beginning -- was
19 not having access to "white man's food" or the government
20 store food which they had been used to for years and years
21 with the trading post.
22 Then there is the family allowance, we
23 have to admit, and there is the fact that the old age pension

1 was boosted from $8 to $40 a month which makes an enormous
2 difference in the life of an Inuit family that you might
3 want to stay closer to the post if you had an old -- if
4 your mother was 70 years old.
5 **COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT:** Thank you.
6 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** Georges
7 Erasmus, please.
8 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Could you
9 tell me about the issue here you mention a number of times
10 in your report -- it starts very early on -- point 6:
11 "The attitude of the administration reflected a regressive
12 change from the progressive
13 liberal attitudes of the late
14 1940s, administration to an
15 apparent entrenchment of more
16 conservative views."
17 And you say:
18 "-- with evidence that will show of such attitudes do not
19 reflect the general opinion of the
20 times."
21 Could you talk a little bit more about
22 that? Was that when Hudson Bay officials were being hired
23 and Diamond Jenness had just walked out the door? Was

that what you were talking about?

SHELAGH GRANT: I am talking about -- I think there was a very idealistic dream. There is a real sense of it that Dr. Keenleyside was a bit of an idealist, a small "l" liberal, very progressive. His ideas would have cost a lot of money and there were a lot of people who followed him or believed in his -- whether Jack Pickersgill, Pearson, Arnold Heaney -- he was part of a gender that they believed in that.

But then when you have the atomic bomb test in the fall of 1949 and then you have outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, changing circumstances -- during that period of months, Dr. Keenleyside was down in South America loaned to the UN on a technical trade mission in Bolivia.

When he came back, the whole circumstances had changed. His budget was cut. The rules of what he could do were changed. Also, he had been pressured for a year at that point to take the UN position.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: He had been pressured for a year what?

SHELAGH GRANT: To take the position in the UN, to head up the head of the Economic Technical

1 Advisory Committee.
2 He no longer had, I don't think, the
3 influence to fulfil the dream he had hoped for and he left.
4 The people who came in had different agendas.
5 Henry Larsen -- if Diamond Jenness' is
6 critical, Henry Larsen does not criticize anybody
7 publicly. But if you get into his private comments to
8 the Commissioner -- and they come at the end of a report
9 under "Personal to the Commissioner", he was incredibly
10 critical, first, to start a Hudson's Bay Company. Then
11 it moved into the Northern Administration and then it moved
12 into factors of how it was affecting the Inuit people.
13 In fact, he believed that there were too many traders in
14 the Northern Administration.
15 He is talking about the bottom level of
16 what is happening to the Inuit. He had a different vision,
17 too. His vision would have fit with the original one.
18 The other one predominantly discounted the ability, maybe,
19 of the Inuit people, but I don't know whether that was
20 as important as the cost of getting from A to B in a short
21 period of time.
22 It was only easier to set up a scientific
23 expedition stations. It was easier -- there was an

accommodation that occurred between Canada and the U.S. by October 1953 at a very senior level in Washington that made some of the sovereignty threat a little bit more understandable, handled. We had a change in name. We had a new Deputy Minister put in. There were changes that were occurring that were to look after one problem.

The relocation was an experiment, but it was to cover too many things, too many authorities as well involved, but that does not explain denying what happened.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: The business of the police inquiry into the excessive profits on the fur, something in the range of 200 per cent, from your records here, it looks like it is not clear whether or not it was ever credited back to the store, to the trading post or else the individuals themselves.

SHELAGH GRANT: It was never given to the individuals. It was supposed to go back.

Professor Soberman had done more on this because he had asked me if I had any more records, and we discussed some of the problem involved in there. I didn't have one document at that time and he didn't have two others, but he tried to get back into that.

The money had gone -- supposedly the excess had gone into -- and I think Professor Gunther tries to cover part of it on there. It was supposed to have gone into the co-operative stores, but the problem is that when you looked at the difference in what the Department was getting from the furs and just basic adding and subtracting, what they got into the furs versus what was at the end of the account at the end to go into the co-operative stores, it didn't match.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Whatever surplus they had went into the co-op.

SHELAGH GRANT: It was supposed to.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Yes, in theory.

Can you tell us about your views on whether or not sovereignty had anything to do with this and if it is either sovereignty or the concept of Canadianizing the north or re-Canadianizing the north, is it splitting hairs what we are talking about, whether it is title to the land or --

SHELAGH GRANT: I think it is a play on games. The fact of re-Canadianizing the north -- the government in Ottawa -- it was a Cabinet directive in 1947.

It was again reasserted in 1953.

Re-Canadianizing the north was to protect sovereignty concerns -- protect, reinforce. The question was not that any Greenlanders or Danish government was going to roll across and demand that this was going to be part of Canada. It had nothing to do with that at all. It was the potential protection until they could show effective occupation.

The problem was that there was no permanent settlement on Ellesmere. There was a police post, one police post in 1951. There had been posts, but that didn't count to the U.S. who did not recognize unoccupied territory as somebody having a sovereign title to it.

I think you will have to look at the whole issue of the Arctic Islands' game preserve that was established in 1925. That was in fact for sovereignty reasoning and -- I am sorry, I didn't give you the back page of that External Affairs memo that says specifically that it was a creation of a means of showing that you could effectively enforce regulations.

So, consequently, you could say, "Greenlanders, you can't go and kill muskox in that area,"

1 and they would have agreed to follow it. Therefore, that
2 is factual evidence of effective occupation.
3 What the whole list of factual evidence
4 of effective occupation in -- there is a book like that
5 that I have a xerox copy of. It doesn't tell you the
6 factual evidence that you haven't been able to maintain
7 effective occupation. In other words, what they were
8 trying to prevent was the evidence that showed that they
9 hadn't been able to administer authority.
10 If you can't control the Greenlanders
11 migration and if you can't control illegal hunting, you
12 don't worry about it if the Greenlanders are not a big
13 problem. But if they arrive over at the joint weather
14 station, at Eureka and say they have been camping on
15 Ellesmere and you are concerned about how the Americans
16 perceive the title of that land, then it becomes a very
17 big problem. So you have to solve it.
18 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** In your
19 paper called "Their Garden of Eden", you mention the --
20 **SHELAGH GRANT:** That wasn't my title,
21 by the way. That's all right.
22 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** It is the
23 title of this document anyway.

1 Would it be sovereignty and suffering
2 of Canadians in the High Arctic?
3 **SHELAGH GRANT:** I apologize. I have
4 said in --
5 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** What I
6 wanted to get to was how you --
7 **SHELAGH GRANT:** Whether sovereignty was
8 the issue. There is concern --
9 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** What I
10 wanted to get to here was in relation to the U.S. Airforce
11 intelligence. They were actually doing a study on the
12 possibility of claiming uninhabited regions of northern
13 Ellesmere Island, and then they decided, even while they
14 were doing this, that they would tell Canada otherwise.
15 And if Canada wasn't going to co-operate, then they might
16 reopen this issue.
17 **SHELAGH GRANT:** Right. The
18 significance of that document is not that the U.S. were
19 going to -- that they were actually planning -- in fact,
20 John Holmes remembers, because he was very young at the
21 office at the time, of talk about this document. The
22 question was whether it was leaked purposely.
23 The significance of that is that the

1 Americans tended to use various pressure tactics to get
2 Canada to agree to things more quickly. Their military
3 men made decisions very quickly and all they had to do
4 was get a "yes" or "no" approval, but to try to get it
5 through Canada and its political system of having political
6 approval became an enigma to them and they were very, very
7 frustrated.
8 In this sense, what that document leaked
9 to External Affairs said in no uncertain terms was, "There
10 are the islands that are relatively unoccupied. There
11 are the islands -- one of them we had discovery claims
12 to -- that we are planning to put our weather stations
13 on. Now, are you going to give approval or are we going
14 to have the Joint Defence Agreement?" That is what was
15 unwritten because that is what occurred between the time
16 they received a copy of that document.
17 Mackenzie King went to see Truman. Then
18 they had the negotiations in December and it was publicly
19 announced in February. It was probably pressure tactics
20 in reality, but the whole issue was laid out there. The
21 islands -- if we don't do something, we may have a right
22 and if we are threatened by another force or can prove
23 we are threatened, we may have international justification

for it.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: But this laid the conditions for moving Inuit to islands in the High Arctic.

SHELAGH GRANT: How does that lay the conditions for it?

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Yes.

SHELAGH GRANT: Canadianization became -- civilianization initially became a part of that agreement which was to keep most of the initial activities under mapping and under defence transport. In other words, military preparation for this defence of the Arctic Region was to be somehow perceived and acknowledged in the public as civilian functions. But the American intention -- and that comes through the memos by Heaney and Pearson -- was that this was never intended to be a long-term situation that -- the joint weather stations were particularly vulnerable.

There are incidents where even the question of the officer in charge was challenged and was reported as a problem. The veto really by the America officer in charge held that if the Canadian officer challenged the American operating officer, he would be

1 held accountable in Ottawa.
2 There are reasons and they are
3 reiterated by memos by Graham Rowley here as Secretary,
4 of various other officials that those joint weather
5 stations were the most vulnerable part that required
6 re-Canadianization, plus the supply missions. Those were
7 the two things -- if you were to pin it on Americans on
8 those, then there was means that they could possibly
9 establish rights to that area because of their settlement,
10 whereas we had none originally. It was part and parcel
11 of trying to protect our sovereign interests.
12 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** You
13 mentioned in that same study paternalism. Could you
14 mention a bit about that?
15 **SHELAGH GRANT:** I guess that was a
16 viewpoint in reading over the documents, memos,
17 correspondence, reports and some of the members of the
18 Department and maybe some of the lower officials, some
19 of the Eastern Arctic Patrol reports -- I wonder, too,
20 whether it was myself at that time -- late seventies, 1980s
21 -- translating something that was written in the fifties
22 that I did not remember.
23 That is when I rethought that when I

1 found the Jenness report and then I started looking back
2 at how other people in the late forties thought of things,
3 and I wished to retain that, that it is paternalism, but
4 it was not necessarily a general overall opinion. I think
5 we moved backwards for a short time and that is in my summary
6 of my conclusions.
7 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** You make
8 some mention about what you think might be very little
9 to avoid undue hardship. You couldn't find any records
10 of any discussions or measures to actually avoid undue
11 hardship.
12 What did you mean by that?
13 **SHELAGH GRANT:** You are going back to
14 the 1991 study.
15 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Yes.
16 **SHELAGH GRANT:** Yes.
17 I didn't see any emergency, medical
18 evacuation, any planning for -- no, there was a minimum
19 of stapled goods that was to come out of the initial --
20 there wasn't any excess in case they ran into problems.
21 In other words, it was planned as if there was no back-up
22 for emergencies. The police had -- they knew that there
23 were no caribou skins, by the way, in the summer of --

1 May 22, 1953. The Hudson's Bay reported no caribou skins.
2 Caribou sinews -- those are the threads that are used
3 to tie the skins together, but no skins.
4 Stevenson was able to get 60 sent up from
5 Port Harrison, but they originally ordered 450 and this
6 was both clothing skins for the cold, sleeping and other
7 uses. There hadn't been anything done at that time to
8 replace it. The police phoned for buffalo skins to cover
9 the tents. They phoned for reindeer skins as emergency
10 for clothing. Well, we know reindeer skins -- that debate
11 has gone on as being more difficult to sew together for
12 warmth than the other.
13 Those back-ups weren't there. It was
14 a trial and it was done too quickly and not enough thought,
15 in my mind. But then the person who did the preparing
16 and ordering -- his background as a Hudson's Bay supervisor
17 may have assumed something without the total
18 responsibility. What you would do as a trader, if you
19 didn't quite order enough supplies in, that wasn't really
20 your fault. But if you are government, you are in a
21 different position.
22 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** When this
23 was going to go ahead, there were actually doubts of the

1 project by the military and others.

2 **SHELAGH GRANT:** Yes.

3 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Could you

4 explain that?

5 **SHELAGH GRANT:** The first reference

6 comes in the NWT Council. That is just for Resolute.

7 The military were against -- RCAF Air Commander Ripley

8 wrote a letter. It can be found -- I may have to tab these

9 for you in the documents specifically one after another

10 that you want.

11 Air Commander Ripley actually wrote on

12 July 6th, for some reason, thinking maybe he could stop

13 this. The fact is that he did not believe they should

14 be sent without proper accommodation, without proper

15 preparatory training.

16 He had just actually been involved in

17 a discussion with Mr. Sivertz, General Myers and Mr. Rowley

18 at Peperall (PH.) Airbase talking about hiring Inuit at

19 Frobisher. Now, the agreement at Frobisher is that the

20 USAF were going to supply accommodation and they were going

21 to supply free fuel and free water and boost the rate from

22 $115 to $140, I think, a month for people hired there,

23 and yet we were -- I think Commander Ripley had a point

1 here. Why are we sending a family expecting them to get
2 part-time employment at Resolute from the RCAF base when,
3 in fact, there was no accommodation for them? That is
4 where Bud Drury in his covering letter -- there was no
5 proper consultation on this.
6 He also writes again in February 1954
7 saying that there were complaints about them being wards
8 of the RCAF. In fact, the RCAF probably did a lot more
9 than has been officially acknowledged as far as hand-outs
10 of clothing. I know there is one RCMP report that talks
11 about the bulldozing roads and stringing up electricity.
12 I think there was a lot of empathy for
13 the Inuit community there, but that shouldn't have come
14 after. Those complaints were ahead, but the letter
15 arrived too late. They were on the boat by then.
16 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** I guess we
17 could keep on going for quite a while, but I will just
18 wrap up with two more questions.
19 You say there are missing files that
20 curiously -- in the spring, there was a file that had
21 previously been opened and it was closed again, the Larsen
22 --
23 **SHELAGH GRANT:** The Larsen telegrams

that went out with the promise to return in one year and the covering memo, why he put that promise in because he met the Cape Dorset Inuit who hadn't been returned as he had reported and should have been returned to Cape Dorset.

This is part of the problem. There is so much to try to cover. Yes, they were found in a transportation file and they were found by another professor who told me about them and he gave me the number. I went for them and the file was closed. I went back and I checked with the archivist and he said, "Yes -- no -- well, which document are you talking about." And he said, "Well, has it been cited," and he gave him the citation which was a paper that was presented at the Inuit Studies Conference in Laval. So he said, "Okay, but I can just get you the document." He was very honest and he said, "Look, this is a ridiculous file. It is a transportation file. What are these telegrams doing in it?"

The answer to that belongs in the Stevenson paper. There were some files that were sorted in 1955 by somebody -- and I don't want to personalize this -- and he sent them back to the Arctic Services taking out, I guess, what he wanted. He sent them back with a

memo, but the memo happens to be in Alex Stevenson's files that he sent to his boss to say that he had sorted the files and took out what he wanted and he sent the others back to -- the C.D. Howe files -- Arctic Services to check to make sure that he hadn't thrown anything out important.

Alex Stevenson, for whatever reason, kept those files in Ottawa, but he kept the memo in his own files in the Northwest Territories. That is the only possible reason it could get stuck in a C.D. Howe transportation file.

There were others. There were irregularities throughout. There were memos that were sort of piled high with a string around them and their little corners ripped out, which means after they had gone to the archives, they had been removed.

It may be an over-eager researcher. Maybe somebody -- heavens knows. Those things happen and I must say that I think Canadian Archives do a better job with their records and make them more accessible to researchers than Britain does. I must admit that Washington is something else when you have to sit in a reading room with people with guns on their hips and other factors. So I don't accuse the system.

The memos that should be there aren't and they are elsewhere. They are copies in the police files. They are copies in the Stevenson papers. There are copies in other files. They didn't keep them for whatever reason.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: The studies that you mentioned that the government had done, the field studies in the sixties -- you have one. How do you know that there are more?

SHELAGH GRANT: Alex Stevenson had one list that were done. Then W. Kemp and George Wenzel did some at Resolute and then I went back to their bibliographer. The Stevenson papers have copies of meetings that were done to discuss relocations.

Then when I get a copy of one study, I look at their bibliography and find that another one had been done. So I have been more or less piecing it together from bits and pieces. It is taking a while and that chapter -- "A Matter of Perspective" -- is not quite complete mainly because I would complete it and then I would get another study in.

There is a general consensus that the relocations generally were not a success, but there was

really a genuine effort in the sixties and seventies -- and most of it related to the DEW line construction -- of looking at: If it wasn't a success, how can we make it better? But then somewhere along the way, it became that we don't discuss why it wasn't a success; whereas if you are trying to make it better, you discuss it and then all of a sudden when you don't want to admit a problem, it becomes hidden.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: So these studies which were done earlier, actually, state the fact that they are not quite as successful as they could have been.

SHELAGH GRANT: A lot of them are done on the DEW line and mines and that, but there are some that talk about the whole issue generally.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: I could ask you --

SHELAGH GRANT: None on Grise Fiord, by the way.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: -- a lot more questions, but I think I will leave it there.

SHELAGH GRANT: Thank you.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Thank you very

1 much for sharing so much material with us.
2 The Commission has already looked at
3 your material. We are certainly going to look very closely
4 at the additional material you have given us and talked
5 about this morning. Thank you.
6 **SHELAGH GRANT:** I appreciate that.
7 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** We are going
8 to adjourn for an hour. So we will try to be back at 2:20.
9 Thank you.
10 --- Luncheon recess at 1:20 p.m.
11 --- Upon resuming at 2:50 p.m.
12 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** We are just
13 going to start. Could everyone take a seat. Thank you.
14 So our first presenter will be Alan
15 Marcus and he will be followed by Magnus Gunther, Professor
16 Gunther.
17 Good afternoon.
18 **ALAN MARCUS:** Good afternoon.
19 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** You may
20 proceed when you are ready.
21 **ALAN MARCUS:** Thank you.
22 My name is Alan Marcus. I am a doctoral
23 candidate at the Scott Polar Research Institute at

1 Cambridge University in England.
2 I would like to thank the Royal
3 Commission for inviting me to appear before them today,
4 and for the opportunity to express some of my observations
5 on the relocation issue.
6 For the last five years, I have been
7 researching the Canadian government's Inuit relocation
8 policies of the 1950s. One of my principal case studies
9 has been the relocation from Inukjuak to Resolute and Grise
10 Fiord. I have also examined some twenty other incidents
11 of government-sponsored Native relocations in Canada and
12 other circumpolar countries during the 20th century.
13 I first went to Inukjuak five years ago,
14 in 1988, to conduct research, shortly after the government
15 relocated some families back to Quebec from the High
16 Arctic. It was my first opportunity to interview
17 relocatees and related families. At that time, there were
18 no contemporary published reports in the academic
19 literature on the relocation, and I decided to conduct
20 further research.
21 I was particularly intrigued by what
22 were clearly opposing views between what Inuit relocatees
23 and government civil servants regarded as the motives and

implications of the relocation. There appeared to be a gulf of misunderstanding between the two sides. After listening to the presentations made over the last few days, it is apparent that this gulf remains firmly in place.

I wrote a Master's thesis on the relocation and received a Master of Philosophy Degree in Polar Studies from Cambridge University in 1990. This thesis was revised and published as a monograph entitled "Out in the Cold", in 1992 and published by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs in Copenhagen.

I have expanded my research on Inuit relocations and am in the final months of completing a Ph.D. at Cambridge. My field is cultural history and my methodology has been to combine archival research in a number of Canadian archives with field research in four Inuit communities, including Inukjuak, Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord.

I have interviewed many of the relocatees and I have travelled around southern Canada during the last few years interviewing former government officials who worked for the Department of Northern Affairs, and RCM Policemen, Hudson's Bay Company traders,

1 missionaries and others who were personally involved in
2 the project, or who came into contact with the Inuit
3 relocated.
4 I have listened with great interest over
5 the last three days to the presentations made before the
6 Commission, and after this time, I have to agree with
7 Commissioner Dussault's comment made on Monday that this
8 most certainly is a difficult issue to assess.
9 The Royal Commission has played an
10 important role in this issue by providing a forum for the
11 relocatees, government officials and researchers to
12 present their views. This has been greatly valuable, but
13 people will still want to know what are the facts, what
14 is the truth? Has the issue become so politicized and
15 divided that the truth will elude us? Why are so many
16 well-meaning individuals looking at the same thing from
17 radically different perspectives?
18 First, if I may, let me look at the
19 reasons for the relocation. Was it sovereignty? Was it
20 humanitarian or was it something else? History, as we
21 know, is not so tidy. I believe there were several factors
22 for the move. One was related to effective occupation.
23 Researchers have been looking for a political motive,

1 a document which categorically states that the Inuit were
2 moved to safeguard sovereignty.
3 Yes, Ben Sivertz and others have told
4 us of the government's desire to Canadianize the High
5 Arctic islands above Lancaster Sound in the 1950s. The
6 Canadianization of this territory in the face of growing
7 American military activity has already been recorded in
8 history books about the period. It is no secret and
9 certainly no surprise that Canada should wish to show in
10 the 1950s as a matter of national pride that it was
11 demonstrating a presence in this vast, unoccupied space
12 on that map which was in fact a part of Canada. As a short
13 illustration, it might be useful to read a short quote
14 from a document from the Advisory Committee on Northern
15 Development from the period we are discussing. It is a
16 confidential document entitled "Policy Guidance Paper for
17 Release of Information on the North".
18 I think it reflects the government's
19 concern at that time about Canadian presence in the High
20 Arctic. The date of the document is May 28, 1954.
21 On the issue of public information on
22 the north, the object is stated:
23 "The first object of public information on the north is

1 to emphasize that the northern
2 regions are as much a part of Canada
3 as any other area in the country.
4 It is most important that all
5 Canadians should be aware of this
6 fact in order that the measures to
7 stimulate and encourage the
8 development of our northern
9 frontier will be supported and
10 sustained."
11 I take notice of the word "frontier" and
12 what do you do with a frontier. Well, you often colonize
13 it.
14 Under the heading "Canada/United States
15 Relations in Sovereignty", there is the passage:
16 "No emphasis should be placed on Canadian claims in the
17 north, lest we seem to be on the
18 defensive."
19 This statement indicates a weakness, an
20 unease of external perceptions. Not necessarily an actual
21 threat to title, but, nonetheless, a concern about how
22 others conceived Canadian occupation in its northern-most
23 Arctic islands. Hence, the drive towards Canadianization

of the islands.

Again, this document was from the period we are discussing -- May 1954.

This process of Canadianization, for example, involved the re-establishment of the RCMP posts at Craig Harbour in 1951 and at Alexandra Fiord in 1953.

Had the posts at those locations not been remanned as flag detachments, the Inuit would never have been moved to Ellesmere Island. Throughout the 1950s officials at the Department of Northern Affairs discussed the repopulation and colonization of the High Arctic islands. This relocation experiment was referred to in government documents as colonization project, a potential forerunner of more Inuit moves to come -- in short, a prototype.

The government's actions to re-establish a Native population in the High Arctic islands and their actions to re-established RCMP posts in the area were twin instruments of Canadianization, of demonstrating "effective occupation" -- which refers to de facto sovereignty. We are not doubting the issue of de juris sovereignty over Canadian title, but we are acknowledging that the actions were taken as part of the government's

1 broader desire to Canadianize this vast territory which
2 in the early 1950s looked particularly empty due to the
3 noticeable lack of a Canadian presence.
4 In the early 1950s, the Department of
5 Northern Affairs successfully sought to encourage Inuit
6 from the MacKenzie Delta region to relocate on Banks Island
7 by offering financial assistance from the newly created
8 Eskimo Loan Fund. Repopulating Banks was part of the same
9 thinking behind repopulating Devon Island, Ellesmere
10 Island, Cornwallis Island and others. Devon Island was
11 considered several times by the Department for Native
12 repopulation during the 1950s, as it had been in 1934 to
13 1936 during a failed colonization project.
14 For the Department of Northern Affairs,
15 it was perfectly simple. It would be useful to have the
16 northern Arctic Islands repopulated and the Inuit were
17 the only people able to do so. The rationale of good
18 hunting would be used and Inuit could be moved from areas
19 designed as "overpopulated" to a region which was
20 unpopulated. It would give these Inuit an opportunity
21 to hunt and trap in virgin territory, potentially rich
22 in game. They could leave their dependence on relief and
23 become self-reliant once again, it was thought. It would

1 kill two birds with one stone and everyone would benefit.
2 That was the idea.
3 The specific decision to target Inuit
4 from Quebec for relocation was, I believe, largely
5 political. As Doug Wilkinson has recalled, Farley Mowat's
6 "People of the Deer" and its controversial indictment of
7 the government's Inuit administration policy, or lack
8 there of, was indicative of rising public concern in the
9 early 1950s of the plight of the Inuit.
10 There were a number of documented cases
11 of starvation and epidemics amongst the Inuit that the
12 public was made aware of by the media in the early 1950s.
13 The Department of Northern Affairs was responding to a
14 crisis of confidence when it undertook the relocation
15 experiment amidst great publicity as a high profile
16 opportunity to be seen to be finding a solution to what
17 was then known as "the Eskimo Problem".
18 The move was motivated by a political
19 response to reduce dependency on relief. Was it also a
20 humanitarian gesture? Gordon Robertson told us that 95
21 per cent of the motivation of the move was to reduce the
22 overpopulation of Quebec. However, Ottawa's process of
23 labelling northern Quebec as overpopulated is an

interesting one.

Reuben Ploughman, the Hudson's Bay Company store manager at Inukjuak in 1953 informed us that starvation didn't enter into the relocation at all. Nobody was starving he said, and the RCMP records reported no cases of starvation either. It wasn't for lack of food that the move was made, Mr. Ploughman said. In fact, he reported that 1952-1953 was a bumper year for fox at Inukjuak, with 5,000 fox pelts traded, far exceeding expectations. He should know, that was his job. There was no starvation or serious lack of food in the Inukjuak area in 1953. That is a fact.

Was this therefore an attempt to depopulate Quebec of a portion of its Native population? I believe it was, but it wasn't done because of scarcity of game. It was done because of a concentration in the E-9 Port Harrison district of high relief and family allowance benefits which were collectively viewed by officials as "white man's hand-outs".

This takes us to the next point. There are a number of references in the documents that officials regarded the experiment, as Gordon Robertson has told us, as a means to establish Inuit in the manner of the

1 traditional way of Inuit life in self-reliant communities,
2 so they wouldn't be dependent on hand-outs. That is what
3 he said.
4 The Department of that day, we are told,
5 thought the Inuit way of life should be preserved and
6 insulated from the seductive easier way of life the whites
7 had. Rehabilitation was the term used at the time. The
8 RCMP called the relocation at Grise Fiord a rehabilitation
9 project, and the constables wrote articles explaining how
10 they were managing to rehabilitate the relocatees. In
11 other words, this was an experiment in social reform.
12 It is ironic that the Inuit themselves had no knowledge,
13 as far as I am aware, that they were being relocated for
14 a rehabilitation experiment in social reform.
15 How was the word "experiment" used?
16 What were its implications? It was an experiment to
17 repopulate the Queen Elizabeth Islands with a Native
18 population. It was also an experiment to see if Inuit
19 from southern regions of the Arctic could adapt to life
20 in the High Arctic environment. The government had never
21 tried such a move before -- to take Inuit from the southern
22 Arctic and move them to the northernmost Arctic regions.
23 As James Cantley, Chief of the Arctic

Services Section, said in the meeting held on August 10, 1953 to discuss the relocation, "the main purpose of the experiment is to see if it is possible for the people to adapt themselves to the conditions of the High Arctic and secure a living from the land."

It was an experiment to see if there were sufficient resources in the vicinity of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay to support a Native population. And it was an experiment to effectively depopulate northern Quebec, which was repeatedly referred to at the time as overpopulated.

This move was therefore not a humanitarian gesture but a pseudo-scientific experiment being undertaken not by scientists but by bureaucrats.

We have been told that the Inuit who took part in the government's experiment were volunteers. It has been suggested in various presentations that because the government considered the people to be volunteers that this was somehow sufficient justification for any hardships they might experience while participating in the experiment.

It was cold -- well, they volunteered. They didn't have the same amenities in the High Arctic

as in Inukjuak -- well, they volunteered. They wanted to return home -- well, it was difficult to take them back. Maybe they will change their minds once they are out of the dark season. And besides, they volunteered.

I would suggest to you that the use of the word "volunteer" has been used by the government as an overriding justification for whatever difficulties the Inuit may have experienced. There has been considerable discussion during these proceedings about what it meant to be a volunteer for the relocation. How can we define the depth of meaning for being a volunteer in this case?

The Inuit told us in their April testimonies that they did not volunteer. In this context, "volunteerism" is related to fear. Hugh Brody's excellent paper, which he has submitted to the Commission, describes the Inuit concept of fear, particularly as it pertained to white people and authority figures like RCM Policemen. The paper provides us with a basis for understanding the fear the Inuit experienced, from their encounters with the police at that time in the fifties.

But, let us say for the sake of argument that they were keen volunteers -- where does that take us?

First, we must ask: How well were they really informed? As Commissioner Sillett has pointed out, they did not participate in the planning of the relocation.

Did they volunteer to go to a place of better hunting, a place they were told would be rich in game? Perhaps, but did they volunteer to go to a distant northern land that had essentially a foreign environment where they would have to learn new hunting and trapping skills suited to living in the High Arctic.

Did they volunteer to endure the three and a half month dark period, during which they would have to hunt, having never experienced anything like the dark period before?

Did they volunteer to be separated on board the boat as they reached Craig Harbour, when they thought they were going to all stay together -- as the oral testimonies and records clearly show us, and as Daniel Soberman reaffirmed from his report yesterday?

Did they volunteer to go to a place where they would have difficulty finding spouses because of the small groups of related family members?

Did they volunteer to go to a place where there was no Hudson's Bay Company store to which they were

accustomed, no Anglican church, no school and no nursing station, all of which they had access to in Inukjuak?

Did they volunteer to be permanently separated from their extended families and homeland?

The list goes on and on. I would suggest to you that the Inuit did not volunteer for these eventualities. It was not part of the bargain, regardless of the fact that a two-year promise of return was made. That is a fact. However, much officials thought that they had actual "volunteers" for their quota of ten families in 1953, the Inuit from Inukjuak had virtually no idea what was going to happen to them -- it was a voyage into the unknown -- which challenges any notion that the government had the people's informed consent.

Gordon Robertson suggested that it was "quite possible there was a major misunderstanding". Well, there certainly was. We have all agreed now that the government through its representatives made a promise of return that after two years if the Inuit wanted to move back, they would be assisted to do so.

When J.C. Jackson, the Department's officer in charge of the annual Eastern Arctic Patrol held a meeting with all the Inuit men in Resolute Bay on 21

1 August 1956, together with Superintendent Larsen, Ross
2 Gibson and an interpreter, he reported that the Inuit asked
3 about going back to Inukjuak and seemed to think a promise
4 had been made. He reported to his superiors in Ottawa
5 that he told them he had no knowledge of a promise. This
6 is three years after the move.
7 But on the 22nd of October 1956, two
8 months later, Ben Sivertz, Chief of the Arctic Division,
9 reminded Cunningham, Director of Northern Administration
10 and Lands Branch, that "they only agreement to go in the
11 first place on condition we promise to return them to their
12 former homes after 'two or three years'". But the promise
13 was not honoured by the Department until 35 years later.
14 Ben Sivertz informed the Commission that
15 the plan was to take some of the population of Quebec away
16 for a better life. Co-Chairman Commissioner Erasmus
17 responded with the question: "What do you mean by a better
18 life?" This question goes to the heart of the controversy.
19 Mr. Sivertz replied "so that they would be independent
20 and wouldn't live on relief". That was his perception
21 and the perception of a government department as a
22 rationale for carrying out an interventionist act. It
23 was not an Inuit perception; it was a white man's

1 perception. And the government turned to the instrument
2 of relocation as a result.
3 We have been told that after a few years
4 or so, the Inuit at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord enjoyed
5 a rich harvest of game -- walrus, seal, polar bear -- did
6 this constitute a better life? No, not from what was said
7 at the April hearings. However good the hunting for marine
8 mammals may have become, it did not in itself constitute
9 a better life.
10 What did they miss from being relocated
11 to the High Arctic? Did their relatives in Inukjuak
12 starve? No. In fact, the Inuit in Inukjuak enjoyed the
13 economic benefits derived from a rise in the price of fur
14 and in income received from soapstone carvings -- after
15 a temporary period in the late 1940s and early 1950s when
16 the Inuit economy was depressed due to the unstable fur
17 market. But fur prices rose again and the Inuit in
18 Inukjuak received one of highest levels of income from
19 handicrafts in the Eastern Arctic in the 1950s.
20 Within a matter of a few years, the Port
21 Harrison district, as it was then known, was no longer
22 labelled "overpopulated" and in fact became relatively
23 prosperous. That was a better life. But the relocatees,

1 who included among them, as Mr. Ploughman and the records
2 have informed us, a number of excellent carvers, did not
3 experience that better life because they were separated
4 from their homeland.
5 For five years, I have been in search
6 of the facts and the truth, however difficult it may be
7 to find 40 years after the event. I have listened to the
8 relocatees in their homes for many hours telling me of
9 their experiences as a result of being moved to the High
10 Arctic. And I reached the conclusion, as the
11 Commissioners may have done after hearing the Inuit
12 testimonies in April, that the people did suffer as a result
13 of the relocation. This, I believe, is a fact.
14 Perhaps the controversy surrounding the
15 claim for $10 million in compensation has clouded and
16 served to further politicize the issue. But when a person
17 suffers as a result of an external act of intervention,
18 compensation is a natural process. Some critics have
19 suggested that clever lawyers and a $10 million pot of
20 gold have induced the relocatees to act out tales of
21 hardship.
22 We have heard critics suggest that those
23 Inuit testifying today were only children at the time of

the move, and have been influenced by events. This is part of the myth surrounding the controversy.

Yet the Commissioners have had to repeatedly point out to witnesses at different times during the last few days that that was not the case at the April hearings, and that in fact there were 10 or 12 elders who appeared who were adults at the time of the relocation. And, what about those relocatees who have testified who were children or teenagers at the time of the move -- have forty years colluded their memories -- or is it not the case that children can suffer too? And that children or teenagers who experienced difficult circumstances, such as permanent separation from their families and friends, or hardship and cold, can carry those experiences for the rest of their lives? Of course they can, that is a fact.

But, we are told, these are Eskimos. They are used to the cold. They are used to migrating long distances. Hardship and uncertain survival were their lot in life. We were only trying to do the best thing for them. This is where I believe there are, in effect, two truths.

In my discussions with the planners of the relocation and the RCMP constables responsible for

supervision of the relocatees, I have been struck by the integrity of the individuals and the sincerity of their motivation to implement the relocation for "the common good of the people".

We have heard presentations from various people over the last few days -- men from the Department of Northern Affairs who were based in Ottawa, like Ben Sivertz, Gordon Robertson, and Graham Rowley, or Henry Larsen, as we heard his thoughts told by his son Gordon, or the constables in the field, Bob Pilot and Ross Gibson. There is no doubting their sincerity, I believe, when they said they were acting in what they thought were the best interests of the people.

But what they believed to be in the best interests of the people and what was actually in their best interests as the Inuit saw it are two different things.

I do not believe that officials set out to deceive, to coerce, or to cause the hardship that we have heard the Inuit experienced. They wanted to help them. And yet, where does that leave us? On the one hand, we have people of authority who wanted to do good, who planned and carried out the relocation, and, on the other hand, we have people who have suffered for forty years,

in some cases, as a result of those actions. It's no wonder that this issue is confusing.

But I would argue, that you can have people acting for what they believe to be the best intentions, and yet, people suffer as a result. This is the argument for two truths.

Ross Gibson told us that he thought, "I was working for the Inuit." I was struck by that comment. Bob Pilot told us on Monday of when he was a senior official with the Territorial government in the early 1970s and became aware that people wanted to move back to Inukjuak. He tried to do the right thing, to facilitate their relocation back to Inukjuak. But it wasn't so easy. What happened? Reality got in the way: Bureaucracy blocked good intentions. As Pilot said, "the federal government and I nickled and dimed each other to death".

But some he was able to move back; others remained. But that was the 1970s and not the 1950s. Most of the people were not assisted by the government to move back until 1988. That was 15 years after Bob Pilot learned of the wish of some people to do so. If it could happen in the 1970s that moving back to Inukjuak was made so difficulty, we can imagine how much more difficult it was

in the 1950s to obtain permission and assistance to move back to Inukjuak.

The Inuit have told us that they wanted to move back from the start -- from the first dark winter when they were hungry and cold and missing their friends and extended families, and their homeland in Quebec. Yes, they were Inuit who could survive one of the severest environments on earth, as their ancestors had done, but they were human beings too. And it was then, as it is now, a natural human response to miss the place you know and the people you know.

They wanted to go home, but they couldn't. They had been placed, for whatever good intentions, in a location from which they physically could not return to their homeland without the benevolent assistance of the government. They were beholden completely to the government and its officials. This is a fact.

It may not be useful to point fingers at who was right and who was wrong, but let's face reality. The Inuit were separated from the officials in Ottawa who now controlled their destiny. They were separated by geographical distance, separated by language, separated

by cultural differences. This had two results. It insulated those small Inuit communities at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord from contact with the outside world, and it insulated the well-meaning officials in Ottawa who were of the assumption that everything was working out just fine with their High Arctic relocation experiment. In other words, it insulated those Ottawa officials from the reality of the hardships those Inuit were experiencing. I believe that to be a fact.

The reality was that as the Inuit have told us, and as Ross Gibson informed me, "it was so cold, dark and miserable that first winter, that if the Port Harrison people had been able to go home, they would have done so". In effect, the government created a grand experiment to relocate Inuit to the High Arctic where they could be self-reliant happy hunters once again, free from the temptation of white man's hand-outs, and yet the people could not go home on their own. That was the basic flaw of the entire project.

Somehow, not one of the planners recorded his concern that the relocatees would not be able to go home on their own. Commissioner Wilson was incredulous, it appeared to me, when she interviewed Ross

1 Gibson on Monday, when told by him that not one of the
2 Inuit chosen for the relocation had apparently asked him,
3 "What if?" "What if I want to go home?"
4 So what happened? The relocation plan,
5 in effect, offered the Inuit a one-way ticket on the C.D.
6 Howe to a foreign land from which there was no return.
7 Co-Chairman Dussault said yesterday
8 that the Commission hoped by holding these hearings to
9 help the Canadian public to understand what had happened
10 in the relocation, in light of the conflicting views.
11 It would be a bonus if these hearings would allow both
12 sides to come closer to a conciliation.
13 In closing, I would like to say that I
14 have presented what I believe to be some of the salient
15 facts in this issue, which served to explain, I hope, why
16 there are, in effect, two truths. But differences in
17 opinion have not kept the two parties from finally coming
18 together, and those differences need not prevent the
19 Canadian government and the Inuit from reaching a solution.
20 Thank you.
21 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** Thank you. I
22 will start asking some questions.
23 You spoke of this being viewed by you

as a social reform, an experiment in social reform or social engineering, and that the human point of view was not the main purpose. I think you referred to a statement made earlier this week by Gordon Robertson saying, "Well, it was 95 per cent for human purposes."

I just want to be clear because you went on to discuss what is the better life. When you say that from your examination and analysis from the documents that you feel that the human purpose was not paramount by far, it was more a desire to experiment all kinds of things that you enumerated --

ALAN MARCUS: That's right.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: -- did I understood you correctly when you said that the human purpose was barely there? Is that too strong or is that what you told us?

ALAN MARCUS: Obviously it is a complex issue.

My feeling is that it was largely a political response to the great overwhelming concern that the Canadian public and, indeed, the people overseas expressed about the way in which the Canadian government in the early 1950s were treating their Inuit population.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: So a response to external factors more than a response to living conditions that were the situation of Inuit people in Inukjuak Quebec?

ALAN MARCUS: Yes, that's correct. I think it is the fact that while the Department had labelled the region as "overpopulated". There were no cases of starvation in that area in the time.

There were in other parts of the Arctic where a humanitarian gesture in the form of resettlement might have been appropriate, but in that particular incident, I do not believe that that was in fact the overriding motivation, no.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: If we move to the related question of what is a better life, the implication -- and I think it is quite clear in the documentation that one of the major purposes was to enable people to return to a self-sufficient way of living. Of course, the best interest of anybody is not something easy to assess. We all know that.

Again, is your assessment made in the context of the situation that was in existence in 1953 or how do you avoid looking today at those things and

1 putting our view to a situation that was quite different
2 in the early fifties because that is what we were told
3 as to how the Arctic was in the early fifties and that
4 it is difficult for somebody who has not witnessed that
5 firsthand to really understand what it is was and what
6 the conditions were?
7 So how did you take that into account
8 in your assessment of the whole event?
9 **ALAN MARCUS:** I hope so. I certainly
10 tried to do so.
11 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** By what
12 methodology or what did you do to prevent yourself from
13 looking at it from a perspective of 1990? Is there a way,
14 a method? I am asking you this because it is a concern
15 that we have.
16 **ALAN MARCUS:** Yes, of course, and I
17 think it is a vital concern. It is too easy to judge the
18 past from the eyes of the present.
19 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** So the
20 standard.
21 **ALAN MARCUS:** Yes.
22 But having said that, for me, I could
23 not have done this research based, for example, solely

on archival evidence. It was crucial to me to go and meet not only the Native peoples involved who are still alive, but also as many government civil servants, including those people who have appeared before you in the last two days and many others who had no part in the relocation but had, in fact, come into contact with the groups in the 1950s to try to get a sense with an open mind as to what were the conditions prevailing at the time.

The whole issue of self-reliance is an interesting one. Certainly there was the view at the time that in the Port Harrison district there was a problem with self-sufficiency, but I would suggest that that was largely due to extraordinary circumstances because in the case of the time period in question in the early 1950s, the Inuit economy was based almost exclusively on the white fox fur. After the war, the price of fur crashed from a high of around $25 a pelt to a low of maybe $3.50 a pelt.

Well, something happened at the same time. Family allowances were introduced in the north and to the Inuit in the late forties and the government increased the relief to the Inuit as well.

I feel that what essentially happened is that the Inuit's buying power that they had enjoyed

for some years at the Hudson's Bay Company store, for example, in Port Harrison was weakened considerably by the crash in the price of fur, but was supplemented by the coincidental family allowance credits which were given and the increased levels of government relief.

What that did is that it established, I think, a very interesting relationship between the government of Canada -- and specifically the Department of Northern Affairs, Resources and Development, as it was then in 1953 -- between the government and the Inuit. I think it developed an exchange relationship, that, in effect, it was something that hadn't happened before.

I give you money in the form of hand-outs, as it was called, and I think that family allowances at this time, because they were so new to the north, and relief were collectively seen by officials as hand-outs. I give you money and I expect something in return and it gives me a rationale for doing certain things. In this case, we are thinking of a relocation experiment and wanting to recruit you to go on board.

Now, the government didn't have that form of exchange relationship prior to this period from, say, the late 1940s, 1949, into the early 1950s. Because,

at the same time, you had such a political outburst, so many letters to the Prime Minister and the minister about Farley Mowat's book and other publications, Richard Harrington, there was a real concern that something had to be done. This was the Eskimo problem. The Eskimo problem was rising relief benefits, dependency on welfare, poor health, an unstable fur-based economy. Something had to be done.

The Port Harrison district consistently had the highest levels because it had one of the highest concentrations of Native peoples in the eastern Arctic.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: In your discussion with the Inuit people involved or the relocatees, did you discuss about a genuine desire by young people at the time to really have resumed the life of hunters and trappers that they had? This was expressed to us in April, that there was the kind of life that they were not happy to be dependent. They were very much looking forward to the possibility of a good life in hunting and trapping.

So did you -- you have met with many of them. How do you distinguish that because we were told, "Of course, it was with the promise to return"? So it

was not necessarily seen in the whole picture, but could you expand on that?

ALAN MARCUS: I think there is something very important to be taken into consideration when talking about self-sufficiency and self-reliance in this case, and that is the difference between hunting and trapping.

In this case, the government was giving relief benefits largely because of a lack in the proceeds from income from trapping fur, but the people who were moved, although they were described in documents and by Ross Gibson as all being dependent on relief, that doesn't mean to say that these people weren't excellent hunters and that hunting was not a difficulty for them in obtaining food for their families.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: We had a discussion yesterday about the Eskimo Loan Fund. Could you tell us what is your understanding of what was the situation?

We were told that this created a debt to the Inuit and it was one of the reasons why for many years afterwards they weren't paid in cash whatsoever. It was put against the debt that they had acquired.

Could you tell us from your research what

is your view on the purpose and the specifics of this fund?

ALAN MARCUS: The Eskimo Loan Fund was a peculiar beast. The intricacies of how the fund actually worked, particularly in the early years, were, I think, a mystery not only to me but to some officials at Northern Affairs at the time. They certainly expressed that to me.

The purpose of the Eskimo Loan Fund created, I believe, in 1952 was to financially assist Inuit to improve their economic wellbeing, but it was used in a certain sort of way. For example, the first loans of the Eskimo Loan Fund were made for this resettlement, three $5,000 loans to the three places where they were going. Of course, they were originally destined to go to three locations, including Alexandra Fiord.

As well, a loan was made -- I think several loans were made at the same period in the early 1950s to the Banks Islanders so that the government could help to financially assist them to resettle from the MacKenzie Delta on to Banks Island, a similar idea although, of course, vastly differently because they had skooners and they could do so of their own volition, whereas in the case of the people we are talking about, the

government actually had to provide transport.

But in that case on Banks Island, the Department was not able to get the Hudson's Bay Company to open a post there largely due to the success of Fred Carpenter, a very well known Inuk of the Bank Islanders, at trading his furs directly with the fur auction and thereby passing the middle men which was the Hudson's Bay Company.

So the government, in order to encourage the Inuit to repopulate Banks Island, hopefully permanently, used the Eskimo Loan Fund to help to provide financial assistance. The difficulty with the Eskimo Loan Fund in the case of the stores established at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord is that while it was originally conceived as sort of a co-operative arrangement such that the names of the loans for those two stores were in the names of Inuit, one was Ahistosik (PH.) who was called "Fatty" on the Eskimo Loan Fund form to self and the other one was Sudlivinik in Resolute Bay.

So the thought was perhaps by the designers in Ottawa that these Inuit could essentially become the shopkeepers and the accountants of these stores and manage their own affairs and certainly Henry Larsen

1 was very keen on the idea of the Inuit being able to
2 establish co-operatives from this period and not to have
3 to deal with the Hudson's Bay Company store.
4 Unfortunately, of course, it didn't work
5 that way as you perhaps have already heard. In the case
6 of Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord, there were incidents
7 particularly at Resolute Bay where people were supposed
8 to be paid for items and I found a number of receipts to
9 this effect.
10 People were supposed to be paid, for
11 example, for work that was done for a geological survey
12 teams and others that came up to Resolute. The cheques
13 were paid to the Department. The Department paid it into
14 the Eskimo Loan Fund, but it paid it into the general
15 account for the store and it was not credited at least
16 in the very early years to the individual accounts. That
17 would explain why it was that people are complaining today
18 that they did not receive payment for services.
19 The same thing happened, as I believe
20 I overheard Shelagh Grant mentioning this morning, that
21 the officers were given, I believe by James Cantley, a
22 former Hudson's Bay Company fur trade Commissioner and
23 Chief of the Arctic Division in the early fifties before

1 Ben Sivertz took over -- that prices would be set for furs
2 at the stores.
3 The furs then would be sent out by the
4 policemen. James Cantley would handle the sale of the
5 furs at the fur auction in Winnipeg, but what would happen
6 in a number of cases is that they would realize a greater
7 sum than the initial price that had been credited to those
8 Inuit. That surplus amount was credited to the particular
9 loan, but it was not credited to the individuals. That
10 was another problem of the Eskimo Loan Fund.
11 So you had cases with Resolute Bay and
12 Grise Fiord loans where considerable profits were being
13 realized even from the early years, principally from fox,
14 but those profits weren't actually being returned to the
15 people as it was originally, I suppose, in the early days
16 of conceiving these establishments. Profits weren't
17 return to the individuals. Essentially, the fund was used
18 as a revolving fund to advance purchase supplies for the
19 next year.
20 So it was a bit of a muddle until things
21 changed in the early sixties and those stores became
22 co-operatives.
23 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** Thank you.

1 This fund, as you have said, was under
2 the name of a member of the community and that was a problem
3 also because of the possible ownership and it was part
4 of the decision to move toward a co-operative form.
5 Are you aware of a situation where --
6 you mentioned two cases where the money was not returned
7 specifically to the people. When you say it went into
8 the general account, it was indeed the general account
9 of the fund itself.
10 **ALAN MARCUS:** No, I would say it was in
11 -- as far as I can see, it was in the general fund for
12 that particular loan.
13 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** Against that
14 loan.
15 **ALAN MARCUS:** That's right. Although
16 I have found a number of records relating to those loans,
17 they are sparse and it is difficult to actually pinpoint
18 throughout those early years precisely what was happening.
19 But certainly one gets a general impression.
20 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** This was
21 mentioned this morning, the auction sale that was higher
22 and the price was not returned, but my question was exactly
23 this one: If you were aware of the different loans, is

there any record that you have come across of the loans in the fund itself because it was for a different purpose for what loans were made, if I understand correctly the system?

ALAN MARCUS: There certainly are documents relating to the Eskimo Loan Fund which identify throughout this period in the fifties who the loans were made to and what the balances were on all of the loans, yes.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: These were individual loans.

ALAN MARCUS: That's correct.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: We are not talking about the loans that were made for the group.

ALAN MARCUS: That's just it. They weren't made to the group. That's right. That was the difficulty. When Ahitusuk (PH.) or "Fatty", as he was called in the records, died eight months after the move, there was a considerable difficulty for the Department because legally his widow as entitled to that surplus.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Thank you.

Bertha Wilson, please.

COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON: Thank you.

1 When government policy is not
2 articulated at the highest level, as seems to have been
3 the case here -- Mr. Robertson stressed the matter never
4 came before Cabinet. It was discussed at that level --
5 I am wondering how a researcher like yourself proceeds
6 to ascertain what the government policy was. Do you
7 ascertain it by looking at what those who had the
8 responsibility for implementing it did -- that is, the
9 government agents, the RCMP and so on -- and then draw
10 inferences from that as to what the government policy must
11 have been? I am just curious as to what kind of process.
12 Obviously it is in the public interest that government
13 policy be clearly indicated. In fact, it is surely
14 essential so that the public can understand or appreciate
15 and assess the government's performance.
16 I am just wondering because I suppose
17 this is why we have had to hear from so many individuals.
18 The only way, it seems to me, that we can glean what the
19 policy must have been is through what they did. This is
20 a fairly difficult and, to me, unfortunate process and
21 I am wondering what you as a researcher does. Is that
22 the process you engage in? Look at what people, in fact,
23 who are carrying out presumably the policy, what they did

1 and then infer from that what the policy must have been?
2 Is that the process?
3 **ALAN MARCUS:** I think we are talking
4 about two things here. I believe Gordon Robertson's
5 remark is made in reference to the sovereignty issue when
6 he said that the question never came up in Cabinet. I
7 may be mistaken.
8 **COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON:** That would
9 be part of the policy. That would explain or be basic,
10 would it not, to the policy, what the reasoning was?
11 **ALAN MARCUS:** There are several
12 different things here. In terms of departmental policy
13 and Northern Affairs, there is substantial documentation,
14 tens and thousands of files at every level in that
15 bureaucracy from the field officers, once they were
16 actually appointed later on in the fifties, all the way
17 up to the Chief and the Director of Lands Administration,
18 Deputy Ministers and whatnot, and indeed documents and
19 Deputy Ministerial files from the Minister. So there is
20 substantial documentation relating to policy matters
21 within the Department of Northern Affairs.
22 Sovereignty issues are slightly
23 different, undoubtedly, because they certainly did concern

1 Northern Affairs and particularly the Advisory Committee
2 on Northern Development which Gramham Rowley was the
3 secretary. A number of policy-related issues concerning
4 de facto sovereignty in them -- waterways or whatever --
5 came before that committee and those records are available.
6 The advantage I had, I believe, in
7 talking with people, whether it was on the sovereignty
8 issue, people like R.H.A. Phillips or Gordon Robertson
9 or Ben Sivertz or others, was being able to once having
10 looked at various documents to bring them with me and to
11 discuss them at great length and to get their feedback.
12 I thought these were documents often relating to those
13 individuals and it was extremely helpful in trying to
14 interpret departmental policy and broader government
15 policy.
16 **COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON:** What
17 prompted me to ask the question was that I guess there
18 was a reference -- I think it was in Mr. Gunther's report
19 -- to the fact that Mr. Sivertz was a fifth level civil
20 servant. It seems to me that you get into that sort of
21 thing when you can't find any enunciated policy at the
22 top level.
23 **ALAN MARCUS:** In that particular case,

Ben Sivertz in August 1953 -- that perhaps Mr. Gunther was referring to regarding this meeting which is often quoted which was held on the 10th of August of 1953 at the time of the relocation.

Mr. Sivertz enjoyed a special position in respect to the Deputy Minister and was, perhaps to some extent, outside of the stratified bureaucracy of the Department at that time.

Of course, then he became shortly thereafter Chief of the Arctic Division, Director of the Lands Branch.

COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON: Thank you.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Commissioner Sillett, please.

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: Thank you very much. Just one question.

You said that the relatives of the relocatees in Inukjuak -- they didn't do that badly following the period of relocation. So I was interested in asking you: Do you have any information which would tell us how the Inuit in Inukjuak lived and the Inuit in the High Arctic lived following the relocation? For example, you talked about economic conditions, but do you

have any idea about how they faired with respect to education and health with their relatives remaining in Inukjuak?

ALAN MARCUS: Again, it is complex and I wasn't there and it is really difficult for me to say without having had firsthand knowledge. I can on speculate from what people have said and documents that I have read.

In terms of the amenities that people have focused on, like, for example, the well provision store at Port Harrison with a much greater variety of supplies than those that were created in Resolute and Grise, or the school or the nursing station or the church -- yes, those services were available there and it took a long time for them to become available in Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord.

In Resolute Bay in terms of schooling, we have had in the audience the first teacher. She was a teenager at the time, Lea Idlow, who helped the children teaching. In fact, a number of photographs were taken by the Department of her and much was made at the time that she was helping those children at Resolute Bay with their studies.

1 But it wasn't until later in the 1950s
2 -- in the case of Resolute Bay, right around 1959 -- or
3 into the early sixties in the case of Grise Fiord that
4 schools were actually created and qualified teachers were
5 brought to those communities.
6 In terms of quality of life, though, life
7 with one's kinship groups, life living on a land that you
8 know, that, I feel, perhaps in this case, was far more
9 important. Really, it is extremely difficult to put any
10 sort of evaluation on the difference between being
11 separated from that life that you knew in Inukjuak and
12 the one that you essentially had no choice but to live
13 in Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord.
14 **COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT:** I guess the
15 reason that I ask that question -- I did remember in April
16 hearing someone saying that when they left, their education
17 had been interrupting and saying that, "My friend finished
18 school. I never had that chance." I heard people saying,
19 "I had no friends when I went to Grise Fiord and my cousin
20 did."
21 I have found that we haven't focused on
22 that question very much and I was just wondering if you
23 had that kind of information.

1 **ALAN MARCUS:** Certainly, that is
2 exactly what I was told as well and some people told me
3 that they were in school. The C.D. Howe came. They were
4 put onboard the boat with their families and when they
5 reached the new communities, of course, there was no
6 schooling at all.
7 They expressed to me the same concern
8 that they weren't able to benefit from the teaching of
9 Majorie Hinds in Port Harrison or the teacher who replaced
10 her -- from that education, certainly, yes.
11 Others have spoken of how much they
12 missed best friends, people they were related to Inukjuak.
13 Others have spoken of missing certain things, very
14 personal things, too -- particular areas of the land,
15 missing certain berries that they used to eat in Inukjuak
16 which weren't available to them at Resolute Bay.
17 I think one of the most interesting books
18 which has come out recently is by Mark Nuttal entitled
19 "Arctic Homeland". He has a chapter discussing
20 "memoryscape", the knowledge that Inuit have for a
21 particular landscape and the associations they have of
22 hunting experiences and family experiences which have
23 taken place in that landscape. They are very much rooted

1 to that landscape.
2 In the minds of the planners of the
3 relocation or the field constables involved, my impression
4 from my discussions from them is at the time they viewed
5 the Arctic as the Arctic, as white, barren and that the
6 Eskimo was an Eskimo and that they didn't necessarily
7 differentiate between particular people and their need
8 to live in a particular land and the knowledge that they
9 had for that particular land, especially when times were
10 difficult in terms of knowledge of hunting.
11 They had none of this when they moved
12 to Ellesmere Island and Cornwallis Island. It was
13 completely foreign, despite the help that was offered to
14 them and which was undoubtedly very necessary from the
15 Pond Inlet Inuit. They had no sense of association of
16 the landscape there whatsoever. It was a foreign place.
17 It was a completely different place.
18 **COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT:** Thank
19 you.
20 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** Commissioner
21 Chartrand, please.
22 **COMMISSIONER PAUL CHARTRAND:** Thank
23 you.

1 Thank you, Mr. Marcus, for your
2 presentation. I have read some time ago your publication
3 and many of the other documents, and I would like to ask
4 you one question and I hope you will be indulgent with
5 me if I have misunderstood the substance of your work.
6 I would like to invite your assistance in furthering my
7 understanding of our work.
8 It occurred to me -- and I said this in
9 April at the earlier hearings -- that in the circumstances
10 of this relocation, the Inuit people did not have the usual
11 safeguards in a free and democratic country whereby the
12 performance of government is assessed. They had, we were
13 told, no access to the franchise, no vote, no effective
14 access to the courts. There were no Inuit ombudsmen.
15 We are in a situation today, it appears,
16 where we are being asked, in a sense, or invited to assess
17 government actions in retrospect in circumstances where
18 the normal modes of assessment were absent at the time.
19 I am concerned about the matter which
20 has already been raised and that is of the apparent need
21 -- and I say "apparent" because I am going to ask your
22 view on it -- to create a 1950s lens to do our work in
23 order to assess the performance of government.

1 So I am going to ask your scholarly
2 opinion with respect to the question of assessing the
3 hardship, the admitted hardship -- it seems to me they
4 are admitted hardships -- to determine if a wrong occurred
5 of a kind to which the state of Canada now ought to respond.
6 I will phrase it that way and I will invite you to correct
7 the description if you believe it is necessary.
8 You are urging us -- and this is a part
9 of the question. I am asking if you are urging us that
10 in striving to assess the hardships to determine if a wrong
11 of a kind to which Canada ought to respond in fact occurred
12 we ought to put on one side the admitted sincerity -- you
13 referred to the motives of the individuals concerned.
14 I want to make sure that you are advising us that we ought
15 to put that to the side, that they are not relevant. We
16 should admit the sincerity and, on the other hand, look
17 at the admitted hardships.
18 I am asking you that because I would like
19 your view as a scholar as to whether then you believe that
20 it is our duty to develop the appropriate 1950s lens with
21 which to make that assessment. I say that because I notice
22 on page 77 in your conclusions that you include a reference
23 to breaches of human rights, but I am not able to discern

that the conclusion is based on an argument of yours.

I am saying, then: Are you then inviting us to complete the crafting of what I have called the 1950s lens? That is the relevant standard. I hope I have phrased my question in a way that it makes it understandable and I would be happy to try to rephrase it in a shorter summary, if you wish.

ALAN MARCUS: Right. Well, I am not a legal scholar.

COMMISSIONER PAUL CHARTRAND: May I clarify that?

I was not suggesting that you ought to use a legal standard. I was only asking if you thought that a standard was appropriate.

ALAN MARCUS: It is a difficult question. Undoubtedly, perhaps one of the most difficult questions that there is to consider having accepted that the planners of the relocation, many of the field officers acted with the best of intentions and were men of great sincerity and high moral values, but that the people involved, the Inuit, nevertheless suffered, as indeed they did, I believe.

I believe that there are certain

fundamental assumptions that we need to make when it comes to considering what are called human rights. For me, in this case, it regards just one thing and that was the very act of placing a people on a boat, of transporting them to a land far away, of making them a promise that they could come back, but of their not being able to do so physically on their own and, for whatever reasons, the government not doing so.

I believe, though I am not a legal scholar, that this was a fundamental human right that was violated. In fact, the Inuit relocatees were, for want of a better word, incarcerated, contained on islands in the High Arctic and that they had no choice once they were on the boat and that they were not able to come home by any means that was within their ability to do so.

COMMISSIONER PAUL CHARTRAND: Thank you for that explanation.

Is it fair to derive from your work and from what you say that your examination of the facts offends your sense of justice? You referred to this belief and to these fundamental assumptions and that in order for us to assess the government policy, we need to explain why it is that your sense of justice is offended.

1 You see, there were other relocations
2 in Canada as well and I am concerned to ask whether one
3 can in fact develop such a particularistic notion of
4 justice as to be able to make a determination of one set
5 of facts which would not apply to another set of facts
6 and are we to develop a particularistic notion of justice
7 on each particular set of facts.
8 So this is the nature of the difficulty
9 that partly faces us. But I do believe I understand what
10 you have said. I characterize is as a sense or belief
11 that you have from your serious examination of the facts
12 that an injustice of a kind that you referred as human
13 rights, but for our purposes it appears that we would have
14 to develop the substance of it.
15 Thank you very much. You may wish to
16 add a comment, but I do want to offer my thanks.
17 **ALAN MARCUS:** Yes, thank you.
18 I would only say that that is the very
19 considerable responsibility of this Commission and I wish
20 you very well in taking on that task.
21 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** Georges
22 Erasmus, please.
23

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Thank you.

Could we go back to the Eskimo Loan Fund. How many loans were involved in this venture? I am starting to gather that there were three loans to assist in the relocation and then there were at least two for the two separate trading stores. So that is about five. Is that correct? Are there more or less?

ALAN MARCUS: Initially, there were only three, one to each store, and each was in the name of the designated camp boss.

Because the Alexandra Fiord detachment -- because the people in the end were not relocated to Alexandra Fiord, I don't believe that that third loan was used or used very substantially. So essentially in the end you were left with two loans -- one to Grise Fiord and one for Resolute Bay.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: You are not really sure what happened to that third $5,000 loan.

ALAN MARCUS: Not off the top of my head.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: When we were being presented with information from Shelagh Grant, her opinion in relation to this surplus that you were responding to with René Dussault a few minutes ago was

that she didn't think that that had ever been credited back to the store's account. In your document -- I think it is yours -- at page 39, you quote Fraser:

"In the case, concern has been expressed because the profit from the annual operation of the Eskimo trading stores has not been returned to the Eskimos. We now understand that this cannot be done because of the unusual circumstances whereby the trading stores were established."

I am getting the impression that you are also saying the same thing, but what does that mean?

ALAN MARCUS: In this case, Fraser was saying the same thing.

As they say, it is a quagmire. The amounts were probably credited to the individual loan for that -- not for that community, but for the store and, for example, Resolute Bay. But it was not credited back individually to people. In other words, that money they never saw at all.

The government, as far as I am aware, the Department used those funds as a revolving account

in order to advance purchase supplies for the following and, in some cases, of course, there was still a profit, a surplus credited to that individual account.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Have you seen this letter that was quoted earlier, the 20th of April 1960? It is to Coombs from G.B. Warner. It is about the Eskimo trading store at Grise Fiord and it outlines the specific amounts. You must have in relation to having --

ALAN MARCUS: It could be. I would have to look at it, actually, to --

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: It talks about so many white fox sold at $15, so man others sold at $18 and then some sold at $20, the total amount being $6,000, and then the auction being $17,953 and the difference being $11,000 and so forth.

You are citing the figures fairly closely there and so I guess you must have seen it.

It seems from this that the constable was suggesting that in fact the trappers had not been refunded.

ALAN MARCUS: Again, I would have to take a look at it, but that could well be the case.

1 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** You talk
2 about in 1956 there having been concerns at a meeting in
3 Resolute Bay. Could you explain that? I haven't heard
4 about this meeting before.
5 **ALAN MARCUS:** That is actually also in
6 my monograph. I don't know what page it is on, but it
7 is in there.
8 That was, I think, to my mind, a crucial
9 meeting because that meeting was held at a period of three
10 years after the move -- so at the very time when this two
11 or three-year promise was supposed to come due.
12 That meeting was attended, as I
13 mentioned, by the Department's officer in charge of Eastern
14 Arctic Patrol, Jackson, and also by Ross Gibson and
15 Superintendent Henry Larsen. At that meeting, as Jackson
16 recalls in his patrol report to the officials at the
17 Department in Ottawa above him -- it may well have been
18 Ben Sivertz -- the Inuit, all the men of whom were present,
19 spoke of wanting to go back to Inukjuak.
20 He says, as far as I can recall, that
21 they wanted to go back for visits, they said, but I think
22 one has to remember that it was this gentleman and not
23 the Inuit themselves who were recording this meeting which

1 was held. It was therefore his interpretation of their
2 request. Whether or not they actually requested to go
3 back permanently or whether they actually requested to
4 go back for visits, certainly it is another world. It
5 is impossible to peg down. What he states is that they
6 went back. They wanted to go back for visits.
7 But what it meant to me is that those
8 Inuit men, all of whom were present at the meeting in
9 Resolute Bay, expressed a concern to go back to Inukjuak
10 for whatever purposes. They expressed a concern at the
11 very time that this promise was to have come due.
12 In his report, J.C. Jackson acknowledges
13 that the Inuit told him undoubtedly through the interpreter
14 who was present that they thought they had been made a
15 promise of return, but what J.C. Jackson told his superiors
16 was that since he had no knowledge of a promise being made,
17 he informed them of that. He suggested to his superiors
18 that if no promise had been made, that the Inuit should
19 pay their own way back.
20 Now, of course, that was impossible at
21 the time and it wasn't a cash economy at the time. It
22 was credited on the store. They didn't have the funds
23 and there wasn't the commercial transport for them to get

on board a plane should they have had the funds to go back to Inukjuak.

But what I think is significant is the fact that it is recorded at that very time in 1956 at the annual inspection of that camp, that they expressed a desire to go home and that that desire went up the ladder to the senior people at the Department of Northern Affairs, the Director, for example.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: When the report got to Ottawa about the particular constable not knowing about the promise, did someone from headquarters respond back and say, "There is an agreement if these people want to go back," as we have been very clearly told here repeatedly, "that they could go back, that this was an experiment"?

ALAN MARCUS: Firstly, he wasn't a constable. He was called the officer in charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol. In fact, he was one of the officials working for the Department of Northern Affairs and they, at various times, took turns being the officer in charge. For example, Cantley or Stevenson, at various times, were the officers in charge.

I was unable to find any memos at all

relating to the response, if there was a response, to this report. This, after all, wasn't a memo as far as I can recall. It was the annual Eastern Arctic Patrol report. So this was on some page within perhaps a 20-page document about the annual Eastern Arctic Patrol. So there wouldn't necessarily have been a responding memo.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: In the interviews that you have had with the Inuit, did you check and see what their impression of this particular meeting was, what they said?

ALAN MARCUS: What they informed me was that they had from the beginning said to officials that they wanted to go home, that they did express their wish to go home and that they did so from the early years.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Could you tell us your view of the type of families that were chosen? We have been getting different types of views on what actually took place.

ALAN MARCUS: Of course, that is a very sensitive issue because while Majorie Hinds prepared a dossier on every single individual that Ross Gibson selected to go and she described every single individual -- and there are other reports, police reports on a number

of the individuals who were selected -- I don't feel that it is my right to go into those personal details. But certainly those documents are available and I couldn't certainly make available copies of those documents to the Commission.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: All right.

ALAN MARCUS: The overall impression was that these were people who were dependent on relief at this time and that these people who were not necessarily the best hunters or trappers, rather, and not necessarily the worst trappers, but perhaps people in the middle.

But, again, it is so subjective. It doesn't necessarily mean whatsoever that these were the characters of the individuals involved. These were perspectives which were written down by white officials who may or may not have had a command for the language, but they were not Inuit and they were making subjective decisions about the characters of those individuals.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: We are interested in a section of your report that talks about -- these were kind of like advanced pioneer colonies, forerunners of things to come if it was successful and that some officials seemed to have had ideas of starting

other colonies in the north if in fact these were successful.

Could you express your views on that?

ALAN MARCUS: Yes. From the very outset, it was described as a forerunner and it was from the very outset described as an experiment. Should the experiment prove successful, further relocations to the Queen Elizabeths Islands could be undertaken.

In the press reports in the major Canadian newspapers, headlines screamed that this would be a forerunner of potential future Eskimo repopulations of the Far North. Through the 1950s, the feasibility was discussed certainly by the Director of the Northern Administration and Lands Branch at the Department at that level.

What happened was that after the move in 1953, the Department became concerned that it did not know precisely what was the availability of game in the areas of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay and that resource studies should be undertaken.

When the idea for moving people again in 1955 came, only a certain number of people were moved. Later on, it was decided that no more people should be

1 moved until these resources studies had been done -- not
2 by the Department of Northern Affairs, but by the Wildlife
3 Service. Even as late as 1960, it was still being
4 considered at the Director level of the Department at least
5 that further Inuit colonies could be created in the Queen
6 Elizabeth Islands.
7 They discovered that area resource
8 surveys hadn't been done and they were shortly done
9 thereafter. However, by that time, around 1960, things
10 had changed completely and by then it was decided -- the
11 movement was to do the reverse, to move Inuit off the land
12 and into settlements, as occurred, and centralization of
13 the Inuit in the 1960s.
14 In so doing, you were providing them with
15 rather expensive services and it would have been foolhardy
16 to have created further colonies at the northernmost areas
17 in the High Arctic where transportation costs would have
18 been prohibitive. So it was deemed by that point no longer
19 necessary to pursue further colonization as it was
20 described with the High Arctic archipelago.
21 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Do you feel
22 that yourself to the reasoning for the move originally
23 and the consideration of moving more people up there?

What do you believe the reason for these colonies were?

ALAN MARCUS: The million dollar question.

As I have said, my feeling is that there was a keen desire on the part of the government to further Canadianize the northernmost islands. As I have said, those detachments on Ellesmere Island were put there, as Bob Pilot has said, for one purpose alone -- even if it was for the small amount of policing action to keep Greenlanders from hunting muskox on Ellesmere Island.

The purpose of those detachments were that they should serve as flag detachments, that they should show the flag, that they should be symbols of a Canadian presence and administration in that area of the High Arctic. It is without a doubt that these relocations were part and parcel of the same ideology and that without those two detachments, this idea would never have gotten off the ground.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Thank you.

In relation to your section called lack of services, we have been told by others and have read that in fact everyone was given an x-ray and medical check-up, everyone moving north. How could it be that

Marcus, as you mentioned here, possibly could have been spitting up blood, actually had tuberculosis, as was described, virtually most of the year at least prior to this? How would it have been possible that he could have had an x-ray and an examination and not actually been put up.

Secondarily, how would it be possible that once they did arrive in the north and his situation seemed to have gotten worse that it was yet another full year before he was actually flown out to get service when at Resolute I am sure there were flights there fairly regularly?

ALAN MARCUS: I think that is question that relates very much to the context of the times. Today, of course, such an event wouldn't take place, but back then things were, of course, extremely different.

According to official reports, the x-ray machine was either not on board the C.D. Howe or not operating at the time that it went to Port Harrison. It may have been put on board when the ship went across Hudson Bay to Churchill, but by that time, Marcus Ipatsug (PH.) may well not have been x-rayed because those people had already received, supposedly, some form of medical

1 examination at Port Harrison, although they did not receive
2 at that time an x-ray at all.
3 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** You are
4 quite clear on that, that there were no x-rays in Port
5 Harrison at this time.
6 **ALAN MARCUS:** That's correct. It is in
7 the monogram. There are two reports which corroborate
8 the fact, including one my Majorie Hinds who was extremely
9 upset at the fact that those x-rays weren't able to be
10 carried out at Port Harrison and she berated her superiors
11 at the Department to that extent.
12 The question about why his tuberculosis
13 went unnoticed at Resolute Bay is more difficult. I don't
14 know why. I can't even speculate why. The question about
15 why he wasn't flown out once it was discovered by Ross
16 Gibson, I think, has very much to do with the times, that
17 the Inuit were expected to wait for their medical
18 examinations, to a large degree, until the annual patrol
19 of the C.D. Howe. It only docked at each settlement for
20 a day or two and, as we have heard earlier from Professor
21 Bob Williamson, the handling of those Inuit on board the
22 C.D. Howe for their medical examinations was pretty hasty
23 at times, pretty rushed at times and pretty depersonalized

at times.

So it would only be to speculate that the thought was that this boy would be all right until the C.D. Howe came, at which point a proper examination by the doctor on board could be conducted as was usually the case.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: In the examinations you have done of this period, were there any occasions when people were actually Medivaced out or did everyone have to wait for the annual evacuation? Markoose had to wait a whole year and then finally when they did discover it after they x-rayed him, they still didn't fly him out. He was shipped out. Was this what was happening all of the time?

ALAN MARCUS: In the case of Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord in the fifties, there were instances -- it may have been late fifties, early sixties. Bob Pilot would be able to tell you better about that, but there were certainly instances where people were because of emergencies, not because, to my knowledge, of tuberculosis but because of some form of medical emergency were Medivaced out and, in some cases, USAF air crews were scrambled from Tuli in order to do that.

1 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** You make
2 mention about at times it seems there was some conflict
3 between different federal departments. There was, it
4 seemed, concern amongst the RCMP about professional
5 healthcare coming to communities that actually blocked
6 the possibility of bringing in a nurse, it seemed, to the
7 Grise Fiord detachment. If, in fact, that occurred, the
8 actual reason for the RCMP to be there would be lessened
9 or negated.
10 **ALAN MARCUS:** I was surprised and, I
11 suppose, to some extent, alarmed when I saw that particular
12 RCMP report. In that case, in the mid-sixties, when
13 perhaps the concern about effective occupation had
14 lessened from what it was in the American military
15 escalation of the early fifties prior to the DEW line.
16 It could well have been the case that
17 the RCMP were no longer sure that those detachments on
18 Ellesmere Island or, perhaps, at Cornwallis would be
19 necessary in order to show the flag. Therefore, the only
20 other task that they had was to look after the welfare
21 of the Native communities there, and one of those tasks
22 was to provide first aid treatment.
23 Now, if a nurse was introduced to the

settlement, that would do two things. One, they would no longer be required to perform that function and so that would be one less responsibility that they would have and one less reason for their actually being there.

There was also the concern about teachers, for example, as far as I am aware, being introduced into both communities and that the RCMP, initially at least in the case of Resolute Bay and more successfully, perhaps, in the case of Grise Fiord, was able to block perhaps the early introduction of federal teachers to those communities.

The other concern was that it was seen to be a considerable advantage in the case, for example, of Grise Fiord that there were only the RCMP there as officials. If you introduced other officials, be they nurses, be they teachers, be they administrators, the RCMP would no longer have exclusive control over those communities and what took place.

I think that is, for example, illustrated back in Port Harrison where Ross Gibson described both for us in his interview and certainly to me the difficulties he had with the welfare teacher Marjorie Hinds who was a considerable personality and who

disagreed with him on all sorts of points.

When you had other officials, you had whites representing other agencies, as in the case of Port Harrison, a number of other whites representing other agencies, it acted to modify the control of the RCMP. The RCMP still at that time had ultimate say so, perhaps, and undoubtedly that was the case in Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay. But in community like Port Harrison with a more sizeable population of professionals and representatives of other agencies, that certainly wasn't the case.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: How serious was the lack of enough members of the other sex in Grise Fiord? We have heard this. What was the real magnitude of the problem?

ALAN MARCUS: If you relocate a few extended families to an extremely isolated location, you can be fairly sure that they are going to have difficulties, teenagers are going to have difficulties in finding marriage partners.

In the case of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, this situation was compounded by the differences between the Pond Inlet Inuit and the Inukjuak Inuit as

is reported in the RCMP documents at considerable length throughout the 1950s and the 1960s. In their reports, which were filed monthly, they recorded if there was any inter-marriages between the two groups and it was a long time, as far as I am aware, before there was.

You had, in fact, an almost ludicrous situation where RCMP constables such as Bob Pilot were being asked by Inuit men in Grise Fiord if he could assist them in finding a potential partner.

Superintendent Henry Larsen realized very early on that this was a fundamental flaw of the relocation plan and he suggested, therefore, two or three years after the move that his constables in Inukjuak find girls of marriageable age to send north to those communities as perspective spouses to those bachelors.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: My last question has to do with the conversation you had with Ross Gibson in which he said to you that during the first winter, it was so cold and on and on, that had the Inuit, presumably at Resolute, had an opportunity to return, they would have all done so.

Did he mention that there were any other occasions when the Inuit actually wanted to return or were

there other conditions like this when this occurred? For instance, we have been told by others that there was concern about lack of food and there was virtually a revolt, I think, in the late fifties or something, that if the stores weren't supplied better, they would want to return.

ALAN MARCUS: I believe he made that comment, although, of course, I would have to check it, in a letter written to me on the 7th of May 1990. I must admit that in the several times that I have interviewed Ross Gibson and in the correspondence I have had with him, he has been extremely candid about this period.

As I believe he said in his interview here, he suggested the idea that the Inuit be re-rotated from Quebec to Resolute Bay which suggests that he was aware that there were individuals who were keen to go back and, therefore, others could be brought up to take their place.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: Just one question. I asked this question of Mr. Larsen's son. I have always wondered if you knew the answer to this. In Resolute, I guess, there is RCAF and they are all men. We know that that is not unusual for bases, but the RCMP

1 -- and in the case of Larsen, he had a family but he didn't
2 bring his family up. I am wondering why wouldn't he bring
3 his family? Was there a policy that -- why would they
4 not bring their families to the north?
5 **ALAN MARCUS:** You are speaking
6 specifically of Superintendent Henry Larsen?
7 **COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT:** It occurred
8 to me that he was one of the people who -- he was stationed,
9 I guess, in Resolute or -- was it Resolute or Grise Fiord?
10 **ALAN MARCUS:** No, Superintendent Henry
11 Larsen was head of G Division for the whole of the Northwest
12 Territories. So the only place he was stationed was
13 Ottawa, but he did make regular inspection trips to the
14 various detachments of G Division.
15 **COMMISSION MARY SILLETT:** My question
16 is then: It seemed to me that the RCMP during that period
17 didn't bring their families. Was there a reason for that?
18 Do you know?
19 **ALAN MARCUS:** Again, Bob Pilot, who may
20 still be around, would be the best person to give you that
21 insider knowledge.
22 As far as I am aware, there was a policy
23 to only have bachelors, certainly, at certain detachments

in the north. At others, at least later, there were married men detachments, but the RCMP had a rather -- as a paramilitary organization, it had a rather unique system for deciding on spouse material.

As I am aware from this period in the 1950s, should a member, as they were known, want to marry a particular woman, then the RCMP conducted an inspection of that individual and questioned people who knew her. But, again, I really don't have that specialist inside knowledge.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Thank you. Thank you for presenting a summing-up of your research and answering our questions.

ALAN MARCUS: Thank you.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: I would now like to ask Professor Magnus Gunther to come forward.

Good afternoon.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners.

I see that it is a quarter to five and I was supposed to be on this morning, and it has been sort of tiring just waiting to get here. So I can imagine how tired you are and how patient you have been and how well

1 you have handled all of this.
2 So what I will try to do is cut back on
3 the presentation that I was going to make, keep it
4 relatively brief and try to keep as much time as possible
5 for questions because I gather those are perhaps more
6 helpful to the Commission than sometimes our written
7 presentations.
8 But I thought in any case that I would
9 like to just cover a few points at least in my written
10 presentation. I would like to just briefly introduce
11 myself. My name is Magnus Gunther and I am a Professor
12 of Political Studies at Trent University.
13 I am basically going to be talking about
14 a report that I carried out under a contract, a government
15 contract in which I was asked by the Department of Indian
16 Affairs to review all of the allegations which had been
17 made about how the government had handled the relocation
18 in order to see whether these could be confirmed by
19 documentary corroboration. In other words, I was asked
20 to see whether there were one or more smoking guns among
21 the documents that would establish conclusively government
22 culpability on the various issues that they had been
23 accused of.

1 Now, my findings are at considerable
2 variance with the conventional wisdom which has appeared
3 in the press on this matter and the views of various Inuit
4 witnesses such as those who appeared before the
5 Parliamentary Standing Committee in 1990 which were the
6 ones that I read very carefully. I haven't been able to
7 read the comments of the witnesses who appeared in April.
8 I want to make as an introductory
9 comment, if I may, Mr. Chairman, a comment about
10 documentary analysis. Clearly, one of the -- first of
11 all, all I could do really with documentary archival
12 analysis was to provide a part of the story. I could not
13 and I did not give the rich and dramatic texture of accounts
14 given by those Inuit and others who were there and can
15 actually remember.
16 There are always problems of reliability
17 and completeness in the case of documents. There is always
18 paper erosion in files. There is always that frustrating
19 point when you think, "Oh, I have something here," and
20 then you look in another file to try to confirm and it
21 just isn't there.
22 A lot of things that people thought were
23 useless 20 years ago such as RCMP daily diaries or monthly

reports or quarterly reports seem mostly to have been thrown out. Accounts that contained trivial amounts for an Eskimo Loan Fund disappeared not because of malevolence or anything like that -- simply, it is one of those things that happens.

So there is always an incompleteness with this. Documents rarely give a totally unambiguous answer to questions, proving once again that history is not there only for historians.

In this case, too, the documents are mostly, apart from the Inuit letters in the files, which, by the way, were saved by chance, were written from the perspective of the dominant white culture. They give, in other words, the view from the top.

However, having said all of that, I would argue that there are some real advantages to documentary analysis which makes it an essential part of any attempt to recreate a story now 40 years old.

Documents do not change over time. The interpretation of them certainly does, but the documents are there. The words remain the same and they don't change in that sense, but oral history is due. Documents do not develop a life of their own. Oral histories sometimes

do. Oral histories are organic and like all live organs, sometimes grow and develop and change with time.

While recall information can convey a richness of personal feelings, of attitudes, of personal perceptions which documents fail to provide, memory is nonetheless a very, very fallible human mechanism.

As all know, memory is firstly high selective. Second, memory is often highly defensive and, thirdly, memory is limited simply in the amount of data that it can process or remember. I am struck here, for instance, by -- Constable Gibson was asked the other day whether he had ever written any letters inquiring about the health of patients who had been moved to the south, and Gibson said "no". Once they had moved on the C.D. Howe, that is not something he would have done, and yet I was reminded that in 1954, when a young 12-year old man from Resolute was diagnosed as having T.B., in fact, there is a letter from Gibson to the Department asking for further information about where this young man was and pointing out that no letters -- or that while letters had been received, they were very incomplete and his parents were concerned.

The same thing with Gordon Robertson.

1 Gordon Robertson said that as far as he knew, the promise
2 to return people was something that he was uncertain and
3 yet in 1956 there is a letter that he sent out saying,
4 "Look, we are still very unsure about whether these
5 projects are doing well," and that letter says clearly,
6 "We are going to bring people back if they fail."
7 So there is a limit to the amount of data
8 that anyone can process and remember and this is
9 particularly true of people who are looking back 40 or
10 50 years.
11 Moreover, it seems to me that the
12 problems of corroboration are especially serious when they
13 become highly politicized. I am involved at the moment
14 in oral history which I have been carrying out for the
15 last two years in which I am trying to recreate the
16 experience of a group of people who were resistance
17 fighters in South Africa between 1961 and 1964. They were
18 broken up by the police. Many of them had long terms of
19 imprisonment and one, whom I knew very well, was hanged.
20 I am trying to get that story together and what strikes
21 me with the oral histories that I am getting is the enormous
22 amount of variance in the way people experience the same
23 events, and it has convinced me at least very, very much

that oral history has to be examined in an incredibly careful way, very, very systematically if one is going to understand it properly and has to be corroborated.

Despite this or perhaps because of it, I believe that two forms of evidence can complement one another -- if not complement, at least challenge one another. In the case of my research, I believe modestly at least that I have been able to find some of the causes for the extraordinary discrepancy between what the documents say and what some of those who are relocated now say.

It seems to me that there are two areas in particular where misunderstandings -- not necessarily malevolence, but very, very serious misunderstandings occurred. I offer very tentatively these as some partial answer to this extraordinary discrepancy that we have seen.

I think those two areas are, first of all, the question of the promise of a return which is figured enormously and I think there were two sets of perceptions there -- and I think that needs to be looked at in some depth -- and, secondly, I think the bizarre Eskimo Loan Fund that you have been looking at has created enormous residue of chagrin, irritation, misunderstanding

1 and has been one of those things that has fed the fires
2 over the years.
3 Mr. Chair, there are five areas in which
4 my documents disagree with the prevailing wisdom on these
5 matters. First of all, I do not believe the documents
6 support the idea that sovereignty was a primary factor
7 or even a material factor in the relocations.
8 Second, I do not believe they confirmed
9 the view that the Inuit were either forced or tricked to
10 move and then deliberately kept in the High Arctic against
11 their will. This, I do not believe, was a case of
12 kidnapping and forceable confinement on the part of the
13 government, though I would add that there were serious
14 misunderstandings about what had been promised at the time
15 of the moves.
16 Third, the issue of how badly flawed were
17 the preparations. I will not in fact cover this section
18 about the preparations in this presentation. We can
19 perhaps pick that up in question time. But I asked myself
20 in my report, "Did the problems --" and there were certainly
21 problems around the preparations -- "fatally flaw the
22 enterprise?"
23 Again, I would argue that the documents

1 suggest that there were problems, but again we have to
2 look at within the terms of the circumstances of the time.
3 I think it is very, very important not to apply the
4 standards of the nineties in that situation in the 1950s,
5 although it is very, very tempting to do so because that
6 world seems so bizarre from our point of view in some ways.
7 In other ways, I think there were some admirable aspects
8 of government at that time.
9 But when we look at how government
10 functioned and what it could do, I think one has to take
11 into account some of the relative conditions that were
12 at work at that time.
13 Fourth, I look at whether the Inuit
14 relocatees faced an environment of radical deprivation
15 both in a lack of government services and basic essentials
16 of living. Again, I think that the documents show a more
17 complex picture than has been suggested, but I do go in
18 fair detail -- well, the problem is information on this
19 issue. How do you compare Inukjuak with Resolute and Grise
20 Fiord? You can. I try in my report to make comparisons
21 on which were better off with respect to housing or medical
22 services and so on, but one can only do it very, very
23 tentatively.

1 But I do come to the suggestion that the
2 northern settlements did in some respects or the people
3 going to the northern settlements did in some respects
4 far better up north than they would have done in Inukjuak.
5 Finally, the question about whether the
6 whole project was a success or a failure. My conclusion
7 to the report was that at least until the late 1960s at
8 Resolute, these projects, at least as portrayed in the
9 archival and other documentation, constituted a limited
10 but not -- I have changed the wording a little bit here.
11 I had originally "a limited but not insignificant success
12 story" and I have changed it here a little bit to "a limited
13 but quite significant success story".
14 That I say was true of Resolute. In a
15 strange way, things picked up in the 1970s in Grise Fiord.
16 For instance, it is claimed that by 1970, where very few
17 people had had full-time employment in Grise Fiord, Reu
18 says that by early 1970, all the men had full-time
19 employment at Grise Fiord. So the situation there would
20 have changed very much.
21 It is clear, too, by the way that if you
22 evaluate these projects, there is a real difference between
23 Grise Fiord, which was the step sister in some respects

1 and did less well than Resolute, where by 1966, at least,
2 the claims were that this was a very, very successful Arctic
3 community by certain measures at least.
4 Let me take a couple of these points
5 quickly. I am of two minds here, Mr. Chairman. I will
6 try to go through the sovereignty stuff -- I am torn.
7 Obviously every word I have written here is precious and
8 rich and very, very important, and yet on the other hand
9 we are all human, we are all frail and we all want to go
10 home, despite the richness and value of what I have to
11 offer here.
12 What can I say very, very quickly? Let
13 me see if I can pull out the main points on my dismissal
14 of sovereignty.
15 There are basically two views on whether
16 sovereignty was key. One argues that sovereignty was the
17 prime reason for determining the time and location of the
18 moves. There is another more circumspect view that has
19 been taken by Kemp who did a contract for the Makivik
20 Corporation in 1982 and Kemp came to the conclusion that
21 sovereignty was considered but not a central issue in the
22 relocations.
23 Soberman, too, is very circumstantial,

I find, about whether he feels sovereignty was important, but he said it was nevertheless material.

Now, I reject both of those views. I reiterate in my paper here the comment by Dean Vincent Macdonald in 1950 that Canada had in every respect and for a long period and little challenge clearly established its title to the whole Canadian Arctic by effective occupation.

This then raised the question of whether there was a de facto, a threat to de facto sovereignty in the High Arctic at this period that warranted the movement of 50 or more Inuit to help Canada strengthen its claim to sovereignty.

I argue very, very quickly that in the case of Ellesmere Island, there clearly was not the slightest concern about either de jure or de facto sovereignty. I am overstating myself to some degree because I am rushing and I am abbreviating, but there was --

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: I just want to make sure that you feel at ease to present. We are going to go extensively on the question period, but I would like you to be comfortable in making the presentations you want

1 to make to us.
2 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Thank you, Mr.
3 Chairman. That is very kind of you and very reassuring.
4
5 My sense of it is that in the case of
6 Ellesmere, two Greenland families hunting for a couple
7 of years and then the threat that there might be more
8 hunters appearing at Etah some time in the future was in
9 no sense a threat to sovereignty.
10 Clearly the RCMP were very, very
11 concerned by what hunting was going on and there might
12 be more hunting that might cause problems in Ellesmere.
13 They were particularly struck by the documents, say, by
14 the importance of the fact that the Greenlanders had been
15 killing muskox. There had been a Royal Commission on the
16 importance of the preservation of the muskox. The RCMP
17 took the protection of the muskox extremely seriously.
18 When the reports came that the
19 Greenlanders who had been tolerated for many years before
20 because a number of them had been employees of the RCMP
21 -- when the news came that they were killing muskox as
22 well and that more of them might appear, that is what I
23 think provided the catalyst for the reopening of the 1951

1 RCMP post and later the 1953 post. On top of that, I argue
2 that it was then decided to graft on a settlement, a
3 relocation scheme whose origins lay elsewhere. In other
4 words, the presence of the RCMP to control hunting
5 infractions and to ensure that Ellesmere was not overhunted
6 -- not a sovereignty, but a game law preservation issue
7 -- then became the basis for piggybacking a relocation
8 scheme.
9 In the case of Resolute, I argue that
10 there, too, the case for sovereignty is weak. First of
11 all, planning for the Resolute relocation started well
12 before the Canadianization and sovereignty discussions
13 of early 1953. Resolute was in the works as a possible
14 site for relocation well before all of those discussions
15 in Cabinet and all of those discussions in the Advisory
16 Commission on Northern Development.
17 Secondly, I would point out that the
18 Canadianization discussion, when they came later on, did
19 not necessarily mean and were not cast in terms of
20 colonization. Canadianization meant to the government
21 providing all Canadian government services -- and that
22 is really clear in 1953 and the main memo from the Privy
23 Council on December 29, 1953. Canadianization did not

1 mean colonization. Canadianization meant the Canadian
2 government replacing American civilians. They were
3 hugely exercised about the presence of the American
4 civilians at the weather stations.
5 There were only 20 of these, but they
6 were symbolic of something that the government felt was
7 very important. The government was irritated that instead
8 of Canadians providing the statistical services at the
9 weather stations, the Americans were doing this.
10 That was the concern -- expanding
11 Canadian government civilian services -- and the reason
12 for that is very clear, that the international court cases
13 on this have always maintained, quite apart from the
14 political issues that were involved -- but the
15 international court cases have always said, "In the High
16 North, you don't need colonization to establish your
17 sovereignty. What you need is effective occupation and
18 effective occupation means having an effective civilian
19 administration or government, not necessarily only
20 civilian administration present in a territory."
21 I also argue that the idea that there
22 the GCI radar station was in the winds for Resolute is
23 not the case. I disagree quite strongly with Professor

1 Grant on this.
2 I would mention one other thing that I
3 have here on page 7. I mention that at an early 1953,
4 the February 1953 meeting of the revived Advisory Committee
5 on Northern Development, the Deputy Minister of Resources
6 and Development was specifically asked what his department
7 was doing -- this is February 1953 -- with respect to the
8 issue of effective occupation of the north.
9 He was asked: What contribution could
10 the inhabitants of the north make? Young, who at this
11 point could have very easily said, "Oh, you know, we are
12 sending up because the decisions had already been taken
13 and the plans were in the works" -- in fact, many of the
14 decisions, in part, had been taken a year before, but at
15 this point it was very clear that Young knew that people
16 were going to be asked to go to Resolute and to two other
17 sites on Ellesmere, and he could have mentioned this.
18 This, in other words, would have been
19 the precisely appropriate point at which to indicate that
20 the Department was sending Inuit north for the purposes
21 of asserting sovereignty had this been the case. But he
22 says absolutely nothing about this.
23 What he does is he outlines a ten-year

1 plan for the education of the Inuit which was to be carried
2 out over the next few years, the assumption being, I assume
3 -- this is my reading into the document -- that with
4 education, Inuit could be employed as civilian government
5 employees and, therefore, make their contribution in that
6 way. That is my reading of it anyway.
7 Finally, I would just mention that it
8 is quite inconceivable, given the nature of the discussions
9 in the AC&D, that there could have been a decision that
10 the placing of a radar station with 100 Americans at
11 Resolute could have occurred without the most
12 extraordinarily extensive discussions either in the
13 Cabinet Defence Committee, which there certainly weren't,
14 or the Cabinet itself or the AC&D.
15 My argument is -- and this, I think, is
16 probably the core of what I want to try to say as to the
17 origins of the projects. The projects were, I think, in
18 fact, born during an absolutely horrendous period in Inuit
19 history. After World War II, government services to the
20 Inuit were grossly underfunded, administration was
21 haphazard and dispersed and despite the genuine attempts
22 that were starting to be made in the last forties to at
23 last ameliorate the truly awful situation of the Inuit,

the condition was in many ways worse than ever.

This was the period when epidemics ravaged communities with deadly effect every three or four years and the statistics are horrendous. TB had struck the Inuit communities with devastating effects, disrupting community lives, community and family lives. I would say this, Mr. Chairman, there is one thing that really struck me as I was doing this. If there ever was a tragedy of monumental proportions, it was this TV ravaging of the Inuit communities. When read the letters that came from people from the south who were being treated, it is truly devastating.

A quite incredible number of Inuit were evacuated to hospitals in the south for an average stay of two years. Sometimes, Mr. Chairman, treatment involved having to lie still all the time. That was part of the standard treatment for some patients at least.

Fifteen to twenty per cent of the Inuit were affected. In fact, in one incredible year, an extraordinary 1,600 out of a total population of 9,500 Inuit were in hospitals in the south.

Infant mortality was extraordinarily high, an astonishing 470 per 1,000 live births in 1950,

1 but this number fluctuated quite violently. I am just
2 quoting the most dramatic here.
3 After the first year, the average life
4 expectancy was still only 31 years. There were only 245
5 children at school in 1951 and this figure was probably
6 somewhat inflated. The schools didn't function
7 particularly well. There are interesting accounts on
8 this.
9 On top of all of this, the Eskimo
10 economy, as it was called, collapsed between 1949 and 1951,
11 literally collapsed. Fur prices dropped from $26 per pelt
12 in 1946 to as low as $3.50 per pelt in 1950, an unbelievable
13 drop.
14 At the same time, the cost of store
15 bought goods on which people were becoming more dependent
16 -- i.e. white man's food -- had not ceased rising. The
17 Inuit were caught in a severe crunch of increasing costs
18 and radically declining revenue.
19 What were the government services that
20 were available? They were appalling. To serve the 8,500
21 Inuit in the whole of the Northwest Territories, there
22 was in Ottawa a staff of seven. In 1950, there was a Chief
23 of Arctic Services, two administrative officers -- that

1 was Cantley and Stevenson -- two clerks and two
2 stenographers.
3 In the field, in the whole of the
4 Northwest Territories, there were six teachers, one of
5 whom was in Port Harrison, and there were 72 RCMP officers
6 and Inuit special constables. There were six nurses and
7 there were three doctors in the whole of the Northwest
8 Territories.
9 By the time the relocations had started,
10 the Ottawa staff had increased by 102, this despite the
11 fact that the Department actually in 1951 and 1952, despite
12 this crisis, had had its estimates cut because of the Korean
13 war and other financial policies.
14 Thus, in early 1950/51, many of the Inuit
15 communities in the north were caught in the grip of a deep
16 and seemingly hopeless crisis of devastating health
17 problems, increasing population. Interestingly, at the
18 same time as the Inuit population had this extraordinary
19 death rate, they also had the highest birth rate in the
20 world.
21 A collapsed economy and by two days
22 standards very, very limited albeit dedicated government
23 assistance -- it was in this situation that one of the

1 two administrative officers of the Department -- Cantley
2 -- was asked by the Northwest Territories counsel to
3 prepare a report on the nature of the crisis and to offer
4 solutions. His 55-page report is, I think, a call to
5 trying to understand government policy at the time. It
6 is never mentioned and so maybe I am mistaken, but it
7 strikes me that it was the most unusually thorough attempt
8 using very crude measures in a way, but it is the first
9 time that there is a really lengthy, thoughtful, systematic
10 attempt to get to grips with the crisis and to suggest
11 some policies.
12 The policy offerings were rather weak,
13 as one can guess from the department that had so little
14 resources, but the analysis is interesting because it helps
15 us to understand, I think, the why Quebec issue.
16 Cantley came to the conclusion that the
17 main immediate problem faced by the Inuit was not only
18 the collapse of the fur-based economy but population in
19 relation to existing resources, as the phrase of the day
20 was. Moreover, in this respect, the most serious area
21 of concern was in new Quebec, in northern Quebec. It was
22 here on what was called the hungry coast, as it was known
23 at that time, that the problems of the relation between

1 resources to population was the most serious.
2 As the annual RCMP report put it -- that
3 actually is a splendid report. It is an unusually graphic,
4 sensitive report by an RCMP officer. You have heard parts
5 of it before. It is by a man called Corporal Mansel.
6 It gives you a good example of sort of the best of what
7 those offices could offer.
8 He says in his report -- this is 1950,
9 admittedly -- that there is an ingrained fear of starvation
10 in northern Quebec, and that is one of the reasons why
11 people keep concentrating at the settlements. The reason
12 for immediate cause and concern and alarm in Cantley's
13 words was because of the size and density of the new Quebec
14 population. It was very large. Out of a total population
15 of 8,500 Inuit at that time, 2,700 were living in new
16 Quebec.
17 As the report says, with 30 per cent of
18 the Inuit population -- and these are crude measures, but
19 this gives you some idea of the sort of thinking at the
20 time, although it is very, very interesting that Professor
21 Williamson, I think, asked some of these questions this
22 morning. With 30 per cent of the Inuit population, new
23 Quebec had only 15 per cent of the land area and 17 per

cent of the coast available to the Inuit for hunting and trapping.

In Quebec, there were only 57 square miles of hunting territory per Inuit compared to 138 square miles in the devastatingly poor Keewatin and 75 square miles per Inuit on the somewhat better off Baffin Island.

The solution Cantley proposed to this problem of over-population and concentration of population in relation to the available resources was to distribute population to other available suitable places where a better living could be obtained. As he says in his report, there are few places where the resources are sufficient to support a large population for any length of time, and by that point, Inukjuak -- this is a guess because the figures fluctuate quite a bit and the statistical gathering resources were few and far between. The population of Inukjuak was estimated to be around about 500 of whom probably about 60 to 70 would have been living in the settlement.

So he says, "There are few places where the resources are sufficient to support a large population for any length of time, but there are enumerable places

where a few families can hunt and obtain a living indefinitely." In this respect, he said, the 185,000 square miles not presently occupied in the High Arctic merited, in his words, consideration.

Now, it is very interesting that a year later, 1952, Cheshire, the General Manager of the Hudson's Bay Company -- and this is interesting, I think, because it provides some broader context for the remarks that we heard from Mr. Ploughman -- just prior to the first conference on Eskimo affairs in 1952 in a lengthy analysis of the Eskimo economy, not quite as lengthy as Cantley's, emphasized the same point. It was Quebec, he said, that merited priority consideration as soon as possible because there the decline in country food was the most serious.

There, too, concentration in restricted areas made the Inuit almost entirely dependent on fur and casual labour for the bare necessities of existence -- his phrase.

Now, strangely enough, at the same time in 1952, things were improving at Inukjuak. The field report for 1952 -- I am sorry, I have jumped ahead a little bit. There is one other point I would like to make.

So one element in this policy comes from,

I think, these two policy documents. The other aspects of the policy came from a more ad hoc series of developments and accidents and opportunities that were to be seized.

At the same time as these reports were emanating, there were other matters occurring the field that seemed to confirm the need for expanding population to the High Arctic. In 1950, Cantley's colleague Stevenson reported on the 1950 crisis at Cape Dorset when 110 Inuit had to be congregated at Dorset and two airdrops made of food to save them from starvation. It is at that time, by the way, when Stevenson starts talking about the need to obviate this problem and send people north of the Lancaster Sound that he adds on a point about, "This might be useful for sovereignty if that was thought necessary."

The next year Idlow suggested that his very large camp at Pond Inlet should be established on Ellesmere and Stevenson reports this as a significant factor. The reopening of the Craig Harbour RCMP post in 1951 suggested that now there was an additional way of improving the lives of people under RCMP protection. Cantley in 1952 felt that there were certain developments at Resolute that required an RCMP officer to be there again

as the single authoritative voice of government because of certain problems that had occurred in the previous year, and that offered another opportunity.

So the background to the locations, in summary, I say on page 12, was the general crisis that developed in Eskimo land as it was called. In the late forties and early fifties and in particular in northern Quebec, the problem of skeleton public services, minuscule bureaucratic resources and the urgent feeling that an even worse crisis was in the offering in the long run.

This was all reinforced by a 1951 northern Quebec medical report which confirmed the prevailing view that living in settlements and dependents on white man's food led to nothing but ill health, particularly pulmonary diseases and malnutrition.

I do note that in the case of Quebec in 1952, the RCMP reports the last year as being a good one -- no doubt about it. Food has improved. 1953 was a bumper year. There were 3,500 fox taken. By the end of 1954, a total of 5,000 fox had been taken where the average was about 1,500 per year.

But the response to these reports was -- and I am quoting the officials here -- no two years

1 were ever the same for the Inuit and feast always follows
2 famine. So the immediate situation and improvement in
3 1952/53 would not have played a major role.
4 It was clear, too, said one report that
5 the long-term problems were the greatest concern. Low
6 fur prices meant that even in the years in which there
7 were bumper harvests, there would still not be sufficient
8 funds to pay for white man's food or to replace worn-out
9 equipment. The time was past, said the documents, when
10 the Inuit could rely on white fox and other means would
11 have to be found for them to obtain a reasonable living,
12 and that is where the sources of the policy lie, I believe.
13 Once again, I would note that by the end
14 of 1954 problems of over-crowding were reported in
15 Inukjuak. In 1956, the RCMP felt that while hunting was
16 not good, things would have been worse had people not gone
17 to the High Arctic and many had gone south to Great Whale
18 River in connection with, I think, a DEW line project.
19 The population of Inukjuak by that point
20 in 1958 had been reduced from 500 to 337, a very, very
21 precipitous decline. 1957 was another year -- an up and
22 down year. Large amounts of clothing had to be issued
23 to the people in the area and relief had gone up, and so

on and so forth.

One last point on all of this. I would like to stress, then, that in my view, the sovereignty claims are both flimsy and flawed -- very, very little evidence that really stands -- and that it is these kinds of references to the problems in northern Quebec and the crisis in the Eskimo economy that are a major reason for the relocations.

Strangely, in 1953 this all changed. In December 1953, the government finally -- it was the end of the Korean war. St. Laurent had taken his decision that the days of benign neglect were over. A new department was created with the youngest minister that there had ever been, with the youngest deputy minister. The funds started flowing. It was the end of the years of penny-pinching and minimal government. The floodgates opened and within a few years, the Department had to defend itself against the claim that there were more officials in the north than there were actually Inuit. By that time, the settlers were in the High North.

Mr. Chairman, despite all of my -- put an academic in front of a captive audience and they can't resist it.

I want to say a -- I will pick two things here. One is the issue of were people volunteers or not. I would like to make another comment on that and then I would like to deal with the issue of the broken promises and then finish with a brief comment on were things better in some respects or were they worse in the north. Then I can go to questions.

I am always assuming that when I have talked for half an hour it is actually only five minutes and it is usually the bored look on my students faces that introduces me to the reality of time.

Volunteers. My sense of it is that the Inuit who went to the High North were neither helpless, compliant pawns in the hands of the RCMP, nor were they equipped to make a fully informed decision on the basis of complete information about what the environment and circumstances of their new lives would be.

My reason for this view is as follows: The archival documents -- and I am only working on archival documents or written material -- show a number of examples of Inuit who did not want to make long-distance moves and simply refused to do so. So there are a good number of counter-instances, a good number of them where people were

saying, "Well, let's try to get these people to move," and the reports say, "No, they won't move. They just won't do it." That was true of groups as well as individuals.

I think to create a general stereotype of the compliant Inuit is a mistake. The archives also show that Larsen was a stickler in insisting that Inuit voluntary co-operation was essential in any moves, but the officers, I note, did have some leeway in pressuring people to move short distances from settlements -- 10 to 20 miles -- when it seemed that they were becoming over-populated or there were problems of a lack of hygiene.

The reports that I have seen, however, say that when an officer ordered people to move out 10 or 20 miles that they say, "We ordered people." They didn't say, "We want volunteers." They said, "You have to move out 5 or 10 or 20 miles outside the settlement." There was one instance of that in the Harrison area I came across.

Thirdly, I would not again that the Inuit witnesses who appeared before the Parliamentary Committee in 1990 did not say or not overwhelmingly say that they had been forced. Only one of the seven said that he had

been forced to go north. The others said what? They said the RCMP had arrived and looked for people "willing to move". This is what the witnesses said, confirming Gibson's point that he had asked people who were willing to move.

They stated others said that they had moved because the RCMP had agreed to their conditions. Another witness said that they had moved because the camp leaders had decided the matter for them. However, as I say, one witness said that he -- I think it was a he -- had been forced to move against his will.

I would mention, too, that the idea of moving was not new in 1953. The Eastern Arctic Patrol in 1952 had asked if people would like to move north and allegedly, according to the reports, ten families had said in 1952 already that they would like to move. In fact, one of those ten is mentioned as moving then in 1953.

However, all of this does not imply the Inuit understanding of the project was complete -- far from it. But this does not in turn mean that the agreement was non-voluntary or that it was unreasonable decision on their part to make.

The situation at Inukjuak was harsh and

1 marginal. The Eskimo economy had collapsed. The RCMP
2 had promised that they would get more game, more furs.
3 I believe there was also a promise about housing that I
4 came across somewhat later in the fifties. In one
5 instance, the use of a power boat which was a powerful
6 inducement in an area where only three families had these
7 -- in fact, that is one of the first things that the leader
8 of the camp going up to Grise Fiord insisted on. He said,
9 "Where is my power boat?" Sargent then wrote and said,
10 "Can I give this used RCMP boat to the Inuit?" and he was
11 told "yes".
12 These people were the poorest of the
13 poor. Marjorie Hinds' reports give extensive detail about
14 the state of their clothing, whether there was food or
15 not, how healthy people looked, and so on. That is not
16 to say that they were all badly fed. For instance, some
17 of them, she says, "Yes, there was a lot of food in the
18 camp," but when she describes the equipment, she also says,
19 "These are the most destitute or they haven't had clothes
20 for years and so on and so forth. They were the poorest
21 of the poor in a sense."
22 They were promised they could return
23 after two years by Stevenson -- I emphasizes this -- if

they did not like the project. They were promised the constant presence of the RCMP and this would have been a very considerable reassurance and they might have been told -- and I stress "might" -- that there would be other Inuit there to help them adapt.

I would like to just emphasize this. In the whole of northern Quebec, 2,700 people had the services of one nurse and three RCMP officers. The three groups going north -- that is 54 people -- were going to have the services of five RCMP officers and four special constables.

In the terms of the time, in terms of what was available, that was a very, very considerable contribution of what was available in terms of government services. In fact, I estimate later on that in the eastern Arctic, the RCMP was committing 30 per cent of its person power to these three projects. That is not to say that those RCMP officers didn't have other tasks, but that was a very, very considerable commitment of resources on the part of government.

In these terms, I thought looking at it all that it did not seem unreasonable to participate. Decisions to go south to the lonely TB hospitals might

have been far more difficult to make in terms of comprehension of what awaited them there, and yet these two were decisions people took -- painful ones, but reasonable ones and ones, to a large degree, based on trust.

I am going to leave the whole issue of preparation and I am going to jump here, Mr. Chairman. I look at, if you like, planning of supplies if you have any questions on that. I look at what Ms Hinds reported. I look at whether the Department took reasonable steps to help people with supplies. I look at -- and I am very critical of -- the decision to separate people on the C.D. Howe and I summarize my comments there on page 18.

I look at what helped people given when they arrived on page 19. I looked at the question of missing supplies also on page 19. My comment on --

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: I am sorry, the document that you have given us has only 17 pages.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Oh, I am sorry. Yours is single-spaced and mine isn't. I will go through this -- I don't think the paging is that urgent, Mr. Chairman, but I will go through it really very, very quickly with you.

It is under "Preparations", page 9,

1 planning of supplies I mention in the middle of that page,
2 Ms Hinds' information at the end of that page. The help
3 given at Inukjuak is at the middle of page 10. The missing
4 supplies is at the bottom of page 10, a very brief comment
5 -- the very brief comment on the health, what they knew
6 about health; the role of the RCMP in contributing to the
7 success at the top of 11.
8 I comment on how difficult the first year
9 was at Grise Fiord at the bottom of page 11. I comment
10 at the very bottom of page 11 on the commitment of personnel
11 that the RCMP and others put into this.
12 My conclusion on page 12 is that in
13 general the preparations given the truncated resources
14 of the Department, the abject poverty of the participants,
15 the parsimonious approach to government spending and the
16 obsession with self-help and the individual responsibility
17 of the day were adequate and acceptable, despite all of
18 the problems that had occurred and despite the criticisms
19 that are made of them.
20 I would like to very quickly turn to the
21 promises that were made because I think in many ways that
22 and the Eskimo Loan Fund and how that developed -- and
23 I don't say anything about the Eskimo Loan Fund here.

I can comment on that in response to questions.

Let me just jump here to the promises to return. The Inuit witnesses appearing before the 1990 Parliamentary Committee hearings stated that promises were made that if they did not adapt to the High Arctic, the government would return them to Inukjuak. These promises were not kept.

I believe that the anger and chagrin that has been expressed around this question is one of the core issues which has kept the sense of grievance among the relocatees alive and it is crucial, therefore, to try to clarify it. And I have tried, to the best of my ability, to do that.

I believe the documentary analysis sheds some light on the profound misunderstandings which occurred around this question.

First, it is clear that promises were made to return people if they were not happy and this was understood and accepted by all the key officials involved. There is a very, very curious lacunae in this whole thing in connection with Constable Gibson. I cannot understand, given the telegram that Larsen sent to Inukjuak on April 18, 1953, how Constable Gibson, unless Constable Webster

1 received it and never gave the telegram to Constable Gibson
2 -- the telegram is so explicit -- how he could not have
3 known that people were supposed to be recruited for two
4 settlements on Ellesmere Island and how he could not have
5 known that they were to be told they could be returned
6 in one year should they wish to. Larsen makes it very,
7 very clear in the telegram.
8 Second, no one expected the promise to
9 last forever, although as late as the early sixties, the
10 Department started arrangement to send back one family
11 that wanted to get back to Inukjuak and that had arrived
12 in Grise Fiord in 1955.
13 Third, the RCMP were required to and did
14 report each year on whether people were content to stay
15 or whether they wanted to leave. For instance, the report
16 that Professor Grant mentioned today mentioning the desire
17 at Grise Fiord of all the people to leave is, in fact,
18 reported, but it is elaborated on in a different way in
19 the annual report from Grise Fiord on that year. I can
20 comment on that later.
21 The RCMP did -- they didn't say groups.
22 They named individuals when they wanted to move, but it
23 is very, very interesting that the reports and this is

maybe where some of these cultural problems occurred that have been discussed. Some of the reports -- as the reports put it, they were reported as a definite expressed desire to move. Very often they would say, "There has been some discussion about wanting to move back to see a parent, but nothing definite. If something definite is reported, I will let you know."

Fourth, the main problems in the 1950s -- and I think it is important to bear this in mind given what you have heard in the last while. The main problems in the fifties was not people wanting to leave, but too many people wanting to go up to the High Arctic, especially to Resolute. For example, in 1955, 70 people wanted to move north from Inukjuak and Pond Inlet. It was an enormous number for the time.

Because of transportation difficulties for such a large number, only 30 ultimately went. In 1958, as another example, 50 more people wanted to move north. Ultimately, only 18 did. But Resolute had an enormous growth in population in those years. From 22 people in 1955, it grew to 83 in 1958 and 120 in 1964. There was a 600 per cent increase in ten years.

Grise Fiord grew much more slowly. In

only tripled in size over a 12-year period between 1954 and 1967, increasing from 32 to 91 people. After 1958, the problem, as the Department saw it, was to try to slow down the number of people wanting to go to Resolute and to restrict movement to Resolute.

The Department, ultimately, in 1959 refused to pay the transportation costs. Up to that time, by the way, transportation costs were always paid by the Department. They were not a cost of the Eskimo Loan Fund as being said. Eskimo Loan Fund did a lot of different and stupid things, but it didn't force people to pay their own transportation costs up to the north.

Only relatives of settlers already there were given government assistance to go north. One person did definitely indicate -- this, again, the reports -- did indicate unhappiness at Grise Fiord in the first year, according to the RCMP, but said that he was willing to wait and see what the spring and summer would have to offer. The RCMP note that since he was a better carver than hunter -- he is actually one of the finest carvers in Inukjuak -- he would be happier running the trading store. So they were hoping that he would run the trading store and wouldn't necessarily have to go and hunt.

He, however, unfortunately died of a heart attack in the summer of 1964 and so it is impossible to know whether he and his family would after all have chosen to return to Inukjuak the next year.

The reports in the fifties generally said that people were enthusiastic about remaining. That is what Stevenson said in 1954. He uses the word "enthusiastic" and Stevenson was really one of the finest linguists in the north. He knew everyone's dialects and so there could not have been a communication problem there. Maybe there was a cultural issue of interpretation and reactions of people to one another.

However, there were from time to time indications of discontent, especially if the hunting was poor or there was some tragedy in the community. In fact, in 1958, the case that Professor Grant mentions -- there was a much more serious issue in 1958 than the stores being empty and the supplies and not having sufficient supplies.

There was a terrible tragedy in 1958. Two of the children of one of the settlers playing on the flow ice had drown and the deaths of those children apparently were absolutely devastating as the reports say

on the state of morale, and that was one of the main reasons too as to why people were all -- the RCMP report says that everyone wanted to leave. They wanted to leave Grise Fiord after that. My sense of it was that it was less the trading store than that tragedy that was the case. However, again, the RCMP report goes on to say that once the C.D. Howe arrived and summer came and the supplies were in the store and people were some distance from the tragedy, they, as it states in the report, "changed their minds".

Sixth, overwhelmingly the reports say that people told the RCMP they wanted to visit and not to return to Inukjuak permanently. That is true of the case that was just discussed Mr. Marcus.

I think this is the most important thing. There was a real distinction. I think it is very important to distinguish between visits and permanent returns. I think it is reasonable to assume that in the 1950s most people wanted to visit rather than to return permanently to Inukjuak; that although lonely and socially isolated in the first years, not by any means inconsequential matters, they nevertheless were doing in most ways far better than they had at Inukjuak.

They encouraged people to come north not

1 only for extended social support -- and the letters started
2 going south in 1954 asking people to go north -- but also
3 because they were able to persuade their relatives that
4 life would be materially better in the High Arctic.
5 When they asked to return for visits,
6 however, they were told visits would not be paid for.
7 There is a crucial letter, for instance, which has been
8 read to you before where in 1961 one of the camp leaders
9 writes to Gordon Robertson and says, "I would like to go
10 back for a visit. I would like to see my sister," and
11 Roberston writes back a letter which says, "We cannot pay
12 visits, but if you can find another reason -- ask the RCMP
13 for another reason, we can pay it."
14 Well, what I think he is saying there
15 is that Treasury Board guidelines did not allow departments
16 to pay for visits. They did allow for permanent returns
17 -- that was stated very clearly in the Treasury Board rules
18 -- and they did allow for situations where if a
19 "rehabilitation scheme" was failing, people could be sent
20 back, individuals could be sent back under those
21 circumstances. But visits were not available.
22 So what did people have. They had the
23 opportunity of paying for their own visit -- difficult,

1 although in 1956 the feeling was that, harsh as it may
2 sound today, at least five of the people with over $1,000
3 credits in the store -- the officer in charge of the Eastern
4 Arctic Patrol felt that they were wealthy enough to pay
5 for their own visits back. I think it is a rather harsh
6 view.
7 Or, the alternative was to take free
8 rides on the RCMP planes. There were two RCMP planes.
9 One came in 1955 and I think another one the year after.
10 There is correspondence to say that the RCMP did arrange
11 free rides to Churchill and to further on. In fact, the
12 regional administrator in Churchill in 1958 says something
13 like, "Why are you asking us for help in connection with
14 these three people who want to go to Inukjuak? We usually
15 arrange these things informally with the RCMP and usually
16 that is not a problem." So free rides obviously did occur,
17 but that stopped after 1961. The RCMP started charging
18 and they were not willing to allow for visits any more.
19 They were not going to give free rides for visits. So
20 returns on that basis, then, had to be permanent.
21 Permanent returns were, according to all of this,
22 legitimate.
23 Let me just perhaps end at this point.

1 I was going to say something about the issue of comparing
2 Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord and Inukjuak and perhaps if
3 there is a question on that, I can try to do that. I won't
4 go on to how successful the settlements were.
5 I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, you have been
6 terribly tolerant and I am really stretching my welcome
7 here, but one of the last things I would like to say about
8 this -- the complex issue of how successful the settlements
9 are is really tricky and especially when I am doing a couple
10 of shorthand generalizations here.
11 There are so many issues of success.
12 Clearly, a lot has been brought out in terms of being
13 comfortable, missing friends, emotional kinds of things.
14 I have not gotten into that, but in terms of income, I
15 think it is possible to say that people moving north did
16 very well. I want to give one example.
17 1953 to 1954 was the very, very tough
18 year that the Grise Fiord Inuit had on the Lindstrom
19 Peninsula. Very difficult year. You have heard all about
20 it -- the first year of adaptation and so on. Strangely
21 enough, that was also a bumper fur year. So they did
22 extraordinarily well in the amount of fur they caught.
23 In fact, per capita, they caught more fur at Grise Fiord

in that first year than they would have in that bumper year in Inukjuak.

But, for example, in 1951, the average family income was $390 per family. In that first year at Grise Fiord, the average family income was estimated at $1,100 per family. So my guess is that -- and it is a guess -- dollar income doubled or close to tripled -- let's say doubled -- even in the most difficult year that they had at Grise Fiord. I am not saying that went on year after year by any manner of means, but they did reasonably well and the reports constantly say, "There are $300 worth of credits that everybody has gotten. People say this is a lot of money."

Now, let's turn to Resolute Bay because I think there the situation was far more "successful", at least in certain terms. At Resolute Bay, income was considerably higher than Grise Fiord throughout this period. Employment, mostly part-time, in the summers became very, very widely available within two years -- so much so that the first three houses which were sent up in 1955 were not assembled until 1957 because the Inuit were otherwise occupied by employment and hunting.

In 1956, five families had credits of

over $1,000 in the trading store which was a very, very large sum of money at that point. I have made my point on that before.

Let me jump to 1964. The average family income was about $2,700 per family in Resolute. There is a very, very long study by Bissett, the Resolute area study which goes into every aspect of living at Resolute at that time. This would have placed these families into the second quintile of Canadian income earners. This did not take into account -- let me put it this way, I don't want to say subsidized rents and so on. I want to say: This did not take into account income in kind. Some have estimated that this might have added another 60 per cent of total earned income and this would have placed the families well over the mean in Canada. I stress that the data here is very tenuous and you have to be very, very careful and you have to take it with a pinch of salt.

Bissett noted in 1964 that all 18 households he studied -- this is ten years later -- were well equipped with radios. All had one and eight had more than one. Tape recorders, 12 households; record players, 16 households; telephones, all households; washing machines; 15 households.

1 Resolute, in the words of the report,
2 had relatively high income. Game was still available in
3 abundance.
4 So my argument here is that this was a
5 very appreciable improvement in the living standards of
6 people from the starting off point ten years previously.
7 However, none of this static. By 1969, there was a huge
8 crisis again at Resolute. The co-op which had been doing
9 terribly well is suddenly $30,000 in debt because people
10 were not paying their heating bills and so this was not
11 a static issue at all.
12 The Yale University anthropologist
13 Bockstoce, in his 1966 study of Resolute, concluded that
14 because of the abundance and ready accessibility of both
15 labour and game, the Inuit at Resolute were among the most
16 affluent Natives in the Arctic. He noted that one person
17 had $7,000 in a bank account.
18 Moreover, Resolute had avoided the
19 community fragmentation which had occurred in some places.
20 The co-op, in particular, had had a potent effect in
21 combatting apathy and resignation and the co-op was of
22 fundamental importance, he thought, in creating a sense
23 of community, self-development and self-control.

It had created community interests and what was emerging was a new confidence in coping with the environment which was still, though, he said, largely controlled by the white man.

Let me leave it at that and thank you very much for your patience. I am sorry. I honestly had thought I could do this very, very briefly.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Thank you. Don't be sorry. We were very happy to have this overview of your thick report that we have all read.

I would like at this point to ask Commissioner Paul Chartrand to start with the questions. Commission Chartrand will have to go in a few minutes and he will start the questioning.

Paul, please.

COMMISSIONER PAUL CHARTRAND: Thank you. My apologies for having to leave to get home on time or to get to the plane on time to get home. I regret the constraints under which the discussion has to take place.

In order to try to make the best of the circumstances, I propose to do as follows: I will ask a question. I will identify a question and then I will attempt to provide examples to show the nature of my

1 concern. Having done that, I shall attempt to restate
2 the question and invite your response. I am sorry about
3 that, but it is my best shot in the circumstances.
4 The question has to do with a matter that
5 appears to go to the heart of your report -- not only that,
6 but also to the heart of the work of this Commission.
7 I am concerned to ask about the standards that you would
8 have to apply to the assessment of the performance of the
9 government in respect to these matters that have been
10 discussed. I don't wish to engage in a discussion of the
11 facts.
12 We are, it seems, at least this matter
13 historically has been put in this way: Was there a wrong
14 of a kind to which the government ought to respond? It
15 appears, then, that if that is a goal, then one must provide
16 an objective standard. You begin your own work by
17 referring to the desirability of objectivity in assessing
18 whether there was a wrong of a kind to which the government
19 ought to respond.
20 I stress that when I am referring to
21 standards, I am not necessarily referring to legal
22 standards. I will not assume that a legal standard is
23 required in assessing the government performance. I might

1 note, by the way, that I am not telling you this as a
2 political scientist that there are mechanisms in our
3 country whereby the assessment of government is carried
4 that have nothing to do with legal obligations, such as
5 turfing the bums out, to use a common expression at election
6 time.
7 My concern is that in looking at your
8 report, you use different relative terms with which it
9 appears to me you purport to assess different fact
10 situations. Let me give two examples only.
11 At page 59, for example, you use the
12 relative term "well". One can say, "Well done, my boy,"
13 after a son has done a high hump. Well, he has jumped
14 four foot five. So there is a standard against which we
15 can measure what "well" means.
16 To do something responsibly. "I
17 congratulate you, my son, for calling in at nine o'clock
18 to tell us where you are. That is responsible." There
19 is a standard there -- the behaviour is assessed against
20 the realistic expectations known to the individuals, the
21 parent in this case. So these are simple examples of the
22 requirement of standards that appears to be attractive
23 to the ordinary citizen.

1 Now, you use these expressions, these
2 relative terms "well" and "responsibly" in a context in
3 which you purport to judge how, what you call, projects
4 are carried out. I want to refer to only one more example
5 where you purport to assess another aspect of what you
6 referred to as a project, and I will adopt your term in
7 this case.
8 On page 45, you use two other relative
9 terms, that is "not perfect" and "not incompetent". Those
10 terms appear on that same page, page 245. So later, it
11 appears to me -- and this is the part of the questioning.
12 I am asking you to assist me by clarifying this matter
13 -- that in rejecting other work that has been done in
14 assessing the performance of the government, you appear
15 to reject attempts at the identification of applicable
16 standards.
17 I would like, again, in this case to
18 provide only two examples. The first case involves a
19 rejection of a standard without an apparent argument to
20 counter it. It is at page 153 where you refer to a work
21 by Grant. The reference, as I understand it -- and you
22 will correct me, please, if I am wrong. You know your
23 work better than I do -- to some human rights standards

1 whereby the government performance might be assessed, and
2 the reference in Grant is to the United Nations Declaration
3 of Human Rights of 1948.
4 You say in a footnote that Grant is
5 apparently unaware of the existence of Article 29(1) which,
6 as you know, is the qualifier to the declaration of rights.
7 That is, they are permissible in some cases. It is a
8 matter of balancing. You point that out, yet what you
9 do on page 264 does not appear to conform to your own
10 rigorous standard established on page 153. That is, you
11 admit the existence of hardship with respect to marriage.
12 At page 264, you do that. You admit there was a hardship.
13 But in so doing and after your criticisms
14 on page 153, you do not explain why you dismiss implicitly
15 Article 16(1) of the relevant human rights declaration
16 which you know is a standard applicable to the matter of
17 marriage. I want to read it just to remind you.
18 "Men of women of full age without any limitation due to
19 race, nationality," and so on,
20 "have the right to marry and found
21 a family."
22 So my point there is that there is a
23 rejection of an argument without an argument to meet it.

1 My next example is a different sort. It is an example
2 of a rejection without -- rejection of a standard; again,
3 I am referring to standard. In this case, the standard
4 is another scholar standard. In this case, the rejection
5 does not appear to meet the argument and then that is
6 another question that I would ask about.
7 I don't think I have the page number,
8 but you will be familiar with it. It is a response to
9 the term "experiment" and this matter has been discussed
10 in the last few days. I do not wish to invite a discussion
11 of the substantive facts, but simply to look at the
12 analytical framework here and I will just emphasize that
13 again.
14 You use the term "pilot project" instead
15 of experiment, but I ask you: If a pilot project does
16 not meet the proffered standard -- that is, a test or trial
17 to generate generalizable knowledge -- you seem to be
18 implicitly asserting that a pilot project does not fall
19 within a test or trial to generate realizable knowledge.
20 My concern is that in the context of the work which it
21 criticized, it appears to me that the standard that is
22 offered is advanced as a useful standard and that the
23 question about a standard is: Is it a helpful standard

with which to assess government performance or is it not a useful standard by which to assess government action?

It seems that your concern is directed at an entirely different matter. You look at the facts, the original facts out of which the standard arose. Now, many will argue, I presume, that standards themselves are not in their nature good or bad depending on the original facts which give rise to them. Human rights standards are all, are they not, borne out of wars and misery and the unconscionable exercise of state power?

So a standard, such as a human rights standard, is used to apply objectively to new facts in order to avoid a particularistic notion of justice. If not, it seems to me that that is what we and I think you are striving for. That is why I am asking the question. We need not a biased view, but an objective measuring stick with which we can apply to different fact situations.

Now, the question, then, is to ask you about your use of standards on the one hand and also to ask for your advice to us as to whether you believe that we ought to establish standards with which to assess government performance.

I noticed that in your work you

demonstrate by the language that you use great confidence in the analysis that you use and you use on page 159 the words "dishonest" and "irresponsible" to characterize works which you criticize and at page 256, a travesty of the truth. These are expressions that I am not familiar with in scanning the usual scholarly literature and I was wondering if they had relationship to the advice you are giving us this afternoon.

In the first page of your presentation this afternoon, you are comparing oral history to written documentation and you characterize memory in its relation to oral history as highly defensive. I was wondering if you meant, then, to compare written analysis as offensive.

So the question is: What is your view with respect to standards and I wonder if you might assist us by explaining your use of the standards, particularly keeping in mind the examples I gave of the use of relative terms which are not standards and applying different relative terms to different fact situations?

I am sorry I have had to go on so long. As I said, there are time constraints and I sincerely hope I am able to wait for the complete answer. Thank you very much.

1 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** You have asked a very,
2 very tough question and I agree that it is a very important
3 one. Let me just deal sort of in reverse as best I can
4 and I am not sure I am going to be able to satisfy you
5 on this.
6 Yes, I suppose on page 159, very quickly,
7 I did use words like "dishonest" and "irresponsible".
8 In a way, I sort of regret that now. I think it is fairly
9 rare in the report for me to come out that way. I really
10 try as far as possible to be judicious.
11 I just found in those couple of instances
12 that my belief that the misinterpretation of the documents
13 was so overwhelming that it committed this lapse, if you
14 like, into this kind of terminology which is not the kind
15 of terminology I am comfortable with.
16 With respect to the UN Declaration of
17 Human Rights, here I might get myself into really bad
18 trouble. One, when I made that remark about section 29(1),
19 I was not trying to get involved at all into the use of
20 an abstract standard that was known at that time by which
21 these projects could be discussed.
22 I thought, in fact, if I remember
23 rightly, that the use of the UN -- there is a throwaway

line in Professor Grant that I was responding to there and it is just in a footnote anyway.

COMMISSIONER PAUL CHARTRAND: I did ask Professor Grant about the same general issue this morning.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Yes. True.

But my sense of it at the time -- and I may be completely wrong here -- was that the UN Declaration, while a very, very admirable document, has never been one that countries have subscribed to as their standard. In other words, I understand it is not -- and I may be really wrong on this -- an international legal document. It is a statement of intent of -- that is how I understood anyway, but not a statement of obligation.

Now, this may be something that I am completely wrong on and if I try to interpret your smiles, I have the sense that I should back off from this as fast as possible. In any case, I certainly didn't have the idea in mind that the human declaration could be used in this instance.

I think I had a different idea in mind and maybe I should have. I can see from your questions how important that would be. I should have had a more implicit sense of what was guiding me and I didn't set

it out explicitly, but I think what I had in mind as I went through this was something like the following kinds of standards of what one could judge the projects by.

The first was: What was the nature of the problem? Was it well understood? Was the government when it said, "This is a problem," presenting a reasonable defensible case, or was it a trivial one? So, in other words, what I had in mind was: When the government decided on a policy, was this well elaborated? Did they understand the nature of the problem?

Secondly, what was the nature of the resources at the time? I try to get into that as much as possible because I think it is there. I think that is where you have to take account to some degree the relativeness of all of this. What were the resources at the time? Were they overwhelming or were they rather limited? Did they improve over time?

Third, given the nature of the problem at the time and given the resources that were available at the time, was the project commensurate? Was it reasonable? I don't know. It is a very, very slippier word, but I can't think of a better one. Was there a reasonable connection between the nature of the problem,

1 the nature of the resources that were available and the
2 activity that was undertaken?
3 Fourthly, how well -- and I was just
4 jotting this down actually -- I have been thinking about
5 this over the last couple of days and I was just jotting
6 this down as you were talking -- given the resources at
7 the time, did people carry out the project? Did they do
8 it badly by anybody's standards? If they did it badly,
9 did they compensate for their mistakes? Did they have
10 enough back-up? Those kinds of questions.
11 Lastly, were the projects a success a
12 least in terms of government standards and, hopefully,
13 the standards of the people who were involved because,
14 after all, they were supposed to be the beneficiaries of
15 this and it was certainly not -- the object wasn't to have
16 a successful government program. The object was to have
17 a successful program that was going to have successful
18 outcomes for people.
19 So I am sorry, in a sense, that I didn't
20 articulate that. I may be making this up at this point
21 in time. I think I had something like this in mind without
22 actually explicitly saying it to myself and having it typed
23 out.

1 Does that answer at all what --
2 **COMMISSIONER PAUL CHARTRAND:** Yes, it
3 does, Professor Grant. I wanted to stress that I invited
4 a fuller elaboration of a matter which I think is important
5 for our work. We will, in my view, need time and reflection
6 with which to assess them, and I thought this was a good
7 opportunity to provide you with an opportunity to assist
8 us by reflecting more fully upon the matter.
9 I am interested particularly in the part
10 of your response where you say that one of the standards
11 that we ought to look at -- and I think this is something
12 that might apply more generally to our work. We ought
13 to look at the standards of the people themselves. Now,
14 that might have some significant relevance for the
15 development of our work in notions of local community
16 justice initiatives, for example.
17 So I want to thank you for your
18 elaboration.
19 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Could I say one very
20 quick word in response? It occurred to me as you were
21 saying this.
22 I think one of the standards has to be:
23 What was the nature of the people who carried this out?

1 Were they decent people? Were they sincere? Do they
2 give a sense of caring? Do they seem to be responsible?
3 Did they put themselves out? That might be added there
4 as well. A little point.
5 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** Thank you.
6 I would like to pick up very briefly on
7 that because I think it is very central to your analysis
8 and also to the work that we have to do.
9 In fact, I asked the question earlier
10 this week about the tests that we should use to make a
11 judgment call on the project. You said, "Was the project
12 reasonable?"
13 The question, I think, that goes to the
14 crux of the matter is really an assessment of what was
15 the situation in Inukjuak and the magnitude of this
16 relocation and the risks that were involved. We have
17 discussed that with Bud Neville yesterday, that it was
18 on file that there was a problem of transportation at that
19 time with the ships and on and on.
20 So with the risks that were involved and
21 the consequences for people -- a break with extended
22 families; difficulty to find mates to get married; loss
23 of opportunity for schooling; medical services and other

1 amenities; the darkness; the shear freedom to circulate
2 that was not offered to them because of the policy to keep
3 those people separate from the base for reasons that were
4 mentioned and were certainly legitimate in the minds of
5 people, but the result was that they were kept separate.
6 They were ordered not to give them food unless it was
7 done through the RCMP, and on and on.
8 So there were major consequences and
9 some of them cultural consequences. This morning we had
10 Professor Williamson who spoke about the relationship with
11 the land, how important it was for them. So really when
12 you add to this the duty of care and to assess the
13 preparation and the errors that were made, the difficulties
14 that occurred, that could be foreseen because of the
15 situation in the north at that time.
16 So the real question, I think, that is
17 before the Commission and the public overall is: Was this
18 out of proportion as a solution to the problem that was
19 there? Let's put to the side the motivations, but looking
20 at the operation, looking at the project itself.
21 When you conclude on the preparation,
22 for example, I think it is on page 12 of the single-spaced
23 document, when you conclude the preparation aspect, it

1 seems to me that if you take each detail, you could justify
2 many of them on the reasonableness and the conditions.
3 But when you put all of this together and if there is a
4 standard against which to judge them, it might be quite
5 different.
6 I was struck when I read your report by
7 your conclusion saying, in general, the preparation, given
8 the truncated resources of the Department, the abject
9 poverty of the participants, the parsimonious approach
10 to government spending and the obsession with self-help
11 and individual responsibility of the day were adequate
12 and acceptable.
13 What seems to be missing is a larger
14 standard against which to judge the whole operation and
15 the project itself, and it seems to me that this was quite
16 different than moving people 50 miles or even within
17 northern Quebec. The magnitude of the move was something
18 that has to be assessed in accordance with the situation
19 in 1953, not nowadays.
20 But still was it proportionate to the
21 problems that were there? It is in the file and you are
22 stating that in 1952 things were starting to get better.
23 1953 was a bumper year for foxes, on and on.

1 So what is your -- I suppose it is --
2 I would like this afternoon if you could tell us what is
3 your views on a test like that? What is really
4 proportionate?
5 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** It is really very, very
6 difficult to give an answer on a larger standard as you
7 have asked for it. In a way, it is sort of a problem.
8 I suppose one could give a global answer, but I think if
9 you do give a global answer, it will be largely one in
10 terms of your gut instincts and your ideology on the whole
11 thing.
12 I think you either like it or you don't
13 like it in that sense. I think in a certain sense you
14 have to take a problem like this and break it up into
15 minuscule parts, particularly when you try to evaluate
16 it.
17 As I have said, it seems to me that, first
18 of all, it is a reasonable proposition to make that if
19 the situation in Inukjuak after 1956/57 had problems and
20 there were serious health problems in the early sixties
21 and there were serious schooling problems, if you go beyond
22 1954 and you look at the reports for 1956, 1957, 1958 and
23 1959, I think -- I am not sure I am completely right on

1 this, but I think the Quebec police took over the patrolling
2 in 1960 and so on. So I wasn't able to find other reports
3 on that.
4 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** IN 1963.
5 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I couldn't fin any
6 beyond 1959 anyway.
7 But if things were a problem in Inukjuak
8 in a general sense, despite the reduced population and
9 there had been a huge drop in population from 500 to 340
10 and still the problems persisted, then the fact that the
11 people had not gone -- so the fact is that it seems people
12 going north made conditions better at Inukjuak. If those
13 people had stayed, my argument would be: It is reasonable
14 to assume that things would have been worse all around
15 for everybody in Inukjuak.
16 This is speculation. There is no way
17 that one can say for sure, but if the problem of the
18 relationship of population to resources was the most
19 serious one, then clearly reducing population in relation
20 to resources was going to be at least a reasonable policy,
21 whether that required sending people so far north or not
22 was another issue that one might look at.
23 So I think that is one of the things that

1 you have to look at. A second is, for instance, you said
2 -- and I won't go on and on on this because you raised
3 a lot of issues. You raised issues about risks and medical
4 services and schooling and so on.
5 I had a sense reading the documents --
6 I am no great expert on the north by any manner of means,
7 but I had a sense that risks and risk taking were a major,
8 major problem just living in the north -- the risks of
9 TB, the risks of dying young, the risks of the RCMP being
10 too far away to help away, the risks that there was not
11 going to be a nurse, that there was not going to be an
12 aircraft. So this was the truth all over the show.
13 My sense of it was -- again, this is
14 something I have to do in a very careful way -- that the
15 RCMP -- it looks limited by our standards today, but the
16 RCMP actually put a great deal of their resources into
17 this to make sure to minimize the risks. They had one
18 RCMP officer at Resolute saying, "Four or five miles away,
19 this officer put in an emergency phone a couple of years
20 later so that people could phone the base. That was
21 something that was very unusual. It would not have been
22 the case at Inukjuak." This was an officer who built a
23 community hall, if that is the right word for it, in 1953

1 for people right away
2 -- another advantage -- and was somebody who tried to take
3 care of things when things went wrong. There were very,
4 very few other Inuit groups in the Arctic that had that
5 degree of care.
6 Now, maybe they didn't like him. Maybe
7 they didn't like his care. That is a separate issue all
8 together, but it seems to me that the RCMP was trying in
9 that case.
10 Now, Grise Fiord -- I think you have to
11 treat both communities differently. At Grise Fiord, it
12 was different. I thought that was a very tough decision
13 -- the decision to send people living 40 miles away and
14 then only join them two years later, which meant that people
15 had to travel a whole day by sled to get to the trading
16 store, to the RCMP. That was a tougher situation.
17 There was also far less medical services
18 at Grise Fiord. The first nurse came in 1968. There they
19 were lucky in a way. Grise Fiord was described at the
20 healthiest community in the north in the mid-sixties.
21 Why was that? We can speculate a little bit, but my sense
22 of it is, for instance, that at Resolute, to take medical
23 services, they had better medical services -- the group

that went north. We have to remember that there were two camps that went north.

Camp A lived five miles across a river from Inukjuak, about a couple of hours to get there. Camp B was 50 miles away from Inukjuak. Camp B went to Resolute. Camp B in that sense had available the use of a medic five miles down the road; the availability of even an RCMP officer three or four miles down the road; the use of a dump where you could pick up wood for housing which they didn't have sixty miles outside Inukjuak.

So, again, I think you have to break the problem up. Schooling is the same thing. I have the same sense about schooling.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: I agree that you have to break the problem up, but at the end, it is like my watch. I put all the pieces on the table, but at the end I have to put that together and see if it makes sense when they are added, each element is added to each other.

Just to --

MAGNUS GUNTHER: And you have to subtract the minuses, too.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: But to give

1 another example, at the bottom of page 13 of your
2 presentation, the sixth point, maybe the seventh line,
3 you are assessing the situation between Inukjuak and the
4 situation of those who went up in the north, the High
5 Arctic. You say:
6 "They nevertheless were doing in most ways far better than
7 they have in Inukjuak."
8 Again, it depends on the standards. It
9 is not just a matter of money and what is in the bank
10 account.
11 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I agree.
12 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** What has
13 happened of the breaking of the family, the sisters that
14 were left over, the parents, the fact that people were
15 not able to meet their kin for not a year or two but decades,
16 and the relationship with the land? It seems to me --
17 did you find some analysis in the documents that you have
18 perused of thought that would have been given to human
19 aspects like these ones, not just mechanic or financial
20 aspects, but more fundamental aspects? Did you find in
21 any of the files and the documents that you have been over
22 that this had been taken into account, analyzed and weighed
23 in the sense of, "Well, are we going to really do that?"

1 Did you find something like that? I haven't in all of
2 the documents I have read.
3 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I must confess that I
4 am very insensitive on the issue you have just raised.
5 I was listening to Professor Williamson, was it this
6 morning?
7 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** This morning.
8 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I seem to have been in
9 this room for a long time.
10 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Nine
11 o'clock.
12 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** This morning.
13 I was very, very struck by my own
14 insensitivity on this in the report. I don't do well on
15 that. I am not enough of an expert. The issues you have
16 raised of the caring for the land, the feeling for family
17 and so on -- I treat this in sort of an abstract -- I am
18 sympathetic, but when I was trying to compare myself to
19 Professor Williamson, I thought, "Gee, he has so much of
20 a better feel for this than I have."
21 So I think that is a real weakness of
22 my report. My sense of it is: Yes, these are reports
23 from a white culture. Wasn't it Professor Williamson who

joked about whites going to the north and counting stones because they always have to count something? Well, I suddenly felt myself terribly vulnerable with my report because I have all these numbers that you have to look at one way or the other.

The reports tend to be caring in that kind of bureaucratic way. It is limited. Years people say, "Look, we are concerned about what has happened to such and such a boy. Could you try to arrange letters?" But I suppose that is a sort of a distant caring, isn't it, when compared to these more intimate matters that you have talked about.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: I think we are getting very close to what is central here. It is where those people really -- was the project considered having in mind that those people were human beings on a larger sense than just making sure that they would have food? But on a more fundamental sense, who were they? I am not talking about our sensitivity in 1993. I know we have to be very careful.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Yes, I know.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: But even given the standard of the day, because of the proportion of the

1 project and its magnitude.

2 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** May I make one comment

3 in response to that, Mr. Chairman? One thing that struck

4 me -- and maybe I am overstating the importance of it,

5 but one thing that I thought was important was that there

6 were these huge numbers of people wanting to go up there.

7 This wasn't an experiment in Arctic terms that involved

8 a tiny number of people for decades and decades. By Arctic

9 standards, a large number of people, if their documents

10 are to be believed, wanted to go up -- quite huge numbers,

11 using the word "huge" again in quotation marks.

12 Why would they have wanted to go up if

13 it was as devastating as is being made out now? Were people

14 lying to them and saying, "Look, it is great up here,"

15 but they didn't mean it when they wrote it down or what

16 was it? Something must have been coming out of the High

17 Arctic saying to people, "Gee, you know, we are doing

18 reasonably well." There must have been some message of

19 that sort.

20 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** Again, we

21 enter into a realm of speculation at this point. We have

22 conflicting points of view as to why this happened. But,

23 again, I was trying to really address the standard under

which to assess after having looked at each piece, the overall project, as opposed to the situation that it meant to cure.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Sure.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Thank you. Bertha Wilson, please.

COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON: My question is really related to what you have just been discussing with Mr. Dussault and it is really this: You have a paragraph on volunteers and the issue of whether these people went willingly or were influenced into going by whatever means is obviously a very fundamental one to this whole problem.

To me, you can't be a volunteer unless you know the risk that you are assuming. You can't be a volunteer to do something in the air, so to speak. In order to be a volunteer, you have to know what it is, the risk is and you have to be accepting that risk in order to be a volunteer.

Not only do you have to have a knowledge of the risk, you have to have an ability to assess it and to assess its impact on you. I have a real problem with this concept of a volunteer sort of up in the air and in

1 the abstract. So I have a real difficulty here and that
2 is why I have been asking some of the people who were
3 involved: Were they told that the purpose of sending them
4 up to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay was to see if they could
5 survive in the conditions that obtained there? And the
6 conditions would have to be spelled out to them.
7 I am wondering: Were they told that
8 that was the purpose if, as some of the government officials
9 have said, it was really an experiment to see whether,
10 if we sent the Inuit back up to Ellesmere Island, they
11 could survive in the same way as Inuit used to survive
12 there long ago? I am wondering whether it is proper to
13 describe these people as volunteers or say that they went
14 there voluntarily unless they had a pretty comprehensive
15 knowledge of where they were going, what they were going
16 to, what they would face when they got and be able to make
17 a decision on that basis.
18 I think this is really a fundamental
19 issue in this whole matter and so I would like your views
20 on that.
21 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Yes. Madam
22 Commissioner, again, I think it is difficult to give a
23 fully satisfactory answer on this. There were a number

of facets of your question.

If I can try to break it down a little, if I remember them rightly, one is: Could you be a volunteer without fully comprehending what the terms of the whole thing are? Then I think what you said was: Were the risks fully explained to them so that they in fact could do this?

I guess my sense of that is that that is too high a standard to expect. I don't think any of us ever really take decisions in terms of fully comprehending all of the risks that are involved -- sometimes with very, very risky and with having far consequences. So I think that is a very, very, very high -- I mean, it is a reasonable standard to establish, but I think it is one that is almost inhuman in some senses to expect.

I think what you can --

COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON: It is a common standard that is used in a whole lot of areas and it is a legal standard. When a person says that they went to undertake or have an operation, it is explained to them what is involved in it, what the risk is. This has to be done if you are going to say that this was their informed

decision and that they voluntarily agreed to have it done.

It is just seems to me to be so basic that you can't describe somebody as a volunteer otherwise, and that raises the question of how detailed the information was that they were given. Were they in a position to appreciate the risks and to assess them? I think this is a fundamental question.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Yes, it is very important.

COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON: It's certainly not an easy one to answer, but --

MAGNUS GUNTHER: I guess I was balking at the word "complete" and "fully informed". It just seemed to me that that was a great deal. In our society, people used to vote for nuclear plants that would provide electricity without fully understanding nuclear fission or something of that sort.

So I think one can take a decision without fully understanding every aspect of something. That was number one. I just want to sort of lower the standard somewhat about how complete and full and total the information had to be before it could be reasonable.

1 That is the only reservation I have with what you were
2 saying there.
3 The second thing was -- this one is more
4 tricky. What was the nature of the information given to
5 the Inuit in the documents --I can only talk from the
6 documents -- and was that reasonable? That is interesting
7 because when you look at the nature of the information
8 given, then you can say to yourself, "Well, were these
9 officers or whoever they were -- did they have a decent
10 sense of what the fully appropriate information should
11 be and what is it?" It is fairly crude, actually.
12 What did Larsen think were the most
13 important things that people needed to know? He is
14 thinking of Inuit whom he has worked with and he obviously
15 cares about and he feels very responsible to, but what
16 does he say in his telegram to Port Harrison. He says,
17 "Tell them about the dark period." So he thought that
18 it was very, very important for them to try to understand
19 that. How do people understand it? There is quote
20 somewhere saying that when people were told about it, their
21 response was, "So be it. What can you do about it anyway?"
22
23 But Marjorie Hinds said she tried to

1 explain it and Gibson says that he tried to explain it.
2 I guess there is a separation between what information
3 do people think people should have and how well it was
4 gotten across to them, which is another issue if we really
5 want to complicate the issue.
6 But for the moment, I am just looking
7 at what information do they feel people should have. One
8 was the dark period. He thought it was very important
9 for them to know that and it seems to me that some attempt
10 was made to explain it.
11 Number two, he felt that the trading
12 store was a very important issue because clearly the
13 trading store was going to play a major role in their lives,
14 and he says, "Explain to people that there will be a trading
15 store, but it will only be supplied once a year." So he
16 knows: This isn't the world of the big trading store at
17 Inukjuak.
18 Thirdly, he says -- because he thinks
19 this is the most important thing they need to know. He
20 says, "Tell them that they can come back within a year
21 if they don't like it," and he does this on his own
22 responsibility. He then writes to the Department and he
23 says to them, "By the way, I have told the Inuit that they

can come back in a year. I have done this on my own initiative because I have in mind the sad experience of the Cape Dorset people of the thirties move."

So those were the three pieces of information that he thought were essential. Were they sufficient? Should they have been told more? I suppose an argument could certainly be made for that and then, as I say, the next stage is: How well was it done? But that is all I can tell you in terms of the documentation.

May I say one last thing on this? The last thing I wanted to say was: People don't go only on information about where they are going. I think they also go on: What does this offer them? I think you can't dismiss that.

I think it is very, very important to bear in mind that the Inuit -- the people who were going might -- we don't know because we are looking at documents -- well have been thinking, "Look, they have told us that the game is going to be better. It is not great here at the moment or it hasn't been great in the past. They have told us that they are going to give us a boat." That was the case in Grise Fiord. "That is a real plus. They have told us that we will get some duffle and clothes and they

1 will help us prepare for going north, and that is a real
2 plus." They have told us" -- and this was the most
3 important from the -- this was the important one -- "that
4 the RCMP will go with us," and that -- in a certain sense,
5 they said -- this is a guess, but that, I think, led to
6 them saying, "Oh, I will take those risks because if I"
7 -- RCMP was, roughly speaking, associated with protection
8 from risk or protection if something bad happened.
9 So the fact that the RCMP were going with
10 them would have played a role -- quite a decisive one in
11 deciding whether the risk was worth it or not.
12 We are going on reconstructing, though,
13 you know.
14 **COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON:** Yes. The
15 problem with a promise to return them if they weren't happy
16 doesn't seem to have filtered down to the people who were
17 actually -- some of them who were speaking to these people
18 about whether they would go or not. In fact, as I
19 understand it, it was denied by the government for quite
20 a long time that such a promise was ever made.
21 I agree with you that it is one of the
22 most important aspects of what a person needed to know
23 because that promise would have been important in the sense

that, "Well, if we find this impossible -- the separation from family and the habitat being so different, it really has come as a shock -- then I can go back." I agree that that was one of the -- but there seems to be an area of ambiguity that surrounds whether that commitment was made or not. But I appreciate your answer.

The other --

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Madam Commissioner, may I just say one thing on the promises?

COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON: Yes.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: I think what is very important here -- and no one thought about it at the time. This is my construction. I think if they had thought it through, they should have been aware that people might want to go back for visits, but they didn't think that one through.

What they had in mind when they said people could come back was that they could come back permanently. But once they got up there and they had a look at the bureaucratic niceties of Treasury Board guidelines and had to live within those -- and I am not talking about what the RCMP did and so on. But once they started looking at the rules, the fundamental gap between

1 paying for a visit versus paying for a return was, I think,
2 crucial to the misunderstanding that took place here.
3 I may be building a pyramid on the head
4 of a pin here, but I really think that was important because
5 that is constantly discussed -- Visits versus permanence.
6 If you want to go back permanently, they showed that they
7 would do it. If you wanted to have visits, you either
8 had to pay for it yourself or you got a free ride. I think
9 that is crucial in breaking up the offer of a promise of
10 return.
11 **COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON:** Having
12 regard to the point that Mr. Dussault was making about
13 the human aspects, would there have been any exceptions
14 made on compassionate ground for a visit -- the death of
15 parents or a relative or serious illness -- or was this
16 just an absolute return permanently, yes, visits, no?
17 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** No, I think there were
18 complications. I am sorry I don't recall them at the
19 moment, but I have that correspondence set out here and
20 I don't want to waste our time necessarily with that.
21 If you don't want an immediate reply, I will try to dig
22 it out and give you the pages on that where, in fact, an
23 administrator says, "Look, here are four instances of where

I would like to give people return visits," and he says, "I don't think these are covered by our regulations." The answer comes back from head office, "Yes, they are and they are these kinds of compassionate grounds."

So I can give you the exceptions. It wasn't just permanently to stay. There were exceptions. I will try to dig that up, though.

COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON: Thank you very much.

You have put a very heavy emphasis on the conditions in Inukjuak by way of the explanation for why the people were relocated, and you mentioned a whole variety of problems that existed there.

Now, were all of these problems resolved -- the health problems and everything -- by the removal of these people to the High Arctic? It would help me to appreciate that as being a reason for the move if the move was followed by intensive services poured into Inukjuak to address what has been described as a misery and so on that existed there. Did that in fact happen?

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Not until after 1953/54 and there is so little information available in a sense. Some housing projects started. I can really

1 just give you very, very, very fragmented information.
2 In Inukjuak, as I understood it, the
3 housing program -- there was an experimental housing
4 program that was started by a constable in 1958. He
5 experimented with some new different kinds of houses, but
6 these applied all to the settlement.
7 I do know that in 1960 they started
8 bringing in again housing for settlement Inuit -- that
9 is, people who were working for the white establishment
10 had wooden houses anyway at the settlement, but I am talking
11 about settlement Inuit who did not have wooden houses.
12 I am talking about settlement Inuit who did not have wooden
13 houses. I know that they started coming in in 1959/60.
14 I think things started changing
15 tremendously after 1966 which I think was the year Quebec
16 took over the services. I read a little bit into this,
17 but I had a sense that Quebec was really determined to
18 make a very, very big effort and, in fact, did make a much
19 superior effort to what the federal government had been
20 doing.
21 In a certain sense -- and I am out of
22 my depth here -- I think they were going to make this
23 something of a showcase. For instance, the co-ops came

in in 1967/78, but by that time Quebec had taken over the services. I think it is 1965/66 that Quebec came in and from the little bit that I have read, I have a sense that they really poured the services in. So we are talking about the late sixties, if I am right on this.

COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON: No, I was thinking of at the time of the relocation of the Inuit and immediately thereafter.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: In Inukjuak.

COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON: In Inukjuak, were these problems that you have been describing addressed by the government? The whole point of this is that it was out of care and concern for the Inuit and their wellbeing that they were moved, and it would certainly help me to appreciate that if a long with the removal to the High Arctic, there was a pouring in of services to relieve this unhappy situation in Inukjuak.

I just wondered if you knew whether there was or not. I am not looking at the sixties and later. I am really looking at the sort of crisis situation that was the justification for the move, but you may not have that information.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: I don't think there is

very much information and it is very mixed. 1951 to 1953 is one period. 1954 on is a very different period.

I don't have much information on what happened after 1954. It is a new administration, a new world, a new way of planning and doing things. From 1951 to 1953, they would have said or did say, "By taking population out of this area, we are going to make life easier for hunting and so on for the people there."

But in other respects, services declined. Services went up in some ways in Inukjuak. This second nurse arrived in 1958. That makes a big difference. In other respects, the services were much worse.

After Ms Hinds left in 1954, the camp educational system -- that is very much in quotes because what I meant was that Ms Hinds would visit a camp for three or four days in the summer, et cetera. That collapsed. There was no education system in the camps.

COMMISSIONER BERTHA WILSON: Thank you very much.

CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT: Commissioner Sillett, please.

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: Thank you.

1 On page 13 of your summary, you say that
2 the Inukjuak Inuit had the option after 1955 of getting
3 a free ride or paying for a flight to Churchill and then
4 paying for a further flight or a boat trip to Inukjuak
5 for a visit, and those options were available until 1961,
6 at least the option of the free ride.
7 But I was wondering: Do you have any
8 idea of how many people, how many of the people in Grise
9 Fiord or Resolute went back for a visit?
10 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** The only letters I was
11 able to find on that was the -- there is reference that
12 says, "Free rides are not a problem. People have been
13 doing this all the time." It is just a very general
14 statement.
15 Then there is a letter of 1958 where
16 three people from Resolute are wanting to go back and the
17 administrator says, "Oh, no problem. Just arrange for
18 it informally with the RCMP." Those are the only letters
19 that I came across where there were actually concrete
20 examples that were given.
21 **COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT:** You go on
22 to say that they did not permit the Department -- I guess
23 Treasury Board regulations didn't permit the Department,

I guess, Indian Affairs to pay for the permanent return of people to Inukjuak.

What period --

MAGNUS GUNTHER: For visits. Permanent was fine.

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: For what period are you talking about?

MAGNUS GUNTHER: My sense of it is that those Treasury Board regulations went on and on into the sixties as well, although I know -- I was talking to a Northern Services officer -- you see, I am not trying to say that everyone followed the regulations. Certainly when a Deputy Minister answered a letter, he was going to say that he had to follow the regulations. But on the ground, the Northern Service officers did whatever they could and I know even in the late sixties, Northern Service officers were providing visits -- not this time through the RCMP, but through the RCAF.

I am not really answering your question, am I? You said, "How long are the --"

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: No, I guess I was sort of surprised by that because I remember listening yesterday to Mr. Pilot who said that in 1973, when he worked

as a senior official with the NWT, he did get a message from the settlement manager that there was a spokesperson from one of the High Arctic communities speaking for the community asking if they could move to Inukjuak, and that was a permanent move and the answer was "no".

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Yes.

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: I guess you heard that as well.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: My first point was that I think no one thought this arrangement was going to last forever, kind of thing, and it might have fallen under that category. But whether that was because the Treasury Board regulations had been changed or not, I don't know. I would have to go back. One could find that fairly easily, actually, if that is something that the Commission wanted to pursue.

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: My third question is: I remember reading and being told that a number of the people who were relocated to the High Arctic were excellent carvers, were very skilled carvers.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Yes.

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: So I am wondering: What role did the carvers have to play in the

1 economy of Grise Fiord and Resolute in the fifties and
2 sixties?
3 The reason I ask that question is that
4 I notice that you say that a study was done in 1966 in
5 one of the High Arctic communities and it was noted that
6 there was an Inuk individual who had $7,000 in the bank.
7 If I can remember correctly, I believe that person was
8 a carver. So for someone to be an exceptional carver in
9 a period of Canadian history when there was, I guess, a
10 really good market for Inuits arts and crafts, it wouldn't
11 be surprising to hear that someone would have that much
12 money, especially if they were really skilled in that area.
13 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Sure. My sense of
14 that is that the carving was very important at Grise Fiord,
15 not at Resolute any more. By 1966, people had full-time
16 -- mostly people had full-time jobs and certainly by 1966
17 and part-time work was very, very much available, although
18 the report also says that people were perhaps moving away
19 a little bit. But there was full-time employment and once
20 full-time employment, people didn't do carving that much.
21 But we could check Bissett's report because he does give
22 the sources of income.
23 My sense of it is that it was Grise Fiord

really where the carvers remained where the carvers were very good and earned a fair income. I don't think the income was as high as Inukjuak. I did some very rough calculations and they are crude as many of my numbers are.

My sense was that until 1960 that at Grise Fiord they may have been earning about half the capita what they were earning in Inukjuak. In other words, let's say, 1959, my sense was that maybe people were earning $100 per head a year on carving, whereas in Grise Fiord it would have been about $50 to $55 by comparison.

Again, very cautiously on the numbers on that.

COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT: Yes, I know.

My final question is: I noticed that you had statistical data describing the general socio-economic conditions of the Inuit in the early fifties. I know that data is very difficult to find for that period in history, but I was wondering if there was any similar information to your knowledge comparing the socio-economic conditions of Inukjuak in the High Arctic communities.

1 For example, is there anything that
2 would tell us what the infant mortality rates were for
3 Inukjuak as opposed to Grise Fiord, what the TB rate was
4 for the community of Resolute compared to Inukjuak,
5 especially in the years 1953 to 1956?
6 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I tried to do this
7 again in a very kind of crude way. The problem is that
8 the statistics are there and hopefully they are reasonable
9 for the Northwest Territories as a whole so you have a
10 baseline.
11 The trouble is that when I tried to add
12 up how many people were out in the hospitals for TB or
13 so on and then try to take that as a proportion of the
14 community each year, I found that the reporting techniques
15 varied from year to year. For example, sometimes the
16 community would be reported as having 85 people, but that
17 wouldn't count people in hospitals. So you didn't know
18 how many people were in the hospital. Other years, they
19 would say, "Oh, our total population is this and so and
20 so many are in hospital." Other times, people would say,
21 "Oh, we have 12 people in the hospital and two of them
22 were for TB and others for something else."
23 So once the numbers -- they were so

1 dicey, so I made a very, very tentative guess that I thought
2 the death rate -- and really tentative. I mean, this has
3 to be taken with an enormous pinch of salt. I thought
4 the death rates in the north were somewhat lower than the
5 general death rates and I offer that very tentatively,
6 and I thought that the TB rates were either relatively
7 or absolutely lower than for the Northwest Territories.
8 But I wouldn't want to defend those
9 statistics to the death. In fact, I don't think I would
10 defend much to the death at this point. Maybe a good meal.
11 **COMMISSIONER MARY SILLETT:** Thank you.
12 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** Georges
13 Erasmus, please.
14 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** I would like
15 to get back to the question of sovereignty and effective
16 occupation.
17 What, according to your understanding,
18 was the test of effective occupation that had to be met
19 by Canada?
20 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** In the High North?
21 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Yes.
22 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** As they were set out
23 -- please stop me, Commissioner Erasmus, if I have

1 misunderstood the question.
2 As I understand it from Dean Macdonald's
3 study of the conditions of sovereignty, effective
4 occupation meant, according to the East Greenlander case
5 -- and, again, I am not a lawyer. So I am going to stutter
6 a little bit on this one -- it meant that there were
7 sufficient indications of an effective government presence
8 such that the legal personality of the state was clearly
9 being maintained or could be maintained if there should
10 be any threat.
11 So effective occupation meant having a
12 sufficient number of indicators of a government presence,
13 and not much was expected even in the East Greenlander
14 case. For instance, it was felt that if you had a post
15 office on some place, that was a good indicator. So
16 immediately the commanders of the weather stations were
17 made postmasters and a year later, St. Laurent said, "Can't
18 we do anything like sending up Customs and Immigration
19 officers?" So immediately the commanders of the weather
20 stations became Customs and Immigration officers as well
21 as postmasters and et cetera.
22 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** All right.
23 What was meant by Canadianization of the

1 north and what relationship did it have to sovereignty?
2 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I don't think it was
3 the same thing, although it was related. As I understand
4 it in the documents at the time -- the definition that
5 I remember was in the Phillips memorandum of December 29,
6 1952 where I think he says, "Canadianization means the
7 provision of all Canadian government services in the
8 north."
9 What he then looks at is a number of ways
10 in which government services can be increased in the north.
11 So, for instance, he says, "Why don't we open up more
12 RCMP posts? Why don't we replace the 20 American civilians
13 who are at the weather stations?" It is unbelievable to
14 me how long it took them to replace those 20 Americans.
15 The internal discussions on that were
16 enormous, but the trouble is that the government was very,
17 very divided on this issue anyway. Some people thought
18 sovereignty was an important issue and other people thought
19 it was a mystical waste of money, and you get that in the
20 debate.
21 So he says, "Why not have more RCMP
22 officers? Why not replace these American civilians? Why
23 not take over an American weather station at Padlaping

1 (PH.)" and so on and so forth. So he wants to both expand
2 Canadian government services and take over the American
3 civilian presence in the north.
4 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** But it
5 didn't include adding civilians to the north that were
6 not going to be actually working at either a weather station
7 or an Armed Forces base or an actual officer working for
8 the government.
9 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Unless I am completely
10 wrong, my sense of it is that it really almost completely
11 meant government employees. That is my reading of it --
12 expansion of government employees in the north.
13 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Delivering
14 services to whom if there is nobody to service?
15 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Well, there would have
16 been weather station services that would have been serving,
17 I suppose, the whole of the north, the Department of
18 Transportation services, services like -- they were very,
19 very preoccupied about getting control of the seaways.
20 For instance, it really was a tremendous burr under the
21 saddle at that time that the Americans were supplying
22 Resolute and the joint weather stations.
23 So a huge effort was going to be made,

a very expensive one, to replace that with Canadian ships, and that was a big deal -- a big issue, rather. Sorry, my language is starting to slip at this stage.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: No, no problem.

What do you think was meant when Ben Sivertz in 1953 said that the Canadian government is anxious to have Canadians occupy as much of the north as possible? It appeared that in many cases the Eskimos were the only people capable of doing this. What do you think that meant?

MAGNUS GUNTHER: My interpretation in my report was that I thought he was talking about sovereignty. I also noted in a footnote that he disagreed. I had had a call from him on that and he said that he was simply talking about the need to have the resources of the north utilized by Canada.

It is hard to have a certain interpretation and then the person that you talk to says, "No, you have the wrong interpretation," and then the person is in the room at the same time. So that is all I can tell you, that I thought at the time that he was thinking of that.

1 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** So then it
2 is to believed according to your document that it is not
3 a question of sovereignty to move people to the north,
4 but as you state in your summary on page 3, that actually
5 once they are there, they contribute to sovereignty.
6 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Yes. Any activity of
7 that sort was going to contribute to sovereignty.
8 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** How is it
9 that there isn't a bridge there? If everyone agrees that
10 once they are there they are actually supporting
11 sovereignty, why is it not that one of the logical reasons
12 could also be -- not necessarily the only one, not even
13 in the primary one. It might be the hunter in a long list
14 of ones, but how is it logical that the same people that
15 are involved -- it is Sivertz that is saying this on the
16 one hand. How is it possible that you could actually
17 decide you are going to move people up there? You know
18 that once they are there they are going to be contributing
19 to Canadian sovereignty, but you are actually deciding
20 to move them there and you are going to vehemently deny
21 in every which way that the decision doesn't have anything
22 to do with sovereignty.
23 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Sure.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: It leaves a little bit of doubt in my mind that that could possibly be going on.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Sure.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Later on, also, when people were considering leaving Grise Fiord and possibly moving to Resolute, there is an argument, "Don't leave. It is going to affect" --

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Maybe we should keep Grise Fiord going for sovereignty reasons.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Yes.

So once they are there, they are important to sovereignty and it is important to maintain them, but you can actually go that far and say, "Still the decision originally didn't have anything at all to do, not even the smallest shred, with sovereignty." Right?

MAGNUS GUNTHER: I don't think anybody can say that. I certainly wouldn't go that far. Then, of course, you are going to ask me, "How far can we go?"

Let me hesitate on that for a moment. Let me just say this, though, more seriously on that:

1 One is that it is interesting when people quote that Sivertz
2 line that they never quote what he also said at that
3 meeting. What he says at that meeting is, quite apart
4 from that one line, "The primary reason we are sending
5 Inuit Eskimo to the north is to see whether they can find
6 a better living there." And no one quotes that.
7 Everybody sort of forgets about that. Everyone sticks
8 to this one line.
9 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** All right.
10 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** The same thing with
11 that 1960 --
12 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** For this
13 conversation, let's say that it is a given that it is not
14 a primary reason. Let's say that we as Commissioners agree
15 that that was not the primary motivating factor.
16 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Yes.
17 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** What I am
18 trying to get at -- and that is why I am asking -- is if
19 there was any element of sovereignty in there, and you
20 continued to say here that it was not the primary and --
21 I can't remember the words, but it wasn't the main or --
22 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Material. It was not
23 material as well.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: All right. So could it be a small portion?

MAGNUS GUNTHER: What I would like to say --

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Could it be a minor consideration?

MAGNUS GUNTHER: I would like to say "yes" and get us over this hump, but I would rather not and I hope that what I say in response is not going to seem like sliding away from the question, but my sense of it is this: There are a couple -- I think there are three of what I would regard as throw-away lines in the documents that refer to sovereignty.

So, clearly, there are people -- now, Sivertz denies that he said this, but let's just assume for the argument that he did. There are a few throw-away lines in the documents that refer to sovereignty. They do not come from top-level public servants at the time. They come from what I called middle level public servants.

The question that one has to ask oneself as to how much role sovereignty played is this: Do middle level public servants, when they express things, express the totality of a public policy? I don't think they do.

1 They are allowed to indicate what their views are, but
2 the policy of a bureaucratic organization is to be found
3 in the hierarchy and what the hierarchy says and what it
4 says officially.
5 So if, for instance, the hierarchy, in
6 wanting to articulate its policy, reads a document that
7 says, "And, oh, by the way, sovereignty could be usefully
8 implemented," but they happen not to use that phrase, what
9 that suggests to me is that they looked at it and they
10 said, "Oh, that is interesting. X things that, but that
11 is not our policy."
12 I think that happened and that is the
13 truth of the matter, that there are endless numbers of
14 documents showing that the policy is to get employment,
15 better hunting and improve the lives of people. Sure,
16 the odd person said something about sovereignty, but that
17 doesn't mean it was the reason or the policy in terms of
18 the hierarchy.
19 You can tell the policy of a government
20 department when you see the sort of key lines that they
21 use over and over again, the key positions, and that is,
22 I think, absolutely clear in this case in literally
23 countless numbers -- I am starting to exaggerate --

1 literally very large numbers of references in the
2 documents.
3 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** What about
4 this 1956 report that I think Shelagh Grant quotes on
5 sovereignty on Ellesmere Island? Included is a list of
6 Canadian activities since 1950 that imply effective
7 occupation and exertion of jurisdiction amongst the items.
8 Then they talk about the six families, the Eskimo
9 colonists that were landed at Craig Harbour in August 1953
10 and then they go on about in August 1953, the RCMP
11 detachment was opened on Alexandria Fiord. Seven Inuit
12 families took up residences in August in the same place.
13 I find that contradictory because I
14 thought that was the place they didn't go to, but certainly
15 at Craig Harbour they did go.
16 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I think they are
17 counting -- maybe it wasn't the special constable who went
18 up there. Maybe it was somebody -- I don't know.
19 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** But the
20 point is: They list the actual six and the seven families
21 and if you take them together, they are actually talking
22 about the two shipments, 53 and 55. Together there were
23 14 families between the two places, Grise Fiord and

Resolute.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Yes.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: So they actually cite those families as being part of effective occupation according to one of the reports.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Yes, I certainly think that once they went up there, they contributed to effective occupation in that sense, but I don't think they were sent up for that reason. I think everybody has admitted that once people appeared in a sparsely populated area of that sort -- pretty much any activity up there contributed --

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: It was coincidence that they landed up there and --

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Not at all. It wasn't coincidence at all. But as I say, you can do something for one reason and it can have a variety of consequences. In this case, they did something for reason X and it had consequences WYZ, but I don't think it was coincidence at all.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: All right.

You talked to Paul Chartrand about a number of things, but I wonder if you could explain to me in your mind what would actually constitute a human

1 experiment?

2 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I assume it would be

3 a medical experiment. It is hard for me to --

4 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** That is the

5 only kind of experiments there are that human beings can

6 participate in?

7 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Or inhuman things like

8 concentration camps. First of all, the word -- maybe I

9 am missing your point here -- "experiment", as I have set

10 out in some detail in my report, meant something completely

11 different from what it means today -- not completely

12 different, but it meant project. It didn't mean a

13 scientific endeavour.

14 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** I realize

15 that. I am not worried about that at this point. I am

16 trying to figure out in your mind: What is a human

17 experiment? There must be some judgment you have that

18 you are basing this one that it doesn't fit. So I want

19 to know what it is that you are using as the test, as the

20 rule, as the line in which once you cross it, you are into

21 a human experiment. So please tell me?

22 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I am sorry, maybe I am

23 getting tired. I missing something on the question

because you are asking me -- I can only think of -- at the moment, the only thing I can think of in terms of a human experiment -- no, I suppose I can start thinking of a lot of things that would involve human experiments.

There are all the kinds of things that people do perhaps with scientifically structured psychological experiments with human subjects, let's say, or medical experiments or the sorts of things that are covered by experimental codes in universities and so on.

I am really sorry, but I am not following you.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: No, that's fine.

What would the test of consent be of the participants?

MAGNUS GUNTHER: I am out of my depth on this question. I have never been on, let's say, for example, a university ethics committee on the use of human subjects. I think I am out of my depth on this.

CO-CHAIR %% ERASMUS: That's fine.

On oral tradition, you started off talking about oral tradition in your presentation and why

1 you thought it could be faulty. One of the criticisms
2 you mentioned was that it was organic and that it tended
3 to change over time.
4 As soon as you said it, I had the
5 impression that that kind of meant that the written
6 versions of history never changed and just earlier today
7 we were presented by researchers who were telling us that
8 this particular subject, for instance -- how difficult
9 it was to write on it because as they continued to uncover
10 new information, virtually every day you could add a new
11 version or an extended view on it.
12 So I was wondering what you thought of
13 that.
14 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Oh, absolutely. I
15 shouldn't set up an incredibly shocked dichotomy between
16 the oral and the documentary.
17 I guess what I had in mind was something
18 like certainly interpretation of documents changes and
19 if you get a new document, then you can interpret -- you
20 get B and it helps you interpret A in a different way.
21 I meant more that what is written there on the piece of
22 paper doesn't change that much.
23 Actually, if you will give me 30 seconds,

I had something very different in mind.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Yes.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: It was a personal experience. For a long, long time in our family, I had an uncle who was an anti-Nazi fighter in the 1930s who had also committed the heinous crime of marrying a Jew. The family story was that Uncle Harold had, right when the Nazis came into power, been arrested in put in Dahar, had been very, very brutally treated there, hung upside down and so on, released after six months and then, lucky enough, was able to take his family out of Germany. I remember this story. This was the family story.

Last time, I spent a little time checking that out when I was in Germany and, indeed, my uncle was a stout and courageous anti-Nazi, but he never was in Dahar and he never was hanged upside down.

I guess what I would like to say about the point is that the story had grown in a way. How it got in to me this way -- I have believed this for 40 years. You need double checks on these things and I had to go to documents and talk to other people before I found out.

Certainly, there was a story there. He was badly treated, but it wasn't in the way that I was

absolutely convinced and that my parents were convinced as well.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: But do you agree that there are different perceptions on history?

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Very much so.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Surely, that could be whether it was written or otherwise.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Yes, I think it is an interpretation question. A document by itself is not going to reach out, shake your hands and explain itself and say, "This is the only way you are going to understand me." I agree with that. It is a matter of interpretation.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: I had a minor thing to try to check with you, figures that are a little bit different in relation to the mark-up of goods being sold by the RCMP.

On page 328, you mention a mark-up of 10 per cent for necessities and 25 for luxuries. In other reports that we have, the mark-up for luxuries is 40 per cent. I was wondering if you were absolutely firm on that or if you had some opinion on that.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Again, I think I am getting a bit tired. I do remember this. I can't remember

whether one was the Hudson's Bay Company or the trading post any more. I think that the trading posts went for -- oh, it was the co-op. I think the co-op had a mark-up of an average of 18 per cent. That was 25 plus -- oh, I do remember now.

The Eskimo Loan Fund had a mark-up of 40 and 10. That is a total of 50 and the co-op had a lower mark-up. That is, 25 and 10 or 35 per cent. I don't know why I am doing these additions. The one went 40 and 10 and the other went, I think, 25 and 10.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: So once the co-ops --

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Or 35 and 10.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Once the co-ops came into place, then they lowered the mark-ups.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: Yes, they lowered it somewhat.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: So this was to repay the loan that these mark-ups -- or else this was the store, the operating costs on the store?

MAGNUS GUNTHER: The mark-ups the store and the Eskimo Loan Fund were to partly pay back the loan, to cover freight costs, to cover interest on the loan.

1 So they covered interest in principle --
2 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** So a
3 percentage of the mark-up actually went to repay the loan.
4 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Oh, yes. That was the
5 main way the loan was paid off.
6 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Rather than
7 people getting credits from trapping and --
8 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** They got credits as
9 well. If, let's say, you sold 20 pelts and the fixed tariff
10 at the time was $15, then $300 was credited to your personal
11 account.
12 It was the same thing with the family
13 allowance or with relief or with your wages. They were
14 personal accounts as well as a total loan account.
15 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** In relation
16 to the loan fund and the mark-up in furs, we have been
17 trying to figure out what has actually happened to the
18 surplus, the letter that was sent to headquarters saying
19 that there didn't seem to be a credit coming back to the
20 store or to the individuals.
21 What is your understanding on that? Was
22 the surplus ever discovered? That was just for one year
23 and in that they were also citing that it seemed like they

1 hadn't received it from the previous year.
2 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Yes. By the way, I
3 would mention that the Eskimo Loan Fund was, from my
4 perspective, a very bizarre financing instrument. You
5 could understand it in a way, maybe.
6 Apparently, the background to it was
7 that there were Indian loan funds that had previously
8 existed and that's where they got the idea. You could
9 understand that perhaps in the first two years or three
10 years, or whatever, when it wasn't sure that the project
11 was going to go on that you couldn't go in with a co-op
12 right away.
13 But everybody hated the Eskimo Loan
14 Fund. The Department did. The RCMP did. The only people
15 who liked the Eskimo Loan Fund was Treasury Board and there
16 are all sorts of memos from Sivertz and Phillips and others
17 saying, "Let's change this thing. It is terrible. It
18 is unfair," and so on and so forth.
19 But my understanding on the payments for
20 fur was that there was a tariff that was set each year.
21 How that was set, I don't know. It was maybe an average.
22 Maybe it was a rolling average of prices.
23 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** And then the

fur was auctioned.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: That's right.

The tariff, in a sense, was a guaranteed income for your fur. So, let's say in a particular year, the market collapsed and the market was only $6 per fur. You would still get your $20 if that was the tariff.

In a way, it wasn't such a bad idea. In other words, it was sort of to even out the highs and the lows of that extraordinary volatile fur market. So the idea was: You would get a tariff no matter what you achieved on the market -- I am sorry, no matter what those furs obtained on the market You would get your $20 even if the Eskimo Loan Fund or the Department selling them got $15.

The Eskimo Loan Fund as a whole was supposed to take the profits and losses on that, and the anger at the time was, "This is crazy. You gave us a tariff which gave us $6,000 and you guys made a profit of -- what was it? -- $11,000 and you have taken it back into the loan fund. Now, in a certain sense, the community will get it, but we want to make sure that the individual trappers get that profit."

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: How would

1 the community get it?
2 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** They wrote to them on
3 that.
4 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** No, but you
5 said in a certain way the community would get it. How?
6 Would it go back to the store as a credit?
7 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** That's right. That is
8 what the argument at the time was, that the community will
9 always benefit. Once the loans are paid off, all of this
10 comes back to the community.
11 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Did that
12 also mean, then, that if they paid a tariff with $15, sold
13 the fur for a lower figure, that the --
14 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** You would have to pay.
15 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** -- store
16 actually got the debit?
17 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Took the loss. Yes,
18 that's the way it worked and that's what made people so
19 upset.
20 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** All right.
21 In relation to the promises that Larsen
22 said to Port Harrison when the whole thing was being set
23 up, the instructions on what to tell people, as you were

1 describing a bit earlier -- you described that the
2 instructions included: One, to tell people about the dark
3 period; to tell people about the trading store and then
4 to tell people about the promise to return.
5 Who was this sent to? Who was supposed
6 to pass this on?
7 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** It was sent to Corporal
8 Webster. I think it was sent in the name of Webster.
9 Oh, no, it would have been sent to the detachment, I think,
10 at Harrison and it was also sent, with the wording somewhat
11 different, to Fort Chimo.
12 The telegram to Pond Inlet was a little
13 different.
14 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Who was
15 supposed to actually communicate this to the Inuit?
16 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** The detachment was in
17 each case.
18 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** I am curious
19 about that because when we had Ross Gibson on the phone
20 -- you may have been sitting in the audience.
21 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Yes.
22 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** We asked him
23 about whether or not he knew anything about a promise to

1 return and he said during the whole time that he had never
2 heard anything about this ever.
3 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I know. I am utterly
4 perplexed because he even, as throw-in line, said, "Webster
5 gave me the telegram." I thought, "Well, if you saw the
6 telegram, then you must have realized two things. One
7 is that people could go back in a year and you must have
8 realized, because the telegram is very, very clear --"
9 it is in my report, by the way, the full telegram.
10 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Then later
11 in the same day we were told by Sivertz that the reason
12 that Larsen didn't know about it is because he had no
13 responsibility for that.
14 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** That Larsen didn't?
15 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Yes, Gibson
16 didn't know about it because he had no responsibility to
17 actually communicate that.
18 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** That, in other words,
19 Webster might simply have said to him, "We have been asked
20 to find people," and that Webster didn't pass on the full
21 terms of the telegram. It is sort of incomprehensible
22 to me. I can't understand it because the telegram is also
23 very, very clear that people are to go to two locations

on Ellesmere.

Now, there I can understand where the mistake might have occurred, that someone might have said, "Oh, you are going to be on this one island," or that someone might have thought two hundred miles wasn't that far away. It sounds strange, but it has some plausibility. But I don't understand how Constable Gibson, who comes across as a fine officer -- not great on paperwork, I think, but responsible -- how that could have escaped him or how he could have forgotten it. But here is emphatic on that.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Then you say that in relation to people wanting to return, your appreciation is that there was no desire for any permanent return, that really what people wanted was just to return to visit.

You are saying that no one wanted to return permanently.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: I only came across -- there were a number of returns by Pond Inlet people that are mentioned.

CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS: Well, they are close.

MAGNUS GUNTHER: And they are close,

1 exactly.

2 There is one of a Grise Fiord family that

3 wanted to return in 1961 and arrangements were made, and

4 then the family, according to the documents, changed its

5 mind. Then there is one case where a family in 1960 either

6 was asked to or wanted to leave Resolute and could have

7 gone back to Inukjuak and instead went to Churchill and

8 six months later asked to come back to Resolute and went

9 back to Resolute.

10 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** I was just

11 wondering, just considering possibilities, mathematically

12 whether or not you could send 14 families anywhere in the

13 world regardless of what the situation and under the best

14 circumstances freely wanting to go there -- if it would

15 be possible that so few people would want to return, having

16 nothing to do with this.

17 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Yes.

18 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** I find it

19 hard to believe that so few people would want to return

20 just knowing the intimacy that the Inuit regard the

21 importance of family.

22 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I can't answer that.

23 I can just tell you what is in the documents.

1 I should mention that there was one other
2 case in 1963, actually, where a family did go back to
3 Harrison and that was paid for. I am not trying to
4 contradict what you were saying. What the family said
5 was that they were very reluctant to leave Resolute because
6 they liked it very much, but they felt that their relative
7 was now old and they owed a duty and so on. A very strong
8 sense of that comes through.
9 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Did you say
10 at the beginning that you have not had a chance to read
11 the transcripts or listen to the April hearings?
12 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I have not been able
13 to sit down and go through them very, very systematically
14 and very carefully and take notes and so on. I have tried
15 to read them, but it has been very, very quick and I haven't
16 really been able to do it very systematically.
17 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** I was
18 curious about that because you make a very major point
19 in your study about the fact that the Inuit have never
20 had an opportunity to really tell their story and that
21 if there is one thing missing --
22 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** I don't want to sound
23 as though I am criticizing the Commission. I actually

1 thought I might be sent a copy and I never was. So it
2 was just a matter of time really. I just got it very,
3 very recently.
4 By the way, I am not copping out here
5 at all.
6 **CO-CHAIR GEORGES ERASMUS:** Thank you
7 very much for answering those questions.
8 **MAGNUS GUNTHER:** Thank you.
9 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** I think
10 everybody is quite tired. The plan is the following:
11 We will have a short five-minute break and offered in the
12 agenda researchers to comment on what was said by other
13 researchers during the day for a very short period. So
14 I would like to say that we will resume in five minutes.
15
16 Maybe, Mr. Gunther, I could ask you right
17 now: Do you have comments? Would you like to say a few
18 comments on what was said by other researchers? I know
19 Shelagh Grant, for one, would like to use the opportunity
20 that was made in the agenda and the other researchers who
21 are still with us.
22 So if not, we will start by those
23 researchers who would like to do that. Afterward, we are

1 going to have a very short closing statement about the
2 two weeks of hearings. We plan to resume in five minutes
3 for half an hour and that will be it.
4 Thank you.
5 --- Short recess at 7:35 p.m.
6 --- Upon resuming at 7:50 p.m.
7 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** Could
8 everybody take a seat, please. We are resuming for half
9 an hour. I would like to ask Shelagh Grant to come forward.
10 **SHELAGH GRANT:** Did you want me to go
11 just to respond and go on or did you want me to going into
12 the sovereignty first and then respond, or is it all lumped
13 into one?
14 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** You are the one
15 who knows what you want to convey to us. You have fifteen
16 minutes. We have to keep within the schedule.
17 **SHELAGH GRANT:** Yes.
18 I want to say that I don't think I have
19 ever appreciated the work of a Commission until I have
20 watched the past two days and I am going to reverse it.
21 I thought I worked hard. You have so much of my impressed
22 opinion at the moment. I really want to thank you for
23 taking the time.

On the issue of sovereignty, I want to clarify a basic I did not stress at this time because it is so basic to my whole philosophy of where I have perceived sovereignty in the question, partially because it has been the key source of my research for fifteen years. I tend to -- in a compounded error, it was assumed by a number of people to be that I thought it was the prime reason. I think we are getting into a play of words.

Unfortunately, at the back of that yellow book that I should have had all tabbed for you, there is an errata sheet on the compounded decision of error. I think there are three typos. The biggest problem is that I had to leave out two paragraphs and one was a prolonged explanation on the sovereignty issue which, in just one sentence, is: Sovereignty, in my feeling -- and I think I can prove it left, right and centre. I will send you the paper I mentioned in there on notes on sovereignty to you -- was definitely the reason for the location of the sites. I have said -- and it got misread -- that the primary reason for where -- and I said when or how, thinking of the timing and the preparation that it was pressured into it. That is an assumption. I am looking for a reason that everything was squeezed in to

that period of time because nothing else made sense.

Then the other qualifier -- and I want to just let you think of the logic on this -- is that the primary reason for who was sent or selected was an economic benefit. Now, you can measure that in two ways: an economic benefit to the government of reducing welfare payments, but I want to say on any relocation history, from 1920, it has never ever been stated that there isn't an opportunity for the Inuit. Now, whether that is an official statement, a real statement, at least we are Canadian enough not to send somebody who is going to be at a disadvantage. There is always that economic benefit.

I believe the two are interrelated because -- and I will just put this argument -- if you had no sovereignty reason, there would be no reason to select Ellesmere Island or Resolute. The missions and the RCAF would be profoundly against Resolute and there would now be no police posts on Ellesmere, basically.

So if you had no sovereignty reason, you wouldn't be going there. You would probably be going where the Hudson's Bay Company suggested -- North Baffin, Clyde River or the Ottawa Islands which is in the southern section of the NWT report.

1 Let's say there was only sovereignty and
2 there is absolutely no high population in Quebec, northern
3 Quebec. There is no high welfare payments. The high
4 welfare payments probably are the fact that the communities
5 are becoming well established and people are gathering
6 around there. And if you have a welfare teacher around
7 Port Harrison who really is seeing the problems, they are
8 more likely to get candidates of, yes, these people need
9 help, especially if she is going into the out camps. I
10 think if you read her books, she is a very sensitive woman
11 in that sense. I can see it creeping up.
12 There is one sheet in there that compares
13 from 1945 to 1954/55. The Deputy Minister kept a list
14 of the welfare payment comparisons. I believe you have
15 to go under relocation along to 1955.
16 What is happening is that the welfare
17 assistance is increasing, actually, right across the NWT
18 in total. Now, you could argue most of that maybe in
19 Keewatin, but it is not increasing faster -- in fact, it
20 is lowering in that period -- in northern Quebec. So
21 whether it is a reason or not ---
22 But they selected them from northern
23 Quebec because it was overpopulated. But if you took away

1 that it wasn't a problem, then likely for sovereignty
2 reasons alone they would have tried to seek volunteers
3 from North Baffin and move them over, as Larsen originally
4 expected, to the Arctic Bay area which some actually went
5 from eventually. Some of them might have moved over to
6 Resolute.
7 So, as I said, the two are totally
8 interdependent. You can't, in my view -- and maybe you
9 can find a measurement, but I can't see how you can separate
10 them. You have to see the two together and that's when
11 I asked the question: Is that really the problem?
12 Now, legally and as a Commission and as
13 far as an Aboriginal Peoples Commission, you may think
14 that is a question. That was just a theoretical, logical
15 question because I thought the problem was with the plan
16 and the way it was implemented.
17 I am going to go to the slides in a minute
18 very quickly. I want to say something about Alan Marcus'
19 work. He has annunciated an excellent narrative and he
20 is very fluent, and I was sitting there green with envy
21 because I was putting in facts and he told the most
22 wonderful story that I could sit there and back up all
23 the facts. I must admit, I know how hard he has worked

on his thesis. I know what it is like to go through that effort and also I have heard, "If I see another new piece of evidence --" and that is the problem with this case.

I have serious reservations with Professor Gunther's paper and I actually started making comments at one point and then I realized that really I could answer them with my own paper. I will be doing a full-length version. I have no question about my own confidence in my researching ability, and I think we have a problem where we have a political scientist looking at something that needs an incredibly complex background of history. I say it is complex because I am still learning. Every once in a while, as of two weeks ago, another piece of missing link came in.

I believe, in that sense, we are looking at a political analysis of something on documents versus looking at something in the whole historical context. I just want to say that that is why I am not making any further comment on that, plus everyone has their own way of writing things.

Sovereignty. That is 1903 when the first problem was uncovered. If you can see Fullerton Harbour near the top of Hudson Bay, that was the first

police post. They didn't have two-man detachments. They had 12 and they had company, but they patrolled with smaller boats. It wasn't just the one boat. They patrolled the whole area.

That was a whaling problem of whalers going over, but fortunately women's corsets went out of style just about the same time that the whales disappeared.

The Arctic Island game preserves. On the back of the External Affairs document, they actually say -- yes, Bill Marstephason (PH.) pressed the muskox and the fear of the muskox, but that was also a way to show that you could administer authority if you could tell the Danish Greenlanders and say, "This established an area of sovereignty and pressed it to make sure the Greenlanders don't kill the muskox and stay off."

At that time, you have the Postupipbock Peninsula (PH.) and you have the one down at Craig Harbour and Dundas. Dundas and Craig switched back and forth, but it was a means of showing effective occupation.

Why was effective occupation important? Well, J.B. Horkin with the Minister of the Interior in 1920 didn't know that imperfect title question. W.F. King had found out for a different reason. He discovered the

1 Cape Sabine area which is right across from the Etah
2 Peninsula. It was as far north as the British ever got
3 as of 1860, 1850s.
4 The Americans in the Hays Expedition on
5 the original Admiralty map had got this stretch right into
6 here until 1875. Finally Nares got the very top. I made
7 a horrible on Morningside. You can see that with the
8 errata on the compounded error.
9 The Americans also got on Greenland on
10 that side and that was part of their attempt to purchase
11 Greenland in 1903.
12 We had public sensitivities over the
13 Alaska Tribunals and if you read some of the cartoons and
14 some of the arguments, we shouldn't have won that, but
15 the public didn't think so. So by 1903, the government
16 figured out that Arctic sovereignty was a super-sensitive
17 question that all you did was tell them it was fine and
18 if there was a problem don't tell the public.
19 It was safe in 1920. Nobody knew that
20 Rasmussen had said it was no-man's land. That was safe
21 and then they discovered that they already knew they had
22 a problem up here.
23 Some maps -- the 1904 map that was done

1 for W.F. King had problem. It was inaccurate and in 1920
2 it was corrected. The situation was worse, not better.
3 The meridians were wider and it was more extensive.
4 Now, the question is: Then you break
5 it down into who left the cairns, who ratified it and who
6 was -- these are all legal interpretations. What happened
7 is that we had the Cape Dorset crew. I mentioned in 1920
8 they recommended moving Inuit to Ellesmere as part of
9 Omedes (PH.). Well, no. In 1903, they wanted to move
10 them up to Baffin and they said, "No, we want to close
11 the post at Dundas. You can move them to Dundas and make
12 sure that you pick some that are from an overpopulated
13 area."
14 That is why we had to take some from --
15 where did we go? -- Cape Dorset because they were
16 overpopulated according to the system, but the rest went
17 from Pangnirtung to Pond. They also had a promise to
18 return and the person that wrote that up is Stevenson in
19 his own report which is almost better than Diamond Jenness'
20 version.
21 This is the first plan that Charles
22 Hubbard put together and the date of that is 1947. He
23 hasn't got the top of Ellesmere at that point. His Slidra

1 Bay (PH.) is where Eureka is. Oh, I am going up. That
2 is Eureka on Ellesmere. This was supposed to be the
3 central entrepôt, the centre of all the operations.
4 They have a base on Tuli, but as John
5 Crump can help you because I sent that information to you,
6 you will see in the writing there that nobody was supposed
7 to have -- the Americans weren't supposed to have a base
8 on Tuli. In writing, the airstrip went accidentally in
9 front of a weather station. They even re-wrote in
10 accidentally.
11 Another intelligence report comes to
12 External -- meeting Charles Hubbard. Where? Tuli. They
13 are not supposed to be there and that is one of the concerns
14 that went on behind where the Americans did something first
15 and asked later. There is an intelligence report I can
16 send you on the Greenland situation that the Danish were
17 trying to negotiate out of in that problem.
18 So there is a lot of sensitivity behind
19 the scenes. That document that is in your folder that
20 I had in the back of the sovereignty or security -- John
21 Holmes and I discussed it at length and the question is:
22 John Holmes -- he knew about it when it came in. He hadn't
23 seen the document. I had to get the copy from the U.S.

1 archives.

2 He believes it was leaked on purpose to

3 put pressure to come to the agreement in December 1946

4 for that joint -- because every island they mentioned was

5 Afrikaans and Prince Patrick, Melville Island is over here.

6 There is a question about that. I think the British is

7 safe, but the Americans have a question.

8 They mention Banks and I couldn't figure

9 that out because all of the British have exploration title.

10 Then I pulled out an old whaling book. There is an issue

11 of the Americans actually having leased and settled for

12 a period of time two whaling refineries on Banks Island.

13 I think they were playing games.

14 I honestly think -- this is sort of part

15 of the American pressure, but what it did do is get Canada's

16 agreement to say "yes" when they couldn't cover with the

17 number of people. They couldn't cover with the number

18 of manpower technology and by 1953, there was a memo in

19 there from Norman Robertson that said, "Right now, our

20 commitment is so high for the four-year plan, we can't

21 afford to do anything. So we won't talk about it." That

22 was literally what he was saying. "We can't discuss

23 anything more. We are in trouble."

In 1953, we have another problem. We have a new president, a different system about letting things out public and they decide to open the post at Craig Harbour and Cape Herschel. That is the decision in 1952. Resolute and Sachs Harbour on Banks Harbour come in. Let's go to the next one.

Things have changed. If you will notice right at the top of Ellesmere, it was called Alert. That was landed and established on Easter Day 1950. Tuli -- the agreement was in 1951, the most massive air strip base in that Tuli now is going to be the centre of their operations.

So Resolute is reduced. So that is partially why in 1951 things aren't quite so bad. Let's see 1953.

The map that is referred to in the DIAND report had two arms and I never used the DEW line reference because it is very confusing because that is not where it was supposed to originally go. The DCI stations were originally supposed to be in the vicinity, which I think is the same as in the general area, of Resolute, Craig Harbour, which was Cobourg Island. Cobourg Island is so close off Craig Harbour you could spit at it.

1 Eureka was the other one. Sometimes
2 Alert was mentioned. Resolute was actually surveyed in
3 1950 when they surveyed for the extension of the airstrip
4 expansion and for other facilities.
5 When the question of where they were
6 going to put this Arctic chain came officially to the
7 Cabinet in January, they knew about it in December and
8 that is where the discussion came from. The Arctic chain
9 -- they didn't know whether it was really going to go except
10 it was supposed to maybe take the place of the CGI.
11 Those CGI radar stations at Cobourg and
12 at Resolute did not, as stated -- they were eliminated
13 in May. They are still on the External Affairs in your
14 calender projected activities in 1954. They were
15 projected still because they hadn't definitely decided
16 where that radar chain was going. If the radar chain
17 didn't go that far north, it might go in. By that time,
18 we have -- plans and technology had a race against each
19 other.
20 Question. That goes in the vicinity,
21 I think, of Craig Harbour -- maybe a little bit further
22 north of Cornwallis and that is just a projected line.
23 Resolute would still be your central mission and the whole

1 issue at that point is that we did not have the manpower
2 either to unload the ships or the technicians and the
3 Americans had a draft system. They could encourage people
4 at all -- and it comes through time and time again. Inuit
5 employment -- or Eskimo employment, unfortunately, is the
6 reference all the way through. So I have to be politically
7 correct and then correct myself. That is the issue.
8 It was a fear and in all fairness, if
9 I said, "If you could have one dream, it would probably
10 have been wonderful because they would have been trained
11 to be really a part of defending and participating in their
12 north." This one was just a small tiny experiment that
13 I don't think was given the attention it should have and
14 that has been my argument.
15 Where the sovereignty comes in -- I have
16 to leave it to somebody else because I know where it comes
17 in on the location, but it is importance in human rights
18 -- I am not a legal expert. I have no legal expertise
19 in human rights law and I admit it up front, and I want
20 to leave that one to the lawyers.
21 I think I am out of time and I want to
22 thank you.
23 **CO-CHAIR RENÉ DUSSAULT:** Thank you.

1 It is getting late. We are nearing the
2 end of our hearings on the High Arctic relocation and I
3 would like to review a few matters of process and procedure.
4 To begin with, we would like to express
5 our thanks for the very considerable co-operation which
6 has made these hearings possible. Both in April and now
7 in June, many people have made a great effort to make
8 themselves available as witnesses and to prepare and
9 present their evidence. Without all of you, each and
10 everyone of you, and the other witnesses who were here,
11 there would have been no hearings. The Commission and
12 the Canadian public would not have heard so clearly the
13 deeply held but divergent views on this relocation.
14 It is our sense that witnesses, both in
15 April and now in June, have welcomed the opportunity to
16 tell the Commission and the Canadian public their stories.
17 For many, it has been the first opportunity that they
18 have been given to tell their full story in public. This
19 is not only the case for Inuit witnesses. It is the case
20 for many others as well. Ross Gibson, for example, has
21 clearly expressed his appreciated at being able to put
22 his story on the public record.
23 The issues raised in these hearings have

1 been a matter of public debate for a decade. It was the
2 existence of a problem which led to the Commission's
3 hearings, not the other way around.
4 The Commission has made it clear that
5 anything the Commission does as a result of these hearings
6 will be consistent with the Commissino's mandate to promote
7 reconciliation. The conciliation is not only a resul;
8 it is a process.
9 The Commission has been careful to adopt
10 an approach and procedures which are consistent with a
11 process of reconciliation. The focus of the Commission's
12 hearings is the actions of the government and the policies
13 which apply to relocations.
14 The Commission is mindful of the need
15 to be accessible to the public. It has endeavoured to
16 accommodate all those who wished to give evidence to the
17 Commission. Special procedures have been adopted to
18 record the evidence of those who could not attend the
19 hearing. The evidence of Ross Gibson and Wilf Doucette
20 has been taken down in this way. Ross Gibson was also
21 connected into the hearing by telephone to respond to
22 Commission's questions.
23 There was one witness who was scheduled

that could not attend the hearings, Mr. Andrew Orkin. He was unable to do so for reasons that he was under no control. So his evidence will be taken Monday, next week, and will form part of the transcript of these hearings.

Various witnesses, such as Mr. Kenney, have indicated a willingness to provide further material to the Commission. Cley Fryer has sent the Commission's counsel a letter. The Inuit Tapirisat of Canada has also sent the Commission a submission. It was received last night.

To permit the Commission to move forward in a timely fashion, the Commission requests that all further material which people may wish to provide be delivered to the Commission no later than August 31, 1993. Any such further materials which are provided to the Commission will be accessible to the public at the Commission's office.

We would like to express our appreciation for the assistance provided by Mary Simon, Roger Tassé, Nick Schultz and the Commission's staff. Finally, I would once again like to thank everyone who has given evidence, brought materials for their important contribution to the Commission's understanding of the

relocation as well as to the public's understanding of the relocation.

Je vais remercier également les traducteurs qui ont fait un travail remarquable dans des conditions difficiles ainsi que les gens qui sont résponsables de la prise des transcriptions pour la bénéfice de tous.

I would like to thank the translaters and the court reporter for their very important work for everybody's benefit.

Merci beaucoup. Thank you.

--- Whereupon the Hearing adjourned at 8:16 p.m.