Canada. Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration : The Royal Commission On Corporate Concentration was established under Order in Council P.C. 879, 22 April 1975, and Order in Council P.C. 999, 1 May 1975, under Part I of the Inquiries Act (R.S.C., 1970, c.I-13) and on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Commission was mandated to inquire into and report upon: (a) the nature and role of major concentrations of corporate power in Canada; (b) the economic and social implications for the public interest of such concentrations; and (c) whether safeguards exist or may be required to protect the public interest in the presence of such concentrations. The commissioners were Robert Broughton Bryce, Chairman; Pierre A. Nadeau and Robert W.V. Dickerson. Bryce was forced through illness to resign from the commission on 5 May 1977. The secretary was Serge Bourque.
The appointment of the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, in April 1975, resulted mainly from an attempt by Power Corporation of Canada Limited, a large Montreal investment and holding company, to gain control of Argus Corporation Limited of Toronto, another huge investment and industrial holding company.
On 25 March 1975, Power Corporation announced that it intended to make a bid for control of all the common and Class C (non-voting) shares of Argus. Although the move by Power failed, it caused considerable discussion especially among businessmen and politicians in Canada. A successful Power takeover of Argus would have resulted in one company in control of significant interests in shipping, pulp and paper, financial institutions, newspapers and broadcasting, packaging, food retailing, equipment manufacturing and mining.
In their report, the Commissioners, who conducted the public inquiry into corporate concentration, speculated on the financial nature of a merged Power-Argus corporation:
"After the acquisition was completed, and before any disposition of assets, the combined firm would have had assets (at balance sheet values) of 83 million. This would have placed it about 37th (in terms of assets) in our 1975 list of large non-financial firms. On an earning basis it would have ranked about 24th. In these calculations we are not including the assets administered by the financial companies in the Power group."
At the time, it was not clear to the Government of Canada whether existing merger laws would adequately protect the public interest if a Power-Argus merger did, in fact, take place. Prime Minister Trudeau concluded, therefore, that the government needed more information to assess the implications of a merger because it did not have "any economic tools to stop such a takeover, and more important we don't even know if such a takeover is or is not in the public interest."
It is important to note that unlike American anti-trust law, Canadian anti-combines legislation is concerned only with restraining of competition and not with the concentration of economic power.
Although the terms of reference for the inquiry on corporate concentration did not mention the word "conglomerates," or the attempt by Power to gain control of Argus, it would appear that the Commissioners were asked to furnish the Government of Canada with guidelines for formulating public policy on large scale corporate mergers in Canada. (See: Report of the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada, 1978, pp. 167-180; and George Radwanki, "The Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration: A Political Perspective", Perceptives on the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, ed. Paul K. Gorecki and W.T. Stanbury, Scarborough: Butterworth and Co. (Canada) Ltd., for the Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1979, pp. 67-75.)
Hearings of the commission were held in all provincial capitals of Canada, and in Sherbrooke, Chicoutimi, Montreal, Trois-Rivières, Ottawa, Sudbury, London, Windsor, Thunder Bay, Calgary, Vancouver, Prince George and Yellowknife from 3 November 1975 to 13 September 1976. The commission received over 200 submissions. RG33-113 General Inventory
