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CLASS, POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE:
THE REMAKING OF THE WORKING CLASS IN 1940S CANADA

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

This interdisciplinary dissertation aims to develop social and political theory capable of understanding social class as a structured process and relationship mediated by gender, race and other social relations and taking place in time and specific socio-material contexts, in order to analyse working classes as historical formations. It also aims to use this perspective and the existing body of historical scholarship to conduct a theoretically-rigorous study of the remaking of the Canadian working class in the 1940s.

Arguing that recent theoretical work on class formation is inadequate, the dissertation critically appropriates ideas drawn from classical and contemporary scholarship to outline a theory of working classes as historical formations. An account of how dominant classes exercise power in capitalist societies is a necessary complement to this theory; the overview developed theorizes the existence of capitalist rule in differentiated forms and as inherently, but not primarily, ideological.

From this perspective, the dissertation analyses the remaking of the Canadian working class in the paid workplace, community and household spheres in the 1940s. It argues that between 1941 and 1947 a broad but uneven process of class recomposition took place, focussing on such issues as the character of struggles in this period, their participants, their organizations and ideologies in order to illuminate the dynamics of change in working-class formations. In the course of struggle, both the working-class formation and capitalist rule were altered in important ways. The new formation that stabilized in the late 1940s

featured improved living standards and greater unity against capital at the most elementary level. It was also shaped in important respects by a particular configuration of racist, sexist and heterosexist social relations. Unions changed from within and without, becoming generally committed to a responsible and bureaucratic practice. The CCF became the undisputed party of the English-Canadian workers' movement, weakening and marginalizing political radicalism. Although it is misleading to interpret this as working-class incorporation, working-class capacities to change society had been constrained and undermined in new ways, in part as a result of the very reforms workers wrested from employers and state power.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have contributed directly or indirectly to this dissertation. Some deserve special mention. My supervisory committee was supportive throughout. David McNally, my supervisor, encouraged the study from its earliest inklings (which his heterodoxy unknowingly helped to stimulate) and offered insightful and constructive suggestions while never infringing on the independence of my inquiry. Craig Heron first accepted my request to work as a teaching assistant in his course "The Working Class in Canadian Society,"which gave me an opportunity to grapple with working-class history in a way I had not done before. He then agreed to participate in the supervision of the dissertation and provided the expert comments of a historian open to interdisciplinary scholarship. From Esteve Morera's close reading came careful observations that have improved the final version in many places.

Mark Thomas read a draft of the second chapter and offered helpful suggestions for its improvement. Alan Sears was enthusiastic about the project from the beginning; I have benefited in many ways from our wide-ranging conversations over several years and am grateful for his encouragement. TJ Baker convinced me to take autonomist Marxism seriously. My thinking on a number of matters examined in this study has been influenced by the ideas of Charlie Post and Kim Moody. At the beginning of my doctoral studies, Gordon Darroch's course on social history and class encouraged me to examine some issues subsequently explored in this dissertation.

I owe a debt of thanks to two scholars who responded to my requests for pre-publication copies of co-written material. Geoff Eley sent me the article "Farewell to the Working Class?," co-authored with Keith Nield. Eric Tucker gave me a number of chapters of the manuscript co-written with Judy Fudge that has since been published as *Labour Before the Law*. The staff of the Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library at the University of Toronto provided assistance in locating material. A doctoral fellowship from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada provided vital financial support.

Sheila Wilmot came into my life shortly before I began work on this dissertation. Her love and encouragement helped me to complete the solitary process of research and writing. Her probing anti-racist feminist class analysis, reflected in comments on every chapter and in our conversations, has challenged my thinking and strengthened this study.

I consider myself fortunate to have met Mansfield Mathias, a participant in some of the history of the working-class movement examined in this dissertation. He kindly agreed to read its third chapter in draft and sent me supportive comments on it by e-mail. An activist and unrepentant radical to the last, not long before his death in November 2001 he typed a remarkable letter in which he reflected on the lessons of the1945 Ford Strike in Windsor. In it, despite living through decades in which the unions of his youth had become quite different organizations, he wrote with conviction that "the power of organized labour has the potential of winning all its battles." This dissertation is dedicated to his memory.

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INTRODUCTION

This is a study of social class, more specifically, the working class. In North America at the beginning of the twenty-first century, dissertations on this subject in any social scientific discipline are uncommon, even unfashionable. The kind of argument made by the authors of *The Death of Class*, namely "that classes are dissolving and that the most advanced societies are no longer class societies" (Pakulski and Waters 1996, 4), is not without influence. Among those who do not accept such claims, few choose to pursue research on topics related to the working class. That this has much to do with the social context of contemporary knowledge production I have no doubt. An historical period marked, in the advanced capitalist countries, by low levels of working-class resistance, falling rates of unionization, extensive labour-management cooperation, the distancing of much of the Left from unions and issues often associated with labour, increasingly precarious paid work, and popular culture that saturates daily life with images of affluent individuals consuming ever-more of the never-ending stream of branded commodities is not one in which many academic researchers will be drawn to working-class studies.[1] Yet it is perhaps in such unpropitious times that it is most important to persist in inquiring into questions of class.

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[1]This list is merely suggestive, not comprehensive. Some developments outside intellectual life in recent years, such as changes in US labour and the involvement of some unions in the global justice movement, have stimulated interest in working-class studies, but on a relatively small scale.

More specifically, this dissertation has two objectives. The first involves the development of social and political theory. Class is often considered in synchronic structural terms, as in the work of sociologists such as Erik Olin Wright and George Marshall.[2] Alternatively, class is taken to be a discursive phenomenon of identities or subjectivities formed by language. Texts by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and by Patrick Joyce typify this position.[3] However, there are good reasons for concluding that these approaches are inadequate. At its best, analysis of class structure divorced from historical process shows how people are distributed into different class positions at a particular point in time. Studies of class as discourse can reveal the complex social meanings associated with class among particular groups of people. However, neither approach nor an eclectic attempt to combine the two will suffice if we accept that class is a structured social process and relationship that

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[2]See, for instance, Wright 1985, 1997a; Marshall 1997; Clement and Myles 1994.

[3]See Laclau and Mouffe 1985 and Joyce 1995b. Gibson-Graham, Resnick and Wolff 2000 present a post-structuralist view that class as exploitation exists, but with a contingent relation to power or domination, and argue on this basis against "capitalonormativity" (13) and for a proliferation of economic difference. To be sure, class - like all social phenomena - does not exist outside of language. But, as argued in McNally 2001, postmodernist theories of language theoretically sever consciousness and language from the material dimensions of social existence, and so produce idealist accounts. Treating exploitation and domination as only contingently related fails to understand how under capitalism the former is differentiated from the latter but entails it, as I discuss in Ch. 2. That postmodernism leads to inadequate treatments of class, gender, nation and other social realities is the contention of, among others, Bannerji, Mojab and Whitehead 2001; Ebert 1996; Palmer 1990; Seccombe and Livingstone 2000; and Wood and Foster 1997.

takes place in historical time and specific cultural contexts.[4] From this perspective, in order to understand working classes what is required is theory that can illuminate classes as formations of people organized by social relations in time. The kind of inquiry entailed by this approach is, in Ralph Miliband's words, "class struggle analysis" (1989, 3). In this sense:

> The subject-matter of class analysis is the nature of this struggle, the identity of the protagonists, the forms which the struggle assumes from one period to another and from one country to another, the reasons for the differences in these forms, and the consequences which flow from these differences; and class analysis is also concerned with the ideological constructs under which the struggle is conducted, and with the ways in which class relations in general affect most if not all aspects of life (3).

While class analysis as understood by Miliband has many dimensions, the emphasis in this study is on developing and using theory that helps us to understand how working classes change as class "happens," to use Edward Thompson's felicitous expression (1980, 8). Since workers are subalterns, not rulers, part of this task involves clarifying how dominant classes in capitalist societies exercise their power in relation to the working class. An adequate theory must fully take into account the fact that, as many feminist, anti-racist and anti-

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[4]On social structure and historical process, see Abrams 1982 (ix-8). The approaches to class presented in Fantasia 1995 and Denis 2000 have some affinities to the theory I develop in Ch. 1, taking up Neville Kirk's call for "due attention to the relational and historical dimensions of class and to the material but nonreductive character of class" (Kirk 2000, 99). My approach is thus quite unlike the synchronic structural notions that Johnston and Dolowitz 1999 (among others) simply and misleadingly present as class "within the Marxist theoretical tradition" (129).

heterosexist scholars have argued at length, class never exists apart from gender, race, sexuality and other social relations. Nor does class solely pertain to paid work; while class is rooted there, processes in social life outside the realm of paid work are a vital dimension of class formation.

The second objective of the dissertation is to conduct a class struggle analysis of the Canadian working class in the 1940s. It is commonplace to acknowledge that important changes in Canadian labour legislation took place at this time, and that new social security measures were introduced in the middle of the decade. The growth of trade unions is sometimes noted, as is the short-lived rise in support for the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. There is a body of work made up of studies of unions and other organizations in this period, as well as some scholarship on workers' lives and struggles that is less institutionally-focused.[5] Overall, though, historians and historically-oriented social scientists have carried out much less research on workers in the 1940s than they have for earlier decades. No study to date has aimed to provide a theoretically-rigorous analysis of the remaking of the Canadian working class in the 1940s. The dissertation aims to conduct one by drawing on the existing scholarship on the subject and interpreting it using the theoretical

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[5]These include Abella 1973; Caplan 1973; Collin 1996; Copp 1976, 1982; Davis and Lorenzkowski 1998; Earle 1989; Fahrni 2001; Fudge and Tucker 2001; Green 1986; Guard 1994; Horowitz 1968; Lembcke 1980; MacDowell 1978, 1982, 1983; Pierson 1986; Prentice 1993; Sangster 1989; Scheinberg 1994; Smith 1997; Storey 1981; Sugiman 1994, 2001; Wells 1995; White 1989. Two books by leading historians of the Canadian working class survey the 1940s as part of much broader narratives: Palmer 1992 and Heron 1996.

tools developed in the first two chapters.[6]

The dual task of this study, the nature of the subject and the theoretical perspective adopted all dictate an interdisciplinary approach of the kind fostered in York University's Graduate Programme in Social and Political Thought. The dissertation primarily draws on work in the disciplines of political science, sociology and history. Those concerned with a disciplinary definition of the project might find it helpful to consider this dissertation as a political sociology of the working class, if political sociology is taken to mean systematic inquiry specifically "concerned with power in its social context" (Bottomore 1993, 1). The development of theory in this study is focused on issues related to working classes as historical formations and the various modes of existence of capitalist social power. The employment of the theory in class analysis in a Canadian context does not claim to illuminate all classes in Canada in the 1940s - the capitalist class, middle class and independent commodity producers are only touched to the extent that they entered directly into the processes of working-class formation - or all aspects of politics and society insofar as they were affected by class relations. As a work of theory-building and second-order analysis, this study does not involve significant original research in primary sources of the kind required of dissertations in the discipline of history. It therefore reflects the strengths and weaknesses of the existing published and unpublished scholarship in Canadian working-class history on

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[6]More precisely, the dissertation examines the working class in civilian life within the borders of the Canadian state at the time. Thus "workers in uniform" in the military and Newfoundland workers fall outside its scope.

the 1940s, which I have come to appreciate more clearly in the course of research and writing. It is my hope that future case studies involving hitherto-unexamined primary sources will add to our knowledge of issues analyzed in this dissertation, shedding new light on many matters that are not currently well-documented or not as yet identified. I also hope that this study will, by advancing a new theoretical perspective and proposing a theoretically-conscious conceptualization of the Canadian working class in a pivotal period of its history, contribute to future research in several academic disciplines on working classes past and present, especially but not solely the Canadian working class.[7] The theoretical treatment of capitalist rule may also be of interest to those concerned with the exercise of power in capitalist societies more generally.

A few words are required on the meta-theoretical assumptions of this study, which are undeniably Marxist. At this time, to employ Marxism in the study of class, politics[8] and society will be seen by many as at best naive and at worst akin to scholarship on the history of a religion by its fundamentalist adherents: attuned to antiquarian details but prevented by orthodoxy from asking probing questions. The collection *Reworking Class* (Hall 1997) and the reader *Class* (Joyce 1995a) reflect this attitude by not including significant Marxist contributions or work that at least engages seriously with Marxist theory and research. Like

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[7]I touch on some implications of the theoretical approach developed in this dissertation for research on contemporary class issues in Camfield 2001.

[8]In this dissertation I use the concept of the political in a broad sense, as pertaining to power in society. I sometimes use the term "official politics" to refer to the activities of government, public policy and the like.

the relatively low level of interest in working-class studies, I consider such a stance as in part conditioned by the contemporary social context of academic research.[9] However, while many dismissals of Marxism can be rejected as intellectually flimsy, this is by no means true of all criticism. For instance, much Marxist theory has been woefully inadequate in its treatment of social relations other than class.[10] However, the same can justly be said for many other schools of social theory as well; reductionism and the underestimation of important aspects of social reality are not the unique property of Marxism. A different kind of critique is presented by Cornelius Castoriadis, who rejects Marxism (to which he had earlier adhered) on the grounds that it stifles a "revolutionary element" whose "appearance represents an essential twist in the history of humanity" with "a second element which was to be developed in the form of a system," one which "reaffirms and extends capitalist culture and society in its deepest tendencies... weav[ing] together the social logic of capitalism and the positivism of nineteenth-century science" (1987, 56, 57). While I find Castoriadis's social theory unconvincing, relying as it does on the notion that "the social world is, in every instance, constituted and articulated as a function of... a system of significations" (Castoriadis 1987, 146) that he calls "the imaginary," its argument is more serious than that

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[9]Eley and Nield 2000 is a thoughtful attempt to situate debates related to class in the social context of the late twentieth century; the responses to it in the same issue of *International Labor and Working-Class History* are on the whole less interesting. While I have differences with Eley and Nield's theoretical approach and interpretation, their promised book on the subject will no doubt be stimulating.

[10]I have addressed this in Camfield 2002. As I argue in Ch. 1, much Marxist class theory also suffers from other serious weaknesses.

of most efforts to go beyond Marxism.[11] In spite of the numerous claims against Marxism and the indisputable failings of much contemporary and historical Marxist theory, I remain convinced of the value of an open, non-dogmatic historical materialism for critical social research.[12] It is, to me, utterly unconvincing to burden Marxism with responsibility for any of the so-called "Communist" societies, whose real relation with Marxism is arguably as antithetical as that of corporate or "free market" capitalism,[13] and then reject it on these grounds. More importantly, Ronald Aronson's claim in *After Marxism* (1995, 50) that Marxism should be evaluated not solely as a theoretical system but as a project of theory and practice is one which I accept, and one which raises extremely serious problems.[14] That said,

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[11]The essay "The Question of the History of the Workers' Movement" (Castoriadis 1988b) contains a reflection from his post-Marxist theoretical perspective on method in the study of the history of the working class.

[12]Among the works which provide support for this conclusion are Burkett 1999; Dyer-Witheford 1999; Gramsci 1971; Harvey 1989; Jakubowski 1976; McNally 2001; Sayer 1987; and Wood 1995.

[13]While disagreeing about the precise characterization of Stalinist societies, the analyses in Haberkern and Lipow 1996, Cliff 1988 and Callinicos 1991 are among those that support this view.

[14]From a Marxist perspective, Shaw 1975 (113-122) presents a view of Marxism similar to Aronson's. If a future transformation of capitalist society by workers and other subalterns is judged definitively to be impossible, then the Marxian project as such ought to be abandoned, leaving behind historical materialism and a politics of resistance within capitalism. Whether socialism in this sense is a historical possibility deserves to be debated elsewhere (see Bensaïd 1997); as long as a non-dogmatic historical materialism as an approach to social inquiry is valid, this dissertation is not affected by the conclusions reached. Aronson is right to note that the defence of Marxism in Callinicos 1991 "gives a plausible set of abstract projections beyond capitalism" but "leaves out a Marxist (or any other) analysis of the current state of workers' or socialist movements" (1995, 83) that might show grounds for their realization. It is the certainty of Aronson's verdict on the Marxian

because the topic of this dissertation is not Marxism, I feel justified in acknowledging this difficulty and proceeding to outline its contents.[15]

The first chapter begins by clarifying the concept of class to establish some of the basic elements of a properly Marxist theory of class as process and relation. It discusses recent theories of working-class formation, in particular those of US political scientist Ira Katznelson and his critics, and then examines the contributions of Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Edward Thompson and the Italian school of autonomist Marxism to a theory of working classes as historical formations. It suggests that key insights of these thinkers and of others who appreciate more clearly than they that class is always mediated by social relations other than class provide the basis for an adequate theory. The second chapter is also primarily theoretical. It develops an account of what ruling classes in capitalist societies do when they rule, since this has major implications for how working classes are formed. It argues that capitalist power exists in differentiated economic, state and other non-state forms. While there is a tendency among theorists to overestimate the significance of ideology or discourse, ideology does matter and its clothing of all forms of capitalist rule needs to be recognized along with more exclusively ideological operations.

The second part of the dissertation turns to the remaking of the working class in

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project, his imposition of historical closure, that is worthy of debate.

[15]One thinker who grappled with the crisis of Marxism stemming from the fate of the USSR and the Stalinization of the Communist movement in a more serious manner than most of his anti-Stalinist Marxist contemporaries was Karl Korsch; see Kellner 1977.

Canada in the 1940s. The world of paid work is the focus of chapter three, which moves from an analysis of the class formation of the late 1930s through an account of wartime changes in workplaces to the dramatic wave of strikes that began in 1941 and attempts to quell wage-worker unrest. It analyzes the new mode of industrial legality which state power was forced to enact in 1944, the post-war strike wave and the anti-communist drive in the union movement which contributed to the containment of labour's contestation of post-war society. It concludes with an examination of the role of organized political currents in paid workplaces and union activity during these important years of class recomposition. Household and community life is the subject of the fourth chapter. From the shape of class in these spheres in the late 1930s, this chapter analyzes developments in social conditions, state relations, party politics and community-based organizing in the war and post-war years. It explores the ways in which workers' needs and aspirations were both articulated and channeled by the political parties of the Left and the limited but significant mobilization in community struggles around housing, childcare, consumer prices and racism in the mid-1940s. Together, these two chapters aim to present an analytical account of the 1941-1947 recomposition of the working class as a historical formation whose growing unity and self-organization remained uneven and fractured by numerous divisions, including those rooted in gender, racial and other forms of oppression as well as divisions stemming from ideological differences and organizational competition. The final chapter focuses in greater detail on two important aspects of this remaking of the working class, the changing nature of unionism and the intertwined issues of nation and citizenship. It then examines the class

composition that had stabilized at the end of the decade and argues against understanding this in terms of working-class "incorporation."

I will conclude these preliminaries by acknowledging that the level of abstraction demanded of a study of a class as a historical formation inevitably risks overgeneralizations, and consequently both misleading conclusions and a forgetting of the tribulations and achievements of working-class people who, in circumstances that were not of their own choosing, did make history in the 1940s. Also, there is the danger that researchers will allow their inevitable political judgments concerning matters examined here to distort their analytical efforts. I have attempted to avoid such errors in this study, mindful of the words of Georges Haupt: "To sacrifice the study of a rich, complex and multiform reality either for ideological considerations, or because it requires more than the routine, is to sacrifice once again what is essential for the history of the working-class movement - the knowledge of its own experience, acquired under such difficult conditions, of which it still remains deprived" (Haupt 1978, 27).

CHAPTER 1: WORKING CLASSES AS HISTORICAL FORMATIONS

This chapter explores what it means to think about working classes as groups of people in particular times and places, in other words as historical collectivities, and how such class formations change. Starting with the most basic question, "what is class?," it examines how a variety of contemporary and less-recent thinkers have grappled with this intellectual problem and offers a reconceptualization of Marxist class theory that incorporates social relations other than class. This kind of theory is important because it draws attention to the existence of classes as multi-dimensional formations in time, at a level of analysis higher than particular groups of workers. The latter are always positioned within a broader field, which I call a class formation. Every such formation, which does not exist as an entity over or apart from individual workers but is made up of the relations between them, is part of the larger set of social relations of a concrete society.[1] While general theoretical reflection on classes as historical formations has a vital role, the complexity and specificity of every working-class formation also imposes real limits on it. One should not confuse the necessary task of clarifying conceptual tools with using them in social analysis.

1.1 What is Class?

For anyone familiar with the attention Marx paid to clarifying the meaning of concepts such as value and labour in his critique of political economy, the fact that he never did the same for class may come as a surprise. As the English historian GEM de Ste. Croix,

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[1]On theorizing society, see Frisby and Sayer 1986 (especially 91-118).

author of *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, observes, "Marx himself, although he made important use of the concept of class throughout his work, never gave a formal definition of it, and indeed employed it in very different senses at different times" (Ste. Croix 1981, 46). In the material published as chapter fifty-two of the third volume of *Capital*, Marx writes "the question to be answered next is: 'What makes a class?'" (Marx 1981, 1025), but the manuscript breaks off after the beginnings of a critique of the idea that the three "great social classes of modern society based on the capitalist mode of production" (1026), wage-labourers, capitalists and landowners, are defined as such by virtue of common sources of revenue. Mining the collected works of Marx and Engels produces no answer.

The result has been a proliferation of definitions of class. A notably clear example is offered by Ste. Croix:

> *Class*[2] (essentially a relationship) is the collective social expression of the fact of exploitation, the way in which exploitation is embodied in a social structure. By *exploitation* I mean the appropriation of part of the product of the labour of others: in a commodity-producing society this is the appropriation of what Marx called "surplus value."
>
> A *class* (a particular class) is a group of persons in a community identified by their position in the whole system of social production, defined above all according to their relationship (primarily in terms of the degree of ownership or control) to the conditions of production (that is to say, the means and labour of production) and to other classes... The individuals constituting a given class may or may not be wholly or partly conscious of their own identity and common interests as a class, and they may or may not feel antagonism towards members of other classes as such (43-44).

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[2]All emphases in quotations are those appearing in the original sources unless otherwise noted.

This Ste. Croix believes to be closer to Marx's "fundamental thinking" (46) about class than other definitions, and he supports his interpretation with quotations from *Capital* to good effect (50-51). A number of contemporary Marxists have found this definition praiseworthy.[3]

A challenge to all such definitions of class has been proposed by Richard Gunn, a British theorist of what can be called the "Open Marxism" school.[4] Gunn argues that there are essentially two ways of conceptualizing class: the "sociological" and the specifically Marxist. The former, which Gunn believes includes most self-styled Marxist conceptions, has two variants, empiricism and structuralism. Empiricism understands classes as groups of people. Structuralism conceives of class in terms of class location or position. According to Gunn, the specifically Marxist concept of class is, like the concept of capital in *Capital*, a social relation. "That which is a relation," he argues, "cannot be a group, even a relationally specified group; nor can it be a position or place (a relationally specified place) in which a group may be constituted, or may stand" (Gunn 1987, 15). Thus "class" refers to a class relation, and "a class" refers to a specific class relation.[5] Class is a relation of struggle. The "fundamental premise" of class is class struggle. "Better still, class struggle is class itself" (16). This concept of class is in keeping with the priority that Marx gives to

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[3]For instance, Alex Callinicos (1987, 50-51).

[4]This name is mine, taken from the multi-volume anthology *Open Marxism* edited by members of an intellectual current associated with the now-defunct journal of the Edinburgh Conference of Socialist Economists, *Common Sense*.

[5]For a similar argument, see Przeworksi 1977 (388).

active over "passive (institutional or structural)" concepts, as demonstrated by his claim in the *1844 Manuscripts* that private property is the consequence of alienated labour, not the reverse (16). Gunn believes that one positive result of understanding class in this manner is that it avoids the morass of problems into which sociological definitions become mired when attempts are made to slot every individual or social location into a class schema. A class relation, such as that between labour and capital, affects different people in different ways. Individuals exist in shifting relationships with respect to it rather than belonging to a given class, so there is no pressure to pigeon-hole everyone into a classification. Certain traditionally-thorny problems for Marxist theory, such as where the middle classes "old" and "new" fit in class analysis, are thereby sidestepped. The focus shifts to the flux of class struggle and the complex character of the lives of individuals (16-19).

Gunn's argument is not completely without merit. The notion of class as structure or set of "empty places" that pervades the sociology of class has led to long debates about where to place particular occupations and where to draw boundaries between classes. In the course of these discussions about synchronic structures, the relational and antagonistic character of class and therefore class struggle itself has been eclipsed. If, as Ellen Meiksins Wood has proposed, "There are really only two ways of thinking theoretically about class: either as a structural *location* or as a social *relation*," and the latter is the "specifically Marxist" way of theorizing class (Wood 1995, 76), then much Marxist sociology of class has drifted into treating class as a location, in conformity with the dominant conceptions in the

discipline.[6] Gunn's theory avoids this common problem, only to fall into another of nearly equal significance.

With Gunn's concept of class as relation, all thinking about classes as groups of people engaged in the production and appropriation of surplus labour in historically specific conditions and about struggles that arise from exploitation becomes necessarily "empiricist." If one accepts this view, then it is legitimate to analyse, for example, the capital-labour relation in Canada in the 1940s and the struggles of the time considered with respect to the class relation, but not to try to draw generalizations about the Canadian working class as it was remade by capital and remade itself through struggle and organization in the course of the decade. Capital and labour and class struggles, yes; a class of workers, no.

The peculiarity of this view is highlighted by the confession in the second-to-last paragraph of Gunn's article that "all this said, it is to be conceded and indeed emphasised that whomsoever so wishes can derive 'sociological' wisdom from Marx's texts. Certainly, and especially in his so-called political writings, Marx was not always a Marxist" (23). This is a revealing admission. It concedes that Marx's thinking about class was often not in harmony with what Gunn claims is the genuine Marxist concept of class, particularly in the works in which he analyses concrete situations and events involving specific groups of people engaged in struggles. In other words, outside the pages of *Capital,* in which Marx

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[6]For contributions to these sociological debates that criticize the class analyses of the major neo-Marxist participants and propose an alternative more in line with Marx's approach as interpreted here, see Meiksins 1986 and 1987.

theorizes at fairly high levels of abstraction in order to grasp the essential laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production, Marx does not usually conceive class as a relation as opposed to classes as groups of people in antagonistic relations with other groups. The kind of abstract Marxism without people seen in Gunn's theory is not new. It is oddly reminiscent of Althusserian structuralism, which also privileges *Capital* (or at least the sections of it not contaminated with a supposedly immature "problematic") as Marx's exemplary text and cast aspersions on many other of his writings for their alleged empiricism and other errors. What makes this more than a little ironic is the great hostility shown to Althusser by Gunn and his "Open Marxism" co-thinkers.[7]

Gunn's formulations about class struggle contain another significant weakness. Emphasizing that struggle is inherent in the antagonistic relation that is class is not in itself mistaken. However, to describe class struggle as the "fundamental premise" of class or, an even more extreme position, to say that "class struggle is class itself"is to risk losing sight of the material basis of social class and class struggle, what Ste. Croix calls "the fact of exploitation." Equating class relations with class struggle is quite different from the claim that class relations are rooted in the appropriation of the surplus labour of direct producers and entail struggle, which takes different forms conditioned by the precise character of the mode of surplus extraction involved. At the very least phrases like Gunn's call for further

[7]Althusser labels Marx's writings from 1857 on as "the Mature Works" (Althusser 1969, 35). Gunn dubs Althusser "the most rigorous of sociological Marxists" (Gunn 1992, 31) - from him, no compliment this!

clarification of what is meant by class.[8]

If we take the production of surplus labour by toilers of one kind or another and its appropriation by exploiters as the starting point of a Marxist theory of class, then Wood's claim that class should be understood as a relation rather than a location makes good sense. But if we are interested in understanding actual capitalist (or other class-divided) societies and not merely with theory at the level of abstraction of *Capital*, then it is not enough to consider class relations as they exist at a given moment in time. This synchronic sense of class relations is what Wood refers to as class situation. "The point," she writes, "is to have a conception of class that turns our attention to precisely how, and in what different modes, objective class situations matter." The real issue is "the complex and often contradictory historical processes by which, in determinate historical conditions, class *situations* give rise to class *formations*" (Wood 1995, 83).

Few Marxist theorists have explicitly dealt with class in this sense. The term class formation is sometimes used to refer to the development of working classes out of the ranks of other classes. Erik Olin Wright, a leading representative of the kind of Marxist sociology criticized by thinkers like Wood and Peter Meiksins for abandoning the centrality of relations of surplus labour extraction to class theory, describes class formation - defined as "the formation of *collectively organized social forces within class structures in pursuit of class*

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[8]Views about class and class struggle not unlike Gunn's are sometimes attributed to EP Thompson, as I discuss below. This underscores the importance of clarifying the meaning of class for a given theorist.

interests" (Wright 1997a, 379) - as one of the discrete elements of class analysis, along with class structure, class location, class interests, class experiences, class consciousness, and class practices.

Here Wright follows many researchers in conceptualizing structures as static phenomena that undergo processes, rather than trying to think in diachronic terms of "structured processes," to use Wood's phrase (1995, 79), or what Philip Abrams calls "structuring" (1981, xvii). But, as RW Connell has argued, "class theory... must be able to deal with historical process, and do so through its central concepts" (1983, 92). Loïc Wacquant amplifies this point:

> Reconstructing the "class structure" by distributing a collection of unrelated, disembedded agents - much in the manner in which a zoologist might allocate different types of apes into a taxonomy of primates - makes the concrete relations and institutions that define and shape class as a historical reality vanish. Thus Wright's conceptual achievements come *at the cost of the disappearing of history and agency* (Wacquant 1989, 172).

In contrast to Wright and like-minded thinkers, I understand class formation as a relational concept of process. A definition of class like Ste. Croix's helps us to grasp a class situation, "but this is the beginning, not the end, of class formation" (Wood 1995, 81). It is from the relations people have to the conditions of production and other classes that class formations develop. Fleshing out this understanding is the concern of this chapter.

Three further issues are worth touching on before proceeding to look at recent academic discussions of class formation. First, when we move away from class understood

as a position or location and look at class formations in history, we ought to be confronted with the reality that class is not something that only happens at the point of production, even if it is ultimately anchored and sustained there. People do not cease to belong to classes when they leave their workplaces. Class relations pervade all aspects of social life. One helpful way of conceptualizing this is to consider capitalist societies as made up of "three primary spheres of activity: paid workplaces, households and communities" (Livingstone and Luxton 1996, 109). Class is rooted in the workplace, but processes of class formation take place across all three spheres.[9] A narrow notion of class that only sees class in and around where wage-labour is performed creates a number of problems, including special difficulties in understanding class as it relates to women's lives. In many capitalist societies women's primary responsibility for the work of cooking, cleaning, caring and child-rearing has led to women working for wages only in certain phases of their lives or, more rarely, not at all. Should the unwaged female partners of male wage-earners be regarded as part of the working class? A theory of class that states or implies that they are not is blind to the close connection between waged and unwaged family members in working-class history.[10]

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[9]It is worth noting that this concept of three spheres only applies to capitalist societies. In pre-capitalist societies, surplus labour was often produced in and around the household (e.g. by peasants and artisans). It is also the case that in many capitalist societies some workers' households are sites of wage-labour.

[10]Johanna Brenner offers the concept of "survival projects" as an overarching framework for understanding the various ways individuals associate in order to get by under capitalism (1998, 2). What some historians call"family strategies" are among the most common and important kinds of survival projects. See, for example, Bradbury 1984.

Second, does the inclusive and historical understanding of class for which I am arguing entail the belief that every social relation is a class relation? Gunn makes this claim. Picking up on a line in Marx's *Wage-Labour and Capital* in which Marx equates the totality of the relations of production with social relations per se, he insists that "class relations just are the social relations (i.e. the totality of the social relations) *grasped as production relations*" (1987, 15). A somewhat similar proposition is advanced by many adherents of autonomist Marxism, whose contribution to theorizing working-class formation I discuss below. According to the theory of social capital developed by Mario Tronti, because capital accumulation is simultaneously the accumulation of the working class and the capitalist class the overall process of capitalist reproduction also involves the reproduction of classes. This does not take place in the workplace alone but in society as a whole, "the social factory." Everyone toiling in the social factory labours for capital and is, therefore, part of the working class. All their struggles are class struggles (Cleaver 1979, 57-61). Gunn and Tronti notwithstanding, not every social relation is a class relation. Whatever Marx may have written, to deny the analytically independent existence of social relations other than class relations is a clear cut case of reductionism. Tronti's position rests on the erroneous belief that all labour in capitalist society produces value.[11] It is important, though, to stress that

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[11]Social capital theory holds that the labour of the unwaged is labour for capital in the social factory. I do not accept this claim. Since this is not the place to rehearse the "domestic labour debate" among Marxist-feminists in the 1970s, I will limit myself to noting that I share the interpretation that the work of the unwaged produces use values, not value for capital (exceptions include slaves or other exploited producers involved in capitalist production, which suggests that "unwaged" is an imprecise category). For instance, the

in a society in which classes exist, social relations other than those of class do not exist in isolation from class. If one accepts that the social relations of capitalist society form a totality,[12] then it can be said that all other social relations are mediated through class relations, and vice versa. This is quite different from the proposition that all social relations are class relations.

Third, in discussing class formations it is useful to follow James Wickham and make an internal distinction, between the working-class movement and the class. Wickham argues that class struggle always involves organization of some kind and that it is never the case that all members of a class participate in struggle and organization. The working-class movement should be understood as being made up of both formal organizations such as unions and parties, which Wickham calls "institutions," and - importantly - less formal "quasi-institutions" which "range from shop stewards' committees and tenants' associations (some of which become institutions in the full sense of the word), through organisations such as

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unwaged labour of women in the home produces use values consumed in the household which reproduce labour power. This domestic labour plays a vital role in the reproduction of capital and of capitalist society as a whole, but it does not produce value in Marx's sense (Vogel 1983, 21-24). My reasoning for including unwaged members of working-class households, such as housewives, in the working class flows from their intimate historical links with wage-labourers. Such people generally depend in whole or in large part on wage income for survival. In turn, wage-workers often depend on them to transform wages into use values such as meals and clean clothes. As Bettina Bradbury suggests, "we have to reconceptualise the working class to include not only those who sell their labour power, but also those who reproduce it, ideologically and materially, and those who are largely dependent on the wages of others" (Bradbury 1987, 40).

[12]How to understand the concept of totality has been a disputed issue, which it is not necessary to address here in greater detail. Jay 1984 surveys the debates on the subject.

factory delegate meetings to friendship networks and other 'informal' contacts. All of these involve political organisation - they are all ways in which people come together to resist together" (1979, 7). To avoid confusing the working-class movement with individual or subcultural forms of resistance, Wickham specifies that it should be conceptually limited to "all resistance to capitalist domination and exploitation which is both collective and explicit" (7). This distinction between the movement, in the sense of formally and informally organized collective resistance, and the usually much-broader class formation has the merit of avoiding an undifferentiated notion of working-class struggle as encompassing everything from unions to the everyday "connective tissues of cultural life" (Palmer 1988, 37) without making the opposite mistake of reducing the class movement to its formal organizations and ignoring the cultural basis on which the movement moves. Class analysis in Miliband's sense of class struggle analysis (1989, 3) requires an ability to make distinctions of this kind in order to illuminate relations among workers who belong to the same class formation.

The aim of this preliminary discussion has been to establish some of the basic elements of a properly Marxist theory of class. Class is not a location but an exploitative relationship between producers and appropriators of surplus labour. In capitalist societies, class relations are anchored in the places where paid work is done but are also very much present in the community and household spheres of social life. Class structures the totality of social relations, which cannot be reduced to class even as all social relations are mediated by each other. Class may be considered synchronically, as class situation. However, class relations exist in time. Thus class ought to be considered diachronically, as a historical

process. A theory of class needs to be concerned with this process of how class situations give rise to actually existing class formations, and the characteristics of such formations. With this in mind, I turn to recent discussions about class formation.

1.2 Recent Theories of Class Formation

The collection *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States* (1986) edited by US political scientists Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg has become a standard reference for social scientific writing that considers class historically. In particular, the introductory chapter by Katznelson and, less often, Zolberg's conclusion are cited as theoretical treatments of the issue.[13] Katznelson rejects the "assumption that classes 'in themselves' will, indeed must, act 'for themselves' at some moment," which, although rarely claimed explicitly, "continues more loosely and implicitly to underpin much of the theoretical debate about class classifications" (Katznelson 1986, 6).[14] This assumption present in some Marxist theory conjures away the problem of class formation by reducing it to a logical evolution out of class structure. An equally flawed "mirror image" (7) of this way of thinking is found in the work of non-Marxists who claim

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[13]Katznelson has subsequently revised his theoretical position, moving from the state-centred perspective of the introduction and conclusion to *Working-Class Formation* to a focus "on political relationships and on liberalism as a contested boundary condition" (Katznelson 1997, 53). He acknowledges "a family resemblance"(40) between this and the views of Louis Hartz.

[14]The original "class in itself"/"class for itself" formulation in Marx is examined in the next section.

that recent changes in class structure make class action unlikely. In both cases, the problem lies in the teleological leap made across the complex historical gap between, in my terms, class situations and class formations. According to Katznelson, EP Thompson[15] and many of the social historians inspired by his work do not sufficiently clarify their theoretical frameworks and, as a result, end up operating with a weak version of this defective assumption. This can be seen in the efforts of historians to devise explanations, such as theories of labour aristocracy, to explain why so many working classes did not behave as theory predicted they should have, or as workers in other countries allegedly did (10-12). On the basis of this analysis, Katznelson makes his case for the need for a theory of class formation.

Katznelson proposes a conception of class in capitalist societies as composed of "four connected layers of theory and history: those of structure, ways of life, dispositions, and collective action" (14). This is "a classification that aims to promote the development of theory free from developmental assumptions" (18). The first level refers to the characteristics that capitalist economies have in common, such as proletarianization, but which vary in each national case because of the existence of a host of political and social factors. Class is an abstract economic concept at this level.[16] Ways of life, the second level of class, "refers to the social organization of society lived by actual people in real social

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[15]For my discussion of Thompson, see 1.5 below.

[16]A few pages later, Katznelson comments in passing that the levels of structure and ways of life are not "purely economic" (17), but he does not further clarify his position.

formations" (16). This includes residential communities as well as workplaces and labour markets. At these levels class can be classified and mapped in the usual sociological fashion (17). Here, class is an "experience-distant analytical concept" (15).

At the third level, "classes are formed groups sharing dispositions" (17). This is the level of workers' cultural interpretations of experience so often studied by historians. However, all concepts of a class consciousness varying by degrees are rejected, in keeping with the anti-evolutionary premise, as is the notion that dispositions reflect or correspond to ways of life (19). The level of collective action is concerned with how workers who share dispositions sometimes act on them by self-consciously participating in movements and organizing. At these levels are found all the really-existing historical working classes that fall between the poles of the "in itself/for itself" model.

Research on class formation, according to Katznelson, is concerned with the comparative and historical study of the content of, and the connections between, each of the four levels of class. The relationship between the levels is "contingent, but not undetermined" (22). Constructing and comparing national cases using the four-layed concept of class will illuminate causal patterns. These are summarized by Zolberg. In "How Many Exceptionalisms?," the concluding essay in *Working-Class Formation*, Zolberg identifies two notable sources of variation in class formation. The character of the state present at a class's emergence is key. The "single most important determinant" is whether a class, at the time of its creation at the level of structure, "faced an absolutist or a liberal state" (Zolberg 1986, 450). The other significant cause of variation is the organization of the economic

structure, more specifically its interaction with "the timing and pace of industrialization" (433). At the end, the answer to the question posed in the title of Zolberg's essay is that each class's history is unique; there are as many "exceptionalisms" as the number of cases considered (455).

A few scholars have responded in writing to Katznelson's four-layer theory of class. In an article on gender and working-class formation in Germany, Kathleen Canning notes that both women and gender are missing from *Working-Class Formation* (Canning 1992, 741). This reflects a larger problem in the way that Katznelson conceptualizes class. At level one, "The structure of production is equated with economics, while the state, culture, ideology, gender, law and religion are viewed as intervening variables rather than constitutive elements of production" (743). Production is never just a matter of economics. Gender analysis reveals the arbitrariness of the distinctions between the four layers (766-767). In addition, Katznelson's separation of "objective" structures and ways of life from the levels at which human agency is allowed to enter the analysis reduces workers' actions to responses to structural developments. This obscures the role that working-class agency can play in influencing all that falls under the categories of structure and ways of life (743-744).

The most sustained critical response to Katznelson has come from Margaret Somers. She praises *Working-Class Formation* for breaking with what she calls the "*epistemology of*

absence" (Somers 1996, 181)[17] of studies whose motivation is to explain why workers have not displayed revolutionary class consciousness. This attention to the formulation of the research question is "a major achievement" (187). Nevertheless, she shares the criticism that workers' agency is only seen as a reaction to structures in Katznelson's theory. The dispositions and collective action of toilers often determined whether or not, and, if so, how, they would be proletarianized, so the creation of a class of wage-labourers should not be seen as an inevitable product of inexorable and autonomous economic forces (191-193). More fundamentally, despite the rejection of the "in itself/for itself" model his theory is still contaminated by the retention of an ideal type of class formation that comes from unreflectively absorbing conventional accounts of English working-class formation. The key flaw is the "unquestioned causal primacy of proletarianization" (191) in the theory. "For a foundational revision to be achieved, states, gender, politics, culture, practices [*sic*], and above all legal institutions and practices would have to be made central to the very definition of class formation and class structure" (190). Somers takes Katznelson, a self-proclaimed practitioner of state-centred social science, to task for not breaking decisively with the "Marxist framework of class formation" (200) by doing away with the autonomy of the economic and the reduction of structure to economics (196).

For Somers, the correct framework with which to study class formation is an economic sociology that conceptualizes economic relations as always embedded in other

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[17]Somers 1996 is an expanded revision of Somers 1992.

social relations (197-199). "But economic sociology is not for the weak-hearted" (198), she warns. It rejects the idea that there is a distinct capitalist economic logic. "Indeed so varied are the processes and the *outcomes* of economic development across time and space that it is surely right to question the conceptual unity of something called 'capitalism'" (195). Contrary to both Katznelson's theory and the model it is designed to supplant, the study of workers should not take capitalism as its point of departure (198).

Somers sketches her alternative account in another article, in which she develops her position as a call for the rejection of the "encoded metanarrative"entitled "The Impact of the Industrial Revolution" (1997, 78). In this history, workers respond to a proletarianization and capitalism that possess an "unquestioned *causal primacy*" (79). This metanarrative, she argues, is shared by theories of class formation in general (80). A new narrative is required: "To summarize my alternative story: The meanings of working-class formation are to be found not in the 'birth of class society' but rather in the long-term consequences of the legal revolutions of medieval England" (95). The village-level participation of freeholders in the national public sphere through the local legal system created a variety of community narratives of justice. English working-class formation in the nineteenth century arose nearly entirely out of protests in northern English villages, where earlier community legal customs survived (95-96). This is indeed a very different interpretation of history than that of Katznelson and many other scholars belonging to various schools of thought.

What are we to make of the work of Katznelson and his critics? Let us start with Somers, who seeks to dramatically recast class formation theory. Conjuring away capitalism

in keeping with the postmodernist penchant for deconstructing universals and elevating particularities is a bold move in the study of class, but Somers is most unconvincing here. The world-historic significance of the development in northwestern Europe and subsequent spread across the globe of a distinctive mode of production based on the employment of wage-labourers by competing members of a propertied class engaged in generalized commodity production should not be dismissed so easily.[18] That societies in which capitalism has been the dominant mode of production vary enormously is indisputable. However, it is possible to both recognize this range of historical variation and to refuse to follow Somers in denying the existence of identifiable tendencies of motion - which can be described as a logic - that make it possible to meaningfully analyse quite different societies as capitalist societies.[19]

It is not wrong to analytically isolate a specific social relation from a complex reality in order to theorize it at a certain level of abstraction. The question is how such abstractions are conducted and what is done with them in more concrete studies.[20] A concept like capital or wage-labour must be a conscious abstraction of an aspect of a complex social-material

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[18]This compressed description does not intend to obscure the importance for capitalism of different kinds of unfree and unpaid labour, but to highlight what differentiates and distinguishes this mode of production. Few, if any, thinkers writing in English in the late twentieth century have done more than Ellen Meiksins Wood to elucidate the distinctive character of capitalism and clarify its historical specificity. Wood 1999 summarizes her perspective.

[19]Banaji 1977 contains much of relevance to this issue.

[20]See Johnson 1982 for a discussion of abstraction and doing history.

reality. Such a concept is a real abstraction, not just a nominal one, because the social relation to which the category refers is held to be part of the material world. Yet the concept is still an abstraction because it is carefully isolated from the enormous complexity of social reality for the purpose of clarifying its basic character (Sayer 1983, 158-159). A concrete analysis must be something more. "To apprehend an essential relation *concretely*... entails grasping it as... a pattern of structured action over time, or in other words as *historical process*" (159). In turn, the discovery of new historical knowledge may suggest a revision of theoretical concepts (157-158). Furthermore, any concrete study should always explore the interconnections between, to stick with the example, capital and other social relations in a particular historical context.[21]

As Somers says, proletarianization is undoubtedly a contested process that needs to be explained, not assumed. It is important not to study it through a narrow lens that sees only male wage-labourers in paid workplaces and excludes household and community life along with all other members of the working class.[22] But to displace proletarianization from its defining role in the emergence of working classes is unhelpful, to say the least.[23] Other scholars have taken note of the significance of changes in the legal structure of medieval

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[21]The issue of the mediation of class by other social relations is discussed in 1.7 below.

[22]Rose 1997 frames the problem as the construction of the white, skilled and male "quintessential worker" as the historically significant object of study.

[23]See, among others, Tawney 1912 and Lachmann 1987.

England and drawn quite different conclusions than Somers has.[24]

These major weaknesses aside, some of the criticisms of Katznelson made by Somers and Canning do deserve serious attention. As both of them point out, class never actually exists by itself as a pure economic reality outside other social relations. Canning's observation that the introduction of gender analysis into class theory reveals the arbitrary nature of the four-layer concept of class is telling. Workers' institutions, ideologies and identities are gendered, but so too is the organization of paid workplaces. Katznelson is at best unclear on this. Finally, the claim that his model depicts what workers do as reactions to the movements of structures, which are not themselves conceptualized as subject to workers' agency, is valid.[25]

This is related to a weakness in the theory's social ontology that has not been identified in previous critical assessments. What the four-layer model does is separate two essentially synchronic levels, structure and ways of life, from two diachronic levels, dispositions and collective action. Like Wright's concept of class formation criticized above, this is a theory that contains the concept of structures that undergo processes, rather than

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[24]See Corrigan and Sayer 1985 (31-41). Mooers 1997 discusses how claims about rights tend to emerge from class struggles in capitalist societies.

[25]Although Canning and Somers discuss this in relation to economic structures, Katznelson has admitted that in his earlier work "the state appeared as a fixed set of structures which shapes and conditions working-class experiences, discourses and actions; but it did not appear as responsive to working-class agency. The state was treated as a cause; working-class thought and behaviour as effects" (1997, 53). The theoretical issue of class and state will be discussed in the following chapter.

Wood's structured processes or Abrams's structuring. It considers the objectivity of structures as something other than a synchronic snapshot of what are always historical processes involving multiple social relations and "the relatively enduring structures formed out of them" (Sayer 1983, 159). This separation of structures from processes is at least part of the reason why the theory does not allow for workers' agency to figure in the determination of structures, since class action is confined to the fourth level of analysis, farthest from the structural realm. When social relations other than class are implicitly considered as somehow less basic or structural than class, an underappreciation of how class and other social relations intermesh is facilitated.

Even if one rejects the kind of theoretical framework advocated by Somers, she is right to commend Katznelson's effort to dispense with an epistemology of absence in theories of class formation. The research problem is best formulated in terms of understanding processes of class formation more clearly, not as a search for explanations of why working classes have failed to conform to theoretical predictions or ideal types. Having acknowledged this, it is also the case that Katznelson's four-layer model has remarkably little to say about this problem. What does it mean to describe the relationship between the levels in the model as "contingent, but not undetermined" (Katznelson 1986, 22)? No clear answer is offered. No doubt much of what is significant in understanding how classes develop can only be discovered through historical studies of particular classes. But if the role of historically-grounded theory is to serve as a guide to this kind of investigation, then surely more than this needs to be said. For instance, are there any identifiable dynamics to class

formation at what Katznelson would conceive as the levels of dispositions and collective action, or are these completely unspecifiable? To take an example from Katznelson's own article, what are the grounds for his claim that there is "one broad exception" to the claim of contingency, namely that workers have attempted to organize themselves in unions in every national case (20)? How, to take another issue, are divisions in the working class related to the division of labour in capitalist production?[26] The theory presented by Katznelson provides few if any clues.

At the same time, in the hands of his co-thinker Zolberg, this theoretical model proves it can be used as the basis for claiming too much, not too little. As previously mentioned, Zolberg finds two principal sources of variation in working-class formation: the character of the state present at the moment of the creation of a working class, and secondarily the nature of the economic structure. Where in generalizations of this scale is there room, for instance, for what historians such as David Roediger and Noel Ignatiev argue is the absolutely central role of white supremacy and racial identity in the historical development of the US working class?[27] The not undetermined contingency proves to be vague enough to allow two overly sweeping causal claims of structural determination.

The limits of the theories offered by Katznelson and his critics suggest that a better framework is needed for the study of working classes as historical formations. This is not

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[26]This is an issue that the autonomist Marxist concept of class composition aims to illuminate: see 1.6 below.

[27]See Roediger 1991 and1994, and Ignatiev 1995.

to deny that there are insights to be gleaned from their work. But for these to be put to good use, they need to be integrated into a different approach. It is with the goal of developing such a theory that I will proceed to examine the work of a number of earlier and more recent thinkers who have reflected on the issue of class formation. Some appear as reference points, usually negative ones, in contemporary academic debate, but rereading them reveals more of lasting value than is generally appreciated today. While differing on many issues, they have in common a concern to examine class in ways that are more historical and concrete than those adopted by most theorists in the broad tradition of Western Marxism, which often comes close to being equated with Marxist theory in general in contemporary academic discussion.[28]

1.3 Karl Marx

Marx never wrote an elaboration of his theory of class. Thus his ideas about working-class formation, although relatively coherent, are unsystematic. This has rarely been appreciated by later followers of Marx who have proceeded to load far more explanatory weight on some of his formulations than they can possibly bear. To start with, Marx's distinctive view emerges in his debates with fellow communists after the failure of the

[28]On the defining characteristics of this tradition, see Anderson 1976 (esp. 92-94). Its "contraction of theory from economics and politics into philosophy" and "loss of any dynamic contact with working-class practice" (93) render its adherents ill-prepared to grapple with issues related to the problem of understanding working classes as historical formations.

European revolutions of 1848-1849. He strongly disagrees with those who, relying on the power of revolutionary will, believe in the necessity of further insurrectionary efforts in the short-term: "Whereas we tell the workers: 'You have fifteen, twenty, fifty years of civil war and people's struggles to go through, not only to change the conditions but in order to change yourselves and make yourselves fit for political rule,' you say on the contrary: 'We must come to power right away, or else we might as well go to sleep' (qtd. Draper 1978, 78). This idea that the working class has to undergo a process of development in which it transforms itself through its own struggles and in so doing readies itself to take power is a central feature of Marx's thought. It is an integral part of his conception of working-class self-emancipation. This was his alternative to the elitist strategy of an educational dictatorship of enlightened leaders who would prepare the people for communism, the prevailing notion among many Western European revolutionaries in the early nineteenth century (Draper 1978, 72-80, 147-165). In his comprehensive study of Marx's political thought, Hal Draper draws out the theoretical implication most relevant to the issue with which I am concerned here. For Marx,"not only the proletarian revolution but the proletariat itself is a historic process. This begins as a process of maturation, first of all in terms of the social system. It ends as an educational and transforming process" (80). In other words, for Marx capitalism creates a class of wage-labourers and the conditions within which it can develop itself into a force capable of leading a transformation of the kind of society within which it emerges and takes shape.

This concept of Marx's is associated with phrases about the proletariat evolving from

a class "in itself" to a class "for itself." In fact, this expression is only found in a few places in Marx's works up to 1852.[18] The best-known of these references occurs in a discussion of early trade unions in *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1847). There Marx writes that "economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle... this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself" (Marx 1955, 150). Draper's comment on this kind of formulation is that "when Marx was in a mind for Hegelian phraseology, the atomized class was a 'class in itself' (*an sich*) but became a 'class for itself' (*fur sich*) insofar as it organized into a social entity and achieved a consciousness of its social and political role in the course of struggle. All this, for Marx, is a historical process, not a static mystique" (Draper 1978, 40-41). Lacking a more developed theory of class formation, many Marxists have relied on this notion, even though it does not explain the dynamics of how the movement from one state to the other occurs.[19]

Another relevant reference concerning class formation occurs in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852). In his explanation of the relationship between Bonaparte and the French peasantry, Marx writes of the latter, which he describes as "a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold

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[18]Draper's exhaustive study finds it in three texts, with an "echo" in a fourth (41).

[19]See, for instance, German 1996 (18).

relations with one another" (Marx 1968, 171), that:

> In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organisation among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name (172).

Although Marx is writing about a class of peasants, not a proletariat, it is worth elucidating the theory of class implicit in this passage. French peasants of the early 1850s are said to form a class to the extent that they find themselves in a similar economic relation to those who have a different way of living and different interests than theirs, presumably those who extract surplus labour from them by taxation and other means. However, the weakness of association between peasant families beyond their locales and their lack of common organization undermines their "classness." In Wood's terms, they can be said to share a class situation. But this "objective" definition is not enough for Marx. It does not suffice to explain the peasantry's role in French society. Because of the disorganized and localized character of their class formation, conditioned by the class relations in which independent small-scale rural producers find themselves, the French peasantry is incapable of playing an independent role in national politics: "They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented" (172). "Community," "national bond," "political organization" - these are aspects of how people exploited in similar ways can become a force capable of conscious

collective intervention as a class in the making of history. One of the reasons why Marx looks to the working class as the key to revolutionary change is precisely because he believes the working class's conditions of life allow it to develop these properties to a much greater extent than other classes (Draper 1978, 41-42).

Marx was quite aware of obstacles in the path of the working class's development. Chief among these is competition. In *The German Ideology* (1847), Marx and Engels write that:

> Competition separates individuals from one another, not only the bourgeois but still more the workers, in spite of the fact that it brings them together. Hence it is a long time before these individuals can unite... Hence every organised power standing over and against these isolated individuals... can only be overcome after long struggles. To demand the opposite would be tantamount to demanding that competition should not exist in this definite epoch of history, or that the individuals should banish from their minds relationships over which in their isolation they have no control (1970, 79).

In this vein, the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848) warns that "this organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves" (Marx and Engels 1968, 43). The mode of production in which accumulation is propelled by market-imposed competition sows division among those who must sell their ability to work in order to survive. A surplus of labour power relative to capital's requirements ensures unemployment and therefore competition among workers for jobs.

Corresponding to this is the division of the working class by the ideology of its rulers.

In any society, Marx and Engels contend, the ruling ideas are those of the ruling class. The dominant ideas hold sway because they are the "ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas" (1970, 64). Material competition underpins ideological competition. So the formation of a working class able to emancipate itself must also involve the overcoming of ideological divisions. Marx never theorizes ideological divisions in the working class at any length, but he is clearly concerned about them. One of his main concerns in this regard is the acceptance by workers of ideologies whose ultimate aim was not communism but political and social reforms within capitalism. Marx considers these ideas as manifestations of the influence of the petty bourgeoisie on the proletariat and rails against them on numerous occasions.[20] Nationalism and racism are also identified as obstacles. In an insightful letter of 1870, Marx notes the hostility of English workers to Irish immigrants as "*the secret of the impotence of the English working class*, despite its organisation. It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it" (qtd. Draper 1978, 67). He compares the anti-Irish chauvinism of English workers to the racism of poor whites in the former slave states of the southern US. In the US, racism against African Americans is the Achilles heel of the working class. "Labor with a white skin cannot emancipate itself where labor with a black skin is branded" (qtd. 68), Marx writes. Against nationalism and racism he counterposes the

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[20]For example, see the response of Marx and Engels in 1879 to the reformism espoused by a group of intellectuals in the German Social Democratic Party (Draper 1978, 516-517).

international solidarity of workers. Overcoming competition and division to create the material and ideological unity of workers is central to the process of the working class's maturation through struggle.

Marx's ideas about class amount to a truly pioneering effort full of important insights. They do not, however, add up to an adequate theory of working-class formation. Given that Marx was only able to analyse quite early workers' movements in the period between the French Revolution and his death in 1883 and that his main theoretical preoccupation was the (never-completed) critique of political economy, it would be unrealistic to expect much more. That said, it is necessary to identify the main weaknesses of Marx's contribution. One is its vagueness about the overall process of working-class formation. Marx believed he knew the direction in which the process was heading, and its likely outcome, but he did not specify much about the dynamics of the process itself. Political texts like *The Eighteenth Brumaire* which make more concrete historical assessments of class movements than theoretical works like *Capital* or popular propaganda like the *Manifesto* are more suggestive in this regard. This weakness can be partially explained by tracing it to the fact that Marx sometimes treats society in a naturalistic manner, "as if it were an organic being in a life cycle" (Cemer 1996, 7). In an early work jointly written with Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family* (1845), Marx claims the working class's essential nature will ultimately determine its actions. He writes that "the question is not what this or that proletarian, or even the whole of the proletariat at the moment *considers* as its aim. The question is *what the proletariat is*, and what, consequent on that *being*, it will be compelled to do" (Marx and Engels1956,

53). As a result of this kind of thinking, he tends to treat the outcome of class formation in the emergence of a revolutionary proletariat as assured. This "optimistic evolutionism" (Molyneux 1986, 30) produces a fatalistic expectation that the continued development of what was still the relatively new capitalist mode of production would drive workers towards unity in revolutionary class organization. This would prove to be sadly mistaken. Related to this is Marx's overestimation of the ease with which revolutionary consciousness would take hold in the working class. To put the same point in another way, he did not appreciate the tenacious persistence of quite non-revolutionary ideas among workers. These were not simply the result of conservative ruling class ideology and the influence of middle class democrats on emergent workers' movements. Although Marx did recognize that racism and nationalism were significant phenomena, he did not elaborate his insights about them into a theoretical account in which social relations other than class were understood as integral aspects of capitalist society. His conception of social being was not as multidimensional as social reality itself.[21] Some fifty years after Marx's death, the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci reflected on some of these issues in ways that go beyond Marx.

1.4 Antonio Gramsci

Antonio Gramsci's prison writings contain some useful ideas about the process

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[21]Seccombe and Livingstone 2000 is an interesting attempt to develop a historical materialist conception of social being as many-sided and to explore the implications of this for workers' consciousness.

through which working classes are formed. As a leading member of the Socialist Party and later the Italian Communists, Gramsci had considerable first-hand experience in working-class politics as well as the history of the European workers' movement up to his imprisonment by Italian fascism in 1926 on which to reflect. Like the contents of his *Prison Notebooks* in general, Gramsci's observations do not add up to a systematic theory, but they make a contribution to the development of such a theory

In his note on methodological criteria for writing the history of subaltern classes, Gramsci sets out an agenda for research. This starts with the "objective formation" of classes by "developments and transformations occurring in the sphere of economic production." The "social groups" out of which new classes arise must also be studied, since the latter are influenced by the "mentality, ideology and aims" of the former. Next is the relationship of a new class to ruling-class "political formations," and how attempts to articulate subaltern interests shape "processes of decomposition, renovation or neo-formation" of the exploited class. New ruling-class political parties, launched in order to maintain hegemony over the subaltern class, are a further issue. Finally come "formations" of the subaltern classes themselves: those which advance "claims of a limited and partial character," others which "assert the autonomy of the subaltern groups, but within the old framework," and those which fight for "the integral autonomy" of the exploited (Gramsci 1971, 52).

There is a great deal packed into these methodological suggestions. First is the assertion that classes are defined at the most basic level by the places people find themselves within relations of production. This is neither novel nor particularly insightful, since nothing

is said about what defines different classes formed in the sphere of production. It is a formal starting point for historical materialist investigation, one which leaves the content to be determined concretely, by the analysis of particular class situations.

More interesting is the inclusion of the need to study the social origins of new classes. This makes it clear that Gramsci does not see working classes as collections of abstract subjects compelled to sell their labour-power to capital. Rather, working classes are formed out of pre-existing social groups whose particular traditions, aspirations and cultural practices - modified by the devastating experience of proletarianization - will be those of the emergent proletariat.

This is also a clear signal of Gramsci's belief that class formation is a process that takes place over time. Structures matter in this process. However, they are structures-in-process, not inert timeless forces but changing ones. Class formation is historical. Even if the "objective formation" of a class at any given conjuncture requires a synchronic analysis, working-class formation, including the structural dimension of workers' relationships to the means of production, is diachronic. This is confirmed by the acknowledgment of "decomposition, renovation or neo- formation." A class's origins do not necessarily stamp it forever if "neo-formation" is possible. If "decomposition" is a possibility, then this suggests that class formation does not proceed inevitably toward the "integral autonomy" Gramsci advocates. It is not a smooth or linear process.

The other methodological criteria Gramsci lists in this note deal with the political organization of subaltern and dominant classes. His mention of formations that assert

workers' partial demands probably refers at least in part to trade unions, so "political" here should be understood in a broader sense than party-political or governmental. Gramsci's first injunction on political organization, namely to study how subaltern groups are passively or actively affiliated to the political formations of the ruling class, suggests that class formation is a relational process. A working class does not form itself over time only through interaction internal to the class. The nature of a subaltern class's necessarily unequal (53) relations over time with a dominant class will have a significant effect on workers' consciousness and organization. For instance, a working class excluded from official politics through the denial of the franchise will undergo different experiences than one whose members are full citizens of a capitalist democracy and whose representatives actively participate in electoral politics and state administration.

To close the discussion of this passage, it is worth noting the typology of political parties presented by Gramsci. There are parties of the dominant class, including those created for the express purpose of maintaining the subordination of workers to the hegemonic order. Some organizations of the subaltern class advance only partial demands. Some assert the class's autonomy, but within the status quo. Others, those which "assert the integral autonomy" (52), seek a comprehensive counter-hegemonic social transformation.

Parties play a very important role in Gramsci's conception of working-class formation. Instead of treating political parties as simply reflections of a class's stage of development, he recognizes that the relationship between party and class is dialectical. "In fact," he writes, "if it is true that parties are only the nomenclature for classes, it is also true

that parties are not simply a mechanical and passive expression of those classes, but react energetically upon them in order to develop, solidify and universalize them" (227) in accordance with their political programme. Political organization by sections of workers, and by parties of the dominant class, to influence other layers of the working class has a significant impact on how the class takes shape.

For Gramsci, political organization entails intellectuals: "there is no organization without intellectuals, that is without organizers and leaders" (334). Every fundamental class, of which the proletariat is one, "creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields" (5). Therefore, in trying to understand working-class formation it is necessary to pay particular attention to the development of a class's intellectuals.

If intellectuals are central to parties, parties are also vital to the development of a class's intellectuals, its organizers. Parties translate different conceptions of the world into ethical and political practice, spreading them among larger numbers of people. For this reason, it is through parties that groups of intellectuals capable of organizing a new hegemony, such as that of the working class, take shape (335). This further confirms the direct link between Gramsci's extensive writings on parties in the *Prison Notebooks* and theorizing class formation.

The kind of concrete study of working-class formation to which Gramsci's notes point requires a profound appreciation of the society in question. Abstract generalizations about

stages of capitalist development will not suffice. National particularities have real significance. Accordingly, social relations "must be understood and conceived in their originality and uniqueness... the point of departure is 'national' - and it is from this point of departure that one must begin. Yet the perspective is international and cannot be otherwise" (240). Gramsci's commitment to this kind of analysis can be seen in the many notes on Italy and the United States in his prison writings. Whatever one makes of the many ideas and observations found in these notes, they are evidence of his concern to grasp the specificities of working-class formation (as well as many other phenomena).

This sensitivity to particularity does not keep Gramsci from proposing a generalization about "the degree of homogeneity, self-awareness, and organization attained... differentiated into various levels, corresponding to the various moments of collective political consciousness, as they have manifested themselves in history up til now" (181). This generalization, made under the heading of "the relation of political forces" in the note "Analysis of Situations. Relations of Force," can be read as a class formation schema. At the "economic-corporate" level, a sense of unity exists among members of the same occupation. At the next level, class solidarity exists and the class's right to juridical equality in official politics is asserted. The third level goes much further, with the class recognizing that its interests are not merely its own in a narrow sense but universal ones, the basis of a new hegemony. Read synchronically, these three levels would correspond to different layers of a working class at a particular moment. Read diachronically, they would mark a proletariat's evolution towards becoming truly revolutionary.

This summary of what Gramsci tells us about how working classes are made may suggest that all he offers are a number of injunctions and suggestions. Such a judgment would not be unfair. The fragmentary *Prison Notebooks* contain many thoughts, but few, if any, fully elaborated theories. Nevertheless, there is still great value in Gramsci's ideas about working-class formation. One way of demonstrating this is to contrast what he offers with the thoughts of some other Marxists in the revolutionary socialist tradition to which Gramsci belongs.

For example, consider CLR James. This talented Trinidadian-born Marxist with a wide range of interests authored *The Black Jacobins* (1938), a fine history of the slave revolt in San Domingo (now Haiti) in the 1790s. But in *Notes on Dialectics* (1948), James develops a strikingly Hegelian theory of working-class formation. Paraphrasing an extract from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, he claims that "to understand the labour movement, is to know that at each stage it degenerates but splits to re-instate its self-identity, its unity, but that this unity comes from divisions within its own self" (James 1980, 65). The different stages in the development of the world working class are necessary. Applying Hegel's doctrine of essence to the working class, James argues that events such as the Paris Commune and different class organizations are forms through which the working class passes. Each form contains its own negation, each the product of a different stage of capitalism. As each form passes away, the proletariat accumulates experience in its progress toward spontaneous revolution and international socialism (87). It would be hard to imagine a theory of class formation more unlike Gramsci's. Abstract, almost mystical in his treatment

of the proletariat as a unified revolutionary subject with an extraordinary memory, James sadly shows no awareness of the historical complexity towards which Gramsci's probing methodology pushes us.

As a second example, consider Trotskyism. Brett Cemer provides an interesting Gramscian assessment of the contemporary studies of the French "May Events" of 1968 by two European Trotskyists, Ernest Mandel and Tony Cliff. Both, he argues, amply illustrate "Trotskyism's own 'nightmare on the minds of the living'" (Cemer 1996, 30): a conception of working-class formation which treats workers as ready to engage in militant struggle but "held back (leashed)" (30) by reformist leaderships from which a revolutionary party can win them by placing "sufficient incentive (choice cuts) before the nose of this beast in the form of the full and correct programme, in which case the dog will prove too strong for the old master and will run to fall in behind the 'authentic' revolutionary leadership" (30). In the absence of a concrete analysis of the French working class and its organic intellectuals, ideas derived from Leon Trotsky's perceptive account of the Russian Revolution become misleading cliches.

Gramsci's contribution to a theory of class formation highlights the historical and relational nature of the process by which workers form classes. It emphasizes that class formation does not happen in the same manner in different contexts. Rather, it is always shaped by the peculiarities of unique societies. These include the relations between working classes and dominant classes. Gramsci's methodological notes suggest general patterns and possibilities, not a model. They are intended to serve as guides for concrete studies, not as

substitutes for research. Another notable indication of Gramsci's rejection of fatalistic determinist conceptions of how classes are made is the importance he gives to political organizations and their intellectual leaderships in the process of class formation. Writing in Mussolini's prison in the 1930s, he has a much greater appreciation than Marx of the pressures working against the development of unified revolutionary working classes. While not incorporating gender and other social relations into the theory of class formation, his method's emphasis on the study of classes in their complexity leaves it open to expansion in this direction. Although Gramsci's thoughts do not add up to an adequate theory of working-class formation, they provide useful elements for the development of such a theory.

1.5 EP Thompson (and Ellen Wood)

Unlike Marx and Gramsci, EP Thompson was primarily a historian, albeit a politically-engaged one. His primary concern was historical research and writing, not social and political theory. His relations with Marxist theorists were fraught with controversy. This is not to say that Thompson was anti-theoretical. Far from it: Thompson was attentive to the theoretical generalizations to be drawn from historical study, and intervened in theoretical debates on several occasions. He writes that:

> The categories appropriate to the investigation of history are historical categories. Historical materialism is distinguished from other interpretive systems by its stubborn consistency (alas, a stubbornness which has sometimes been doctrinaire) in elaborating such categories, and by its articulation of these within a conceptual totality... a developing *knowledge*, albeit a provisional and approximate knowledge with many

silences and impurities (Thompson 1978c, 50).

What he was resolutely hostile to was theory developed outside of an ongoing dialogue with historical processes. "Each notion, or concept, arises out of empirical engagements, and however abstract the procedures of its self-interrogation, it must then be brought back into an engagement with the determinate properties of the evidence, and argue its case before vigilant judges in history's 'court of appeal'" (43). As a theoretically self-conscious historian rather than a systematic theorist, his fragmentary pronouncements on class theory need to be treated with some caution. They have at times been misunderstood because their meaning is not always clear and they are often presented, sometimes polemically and without care to avoid misreadings, in counter-position to views with which Thompson disagrees. For this reason, there is great value in Wood's careful elucidation of a theory of class out of his work, on which I draw here.

Thompson's most famous contribution to theorizing class is found in the preface to his great work *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963). Here he writes, against Stalinist orthodoxy and the academic sociology of the day, that class is a "historical phenomenon," not a "'structure'" (8) or a "thing" (9) but "something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships" (8). It is an historical relationship inconceivable without both terms of the relation; classes do not develop separately and then interact with each other. In what has become perhaps his most celebrated and disputed theoretical claim, Thompson writes that "class happens when some men [*sic*],

as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs" (8-9). These experiences are not free-floating. They have a material foundation: "The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born - or enter involuntarily. Class-consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms" (9). Historical evidence does not lend support to vulgar Marxist notions of class. Class consciousness is never a simple reflection of a relation to the means of production, the consciousness the class "ought to have (but seldom does have) if 'it' was properly aware of its own position and real interests" as decided by a "party, sect or theorist" (9). In the same spirit as his remarks on theory above, he concludes "class is defined by men [*sic*] as they live their own history, and, in the end, this is its only definition" (10).

In his essay "The Peculiarities of the English," Thompson restates this position with characteristic verve:

> Sociologists who have stopped the time-machine and, with a good deal of conceptual huffing and puffing, have gone down to the engine-room to look, tell us that nowhere at all have they been able to locate and classify a class... Of course they are right, since class is not this or that part of the machine, but *the way the machine works* once it is set in motion... Class is a social and cultural formation (often finding institutional expression) which cannot be defined abstractly, or in isolation, but only in terms of relationships with other classes; and ultimately the definition can only be made in the medium of *time* (1978b, 295).

A happening, a process, a relationship, a formation: these ideas are central to Thompson's

concept of class. "*A* class," in this view, is "a very loosely defined body of people" with similar "experiences," ideas and "interests," "who have a *disposition* to *behave* as a class" (295).

This approach has been taken to task by other Marxists. It is often seen as giving short shrift to the "objective" dimension of class. For example, Ste. Croix comments on the preface to *The Making of the English Working Class* that instead of Marx's two-sided analysis in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* - "economic conditions of existence" as well as "community," "national bond" and "political organization" - Thompson's theory of class acknowledges only the significance of the second aspect (Ste. Croix 1981, 62). If class is defined by people as they live their history, what happens if they do not speak and think in class terms? In the absence of class-like behaviour, where there is no class "disposition," does class cease to exist? Does not Thompson dissolve class "in itself" into class "for itself," making class analysis irrelevant when class-conscious collective action is not happening? This is what Thompson's more structuralist critics have contended.[22]

Thompson's restatement of his theoretical conclusions in reply to his critics in the article "Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle Without Class?" helps to clarify his position. Class, he emphasises, is a historical concept. It takes place not only inside the heads of theorists but as process in time. As a category, it can be used in two ways. One refers to class phenomena as they occur in capitalist society from the nineteenth century on.

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[22]For example, Anderson 1980 (39-43).

Here, he writes, "the concept not only enables us to organize and analyse the evidence; it is also, in a new sense, *present in the evidence itself*" (1978a, 148) in self-conscious class organizations and cultures. The other use of the concept is as "a heuristic or analytic category" (148) that may be used in the study of societies before industrial capitalism. In such societies modern languages of class were not in use. Here, he cautions, we need to be aware that people thought of themselves and their world in other terms, for instance as belonging to ranks or other politically-constituted status groups. However, because there is no other concept available to understand "a manifest and universal historical process" (149), class ought not to be abandoned. We can think and write about class because people have behaved in class ways, even if they did not see what they were doing in such terms. This has been so because of the pervasive reality of class struggle:

> people find themselves in a society structured in determined ways (crucially, but not exclusively, in productive relations), they experience exploitation (or the need to maintain power over those whom they exploit), they identify points of antagonistic interest, they commence to struggle around these issues and in the process of struggling they discover themselves as classes, they come to know this discovery as class consciousness. Class and class-consciousness are always the last, not the first, stage in the real historical process (149).

This explains why Thompson sees class struggle as both prior to class, and more universal (149).

This passage suggests that Thompson does not, in fact, leave Marx's "economic conditions of existence"out of his class theory. This is confirmed when he writes in the same

article that the "static structural analysis" of class may be "both valuable and essential" in offering "a determining logic." What it does not provide is "the historical conclusion or equation - that these productive relations = these class formations" (1978a, 147n). When Ste. Croix and like-minded critics fault Thompson for underplaying class in its "objective" sense, they have not understood that this is what Thompson is referring to when he writes of "productive relations." If one reads "class formation" where Thompson writes "class" in sentences like the famous line in the preface to *The Making of the English Working Class* that "class happens when some men...", his meaning becomes clearer. "Productive relations" or class relations in the synchronic sense of class situations exist in all societies in which exploitation takes place. Exploitation leads to class struggle, out of which class formations "arise at the intersection of determination and self-activity... in an open-ended process of *relationship* - of struggle with other classes - over time" (1978c). How class formations develop in time within an array of social relations is the real question, the process demanding historical inquiry.

Thompson himself never explicated his theory of class as such at any greater length. However, Wood has done a fine job of this in the chapter "Class as Process and Relationship" in her *Democracy Against Capitalism*. She also draws out several significant implications of this theory of class, acknowledging that here she is doing more than just interpreting Thompson (Wood 1995, 93). One is that class as a relationship involves not only relations between classes, but also among members of the same class. A working class is not brought together directly as a class formation by virtue of workers' relations to

capitalists in workplaces. Workers employed by the same capitalist enterprise share an immediate relation to their particular employer. They do not, however, have as direct a relationship to wage-labourers working for other employers, or with the capitalist class as a whole. Wood argues that theories that too easily derive class from the structure of relations of production do not appreciate this issue (93-95).[23]

This raises the question of what significance relations of production actually do have in the making of classes. To explain their influence, Wood suggests, it is necessary to follow Thompson in utilizing a concept of experience. This is not a neat theoretical answer to the question, which can really only be answered by studying the messy complexities of history. "It is in the medium of this lived experience that social consciousness is shaped and with it the '*disposition* to *behave* as a class'" (96), to use a phrase of Thompson's. The concept of a common experience is, for Thompson, a way of describing how social being determines social consciousness. This is not a static relationship, for neither is social being itself. Class is not a structure formed outside of history that then undergoes process, as many theorists would have it, but a structured process. The relations of production are only the point of departure. How their powers of determination contribute to class formation "remains an open question to be resolved empirically by historical and sociological analysis" (98). Although this is no doubt unsatisfactory for those who expect a solution at the level of theory, Wood believes that it "is where the most important and problematic questions about

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[23]This implicitly touches on the issue of social-spatial ties among workers. See Savage 1996 for a discussion that distinguishes dense ties from ties of range.

class lie" (98).

The final point made by Wood that I will touch on concerns the "in itself"/"for itself" distinction. If one accepts Thompson's class theory, this should not be understood as distinguishing objective class structure from subjective class consciousness. Instead, it should be thought of as referring to different variants of class formation, each with its own relationship between being and consciousness. The former can be associated with historical moments where class relations have not given rise to obvious and conscious class formations, those for which Thompson coined the phrase "class struggle without class" (102). Whether Marx's "in itself"/"for itself" couplet is worth retaining at all is questionable, but in Wood's hands it at least no longer provides a license for thinking that working classes ever actually exist without experience and consciousness, however fragmented and inadequate that consciousness may seem by the standards of radical politics. Thus Thompson's approach is incompatible with Marxisms "in which nothing exists between the objective constitution of classes by modes of production, on the one hand, and an ideal revolutionary class consciousness, on the other, except a vast empirical-historical (and hence impure and theoretically indigestible) spectrum of 'false' consciousness" (105).[24] What is probably

[24]This polemical description by Wood of Western Marxism, especially Althusserianism, also applies only too well to the classical Marxism preserved in dogmatic form by many of the marginal revolutionary socialist currents that survived Stalinism and fascism. Gramsci's prison writings provide an important alternative to such an empty understanding of workers' consciousness. Perhaps most significantly, Gramsci grasps that popular consciousness is a contradictory mix of the ideologies of the hegemonic class and elements arising from practical experience which include critical insights about the nature of society (Gramsci 1971, 326-343, 419-425). Seccombe and Livingstone 2000 builds on

of greatest value in Thompson's contribution to a theory of working-class formation is the way in which this historian identifies class formation as a structured process and relationship and offers some generalizations about its character. The manner in which Thompson formulates theoretical points is not always straightforward, with his use of "class" being the best example. Even so, his essential argument that exploitative relations of production generate class struggle, and that class formations develop as workers experience this struggle, is clear enough. This is accompanied with a forceful directive to study the specific social determinants of experience and their cultural expressions in each case. Thompson recognizes that class relations are not the only social relations, although he does not theoretically assert the multidimensionality of social being. As guidelines for research, his theoretical observations are helpful but less specific than Gramsci's. Perhaps because Thompson was primarily a historian of eighteenth and early nineteenth-century England, when working-class organizations were in their infancy, Gramsci's emphasis on the role of political parties is missing from Thompson's theoretical generalizations about class formation. That said, Thompson certainly does not neglect agency in his historical work on the issue. A reader of *The Making of the English Working Class* is told in the opening paragraph of the book's preface that this "is a study in an active process, which owes as much to agency as to conditioning. The working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. It was present at its own making" (1980, 8). The book does discuss plebeian radical societies and other

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these ideas.

similar political institutions at length. In the end, its author would likely have preferred that we take his work as a stimulus to studying how other working classes were made rather than writing theory about their making. I take this as a salutary reminder that the development of theory ought not to be an end in itself.

1.6 Autonomist Marxism

The last body of Marxist thought I will examine is not as well known as the previous three or identifiable with a single thinker, and so requires a brief introduction. The current often referred to in English as autonomist Marxism (in Italian, "operaismo"; in French, "l'opéraïsme") originated in Italy in the early 1960s as a New Left in opposition to the dominant Stalinist Communist Party (PCI). Some of its earliest theoretical efforts were responses to workers' resistance to the modernization of Italian industry, which the PCI supported in the belief that new technology would lead to productivity increases and higher wages. This clash spurred Raniero Panzieri, Romano Alquati and others to reconsider the use of technology in capitalist production from the shopfloor perspective of workers who recognized that "modernization" meant an increase in their exploitation (Cleaver 1992, 112-113). Among the theorists associated with autonomist Marxism in its heyday in the late 1960s and the 1970s were Mario Tronti, Tony Negri and Sergio Bologna. Some, including Tronti, eventually returned to the PCI or aligned themselves with it. In general, this current attempts to rethink Marxism systematically from the perspective of the working class. This project follows from the belief that much of Marx's work and most self-styled Marxist

thought does not adopt a consistently working-class standpoint in its attempt to comprehend capitalism. As a result, such theory presents a one-sided account in which the implications of capitalist development for workers and/or the working-class resistance that capital strives to overcome are overshadowed or ignored (107-110). A principal tenet of autonomist Marxism is that capital depends on labour for its survival while labour could exist without capital. Such an autonomous existence, in other words the abolition of capitalism and its replacement with a self-governing socialist democracy, is the political goal of this current.[25]

The chief contribution of autonomist Marxism to a theory of working classes as historical formations is a trio of concepts: class composition, decomposition and recomposition. The first is derived from the autonomist development of Marx. In *Capital*, Marx studies the composition of capital. This refers to the ratio between constant capital (means of production, dead labour) and variable capital (labour employed in production, living labour). Considered in simple physical terms, this is the technical composition of capital. Considered in terms of value, it is the organic composition of capital. The autonomists reason that if capital has a composition, so does labour. The two concepts comprehend the same reality, the organization of the capitalist production process, from different perspectives: Marx's from the side of capital, the autonomists' from the side of the working class. Class composition "involves a disaggregated picture of the structure of class power existing within the division of labour associated with a particular organisation of

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[25]Cuninghame 2000 is useful on the history of autonomist Marxism in Italy.

constant and variable capital" (113). A class composition refers to the relations within a working class as it exists in relationship to a certain structure of production. The divisions and hierarchies that exist within the class thus become an integral part of a central concept of autonomist class theory. This flows from a hallmark of autonomist Marxist thought, the view that any division of labour within capitalist production is not only technical but also a specific mode for capital's attempts to control labour. Capital aims to establish a class composition that allows it to accumulate with a minimum of disruption by workers (113-114).

In a useful explication, the collective around the short-lived mid-1970s US autonomist journal *Zerowork* outlines four dimensions of the analysis of class composition. One is the study of "struggles themselves: their content, their direction, how they develop and how they circulate" (Zerowork 1992, 111). Another is the relations between different sections of the class (including the unwaged), "the way these sectors affect each other and thus the relation of the working class with capital" (111). This makes divisions and inequality within the class, reflected above all in different wage levels (111), a key issue. The third dimension is the relations between workers and their organizations, including trade unions and political parties. "Whether a particular organization advances the interests of the working class or not, it plays a role in the relationship between the working class and capital" (112). Finally, the authors write that "all these aspects have to be related to the capitalist initiative in terms of general social planning, investment, technological innovations, employment and to the institutional setting of capitalist society" (112).

The concept of recomposition refers to activities which unite workers as a class against capital, thereby disrupting capital's organization of exploitation and increasing their power to meet their own needs. By reducing divisions within the working class, the balance of forces between the classes is shifted in workers' favour. It is sometimes referred to by autonomists as "political recomposition." In response, capital attempts to break down the growing unity among workers in order to reimpose its control and establish a new class composition favourable to itself. According to autonomist Marxism, the capitalist class does this by reorganizing production with new technology and a new division of labour and also through the state, using fiscal, monetary and social policy. This is decomposition. For autonomist Marxism, workers are locked in an ongoing struggle with capital in which they attempt to recompose themselves as a class to meet their needs and capital responds with strategies of decomposition. With the dynamic concepts of recomposition and decomposition and the static concept of class composition it is possible to analyse the cycles of workers' struggle that characterize the history of capitalism (Cleaver 1992, 114). The autonomists theorize these cycles as battles by capital to atomize workers, reducing them to "wage-labour" - by which they mean passive sellers of labour power to employers - (decomposition), and workers' efforts to resist and make themselves into a "working class," an active, class-conscious force for itself (recomposition) (1980, 53).

There is much that is debatable about autonomist Marxism that influences how these concepts are used by their best-known proponents. Tronti's social capital theory, discussed earlier, is one. Another worth mentioning in this assessment of contributions to a theory of

working classes as historical formations is the tendency to conceptualize labour as a collective subject that exists outside and against capital, rather than in and against capital. Werner Bonefeld cautions that the autonomist "approach tends to neglect the forms in and through which labour exists in capitalism" (Bonefeld 1993, 26). Autonomist Marxism risks replacing the one-sided kind of Marxism in which only capital has agency and workers are strictly reactive with an equally one-sided reversal. At times, it depicts a constantly active working class whose struggles push capital to introduce new machinery and look for other ways to tame labour insurgency. Bonefeld's dialectical correction is to argue that labour exists within and against capital, not outside and against it. In capitalism, labour does not exist outside of capital nor capital outside of labour (26-27). Thus it is wrong to suggest that a pure working class confronts an external enemy. The antagonists in class struggle are intertwined. A third cause for concern is that concepts like labour and capital formulated at the level of abstraction of *Capital* should not be used in more concrete historical studies without considerable care. "Labour" always exists as a to some degree heterogenous working-class formation. Neither it nor "capital" are singular subjects, since "capital" involves competing capitalists. Another problem is the claim, or at least the suggestion, that capitalists reorganize paid workplaces with new technology solely or primarily to decompose the working class. While work reorganization may sometimes have this goal, it often has other motivations related to improving an employer's competitive position. Nevertheless, because there is no necessary connection between the concepts of class composition, recomposition and decomposition and other theoretical positions commonly

maintained in autonomist Marxism, the concepts themselves are not invalidated if one or more of the latter are rejected.

The concept of class composition has itself also been criticized. Autonomists who aligned with the PCI, such as M Cacciari, contend that the concept is reductionist. Yann Moulier summarizes their argument: "the passage from labour power (in an analysis of class composition) to the working class (level of analysis situated on the level of political organization) is *neither immediate nor linear nor determined* by the causality of the immanent structure of this class composition" (Moulier 1986, 47).[26] According to these critics, other autonomist Marxists err in leaping from an account of the capital-labour relation using the concept of class composition to "the working class as a historical and political category" (48). In this move, institutions and class consciousness are treated as reflections of a class composition.

Moulier responds that if class composition is a sociological analysis from which the character of workers' organizations can be deduced ahistorically, then the critics are correct. However, Moulier's interpretation is that the concept should be understood as referring to a "*complex process* and a method of analysis"(50) integrating the structure of capital and wage-labour with the broader realms of social, political and cultural organization. Thus understood, it can be used to investigate cycles of capitalist restructuring and workers' resistance. These do not unfold according to a predetermined logic but through class struggle

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[26]The translation of Moulier's text is my own.

(50). "Composition *in the course of making itself*, therefore, superimposes itself on composition *as pure state of fact*" (52). To paraphrase, the concept of class composition is worth retaining if it is understood as a tool for the analysis of historical processes and not as a way of deducing a class formation from a form of the labour process. Implicit in Moulier's position is an understanding that class composition, recomposition and decomposition do not take place only in the workplace but across capitalist society - hence the reference to social, political and cultural life. It is not only at the point of production that classes are composed. This interpretation is in harmony with the expanded scope of class found in autonomist Marxism. As I have argued, there are grounds for such a broad view of class other than the dubious concept of the "social factory."

One need not accept autonomist Marxism wholesale to recognize the usefulness of the concepts of class composition, decomposition and recomposition. The first offers a way of understanding the foundations of a working-class formation in a historically-specific organization of capitalist production that underpins the relations between classes and within the working class. With this as a pointer, it is less likely that analysis will suffer from overly general observations about relations of production. When working-class formation is framed in such a vague way it is more likely to result in an account that highlights struggle and culture and underestimates the influence of the character of production, including qualitative features of work-life in a particular period. The concept of class composition directs us to take such determinants seriously, without falling into the ahistorical error of trying to read a class formation off a structure of production. Class composition certainly does not displace

the centrality of class struggle. Nor does the concept necessarily narrow one's attention to workplace developments alone. Rather, it grounds class struggle and formation in the organization of production and directs us to pay attention to how different sectors of a working class relate to each other as well as their relation with capital. Care must be taken in periodising a particular class composition, as is the case whenever synchronic concepts are used in the study of processes. The concepts of decomposition and recomposition are helpful in analysing waves of workers' struggles and employers' offensives, providing that they are used to analyse the *effects* of developments on working-class formations, without any assumptions about the conscious intentions of those caught up in class struggles. The associated autonomist use of "wage labour" to refer to a fragmented, passive class formation and "working class" for a united and combative one is not worth retaining. It is confusing to those not familiar with this school's terminology and implies that the former kind of class formation is not really a class at all.

1.7 Never Class Alone: Gender and Class as an Illustration

Before pulling ideas taken from Marx, Gramsci, Thompson and autonomist Marxism together to outline a theory of working classes as historical formations, it is necessary to pause and consider briefly a question touched on earlier, the mediation of class by other social relations. Irrespective of what some Marxists may have thought in the past, societies are made up of a good deal more than class relations. A society, as a complex whole, is a "rich totality of many determinations and relations" (Marx 1973, 100). If class has a

privileged causal role in historical change (a contentious issue in social theory which I mention here only in passing), it is not because class relations are in some sense more real than, for instance, gender relations.[27] Other social relations are not epiphenomena of class.

Without straying into a discussion of social ontology, if capitalist societies are considered complex, structured totalities, then class relations should be understood to be mediated by other social relations and vice versa. What Stuart Hall and his co-authors write about race - that it is "the modality in which class is lived" and "the medium in which class relations are experienced" (Hall et al 1978, 394) - is true, and not only of race but of all social relations that simultaneously mediate class. To say that class is mediated by other social relations means that it does not exist outside of them. Class is not initially constituted in pristine isolation and then brought into contact. Rather, the relationship between class, race, gender and other social relations is an internal one. Consequently, a host of social relations need to be considered in the study of any working class as a concrete historical formation. Relations of gender, race, nation, sexuality and space are all involved in the study of class. Workers' social existence is shaped by these and potentially other influences.

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[27]I find Wood's argument on this matter salutary: "We need to be reminded why Marxism ascribes a determinative primacy to class struggle. It is not because class is the only form of oppression or even the most frequent, consistent, or violent source of social conflict, but rather because its terrain is the social organization of production which creates the material conditions of existence itself. The first principle of historical materialism is not class or class struggle, but the organization of material life and social reproduction. Class enters the picture when access to the conditions of existence and to the means of appropriation are organized in class ways, that is, when some people are systematically compelled by differential access to the means of production or appropriation to transfer surplus labour to others" (Wood 1995, 108).

Every class formation is affected by how social relations other than those of class are ordered.

As a result, workers' identities have facets other than class, though these do not take shape outside of class. Workers' experiences of class itself will vary depending on where they are positioned vis-a-vis other social relations. As Karen Sacks writes:

> One should not expect to find any generic worker or essential worker, or for that matter, working-class consciousness... not only is class experienced in historically specific ways, but it is also experienced in racially-specific, gender-specific and kinship-specific ways. The big issue is how to go about finding the unities and commonalities of class and class consciousness while being attentive to specificity (Sacks 1989, 542-543).

Himani Bannerji cautions that "we don't always already know what identity and difference mean in their configurations with history, capital and class, in the hands of diverse historical agents who are located in specific historical moments and social relations of power" (1995, 19). To those who do not wear theoretical blinders, working-class action and consciousness will show evidence of this specificity and the complexity that I have called the multidimensionality of social being. An important consequence of this multidimensionality is that workers may be organized by, and identify with, multi-class social groups or communities whose axis is racial, gender, sexual or national supremacy or oppression, though workers' involvement in such formations does not necessarily eliminate class antagonism within them. Class must be studied concretely, with the understanding that social reality is multidimensional. In other words, class is never only about class.

A complete theory of working classes as historical formations would offer general considerations of how gender, race, nation, sexuality, space and possibly other social relations each mediate class in capitalist society. Because there is a great deal that is quite specific about how each of these is organized in particular capitalist societies, there are limits to what can be specified in more abstract theoretical terms. This does not rule out theorizing the mediation of class by other social relations altogether, but places limits on what can usefully be said at this level. Space precludes more than a brief discussion of one case here. I will consider gender and discuss a few concrete examples which demonstrate how class is mediated by gender. What follows simply illustrates this key theoretical point; it is not meant as anything remotely resembling an exhaustive treatment of this enormous subject.[28]

In the experience of workers, class and gender, like other social relations, are interpenetrating. They can, however, be distinguished analytically. As Rosemary Pringle argues, "classes are always already gendered while men and women experience their gender in class terms... Class has different meanings for men and women and cannot be separated from these gender meanings" (qtd. Sugiman 1994, 6). Any working-class formation will be structured by the prevailing order of gender relations. Gender enters into what Johanna

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[28]Brenner 2000 (293-324) offers a useful discussion of the "intersection" of class, gender and other social relations in the US context. Bannerji 1995, 2000 and Dua and Robertson 1999 are important anti-racist feminist works which highlight the mediated character of class in the Canadian context. Collins 2000 addresses these issues from within a US context, though with less attention to class than to race and gender. In contemporary theory, the concept of intersectionality generally addresses the same reality which I discuss as mediation. The latter term emphasizes that social relations do not merely intersect (from starting points external to each other) but interpenetrate (as internally-related).

Brenner calls "survival projects," "the ways people group together in order to live in capitalist society" (1998, 2). These varied strategies are fundamental to workers' lives. They may be individual or based on families or other collectivities. Survival projects "will necessarily include forms of mutual support, not only in the workplace but outside of waged work - relations of sharing and solidarity across households, in neighborhoods, in kinship and friendship networks, in communities, and so on. Key resources include sharing cash income, bartering services such as childcare, and sharing living space" (2-3). Gendered identities develop in the context of survival projects. They are also shaped by many other influences, including the ideologies and practices of religion and schooling and various kinds of legal and administrative regulation by state power. Such identities are culturally produced, given meaning in conditions that are largely not chosen by working-class people themselves.

Among these conditions is women's oppression, a universal feature of capitalist societies (and most other societies too). If, as Brenner suggests, the social organization of gender "reflects the different kinds and levels of resources that men and women bring into the process" (4), then inequality is a hallmark of gender relations. The gendered class experiences of working-class women have included unequal responsibility for housework, childcare and other kinds of domestic labour, less say in household decision-making, male violence, low pay and poor conditions of waged work, barriers to obtaining better-paid and more secure jobs, the denial of reproductive freedom and the disparagement of their participation in workplace organising and public community life. However, it would certainly be a mistake to think that these burdens eliminate women workers' agency

altogether. Oppressive gender divisions of labour have at times facilitated the self-organization of working-class women. For instance, Brenner points out that networks formed around care-giving responsibilities have also allowed women workers to make demands on community institutions and male workers, take on waged work and engage in activism (7).

The gendering of class is brought out clearly by Pamela Sugiman's research on Canadian auto workers in the mid-twentieth century. When in 1937 newly-formed Local 222 of the United Auto Workers struck General Motors in Oshawa and established a foothold for industrial unionism in auto, most workers in the industry were white men. However, the production work force also included some white women, largely of British and Eastern European origin, and men of colour. A segregated division of labour was in place. White men, white women, and men of colour did distinct kinds of work and did not compete for jobs within each other's classifications (Sugiman 1994, 19). The employment of white women increased greatly within a few years of the unionization of the industry, as the wartime expansion of production created a demand for labour that drew women into auto plants in unprecedented numbers. For instance, women quickly moved from 8% to 25% of the workers at McKinnon Industries in St. Catharines (20). There, as in other plants, they continued to be employed in gender-specific job classifications on the basis of the prevailing stereotyped assumptions about women's skills and aptitudes (22).

Enveloped in the dominant ideology of the male worker as sole breadwinner and women as dependent homemakers - an ideology that existed in contradiction with the reality

that one man's wage could not support a family (95), and thus was rarely the basis for a viable survival project - some male UAW members were also distrustful of women as conservative and unreliable dues-payers (29). The gendered strategy of male workers involved defending their wages and conditions of work and only challenging gender-based inequities when these directly affected men. For instance, the employment of women in lower-paid "women's jobs" was not an issue until women began to be hired to perform "men's jobs." Only then did men begin to demand equal pay for equal work, fearing that lower-paid women would exert a downward pull on men's wages (42). Equal pay was rarely treated as more than a simple wage issue. Moreover, Sugiman argues, gender assumptions were so entrenched that "most women accepted unequal pay because they compared their rates only to those of other women" (50). Issues specific to women, such as child care and maternity leave, received little attention in the UAW (57). At end of the Second World War, women's sex-specific seniority lists gave them little protection. Women were unable to transfer into "men's departments," so "the legal application of the seniority principle resulted in the lay-off of many experienced women workers while newly hired men retained their jobs" (52). In some plants, male unionists supported laying off women before men, regardless of seniority, although others challenged this violation of union principle (54-57). Sugiman concludes that the UAW was a "masculine institution, led by men, and shaped according to white working men's vision of justice and equality" (61). When one also considers that in Canada in the 1940s being a union activist proclaimed a woman's commitment to the labour movement and to waged work as well as her discontent - all very un-feminine qualities (61),

- it is not surprising that many women auto workers were pro-UAW but few became activists. Sugiman argues that at this time most women responded to workplace difficulties in ways other than getting involved in the union.

Central to coping with the factory was the shop-floor culture of femininity created by women workers. This was based on contemporary concerns about physical appearance, cosmetics and clothing. It allowed women to assert their gender identity in the male-dominated work environment (77-78). However conventional these concerns might have been, asserting femininity through fashion in the factory was not inherently conservative. According to Sugiman, incidents such as opposition to attempts by management to enforce rules that required women to wear headgear that they felt made them unattractive expressed resistance to managerial power (82). Marriage and domestic life were also important aspects of the culture forged on a gender-segregated shop-floor. Through this culture women formed close friendships and occasionally intimate relationships with women (86). This understanding of how class was lived by some helps us better understand the Canadian working class of the day.

Historical studies like Sugiman's are valuable for their detailed attention to the gendered organization and lived experience of class. That said, a note of caution is in order. One should not assume that the situation in which UAW women found themselves and the ways in which they responded were typical of women workers in Canada. Most wage-earners were not unionized. Not all who had unions lived gender and class the way women in the auto industry did. For instance, Julie Guard has shown how in the 1950s women in

the Communist Party-influenced United Electrical union (UE) openly pressed to have gender equality taken up as a central union concern and demanded that their union brothers champion the struggle for women's rights (Guard 1996, 167-175).[29] This response by UE women was conditioned by the fact that they made up a larger proportion of the employees in their industry and enjoyed greater employment stability than UAW women. UE's unusually advanced, though still flawed, politics on "the woman question" were also important (151-152, 175). The work of Sugiman and Guard is a reminder of the complexity of the gender dimensions of a class formation.

The reorganization of gender relations can contribute to the remaking of class formations. For example, Anna Clark's *The Struggle for the Breeches* documents the presence in the emerging British working class of the early nineteenth century of both an older artisanal mode of gender relations, to which a "masculine solidarity based on skill, physical prowess, and drinking" (Clark 1995, 34) was central, and the less sexist and exclusionary mode found among textile workers. Endemic tensions and conflict between men and women in working-class communities undergoing the tumultuous changes of the time were a problem for contemporary political radicals. "A practice of sexual cooperation" (266) developed among textile workers was the basis for the egalitarian gender politics of Owenite socialists who criticised marriage and sought to unite male and female workers alike. However, some women did not accept this radicalism because they feared being

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[29]See also the unpublished dissertation from which her 1996 article is drawn: Guard 1994.

abandoned by their male partners in hard times if they were not married. Some men rejected solidarity with women. The strategy that eventually won out involved male trade unionists combatting the drunken libertinism of artisanal culture and demanding the breadwinner wage and later the vote to allow respectable male workers to support their families. The breadwinner wage was not a tradition, but part of a new working-class strategy. In effect, unionists demanded inclusion in the ideology of domesticity and separate spheres from which the working class had previously been excluded (266-268). Clark's work illustrates well how struggles over the social construction of gender can affect processes of working-class formation. At the same time, the course of class struggle influences which pattern of gender relations becomes dominant. The adoption of a conservative strategy to stabilize working-class families in Britain took place following important defeats for workers. A deteriorating balance of class forces shaped workers' sense of what was possible in difficult circumstances. Political horizons fell, contributing to the outcome in which advocating lives of domesticity for respectable workers seemed preferable to a more risky and threatening egalitarian gender politics (Koditschek 1997, 353). Thus the integration of gender and class analysis forces us to try to understand how class shapes historically-specific gender relations that simultaneously organize class. The mediation of class by gender and other social relations presents a challenge to think dialectically as well as historically.

1.8 Towards a Theory of Working Classes as Historical Formations

Taken together, the ideas of Marx, Gramsci, Thompson and autonomist Marxism

discussed above, enriched by the analyses of gender, race, sexuality and other social relations that have been generated by theories that have emerged from struggles against oppression, amount to a significant contribution to a theory of working classes as historical formations. Marx's concept of class as a relationship of surplus labour extraction is the foundation stone of the theory. In contrast to notions of class as location or level of wealth, struggle is inherent in Marx's conception of class relations. Here conflict is materially and historically grounded in a way that it is not in contemporary social theory influenced by the metaphysical Nietzschean idea of a universal will to power.[30]

For Marx, working classes are understood not as static class situations but as formations in time. He does not develop this implicit view of class as process, although some of his political writings like *The Eighteenth Brumaire* display a recognition of some of the crucial dimensions of class formation. Much less sound is his belief that the working class matures towards becoming a revolutionary "class for itself." This is a rather too linear conception and deserves to be abandoned, along with the "epistemology of absence" of studies structured around explanations of why reality has not conformed to Marx's theoretical prediction.[31] In its place, the autonomist Marxist concepts of class decomposition

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[30]The most influential source of such an understanding of power and conflict is Michel Foucault. Neocleous presents an excellent critical discussion of how "the social is reduced to perpetual war" (80) in Foucault's thought (1996, 79-87).

[31]Note that it is not the possibility of workers organising as a class and emancipating themselves that is rejected, but what Molyneux calls Marx's "optimistic evolutionism." Working-class history does not support such teleological optimism.

and recomposition can serve as tools to help analyse how struggles over the extraction of surplus value and capital's control of labour in and beyond paid workplaces shape the development of class formations.

The concept of class composition builds on some of Marx's essentials. It directs us to inquire into how the division of labour corresponding to a certain structure of capitalist production conditions a working-class formation, not in the sense of job categories but in terms of the relations between sections of the class and between them and capital. It highlights internal divisions and hierarchies and the fact that the division of labour is not just a technical matter. The concept is an invitation to fill abstractions such as "the capitalist labour process" and "relations of production" with more historical content. As such, it is a counter-pull to any "culturalist" inclination to pass too lightly over the social-material organization of work in studying class formation.

Gramsci and Thompson also consider class as process. Thompson is the more eloquent of the two on this point: workers enter into exploitative relations of production, discover that their interests differ from those of members of the ruling class, engage in struggle and create class formations. All this takes place in the cultural experience of working people. Thompson's approach demands that scholars examine the lived history of really-existing workers and rid themselves of the false consciousness-ridden generic proletarians found in some Marxist theory. Gramsci's suggestions about the need for research into national contexts and the social origins of new working classes reflect a spirit similar to Thompson's.

As products of different historical contexts than that of early twenty-first century North America, the theories of Marx, Gramsci, Thompson and the autonomist Marxists do not adequately appreciate of the multidimensionality of social being or how class is always mediated by other social relations. Feminist, anti-racist and other contemporary intellectual approaches arising from social movements against oppression alert us to these issues and emphasise that class formation is never solely about class. Gender, sexuality, race and other social relations need to be integrated theoretically as part of how class formation is understood. To do this is not to collapse class into gender or race. It is necessary to analytically distinguish each of these social relations from the others because each has its own character. At the same time, we must remember that the distinctions are analytical. In concrete social reality, class and other social relations interpenetrate. They are lived together by working people.

The role of conscious efforts to organize workers around various political projects is best highlighted by Gramsci. Like Thompson, he recognises that because class formation is relational the characteristics of ruling classes and their political organizations are part of the picture. Gramsci also emphasises that unions, parties and other workers' organizations are key players in class formation. By propagating particular conceptions of the world and motivating certain actions, they can contribute in decisive ways to what workers do and think. This is an aspect of the organization of hegemony. Understanding the political (in a broad sense) agency of workers and of other classes that seek to influence and direct workers is vital if we are to avoid falling into the view that classes are formed, as it were, behind the

backs of the individuals of which they are made up. Parties and other organizations are, for Gramsci, vehicles for the organizers and leaders that he calls intellectuals. Their histories and ideologies need to be investigated. Autonomist Marxism's concept of class composition complements Gramsci's guidelines by specifically problematizing the relationship between workers and working-class organizations. This guards against a simplistic equation or identification of one with the other in studies of how working classes are made and remade in societies ruled by capital.

CHAPTER 2: CAPITALIST RULE

Scholars who adopt theoretical perspectives that see popular struggle as central to making progressive social change and who study subaltern groups face a persistent temptation to emphasize resistance. There are good reasons for doing so: discerning how past struggles have affected social processes can be enlightening, and recounting forgotten acts of opposition can inspire hope and challenges to injustice today. However, to neglect ruling-class power when trying to understand how working-class formations develop would be a major error. As Victoria Heftler observes, an emphasis on resistance alone:

> may not only restrict our sense of which subalterns are interesting (as feminist historians have been arguing for a long time), but its focus on the "counter-blows" from below rather than the blows from above may be ultimately disempowering. In focusing on what are, after all, losing propositions, we may celebrate failed actions at the expense of provoking more successful ones. And in our disappointment with those supine subalterns who don't resist, we may miss the opportunity to show just *how* those subordinates are laid low (Heftler 1997, 74).

In other words, the power of the powerful matters, for scholars as well as subalterns. Bonefeld's previously-discussed correction of autonomist Marxists who forget that under capitalism labour always exists within as well as against capital makes a similar point. In a different vein, so does Wood's defence of Thompson against critics who charge him with "subjectivism" for the role he gives to class experience in *The Making of the English Working Class*. Wood argues that, far from offering a history of self-contained plebian culture, Thompson's book explores how between 1790 and 1832 "the working out of

capitalist modes of expropriation, the intensification of exploitation this implied, and the structure of social relations, legal forms and political powers by which that exploitation was sustained" put its stamp on all layers of the exploited, whose "common 'experience,' with the struggles it entailed... underlay the process of class formation" (1995, 89). Perry Anderson eloquently expresses the general point in his *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (1974) when he writes that "A 'history from above' - of the intricate machinery of class domination - is thus no less essential than a 'history from below': indeed, without it the latter in the end becomes one-sided (if the better side)" (qtd. Corrigan and Sayer 1985, 13).

This suggests that a theory of working-class formation needs a theory of ruling-class power. More specifically, what I aim to provide in this chapter is a socio-political theoretical overview of how dominant classes exercise power in capitalist societies. Contrary to the arguments of many liberal theorists, there are ruling classes in capitalist societies. The question that forms the title of Göran Therborn's *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?* (1978) is the one posed here. However, unlike Therborn, my concept of ruling goes beyond state power. As I will argue against post-structuralism, capitalist power is uniquely centralized and coordinated in the state. But confining a theory of ruling-class power to the state is a mistake. The scope of capital's power is much greater, for it is also exercised through managers, supervisors, private armed forces, voluntary associations campaigning for moral regulation, and other non-state agencies.[1] It also exists in the impersonal form of

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[1]This broad understanding overlaps in some respects with Dorothy Smith's concept of relations of ruling, a "pervasively structured... complex of organized practices, including

money. Because of this multiplicity of forms, the organization of my account does not correspond to the spheres of paid work, household and community, each of which are fields in which capitalist power is deployed. Instead, I deal first with capitalist social domination in its economic form. Next I consider state power, turning last to the interrelated matters of ideology, hegemony and moral regulation.

2.1 The Ruling Class? A Brief Clarification

The term power can be used to refer to "human causal powers - that is, the capacities agents have to alter the course of events" (Callinicos 1990b, 162). Power in this sense may be exercised over inorganic matter, other species, or other human beings. However, it is the term's other meaning - "a relationship between individuals or groups such that one party to the relationship is subordinate to the other" (162), which I will usually call domination, that is relevant for this discussion of class rule.

More contentious than how to define power is the question of whether there is a ruling social class in a capitalist society. A capitalist class certainly exists. One useful definition of its membership is "those people who do not work for a living but get their livelihood from income from stocks and bonds, from rents, from interest payments, and so

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government, law, business and financial management, professional organization, and educational institutions as well as the discourses in texts that interpenetrate the multiple sites of power" (Smith 1987, 3). However, the theoretical approach I develop deals only with forms of capitalist class rule, whose mediation by gender, race and other social relations of inequality is recognized. It does not attempt to theorize power relations in general.

on" as well as "those top-level executives and government officials who have the power to hire and fire workers and who fulfil the functions of capital (that is, the management of capital and the supervision of labour)" (Veltmeyer 1986, 27). To this should be added family members who are largely dependent on the incomes of such persons. We should also recall here that capitalist classes, like working classes, are historical formations. But does this class rule?

Much, though not all, twentieth-century liberal thought denies that the unequal distribution of economic resources results in the systematic entrenchment of concentrated social power in any one group in capitalist society. Even thinkers who admit that governments suffer from a bias towards corporate interests generally draw back from this claim.[2] Researchers of a post-structuralist persuasion recognize that power relations permeate, indeed constitute, society. Michel Foucault, one of the leading post-structuralist theorists, does on occasion speak of the ruling class: "A dominant class isn't a mere abstraction, but neither is it a pre-given entity... between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production" (Foucault 1980c, 203). However, much post-structuralism picks up on the Nietzschean strain in Foucault's thought - exemplified in the claim that "it's all against all... We all fight each other. And there is

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[2]Some Weberians do, however, accept it within their conceptual framework. See, for instance, Parkin 1979 (135-136). Held 1987 (186-205) surveys what he dubs "classic pluralist" and "neo-pluralist" theories, which reject the claim.

always within each of us something that fights something else" (208) - and proposes an understanding of power relations organized around collective subjects made up of discursively assembled "individuals, or even sub-individuals" (208). This approach is much concerned with power but pays little or no attention to its exercise by capitalist classes as such.[3]

Nevertheless, it is possible to mount a sound defence of the proposition that the capitalist class rules. This does not entail any kind of conspiracy theory. John Hoffman suggests that:

> Since classes are best understood as organized or concentrated relationships, a ruling class can be characterized as a class which is the most fully *developed*: the class which is able to enforce [in the words of Marx and Engels] "its interests in a general form, in a form possessing general, socially coercive force;" the class which is organized and concentrated on a society-wide basis (Hoffman 1986, 351).

One of the most notable features of capitalist class rule is its impersonal character. "Personalized domination" (Sayer 1987, 105) is characteristic of class rule in pre-capitalist class societies. "The bourgeoisie, by contrast, rules impersonally - and is the first class in history to do so - in the context of the formal equality of all individuals" (105).[4] State power

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[3]See, for instance, the essays in Burchell, Gordon and Miller (eds.) 1991.

[4]This formal equality has frequently been denied to women, people subject to racial oppression, lesbians and gays, non-citizens and others. At the same time, those excluded from formal equality have often been able to win a considerable degree of inclusion within it. The generalization of formal or legal equality available under capitalism is unlike anything found in pre-capitalist class societies, for reasons explained well by Wood (1995,

is crucial to its ability to do so, as will be discussed below. Anderson writes that "struggle between classes is ultimately resolved at the *political* - not at the economic or cultural - level of society... it is the construction and destruction of States which seal the basic shifts in the relations of production, so long as classes subsist" (qtd. Corrigan and Sayer 1985, 13). From this, one need not draw the conclusion that the bourgeoisie is a unified group that wields the state as its instrument; accounts which do so are vulnerable to telling criticism. It is more accurate to follow Hoffman's suggestion and hold that the capitalist class rules by virtue of its superior capacities for social domination. These are organized in differentiated forms, chiefly those of economic and state power. All forms of class power are mediated by gender and other social relations. The concept of form is important to the theoretical approach presented here, and will be elaborated in the discussion of the contentious issue of state power. First, though, I will address economic power.

2.2 Economic Power

The differentiation of social relations into distinct "economic" and "political" spheres occurs only in capitalist societies.[5] Wood's exemplary explanation of what is involved in the

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201-203).

[5]As John Holloway argues, "The separation of exploitation from the maintenance of order is one aspect of the [in Marx's words] 'specific... form in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of the direct producers'... the economic and the political are, by virtue of the separation which constitutes them, moments of the relation between capital and labour... To take the distinction between economics and politics for granted is thus to be blind to the question of *form*, to consolidate the fetishism inherent in the concepts (Holloway 1992, 160).

separation of the economic in capitalism deserves to be quoted in full:

> the social functions of production and distribution, surplus extraction and appropriation, and the allocation of social labour are, so to speak, privatized and they are achieved by non-authoritative, non-political means. In other words, the social allocation of resources and labour does not, on the whole, take place by means of political direction, communal deliberation, hereditary duty, custom, or religious obligation, but rather through the mechanisms of commodity exchange. The powers of surplus appropriation and exploitation do not rest directly on relations of juridical or political dependence but are based on a contractual relation between "free" producers - juridically free and free from the means of production - and an appropriator who has absolute private property in the means of production (Wood 1995, 29).

Another way of understanding the separation of the economic is to think of it as a specific division of labour in the structure of class domination. If politics is understood in a broad sense, as pertaining to power relations wherever they occur, then one can say that under capitalism those ruling-class political functions directly associated with extracting and appropriating surplus labour in paid workplaces - the economic - are made distinct from other political functions (31). However one chooses to formulate it, this separation gives class rule a shape different from anything found in pre-capitalist class societies.

The most pervasive and impersonal manifestation of the economic form of capitalist rule is the "silent compulsion of economic relations" (Marx 1977, 899). Capitalist employers do not need to use personal coercion on a routine basis in order to command wage labourers in the workplace. Unlike the direct producers of most pre-capitalist societies, proletarians

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I address the issue of form in my discussion of state power below.

generally can only obtain enough goods and services to maintain themselves by entering into market exchange. They lack adequate non-market access to social reproduction. As a result, they are compelled to sell their ability to work in return for wages in order to support themselves and dependent members of their households. This is the power of money. It is very significant that capital can rule through its most abstract form, money, "social power in the form of a thing" (Marx 1973, 158). [6] As Bonefeld writes, "The money power of 'capital' is the most fundamental level of the class struggle. The power of money is collective and abstract. It is collective because of the generality of its form... Money expresses the abstract average of capitalist domination as it measures capital's capacity to impose work in a repressive and oppressive, nevertheless contradictory, way" (Bonefeld 1993, 34-35). Here lies the basis of capital's ability to discipline the working class with the threat of unemployment, which greatly reduces the need for employers to coerce labour directly. Such coercion is also minimized by the fact that workplaces employing wage-labour unite two processes that exist separately where producers retain control over their products: the production and appropriation of surplus labour (Marx 1977, 291-293; Wood 1995, 40-43).

These features of capitalism reduce coercion by employers, managers and supervisors against proletarians, although they do not eliminate it. It is also important to recall that capitalists have never relied solely on wage-workers but have extracted surplus value from

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[6]There is a useful discussion of the views of Marx and Gramsci on this kind of domination in Hoffman 1984 (81-86).

slaves, serfs, indentured servants and other unfree labourers (Banaji 1977, 7-9), against whom personal coercion is more regularly applied. Capitalists can also hire security personnel and, where the law allows, establish their own private police forces. Nevertheless, on balance it is fair to say that where production is organized in a capitalist fashion personal coercion does not have the same central economic role that it has in societies in which exploiters must from time to time extort labour or a portion of the fruits of production from recalcitrant peasants or other independent small producers.

That said, the paid workplace - whether factory, field, office, mine, home or some other site - is not a space of freedom. Personal coercion, usually of a fairly weak character, plays some role in capitalist production.[7] More importantly, capital is much more intimately involved in organizing work than any previous ruling class: "As an agent in producing the activity of others, as an extractor of surplus labour and an exploiter of labour-power, it surpasses all earlier systems of production, which were based on directly compulsory labour, in its energy and its quality of unbounded and ruthless activity" (Marx 1977, 425). Capital must exercise enough command over paid workplaces to ensure smooth production for profit. Moreover, the pressures of capitalist competition drive employers to reorganize the labour process in order to get workers to produce more surplus value.

In early phases of capitalist production - those in which Marx sees the formal

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[7]The physical abuse of workers by brutal supervisors is an example. While reprehensible, this is less violent than, for instance, the treatment meted out by European feudal lords to their tenants.

subsumption of labour under capital - "capital subordinates labour on the basis of the technical conditions within which labour has been carried on up to that point in history... that is to say, it takes over an *existing labour process*, developed by different and more archaic modes of production" (425, 1021). The domination of capital may lead to longer hours of work at greater intensity, but the labour process itself does not change. However, such arrangements tend to develop into "the specifically capitalist mode of production" (1021), the real subsumption of labour under capital. This "not only transforms the situations of the various agents of production, it also *revolutionizes* their actual mode of labour and the real nature of the labour process as a whole" (1021). Real subsumption has great advantages for capitalists. With it:

> the productive forces of directly social, *socialized* (i.e. collective) labour come into being through co-operation, division of labour within the workshop, the use of *machinery*, and in general the transformation of production by the conscious *use* of the sciences, of mechanics, chemistry, etc. for specific ends, technology, etc. and similarly, through the enormous increase of *scale* corresponding to such developments (1024).

This generates increases in productivity of historically-unprecedented magnitudes.[8] What should not be forgotten is that the prerequisite for such growth is the penetration of capitalist rule into the labour process in order to thoroughly reorganize work as no ruling class in history had ever done before.

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[8]Wood 1999 (43-64) summarizes the historical arguments for this claim.

Marx writes that "the capitalist, who is capital personified, now takes care that the worker does his [*sic*] work regularly and with the proper degree of intensity" (1977, 424). This is the essence of capitalist command of paid work. Historically, it has been organized in a variety of ways. Richard Edwards analyses these as different systems of control, each of which involves a mode of directing, evaluating and disciplining workers (Edwards 1979, 18). The first system, simple control, has two variants: entrepreneurial and hierarchical. In the former, which Marx has in mind in the above quotation, the personal authority of the employer is key. The capitalist watches over any hired assistants as well as over the workers, intervening directly whenever he or she sees fit, unconstrained by existing rules or procedures. Entrepreneurial control is only possible if the capitalist can personally supervise all managers and supervisors and be familiar with at least most of the employees. It relies heavily on the personal abilities of the employer, and is only viable in relatively small-scale workplaces.

The hierarchical version of simple control was developed to overcome these limitations. In this sub-system, everyone with managerial or supervisory authority, at whatever level in the organizational hierarchy, exercises it over those immediately below them in the same arbitrary fashion as employers in the entrepreneurial variant (23-36). The railways in mid-nineteenth century Canada are an early historical example of the practice of hierarchical control.[9] The paternalistic character of relations between railway workers and

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[9]See Craven and Traves 1986.

management at this time - manifested in the employer's commitment to providing work in periods of low demand - is a reminder that capitalists frequently supplement the authority of systems of control with other means of bolstering their workplace domination. Most common are services, benefits and other perks on top of money wages.

The second system identified by Edwards is technical control. This involves "designing machinery and planning the flow of work to minimize the problem of transforming labor power into labor as well as to maximize the purely physically based possibilities for achieving efficiencies... Technical control is structural in the sense that it is embedded in the technological structure or organization of production" (112). This is not merely the introduction of machinery, which does not in itself change the system of control. Nor is it simply the use of machines to pace workers. For the system of technical control to function, "the entire production process... or large segments of it" must be "based on a technology that paces and directs the labor process" (113). Pioneered in the nineteenth century in the textile industry and later in meatpacking, such continuous flow production preceded its most famous and effective development, Henry Ford's assembly line in automobile production. Technical control changes the nature of workplace conflict. Instead of direct clashes between workers and agents of capitalist command, struggles erupt over the technologically-imposed pace of production set by capital's agents. While front-line supervisors ("foremen") must still evaluate and discipline workers and retain the kind of unconstrained authority associated with the hierarchical sub-system of simple control, the basic direction of work becomes a technical matter (113-121). The Canadian auto industry

before the recognition of the UAW is a good example of this system of control.[10]

The third system, bureaucratic control, "is embedded in the social and organizational structures of the firm... job categories, work rules, promotion structures, discipline, wage scales, definitions of responsibility and the like" (131). The aim here is to routinize direction, evaluation and discipline so that the intervention of supervisory personnel becomes the exception rather than the norm. The three elements of control are codified in formal procedures administered by management. This does not completely replace hierarchical and technical methods but subordinates them to the logic of bureaucratic control. Although originating in non-union workplaces, this system can function well when labour unions cooperate with management in jointly administering and enforcing collective bargaining agreements. These usually alter direction, evaluation and discipline without challenging capitalist command. Bureaucratic control is largely a post-World War Two phenomenon.

Edwards's typology of systems of control is not without weaknesses. For instance, it is arguable that the distinction between technical and bureaucratic control is overdrawn. In his study of debates on the labour process, Paul Thompson suggests that what Edwards calls technical control is never purely technical. Other measures are used to supplement it, and "overall machine control" is not as distinct from "machine pacing" as Edwards depicts it. Consequently, the variety of workplace control strategies and their combination need to be studied (Thompson 1989, 148-152). It also needs to be kept in mind that such strategies

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[10]See Manley 1986 (105-111).

can never escape the contradictions of capitalist production at the level of the individual workplace and the economy (Hyman 1987). The key point remains: wherever the real subsumption of labour to capital exists, capitalists generally insist on controlling the paid workplace.[11] Systems of control do not exist in isolation from other social relations, of course. Capitalists and their agents take advantage of all manner of occupational and skill differences and the associated divisions socially constructed around gender, racial, national and other oppressive social relations to bolster their domination.[12] But no matter which methods of rule are deployed, their success and workers' compliance is never assured. The repertoire of workers' resistance - and counter-initiative[13] - on the job is large. It includes efforts to make time spent at work more bearable, working slow, sabotage, theft and strike action (Rinehart 1996, 90-91, 135-144). Thus even where the most coercive and sophisticated systems of control are put in place, employers may not achieve their goals. Even more serious from their point of view is the potential for strikes, demonstrations, riots and other kinds of collective action to overwhelm the private power available to capitalists.

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[11]Exceptions do exist: worker-controlled enterprises in capitalist societies. However, such workplaces are still subsumed under capital through the pressures of competitive accumulation. See Rinehart 1996 (190-192) and McNally 1993 (180-182).

[12]For example, see the historical study of the interplay of gender, ethnicity and skill among clothing workers in Canada in Steedman 1997.

[13]As Nick Dyer-Witheford points out, workers in struggle are capable of counter-initiatives as well as more reactive acts of resistance (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 54)

Hence the need for state power, to which I now turn.[14]

2.3 State Power

Why state theory? The answer may not be obvious, especially because one influential contemporary school of theory, post-structuralism, denies the need for a specific treatment of state power. Foucault deliberately avoids a theory of the state, "in the sense that one refrains from an indigestible meal" (qtd. Gordon 1991, 4). For him, it is "not the 'centre of power,' not a network of forces, but a multiple network of diverse elements... a strategic distribution of elements of different natures and levels" (1979, 307) that should be studied. "Ultimately," he argues, "what presides over all these mechanisms is not the unitary functioning of an apparatus or an institution, but the necessity of combat and the rules of strategy" (308). We should take care not to be entranced by the state:

> We all know the fascination which the love, or horror, of the state exercises today; we know how much attention is paid to the genesis of the state, its history, its advance, its power and abuses, etc.... But the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor, to speak frankly, this importance; maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think (1991, 103).

For post-structuralism, the state "is not the site or source of power... but rather one

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[14]A theoretical argument that the class struggle is the basis of the historical necessity of state power for capital is offered by Simon Clarke (1983; reprinted in Clarke, ed. (1991)).

instrument among others, and one modality of 'government'" (Pasquino 1991, 117). "The State consists in the codification of a whole number of power relations which render its functioning possible," argues Foucault (1980d, 122). In other words, it is "superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth" (122). Privileging the state as more than one of many instances of power invites political strategies that lead to totalitarian outcomes (Foucault 1980b, 59-60). Instead of examining power in such an allegedly dangerous fashion, post-structuralists advocate studies of specific power relations and modes of power's operation. These include "the practices and rationalities that compos[e] the means of rule and government" (Kerr 1999, 174) in modernity, which post-structuralism refers to as governmentality.

The political case for the post-structuralist view of the state is weak. Some theorists have long argued without recourse to Foucault that political strategies centred on the capture of existing states, rather than the democratic transformation of state power leading to its eventual abolition, are not able to bring about truly emancipatory social change.[15] What of the explanatory merits of this approach? To the extent that it has helped researchers to see that power operates in many places in society and not only in the state, post-structuralism has

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[15]For instance, see Marx 1970 (esp. 63-83, 162-173), Sayer 1985, Corrigan and Sayer 1985 (182-208) and Holloway 1980.

made a positive contribution to social and political thought.[16] But insofar as it avoids clarifying what distinguishes state power from other modalities of domination, post-structuralism is intellectually regressive.

To show why this is so, we need to return to the separation of economic and political in capitalism. With the gradual erosion of pre-capitalist social relations in which property ownership and political rights are tied together, "politics is abstracted out of the relations of production, and order becomes the task of a specialised body - the state" (Kay and Mott 1982, 83). Thus in capitalist society a great deal of power is centralized in the state, while individual members of the dominant class have less juridical authority than their pre-capitalist counterparts. Foucauldian post-structuralism is blind to all this. In it "the state is dissolved into power, in turn dissolved into the social" (Neocleous 1996, 70). The specific character of the state is left largely undefined. Even when post-structuralists do study the activities of modern states, these are treated as some of many vehicles for a broader governmentality (70-79; Kerr 1999, 184-190). The fatal problem in this approach is pinpointed by Mark Neocleous: "a state that is merely a locus of power like any other locus of power is no state at all" (70).[17] For these reasons, post-structuralism is of little help in

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[16]Even so, one could argue that it is the struggles of women's, anti-racist, lesbian and gay and other social movements since the 1960s (on which theories other than post-structuralism have also reflected) that have been most responsible for the expansion of the study of power.

[17]Implicit here is a certain definition of the state. Peter Burnham offers a good case for defining the state in organisational terms rather than in terms of its functions or as an ethical community. His account of the organisational view of the state uses Bob Jessop's

understanding state power and its relationship with capitalist class rule. State theory is needed for this task.

But which state theory? There is an enormous literature on the topic of the state in capitalist society. To rehearse even the main academic contributions of recent decades would be a lengthy undertaking.[18] Instead, for the purposes of this chapter, I will briefly outline two of the most influential approaches in radical scholarship and suggest why a lesser-known approach - the analysis of state power as social form - offers a better way to understand how state and class are related. I expand on the form-analytical theory of state power to explain what capitalist states do as the political administration of civil society.

The first school of state theory to consider here is associated above all with the work of Miliband, dubbed "instrumentalism" by some of its critics. In this perspective, the class character of the state is essentially determined by who holds authority in state institutions. In *The State in Capitalist Society*, Miliband concludes that in the advanced capitalist

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definition: "a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society in the name of their common interests or general will" (qtd. Burnham 1994, 2). Which institutions and organizations are part of the state is historically variable, but the state is always more than the government. The concept of the state is prior to the government, civil service, military or any other organization, although the state never exists apart from them (Burnham 1994, 5-6).

[18]Jessop 1982 and Clarke 1991 are detailed critical surveys of the influential Western European debates on state theory from the late 1960s to the end of the 1970s by participants of conflicting theoretical persuasions. Panitch 1977, the major Canadian collection on the state, reflects the debate between two of the main European figures in the debates, Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas.

countries "the evidence conclusively suggests is that in terms of social origin, education and class situation, the men who have manned [*sic*] *all* command positions in the state system have largely, and in many cases overwhelmingly, been drawn from the world of business and property, or from the professional middle classes" (1969, 66-67). Against the contention that this treats the state as an instrument wielded by the capitalist class and deprives it of autonomy,[19] Miliband suggests that the state elite does have its own interests. Its self-interest and concern with the long-term maintenance of social order are sources of friction between the state elite and capitalists (Miliband 1983, 62-64). Despite their differences, however, the relationship between the state and the dominant class in capitalist society can be characterized as a "*partnership between two different, separate forces*, linked to each other by many threads, yet each having its own separate sphere of concerns" (65). The degree to which the state is autonomous depends on the level of class struggle. Where class struggles threaten the capitalist class's hegemony, state autonomy increases. If bourgeois hegemony is seriously weakened, the state may become authoritarian or "Bonapartist" and act more independently (61).

The second major approach is that of structuralist Marxists, such as Poulantzas and Therborn.[20] Here, the state's relationship to class power is generally posed not in terms of

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[19]This is Poulantzas's contention (1972, 247;1976, 74).

[20]It should be noted that in his last years, Poulantzas's work moved in a less structuralist direction - see his 1978, which considers the "institutional materiality" of the state.

the state elite and the ruling class but as the place of the state in the objective structures of the capitalist mode of production. To cite a typical formulation, "the State is precisely *the factor of cohesion of a social formation and the factor of reproduction of the conditions of production of a system* that itself determines the domination of one class over the others" (Poulantzas 1972, 246). In keeping with this, Therborn presents the key issue for understanding a state's character as "the *effects* of the state upon the production and reproduction of given modes of production" (Therborn 1978, 144). If the effects of state action and inaction assist the reproduction of capitalism, the state is capitalist in nature (137-138, 161). Far from being a "structural super-determinism" (Miliband 1972, 259) whose focus on the objective relations of capital with the state clouds the distinction between the two (1973, 87-88), adherents of this school believe that their theory offers the best understanding of state autonomy. Within structural limits, the way in which the inherent relative autonomy of the state from the capitalist class manifests itself is a product of the conjuncture of class struggle (Poulantzas 1976, 72).

Although these two perspectives have, along with post-structuralism, been the most influential among critical scholars, it can be argued that both have major weaknesses. Miliband's approach encourages concrete studies of state organizations, but does not theorize how the state and civil society[21] are structurally related. As a result, the state is seen as a

[21] I follow Neocleous (who follows Marx) in using the concept "civil society" to refer to the sphere of non-state social relations, rather than the more common and restricted Gramscian usage of the term as meaning the non-state region of the "superstructure." See Neocleous 1996 (1-26).

state in capitalist society rather than a capitalist state; its class character is ultimately the contingent result of class struggles that decide who holds positions of power in the state apparatus, rather than being inherent in its form (Clarke 1991, 19). Structuralist state theory poses the issue differently, but ends up in the same place. The state's place in the structure is defined by its function of ensuring cohesion and reproduction. So long as there is a dominant class, the state must, by virtue of this tautology, be its servant (Clarke 1977, 96, 98). However, when a state is considered more concretely, in a conjuncture, it expresses not the power of the ruling class but the balance of forces between struggling classes. Its class character is no longer structurally-determined but contingent. The state becomes simply "the arbiter of conflicting interests" (98). According to Simon Clarke, the structuralist theory is remarkably akin to conventional structural-functionalist sociology. Functions are specified, but how they are carried out is not. This allows any phenomenon to be explained by its alleged contribution to the functioning of the system, which is itself taken for granted (98-100).[22] Neither of these two approaches offers an adequate Marxist theory of state power.

An alternative way of thinking about the state that has more promise for the study of capitalist rule can be found in the work of a number of theorists, mainly British and German, who conceptualize the capitalist state as a social form (mode of existence) of the relationship between capital and labour. In explaining this perspective it is best to begin by going back to some of Marx's early writings on the state. In 1843, he observes that "the abstraction of

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[22]See the discussion of functional explanation in Sayer 1987 (113-125).

the *state as such* belongs only to modern times, because the abstraction of private life belongs only to modern times. The abstraction of the *political state* is a modern product" (qtd. Sayer 1985, 230-231). Civil or bourgeois society[23] comes into existence, he writes, "only with the bourgeoisie" (qtd. 231); so too, then, does the state in this sense. This is Marx's way of contrasting capitalist rule with "the feudal world [which] made no distinction between the personal resources of the feudal lord and the resources of the political organization" (Pashukanis 1989, 148). As Derek Sayer notes in his useful commentary on these writings of Marx, the implication of this line of thought is quite clear: the state in capitalist society is "a definite and delimited *social form*: the social form, specifically, of *bourgeois* class rule" (231). Sayer suggests that "state" should be reserved for this case alone, to distinguish it from organizations of ruling class domination in pre-capitalist societies, where the economic and the political are not separated (231-234). This places a strong emphasis on the historical specificity of what Marx calls "the state as such" or "the political state." However, Sayer acknowledges that Marx and Engels elsewhere use the term "state" in a wider sense, not restricted to capitalism (231). To avoid confusion, I will use the more familiar term "capitalist state."

Picking up on the earlier explanation of the separation of the economic and the political under capitalism, we can see that what Marx perceptively draws attention to in these early formulations is a division within ruling-class power not found in pre-capitalist societies.

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[23]Marx uses the German term *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, which can be translated either as "civil society" or "bourgeois society."

The form-analytic approach to theorizing state power develops these insights in light of Marx's later claim that "it is in each case the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers... in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and hence also the political form of the relationship of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the specific form of the state in each case" (Marx 1981, 927). In his development of form-analytic state theory, Bonefeld argues that in capitalist society class is conceptually prior to politics and economics. Class exists in the forms of economic and political (state) relations because social production and ruling-class functions are organized in a differentiated manner, as described in the passage from Wood quoted earlier. Bonefeld suggests that political relations do not so much reproduce or correspond to economic relations as complement them. In his Hegelian-Marxist style, he considers capitalist society as a process in motion and concludes that "the state is not... a state in capitalist society, but rather a moment of the class antagonism of capital and labour. The understanding of the political is thus an analysis of the unity-in-separation of different forms assumed by class antagonism" (Bonefeld 1993,32).[24] In other words, the forms of capitalist power exist as a differentiated unity.[25]

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[24]These forms also exist on the international level. Burnham 1995 and Holloway 1995 offer form-analytic studies of global capital and the international system of states. It would be a mistake to draw the conclusion from Bonefeld's formulation that there is no need for conjunctural analysis of political (in a broad sense) forces.

[25]It should not be assumed that the reason they exist in this manner is because the state has a monopoly on the use of violence in society. As suggested earlier, it does not. What the state does is regulate force and sanction who may use it, and in what situations

The term "form" can be used in a number of ways, but in this case to conceptualize capitalist state power as a social form of the relation between capital and labour is to understand it as a "mode of existence" (Bonefeld, Gunn and Psychopedis 1992, xv) of that relation. Economic relations are a complementary form of the same relation.[26] Form here has a different meaning than it does when one talks about liberal-democratic and authoritarian forms or varieties of the capitalist state (xv). When seen in this way, it becomes clearer why the state in capitalist society is more precisely a capitalist state. This specific social phenomenon is a creation of capitalism. In Clarke's words, "The class character of the capitalist state is not a matter of the subordination of the state to the power of a particular class, but is inherent in the very form of capitalist state power"(Clarke 1988, 130). Sayer draws out the radical implications of this understanding:

> The link Marx posits between state and bourgeoisie is more internal and essential than the contingent one of control... The state form as such is, at the deepest level, a bourgeois form because it is both an index and an essential facet of the division of labour on which the capitalist mode of production ultimately rests. Where the state survives as the means

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(Clarke 1983, 116). Legitimate circumstances for the use of violence by private citizens often include the defence of private property and of male, white and heterosexual supremacy. The capitalist state does not exist because capitalist employers have no coercive powers available to them. Rather, capitalist state power is a historically necessary support for class rule because the power of property-owners alone is not sufficient to suppress workers' resistance and guarantee the subordination of the working class to capital (117-121).

[26]Although the economic and the political are forms of the capital-labour relation, it should be noted that the constitution of social relations as capitalist is ultimately rooted in the economic sphere. It is there that production is socially organized in capitalist fashion, as simultaneously the production of value and use-values.

> through which the general interest is asserted, people's material relations are not ones through which they are directly controlling their collective destinies. Were they so, an independent state would neither be possible nor necessary. Some may see this as a disturbingly utopian conclusion. It was, however, Marx's (Sayer 1985, 241).

This view is significant, not least because it poses a challenge to much Marxist theory.

It would be a mistake to end here, with a demonstration of the character of the capitalist state. "Rather, the class character needs to be analysed as a specific form and praxis of class domination, and, as such, open to class struggle itself" (Bonefeld 1993, 51). The capitalist state is not an ahistorical structure but a structured historical process. Specifying the character of the capitalist state form should not be the point where theoretical efforts halt. It is necessary to use form-analytical theory to study the historical practice of capitalist rule through state power, including its contestation by subalterns. Not doing so is an error with both explanatory and political dimensions. Corrigan and Sayer are eloquent on this point:

> the effect of ignoring history is to obscure the *accomplished* - and therefore the fragile and precarious - character of these forms, and efface the *alternative* forms against the challenge of which they were constructed. We cannot, even methodologically, sever social forms and "structures" from the class (and other) struggles through which they are brought into being *and sustained* without doing great violence to our understanding. Social forms *are* class struggles (1981, 42).

This warning is especially pertinent because the work of some form-analytical theorists, including Bonefeld, often remains at a high level of abstraction, although this approach to state theory certainly does not sever social form from class struggle.

As John Holloway points out, form-analytic theory does not analyse the state as simply an apparatus, institution or set of functions. From this perspective, what needs to be studied is not only what the capitalist state does and why, but also how. In the most general terms, the capitalist state constitutes social relations in ways that "support and have their roots in, but are distinct and separate from" (Holloway 1980, 11) the organization of social relations by capital in its abstract mode of existence as value (9, 11). For the state to be able to do this, a system of taxation is necessary. When the state provides a service that meets a human need, it does so in a way that is different from the manner in which subalterns previously met this need, and different from other more egalitarian and democratic means of doing so. State methods attempt to replace previous or alternative subaltern methods of social provision (Corrigan and Sayer 1981, 38).

The concept of political administration developed by Neocleous helps in understanding these and other practices of capitalist states. Political administration is an umbrella term that refers to the multifaceted activity of capitalist states in civil society.[27] Operating through a continuum of legal and administrative mechanisms, political administration performs at least three functions. It shapes the capitalist market. It constitutes the legal persons who enter into contracts in the market as simultaneously subjects of rights and objects of administration. It also manages the working class by creating new

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[27]Although Neocleous does not discuss taxation, it should be treated as an aspect of political administration. See the brief discussion of taxation as rule in Curtis 1992 (106-107).

mechanisms that respond to workers' demands and struggles in ways that defuse their subversive potential (Neocleous 1996, 88-92, 110-116). Thus, the political administration perspective allows state social reforms to be interpreted as neither simply gains for working people nor means of social control foisted on them from above, but as contradictory products of struggle. For example, unemployment insurance grants non-market access to subsistence to eligible workers and simultaneously subjects them to administration by state power. This is quite different from the way in which earlier worker-controlled institutions of mutual aid, such as Friendly Societies, were organized (136-140). The 1909 words of Winston Churchill suggest that at least some members of the British ruling class were aware that introducing such social reforms was a way to subsume class struggle: "With a 'stake in the country' in the form of insurance against evil these days workers will pay no attention to the vague promises of revolutionary socialism" (qtd. 139). Nevertheless, one must investigate the impact of specific reforms in order to avoid the functionalist assumption that rulers are always able to realize their objectives.

One area of weakness in form-analytical theory as it has been developed to date is the mediation of the state form of class relations by gender, race and other social relations.[28] These dimensions of capitalist state power have received little treatment by the theorists discussed. This problem can, however, be remedied by drawing on other studies. For instance, RW Connell argues that "*the state is constituted within gender relations as the*

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[28]The same could be said of most radical state theory.

central institutionalization of gendered power. Conversely, gender dynamics are a major force constructing the state" (Connell 1990, 519). A state's practices of what Neocleous calls political administration will bear the stamp of "*a definable 'gender regime' that is the precipitate of social struggles and is linked to - though not a simple reflection of - the wider gender order of the society*" (523). This regime includes a gender division of labour among state employees and in the bureaucratic organization of the state, and a gendered internal power structure (523-525). The mediation of state power by race and sexuality must be considered in similar fashion.[29]

The form-analytic understanding of capitalist rule through state power is often ignored in discussions of state theory. When it does receive attention, it is sometimes pilloried as reductionist. It has been argued that form-analytic state theory risks collapsing state into class, thereby denying the relative autonomy of the state (Jessop 1982, 132-133). However, this criticism fails to acknowledge that form-analytic theory does not see its task as devising an answer to the much-pondered question of how the state can be both an economic/class organization and a political institution separate from the ruling class. To pose this question is to confuse levels of abstraction (Clarke 1983, 115). The problem is not how economic power determines political power - a reductionist question - because the economic and political are differentiated, though complementary, modes of existence at a

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[29]See, for instance, Kinsman 1996 (esp. 37-39) on heterosexism and state power.

more concrete level of the class relation between labour and capital.[30] Form-analytic theory starts with a different question than the one with which most critical theories of the capitalist state are preoccupied. For this approach, the question from which to begin is the one asked by Evgeny Pashukanis in 1929: under capitalism,

> Why does class rule not remain what it is, the factual subjugation of one section of the population by the other? Why does it assume the form of official state rule, or - which is the same thing - why does the machinery of state coercion not come into being as the private machinery of the ruling class; why does it detach itself from the ruling class and take on the form of an impersonal apparatus of public power, separate from society? (Pashukanis 1989, 139).

To ask and answer this question is to defetishize the capitalist state form. The autonomy of the state is not its essential feature, but the fetishized manner in which one significant form of capitalist rule appears.[31] To put it another way, the view that the state is fundamentally separate is an aspect of "the way reality presents itself through the categories of common sense and is handled, practised and reproduced in daily life" (Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer

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[30]It is significant that capital exists concretely as many competing units of capital with contradictory interests. Each tries to reduce the barriers to profitability it faces, while trying to make sure that others bear full market discipline. It falls to states to try to enforce the general interest of capital (Clarke 1988, 122-125). For an interesting historical case, see the examination of how the US state responded to capital's disunity with the 1935 National Labour Relations Act (the Wagner Act) in Gordon 1994 (204-239).

[31]Other fetishized forms include capitalist rule in the workplace, which appears as neutral technical coordination, and money, which appears as a neutral means to facilitate exchange between individuals. To defetishize these and other phenomena is to reveal their character as "form-processes: processes of forming social relations into a pattern compatible with the reproduction of capitalist relations of exploitation" (Holloway 1991, 172).

1980, 12). This fetishism is not a once and for all accomplishment, but an ongoing process of fetishization sustained by capital's social domination (Holloway 1992, 154-159). This insight is another indication of the worth of form-analytic theory for understanding capitalist rule.

2.4 Achieving the Obvious: The Issue of Ideology

There is an obvious omission in the preceding discussion of the economic and political forms of capitalist rule: the issue of ideology. This is all the more significant because many social and political theorists see ideology or discourse as the most important means by which class rule and other kinds of domination are sustained. For some, the power of ideology or discourse[32] is thought to lie in its ability to shape or even define subjects at a fundamental or formative level. A prime example of this conception is found in the work of Althusser. Ideology in general (in contrast to specific ideologies) is "omnipresent, trans-historical and therefore immutable in form throughout the extent of history" (Althusser 1971, 161). It "*is eternal*, exactly like the unconscious" (161). The function of ideology is one "*of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects*" (171). In the same moment that individuals become subjects, in the sense of human agents, they are also subjected, in the sense of being dominated. The result of this process of interpellation is that "with the exception of the 'bad subjects' who on occasion provoke the intervention of the (repressive) State apparatus... the

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[32]These two terms are often used with a confusing array of meanings. At this point, I use them loosely and interchangeably, simply to refer to systems of beliefs.

vast majority of (good) subjects work right 'all by themselves,' i.e. by ideology" (181). From a philosophical perspective hostile to Althusser's structuralism but sharing its anti-humanism,[33] Foucault contends that systems of power-knowledge, rather than ideology, define subjects. Much of Foucault's work examines "the procedures that constitute the individual as effect and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge" (Foucault 1979, 192). For many theorists who draw on Foucault, the term ideology is thought to be tainted by association with a notion of truth with which it can be contrasted. As an alternative, post-structuralism employs the concept of discourse to refer to a system of knowledge and power.

There are ways of taking ideology seriously that do not involve the belief that ideology constitutes subjects at such a deep level. It is interesting to note that in his later years Foucault himself took a step away from the notion that subjects are fundamentally produced by power-knowledge (Foucault 1983; Callinicos 1990a, 87-89). There are certainly good reasons for rejecting the kind of "deep" theories of ideology or discourse offered by Althusser and Foucault. The most telling critique of such theories is that by conceiving of subjects as entirely constituted by ideology or discourse they deprive human beings of agency. In Althusser's conception, individuals are merely bearers of social structures who carry out functions to which they have been assigned through ideology (Soper 1986, 104-110). Although at times Foucault suggests that subjects are not simply effects of power-knowledge, these gestures and qualifications do not amount to another coherent conception

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[33]On French philosophical anti-humanism, see Soper 1986, Ferry and Renault 1990 and Lecourt 2001.

of the subject (Dews 1987, 161-192). One implication of this discussion of "deep" theories is that a defensible concept of ideology must help explain how belief systems condition popular consciousness without reducing individuals to empty vessels filled up by ideology from birth, or blank slates upon which discourses inscribe themselves.

A commonly-held and less "deep" view of the role of ideology is that which has been labelled "the dominant ideology thesis" in the book of the same name by sociologists Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan Turner. According to these authors, the wide range of thinkers who endorse this thesis maintain that in every class society there is a dominant ideology or common culture,[34] which is beneficial to the dominant class and whose methods of transmission are strong enough to incorporate subordinated classes and secure social order (1980, 1-58). The authors of *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* argue that the thesis is false. There are dominant ideologies in feudal and early capitalist societies, but they are widely held only by members of the ruling classes, not by subalterns. The frailty of the means of ideological transmission in such societies limits the penetration of dominant ideologies into popular consciousness (65-86, 109-127).[35] In what the authors refer to as late capitalism, the dominant ideology is said to partially incorporate the working class. However, system integration or the reproduction of the society in question is not the same

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[34]Given the looseness with which the term discourse is employed in contemporary scholarship, one may substitute less "deep" versions of the concept for ideology here, and therefore consider the dominant ideology, culture or discourse thesis.

[35]This is a frailty relative to the means of ideological transmission subsequently developed in capitalist societies.

as social integration, the normative endorsement of the social order by people in subordinate social positions:

> Our position is that the non-normative aspect of system integration provides a basis of a society's coherence, irrespective of whether or not there are common values. Social integration and system integration can vary independently. Social classes do have different and conflicting ideologies but are, nevertheless, bound together by the network of objective social relations (168).

Because of the weight of oppression and exploitation in daily life, Abercrombie, Hill and Turner suggest that subalterns frequently accept the status quo in a pragmatic fashion, simply because it is what exists. This is a different stance than endorsing the social order as good (166-168). For the authors of *The Dominant Ideology Thesis*, in contrast to Western Marxism in general (Callinicos 1987, 141), economic and political power are more significant pillars of capitalist rule than ideology.

So is ideology in fact an unimportant aspect of class rule in advanced capitalist societies? Not necessarily. The authors of *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* are right to argue for taking economic and political rule more seriously. The importance of ideological or discursive domination is often overstated. This overestimation is most likely to occur when the contents of ideologies are studied in isolation from how they are interpreted by members of subaltern groups, whose concealed views or actual behaviour may reveal how little heed

they pay to pronouncements favouring the status quo.[36] When looking at "late" capitalist societies, Abercrombie, Hill and Turner's claim about the importance of pragmatic acceptance by working people is plausible.[37] However, they offer little to clarify what is involved in what they call the partial ideological incorporation of the working class. This suggests that more analytical tools are needed than those offered in *The Dominant Ideology Thesis*.

At this point the concept of ideology needs to be defined more precisely. A useful place to begin is Alex Callinicos's definition of an ideology as "(1) a set of widely held beliefs; (2) whose acceptance is socially caused" (Callinicos 1987, 138). Ideologies are not by definition false, he suggests. Nor does their acceptance automatically bolster the ruling class. Claims to the contrary by Marx and others run up against the problems of treating "subordinate classes as passive receptacles of ideas inculcated in them from above" (140) or, in the case of accounts that explain ideology as arising from the fetishism of commodity production, have difficulty explaining how working people can ever see through ideology and why they must interpret fetishised appearances in false ways (140). This definition is fairly minimal, but a good start. Terry Eagleton improves on it. Ideology, he writes, is

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[36]Scott 1990 explains why the public statements of subalterns may not express private beliefs, and demonstrates the importance of "hidden transcripts."

[37]It has been observed that the term "late capitalism" assumes too much certainty about the future of capitalism, and could only be used by those who have a hindsight about the evolution of this mode of production which today we do not possess. For this reason, the term advanced capitalism is preferable.

"ideas and beliefs (whether true or false) which symbolize the conditions and life-experiences of a specific, socially significant group or class" and which legitimate and promote a group's interests against those of other groups (Eagleton 1991, 29).[38] By not insisting that ideologies are necessarily false or supportive of the dominant class, these definitions have the merit of skirting a number of thorny epistemological debates that are rarely helpful in understanding social processes.

That said, it is true that ruling classes generally do try to make their rule seem natural to subalterns. As Corrigan and Sayer write, "Classes rule most securely through the achievement of the Obvious, wherein the conditions of their dominance become the taken-for-granted categorial and moral frameworks through which people apprehend 'reality'" (1981, 32-33). However, they caution that "it needs immediately to be stressed that this *is* an achievement: not only did it have to be fought for (against alternatives that had first to be smashed); it *remains* fragile and precarious, demanding unceasing maintenance (against new forms of those same alternatives, which *will* gum up the works)" (33). This imperfect ideological effort to naturalize domination is also referred to by Corrigan and others who develop this approach as moral regulation.[39] It is a valuable perspective, since examining how ruling classes strive to make their rule seem natural can help make sense of what *The*

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[38]This is one of six definitions offered by Eagleton (1991, 28-30), who in his book on ideology wisely observes that both the broader sociological and narrower epistemological approaches to ideology have their places (7, 221).

[39]See Corrigan 1981 and Valverde and Weir 1988.

Dominant Ideology Thesis calls the "partial incorporation" of the working class by ideology. Of course, an unsympathetic critic might retort that this is just a fancy version of conspiracy theory. In response, it can be argued that historical research reveals many conscious efforts to create and naturalize "categorial and moral frameworks" of capitalist rule.[40] In addition, Corrigan and Sayer's emphasis that these frameworks do not spontaneously impose themselves on subalterns but must be constructed, maintained and defended against challenges from below guards against elitist assumptions about the ease with which the minds of working people can be pumped full of ideas antithetical to their own interests.

Gramsci makes an important contribution to understanding this ideological aspect of class rule. In his prison writings, he offers some clues about working-class consciousness that capture the incompleteness of ideological domination. He suggests that the consciousness of most members of a subaltern class is a contradictory mix of ruling-class ideology and ideas arising from their practical experience which include critical insights about social relations (Gramsci 1971, 326-343). In most circumstances, when the class's "conduct is not independent and autonomous, but submissive and subordinate," the ruling-class elements in consciousness far overshadow critical ones. But in moments of mass insurgency, when the class "is acting as an organic totality," its own world view "manifests itself in action... in flashes" (327). Wally Seccombe and David Livingstone's book "*Down*

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[40]Corrigan and Sayer 1985 contains many examples from English history. Seccombe and Livingstone 2000 examines the relevant role of the mass media in contemporary Canada (94-99).

to Earth People" demonstrates the strength of these ideas in a study of the English-Canadian working class in the 1990s, benefiting in particular from a conception of the multidimensionality of social being that is at best underdeveloped in Gramsci.

A radical challenge to the thoughts about ideology developed here, not to mention stronger claims like those entailed in the dominant ideology thesis, is made by James C. Scott. He rejects both the "thick" theory of false consciousness or hegemony, which holds that ruling-class ideology is the reason why subalterns give the status quo normative support, and the "thin" version, that ideology creates an acceptance of the social order as "natural and inevitable" (Scott 1990, 72). Scott draws upon Abercrombie, Hill and Turner's powerful case against the "thick" theory. Since this has already been examined, there is no need to discuss it further. But what about Scott's critique of the "thin" version? He writes that its flaw lies "in assuming that the absence of actual knowledge of alternative social arrangements produces automatically the naturalization of the present, however hated that present may be" (80). He bases his argument on historical evidence of subaltern beliefs in the possibility of "a world turned upside down" or of an end to class divisions, exemplified in the rhyme of the 1381 English peasants' revolt, "When Adam Delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman" (80-81). Scott concludes that both the thick and thin variants are wrong because "obstacles to resistance, which are many, are simply not attributable to the inability of subordinate groups to *imagine* a counterfactual social order. They do imagine both the reversal and the negation of their domination, and, most important, they have acted on these values in desperation and on those rare occasions when the circumstances allowed"

(81). The naturalization of existing social relations is apparently just not the issue.

Scott's work is often insightful and usually admirably egalitarian in spirit. If he is correct, ideology does not play a major role in class rule. There are reasons for agreeing with him in the case of pre-capitalist class societies. As *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* suggests, their ruling classes did not have especially effective means for propagating their ideologies on a mass scale. However, there are several grounds on which his position is unconvincing as a critique of the perspective on ideology I have outlined above. First, much of Scott's historical evidence is pre-capitalist and does not speak to the conditions of subalterns in capitalist societies, whose rulers can usually marshal greater resources for disseminating ideology than earlier ruling classes ever could. Second, contrary to what Scott suggests, there is nothing automatic about "achieving the Obvious" through ideology. Third and most important, my claim is not that ideology naturalizes the status quo and thereby prevents workers' resistance. It is true that ideological efforts to make people believe that existing class, gender and other social relations should be taken for granted as "just the way things are" may be designed to eliminate resistance altogether. Yet they are never able to do so. Rather, they are important because they create obstacles to the growth of anti-capitalist analysis and politics in the soil of working-class experience.[41] As Michael Mann suggests in his study of sociological research on workers' consciousness, "It is not value- consensus

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[41]Therborn identifies six different attitudes produced by ideological domination: accommodation, a sense of inevitability, belief in legitimate representation, deference, fear and resignation (Therborn 1980, 94).

which keeps the working class compliant, but rather a *lack* of consensus in the crucial area where concrete experiences and vague populism might be translated into radical politics" (Mann 1970, 436). More accurately, dominant ideologies - which are "dominant in the sense that the ruling class will seek to prevent subordinate classes from developing an ideology that systematically challenges its right to rule" (Callinicos 1987, 154) - do not incorporate the working class so much as give workers' consciousness its typical contradictory character. Disentangling the critical insights that subalterns gain through their lived experience from ideologies which directly or indirectly support capitalism and then elaborating them into a coherent ideology that can guide political strategy is no easy task, as Gramsci recognizes (Gramsci 1971, 330-335). Dominant ideologies make their crucial contribution to capitalist rule by retarding the development of such a counter-hegemonic world-view.[42]

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[42]An issue related to this discussion has been raised in research into the social construction of a distinct cultural sphere in nineteenth-century Britain. In *Culture and the State*, David Lloyd and Paul Thomas examine the development within social relations of a distinct cultural space dedicated to the cultivation of a particular kind of subjectivity. At a time when capitalism was furthering the social division of labour among workers, the concept of culture - the practice of an all-round development of an individual's faculties, of an "ethical disposition" (Lloyd and Thomas 1998, 7) - arose. This disposition, to be taught to the rebellious working class in schools and elsewhere, prepares individuals to be represented, rather than to represent themselves. The emergence of a separate cultural sphere, Lloyd and Thomas suggest, corresponds to the differentiation of the state from civil society taking place in the same historical era. Both state and culture are, according to bourgeois ideology, spheres in which really-unequal individuals can be brought together as supposed equals (14-15). As they write in a piece of opaque prose, culture's "transcendence of specialization and division in order to provide a space of reconciliation nonetheless depends itself on a differentiating specialization of function. This differential relation, which expresses a specialization that is to overcome the effects of specialization, establishes culture's analogical and finally instrumental relation to the state insofar as each emerge from division as sites in which division is supposed to be transcended (65). *Culture and the State*

While the role of ideology clearly should not be ignored, neither should ideological domination be examined in isolation from the coercive forms of economic and political power discussed earlier. Social and political theorists often discuss coercion and consent as if they were essentially independent. This is not helpful. However, the issues involved are not straightforward. Marx and Engels present coercion and consent in synthesis, without an analysis of each; in his prison writings Gramsci distinguishes and analyses the two, but ultimately fails to synthesize them adequately (Hoffman 1984, 18-75).[43] The coercive dimensions of capitalist rule are usually accompanied in practice by attempts to elicit consent. However, the eliciting of consent itself always takes place in the context of a particular relationship of forces (Therborn 1980, 98, 108-109). As Therborn points out, "Implicit in the dichotomy seems to be, in most cases, the totally mistaken notion that domination is ensured either by ideology (consensus, including 'false consciousness') or by non-ideology" (98). This line of argument should not be taken so far as to dissolve the

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integrates studies of late eighteenth and nineteenth literary and philosophical texts, the English working class and schooling in a way that is theoretically suggestive but at times less than convincing in terms of historical research. Its authors also use an Althusserian-style conception of the interpellation of subjects by ideology of the kind criticized earlier. Despite these weaknesses, Lloyd and Thomas's argument about the emergence of a distinct cultural sphere and its correspondence with a state differentiated from civil society raises an intriguing connection between the often taken for granted sphere of culture and ideological efforts to make capitalist rule seem obvious to the ruled.

[43]"Paradigmatically he [Gramsci] cannot grasp coercion and consent as facets of that unitary regulation by which capital rules" (Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer 1979, 110). The inclusion of this perceptive observation here does not indicate agreement on my part with the substance of the book in which it appears.

distinction between coercion and consent. In different historical conjunctures, greater emphasis will be placed on one or the other. But since the ideological and non-ideological dimensions of capitalist rule are inseparable in social reality, there are clear implications for how ruling-class power should be conceptualized. While one can refer to economic, political (or state) and ideological forms of capitalist rule, this formulation has the risk of implying a clear-cut separation between the ideological and other modes of existence of the social relations between labour and capital. In fact, economic and political forms are always clothed in ideology, though the operations of ideology are not restricted to them.

Althusser's very broad notion of Ideological State Apparatuses - distinguished from Repressive State Apparatuses because they function by ideology rather than by violence, and including even the family and trade unions (1971, 142-145) - avoids clarifying the relationship of ideological methods to state power by annexing the former to the latter. However, swallowing up ideology into state power does a disservice to the understanding of both. There certainly are state institutions that devote all or many of their resources to reproducing the dominant ideology, although these are perhaps only the most obvious examples of the state's ideological role. The political administration of civil society is always ideologically-laden; contemporary workfare programmes are but one glaring example.[44] Yet institutions of civil society that may receive no state support, such as private

[44]Corrigan and Sayer 1981 and 1985, Lloyd and Thomas 1998, Sears 1995 and 1999 and Ursel 1992 are among the studies that support this general point. See Shragge 1997 on the case of workfare in Canada.

research institutes, religious groups and voluntary moral reform organizations, do important ideological work in many capitalist societies. As a result, lumping both state and non-state efforts together by means of a functional definition of Ideological State Apparatuses is misleading. Studying the contribution of ideology to capitalist rule is not simply a matter of seeking out the obviously ideological institutions. It also requires exploration of the ideological aspects of social relations, of culture in the sense of "the common sense or way of life of a particular class, group or social category" (Johnson 1980, 234), of the ideological texture of class relations in both their economic and political forms (231).

This chapter has analysed the major modes of capitalist social power. These forms are the key means by which capital is able to decompose the working class and maintain itself as the most fully developed class, the ruling class. The "silent compulsion of economic relations," control in the workplace and political administration, always accompanied by ideological efforts to make rule seem obvious to the ruled - these are enormously powerful forces. Countering it are all activities and ways of thinking that contribute to working-class recomposition. Capitalist rule is challenged by everything that develops greater unity, solidarity and equality between and among workers in their places of paid work, homes and communities, by all successes in working-class self-organization, and by knowledge of how capitalist social relations can be changed. In the clashes of decomposition and recomposition, class formations are shaped and reshaped, as outlined in the previous chapter.

As I have argued, theory offers indispensable guidance in understanding social

processes in a complex world in which things rarely are how they are depicted in the prevailing "common sense." However, the elaboration of theory should not become an end in itself, as it often does among theorists of all intellectual persuasions in the contemporary academy. With this in mind, it is time to use the theory developed here to explore the remaking of the Canadian working class in the 1940s.

CHAPTER 3: CLASS RECOMPOSITION IN CANADA IN THE 1940S: PAID WORKPLACES

During the 1940s, the Canadian working-class formation underwent an epochal shift. This chapter explores this process of change in the sphere of the paid workplace; the subsequent chapter considers its community and household dimensions. The focus in both is how the class composition that had crystallized in the 1920s was cracked and how relations between labour and capital and within the working class were recomposed. The aim of these chapters is not to provide a comprehensive narrative of class experience during these years - a worthy if ambitious challenge for a future social historian. Rather, it is to conduct "class struggle analysis" in Miliband's sense, to elucidate how class recomposition happened and to identify the key features of the new class formation stabilized in the late 1940s. Each chapter begins with an account of the preceding class composition in the sphere or spheres it treats. This is followed by an examination of the tremors, upheavals and continuities of the war and immediate post-war years. These lines of investigation converge later, in Chapter 5, which focuses on two important aspects of the class composition consolidated across paid workplaces, communities and households once the uneven cycle of class recomposition came to an end and analytically depicts the overall shape of the new class composition. While organizing the inquiry in this way does divide what should ultimately be thought through together, I believe that this division is justified by the differentiation of social relations in the realm of wage-labour from the other spheres of social reality (and vice versa) and by the difficulty of analytically presenting a complex process.

3.1 Class Composition in the Paid Workplaces of the Late 1930s

By the early 1920s, the "Workers' Revolt" that reached its zenith in 1919 with general strikes in Winnipeg and Amherst, Nova Scotia, and solidarity strikes elsewhere, had been defeated. Arrests, deportations and other repressive measures taken by the state and employers allowed the ruling class to regain the upper hand and throw most workers onto the defensive for two decades. The last battle of the cycle of struggle that had started in 1917, the Cape Breton coal miners' strike of 1925 - "a small civil war" (McKay and Morton 1998, 74) - was a decisive victory for capital. One measure of the working-class defeat is the condition of the unions. Membership shrank in the small industrial union movement as well as in the craft unions, generally affiliated to the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC). According to government statistics, union membership peaked at 378 000 in 1919 but by 1926 was reduced to 275 000, or 12% of non-agricultural paid workers - an inter-war low in union density (Leacy 1983, E175-177). Furthermore, during the 1920s between 145 000 and 200 000 workers were represented by industrial or works councils. Often accompanied by various "corporate welfare" programmes such as company-run magazines, leisure activities and profit-sharing schemes, these employer-sponsored instruments of labour-management cooperation were designed to prevent the spread of unions. In a period when workers were on the defensive, they had some success (Palmer 1992, 217-221; MacDowell 2000, 102-107). Many employers were able to proceed with plans for mechanization and the introduction of scientific management (Heron and Storey 1986, 12-13). Neither the fledgling Communist

Party of Canada (CPC) nor the divided forces of labourism, reformist socialism and non-CPC Marxism were able to rally much resistance to capital's onslaught in the 1920s, though all retained pockets of support among workers. The class composition that emerged from the defeat of the Workers' Revolt would persist in its essentials until the beginning of the 1940s, despite valiant efforts by Communist and socialist[1] activists to rebuild workers' power during the harsh years of the Great Depression.

Some bare outlines of the class situation in paid workplaces at the end of the 1930s can be presented statistically. On the eve of the Second World War, the population of Canada numbered some 11.267 million people (Leacy 1983, A1-14). It was also a mostly urban populace: according to the 1941 census, more than half lived in centres of 1000 or more residents, with over 2.6 million in cities larger than 100 000 (A67-74). In 1939 the civilian paid labour force was counted at 4.649 million persons aged 14 and over (D124-133), of whom 638 000 were women (Palmer 1992, 266).[2] With the male participation rate in the paid labour force nearly four times that of women according to the 1931 and 1941 censuses (Leacy 1983, D107-122), and only one in twenty married Ontario women working for pay in 1939 (Sangster 1995, 223), the world of paid work was a very male one.[3]

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[1]I use "Communist" to refer to the CPC (from 1943, the Labour Progressive Party (LPP)), "communist" to the CPC and other Marxists, and "socialist" to the various non-CPC currents of the Left.

[2]This represented 13.7% (the lowest percentage in the Western industrialized world, according to Christie 2000 (305)), not 6% as Palmer states (1992, 266) - but see the following footnote.

[3]Official statistics of the time must be treated with some caution. For instance, the figures for paid workers are, in the words of two scholars, "very incomplete" (Cruikshank

Agriculture accounted for 1.379 million, and non-agricultural work 2.741.[4] The modest economic improvement of 1937 was short-lived and immediately followed by rising unemployment: in 1939 the category of "persons without jobs and seeking work" numbered 529 000 (Leacy 1983, D124-133).[5] Official figures showed that manufacturing employed more paid workers than any other category of industry in 1939: 627 000. Services came next, with 575 000. 302 000 were employed in trade, and 206 000 in transportation, storage and communication. Construction claimed 127 000 and the two categories of mining, quarrying and oil wells and finance insurance and real estate had 82 000 apiece. Forestry, fishing and trapping employed 56 000, and public utilities 22 000 (D318-328). Against any early twenty-first century tendency to assume that at the close of the 1930s the large factory was the typical paid workplace in Canada, it needs to be emphasized that most people who worked for wages did so elsewhere. For instance, in 1936 barely more than 145 000 workers were reported as employed in establishments of over 500 employees (Leacy 1983, R812-825).

One must be aware that these aggregates mask considerable diversity. For instance,

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and Kealey 1987, 132), and not only because of the acknowledged exclusion of the residents of aboriginal reserves and of the Yukon and Northwest territories (as well as Newfoundland, not yet part of the Canadian state). Part-time workers and women were sometimes missed (Strong-Boag 1988, 43). Many unions did not submit membership statistics to the federal Department of Labour.

[4]Little or no relevant research has been done on agricultural wage-workers in the 1940s. Regrettably, they remain essentially invisible in this study.

[5]This number certainly underestimates unemployment. Pierson 1986 suggests "about 900 000" (23).

the average weekly wage in manufacturing was reported as $22.79, rather higher than the $16.33 of service workers (E86-103). But the category of manufacturing included, among others, low-paid clothing workers, whose weekly average was $17.15, producers of rubber products who averaged $21.45, and those employed in making machinery, who at $25.39 had higher wages than most (E104-119). The fact that a 1939 subsistence-level household budget for an adult man and woman with three children aged 6, 10 and 12 was calculated by Toronto's Welfare Council at $28.35 per week ($1474.20 per year) (Welfare Council 1939, 42) gives a sense of the significance of these wage statistics.

To understand the stratification and divisions in the working class at which these figures hint, it is necessary to go beyond statistics and explore the pre-war working-class formation in Canada in other ways. Workplaces did not vary simply according to size, but also circumstance. For example, camp-dwelling bushworkers hired on a seasonal basis still sweated in the woods alone, in pairs or in small work gangs, even if by the late 1930s timber was as likely to be hauled away by diesel-fueled trucks and tractors as by horses (Radforth 1987, 46-69, 83). With fully one-third of the women employed for pay toiling in the unpopular job of domestic servant or in other female-dominated personal service jobs like restaurant servers and laundry workers (Strong-Boag 1988, 53), female wage-labourers were especially likely to find themselves isolated in small workplaces. This was even more true for urban African-Canadian women, at least 80% of whom were forced by the racist division of labour to take jobs in domestic service (Brand 1991, 15).

Whatever the kind of workplace, the Great Depression meant mass unemployment

and often, for those who kept their jobs, wage cuts and reduced hours. Where hours were not cut the work week remained long: Alfred Edwards's experience in a London, Ontario knitting mill was not unusual for workers in manufacturing: "three days of 7 till 12 and 1 till 8 and two days of 7 till 12 and 1 till 6" plus "cleaning on Saturday mornings from 7.00am till 12.00 or 1.00," with unpaid holidays on Christmas Day and New Year's Day (Edwards 1995, 264). Deckhands in the merchant marine may have had it worst of all, since they were on call twenty-four hours per day (Green 1986, 6). Yet the absence of the crushing regularity of shifts in a factory or office was rarely liberating. The case of railworkers in the running trades illustrates the point, for they were burdened with unpredictable schedules that often took them away from home with little notice (Rosenfeld 1988, 247-248).

Regardless of where they worked and how many hours of their lives were spent there, most wage-workers in Canada shared common experiences of hierarchical capitalist control on the job. "Generally, employers continued to control their workplaces unbridled by any formal worker presence. It was an age of authoritarian, repressive management" (Heron and Storey 1986, 16). The waiting ranks of job-seekers allowed employers to fire and replace workers with ease, at least those not classified as skilled. Foremen (management and supervisory personnel were overwhelmingly male) usually had the power to hire and fire. As a result, they wielded tremendous authority, often in highly arbitrary ways. Robert Storey's finding that "firings and kickbacks of wages were an integral aspect of employee-supervisor relations throughout Hamilton"(1981, 256) was true much more generally. Where foremen could dole out benefits, such as paid sick time, they did so as they saw fit (Edwards

1995, 289). Some supervisors would even go so far as to demand sexual access to the wives of male workers (Heron 1988a, 96). Workers who faced racism and sexism were particularly vulnerable (Storey 1981, 210; Sangster 1995, 98; Strong-Boag 1988, 55-56, 60; Sugiman 1994, 12), although it was not only racially-oppressed immigrants who tried to persuade foremen to hire their relatives and friends. In general, workers had nothing to gain by turning to the state, whose legal and administrative measures, such as provincial industrial standards laws, placed very few limits on managerial power. Little wonder, then, that fear was so pervasive in the workplace.

The preceding lines are a brief sketch of how capital subordinated labour in paid workplaces in the late 1930s. As explained in Chapter 1, analyzing class composition requires the adoption of a different perspective, one that looks at relations between different sections of the working class and at workers' resistance to capital, as well as at workers and their organizations.

A notable feature of the class composition that endured until the 1940s was the eminent place retained by skilled male workers, estimated at 12% of the labour force in the 1930s (Struthers 1983, 4). The drive by employers that began in the late nineteenth century to raise productivity through mechanization and scientific management changed paid workplaces irrevocably. Yet skilled work was not eliminated altogether. Some of the older kinds of craft workers remained, though their jobs had, to various degrees, been altered. New technologies generated new skills: for example, electricians were indispensable in modern workplaces, and mechanized production required tool and die makers and repair personnel.

Some specialized jobs in mass production had not been broken down and mechanized, among them cabinet-making (Parr 1990, 177-180) and sheet mill work in the steel industry (Storey 1981, 147-148). In general, it is possible to distinguish between those skilled workers employed within mass production industries, who were rarely unionized and often acquired their jobs by rising from less-skilled positions, and other skilled workers, such as those in construction, who more often belonged to craft unions, were less susceptible to replacement by workers rising to their status and therefore had more bargaining power.[6] In both cases, though, these workers whose labour was socially recognized as skilled were overwhelmingly white men, and this was no accident. Male supremacy ensures that "skill is not only a technical category but is also an ideological construct that is highly gendered. Definitions of skill are bound up with masculine identities and play an important role in defining the skill level of work performed" (Rosenfeld 1988, 268). According to the dominant gender ideology of the day, men were rightfully breadwinners who earned wages to support their families (258-259; Parr 1990, 240).[7] Consequently, although many working-class women were wage-workers for at least a portion of their lives, as I will discuss below, the gender division of labour in paid work generally excluded them from jobs that required years of work experience or training in order to attain skilled status. However, it was not simply that women were considered unworthy of training: work done by women was deemed

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[6]I owe clarification of this point to Craig Heron.

[7]It is important to understand that in reality most men's wages were not in fact sufficient to support a family. The "breadwinner wage" was a myth, except for those earning the wages of skilled men (Parr 1990, 241; Sangster 1995, 73).

inherently less skilled than that of men. The closest that women came to qualifying as skilled was in jobs at the top of the hierarchy of "white-collar" waged work. These included private secretaries and stenographers, graduate nurses and social workers. A rare few made their way into the male preserves of high school and university teaching. But the total number of women in all such jobs, which were commonly held to be "middle class," was very small (Strong-Boag 1988, 57, 42, 53-54).[8] They, like male skilled workers, shared an Anglo-Celtic ethno-racial identity, whether born in North America or "the old country." The material and ideological power of racism in mid-century Canada segregated workers who did not belong to the dominant ethno-racial group into a few occupations and coded their labour as unskilled by nature.[9]

Located as they were within this gender and racial grid, skilled male workers formed a distinct stratum within the working-class formation. Their relative scarcity in the labour market underpinned their ability to obtain higher wages and maintain their status (McKay 1986, 34). Pride in their proficiency as workers who enjoyed greater autonomy on the job - albeit much less than craft workers of the previous century - bolstered their conviction in the value of the labour of white breadwinners. While their beliefs about the entitlements of citizens of the Dominion were shared by members of the middle class, their masculine respectability, argues Mark Rosenfeld, was not the same as that of lawyers or doctors: "Its

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[8]The best study of skilled women workers in this period is McPherson 1996 on nurses.

[9]See, for example, Heron 1988a (77) and McPherson 1996 (118-120)

style was too aggressive, direct, and rough for middle-class gentility, nurtured as it was in part at work" (Rosenfeld 1988, 276). Class friction between these workers and employers on the job also set the skilled apart from capital. Although skilled men often worked closely with other workers, there was sometimes distance between them. On the railways, for example, the conductors, engineers, firemen and brakemen of the running trades "could be accused by those working in the car shop, roundhouse, or the bridge and building department, as comprising a self-important elite that would have little to do with other railroaders" (269). Such sectional consciousness could be militant in defence of fellow tradesmen, while disdainful of the struggles of others, especially women and "foreigners." Some skilled workers did, however, have a broader view of working-class solidarity.

A distanced attitude to the less-skilled prevailed in the craft unions to which some skilled workers, especially those in the building trades, belonged. Affiliated in the main to the TLC, which federated locals of American Federation of Labour (AFL)-chartered "international unions," some craft unions belonged to the All-Canadian Congress of Labour (ACCL) or remained outside of the two pan-Canadian labour centrals. In Québec, skilled workers were found in TLC and ACCL craft unions as well as in the conservative Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour (CCCL)'s unions, which were organized on an industrial basis. The policy of the AFL and TLC was one of support for the organization of workers in each occupation by the affiliated union with appropriate jurisdiction. In the age of mass production industries employing many less-skilled workers, this "antiquarian position" (Storey 1981, 83) was a strategic dead-end. This, along with the lack of interest

displayed by the AFL and TLC in organizing outside the ranks of skilled workers, led to the creation of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) inside the AFL.[10] Before long the AFL suspended and then expelled the CIO unions. After some argument and delay, the TLC eventually bowed to AFL pressure and followed suit in 1939 (Abella 1973, 33-40).

The decision of the TLC to expel the dynamic industrial unions that were trying to organize the unorganized majority of the working class cannot simply be explained as the result of the intransigence of the AFL leadership. Some craft unionists, particularly outside mass production industries, were actively hostile to workers who lacked skill and respectability. This could sometimes go to great lengths: during the 1930s, the Hamilton Trades and Labour Council spurned calls for solidarity from strikers at National Steel Car and Mercury Mills and distanced themselves from protests by unemployed workers. In 1937, the council split when AFL loyalists walked out to form their own body in opposition to supporters of the TLC leadership, which at the time was tolerating the CIO unions (Storey 1981, 160-165, 259-263). Skilled workers did at times play a different role. Halifax carpenters supported locked-out fishers and fish handlers in 1939 (McKay 1985, 95). Body shop workers at the General Motors plant in Oshawa kicked off the struggle that would lead

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[10]More precisely, in response to a growing movement among US workers, a wing of the AFL leadership led by John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers (an AFL-affiliated industrial union) reacted to the conservative inertia of the AFL by forming the CIO, "*an alliance of dissident trade-union bureaucrats, with important financial resources and friends in high places, created for the purpose of capturing an already existent mass movement of industrial shop committees and rebel locals - a movement with dangerous embryonic proclivities toward an anti-Gompersian model of 'class struggle unionism*'" (Davis 1986, 56-57).

to a victory for the industrial unionism of the UAW when they struck against speed-up in February 1937 (Abella 1974, 95-96). At Stelco, the homogeneously Anglo-Celtic workers of the sheet mill were union pioneers (Storey 1981, 182-194); at nearby Dofasco, two Communist members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers tried to organize the factory (198). However, these were exceptional cases. The extreme sectarianism of the Hamilton splitters was not the norm, but the exclusivism of craft unionism was a barrier to union and class unity.

Most wage-workers were labelled "unskilled" or "semi-skilled."[11] In some cases, less-skilled workers did jobs that needed little training, such as construction labour. Others involved a great deal of job-related knowledge but were deemed unskilled. For example, in the case of bushworkers, few of whom were Anglo-Celtic, many men in inter-war Canada had the basic skills required to get a start in this kind of work. Thus there was a labour surplus. Unions were fairly weak, and the work itself involved heavy physical labour in an outdoor setting (Radforth 1987, 32-34, 68-69). The social construction of skill around gender and ethnicity was even clearer among garment workers, who were two-thirds women and recruited largely from the Eastern European Jewish and Italian immigrant communities and among Québec francophones, with some Anglos. Although there was little difference between the inherent skill demanded by the jobs done by women and men in the industry, English-speaking men held better-paid "skilled" positions, which few women did (Steedman

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[11]I use the term "less-skilled" to cover both.

1997, 8, 21-22, 48-52).

The less-skilled majority of paid workers toiled in factories, stores, warehouses, offices, mines and other workplaces. Unlike the fairly homogenous skilled layer, the less-skilled strata of the class formation did not share a common language, gender, ethnicity and citizenship status. As noted above, some were women, one in three of whom worked in personal service jobs of one kind or another. Clerical work in the rapidly-expanding office sector or in manufacturing accounted for most of the rest (Strong-Boag 1988, 53). While the percentage of women in the paid labour force in any given year was low, many more belonged to it for at least part of their lives. Working-class women most often worked for wages before marriage, as suggested by statistics which indicate that about half of those between the ages of 20 and 24 were in the labour force, in contrast to only about one in seven of those aged 35-64 (43). Many of those over 35 were not Anglo-Celtic. Gender segregation extended down to the level of which jobs women held in the settings where they worked for pay. In industries that employed both men and women, women were invariably hired into specific departments and lower-paid "women's" classifications, such as sewing in car plants (Sugiman 1994, 23). Racism functioned in a similar way. Those whose ethnicity was not Anglo-Celtic - other Europeans, East Asians, South Asians, aboriginals[12] and other racially-oppressed workers - were slotted into lower-paid jobs in certain lines of work. These

[12]Unfortunately, there is virtually no published research on aboriginal people and wage-labour in the 1930s and 1940s. See Knight 1996 (321-324) and Lutz 1999 (98-100), who suggest a decline in involvement in waged work and an increase in subsistence farming, hunting, fishing and trapping in British Colombia during the Depression.

included the worst jobs in steel and auto plants (Storey 1981, 129; Sugiman 2001). Many African-Canadian men could only find jobs as sleeping car porters (Calliste 1988, 37-38; Grizzle 1998, 37). Asian workers were super-exploited in resource and service industries (Creese 1988-89, 28). Some employers deliberately hired racially-oppressed workers, a practice which in a racist society could function to drive down wages and divide workers (29-30, 34; Heron 1988a, 77-86; Muszynski 1996, 129-179).

At the close of the 1930s, very few less-skilled workers were unionized. Those who did carry union cards were divided between ACCL,[13] CIO and CCCL unions, along with a handful of TLC affiliates.[14] Only a handful of the unions of the less-skilled, such as the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACW) and United Mine Workers of America (UMW) of the CIO and the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees (CBRE) of the ACCL, were relatively stable institutions with fairly well-established collective bargaining relationships with employers. In a few pockets of industry where militant industrial unionists had some power, direct action was the preferred method of resolving disputes.[15] But it was more common to find small groups of unionists patiently visiting the homes of their fellow

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[13]Several small unions left the ACCL in 1936 and formed the Canadian Federation of Labour, "promanagement, anti-American, politically conservative" (MacDowell 2000, 111).

[14]The unions of the CPC-led Workers' Unity League (WUL), notable for their valiant efforts to organize the less-skilled employed and unemployed as well as for the ultra-left and frequently sectarian tactics of the CPC at the time, dissolved in 1935 and joined TLC affiliates. On the WUL, see Manley 1994.

[15]For example, this was the case among Sydney steelworkers (Montero 1979, 66; Crawley 1997, 102-107).

employees to "talk union," hoping for a breakthrough in which the willingness to organize would overcome the fear of retribution by hostile bosses.[16] Communist and socialist activists played important roles in these embattled networks. They faced sometimes overwhelming odds, as they could usually count on vigorous resistance to their efforts by employers, all levels and branches of government, and most religious and community leaders, not to mention indifference or worse from craft union leaders. Racism and sexism were also obstacles to organizing the less-skilled. Two examples illustrate the possible impact: white men in Hotel, Restaurant and Culinary Employees and Bartenders Union Local 28 agreed to exclude Chinese cooks and Japanese hotel workers from their union (Muszynski 1996, 185), while in the 1937 sit-down strike at the Holmes Foundry in Sarnia, Ontario a mob of anti-union Anglo-Celtic employees and other citizens violently ejected the Eastern European strikers to shouts of "We'll give their jobs to white men" and hoisted a Union Jack to mark the triumph of "real Canadians" (Snow 1977, 13-22). Uniting the less-skilled posed a daunting challenge.

Nevertheless, the late 1930s saw a significant burst of workplace struggles. The economy improved in 1937, reflected in a drop in the number of persons officially counted as unemployed and seeking work from 571 000 in 1936 to 411 000 the following year (Leacy 1983, D124-133). With unemployment at its lowest level since 1930, the fear that kept so many workers from taking action to improve their lives on the job was diminished.

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[16]Manley 1986 discusses the case of auto up til 1936.

Events below the 49th parallel provided inspiration. The massive wave of sit-down strikes and CIO organizing that began in late 1936 in the US was a living demonstration to Canadians of the power of less-skilled workers. South of the border, a wave of workplace struggle and class recomposition had begun in 1934 (Preis 1964, 19-43; Davis 1986, 58-59). From 3.088 million in 1934, the number of US union members rose to 3.989 million in 1936, 7.001 in 1937 and 8.034 in 1938 (Goldfield 1989, 1267). A byproduct of this upsurge was the passage of the National Labor Relations Act ("Wagner Act") in 1935 by politicians who believed that "government regulation was necessary to constrain, limit and control the increasingly militant labor movement" (1274).[17] But there was no Canadian equivalent to what Michael Goldfield describes as the "truly dramatic and earth-shattering" (Skocpol, Finegold and Goldfield 1990, 1308) US strikes of 1934, and when some Canadian workers took the offensive in 1937 their gains were more modest.

In 1936, there were 186 strikes and lockouts involving 35 571 workers, amounting to about 278 000 person-days of work (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987, 136), or 0.05% of time worked (Leacy 1983, E 190-197).[18] This was not much greater than the level of strikes in the previous years of the Depression. But the following year, there were more than 73 000

[17]This union growth in the US cannot be attributed solely to the union recognition and collective bargaining rights granted by the NLRA, which was ignored by employers and not enforced by state power until after it was upheld by the Supreme Court in April 1937 (Goldfield 1989, 1266-1268; Skocpol, Finegold and Goldfield 1990, 1309-1311).

[18]Where possible, I use the statistics of Cruikshank and Kealey's specialist study of strikes, which are generally slightly higher than those in the second edition of *Historical Statistics of Canada*.

strikers and 341 strikes (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987, 136), which cost Canadian capital some 886 393 person-days and 0.15% of working time (Leacy 1983, E190-197). Unlike in the US, few strikes were sit-downs.[19] Union membership grew in 1936 and reached an inter-war peak in 1937 at 384 000, 18.2% of non-agricultural workers (Leacy 1983, E175-177). Yet this did not match the achievement of 1919 in terms of the development of class power or union density.[20] The return to higher unemployment again in 1938 brought the recovery of struggle to a halt. Still, there were more workers who would have understood the Ontario textile worker who spoke up in a meeting to tell of her new-found confidence in deterring a sexually-harassing supervisor and "almost shouted, 'You ask what has the union done? The union made me strong'" (Edwards 1995, 294).

A week after GM workers were victorious in Flint, Michigan, a brief strike in February 1937 by body shop workers led to 4000 employees of GM Oshawa joining the UAW within a month. In their April strike, Oshawa auto workers did not actually gain formal UAW recognition but what they did accomplish went far beyond the 44-hour workweek, seniority system and other gains in the contract signed with GM: in the face of

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[19]In addition to the one in Sarnia mentioned above, sit-downs - some of them brief - are known to have taken place in Windsor in late 1936, and in1937 in Chatham and Oshawa (Snow 1977, 12-13), Kitchener (Adair, Pautler and Strang 1976, 2-3), Kingsville, Calgary and Edmonton (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 206, 220). There were also sit-downs in a number of Northern Ontario lumber camps in 1937-38 (Radforth 1987, 139-140). The first Canadian sit-down was probably at Colonial Footwear in Toronto in June 1936 (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 206).

[20]The official measure of union membership in 1919 is "undoubtedly low," and "probably well more than one in four [workers] passed through a union"(Heron 1998, 270) in 1919-1920.

a vociferous anti-CIO campaign by Liberal Premier Mitchell Hepburn, they had made a major breakthrough for industrial unionism in the hostile mass production sector (Napier 1976, 21-23; Abella 1974). A study of Oshawa labour from 1937 to 1939 reveals a broad class recomposition taking place on a local scale in the wake of the victory: the UAW spread to plants that produced parts for GM, dairy workers, bread sellers and municipal employees organized themselves into ACCL industrial unions, and steel workers formed a local of the CIO's Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC). A local labour council was also created, and a weekly labour newspaper launched (MacDowell 1993, 698-700).

However, Canada was not Oshawa writ large. Steelworkers in the Nova Scotia towns of Sydney and Trenton were able to win recognition[21] for SWOC in 1937 (Earle and McKay 1989, 14), but workers trying to build the United Rubber Workers of America (URW) in Kitchener were able to force only some employers to recognize their union (Adair, Pautler and Strang 1976). A CPC-initiated effort after the GM Oshawa victory to spread CIO organizing by mass leafleting at Southern Ontario plants was a flop (Abella 1973, 25; Napier 1976, 23-24).

While the Oshawa strike was on, Montréal dressmakers, many of them Catholic francophone women newly organized by the heavily-Jewish and anglophone International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), struck in response to employers signing a contract with CCCL unions and trying to use Québec's Collective Labour Agreement

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[21]However, the Dominion Steel Company still refused to negotiate wage levels and other plan-wide issues (Crawley 1997, 106).

Extension Act to extend poor wage and hour provisions across the entire industry.[22] The fruits of the dressmakers' success included a union shop agreement (Steedman 1997, 211, 245-251; Dumas 1975, 57-68). The strike by 9000 Québec textile workers saw clashes with police and workers' anger directed at English-speaking company executives; the CCCL's Catholic National Federation of Textile Workers won a first contract, with minor gains (Jamieson 1968, 260-261; Rouillard 1989, 193-195).[23] On the waterfront, the Canadian Seamen's Union (CSU) began to organize sailors on the Great Lakes fleet (Green 1986, 25-42; Kaplan 1987, 19-25). In Vancouver, an attempt was made to unionize domestic servants (Light and Pierson 1990, 282-283).

The year 1938 opened with a strike by Nova Scotia inshore and offshore fishers, soon joined by Halifax fish-handlers. However, the Fishermen's Federation was led by schooner captains, and it therefore decided against seeking union recognition (Calhoun 1983, 6-7). In British Columbia, dominated by resource industries, the situation differed from that in central Canada, the heartland of manufacturing: in 1937 there were fewer strikes, not more, and between1937 and 1939 employers lost only one-third as much time as in the previous three years. Nevertheless, British Colombia unions grew significantly, from 9.6% density in 1936 to 12.9% in 1937. Provincial legislation that favored company unions coupled with violence

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[22]On this Act and other provincial industrial standards acts passed in the 1930s, see Fudge and Tucker (2001, 198-205) and Klee 2000.

[23]For details on Montréal industrial unions in the late 1930s, see Copp 1982 (843-855). David 1980 claims that the 1936-37 union organizing in Québec was proportionally as important as that in the US at the time (231); even if true, the qualitative differences overshadow any statistical parallel.

from company officials, strikebreakers and police led to the crushing defeat of the eleven-month strike in 1938 by Blubber Bay lime workers who belonged to the CIO's International Woodworkers of America (IWA) (Parnaby 1999, 23-43). Across Canada, high unemployment, on-the-job tyranny, hostile laws and armed men to enforce them remained potent weapons for capital. The revival of struggle in 1937 ran up against them all, as well as the division and fragmentation of wage-earners that limited working-class power.

To close this analysis of workplace class composition on the eve of world war, it is worth touching on the relationship of workers to their unions.[24] Most important, Canadian unions were often minimally bureaucratic organizations that depended on the active participation of members for their survival. Bureaucracy - "not so much a distinct *stratum of personnel* as a *relationship* which permeates the whole practice of trade unionism... in large measure a question of the differential distribution of expertise and activism: of the *dependence* of the mass of union membership on the initiative and strategic experience of a relatively small cadre of leadership - both 'official' and 'unofficial'" (Hyman 1989, 158) - was minimal in many unions.[25] Only better-off union locals employed business agents, and

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[24]The CCF and especially the CPC had some workplace-based groups, which are discussed in the final section of this chapter.

[25]Hyman's analysis should not be read as denying the significance of the existence of a stratum of full-time union officials with powerful conservative tendencies (1989, 150), but as locating them within the larger issue of the social relation he identifies. His is a stronger analysis than that offered by Mark Leir, who argues for the study of labour bureaucracy not in terms of leadership ideology but the power relation between leaders and members, only to end up writing that "Bureaucracy... is a fundamental belief in the inability of the masses to rule themselves" (1991, 412, 426). In the version of Leir's analysis included in his 1995, this inconsistency does not appear. My analysis of the labour officialdom,

their ability to do so was threatened when unemployment led to falling dues income.[26] The Canadian offices of AFL and CIO affiliates, the US head offices of these international unions, and national unions employed full-time office staff and organisers. In some cases, these officials had authority over decisions about taking strike action, issuing strike pay from central funds and negotiating collective agreements. The labour centrals had limited powers and maintained only a small number of full-time executives and staff. At all levels, full-time officials depended on the collection of dues from individual members, which in most cases was a major task of union stewards and sub-stewards. As a result, local and upper-echelon leaders would quickly feel the financial consequences when disaffected or fearful members were reluctant to pay.[27] Very few local unions had contracts which committed employers to a "check-off" that deducted dues from workers' pay packets and remitted it to the union. Only in Nova Scotia after the passage of the Trade Union Act in 1937 were employers required to check-off dues for recognized unions, providing that the employer in question already had a system in place for making deductions (Abbott 1989, 38-39).[28] The state was rather more willing to prosecute infringements of capital's rights, take action against

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presented in 5.1, gives a greater role to the place of officials within relations with employers and state power than Leir's, which focuses internally, on leaders' authority and control of information (1995, 33-41).

[26]For a craft union example, see McKay 1985 (88, 96).

[27]See Wells 1995 (201) on the case of the UAW.

[28]As Abbott notes (36), the province's Coal Mines Investigation Act was amended in 1927 to allow for voluntary (at a miner's request) dues check-off. This merely placed in law what Nova Scotian coal miners' unions had won in some places as early as the 1880s (27).

"subversives" and compel union officials to adhere to the rules of compulsory conciliation than to grant workers and their unions sweeping legal reforms similar to those won in the US.[29]

So as a distinct stratum within the working class, the Canadian union officialdom was relatively weak and insecure. It was also moderate: most industrial as well as craft union full-time officials were committed to "responsible" unionism and saw militancy as "a means of bringing recalcitrant employers to the table, not of challenging capitalist relations of production" (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 227).[30] However, such officials did not have extensive means at their disposal to control workers whom they were unable to lead by persuasion. For instance, where contracts were in place, they did not always prohibit strikes (Warrian 1986, 149), and even where they did so they did not prevent workers from taking other kinds of job action. This left militant industrial union activists who had built bases of rank and file support with a certain scope for independent action when opportunities arose. The economic and political power of capital and the failure to make major inroads in organizing the less-

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[29]However, weak versions of Wagner Act-model rights to union recognition and collective bargaining were established in Nova Scotia, Alberta and British Columbia in 1937-1938. Saskatchewan, Manitoba and New Brunswick governments made small concessions to union rights within the voluntarist framework advocated by the TLC (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 205-225).

[30]See the general comments of Heron 1989 (255-256) and Palmer 1992 (263-265). The ideological bases of the moderate workplace politics of officials varied, and included CCCL Catholic social doctrine as well as craft conservatism and the kind of industrial unionism envisaged by most top CIO leaders. Crawley 1997 provides a revealing look at the conflict between Sydney steel worker militants and SWOC's "responsible" national and international leaders in the late 1930s.

skilled were more pressing problems for most workplace activists than the officialdom of unions to which fewer than one in five wage-workers belonged.

It is evident from this analysis that the working-class movement of the late 1930s was marked by an important division between exclusivist white male craft unionists and those who sought organization on more inclusive industrial lines. This split existed within a class formation whose heterogeneous less-skilled majority, itself divided by racism, national and inter-ethnic frictions and male supremacy, almost entirely lacked union organization of any kind. With so many unemployed looking for work, the situation of the employed was precarious, strengthening capitalist control on the job. The threat of being easily fired and replaced, the absence of state assistance for those trying to unionize and negotiate collective agreements and the conservatism of TLC unionism were barriers that workers could not easily surmount. The relationship of forces in the paid workplace sphere was highlighted by the limits of the struggles of 1937, and by how quickly rising unemployment rolls quelled this outburst of resistance by workers to the conditions in which Canadian employers compelled them to work.

3.2 Wartime Workplaces

The outbreak of the Second World War led to major changes in the world of paid work. The state assumed a role without precedent in Canadian history as war effort pulled the economy out of the Depression. "In war production, the state acted as an executive committee" (Coleman and Nossal 1991, 53), although the state agencies that coordinated

both private and state-owned enterprises were run by corporate figures taken into government service, rather than by career civil servants.[31] In contrast to British and US wartime practice, union leaders were not invited into the state's economic administration, with the sole exceptions of the Wartime Transit Committees set up in some cities (63-64) and the tripartite National Labour Supply Council, formed in 1940 to help ensure that war industries were adequately supplied with skilled workers (Warrian 1986, 6-7).

The early War Supply Board, made up of a selection of business figures, was replaced in April 1940 by a new federal Department of Munitions and Supply (DMS). Its Minister, CD Howe, was empowered by legislation to "mobilize, control, restrict or regulate to such extent as the Minister may, in his absolute discretion, deem necessary, any branch of trade or industry in Canada" (qtd. Rea 1991, 166). Under Howe's leadership, DMS established "production branches" to oversee the manufacture of various war supplies, launched Crown corporations where there were no private enterprises ready to begin production, and appointed Controllers responsible for key sectors. In each case power was concentrated in the hands of a small number of business executives. Paid by their own firms, they were dubbed "dollar-a-year men"; both they and Howe retained the strongly anti-union stance of most pre-war Canadian capitalists (Coleman and Nossal 1991, 56-66; Bothwell 1981, 62-65).

In 1939, Canada had almost no facilities for manufacturing armaments or aircraft.

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[31]The Canadian state bureaucracy simply did not have personnel with the necessary expertise in economic management (Coleman and Nossal 1991, 48).

Industries upon which these depended, such as machine tools and chemicals, were scarcely more developed. However, there were major sources of raw materials, including wood, metal and minerals, and significant motor vehicle and steel producers (Coleman and Nossal 1991, 54-55). DMS supervised an economic transformation in which, between 1939 and 1945, $718 million of government money was invested in new state-owned war plants, many of which were privately-run. State funds also poured directly into private production, reaching 42% of total investment in 1943 (Phillips and Watson 1984, 26, 28). As capital accumulation raced from Depression lows to record levels, so too did the labour employed. The number of workers in manufacturing grew to 712 000 in 1940, jumped to 904 000 in 1941, and soared to 1 131 000 in 1942. By 1943, they numbered 1.25 million. The 1944 peak of 1.263 million was more than double the 1939 total. The service workforce also grew, though less dramatically, from 575 000 in 1939 to 700 000 in 1944. Between 1939 and 1945, the number of transportation, communication and storage workers went from 206 000 to 305 000. When one considers the number of wage-workers who enlisted in the armed forces, which expanded from a mere 9000 in 1939 to 779 000 five years later, the scale of war-driven change to the world of paid workers was enormous (Leacy 1983, D318-328). Another aspect of this was that many more people now worked in very large workplaces: in 1945, over 447 000 were employed in workplaces of 500 or more. This was over three times as many as in 1936 (R812-825).

The state's activity was not confined to running the military and supervising and in some cases directly organizing production. With the coming of war, the political

administration of civil society expanded and deepened. Here I will outline some aspects of political administration in the early war years that are most directly related to the sphere of paid workplaces, leaving others to later in this chapter and the one that follows. At the outbreak of war, the government proclaimed the Defence of Canada Regulations (DOCR). Before long, an amendment to DOCR banned the CPC and many CPC-run organizations. The Jehovah's Witnesses and various fascist groups were also banned. In a reversal of the usual legal standard, those accused of association with a banned organization were obliged to prove their innocence . Among the 133 Communists interned were Pat Sullivan, leader of the CSU, and CS Jackson of the United Electrical Workers (UE). DOCR repression did not fall solely upon Communists (Whitaker 1986). Some Italian-Canadian workers were deprived of their jobs after their nation of ancestry entered the war on the side of Germany (Storey 1981, 316). A UE local at RCA in Québec was destroyed when the German and Italian immigrants who made up the bulk of the workforce were told to quit the union or face internment (Guard 1994, 117). In December 1939, Ontario's Attorney-General had SWOC and CCF leader Charles Millard arrested after he made a speech in Timmins that criticized investors' opposition to the federal tax on war profits. The charge was dropped in March1940, but not all unionists who ran afoul of the DOCR were so lucky. In November 1940, the UAW's George Burt and sixty-nine UAW members were arrested for peaceful picketing across from the Chrysler plant in Windsor. Burt's conviction was upheld. Protests by the CCL soon led to an amendment that clarified the legality of peaceful pickets (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 231-232; Yates 1993, 34).

The DOCR was the most repressive addition to political administration, but other policies were much more sweeping in scope. Following a meeting between the executive of the TLC and Prime Minister King and his cabinet in October 1939, the federal government used its wartime powers to issue PC 3495. This order-in-council extended the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA)[32] to cover all industries engaged in war work. This move had been requested by the TLC leadership but was also supported by both the staunchly anti-union Canadian Manufacturers' Association (CMA) and Canadian CIO leaders, who hoped compulsory conciliation would reduce the Ontario government's hostility to them. By 1941, the IDIA covered 85% of Canadian industry (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 234), thereby placing most paid workers in a direct relationship with the newly centralized federal state apparatus. The impact of this change, unforeseen by its union supporters, will be discussed below. Also issued was PC 2516, which established the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, although this price controls agency was "relatively inactive" (Russell 1990, 187) in the early years of the war. In 1940, a general statement, the War-Time Labour Policy (PC 2685) was passed. It contained a series of principles designed to promote labour peace, including the right of workers to associate and bargain through unions or other representatives to reach collective

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[32]The IDIA of 1907 - which required workers and employers to provide thirty days' notice of changes in employment conditions and, when disputes arose, allowed either side to request the calling of a tripartite conciliation board, during whose sitting strikes were illegal - had been declared unconstitutional by the British Privy Council in 1925. Following this decision, the IDIA applied only in the federal jurisdiction and in those provinces which mandated its application. On the IDIA, see Fudge and Tucker 2001, esp. Chs. 2 and 4, Russell 1990 (105-168) and Craven 1980.

agreements, which were to be honored. However, PC 2685 was a toothless document: it was explicitly worded in such a way as to make its principles entirely voluntary, and thus carried no effective legal force (185-186; Fudge and Tucker 2001, 235). The impact on wage-workers of this combination of heightened repression, compulsory conciliation and a powerless declaration of principles soon became evident.

In addition to these measures, the Canadian state also devoted considerable resources to initiatives targeting wage-earners that were explicitly ideological in nature. Radio broadcasts and posters on the streets and in paid workplaces urged workers on the "home front" to toil for the "war front" and spend more of their wages on war savings certificates. The virtue of patriotic sacrifices in time of war was extolled. "Industrial workers were symbolically transformed into soldiers of production. To cease fire in either case meant capitulation to enemy forces, to both the foot-soldier across the hedgerow or the potential *agent provocateur* lurking by the drill-press" (McInnis 1996a, 47-48). However, the exhortations to work harder and longer were not always well received: there were reports of mass walk-outs from workplace lectures on raising productivity (49). Perhaps in response to such spontaneous acts of protest, beginning in 1942 a programme, co-presented by state agencies, the Workers' Educational Association (WEA), the TLC and the CCL, was launched to show films to workers in union halls and other such spaces. By 1945, each month some 50 000 people were attending these screenings (252-253). What effects such ideological campaigns actually had is, however, difficult to judge.

The economic transition to a war footing finally brought the Great Depression to an

end. This did not occur overnight, but as companies received more orders for war production, more civilian jobs became available. Many men enlisted in the military. As a result, the official figure of those unemployed and seeking work fell from 529 000 in mid-1939 to 423 000 one year later. All-out war production reduced this to 195 000 the following year, 135 000 in 1942, and an extremely low 76 000 in 1943 and 63 000 in 1944 (Leacy 1983, D124-133). Not only did unemployment fall, but a greater percentage of the working class was employed or looking for paid work: the 1941 census reported that 85.6% of men and 22.9% of women over 14 years of age were labour force participants, as compared to 78.4% and 19.4% in 1931 (D107-122). In 1941, women for the first time came to hold the barest majority of clerical jobs, up from 45.1% a decade earlier (Lowe 1987, 49). However, because special efforts to recruit women into paid work did not begin until 1942, when "the slack in the labour market had been taken up" (Pierson 1986, 23), the census does not capture the notable increase in women working for wages - more out of economic necessity than patriotic choice (Scheinberg 1994, 155; Christie 2000, 305-306) - that took place after the labour of men, including many who had moved from rural to urban areas, was fully mobilized. With the enactment of National Selective Service (NSS) in the spring of 1942, the state moved to actively recruit unmarried women to the paid workforce. Childless married women were the next reserve to be drawn on. Not until the labour shortage worsened in 1943 were married women with children called upon to take part-time work in services such as hospitals and laundries (Pierson 1986, 23-33). In 1944 the percentage of women in the paid labour force grew to a high of 33.5% (215), with considerable regional variation (Christie 2000, 305).

With the fall in unemployment and an ever-growing demand for labour, employers were forced to compete for some kinds of labour (McInnis 1996a, 56). Workers' bargaining power began to rise: the annual average industrial composite weekly wage (not adjusted for inflation) went from $23.44 in 1939 to $24.94 in 1940, thereafter rising steadily until in 1945 it stood at $32.04 (Leacy 1983, E86-103). Impressive though this may be, it must not be forgotten that hours were longer and this average conceals job classification, occupational, gender, racial and regional disparities, and that the official cost of living index (1935-1939 average = 100) rose from 101.5 to 120.4 between 1939 and 1945 (K1-7).[33]

These statistics shed little light on the conditions in paid workplaces. Unfortunately, there has been almost no research conducted on how labour processes changed during the war years. Longer hours definitely became the norm. Halifax shipyard machinists who in 1939 worked 40-44 hours per week were typically toiling 48 hours four years later. In 1943, aircraft workers put in standard weeks of 45-58 hours and workers in firearms factories between 44 and 60, depending on their region and job classification (Department of Labour 1940, 24; 1944, 54-59). In one unusual case, a group of workers placed an anonymous notice in Toronto newspapers on June 3, 1940 in which they complained about being forced to work seven eight-hour days without time off, fines for lateness, and other managerial policies at

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[33]In the First World War, this index shot from 80 to 118.1 between 1914 and 1918, and grew in the immediate post-war years to a staggering 150.4 by 1920. During the Second World War, the top officials of the Canadian state, remembering the Workers' Revolt, were determined to keep inflation down. Their key policy instruments were price and - especially - wage controls, which are discussed below. Russell 1990 (186-188) summarizes the Keynesian anti-inflationary theory that inspired them.

a factory identified only as "DND Plant No. 1" (Sobel and Meurer 1994, 85-86). Managers and supervisors increased the pace of production to meet their deadlines for orders.[34] Beginning in late1942, the state fostered Labour-Management Production Committees in manufacturing and other workplaces in an effort to boost productivity and reduce conflict and absenteeism. By the end of the war, representatives of some 300 000 workers sat on such bodies, which were supported by the TLC, CCL, CCCL and the separate railway unions as well as by employers (McInnis 1996b, 317-325).[35] Fragmentary evidence suggests that Ian McKay's comment that "the war economy had little respect for traditional definitions of the craft" (McKay 1985, 97) was true not only for the Halifax carpenters about whom he writes, but more broadly. According to Jay White, "wartime regulations enervated traditional work patterns in heavy industry by means of 'skill dilution;' complicated jobs were broken down into more simplified tasks, each with its own wage. The result was a segmented labour force divided by hierarchical pay scales" (White 1989, 148). Much of this workforce was newly assembled, almost from scratch. At the largest war plant, Toronto's John Inglis, 16 000 workers were hired over the course of the war. Half of them were women, making this the country's largest single employer of women. Yet, as was generally the case, drawing more women into wage-earning jobs hardly involved a step towards equality: women worked only in the plant's state-owned Ordnance Division, in consciously simplified, repetitious jobs paid

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[34]For example, see Brandt 1981 (124).

[35]Judging by the level and character of class struggle during the war, discussed later in this chapter, these committees failed to reduce workplace conflict.

at lower gender-specific pay rates (Sobel and Meurer 1994, 43, 53-55, 60-61, 77).

Despite the larger numbers of women working for wages, the gender division of labour in paid workplaces was often modified only slightly and racial divisions even less. For instance, in the textile mills of Cornwall, Ontario, men from rural communities, those ineligible for military service because they were too young, too old, or had a disability, and immigrant men were all drawn on before management considered hiring women into "men's jobs." This move was opposed by the male-dominated union, which defended job segregation by gender (Scheinberg 1994, 166-172). In auto plants, women were concentrated in sewing, wire and harness and a few other "women's" jobs. Here and in other lines of work, male unionists were often ready to fight for equal pay for equal work when employers hired women into "men's jobs" and paid the women less than the going male rate. However, when women were hired into gender-segregated classifications at lower pay rates and did not replace men, few women and almost no men objected (Sugiman 1994, 19-25, 42-51). Gendered inequalities in paid work were so taken for granted that "most women accepted unequal pay because they compared their rates only to those of other women" (50). The state's job training for women was designed to minimize the introduction of women into skilled work, thereby acting as a buffer against more significant changes to the gendered stratification of the working class (Pierson 1986, 71-76), which was also a racialized division. There were no wartime plans to implement anti-racist employment practices in Canada. Despite these real limitations, the great demand for their labour power allowed many women to avoid or leave undesirable jobs in domestic service. This opening was of

particular importance to African-Canadian women. Generally denied paid work except as servants before the war, some were able to get factory jobs for the first time (Brand 1994; Daenzer 1993, 20-21). Urban restaurants and retail stores, which relied on the labour of women, had to raise wages to retain workers (Sobel and Meurer 1994, 57).

In sum, while more people were working in paid workplaces during the war and the labour shortage greatly lessened the fear of being fired, hours were long and, for some, work reorganization and intensification were part of the daily grind under often-despotic managers. State authority intruded into the world of work in new ways. NSS regulations, which slotted employers into four categories according to their importance to the war economy, allowed only workers with a permit to look for work to be hired. Under NSS rules, seven days' notice was required before a worker could quit or be fired (MacDowell 1983, 17). Workers with certain skills could be funneled into priority jobs; others, such as teachers, were forbidden from leaving their jobs as long as the war was on (McInnis 1996a, 58). Still, once unemployment was low, workers often responded to unpleasant workplace conditions by changing jobs and skipping work. "'In some companies,' one corporate executive exclaimed, 'workers flow through the plants like water'" (57). It was in these conditions that the class struggle in paid workplaces was actually fought out, the subject to which I now turn.

Many of the relatively few open clashes between labour and capital that took place early in the war resembled those of the pre-war years. Not long after the declaration of war, the CSU-affiliated fish handlers and inshore fishers of Lockeport, Nova Scotia were locked out. They were defeated in a two-month fight quite similar to others in the previous decade:

the provincial government "red-baited" their leaders and declared their pickets illegal, and the RCMP intervened in force (Calhoun 1983). Coal miners in Nova Scotia, wary that mechanization would eliminate many jobs, frequently clashing with management over control issues on the job, and frustrated by their UMW grievance procedure and low wage increases, used their workplace power to wage many short wildcats in 1939 and 1940. The company, government ministers, UMW officials and CCF leaders all deplored these "petty strikes," to little avail (Abbott 1989, 39-40; Earle 1989, 116-125). Due in large part to the militant miners, many of whom were socialists or Communists, rather than the UMW leaders, who were pioneers of bureaucratic industrial unionism, Nova Scotia accounted for 42% of strikes and 51.3% of striking workers in Canada in 1940 (116). Also militant were the sailors of the CSU, who in April 1940 struck from the Great Lakes to the St. Lawrence for six days. In the aftermath of the strike, the CSU signed improved contracts covering most of the Great Lakes workforce (Green 1986, 75-82). In Montréal, the ILGWU struck and won a 10% wage increase along with a union shop agreement and 44-hour week (Copp 1982, 856-857; Jamieson 1968, 283). Such achievements were, however, few and far between.

More typical of struggles in the first year of the war was the strike by textile workers in Drummondville, Québec. The issues were speed-up and the recognition of a CCCL affiliate, but the settlement reached through conciliation after a strike that saw workers arrested and damage to company property only obliged the employer to meet with a committee of employees (283). By one estimate, only 16% of strikes in 1940 resulted in victories for workers, a low not seen since 1924 (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987, 97). A few

employer conceded recognition and negotiated agreements without strikes - this was the case in the Montréal aircraft industry, where the TLC-affiliated International Association of Machinists, which had become an industrial union led by conservative craft unionists, negotiated contracts containing high wages but no union security provisions (Copp 1982, 857-858) - but these were exceptional cases.

The DOCR held the threat of more than routine state harassment over the small number of workers who dared to take action openly. When the previously-mentioned seventy UAW members and staffers were arrested on two days outside Windsor's Chrysler plant, they were picketing because Chrysler had responded to an organizing drive with a lockout (Yates 1993, 34). Despite the fall in unemployment, union membership grew almost not at all. This can be explained by state repression, along with the ban on strikes during now-compulsory conciliation, the ideological atmosphere of patriotic social harmony for the war effort, and the fact that few workers immediately had the confidence to take advantage of the new opportunities for collective action provided by low unemployment. However, by the end of 1940 most of the unions that oriented to the swelling numbers of less-skilled workers in manufacturing, service and other sectors had come together, as the ACCL and Canadian CIO affiliates merged to form the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL). The first executive of the new labour central was composed entirely of CCF partisans or sympathizers, moderates with "a common faith in the importance of 'respectability' to achieve a lasting place for organized labour" (McInnis 1996a, 290). All were drawn from the three largest

industrial unions, the CBRE, UMW and ACW, with the exception of Millard[36] (Abella 1973, 41-53). Whether the formation of the CCL would in fact help improve the fortunes of industrial unionism remained unclear. The enhanced powers of the DOCR had strengthened the political administration of civil society and, together with the wartime ideology of social uniformity, enhanced capitalist control in the paid workplace sphere. However, it would not be long before more wage-earners began to take collective action and came into conflict with employers and state power.

3.3 The Strike Wave of 1941-1943

With unemployment shrinking and capital's need for labour for war production showing no sign of lessening in the wake of the fall of France to German military might in the summer of 1940, workers found themselves with greater bargaining power than they had enjoyed for many years. The 1940 rise in the annual average industrial composite weekly wage of $1.50 above the 1939 level was significant. Behind the composite lay a different reality though: increases in the annual average weekly wage of $2.44 for those employed in manufacturing durable goods and $3.88 for construction workers, two categories vital to the war economy, while service workers' wages rose by a mere $0.41 (Leacy 1983, E86-103). Although some of the increase no doubt came from working longer hours, pay rates were

[36]Millard, close to the CCF leadership, was ousted from his position as Canadian regional director of the UAW in 1939 by supporters of the Communist-influenced Unity caucus and replaced by Burt (Yates 1993, 29). He was subsequently appointed CIO regional director and, in mid-1940, placed in charge SWOC in Canada (Abella 1973, 55-57).

creeping up from their Depression-era lows. Unions attempted to use the conciliation boards mandated by the IDIA to push for raises. Boards' recommendations varied considerably. The result was increasingly uneven wages within industries and growing wage bills for employers (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 235-236).

Some state officials wanted to respond with a ban on strikes accompanied by compulsory binding arbitration of wage settlements. Fear that such draconian action would spark a working-class revolt similar to that seen at the close of the First World War led in December 1940 to a watered-down addition to political administration in the form of the wage controls of PC 7440. This order in council directed conciliation boards to consider 1926-1929 wage rates or any subsequent higher rate as the standard in determining the fairness of wage claims. There were few exceptions, although boards could authorize (not order) a cost of living bonus, and workers were still permitted to strike after boards had reported. Very soon after PC 7440 was issued, conflict began over whether wages ought to be compared on a pan-Canadian basis or only locally. Unions favoured the former method of comparison, in the hope that this would create industry-wide wage standards; the government insisted on the latter, in the name of preventing inflation. In 1941, it resolved this disagreement by imposing the use of the local comparison on conciliation boards (236-237; Russell 1990, 188; Copp 1982, 859). Not content with this, in the summer of 1941 the government added two further measures to the political administration of labour. One served to prevent leading union lawyers from sitting on conciliation boards. The second, PC 4020, set up another administrative body, the Industrial Disputes Inquiry Commission (IDIC). The

federal Minister of Labour was given the authority to require that an IDIC investigation take place before an IDIA-mandated conciliation board could be appointed. This would further postpone workers' freedom to take legal strike action (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 246-247). Such inquiries were called "very frequently indeed" (Webber 1985, 66).

With the annual income at which federal income tax had to be paid lowered in 1939 from $1000 for single persons and $2000 for families to $660 and $1200, and those paying income tax now subject to the new National Defence Tax[37] (NDT) (Russell 1984, 60), workers' resentment grew against state policies that held down their wages and constrained their ability to organize and strike while leaving employers free to act as they desired (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 237). Many of the worst features of work life remained unchanged from the pre-war years, since PC 2685 had not converted employers to a new philosophy of labour relations. Long wartime hours meant that workers had even less respite from the bossing of supervisors that was a hallmark of capitalist rule on the job.

What made these conditions even more galling in the minds of many workers was that they contradicted the anti-fascist and democratic justification of the Allied war effort proclaimed on posters, over the airwaves, in the newspapers, and at the movies. As one female UAW striker at McKinnon Industries wrote to the *St. Catharines Standard* in 1941:

> As far as I know I certainly wasn't forced or coerced into joining the union. I joined because it stands for democracy, which is what we are trying to fight for. There are plenty of millionaires being made out of this

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[37]A flat tax levied on the basis of total income, not income above the exemption level.

> war and they sure do not care who gives their lives as long as they rake in the money. We don't want Hitler here, but we are being run by a few "would-be" Hitlers. The working man of McKinnons should be able to live not merely exist and have the right to save a dollar and send their children to college the same as G.M.'s executives do. The workers are the ones that count and should not be treated as ignorant dogs (qtd. Sugiman 1994, 34).

In 1943, CCF MP Angus MacInnis argued in the same vein during hearings of the National War Labour Board:

> Employers urge vociferously and energetically the necessity of destroying totalitarianism before it destroys us, and at the same time they refuse to grant their employees the elementary right to a voice in determining the terms under which they will work. In other words, certain Canadian employers insist on maintaining, in that field of social relationships over which they have control, the totalitarian system which Hitler first imposed on the people of Germany and is now trying to impose on the peoples of the world (qtd. McCrorie 1995, 26).

In a capitalist democracy at war with fascist regimes, it made sense for the state to rally the working class to accept wartime sacrifices by emphasizing the war's democratic motivations and aims. However, in a move that illustrates VN Voloshinov's proposition that ideological signs are multiaccentual,[38] workers frequently accepted the state's claim that the war was a democratic fight against fascism requiring the acceptance of temporary sacrifices while simultaneously interpreting its ideology of democracy in ways that legitimized their

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[38]Voloshinov writes that "different classes will use one and the same language. As a result, differently oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign. Sign becomes an arena of class struggle" (1973, 23). This idea is discussed in McNally 2001 (112-118).

grievances against aspects of capitalist domination. Hence references to Hitler became a potent way for wage-workers to condemn the treatment they had long experienced at the hands of supervisors and managers.

Caught between increasingly frustrated workers, employers committed to retaining unrestrained control of their workplaces and a growing list of state regulations, union officials found themselves in an uncomfortable position. In order for unions to be considered responsible and therefore entitled to act as collective bargaining agents and have access to the corridors of power for discussions with state officials, top union officials needed to be able to control their members and prevent disruption of the war economy. Yet the more they cooperated with the state and corporate management, the more credibility they lost among the rank and file; without membership credibility, the ability of officials to lead and restrain workers was reduced. To maintain the support of the members, win gains for them, and apply pressure to employers and the state, they had to be prepared to issue demands and lead strikes. While CCL unions would strike more often than those of the TLC, this was primarily a reflection of the anti-union stance of employers in the industries where the industrial unions had set out to organize the less-skilled (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 245). To note this is not to deny the political differences between the TLC's leadership, an alliance of Liberals and some Communists that generally supported the federal Liberal government of Mackenzie King, and the CCL's, which was CCF-aligned with a Communist minority. Rather, it is to suggest that when leaders of CCL unions supported workplace militancy their goal was to achieve union recognition for the purposes of collective bargaining, not to challenge

capitalist rule in the workplace. The fact that not all local leaders and rank and file activists fully accepted this ideology of "responsible" industrial unionism was a problem for top CCL officials.

Several strikes in 1941 demonstrated the obstacles to workers' efforts to improve their workplaces in wartime conditions. Two involved locals of SWOC. At Peck Rolling Mills in Montréal, SWOC had been granted recognition at the recommendation of a conciliation board. Peck workers worked weeks of 50-80 hours, and the basic hourly wage was $0.307. Union and management agreed on a five day, 54-hour week with overtime paid at time and a half. But since Peck's wages were higher than the 1926-1929 average and similar to those paid elsewhere in the Montréal area, they were upheld by the majority of the conciliation board. The board's employee appointee urged the use of a national comparison, and therefore an increase of the base hourly wage to $0.40. In the first major fight over wage controls, Peck workers struck in support of this increase from April 23 to June 11. The strike ended when the government offered to reconvene the board. The board did not meet all summer and the SWOC local fell apart, though it would later be revived (Copp 1982, 859-860; MacDowell 1978, 183-184).

At National Steel Car in Hamilton, the central issue was union recognition; several SWOC supporters had been fired by the employer. A conciliation board called for a government-run vote, union recognition and bargaining in the event that workers voted for SWOC, and the reinstatement of the fired workers. When the company refused the recommendation of reinstatement, workers struck. A state controller was appointed to run

the plant. His reinstatement of the fired unionists and organization of a vote on representation brought the strike to an end. SWOC clearly won the vote, but the controller, following government instructions, refused to recognize the union. Instead, he offered to meet with a committee of employees to discuss wages and hours - a resolution to union recognition efforts that flouted PC 2685 but was favored by the federal cabinet. SWOC called another strike, leading to the appointment of CD Howe's hated director of labour relations, HB Chase, as controller. His solution was to negotiate agreements with both SWOC and the employee association set up by his predecessor (181-182; Fudge and Tucker 2001, 240-242). The Peck and Steel Car strikes sent a clear signal to workers trying to organize unions in mass production: PC 2685 was toothless, and the government's labour policy was, in practice, a barrier to wage increases and union recognition.

A third strike, in the Québec town of Arvida, showed the lengths to which the government was prepared to go to act against strikers in war industries. The Aluminum Company of Canada's (Alcan) large factory in Arvida was an important war plant. Its employees were members of a CCCL affiliate, and the union had prepared a meeting for July 24 to call for a conciliation board. However, earlier that day the workers stopped work and hundreds occupied the factory. Several thousand construction workers hired to work on plant expansion struck in solidarity. The federal conciliator who was summoned, a unilingual anglophone, misinterpreted the fact that the union had not initiated the strike as evidence that "outside agitators" were to blame. On this basis, CD Howe publicly declared that what was happening in Arvida was a case of suspected sabotage in the most important war industry,

and the worst disruption of war production to date. Provincial police and two companies of troops moved in, and the plant occupation was soon ended. Still, the workers only agreed to return to work after the CCCL Secretary General, Gérard Picard, appeared and made a personal appeal. The strike had lasted only five days, but had been widely, if inaccurately, reported (Dumas 1975, 70-74). As a result, Howe won new powers to deal with such cases: on the day the strike ended, PC 5830 authorized the Minister of National Defence, at the request of DMS, to order the military to intervene in labour disputes without the usual prior request from municipal or provincial civilian officials (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 251-252).

Another high profile conflict of 1941 was the slowdown strike by Cape Breton miners. In April, miners struck for four days against the decision of their UMW district executive to accept a conciliated contract without a membership vote on the deal. By the time the investigators sent by the UMW International leaders in the US to scrutinize the tumultuous District 26 had arrived, the miners had begun a slowdown. All efforts by top UMW, CCL and CCF leaders as well as the government to cajole them to cease curtailing production failed. When District 26 official and CCL leader Silby Barrett charged thirteen unionists for violating the UMW constitution, the committee leading the job action organized a one-day strike that saw the mines in Glace Bay and New Waterford closed and 5000 workers marching behind banners that read "We are Fighting for Democracy" and "Down with Hitler and Silby Barrett." Unwilling to force a lockout that would halt mining altogether, management endured this job action until the end of the summer. At that point, DOSCO began to victimize individual workers, laying them off until they promised full

production. This finally brought the slowdown, which had cut production by at least a third from May until September, to an end (Earle 1989, 128-139).

These four struggles highlight issues that emerged as important concerns of wage-workers who were putting in long hours for the "war against fascism" in workplaces that most often bore no trace of democracy. State power and employer intransigence meant that union recognition was not much easier to attain than it had been before 1939. PC 7440 stood in the way of negotiating the wage increases to which many workers believed themselves entitled. Mandatory conciliation boards often made reports that did not favor workers' demands, even if this meant flaunting the federal government's avowed labour relations policy, PC 2685. When board majority reports were pro-union, the government was free to ignore their recommendations. Worse still, the government could use its wartime powers and directly appoint managers to do its bidding, or even send in troops to break strikes. Some union leaders moved timidly or not at all to fight for workers' needs against arrogant employers and state officials whose neutrality was generally merely nominal. For many paid workers, it was increasingly unacceptable to be loaded with such burdens at a time when mass unemployment was no longer a threat and the low degree of competition in the labour market meant that they had more workplace power to press for gains than they had possessed for at least two decades.

Faced with a growing number of work stoppages, by the end of 1941 the federal government had added further weapons to the arsenal of political administration. PC 7307 imposed the requirement that a majority of those affected - as determined by the Minister of

Labour - not just a majority of those casting ballots, had to vote to authorize a legal strike (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 252). PC 8253 tightened wage controls and removed wages from the sphere of responsibility of conciliation boards. Now wage increases could only be granted by orders of the new tripartite regional or national War Labour Boards, and only "where existing rates could be shown to be unfavourable compared with rates in similar occupations in the same or comparable locations" (Russell 1990, 188-189). Cost of living bonus payments were the only other means for increasing wages. These could be denied if boards decided wages were already high (189), and "the methods of payment were complex and resulted in enormous confusion and frustration" (Copp 1982, 863). In a third move, any action which interfered with war production, or counselling such an action, became an indictable offence under the DOCR, a move which Russell attributes to the Arvida and Cape Breton strikes (Russell 1990, 185).

Yet in spite of capital's attempt to quell unrest by expanding and tightening political administration, 1941 saw the beginning of a wave of workplace struggle that would continue through 1943. During the year, 267 strikes involving about 88 000 workers began (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987, 136). Union membership shot up by 100 000 over 1940, to 462 000. In absolute terms, more workers - and, notably, more of the historically non-unionized less-skilled majority of the working class - belonged to unions than ever before in Canadian history, even if union membership was only 18% of the growing non-agricultural paid workforce (Leacy 1983, E175-177). It was this increasing organization of wage-workers and their propensity to stop work to back up their demands, sometimes in defiance

of the law, that prompted PC 7307 and 8253 and the amendment of the DOCR. Much to the dismay of the ruling class, the web of law and administrative that was supposed to keep workers working and stem the unionization of workers in war industries failed to accomplish these goals: in 1942, there were no fewer than 409 strikes, a number previously topped only in 1919 and 1920. More workers withdrew their labour than in any year except that of the Winnipeg General Strike, with over 116 000 stopping work (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987, 136). The number of workers in unions continued to rise, to 578 000, with union recruitment outpacing the rate of employment growth so that union density climbed to 20.6% (Leacy 1983, E175-177). Fully 200 000 of these unionized workers belonged to affiliates of the young CCL, which trailed the TLC's membership by only about 30 000 (E178-189).

Many of these strikes were unlike those of the Depression and 1920s: "quick, mass walkouts which under the pressure of war conditions often led to short, sharp workers' victories" (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987, 118) is the characterization offered by two historians. The strike wave was concentrated in manufacturing - in particular, metals and shipbuilding - and mining, which together amounted for 79% of strikes and 85% of those involved (102).[39] Although the lack of research on the topic makes it difficult to assess the role of women in wartime strikes, the concentration of women in sectors of the paid workforce other than those which provided most of the wave's volume is not insignificant.

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[39]In comparison, these two sectors accounted for 53% of strikes and 61% of strikers in the 1917-1920 strike wave, and 63% and 88% of the 1937 revival of workplace struggle (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987, 102).

With 116 000 strikers but only 454 000 person days of work struck in 1942 - slightly less than four days per worker on average - the contrast with strikes of the 1930s, when the average was often at least twice as long (136), is remarkable. In addition, it is likely that confident workers also conducted very short stoppages over immediate job issues involving only the members of a workgroup or department which, consequently, were not counted in the official statistics. Sabotage was not unknown either.[40] In those cases where workers were unable to win quick settlements, their chances of defeat rose considerably. Employers who were unwilling to yield could often outlast even determined unions; this explains many of the 39% of strikes in 1942 that capital won (97).[41] Geographically, Ontario led in the number of strikes, with 31%. The Eastern provinces accounted for 24%, and Québec 28%. Strikers were distributed at 22%, 31% and 31% respectively. The declining role of Western Canadian workers in the wartime strike wave relative to their prominence in the Workers' Revolt two decades earlier is noteworthy, and parallels the growth in importance for Canadian capital of manufacturing employment located in Ontario and Québec.

There were some important union breakthroughs, such as the UAW's wresting recognition from Ford at its Windsor operations in late 1941, following the unionization of

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[40]On brief strikes and sabotage at Ford Windsor, see Wells 1995 (200). Significantly, Wells concludes that these methods of struggle allowed workers to win "unprecedented control in areas such as supervisory practices and workloads" (200) - key issues for less-skilled workers in an anti-union manufacturing industry.

[41]Clear workers' victories are estimated at 27% in 1942, with 23% of strikes ending in compromise and 11% indefinite. As the strike wave gathered force, the 1943 balance continued to shift in favour of workers, with 34% victorious, 20% compromise, 40% employers' favour and 6% indefinite (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987, 97).

Ford in the US (Moulton 1974, 131-132). In the context of widespread union organizing and action on the job, there were also signs of self-activity in some sections of the working class in which collective action had historically been extremely rare - a sign that working-class recomposition of considerable breadth and depth was underway. For instance, in the fall of 1941, seasonal cannery workers at the Imperial plant on the Fraser River in British Columbia won $0.10 raises to both women's and men's hourly rates with a brief strike, then joined the Fish Cannery, Reduction Plant and Allied Workers' Union. This "strike first, unionize second" pattern, associated with workers with little or no previous trade union experience, was repeated by other groups in this workforce divided along racial and gender lines and between year-round and seasonal workers (Muszyinski 1996, 189-190). The CCL's Office and Professional Workers' Organizing Committee recruited 840 bank workers in Toronto, Montréal and Ottawa in 1941 and1942 (Lowe 1981, 867). However, after a three-week strike by workers at the Canadian National Bank in Montréal failed to force the employer to sit down with the union, the banking drive disintegrated (Sufrin 1982, 38-39). On the Canadian Pacific Railroad, African-Canadian porters, whose efforts to organize themselves in the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters had begun in 1939, made their first request for recognition (Grizzle 1998, 21-22). Canadian National Railways' porters, already members of the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Transport and General Workers (CBRTGW), challenged their white-dominated union's failure to fight for their interests (Calliste 1988, 39-41). As these examples suggest, it was not only workers in war manufacturing who were organizing themselves and taking action.

However, employer opposition to unions remained strong. In the midst of a war against Nazi Germany, it was still possible for the Davis Leather Company of Newmarket, Ontario to circulate a leaflet that asked its workers to sign below a statement that read, in part "I feel it will be better for me to depend on the Davis Management's word that they will meet the Relationship Committee [company union - DC]'s requests in a fair manner both as to working conditions and wages than to trust in the fairy promises that are being made by some unknown Jew from Toronto" (qtd. in Warrian 1986, 22). The federal government was unrelenting in its wage control policy, in mid-1942 adding PC 5963, which built on PC 8253 by prohibiting unions from bargaining with employers over "any work rules, regulations, or conditions which had the effect of indirectly increasing wage rates" (MacDowell 1982, 66). In addition, state power continued to render effective assistance to companies that refused to recognize unions.

This was most notoriously evident in the struggle of gold miners at Kirkland Lake, Ontario. An IDIC report had recommended the establishment of employee committees at each of the various mines as an alternative to recognition of Local 240 of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (CIO/CCL). In an unheard-of move, the employers walked out of the conciliation board, which then unanimously recommended union recognition. This the employers refused. The union then called a strike vote, the first to be conducted under the rules laid down by PC 7307. Amidst considerable administrative confusion and anti-union conduct by state officials, a strike was authorized by 63% of those eligible to vote. The strike began on November 18, 1941 and lasted through the bitterly cold

Northern Ontario winter. Financial support and political solidarity came in from Mine Mill and CCL leaders, locals of both CCL and TLC unions, numerous support committees, the CCF, the CPC and United Church figures. The mine owners were aided by the provincial police, who marched through the town every morning and were active in protecting scabbing miners and imported strikebreakers. Determined to hold the line against the spread of CCL industrial unionism, the federal government declined to intervene in support of the union, despite a flurry of requests to do so. Finally, on February 11, 1942 Mine Mill 240 returned to work. Although the miners had been defeated, the Kirkland Lake strike focused the attention of many workers on the anti-union stance of the federal government and convinced them that defeats such as this should not be allowed to occur again. Since the mine owners refused to rehire many active union members, the strike also led to the circulation of Kirkland Lake veterans around the labour movement as staffers and other activists (MacDowell 1983). A high-profile defeat, Kirkland Lake nevertheless furthered working-class recomposition by uniting a considerable body of workers against state policy in time of war and by developing awareness of the need for solidarity action in support of workers who were forced to confront recalcitrant employers and could expect no assistance from the authorities.

The year 1943 saw the strike wave rise to even greater heights. The obvious inability of all the orders in council and DOCR to maintain labour peace was demonstrated as the number of strikers almost doubled from its 1942 level to over 220 000 - the most ever recorded - with at least 435 strikes amounting to 1.042 million person days (Cruikshank and

Kealey 1987, 136). The ranks of organized labour reached 665 000, about one-third of whom were on strike at some point during the year. Membership in the CCL almost matched that of the TLC. In response, the craft-led federation tried to compete with the fast-growing CCL unions by recruiting less-skilled workers into federal locals not confined to a single craft and directly chartered to the TLC itself (Smith 1985, 100). Union density increased to 22.7% (Leacy 1983, E175-177, E178-189), with workers in a host of traditionally non-unionized occupations - female telephone operators in BC (Bernard 1982, 90) and Simpson's workers (Sufrin 1982, 34-35), for example[42] - signing union cards. On the Pacific Coast, the Native Brotherhood, an aboriginal league with some union features, started to sign contracts covering aboriginal cannery workers (Muszynski 1996, 193-194).

The year began with an illegal strike of over 13 000 steel workers in Nova Scotia and Sault St. Marie in response to the unfavorable majority report of the Royal Commission that had been established to look into the wage dispute in this key war industry. Though the strike was ended with an agreement that did not include a national wage rate but set $0.55 as the minimum hourly pay (the union's demand had been a ten cent raise to lift the base rate across the entire industry to $0.55, with the cost of living bonus on top of that), the Sault St. Marie local initially voted to reject the deal (MacDowell 1982, 70-85). Howe and the other anti-union hawks in the federal cabinet who had wanted to use force against the strike had

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[42]The former were successful in their attempt to unionize, but at Simpson's two TLC unions, the Retail Clerks and the Building Service Employees failed - a sign, perhaps, of the weakness of craft unionism in a multi-occupational workplace.

lost out to King's strategy of compromise. The strike and its settlement had major repercussions. As Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker argue, "The steel strike marked a profound change in direction in state intervention; it established a pattern in which the use of coercion abated and its threat diminished as a means for resolving disputes. Instead, the government accepted the need for compulsory collective bargaining and tolerated ad hoc incursions against its wage control policy" (2001, 266). Federal rules for compulsory collective bargaining would take a year to arrive, but in the interim CCL leaders were concerned to maintain a moderate stance so as not to hurt their chances (MacDowell 1982, 85).

However, 1943 was marked by the willingness of many workers chaffing against their employers and state policy to strike. A number of strikes were notable for their size. Over 20 000 Montréal aircraft workers struck to make their cost of living bonuses retroactive in what may have been the largest single strike of any year since 1919. Nearly 7000 aircraft workers in Vancouver were locked out over their demand for ten minute breaks on each shift. A similar number of Québec shipyard workers also walked off the job. In Windsor, 15 000 auto workers struck for three days in April against speedup and several suspensions (Jamieson 1968, 287, 285). In a major act of class solidarity, some 20 000 Nova Scotia workers took part in a one-day December stoppage to protest the closing of the rolling mill at the Trenton steel plant (White 1989, 161).

The strike wave also saw struggles spread to municipal public services. In Montréal, a dispute over profit-sharing and an effort by the CCL's CBRTGW to organize public transit workers, some of whom belonged to a TLC union and others to a CCCL affiliate, led to a

strike that won recognition for the CBRTGW. A subsequent ruling in favour of the claim for full payment of profit-sharing bonuses consolidated the new union's place (Dumas 1975, 78-96). CCL-organized municipal manual workers in the city struck twice, first against victimizations and then in support of recognition strikes by police and firefighters. White collar city workers in a CCCL union struck at the end of the year and received full pay for the days on strike, though not recognition (109-127).

The Ontario government's labour minister had promised provincial compulsory collective bargaining legislation to surprised delegates at the 1942 CCL convention (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 261), but it did not deliver until April 1943 when it established a Labour Court empowered to grant certification, determine bargaining units and enforce other aspects of the new Ontario Collective Bargaining Act (MacDowell 1978, 190-192). The British Columbia government created administrative mechanisms for the same rights, with little in the way of enforcement provisions (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 271). Despite their moves towards similar reforms, federal politicians and officials had not abandoned their efforts to stamp out labour unrest. Scores of wildcats swept across Canada's coalfields over the course of the year. Nearly 10 000 Alberta and British Columbia coal miners in UMW District 18 struck in November over pay and two weeks paid vacation, with a Royal Commission delivering a settlement that compromised on wages but included the holiday demand. Unable to control miners' militancy by any other means, the government's response was PC 8021, which banned strikes in coal mining for the duration of the war. In December, only a few weeks after it was passed, PC 8021 was superceded by PC 9384. This stiffened

penalties for illegal strikes and tightened up wage controls still further by rolling cost of living bonuses into base rates and decreeing that no more bonuses were to be awarded. The new base rates could only be adjusted by one of the War Labour Boards in cases of exceptional inequality or injustice (Jamieson 1968, 290; Russell 1990, 190; Copp 1982, 864). By removing the loophole of bonuses, PC 9384 made it nearly impossible for workers, or employers seeking to retain employees, to boost wage rates in spite of the very low level of unemployment and high demand.

As the fourth full year of the war drew to a close, the state regulation of the sale of labour power achieved through strike prevention measures, wage controls and the restrictions of NSS had become even more pronounced. A working class whose bargaining power in paid workplaces and readiness to strike continued to grow had forced the state to make a string of additions to political administration which tightened the regulation of labour power. While these slowed wage growth, job-switching and unionization, they, combined with employer practices seen as "Hitlerite," were in fact generating more conflict. Workers seeking higher wages, better conditions and union recognition now found themselves routinely pitted not only against corporate employers but state power too. This was turning workers against the Liberal government in Ottawa and those who implemented its labour policies. Some workers were engaging in illegal strikes, defying the law and sometimes their own union officials. The expanded authority of federal state officials in wartime had enhanced the powers of political administration organized at the federal level. This had initially been relatively successful in keeping labour unrest to a minimum. Yet the

centralization and extension of state power was ultimately contradictory, for when struggles did break out on a very large scale, in defiance of laws and regulations, wage-workers in different industries and regions were to some degree unified in opposition to a common adversary.

This is a concrete illustration of what Thompson conceives when he writes about how "people find themselves in a society structured in determinate ways..., experience exploitation..., identify points of antagonistic interest,... commence to struggle around these issues and in the process of struggling they discover themselves" in class terms (Thompson 1978a, 149). To note the growing numbers of strikers and of workers signing union cards is important, but misses the full theoretical significance of what was underway: through struggles in the altered class situation of wartime paid workplaces, the structure of the working-class formation put in place by the defeats of the early 1920s was changing. Aspects of class relations were being remade by the growing unity and power of wage-workers faced with intransigent employers and state officials. New levels of confidence, determination, solidarity and combativity, evident in workers' self-activity, were affecting relations among wage-workers, between unionists and their official leaders, and between labour and capital. Greater class power eventually forced concessions from the state that in 1939 had seemed beyond the ability of labour to achieve.

Class recomposition in the workplace, displayed unmistakably in the strikes of 1943, left top politicians and civil servants with few choices. The wave of workplace struggles and

political radicalization reflected in growing support for the CCF[43] demonstrated that the approach taken since 1939 would no longer do. Stricter legal and administrative controls and more severe military and police repression, the alternative recommended by Howe and other government hard-liners, risked escalating confrontation between state power and the working class. This might boost worker militancy and radicalism and weaken "responsible" union leaders. As Fudge and Tucker observe, "King was forced to face the fact that compulsory collective bargaining legislation was necessary to obtain working people's continued support for established political traditions and economic relations in the post-war period" (2001, 262). Thus it was struggles that were changing the working-class formation in Canada that forced the state to grant reforms sought by the labour movement. However, when these were at last conceded they were designed to reinforce capitalist rule over paid workers who had become more conscious of their power at the workplace and beyond.

3.4 Wage-Workers and the Arrival of Industrial Pluralism

In February 1944, after months of consultations, King announced the government's solution: the Wartime Labour Relations Regulation, PC 1003. This made collective bargaining, conciliation and grievance arbitration compulsory where unions were certified. A union that could prove it had majority support in a state-determined bargaining unit could apply to the appropriate tripartite national or regional war labour relations board for

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[43]The party-political dimension of class recomposition beyond paid workplaces is discussed in the following chapter.

certification. If successful, it became the exclusive bargaining agent with which the employer was required to negotiate in good faith to reach a collective agreement.[44] It also became legally accountable for offences it committed. Conciliation by state officials and then a tripartite board was required. Only after a strike vote and after two weeks had elapsed since the board issued its report could a legal strike begin. Workers could strike for a contract, but not over union recognition or jurisdiction. Strikes and other forms of direct action were also prohibited during the life of a contract; all disputes were to be resolved by agreed-upon binding procedures. Both unions and employee associations formally independent from employers could be certified. Unfair labour practices on the part of workers as well as employers were specified. For the duration of the federal government's special wartime authority, PC 1003 applied to workers in federal jurisdiction, war industries and those provinces that opted in to its provisions (Russell 1990, 210-214; Fudge and Tucker 2001, 273).

Most unionists were initially pleased with PC 1003. Least critical was the TLC executive, whose conversion to support for legislation empowering state agencies to grant

[44]Technically, PC 1003 recognized individual employee representatives, not unions, as bargaining agents. For this reason, Warrian argues that it did not recognize unions and its chief significance was that it forced employers to engage in collective bargaining. It did not make refusal to recognize a union an unfair labour practice. Hence, it "was more of a continuation of past policy than breaking new ground" (1986, 37). However, this evaluation does not capture PC 1003's actual effects: "Although the Regulations provided that bargaining representatives and not trade unions were to be certified, trade unions were recognized as competent to enter into collective agreements" (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 275).

union certification was relatively recent.[45] The CCCL leadership, influenced by Roman Catholic social doctrine, had agreed with the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the arch anti-union CMA that the Regulation had to make unions legally responsible. CCL officials were supportive but had reservations. JL Cohen, the prominent left-wing labour lawyer retained by the CCL and many of its affiliates, noted that PC 1003 did little to compel employers to abide by their new obligations, permitted company unions, placed the burden of legal responsibility on unions, and did not resolve the question of union security.[46] As unions experienced the effects of PC 1003, others came to similar conclusions (275-279). Only scattered radicals, among them One Big Union (OBU) veteran RB Russell, were worried about the consequences for labour of the close relationship with state power entailed by PC 1003.[47] However, the new hard-won rights and concern that they might be placed in jeopardy by actions that transgressed the bounds of industrial legality led many union officials - and probably many unionized workers - to moderate their actions. So too did anticipation of a federal election and the end of the war (276).

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[45]The AFL believed that the Wagner Act favored industrial over craft unions, and so before the war the TLC had called for legislation that protected the right to organize and bargain, without creating an administrative authority to certify unions or compel collective bargaining. This policy only changed after the Kirkland Lake defeat (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 195-196, 257, 264).

[46]As Fudge and Tucker note, union security - essentially how the payment of dues to unions is organized - involves two issues: a stable income for the union and the control of members by union officials (2001, 280).

[47]In the autumn of 1944, Russell worried "that what stands before us beyond the Labor Code is a servile state... In our efforts to break down fascism we, ourselves, have had to build up a dangerous state apparatus. It has control of the labor organizations" (qtd. Campbell 1999, 217).

A number of unions, including the Canadian District of the UAW, decided the time had come to make no-strike pledges to show that their patriotic commitment to the war effort was of a piece with their agenda of moderate social reform. The July-August 1944 issue of the CCL journal *Canadian Unionist* ran an editorial entitled "No Strikes for the Duration" ("No Strikes" 1944). After the invasion of the USSR by German military might in June1941,Communists had called for no-strike pledges as part of their new-found enthusiasm for all-out, uninterrupted war production. The Communist-led UE had been one of the few unions to officially embrace such a pledge before PC 1003. The TLC had offered to take the pledge after the outbreak of war if the federal government gave unions a major role in war production along with reforms to reduce workplace conflicts, but its generosity had not been reciprocated (Wells 1995, 207-208; Abella 1973, 141; Fudge and Tucker 2001, 233-234)

PC 1003 broke the strike wave that had been growing since 1941, primarily because it provided a legal route to certification and prohibited recognition strikes. However, it did not pacify wage-earners. Even if union recognition was now less of an issue and PC 9384 kept wage increases off the table, skirmishing with management on the "frontier of control" over the limits of capitalist rule on the job continued unabated. This could flare up around the pace of work, supervision, refusal to deal with grievances filed, union security and other union rights in the workplace. In 1944, there were still 217 strikes involving nearly 76 000 workers.[48] This was the lowest level since 1940, but the average length of strikes rose

[48]Official statistics considered that 34 strikes over "union questions" were responsible for 70% of struck person-days (White 1989, 149).

slightly (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987, 136). A possible explanation for this fact is that workers were now more likely to be walking off the job in clashes with employers who, taking advantage of the feebleness of PC 1003's powers of enforcement, refused to deal seriously with unions. Key companies in many industries, including Ford, Stelco, Westinghouse and Canada Bread, declined to sit down and negotiate collective agreements with legally-recognized unions or ignored contract provisions (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 279). Also ineffective was PC 1003's ban on strikes while contracts were in force; the wartime labour relations boards refused to crack down on wildcats (286).

In some workplaces, workers were able to use PC 1003 as leverage to get their unions recognized and then negotiate first collective agreements.[49] In others, the difficulties of getting employers to negotiate contracts did not deter many workers from signing union cards. Union density hit 24.3%, a full one-third greater than in 1941, reflecting 724 000 members (Leacy 1983, E175-177). With the bulk of this union expansion among less-skilled workers who joined CCL unions and those TLC affiliates that organized beyond the ranks of the skilled, the make-up of the unions had changed significantly. After the passage of the most union-friendly labour legislation in Canada, introduced after the election of the CCF in 1944, Saskatchewan provincial government employees gained and used the right to unionize, choosing the TLC over the more "political" CCL (Makahonuk 1987, 270-272). An even more unusual indicator of the scope of class recomposition was the interest in

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[49]For example, one local leader recounts that "PC 1003 made all the difference" (King 1998, 46) for Mine Mill in the BC towns of Kimberley and Trail.

unions, especially the Foremen's Association of America, shown by supervisors in mass production industries. Employees hired to act as the front-line agents of capital in workplaces ruled with technical control methods had less power and status than those who worked in systems of hierarchical control. The spread of industrial unionism brought with it new constraints that furthered this trend. Supervisors' interest in unionization, with its potential to threaten capital's control on the shop-floor, was sufficient to prompt the CMA to devote a conference to the subject in 1945 (Warrian 1986, 248-250).

The major strikes of 1944 highlight the points of sharpest labour-management conflict on the job in the wake of PC 1003. At Ford, 14 000 struck in the spring after management tried to undermine the grievance procedure and suspended six stewards. Ford abrogated its contract with UAW Local 200 and sought RCMP intervention. The Communist local president and other top union officials opposed the strike, opening up a split between UAW leaders, in the main drawn from the skilled trades and (like supervisors) most often Anglo-Celtic or German Protestants, and a membership including shop-floor leaders who were mostly less-skilled workers, often Ukrainian or Finnish Catholic men who were not fluent in English (Wells 1995, 203-205). In the case of the Halifax and Dartmouth shipyards, 3000 CCL-affiliated workers struck for a month to force the employer to grant their union the dues check-off to which it was entitled under provincial law (White 1989). Public transit workers in Montréal struck for a union shop clause until the state appointed controllers to take over Montréal Tramways and ordered an end to the strike (Dumas 1975, 99). The repeal of PC 7307 in September 1944 (Webber 1985, 68) as a further concession to organized

labour did make it easier for workers to strike legally, yet by no means did this move address the issues around which workplace conflict continued to flare up.

The following year saw the war come to an end. The class struggle at work apparently continued in much the same fashion as in 1944, with some 96 500 wage-earners involved in 212 strikes (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987, 136). Most wartime orders-in-council, including PC 1003 and PC 9384, remained in effect. However, important changes did accompany the cessation of hostilities. Workers had been looking forward with great anticipation to the end of the war and its privations. But they also feared that employers would move to roll-back their wartime wage increases, seniority rules, grievance procedures and other union rights, to restore, in the words of one union writer, the "old familiar pattern of an industrial dictatorship" (qtd. in McInnis 1996a, 111). Corporate discussion about the post-war period suggested that these fears were well-grounded (103-110). Would the federal government's *White Paper on Employment and Income* of April 1945[50] deliver the promised post-war prosperity, or would the economy slump, as it had after the First World War? What would happen as hundreds of thousands of military personnel returned to the civilian paid workforce? No longer restrained by appeals to wartime sacrifice and restraint, many workers were prepared to take collective action to address their concerns.

However, many women were denied the opportunity to become peacetime wage-earners. Even before fighting had come to an end in Europe, war production started to slow

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[50]On this document, see Wolfe 1984 (54-55).

down. This meant layoffs, above all for women who had been encouraged to take jobs in war plants. Male veterans and other men were believed to have an entitlement to paid employment that women did not. Women's increased recruitment to the paid workforce in wartime had entailed at most a temporary relaxation of beliefs about the unfitness of white women, especially married white women, participating in wage labour. Anxiety about even temporary changes to gender relations, expressed around such concerns as white women workers' endangered femininity and immoral sexual behaviour, was commonplace (Pierson 1986, 129-214). The "picture of female strength and skill under adversity" (Keshen 1997, 266) depicted in magazines was tied to the assumption that this was conditional on the exceptional wartime circumstances that led women to leave the home and work for wages.[51] In this ideological climate, efforts to expel women from paid work meant a return to gender normality, and not only for men: although many women undoubtedly wanted to stay in their jobs, the ideology of the male breadwinner and men's privileged attachment to the world of paid work was also accepted by many women. This helps explain why women had begun to leave paid employment before the war's end (Christie 2000, 306). Unionized men rarely resisted the ejection of women, which contributed to reducing women's participation in paid work from its peak of 33.5% in 1944 to 25.3% in 1946 (Porter 1993, 115). While it is not accurate to call the expulsion of women "the first act of labour-management consolidation under PC 1003" (Forrest 1995, 150) - this dubious honour belongs to the no-strike pledges

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[51]Adequate appreciation of this conditionality is missing from Keshen 1997, whose conclusions rely too much on the contents of print media.

taken by the UAW and others in 1944 - there is no doubt that male workers' complicity with the mass layoffs of women indicates the resilience of cross-class agreement on the ideal that wage-work was primarily for men.[52] Gender inequality in the workplace had not been seriously challenged during the war; driving many women from their jobs only ratified it.

The key struggle of 1945 was the first major post-war trial of class strength, pitting the UAW - with 51 000 members, the largest industrial union in Canada (Yates 1993, 54) - against Ford. With 10 000 Ford workers out for ninety-nine days from September to December, supported at the climax of their strike by approximately thirty solidarity strikes by 8500 other workers (Wells 1995, 211), the fight of Windsor's UAW Local 200 for a union shop and dues check-off against Ford's offer of a company union accounted for about two-thirds of the 1.458 million person-days of strikes in Canada that year (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987, 136). It was won with the strikers' own militant tactics - mass picketing, shutting down the Ford plant powerhouse, a car blockade - , sympathy strikes, and widespread support from working people in the city, the region (including Detroit) and beyond. Windsor's mayor came onside. For the first time since the expulsion of the CIO unions more than six years earlier, the head of the TLC sent his support to a CCL local. The company and some top Liberal and Conservative politicians demanded the use of troops. Given the extent

[52]On the layoffs of women in the auto industry, see Sugiman 1994 (51-57). On Toronto aircraft production workers, see Endicott 1991 (138-140, 150-152). See also Sangster 1995 (75) and Sobel and Meurer 1994 (101-102). It is worth noting that UE led an unsuccessful illegal strike at the Long Branch Small Arms plant after mass layoffs were announced there in 1945 (Guard 1994, 80, 126, 217). Social policy measures that helped push women from their jobs are discussed in Ch. 4.

of class solidarity, such a move would have made considerable violence and bloodshed inevitable, and so this demand was refused. At the same time, many UAW and CCL officials were not happy about the strike's militancy, and opposed the illegal sympathy strikes and the call for a one-day cross-country general strike issued by the joint policy committee of UAW Locals 200 and 195. Strikers voted down the local executive's first attempt to end the strike and submit the unresolved issue of union security to arbitration. The second, successful vote led to an arbitrated settlement whose significance was predicted by no one (Moulton 1974, 138-143; Wells 1995, 209-211).[53]

While refusing the demand for a union shop, the arbitrator, Justice Ivan Rand, ruled that all workers covered by the contract negotiated by the union be required to pay dues. The check-off was granted to the union. In return, the union was compelled to hold secret ballots to authorize legal strikes, to disown illegal strikes, and to discipline members who took part in them. The union would lose dues income if its officials did not comply. Workers who engaged in wildcats could be fined and lose seniority. Shop-floor union officials were given special protection from layoffs and privileged access to overtime. The "Rand Formula," as mandatory dues payment through check-off was dubbed, was widely supported in the UAW and beyond for its resolution of the union security question (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 284-

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[53]According to former UAW activist Mansfield Mathias, who claims he confirmed this information with George Burt and Paul Martin Sr., UAW leaders had verbal assurances from the federal government that the arbitrator would be instructed to include dues check-off in the settlement. Their desire to avoid having this information become public made it more difficult for them to win acceptance of an arbitrated settlement (Mathias 2001).

285; Wells 1995, 212-214; Russell 1990, 222-226).

A few prescient radical workers did raise warnings, though they went largely unnoticed at the time and subsequently. While acknowledging that the check-off "was an important concession wrung from the bosses by great militancy and strength... a recognition of the solidarity and power of the Canadian labor movement," an anonymous writer in *Labor Challenge* warned of the dangers contained in the ruling: "The company, holding the check-off purse-strings, hopes to convert the union into a strike-breaking agency by compelling it to declare wildcat strikes illegal and to repudiate its own picket lines. The 'company security' clauses are an attempt by the bosses to meet and undermine the great rise of union militancy that is spreading over Canada" ("Ford" 1946, 1, 7). British Columbia CCF MLA AJ Turner spoke out against this "company security." So too did some LPP union leaders in Ontario, though the party leadership did not. John Turner, a Communist and Secretary of the Vancouver CCL labour council, said he "saw no danger in making the union responsible for work stoppages" ("Trade" 1946, 7).[54] No doubt there were some unionists who agreed with Art Schultz, a founding member of the Oshawa UAW local, who thought the check-off would distance union leaders from rank and file workers (Moulton 1974, 150). However, the administrative efficiency of the check-off, which eliminated the need for time-consuming dues collection from individual workers by stewards and sub-stewards, made the mechanism

[54]*Labor Challenge*, in which the articles by the unknown author(s) appear, was published in Toronto by a small grouping of Trotskyists, then members of the CCF. It is housed in the Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library at the University of Toronto.

very appealing to union officials. A commitment to "responsible" unionism predisposed many to accept the trade-off of enhanced company security for this version of union security.

A number of radical scholars have contributed useful critiques of PC 1003, the Rand Formula and the labour relations regime of industrial pluralism that they inaugurated.[55] To understand the full significance of PC 1003 - whose key features became enshrined in post-war law with the 1948 Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (IRDIA) and its provincial counterparts - for working-class formation, it is helpful to reflect on it through the theory of state power as a social form of capitalist rule developed in the previous chapter. From such a perspective, this change in the legal-administrative mechanisms of political administration reconfigured the antagonistic internal relation of labour within and against capital through the state form.[56] The structured historical process of capitalist rule exercised by the Canadian state was altered by the workplace struggles of the 1940s. As Neocleous writes of measures of political administration, through new state institutions:

> the state appropriates and nullifies the struggle of the working class; as such they are the fossilized remnants of class struggle; they are the subsumption of struggle - working-class struggle abolished and preserved. Born of the struggle of the working class these structures are then left with the task of administering that same class, a task performed in relation to both collective organizations of the working class and its decomposed

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[55]I take the term "industrial pluralism" from Fudge and Tucker 2001. Consider Forrest 1995 and, more generally, the articles collected in Gonick, Phillips and Vorst, eds. 1995, as well as Heron 1989, Panitch and Swartz 1993, Russell 1990 (210-230), Fudge and Tucker 2001 (299-301) and Wells 1995. See also Napier's comment (1976, 60).

[56]This is an issue highlighted by Bonefeld in his critique of autonomist Marxism (1993, 26), touched on in Ch. 1.

elements known as "citizens" (1996, 107).

Through these institutions - in the Canadian case, chiefly labour relations boards - the very organizations through which workers combined in their workplaces to assert class needs against capital become more entangled in capitalist rule. In the new regime of industrial legality, unions became both subjects of additional rights and objects of novel mechanisms of political administration.[57]

As I argued in the previous chapter, reforms to political administration like PC 1003 and the Rand Formula need to be understood as contradictory products of struggle. The state-run procedure for achieving union recognition and the obligation placed on employers to engage in collective bargaining with certified unions meant that groups of workers who lacked sufficient power to quickly force employers to recognize and bargain with their unions - in other words, most paid workers - no longer had to fight hard simply to get to the negotiating table. This no doubt contributed to the spread of unions and collective agreement coverage from 1944 on. Grievance and arbitration procedures regularized the resolution of disputes. However, the cost was high. In Peter Warrian's words, "The rule of law required the acceptance of property rights" (1986, 243). The right to strike became tightly restricted;

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[57]Neocleous's valuable theoretical work is marred by a tendency to downplay the contradictory character of unions with one-sided formulations. The claim that "to the extent that *organizations of collective labour* are a product of working-class struggle, their specific *form* is an outcome of their constitution by the state" (143) is an overstatement, since the makeup of the membership, their activity and their ideology (all conditioned by broader social relations) also shapes the form of such organizations.

strikes were allowed solely as a means to obtain union contracts. The methods of struggle - mid-contract strikes, sympathy strikes - which were central to the upward spiral of workers' power that won industrial pluralism and the Rand version of union security became illegal. Compulsory conciliation delayed strike action. Union officials became legally compelled to police workers' adherence to contract language, and unions liable for their infractions of industrial legality. The penalties of the Rand Formula, where it was adopted,[58] added extra clout to those spelled out in legislation. The bureaucracy of grievances and arbitration was to replace job action when workers came into conflict with supervisor and managers. Allowing the state to determine bargaining units reinforced a fragmenting bias in favour of single-enterprise units and against industry-wide and other kinds of broader-based bargaining. Standard labour board practice also entrenched divisions, frequently gendered, between units of production and office workers and between full-time permanent and other workers (Forrest 1995, 145-146). All of these restrictive and divisive features act as barriers to working-class recomposition. To take two examples, banning wildcats further subordinates labour to capital in the paid workplace, while the prohibition of sympathy strikes is an obstacle to wage-workers acting in concert. Those who had an inkling of such implications and raised their concerns at the time were few in number and without much

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[58]The Rand Formula spread quickly, and was eventually built into labour legislation (Russell 1990, 226-227, 257). Dues check-off also became standard where most other forms of union security existed.

influence, a point that deserves further consideration.[59]

3.5 The 1946-1947 Strike Wave and Post-War Recomposition

The Windsor Ford strike was the first battle in the second wave of workplace struggle in the 1940s. Many workers followed it, recognizing that the outcome of this clash between industrial unionism and a large, traditionally anti-union employer would have implications for their efforts to retain and improve their wartime collective agreement gains or negotiate a first union contract.[60] The victory of the UAW after a long strike and the decision by state authorities to refrain from brutally intervening against mass militancy were no doubt seen as significant by less-skilled workers in various sectors. As older workers could tell them, this was quite unlike the post-war strikes a generation earlier. Inspiration may also have come from the US, just as it had in 1937. South of the border, massive numbers of CIO-organized workers in a range of industries had initiated a wave of strikes beginning late in the summer of 1945. Some AFL-affiliated workers joined in. Not always legal and in some localities escalating into broadly-supported or general strikes, the struggles of US workers were

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[59] I return to this in Ch. 5. Because the Rand Formula was not immediately generalized, the preceding discussion does not analyze the contribution of the Rand Formula to union bureaucratization. Nor does it consider the inclusion of management rights in collective agreements and the channeling of union aims away from issues of workplace control. Both issues are assessed in Ch. 5.

[60] For example, in Hamilton industrial and craft unionists both followed the strike with interest and support (Storey 1981, 362-363)

communicated to many Canadians through the newspapers, radio broadcasts and newsreels of the day, as well as through the CIO affiliates in the CCL.[61]

In February 1946, the CCL leadership resolved to move forward with a coordinated campaign for a "living wage" whose demands on employers and the federal government included a $0.15 hourly wage increase, a workweek of forty hours or less with no loss in net pay, an all-out increase in consumer goods production, preservation of state price controls and subsidies, and planning by business so as to avoid price increases as a result of higher wages. The hope was to use strike action to win settlements, including union security, which would set a pattern that could be enforced across major industries. Strike preparation began in the steel, rubber, electrical goods, packinghouse and forest sectors. The CCL also called for free collective bargaining, including an end to wage controls (Warrian 1986, 185-187; Fudge and Tucker 2001, 286-287). While still docile in its support for continuing wage controls, the top TLC leadership did express concerns about the government's strategy of holding down wages to prevent consumer price inflation (Warrian 1986, 187-188). With PC 9384 and many other wartime regulations still in effect, the CCL campaign was, in effect, throwing down the gauntlet before the state, which declared five cents the greatest permissible hourly wage increase, and major employers. This was not just a matter of

[61]Lipsitz 1994 (99-154) contains an excellent discussion of this wave of struggles, noting that they "revealed themselves to be more than simple responses to wartime economic and social realignments. They displayed a revolt against work, against exploitation, and against hierarchies rooted in the experience of labor itself" (152). The interpretation in Davis 1986 differs, arguing that "there was minimal rank-and-file initiative in the organization of the strikes" (86).

bargaining positions but also the methods to be employed to back them up: the plan required each union to stop production, which typically entailed mass picketing, powerful but generally illegal (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 287).

First off the mark was the IWA. Over 30 000[62] wood workers, including some with no previous connection to the IWA, walked off the job in May in a strike remarkable for its size and breadth of support in the towns of the Pacific coast. After four weeks, several thousand marched to and through Victoria in a show of solidarity. Shortly afterward, the federal Minister of Labour appointed a controller responsible for all plants making wooden containers, and their supplier camps. Their employees were ordered to return to work at pre-strike wages. The leadership of the IWA, which by recruiting some 10 000 members during the strike had grown to 27 000, decided to end the strike (Lembcke 1980, 127-129). The contract gains - a $0.15 hourly increase and 44-hour week (the IWA had sought $0.25 and 40 hours), voluntary dues checkoff and an industry-wide agreement (Logan 1948, 284) - were significant.[63] Although British Colombia wood workers were spatially and socially distant from the concentrations of manufacturing workers in Ontario and Québec, the heart of Canadian capital and of the CCL, their strike was a limited victory for the post-war drive to

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[62]Jamieson 1968 (298) says 38 000 and Logan 1948 (284) and Neufeld and Parnaby (2000) give 37 000, but an IWA member writing in 1947 gives the provincial workforce in wood as 33 000 (Lembcke 1980, 127n).

[63]But see Grey's analysis of myths that exaggerate the strike's achievements (1989, 249-255). Grey notes, for instance, that the settlement was not a British Colombia industry-wide agreement and that woodworkers in the interior of the province saw a smaller wage increases than those on the coast.

solidify the industrial unionism of less-skilled workers.

Not long after the IWA strike began, the TLC-affiliated but left-led CSU crews on Great Lakes' shipping walked off their vessels. The failure of employers to agree to the union's understanding of an eight hour day meant that a strike was not unexpected. Strikebreakers were hired. The RCMP, Ontario and Québec provincial police and CN railway police were all deployed against the pickets set up by CSU members and their supporters in towns along the tied-up canals. The result was violent clashes and the arrest of many strikers, with hundreds charged not only under the Criminal Code but also the draconian Canada Shipping Act to which sailors were subject. As in Pacific wood, the strike was brought to an end by the imposition of a state controller, under PC 2556. In this case, however, the cost to capital of reopening the key shipping route was granting the workers' central demand: the state ordered the companies to introduce a system of three eight-hour shifts. Soon the practice of a hiring-hall system, which created a union closed shop, was implemented and included in contracts signed with the Great Lakes companies. It was a clear victory for a militant and widely-supported strike of less-skilled workers (Green 1986, 138-150; Kaplan 1987, 43-48).

Picket lines ringed many Ontario mass production workplaces in mid-1946 (Jamieson 1968, 298). The day after the CSU strike was ended by decree, some 10 000 rubber workers took up the CCL campaign. Having failed to make much headway in Canada before or during the war, eleven URW locals struck to win common demands across the industry. The companies were resistant, and the strike dragged on through the summer (England, England

and Stewart 1976, 80-86). The URW was soon joined by electrical workers in various cities and towns. With more than one-fifth of its members women at the time (Guard 1994, 26, 412), UE was the least exclusively male of the major CCL unions. Its strike aims included the replacement of separate male and female wage rates by equal, gender-neutral ones. This was an unusually radical demand, and the high-point of gender egalitarianism for the Communist-led electrical workers' union (26). Auto workers struck Chrysler's operations in Windsor (Yates 1993, 61-62) Over 12 000 steel workers were out in Hamilton, Sault St. Marie and Sydney even though their strike was illegal due to the imposition of a controller on the basic steel industry. As a consequence, they faced fines and jail sentences (Storey 1981, 376).

In the summer of 1946, Hamilton was the eye of the storm, with over 12 000 of the city's wage-workers on strike. UE had shut down Westinghouse[64] and the URW Firestone. At the *Hamilton Spectator*, members of the International Typographical Union were out as part of a strike gripping the Southam newspaper chain (Jamieson 1968, 306-317). Most important, United Steel Workers (USW)[65] Local 1005 was locked in struggle with Stelco which, like Ford, was a committed anti-union firm. USW 1005 had vanquished a company union to win recognition under PC 1003 in 1944 and signed a first contract without union security provisions early the following year. Now the USW led a strike for a grievance procedure, seniority system and the Rand Formula against an employer that workers believed

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[64]See Ready 1979 for a participant's account of work and organizing at this plant.
[65]SWOC became the United Steel Workers of America in 1942.

was intent on rolling them back to pre-war conditions. The company used managers, summer student employees and workers who declared themselves members of the "Loyal Order of Scabs" to continue production behind the picket lines. Members of all the striking unions and many others, including the pro-labour mayor, united to close the huge Stelco works in an enthusiastic movement of community class solidarity that drew power from the participation of Italian and Eastern European Stelco workers and their families who had previously not been active in the union. Sailors and railway workers refused to transport Stelco products, and Stelco workers in Montréal would not use steel from Hamilton. After RCMP and provincial police detachments arrived in the city, a crowd of some 25 000 people turned out; restaurant and hotel workers even refused them service (Roberts 1981, 6-7, 32). In the words of one striker, "a lot of people had served overseas during the war, only to come home to the police. They had been fighting a police state. Now it looked like they were going to live in one" (qtd. in Roberts 1981, 32). As in the 1945 Ford strike, the state declined to intervene against flagrantly illegal activities due to the widespread solidarity shown by workers in the city and beyond. There were a few incidents of wavering by USW leaders, but by hanging on for eighty-one days until early October workers forced Stelco to make concessions. Workers in basic steel gained paid holidays, the Rand Formula, and wage increases far above the maximum pegged by the state (Storey 1981, 378-394; 1987, 378-382). Another high-profile employer had succumbed to class solidarity, and the steel settlement helped bring an end to the rubber and electrical workers' strikes on similar terms (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 290; Smith 1997, 174).

All told there were 243 strikes by about 140 000 workers during 1946. Because so many were drawn-out disputes involving large numbers of strikers, they accounted for an enormous 4.5 million person-days of work. This was higher even than the 1919 level, more than four times the figure for 1943 and three times the total struck in 1945. The ranks of the unions, which had contracted slightly in 1945 due to end-of-war layoffs, expanded by over 120 000 to reach 832 000, a density of 27.9%. Wage-earners in several major mass production industries now enjoyed gains entrenched in collective agreements that created what were essentially industry-wide patterns, though not cross-industry standards (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 291-293). The means by which they had achieved these advances, and the fact that the might of the state had been unleashed only against the CSU and the textile workers of Valleyfield, Québec (Montero 1979, 123-132), who nevertheless won their strikes, was not lost on other workers.

As a result, over the following year more smaller workplaces were shut down by what were generally shorter strikes over demands resembling those fought for by the "big battalions."[66] The long-awaited lifting of wage controls, by now frequently flouted, along with the rest of the wartime measures for the political administration of the workplace reduced the reticence of some less-powerful groups of workers to press their demands. The result was 272 strikes by over 105 000 workers adding up to 2.4 million person-days. With

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[66]A highly politicized exception was job actions by the CSU and other maritime workers who refused to load war materiel on ships bound for the Nationalist government in China (Green 1986, 170-172).

less to fear than ever before, and much to gain, union membership reached 912 000, or 29.1% of non-agricultural wage- labourers (Cruikshank and Kealey 1987, 136; Leacy 1983, E175-177). The largest strike of the year was the four month-long battle by over 14 000 UMW District 26 coal miners in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which with 1.3 million strike days accounted for more than half of the time struck in 1947 (Jamieson 1968, 298). Unlike so many of the struggles of the Eastern miners in previous years, this one remained within the bounds of industrial legality. Faced with a crisis of their industry at the end of the war, most miners were now resigned to the mechanization they had long resisted (Abbott 1989, 42-43). A similar number of meat packers across the country also struck after state control of the industry was lifted. Since federal jurisdiction for labour legislation in war-related industries had recently expired, the packinghouse workers had a notably different experience in Ontario, where the United Packinghouse Workers (UPW) achieved a common agreement, than in rural Prince Edward Island, where the government outlawed the strike, hired strikebreakers, assumed ownership of the plant and passed new anti-union legislation (McInnis 1996, 200-203; Jamieson 1968, 305-306; Mahn and Schaffner 1976, 47-52).

A few other less-powerful groups of workers attempting to win union contracts found themselves treated almost as severely as the Prince Edward Island meat packers. Nova Scotia fishers organized in the CSU, for example, were dealt a crushing blow after the provincial Supreme Court ruled that they were not employees, and therefore not entitled to union recognition (Nisbet 1989). Yet if it was male workers of European origin in big industrial unions in Ontario-centered manufacturing whose large-scale struggles reaped the

most gains, this was not the only section of the class that benefitted from the post-war wave of strikes and union organizing. Other less-skilled workers, among them municipal employees (Lenihan 1998, 158-160), became more militant and organized. Lesser gains were also achieved by some of the most oppressed wage-earners: for instance, on the Pacific coast the new United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union (TLC) (UFAW) was able to obtain contracts for Chinese cannery workers, though these new agreements reproduced the prevailing gender and racial divisions in the workforce and many employers laid off Chinese workers rather than keep them on at union rates (Muszynski 1996, 195-198).

By the end of 1947, the strike wave had petered out. The cycle of workplace class recomposition that had begun in 1941 drew to a close. Whether the post-war strikes even qualify as "labour unrest" has been questioned by Stuart Jamieson, who notes that they displayed much less violence, repression, "turbulence and mob action" than those of previous years (1968, 296-297, 303). This, however, is a misleading evaluation. The strikes of 1946-1947 are better analyzed as class struggles in a period of transition from the wartime mode of workplace political administration, in which state power resorted to increasingly extensive and coercive regulations to control paid workers and preserve the pre-war regime of limited union rights,[67] to a new regime, industrial pluralism. This transition was forced on the Canadian state by working-class recomposition. Capital simply could not continue to subordinate wage-labour in the old way without a massive escalation of state repression, too

[67]This has been referred to as industrial voluntarism (Russell 1990; Fudge and Tucker 2001).

dangerous a course for most members of the ruling class to consider seriously. The alternative, industrial pluralism, was not an unproblematic gift of labour rights granted by a reforming Liberal prime minister or won by responsible industrial unions in alliance with the CCF. Nor was it a trap foisted on a weak proletariat by a canny bourgeoisie.[68]

Unrest there certainly was. Many strikes were clearly illegal. A minority of rank and file workers and low-level union officials on occasion acted independently of higher-ranking union leaders.[69] In Windsor, Hamilton and other cities and towns, some strikes took on the character of local class-wide struggles, drawing in widespread support from other workers for those walking the lines. The solidarity and militancy of less-skilled workers in several major strikes and the widespread willingness to stop work shown by a working class whose social weight and level of union organization had increased considerably since the early 1920s in part explain why violence and arrests on the scale seen in the struggles a quarter-century earlier were not repeated. Nevertheless, the struggles of 1945-1947 did not have the politically-radical tone of those of 1919. As I have argued, the emerging regime of industrial legality reshaped the antagonistic internal relation of labour within and against capital. The

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[68]All three views contain elements of truth, but at best rely on a partial reading of the historical evidence and rest on faulty theoretical foundations. The first interpretation is implied by Granatstein 1975, who follows the tradition of dubbing PC 1003 "Labour's Magna Carta" (280n), and the second by Macdowell 1978. The third, the viewpoint of a vulgar radicalism, crops up occasionally but not, to my knowledge, in any scholarship. My analysis draws on the insights of the scholarship cited in footnote 55 of this chapter while rethinking them through the theoretical approach developed in Ch. 2.

[69]See Wells 1995 (210-211), Storey 1981 (383-386), Smith 1997 (170) and McInnis 1996 (195).

union officialdom which as a social stratum mediated the capital-labour relation was in a different position vis-a-vis employers, state power and the workers it represented. It now had a more compelling interest in upholding the rule of law and actively making sure that the rank and file did the same. It was the "responsible" and bureaucratic industrial unionism championed by the likes of Phillip Murray of SWOC/USW and the CBRE's Aaron Mosher that dominated the CCL, not the radical industrial unionism of the earlier OBU and WUL. Top CCL leaders played more of a leading role in the strikes of 1946-1947 than in the wartime strike wave. The character of the working-class Left was also quite different from what it had been during the Workers' Revolt.[70] The opening of the Cold War, which I will discuss below, had conservative political effects. For these reasons, the class recomposition of the 1940s had a less radical ideological dimension than that which took place at the close of the First World War. The lived experience of paid workers in the two post-war upheavals was qualitatively different.

With the years of Depression and war finally over, many workers were eager to enjoy the higher levels of consumption made possible by the combination of wage increases and the economic shift to peacetime production. 1946 had seen the first signs of Cold War. This caused a notable change in the ideological environment, whose hallmarks became anti-communism and the cult of domesticity.[71] The federal IRDIA of 1948 and its provincial

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[70]On bureaucratic industrial unionism, see 5.1 below. The changed Left is touched on in the following section, and explored in Ch. 4.

[71]Cold War conflict in the unions in the immediate post-war years is examined in the following section of this chapter. Anti-communism and domesticity in society beyond the

equivalents codified industrial pluralism, with some variations in the different jurisdictions (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 295-297). Collective bargaining started to become routinized for many of the three in ten paid workers who were union members. Strikes and other kinds of workplace resistance did not disappear, but did begin to subside and become less intense. Workers who tested the limits of the law were more likely to suffer harsh consequences. For instance, in 1949 the unified Catholic teachers of Montréal walked out of the schools in a 95% solid strike which featured a high degree of women's participation. Their union was initially deprived of its certification for violating the ban on teachers' strikes. It retrieved this on appeal, only to lose it again in 1954 thanks to a law passed specifically for the purpose (Rouillard 1989, 229-230, 275-278; Fahmi 2001, 351-357). Also in 1949, the sometimes-violent illegal strike by CCCL-affiliated miners in Thetford Mines and Asbestos had wide support and a high profile in Québec, but, contrary to its subsequent image,[72] was hardly a victory for the miners or the CCCL's new leaders, who were moving the Catholic union federation away from corporatism in favour of ideas of business reform that included co-management and profit-sharing (Rouillard 1992, 654-655; 2000, 307-314). State power could also intervene if a legal dispute threatened capitalist profitability, as the 125 000 members of eminently "responsible" craft unions who shut down both major railways in 1950 discovered. A great hue and cry was whipped up in the media, and the House of

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workplace are discussed in Ch. 4.

[72]The strike's victorious image owes much to its impact on the Québecois liberal intelligentsia, which gave it significant support. Trudeau 1974, originally published in French in 1956, contributed to the interpretation.

Commons passed legislation ending the strike after eight days (Jamieson 1968, 333-338). With legal channels in place and the boundaries of acceptability jointly policed by management, state power and union officials, life on the job for most wage-workers settled into the orderly routines of Cold War Canada.

3.6 Party Politics in Paid Workplaces

An important dimension of class recomposition deserves more attention than it has received in the preceding pages: the role of organized political currents in workplaces and the unions.[73] The conventional lenses through which this issue has been seen are, on the one hand, the CPC's alleged conspiracy to place organized labour in the service of the Kremlin and, on the other, the internecine battle between the CCF and Communists in the unions, especially the CCL.[74] Studies organized around the latter theme chronicle events of undoubted significance in the 1940s, but have not done so with a view to investigating how the CCF's Cold War ascendancy at the expense of the LPP contributed to remaking the working class.[75] Research has frequently focused on the infighting in the union officialdom without inquiring into how this played out among unionists and workers more broadly. To illuminate how organized political currents figured in workplace class recomposition in the

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[73]Party politics beyond this sphere is explored in Ch. 4.

[74]Former CPC member and CSU leader Pat Sullivan's book (Sullivan 1955) is an example of the first genre, as is the discussion in Kaplan 1987. Abella 1973, Horowitz 1968 (85-161), Lembcke 1980 and Morton 1998 (201-212) have different political sympathies but are organized around the second theme.

[75]Heron 1996 (80-81) and Palmer 1992 (290-298) do touch on this.

1940s requires asking different questions than those that have structured other studies: what were the effects of workplace and union-centred activities of political parties to achieve party goals, and to what extent were wage-workers who joined or associated with parties able to advance their own interests through these organizations?

There were three large organized political currents active in the workplace sphere: the Liberals, CCF and CPC/LPP: "Communists promoted their political priorities in their union organizations, as did Liberals and CCFers in the same period; hiring political cronies, caucusing before meetings, and strategizing before conventions were not always democratic, but were hardly unique to the Communists" (Heron 1988b, 233-234).While the Conservatives, Social Credit and, in Québec, the National Union certainly sought and received some workers' votes, they did not possess *organized* currents of workplace supporters. The Liberals did have something approaching one by virtue of their base of support among craft union officials, a product of the Liberal-Labour ("Lib-Lab") tradition dating back to the nineteenth century of moderate reform-minded workers aligning themselves with the least unsympathetic of the two pan-Canadian capitalist parties. Perhaps the most prominent representative of this tradition in the 1940s was Humphrey Mitchell. When he assumed the position of Minister of Labour in Mackenzie King's cabinet in late 1941, the TLC's journal noted that he "has for twenty-two years been a member of the Hamilton Local of the International Union of Operating Engineers" ("Meet" 1941,11). That a former chair of the Hamilton Trades Council and Ontario TLC executive would be sitting at the federal cabinet table was the cause of obvious satisfaction among TLC leaders, who

praised the government's "wisdom in making the appointment" and offered Mitchell "the fullest and most sympathetic co-operation" while noting that he was "only one among so many" in cabinet ("Labour" 1941,10).[76]

The end of the Depression saw a decline in agrarian support for the CCF and greater emphasis by the party on unions (Brodie and Jenson 1988, 198), though CCF political thought enshrined a division of labour between the political (parliamentary) tasks of the party and the economic (workplace) responsibilities of the unions. The confluence of labourists, reformist socialists and non-CPC Marxists in the CCF gave it an initial base of wage-earning activists. Because the CCF's political strategy was fundamentally geared around winning elections and forming governments, the CCF's structure was residentially-based. CCF leaders made little effort to organize workplace groups. However, provincial CCF Trade Union Committees did set up some industrial CCF clubs (McDougall 1984, 6; Horowitz 1968, 107;Young 1969, 140, 148). The CCF probably benefitted from the political isolation and weakness of the CPC in the early war years, when the latter had an anti-war line, but the impetus for the CCF to become better organized in the paid workplace sphere in the mid-1940s came not from any decision to involve the party in struggles against employers but from the party drive for union backing and sharpened CCF-LPP competition and conflict.

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[76]In contrast, an editorial in the CCL's *Canadian Unionist* observed that the appointment did not prove the government's commitment to labour rights and that the new minister would be judged by his behaviour in office, not his past union service ("A New" 1941, 150). Mitchell came under fire for his anti-union role in the Kirkland Lake strike, and by November 1942 the TLC had joined the CCL in a joint call for his resignation (Heron 1999, 195).

For example, it was not until 1945 when Larry Sefton, a SWOC staffer and former Kirkland Lake striker, arrived on the scene in USW 1005 charged with breaking Communist influence, that CCF members became a cohesive force in the Stelco local (MacDowell 1983, 220; Freeman 1982, 47-48). Even then, the CCF's strategy for building support in the unions was not to recruit individual workers, though this certainly happened, but to seek the backing of high-profile labour leaders and, beginning in 1942, to pass motions through union bodies to affiliate to the party (Horowitz 1968, 71-73; McDougall 1984, 6).[77] There were numerous dedicated CCF rank and filers, but it was the full-time union leaders and staffers active in the party - the likes of Mosher, Millard, Barrett, Sefton, the UPW's Fred Dowling and middle-class CCF youth activists hired as staff by CCF-led CCL affiliates - who were at the heart of party activity in paid workplaces and unions. In some of the CIO unions, above all SWOC/USW[78], a CCF card was virtually a prerequisite for a staff job (Young 1969, 80).

Alone of the political parties, the CPC attempted to organize systematically in paid workplaces. It had no compunction about party activity in the unions (Penner 1977, 141-142). However, according to long-time Communist leader and historian Stanley Ryerson, the proportion of party members who belonged to workplace cells was never more than 10% (Comeau and Dionne 1982, 90). While party membership was substantially working-class,

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[77]Prior to 1942, the only union affiliated to the CCF was District 26 of the UMW, linked to the party at the initiative of the miners (Horowitz 1968, 71; Earle and Gamberg 1989, 94-101).

[78]CPC members who held Canadian SWOC staff positions were fired in 1940 (Abella 1973, 56-59).

it was fairly uncommon to find several members employed in the same establishment and organized in a necessarily-clandestine cell. Most belonged to neighbourhood branches instead. As a result, when the banned CPC formed the legal LPP in 1943, the decision to base the new party on clubs organized principally on a residential basis, with occupation or language-based clubs allowed in exceptional cases, did not mean a dramatic change (13). CPC/LPP unionists would also gather from time to time for industrial fraction meetings.[79] Regardless of how they were organized within the party, Communist wage-workers were expected to carry out party activity on the job and in the unions. This included fighting for the adoption of party-backed policies, standing for office, promoting party campaigns, selling publications and recruiting. The political rationale for such activity was no longer found in any sort of revolutionary socialist politics, a distorted Stalinist version of which had been replaced in 1935 with the two-stage strategy of the Popular Front.[80] Yet even after the launch of the LPP, with its programme for an eventual peaceful transition to socialism (Comeau and Dionne 1982, 11-12), workplace activity by members - whether officials, staffers or rank and

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[79]Sullivan 1955 (44-59) gives a sense of CSU fraction activity, albeit one distorted by Cold War anti-communist partisanship.

[80]The stage of the struggle for socialism was to be preceded by one of building a Popular Front against fascism (later, against monopoly capital and US imperialism) allying the working class, farmers, professionals and the progressive wing of the bourgeoisie. The Popular Front strategy was dropped in Sept. 1939 as the CPC fell in line with the Communist International (Comintern)'s anti-war line that accompanied the signing of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany. It was revived and broadened to include anti-fascist Conservatives and Social Credit supporters when the Comintern declared that the war had become anti-fascist with the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941 (Penner 1988, 161-183; Comeau and Dionne 1982, 1-34).

file unionists - had a more important role for this party than for any other. It tended to be concentrated in unions whose policies generally coincided with those of the party (Penner 1977, 142). In Canada in the 1940s, Communists led or had significant influence in the CCL's IWA, UE, Mine-Mill, Fur and Leather Workers (FLW), Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders (merged into the BC Federation of Shipyard Workers in 1944) and UAW, as well as the TLC's CSU, UFAW and United Textile Workers.

In assessing the effects of party activities on class recomposition in the paid workplace sphere, there are two key questions: how did party politics influence workplace actions vis-a-vis capital, and how did they shape relations between wage-earners, including those between union members and officials? On the first question, there is no doubt that Liberal influence, strongest among skilled workers and in the officially non-partisan TLC, was one promoting "responsible" unionism, respect for leadership authority, labour peace and support for the federal government and its policies both during and after the war.

For workers who discovered that Liberal policies were obstacles to their efforts to improve wages and conditions by joining and building unions that could achieve lasting gains, the CCF's refusal to tie its support for the war[81] to opposing strikes and restricting union rights was no doubt appealing. The CCF did not advocate that unionists give up their right to strike by taking the no-strike pledge, arguing that strikes should be avoided wherever possible but that the option of striking remained necessary so long as collective bargaining

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[81]On the CCF and the war, see Naylor 1997.

was not compulsory (Horowitz 1968, 89-90). This stance probably coincided with that of most workers, who generally supported the war but were not convinced that this obliged them to renounce their own interests on the job. While most CCF leaders supported "responsible" unionism and sometimes spoke out against illegal strikes, such as those in the Eastern coalfields early in the war, the party's working-class members included workplace activists whose approach was more militant. This meant, for example, that left-wing CCF members in the UAW worked with Communists, nationalists and others in the Unity caucus that removed the CIO-backed Millard as Canadian director in 1939 (Yates 1993, 29). They continued to do so in the Left caucus that fought UAW President Walter Reuther and his supporters in the post-war years (66). The right-wing CCF members who were active on the side of Millard and the Reutherites more accurately reflected the CCF leadership's politics.

Rather less division was permitted in the Stalinist CPC, whose influence was contradictory. In the late 1930s, the party leadership took the position that criticism of conservative union leaders was to be avoided for the sake of unity, even in 1938 expelling the radical editor of the Sydney-based weekly *Steelworker and Miner* from the party and launching *Union News* in competition with it (Manley 1997, 22).[82] From shortly after the outbreak of war until June 1941, the embattled party[83] encouraged strikes, believing, in the

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[82]This revealing incident is never mentioned in Crawley's article on Cape Breton steelworkers and union politics in this period (Crawley 1997).

[83]The Comintern's anti-war line, which put more blame on Britain and France than Nazi Germany, caused considerable internal confusion in the CPC. The ban of June 1940 and subsequent arrests also hindered the party (Comeau and Dionne 1982, 6-7; Penner 1988, 165-168). Reports of internal disagreements can be found in RCMP reports on the party (Kealey

words of a circular from its Central Political Bureau, that "the war and the war regime gives to every strike at its inception in greater or less degree the character of a struggle against the war" (qtd. in Kealey and Whitaker1989, 201). Following the invasion of the USSR, the party did an about-face. The war was declared to be just and anti-fascist. All else had to be subordinated to all-out mobilization behind the war effort. Now seeking "A National Front for Victory," the party championed wartime no-strike pledges and incentive pay. This likely did it political damage among unionists during the wartime strike wave. Its commitment to renouncing the strike weapon allied it with conservative union leaders against the CCF. CP-led unions, such as the UE (Smith 1997, 121-124) and CSU[84] (Kaplan 1987, 35), avoided strikes for the duration of the war and supported labour-management cooperation to boost production. Despite the discipline demanded by the party, not all Communist unionists adhered consistently to the new line; some did support or even lead strikes on occasion (Comeau and Dionne 1982, 10). In the UAW, some opposed the no-strike pledge and cooperation with the employer (Yates 1993, 41). However, these independent-minded Communist militants were exceptions. After the end of the war, the LPP swung back to strongly supporting strikes and proposing militant tactics, such as a one-day general strike in support of the Ford strike, although without a radical critique of industrial legality.

On the issue of relations among workers in paid workplaces, the record of the CCF

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and Whitaker 1989, e.g. 27-28, 34-35, 64).

[84]Green's claim that the CSU took the pledge "like all unions" (1986, 100) is simply false, reflecting his basically uncritical attitude to the CSU and CPC/LPP.

and CPC/LPP was mixed. Both claimed to stand for workers' unity in the workplace irrespective of party affiliation or other distinctions; neither challenged the blindness to the specificities of gender, racial, sexual and national oppression among wage-earners that characterized how unity was generally understood and practiced by industrial unionism. The CCF leadership did find itself forced to tread cautiously as it sought to use its position of strength in the CCL to realize its goal of becoming the recognized political arm of the labour movement while avoiding entanglement in the disputes between the industrial CCL and the officially non-partisan TLC officialdom (Horowitz 1968, 61-80; Young 1969, 80). This was one problem with which the CPC/LPP, too weak to win the backing of any union federation, was not burdened. The Liberals' preference for the TLC over the upstart industrial unions suggests that they did little to alter the existing divisions among workers. When it came to promoting democratic membership control in the unions, no party behaved in an exemplary fashion. On balance, Communists probably had a slightly better record, partly because as a minority tendency they had the most to lose (at least in unions which they did not lead) and partly because the anti-bureaucratic traditions of rank and file democracy that had flourished among such groups as the Cape Breton miners and steel workers retained some influence on Communist union militants in spite of the baneful influence of Stalinist theory and practice[85] (Yates 1993, 31; Green 1986, 97, 246; Smith 1997, 99-100; Palmer 1992, 298; Cannon 1973,

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[85]Note dissident Communist Henri Gagnon's 1949 criticism of the party for "sometimes winning certain strategic posts and then ruling by decree in certain sectors of the working-class movement" (Comeau and Dionne 1982, 65).

288-297). Neither the CCF nor the CPC/LPP encouraged rank and file self-organization or independence from the union officialdom as such. Occasional Communist initiatives in this direction, such as the Shop Stewards' Council set up in Toronto after CPC staffers were fired from SWOC in 1940 (Abella 1973, 68-69; Smith 1997, 71-73), were not intended to develop workers' self-activity but to further the party's work in the unions and weaken its opponents in the labour leadership. Overall, the most significant contribution of political parties to class recomposition and decomposition in the1940s was a fractious conflict that culminated in the destructive post-war anti-communist drive in the unions.[86]

In an institutional sense, the conflict between the CCF and Communists can be traced back to the formation of the CPC in 1921. Pre-existing frictions between revolutionary and reformist currents in the working-class movement intensified during the realignments in the international Left between 1914 and the early 1920s. Some social democratic-led unions, such as the ACW (Abella 1973, 51), banned Communists from elected office. The Stalinist "Third Period" line which labelled the CCF "social fascist" and launched the WUL's "red unions" deepened the mutual antipathy (Penner 1977, 148-154; 1988, 113-114). This ultra-sectarian outlook was dropped with the adoption of the Popular Front line in 1935, after which the CPC's differences with the CCF no longer derived from revolutionary socialism. In fact, "By the 1940s, both parties were committed to a fundamentally elitist conception of

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[86]To avoid a possible misinterpretation, I should note that it was not the existence or activity of political parties as such that was behind this debacle, but the theory and practice of the specific parties.

socialism that directed their energies away from a concern with the level of confidence, militancy and organization among rank and file workers" (McDougall 1984, 10). Thus there was continuity in the hostility between the two parties, even if its political grounds had changed.

The growth of industrial unionism in Canada created a new terrain of party competition. The CCF, which like the CPC had only a weak base of support in the TLC, wanted the official backing of the new unions but initially had to move slowly. The Communists, who realized they stood no chance of achieving this for themselves, hoped at first to reach an agreement with the CCF. After their offers were rejected in the late 1930s, they worked hard to prevent the CCF from succeeding and to expand Communist influence in the CIO/CCL (Penner 1977, 157-158; 1988, 150, 153, 155). In its efforts to frustrate the Communists and retain control, the CCL establishment was ready to use anti-democratic tactics and flaunt its own rules (Abella 1973, 66-70, 82-85). The support of most of the upper ranks of the CCL for the CCF aligned the party with the layer of full-time officials whose aim was a secure and "responsible" industrial unionism. Militant workers who clashed with these officials ran up against what some experienced as a bureaucratic and conservative CCF.

For most of the war, the CCL was caught up in acrimonious internal debate over labour political action between CCF supporters, some of whom were driven more by anti-communism than by agreement with the CCF platform (Horowitz 1968, 107), and those - Communists, Liberals, a few CCFers (Yates 1993, 45), and others - who, for various reasons,

favored a "non-partisan" policy. Both sides used means both fair and foul. In 1942, with CCL membership and popular support for the CCF both growing quickly, party efforts to develop ties with the industrial unions picked up. The following year the CCL executive recommended that the annual convention officially back the CCF and that union locals affiliate. A motion to such effect was passed, although LPP-led opposition led to the adoption of a policy at the 1944 convention that somewhat distanced the CCL from the CCF. Clear support for the CCF was definitively reaffirmed in 1946. The dispute was also fought out in the various CCL affiliates, where the tempo varied in accordance with the political balance of forces in each union (Horowitz 1968, 72-102; Abella 1973, 73-167; Yates 1993, 40-46; Smith 1997, 139-150).

The nature of the inter-party conflict changed after the war's end. Political action had never been the sole contentious issue, since it was debated alongside other matters of union strategy in the war and post-war periods; now it was subsumed by anti-communism. The relaxation of official hostility to the USSR and Communism that accompanied the wartime alliance against the Axis powers came to an end in Canada with the defection of Soviet diplomat Igor Gouzenko in September 1945, the ensuing revelations of spying, and the 1946 arrest and trial for espionage of LPP members including MP Fred Rose. As the Cold War began, conflict between the top CCF-CCL officialdom and the Communist-led current in the unions dovetailed with the ruling class's ideological offensive and became an all-out anti-communist drive across the unions, egged on by the US head officers of internationals but carried out, in most cases enthusiastically, by Canadian labour leaders and staff. Between

1947 and 1950, most Communists and other leftists tagged as "Reds" were forced from official union positions. They included non-Communists who resisted, among them CCF MPP and Mine Mill leader Robert Carlin. Unions that would not submit were expelled and subjected to raiding: the CCL's UE, FLW and Mine Mill and the TLC's CSU and UFAWU. The Communist-led BC district of the IWA seceded from the international union (Abella 1973, 86-167; Copp 1980, 13-38; Green 1986, 195-289; Grey 1989, 384-402; Horowitz 1968, 106-131; Lembcke 1980, 129-148; Muszynski 1996, 201; Palmer 1992, 290-298; Neufeld and Parnaby 2000, 110-121; Smith 1997, 176-203; Whitaker and Marcuse 1994, 342-343; Yates 1993, 58-77). The CCF had played a vital role in this Cold War cleansing of the House of Labour. This purge had an impact, direct or indirect, on all wage- workers: "far more energy was consumed in the battle for control of the leadership of the industrial unions than was directed toward sustaining the shop floor strength of the working class" (McDougall 1984, 9-10). By the time it was over, ideological conformity had been imposed on most of the movement, union democracy weakened, and the position of full-time officials (often proponents of cooperation with employers) strengthened in relation to the rank and file. Some of the solidarity developed between 1941 and 1946 was gone. In short, although the forces of recomposition were already faltering when the Cold War anti-communist drive began, it helped seal their fate and contributed a measure of decomposition.

Having examined the effects of political party activity in the paid workplace sphere, one final question remains to be briefly addressed: to what extent were wage-workers able to advance their workplace class interests through these organizations? Here there is less

evidence with which to make an assessment, so what follows must be more tentative. The Liberals were evidently no help, since, not surprisingly, the party of King, Howe and Hepburn consistently advocated collaboration with capital. CCF defence of the right to strike in wartime and support for union recognition and collective bargaining rights enhanced the public legitimacy of labour's goals, and therefore may have increased the confidence of workers to take action when faced with intransigent employers and governments and pressure to moderate demands and postpone job action. On the other hand, the CCF was not an organization which functioned as a network for workplace militants. The CPC/LPP, with its factory cells, industrial branches, union fractions and emphasis on workplace politics, seems to have played that role to some extent. Activists who joined or worked with the party probably came into contact with militants in other workplaces, communities and unions whom they would not have otherwise met. However, membership in the party came with considerable costs, especially before mid-1941 and after 1945. In the years when the risks attached to associating with Communism were less, the official line of the party was hostile to workplace struggle. In those years, being a member or sympathizer would not have been of much use to those who were more concerned with organizing against their employers than with cooperating with them to produce more for the war effort. Thus it is fair to conclude that none of the parties were reliable vehicles for workplace class struggle.

Far from being a decade in which patriotic workers and employers coordinated by a far-seeing state pulled together in harmony, the 1940s were marked by an upsurge of struggle in paid workplaces that reshaped the Canadian working class. In the strike waves of the

1940s, a sizeable minority of less-skilled workers were able to take advantage of capital's wartime need for labour and the official ideology of democratic anti-fascism to organize into unions, including those of the new and assertive CCL. Their persistent willingness to strike their employers and take action in support of each other despite increasingly restrictive state measures forced state authorities to concede to their unions rights to be recognized and negotiate collective agreements, moves that Canadian employers and governments had long resisted. Through the unions, less-skilled workers were able to not only improve wages and benefits but also to curb the autocratic power wielded by managers and supervisors, thereby changing their daily work lives in tangible ways. These gains cracked the established mode of capitalist rule in paid workplaces and, along with the regime of industrial legality heralded by PC 1003, altered the antagonistic internal relation of labour within and against capital. Yet these gains were neither thoroughgoing nor unproblematic. Industrial pluralism compelled union officials to enforce capitalist control in paid workplaces. Gender and racial oppression went all but unchallenged by unions dominated by Anglo-Celtic men. Labour's officialdom promoted moderation, and conducted a damaging anti-communist purge. None of the organized political currents present in workplaces consistently acted to further class recomposition or offered a radical critique of the new mode of industrial legality. Nevertheless, the hindsight of the early twenty-first century should not lead us to underestimate the significance of the workplace class recomposition of the 1940s.

CHAPTER 4: CLASS RECOMPOSITION IN CANADA IN THE 1940S: HOUSEHOLDS AND COMMUNITIES

This chapter, like the previous one, explores how the working-class formation changed during the 1940s. Following the theoretical approach to class laid out in the first chapter, it looks outside the paid workplace sphere to examine relations within the working class and between workers and the ruling class, in both state and non-state forms. It is necessary to do so because class relations are not restricted to those between employers and wage-earners; the social processes through which class happens, to use a Thompsonian phrase, are those of the community and household spheres as well as paid workplaces. In line with Gramsci's perspective, an important part of this analysis revolves around the role of the political parties of the workers' movement, the CCF and LPP, which were primarily active outside paid workplaces. The strategies, tactics and methods of these political currents contributed to the remaking of the working class as a historical formation in the class recomposition of the war and immediate post-war years.

4.1 Class Composition in the Households and Communities of the Late 1930s

The defeat of the Workers' Revolt and the impact of the Great Depression put the working class in a weakened position and a defensive stance in inter-war households and communities as well as paid workplaces. Working-class living standards - often difficult to evaluate because both quantitative and qualitative issues are involved - may have improved in the 1920s (Palmer 1992, 233). What is not in doubt is that the ensuing Depression brought

terrible hardships to many working-class households. Unemployment reached a high of 26.6% in 1932 and remained 15.1% in 1938, according to official statistics (Struthers 1983, 215). When wage-earners held onto their jobs, even if with reduced hours of work and wage rates, they and the non-waged members of their households were aided by price deflation (Palmer 1992, 233). Still, only skilled male workers could hope to earn wages high enough to allow them to support their families without additional sources of income.[1]

Most working-class people struggled to cope during these years using household survival strategies that depended even more than they had in the past on the non-wage contributions of all but the youngest family members, and sometimes other kin. These included rent paid by lodgers, money earned from selling goods produced at home, and countless hours of unpaid domestic labour (Comacchio 1999, 127-129; Pierson 1990b, 214). According to Cynthia Comacchio, for many "the Depression necessitated a return to the family model that middle class, and more prosperous working-class families, had been slowly moving away from: that of the interdependent family economy" (1999, 123). Interdependency did not mean equality, however: the dominance of adult male household heads was pronounced. The fact that many husbands handed over most of their wages to their wives, who were responsible for household budgeting (Strong-Boag 1988, 127), hardly challenged sexist power relations. The economic crisis affected gender relations in working-class households. Unemployed husbands who could not live up to the norms of the

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[1]See the discussion in 3.1.

hegemonic ideology of the male breadwinner often experienced their inability to provide as a crisis of masculinity. This led to domestic tension, as women had to deal with depressed men at loose ends and often unfamiliar with household routines. More women were forced to take on waged work on top of the unpaid labour of child-rearing and looking after the household (Sangster 1995, 122; Little 1998, 77-80; Comacchio 1999, 124-125). In addition to the material burden, this placed additional strain on working-class femininity, closely linked as this was to properly caring for family members and maintaining respectability (Rosenfeld 1988, 260; Sangster 1995, 111-131).

A large minority of the modest homes in which working-class people lived were their personal property, rather than rented. The 1931 census reported that 46% of all urban households were headed by home owners; the 1941 figure was 41% (Harris and Hamnett 1987, 177). A reasonable estimate of working-class home-ownership in the 1930s is slightly under 40%.[2] Older men were most likely to own their own homes (Doucet and Weaver 1991, 311-314). Because workers' mortgages in Canada were usually held by individuals rather than brokers or other institutional lenders, foreclosure rates seem to have been lower in Canada than in the US during the Depression. Lenders generally had little to gain from taking possession of workers' small properties (Harris and Sendbuehler 1994, 500).

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[2]Harris and Hamnett 1987 calculate an urban "working class" home-ownership rate of 38% in 1931, but this excludes a waged "middle class" of professional employees, intermediate non-manual workers and foremen and supervisors, 41% of whom are said to have owned their homes (183, 187). Many of these "middle class" employees are workers from the viewpoint of the class theory developed in Ch. 1.

However, owners who became unemployed or who suffered falling wages could still lose their homes. Mortgages were not the only concern, as municipal governments could force the sale of houses whose owners fell behind on property tax assessments; from 1936 to1939, Vancouver offered "work for taxes" schemes to home-owners in arrears who were not on relief (Wade 1994, 53-55).

Houses themselves were built by small builders or the workers themselves, and sometimes both (Harris and Sendbuehler 1994, 494). Their material existence bore witness to divisions within the working-class formation. In Hamilton, for instance, skilled worker-owners often enjoyed brick homes some distance south of Lake Ontario, while the homes of the less-skilled were more likely to be owner-built and close to the Lake and to industry. However, by the 1930s some areas originally built as working-class residential suburbs - not uncommon in major cities (487; Harris 1992, 14, 28) - had been overrun by the spread of industrial plants (Harris and Sendbuehler 1994, 506-507). Poor households could sometimes be found in rudimentary housing on the fringes of urban areas (Wade 1994, 50-51). Still, owning even a basic and inconveniently-located home provided a measure of security in hard times for some working-class households.

This was something that the majority of the working class who lived in rented accommodation in the 1930s often lacked. With the pan-Canadian average monthly rent for a six-room house with modern conveniences estimated at approximately $24.24 in 1939 (43), many of the families of less-skilled wage-earners lived in overcrowded apartments or as lodgers. Affordable rental housing was in short supply (Comacchio 1999, 127-128) and the

non-farm vacancy rate in 1939 was only 2.6%, the lowest level since 1922 (Leacy 1983, S246).[3] However, there is some evidence that affordable housing opportunities existed for the households of some employed men in the Depression due to the availability of housing built during the expansionary 1920s (Doucet and Weaver 1991, 434). Nevertheless, loss of income could be disastrous, for renters who could no longer pay found themselves evicted. There were also cases of eviction as political discrimination against activists who fought for the rights of those on relief, or their relatives (Wade 1994, 51). Housing conditions were especially bad for renters who faced racism. Not only did a variety of formal and informal racist barriers to housing exist, but these practices were entirely legal (Backhouse 1999a, 251).

Some workers lived without permanent housing at all. The number of homeless people is difficult to quantify, since they fell through the cracks of the census (Wade 1994, 59). Most were unemployed men. Although there were fewer people without homes in the late 1930s than there had been earlier in the Depression, their numbers were still considerable.[4] Sleeping in parks, hostels and ramshackle shelters in "jungles" and spending

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[3]The figure of 2.6% in *Historical Statistics of Canada* is an estimate based on the urban averages of Toronto, Montréal, Winnipeg and Ottawa, and rural data extrapolated back from the 1941 census. This seems reason enough to treat it with more than the usual caution.

[4]Between 1932 and 1936, many single homeless men were removed from the cities and placed in federal camps where they would work for relief. Although the intention of state officials was to remove a source of unrest, this plan had the unintended consequence of assembling the poorest unemployed male workers in spaces where they could organize collectively. The struggles of the camp dwellers, organized in the Relief Camp Workers' Union (RCWU) (a WUL affiliate), led to the abolition of the camps after the 1935 "Regina

their days on the streets, in libraries or wherever else they could avoid harassment from police enforcing vagrancy laws and telling them to "move on," the homeless were one of the most oppressed and atomized layers of the working class.

Working-class households tended to be concentrated in residential neighbourhoods where most inhabitants belonged to the same class stratum and ethnic group. This was the social-geographical basis of working-class community life. In some cases, the result was tight-knit communities of working people of the same or related ethnicity. Anglo-Celtic workers, themselves divided by skill status, tended to live apart from others of European origin. The working class of Montréal, the largest city of the era, mostly lived in distinct Anglo-Celtic, French Canadian and Jewish neighborhoods, with some ethnically mixed areas such as the French and Irish Catholic Griffintown (Fahrni 2001, 57-67). Many of Toronto's Jews - the only non-Anglo-Celtic ethno-racial group to constitute over 5% of the city's population of slightly less than 700 000 (Harney 1985, 3) - lived in the area around Spadina Avenue. Such community environments not only allowed for sociability among members of the same ethno-racial group, but could also facilitate mutual aid in hard times and mobilization for struggle when necessity and opportunity both presented themselves (Patrias 1990, 14-20, 45-46). For Eastern and Southern European immigrants, the almost-complete sealing of Canada's border to immigrants and the end to sojourning (working for some years before returning to one's country of origin) during the Depression imposed a measure of

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Riot." See Brown 1987.

relative stability on community life and facilitated cooperation across ethno-racial lines.[5] Clearly, race and ethnicity were among the significant social relations mediating, and thereby shaping, class.

Racial oppression and ethnic chauvinism had a major influence on the organization of the community sphere. The few people of colour who dared to move out of their marginalized and, in practice if not in law, segregated areas into white-dominated neighborhoods often faced harassment and other racist violence. In Trenton, Nova Scotia in 1937, a crowd of several hundred destroyed a house purchased by an African-Canadian family (Comacchio 1999, 119). Elsewhere in the province, there was "segregated and unequal education for blacks" (Moreau 1997, 187). Vancouver's population of Chinese origin, the largest in Canada, was concentrated in the Strathcona district, where some worked for wages. By the 1930s, Chinese Canadians also lived in adjoining neighbourhoods, but "Chinatown" remained their enclave in a city where they experienced racism only slightly less virulent than that of earlier periods (Anderson 1991, 144-168).

While by the late 1930s the entire population in Canada of European origin may have belonged to what Constance Backhouse calls "the dominant white group," separated by a "racial chasm" from aboriginal people and those of Asian and African heritage, whiteness was "splintered in many directions" with "multiple subgroups form[ing] distinct rankings" (1999a, 9). Anglo-Celtic citizens were at the pinnacle of the hierarchy socially constructed

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[5]See Patrias 1990 (15-16). I owe clarification of this point, which deserves further investigation, to Craig Heron.

by racial oppression.[6] Outside Québec,[7] their supremacy was most pronounced in those smaller cities and towns in which they were the overwhelming majority of residents. Those of Northern European heritage were placed below them. French Canadians and people of Southern and Eastern European origin made up the lower ranks, whose claims to whiteness were denied or treated with skepticism by some of the Anglo-Celtic population who proudly identified as subjects of the British Empire. Francophones were sometimes told to "speak white" (Frager 1999, 234), for example. Jews, mostly immigrants from Eastern Europe, stood lower still.[8]

The community sphere entailed more than just residential geography, and solidarity was forged there as well as division. In the late 1930s, working-class sociability was still rooted in neighbourhood life. Many of the precious hours not devoted to earning a living or

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[6]The concept of racial formation - "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed" (Omi and Winant 1994, 55) - is helpful in understanding how various ethnicities were assimilated over time into the dominant white "race" in Canada, although Omi and Winant do not frame their theory in terms of racial oppression, as do Allen 1994 and, following Allen, Ignatiev 1995.

[7]In the historical period covered by this dissertation, the process by which the French-Canadian national minority came to be constituted as a Québec nation within that province's juridical borders and French-Canadian minorities elsewhere in the Canadian state was underway but was by no means completed. On this, see, for instance, Martel 1998 and Moreau 1995.

[8]Studies that explore the social construction of working-class whiteness in the USA from historical and materialist viewpoints include Ignatiev 1995 and Roediger 1991 and 1994. See also Arnesen 2001 and responses to it in the same issue of *International Labor and Working-Class History*. Unfortunately, there are still no Canadian equivalents of these pioneering works, but see Frager 1999.

the unpaid domestic toil that made it possible for wage-earners to go out to work were spent in such spaces as places of worship, drinking establishments, and halls run by the Royal Canadian Legion, some of the more secure union locals and ethnically-based groups ranging from the Tory Anglo-Celtic-supremacist Orange Order to the CPC-linked fraternal orders of Ukrainians, Finns, Jews and other European nationalities. Mass commercial consumer culture also had sites of its own, such as cinemas. It penetrated community and household life more generally through the radio and print media. However, many workers were too poor to sample more than a few of its pleasures.[9] In these neighbourhoods, various political parties and organizations were active, especially those that consciously sought working-class support. All the parties campaigned during elections; the CCF and CPC in particular were active year-round. The point of greatest significance for this dissertation's exploration of class as a structured process and relation is that in this variety of community settings, as well in the home, many of the unifying and divisive cultural "connective tissues" (Palmer 1988, 37) of working-class existence were created and held together. These underpinned both "the historical peaks of dissidence and confrontation"(37) and the everyday lived experience of subordination. Three examples of what such ties meant are the generally-ignored role of women's unpaid domestic labour as a form of support for striking husbands (Frager 1999,

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[9]The phenomena of commodified mass culture and the Canadian working class's relationship with it have been too-little studied to permit many judgments to be made about its role in working-class de/recomposition in the late 1930s and 1940s. Palmer 1992 (229-236) contends that in the inter-war years it "served to divide men from women at the same time as it understated class identification" (236); Heron 1993 (119-121) questions Palmer's evaluation.

233, citing Penfold 1996), neighbours taking direct action to stop evictions, and the mass community mobilizations that played a crucial role in key workplace struggles, among them the strikes at Ford in Windsor in 1945 and Stelco in Hamilton the following year. While the relations and experience of wage-labour are absolutely crucial to understanding the creation and remaking of working classes as historical formations, class is never shaped solely in the sphere of paid work. Communities and households are also sites of class formation.

Capitalist rule outside paid workplaces was, for many, less restrictive than it was during the hours in which wage-earners were under the eyes of managers and supervisors. For workers who lived in company-owned housing, especially in towns dominated by one employer, the power of the boss was never far away. In the Depression years, the impersonal rule of money was felt especially acutely.[10] Yet corporate influence and the generalized power of money were not the only non-state forms of class rule over civil society. Church officials might also be directly involved. In Québec, the fervently conservative and anti-communist Roman Catholic Church remained a powerful agency of moral regulation (Strange and Loo 1997, 147). It was also a force elsewhere in Canada. For example, the Catholic hierarchy in Toronto maintained a keen interest in the lives of its working-class parishioners. Singled out for special attention were Catholic Eastern European immigrants. Lay informants reported to the Archbishop, who for a time retained his own personal anti-

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[10]It should not be forgotten that the power of money was intimately tied with that of the state. Many people experienced harsh treatment when banks turned to state power to enforce their demands on debtors.

communist spy as well as having close relations with the municipal police force's Red Squad. The Catholic Welfare Bureau, one of the number of private religious organizations charged with distributing Toronto's municipal relief during the Great Depression, insisted that the children of Catholics on relief register for Sunday School and that families engage in morally-upright leisure pursuits. Other Catholic (and Protestant) organizations also served up moral injunctions along with their charitable services for the poor (Maurutto 1997, 116-129).

While the impersonal power of money, intrusive religious institutions and other private organizations did shape class relations, workers' interactions with state power were central to class formation outside the paid workplace sphere. There were many facets to this interaction. Taxation was not a major concern for most workers because few of them paid any federal income tax in the late 1930s: individuals earning less than $1000 annually and families whose income was below $2000 were exempt (Russell 1984, 56). While the state took little out of workers' pockets by way of direct taxation, it also offered virtually no services that would amount to a social wage. Those that did have this character were organized by the social supremacy of Anglo-Celtic citizens and by a gender regime for which shoring up the breadwinner status of working-class men was a priority.[11]

Working-class families probably had more general and sustained contact with the

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[11]Notable in the large literature on the gendering of social welfare in the US are Gordon 1990, Orloff 1993 and Skocpol 1992. Work on this topic in Canada, including Ursel 1992, Hobbs 1995 and Christie 2000, has yet to produce a study on par with Skocpol's (whatever its significant weaknesses).

public schools than with any other state-run institution.[12] In Québec, school attendance was not compulsory[13] and the schools themselves were under the control of Catholic and Protestant denominational officials rather than the provincial government (Magnuson 1980, 73-75). Across English Canada, most working-class children spent some years in public school.[14] By the late 1930s, the decline of jobs open to adolescents meant that more working-class youth were attending high school, even if many stayed only until they were legally allowed to quit (Stamp 1978, 92; Heron 1995, 246, 258). The streaming of students into either academic, technical or commercial high school courses was designed to dispatch young people into distinct gendered strata of the working class or, for a few, the middle class (244, 255-256). The desire of many students to escape from schooling was influenced by the attraction of getting out and earning money. Another factor was the school environment, which was one of discipline and deference to authority. This was enforced in classrooms, corridors and elsewhere on school property, and sometimes beyond the school grounds as

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[12]To avoid misinterpretation, I should note that I am not suggesting that the public school system - which workers fought to allow their children to attend - was nothing more than an apparatus of political administration. However, since my concern here is working-class composition I discuss state schools, like other institutions, only insofar as they shaped class relations.

[13]This changed in 1943, when the Duplessis government passed a law requiring students to attend school until the age of fourteen or the completion of grade seven (Marshall 1998, 11).

[14]The school-leaving age was fourteen in New Brunswick and Manitoba, sixteen in Nova Scotia and Ontario, and fifteen in the other provinces of English Canada (Keshen 1997b, 367).

well.[15] The intent was to inculcate traits deemed appropriate for good employees and citizens. The same goal influenced the curriculum. "Citizenship education in the economically depressed 1930s was expected to generate social harmony" (Bruno-Jofre 1998-99, 29), and so the virtues of free enterprise, Canada as a white settler state and the British Empire were extolled. It would be a mistake to assume that working-class youth simply absorbed these ideas uncritically and were thereby ideologically programmed. However, these teachings, like other manifestations of the dominant ideology in society, likely hindered the spread of political radicalism to some extent.[16]

The state paid noticeably less attention to older workers than to the young. One of the few social wage programmes that did exist was the Old Age Pension. With the passage of the necessary provincial enabling legislation in Québec and New Brunswick in 1936, the means-tested pension established in 1927 became available in every province to eligible women and men aged seventy and over. At $20 per month, it provided a mere pittance, but one to which many older workers believed they were entitled as citizens (Snell 1996, 9, xvi). Although this pension coexisted with laws which compelled children to support their elderly

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[15]For instance, at the London Technical and Commercial High School, the slogan "Get the 'Yes Sir' Habit" was proclaimed by teachers and emblazoned on signs. Smoking was prohibited within two blocks of the school (Anstead and Goodson 1993, 69-71)

[16]On the limits of ideological incorporation, see 2.4. It is interesting that the CPC leadership, by then yearning for respectability to further the cause of the Popular Front, directed members to ignore the 1939 Royal Tour of Canada rather than protest or criticize the monarchy (Kealey and Whitaker 1997, 335-336, 405-406). This suggests the persistence of popular monarchist sentiments which the CPC wished to conciliate rather than challenge.

parents, state officials' enforcement of these statutes and other kinds of pressure to coerce support were erratic (85-99).

Several other social wage measures were also in place. By the late 1930s, in all provinces except Prince Edward Island workmen's (*sic*) compensation acts granted benefits to injured workers whose claims were approved by the administrators of compensation boards. Significantly, certain occupations - including domestic service and retail sales, in which most wage-workers were women - were not covered (Guest 1997, 44-48). State pensions for the blind were created in 1937 (97-98). In most but not all provinces, widowed, divorced, separated or deserted women with children, and those with incapacitated husbands, could apply for a means-tested mothers' allowance or mothers' pension. Women who qualified received a monthly payment. The amount varied widely between provinces, but was never enough to lift a household out of poverty. In some cases, an applicant had to have lived in the province for a specified number of years. Citizenship might be a required qualification. All women who applied were obliged to prove their "good character" and continue to do so when subjected to the intrusive moral scrutiny of inspectors. Aboriginal women were automatically disqualified in most provinces (60-61; Little 1998, 76-106).

Beginning in 1935, the federal state undertook to subsidize home ownership on a small scale. The Dominion Housing Act of 1935 and National Housing Act of 1938 were policies designed to stimulate building construction, which had been hit very hard by the economic crisis, by providing funds to assist private lenders in providing mortgages. They also aimed to promote respectable single-family home ownership among better-off sections

of workers (Belec 1997; Belec, Holmes and Rutherford 1987, 213-217). Their impact on working-class life was minimal, though, since the policies of lending institutions remained unchanged and the small number of homes built with the assistance of these programmes were not on average more affordable than others (Belec 1997, 55, 57, 59). The Home Improvement Plan created in 1936 was similar in nature. It offered loans for home repairs. Targeted at married male property-owners who could demonstrate good character, including respectable TLC unionists, the Plan relied on idealized notions of the single-family household and "modern" wives preoccupied with home efficiency (Hobbs and Pierson 1988, 15, 23, 27-34). Given their narrow focus, such housing policy initiatives could not have had an impact beyond a small minority of working-class households.

Much more common was the experience of being forced to apply for poor relief. This was a highly-stigmatized form of welfare, although its stigma was somewhat reduced in working-class areas by the fact that so many people were on relief during the Depression. Relief was provided by municipal authorities, often in conjunction with private charities. It was the only recourse for working-class households that found themselves without enough money or some other means of meeting their basic needs. Applicants had to prove to relief officers that they were in dire poverty and genuinely deserved assistance; liquor permits and drivers' licenses or car registration plates had to be surrendered in order to qualify. Married men usually had top priority, followed by single men, transient men, single women, and transient families. Families headed by women might qualify for mothers' allowances rather than relief (Hobbs 1995, 196-200, 212-213). Relief could be granted in the form of goods

such as food, fuel and used clothing, as vouchers, the payment of bills or as cash. By the late 1930s, protests by the unemployed had succeeded in making cash relief more common and the obligation to work for relief rarer (Guest 1997, 84-88). However, relief benefits were still very low,[17] in accordance with the principle of "less eligibility" - relief had to be less than the lowest wages (Struthers 1983, 7) - and the belief that men who were not toiling as breadwinners for their families were "sick and unfit for citizenship" (Christie 2000, 213).

Even though the ranks of the jobless fell from the levels of the early 1930s, provincial and municipal governments continued to crack down on relief recipients, motivated both by reduced federal transfers for relief and fear that relief dependency was undermining working-class masculinity and threatening the family (Struthers 1983, 168-169; Christie 2000, 209-214; Hobbs 1995, 200-201). For example, in Ontario the Hepburn Liberals ordered a purge that led to 31 000 people being cut off relief in the winter months of early 1936 (Struthers 1994, 96). Thus the experience of relief was a harsh one that did not endear state officials and their elected masters to many workers, except perhaps for those secure Anglo-Celtic householders who felt rewarded for their upright conduct and looked down upon those less respectable than themselves.

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[17]The average monthly relief per person in 1935 was highest in Ontario, $7.56, and British Columbia, $7.02, and lowest in New Brunswick, $3.15, and Prince Edward Island, $1.60 (Hobbs 1995, 326). In Ontario the maximum shelter allowance for a family was set at $15 per month. The food allowance for a family of five was $5 per week (Struthers 1994, 85, 277). Recall, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, that in 1939 the Toronto Welfare Council calculated that the subsistence level income for a family of two adults and three children was $28.35 per month.

When working people ran afoul of the law, whether by virtue of being homeless, taking part in an unsanctioned march, or being suspected of engaging in one of many criminalized practices, they encountered police officers charged with maintaining social order.[18] Routine policing fell chiefly to municipal forces. Some provincial and municipal governments were driven by financial pressures to fold their police forces and turn to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; the RCMP was also often called out against strikes and demonstrations (Talbot, Jayewardene and Juliani 1985, 158; Brown and Brown 1973, 58). Police action against the militant struggles of the unemployed was "the most widespread, severe, and in many cases brutal" (Jamieson 1968, 216) repression seen since the years of the Workers' Revolt. The killing of three striking miners by the RCMP in Estevan, Alberta in 1931 (Brown and Brown 1973, 69-76) and their attack on the "On to Ottawa Trek" of relief camp workers in Regina in 1935 (Brown 1987, 179-200) were only the worst of many incidents. No wonder, then, that by the end of the decade the RCMP's image was tarnished in the eyes of the Left and the working class more broadly (Brown and Brown 1973, 78). Heavy-handed policing of protest continued even after the repeal in 1936 of the draconian

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[18]Neocleous 2000 offers a theory of police power that builds on his 1996 work. Greg Marquis's claim that in relation to the working class Toronto police "performed a service role that was highly personalized, minimally coercive and often genuinely helpful" (1992, 357) is one-sided. He admits that "the bulk of recorded police work was coercive" (357). The suggestion that the rise in the 1930s of patrol cars equipped with radios restructured the social service role of the police, with police responding to "domestic crises and similar interpersonal disputes" (358) is not developed in his article. Sangster 1995 (131-135) discusses working-class women's encounters with police and the courts, evidently institutions of sexist and racist class power.

Section 98 of the Criminal Code, which had made belonging to or supporting "seditious" organizations a crime and been used extensively against communists. Persecution of the Left was most severe in Québec. There the 1937 Act Respecting Communistic Propaganda - the "Padlock Law" - empowered the police to close buildings and destroy communist printed publications (Strange and Loo 1997, 129, 131, 133).[19]

In addition to the police, workers were subject to the attention of other officials charged with particular aspects of the political administration of civil society. Federal immigration officials, whose Department of Immigration and Colonization became a lowly branch of the Department of Mines and Resources in 1936, no longer had Section 98 at their disposal. As a result, it became harder for them to deport immigrants for being radicals. They did, however, continue to deport non-Anglo-Celtic immigrants for being "public charges" - in other words, on relief - albeit it a lower rate than in the early 1930s (Roberts 1988, 2, 158, 160-161, 191). In urban areas, public drinking establishments frequented by many working-class men, and a few women, were regulated by municipal inspectors.[20] Working-class households might be visited by public health inspectors who enforced regulations in ways that reflected the ideological assumptions of the respectable middle and ruling classes.

As this dissertation has argued, capitalist rule was wielded over households and in

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[19]See the recollections of the impact of the Padlock Law in Weisbord 1983 (79-80).

[20]On state regulation of Vancouver beer parlours in this period, see Campbell 2001.

communities in various ways. Not surprisingly, then, working-class people also organized themselves against relations of class rule in these spheres. Their organizations and the ways workers used them to try to meet their needs helped define the class composition that existed prior to the Second World War. The most significant community-based class movement of the Great Depression was that of the unemployed. It peaked in 1935, the year of the On to Ottawa Trek led by the RCWU (Brown 1987, 125-200) and "mass resistance, expressed in protest meetings, rallies, occupations, anti-eviction confrontations (an eviction had only to be rumoured for fliers to appear on telegraph polls [*sic*] giving the time and place at which volunteers should gather to keep out the bailiffs), and relief work strikes" (Manley 1998, 485) against cuts to relief in Ontario. The Trek was stopped by police repression, although it did lead to the abolition of the hated relief camps. In Ontario, the Hepburn government's tightening-up of relief administration combined with the anger of the wealthy and farmers and some improvement in employment levels to slow the movement (Struthers 1994, 98).

Another factor in the decline of the movement was the CPC's change of line. The CPC had taken the lead in organizing unemployed workers since the onset of the Depression.[21] With its abrupt turn in 1935 to the strategy of building a Popular Front against fascism, the party downplayed the cause of the unemployed. It initially opposed the On to Ottawa Trek (Manley 1998, 487). Its local activities in the late 1930s still included leading a sit-down of Chinese-Canadian unemployed men on the streetcar tracks at the busiest

[21]Its boldness and commitment were accompanied by the reckless tactics and sectarianism that were hallmarks of the "Third Period" line, as discussed in Manley 1998.

intersection in Calgary in 1937 (Palmer 1980, 147). When in 1938 British Columbia relief project workers marched out of their camps, which the provincial government had started to close down, and into Vancouver, the Communist leaders of the Relief Project Workers' Union (RPWU) cautioned against actions that might provoke disapproval. In response to a municipal ban on "tin-canning" (panhandling), the RPWU occupied three buildings and was met with a police assault (Phillips 1967, 116-119, 169, 172; Manley 1998, 488). In Toronto, where the CPC's central leadership exercised tighter control over the party than it could in far-off Vancouver (Manley 1997, 17), Communists tried to restrain the militancy of 1939 relief strikers. This cost them support among single unemployed men. By this point, the CPC was "unashamedly reformist" and "channelled [*sic*] mass protest into representative lobbies (invariably including at least one clergyman) of provincial governments, electoralism, and faith in the state" (488).

The unemployed workers' movement was marked by the cleavages of gender, ethnicity and political allegiance characteristic of the working class in this period. Unemployed male breadwinners were its focus. The 1935 Trekkers were almost entirely men, with women active in the host towns along the way. In Ontario, both single women and married women fighting for themselves and their children took part in the later phase of the struggle of the unemployed (485-486). While the movement was remarkable for its breadth, it was internally divided between moderates and the militant communist and socialist-influenced groups, chiefly those organized in the disproportionately non-Anglo-Celtic and CPC-led National Council of Unemployed Councils, but also others, including the CCF-

linked East York Workers' Association (Schulz 1975). Among the organizations that sought assistance for the jobless through the use of such respectable methods as lobbying and electing representatives to municipal councils were Halifax's Liberal-led Workers' Political and Protective Association and, also in Nova Scotia, the Pictou County Workers' Association (Manley 1998, 481-483).

So although the movement won real gains for unemployed wage-earning men and their dependents, and its radical-led wing challenged Anglo-Celtic nativism with appeals for class solidarity (480), it did not break up the existing class composition and open a period of generalized working-class recomposition. The reasons for this included the acceptance of the sexist denial of women's entitlement to paid work and the ideology of female domesticity of which this was a vital element, state repression, the split between households headed by Anglo-Celtic skilled men and the rest of the class, and the fact that struggles in paid workplaces were at a low level when those of the unemployed were at their height. Nevertheless, the movement did teach some workers what could be gained through self-organization and militancy, and some participants would later become active trade unionists (490).

Organizations of the unemployed were not the only working-class community-based groups in the late 1930s. Some came together to fight for better housing. Notable here was the Vancouver Housing Association, which united a range of working-class and middle-class activists in a major public campaign for affordable housing (Wade 1994, 87-92). Middle-class figures were not found in another common kind of community group, union "ladies'"

auxiliaries. The wives of male trade unionists were encouraged to join these bodies, although not all unions had them. Auxiliaries spoke out for unions, pushed for the purchase of union label goods, contributed unpaid labour for union functions and provided support for union struggles, as well as holding social gatherings for members and families.[22] Another significant group was the Toronto-based Workers' Educational Association (WEA), which also had a Women's Auxiliary. By the end of the 1930s, the WEA had thirty-nine district associations across the country (Taylor 2001, 23-29; Radforth and Sangster 1981-82, 63-64). In addition to classes, some taught by pro-labour university faculty (59-60), in 1937 the WEA made a venture into radio with lectures carried by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (Klee 1995, 108-110).

Following its adoption of the Popular Front line, the CPC initiated local women's organizations to take up issues such as the rising prices of consumer staples, children's interests and other concerns of urban working-class community life. Despite this focus on organizing women in the community, the party's gender politics, including its pro-family stance, accepted rather than undermined beliefs in women's essentially domestic and maternal nature (Sangster 1989, 137-141, 158-160). The CPC did, though, exalt an image of working-class mothers' "strength, resourcefulness, and political awareness, not passivity, dependence, and private leisure" (159-160) which jarred with the dominant gender ideology, even if it did not critique it outright, and some Communist women exercised significant

[22]See the study of the IAM's auxiliary by Murray (1988). She hints that the auxiliary's social activities were becoming less popular in the 1930s (84).

activist initiative.

Communists were not the only people who sought to organize working people in the community sphere in accordance with an ideological vision. Of the various associations made up of workers but led by middle-class or ruling-class figures and loyal to the status quo, the largest were the mass organizations run by the Roman Catholic Church in Québec. By 1939, the Catholic Worker Youth had a paper membership of close to 42 000, of whom about 4000 were activists (Cole-Arnal 1997, 512). Rooted in Montréal, it supported the CCCL unions exclusively and its official ideology was the ultra-conservative, corporatist, and intensely anti-communist social Catholicism of Québec's bishops (514, 518-519). An adult equivalent of the youth organization, the Canadian Catholic Workers' League (CWL), was officially formed in 1939 (Collin 1996, 36). Both had their own public press and enrolled women and men in separate sections. The roots in the working class of Québec's Catholic leagues were much deeper than those of any Establishment-run association for workers in English Canada. One significant English-Canadian organization, which received official Papal sanction in 1938 (Lotz 1975, 112), was the Antigonish Movement in Nova Scotia. Primarily rural, with "a fundamentally petty producer-populist programme" (Sacouman 1981, 157), its adult education and cooperatives were influential in areas where many men worked for wages in the coal or steel industries but also returned to subsistence fishing or farming when necessary (1977, 83-85). It stayed clear of party politics, including the CCF (Baum 1980, 197, 200). While the Antigonish Movement was quite unlike the stridently Catholic workers' leagues in Québec in many respects, both brought workers together under the

leadership of their "betters" around ideas that were not threatening to capitalists and the major political parties that spoke for them. Although the Catholic leagues did promote a certain highly-constrained kind of class identity, such associations acted as alternatives and barriers to working-class self-organization in the community,

The same could be said of the Liberal, Conservative, National Union, Social Credit and Reconstruction parties, to the limited extent that they tried to organize workers. In general, these capitalist parties were run by cliques that were really only interested in enfranchised workers as voters and foot-soldiers for their electoral contests.[23] The "dominant values" that the Liberal Party "propagated as a mediating institution between the state and the mass of the citizens were those of deference and unreflective loyalty" (Whitaker 1977, 413) - hardly levers to encourage anyone to act and think in terms of working-class interests opposed to those of the ruling class. To fend off challenges from the Left in the Depression, some provincial Liberals, notably in British Columbia, Ontario and Nova Scotia, adopted "New Deal"-influenced platforms and won elections on this basis (Robin 1978, 45; Penner 1978, 211; Beck 1978, 211). The Conservatives, arch-loyalists to British imperial traditions, were even more resolutely hostile to independent working-class politics than the Liberals. The National Union in Québec, Social Credit in the Western provinces and Reconstruction in the Maritimes all made populist appeals for votes. Their role in relation to the working

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[23]Those denied the franchise included Chinese Canadians, Japanese Canadians in British Columbia and Saskatchewan, and aboriginal people (*History* 1997, 80-83). Women in Québec did not gain the provincial franchise until 1940 (76).

class was fundamentally the same as that of the traditional parties, although elements of the National Union and Social Credit were willing to use radical rhetoric to garner workers' votes and Social Credit had attracted some enthusiastic working-class support in Alberta (Brodie and Jenson 1988, 175-181; Hannant 1985). Nevertheless, although none of these capitalist parties had a significant organized active mass base in the working class, together they retained the electoral loyalties of the majority of workers. This indicates the frailty of independent working-class organization and consciousness in relation to "official politics," even in the Depression.

As argued in the first chapter of this dissertation, organizations, including political parties, with meaningful roots among workers play an important role in mediating class experience and influencing the development of working classes as historical formations. In Canada, most of the radical "minority [of workers] with a higher level of *political* commitments, knowledge, and organizational skills than the majority" (Le Blanc 2000, 141) were members or supporters of the CCF and CPC. This radical minority influenced broader layers of people who were inclined towards militancy or who took an interest in public affairs. For some workers, these two parties represented the independence of their class from the parties of employers and financiers. By the late 1930s, the CCF was no longer the loose federation for electoral action of agrarian reformers, labourites, socialists, and left-leaning middle class people that it had been for the first few years after its launch in 1932. By 1938 it had become a parliamentary party, with federal and provincial sections (Young 1969, 148), whose local clubs were strongest among Western workers and farmers. In the

process, those for whom class struggle and workers' self-organization were central to socialist strategy ceased to exist as a current that challenged Fabian statism in the CCF.[24] Most CCF leaders made their appeals "on the basis of the universalist values of liberal democracy" (Naylor 1993, 28), not in class-specific language.

Still, it was primarily to independent commodity producers and, increasingly, urban workers, that the CCF addressed its appeals. The party's social base was mainly among farmers and workers in English Canada. In the 1935 federal election, the CCF fielded candidates in 48% of ridings; all but three of these 188 constituencies were west of the Ottawa River (Whitehorn 1992, 72). All together, the CCF garnered just over 391 000 votes, 8.9% of the total. This broke down into 33.6% in British Columbia, 21.3% in Saskatchewan,19.4% in Manitoba, 13% in Alberta, 8% in Ontario and 0.6% in Quebec. No candidates stood in the Maritimes (Young 1969, 319).[25] Yet these statistics conceal the fact that the party polled more votes in Ontario - almost 128 000 - than in any other province (Whitehorn 1992, 72). The CCF's working-class support here and elsewhere was not

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[24]See the pioneering study of the class-struggle current in the 1930s in Naylor 1993; Naylor 1997 also reveals the decline of class politics in the CCF. CCF Fabianism was most famously articulated in the book *Social Planning for Canada* (1935) produced by the League for Social Reconstruction, a small group made up of dissident members of the Anglo-Canadian intelligentsia (Horn 1980).

[25]British Columbia CCF support reflected the strength of urban socialist workers. CCF voter support was most clearly agrarian in Saskatchewan (Brodie and Jenson 1988, 180).

accompanied by formal union affiliations or an organized CCF presence in the unions.[26] In fact, the only union to affiliate was the UMW in Nova Scotia, which linked itself to the party in 1938 to the surprise of CCF leaders (Earle and Gamberg 1989, 98-101). Party officials were eager to garner more working-class support, yet wanted to avoid becoming embroiled in the conflicts between competing union federations (Young 1969, 79-82). Though the CCF had no official strategy of involvement in community struggles, some CCF members were active in the unemployed movement and other campaigns.[27] This participation helped earn respect for the CCF to sustain it as a weak mass farmer-labour party with a programme, the Regina Manifesto, that spoke of achieving far-reaching social reforms without violence and "solely by constitutional methods" (qtd. 305). CCF clubs at the base were generally democratic and participatory bodies animated by enthusiastic volunteers.[28] Study groups and other socialist educational activities were central to their work. At the summit the CCF was run by a small number of elected leaders and hired staff, although this federal and provincial officialdom was still quite ramshackle (146-148; Zakuta 1964, 35-36, 45).

The young CCF faced competition in its efforts to make itself the party of Canadian

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[26]In 1939, Millard stated to other CCF leaders, probably accurately, that the CPC had more influence in the unions than did the CCF (Young 1969, 273).

[27]In addition to the evidence in Schulz 1975, note the CCF's response to the expulsion of 1100 persons from hostels in Toronto in 1935 (Caplan 1973, 72).

[28]The social history of the CCF has been very inadequately researched, but glimpses of the grassroots life of the party in the late 1930s can be seen in Melnyk 1989 (58, 104, 35-137) and Avakumovic 1977 (117-119).

workers. The CPC had set itself the same goal at its foundation in 1921, although it simultaneously asserted that it already represented the true interests of the working class by virtue of its Marxist programme (Angus 1981). Its base of support was smaller than the CCF's, but its membership was more ideologically homogeneous and more tightly organized by party structures. Beginning in 1935, the CPC downplayed talk of class struggle and threw itself enthusiastically into building a cross-class Popular Front of anti-fascist forces as part of the international Communist movement's strategy to defend the USSR.[29] In the late 1930s, campaigns to aid the faltering Spanish Republic and back China against Japan, protests for peace and against British Prime Minister Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler, and agitation on immediate issues in Canada netted the party new members, including many Anglo-Celtic white collar workers and middle-class people.[30] This pleased party leaders, who had been trying from the beginning to "Canadianize" the CPC. However, most CPC

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[29]Manley 1997 examines the meaning and practice of the Popular Front for the CPC at the close of the 1930s. In Alberta, the CPC even managed to obtain the approval of a Mormon bishop in Drumheller, who recommended that local Social Crediters work closely with the CPC (Kealey and Whitaker 1997, 219). On the Popular Front as international strategy, see Claudin 1975 (166-242). Denning 1996 casts the Popular Front era in the US in a new light as "a laboring of culture itself" (462) (but note Warren 1999's critique of Denning for distorting the politics of the Popular Front). The same cannot be said about Canada, where there was no working-class upsurge in the 1930s akin to that which gave birth to the CIO and so influenced American cultural production. Some sense of Communists and culture in Canada in the late 1930s can be gleaned from Kimmel 1993.

[30]While the CPC claimed 16 000 members in 1939 (Avakumovic 1975, 115), the real figure was probably at least several thousand lower. This does not, however, register the layer of people sympathetic to the party. Muldoon 1977 (159-162) makes a rare effort to calculate the numerical reality behind membership claims in the 1940s.

members were still non-Anglo-Celtic Europeans active in the many CPC-linked community groups based on ethnicity (Manley 1997, 12-14). These included the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association and the Finnish Organization of Canada. The Canadian League for Peace and Democracy was the most prominent of the CP-linked groups set up around a cause rather than a social identity. New recruits were joining an organization that had become somewhat looser in an effort to accommodate them and to immerse all Communists in "mass work" in communities and the mainstream unions. This looseness did not, however, significantly democratize the CPC, whose top leadership attempted, not always successfully, to run the party from coast to coast and to ideologically consolidate the membership around Stalinist doctrine (5-10).[31]

In 1937, CPC leader Tim Buck called for CCF-CPC cooperation to "establish the working class base for people's unity and the militant spearhead of a people's front which would smash reaction and make our Canada a land of democratic people's progress" (qtd. Penner 1977, 157). Since the CCF rejected such unity overtures,[32] which were typically

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[31]In practice, Party members enjoyed greater independence the further they were from the Toronto "centre" (Manley 1997, 15; Palmer ed. 1988, 52). Manley's observation that the CPC was especially concerned that members might "be seduced by Trotskyism" (1997, 8) likely says more about leadership worries about those working-class members who chaffed against the CPC's Popular Front moderation (14-22) than about the influence of the tiny Trotskyist current in Canada.

[32]There were, however, CCF members who responded positively. Some did so because they held pro-Popular Front, pro-USSR views then popular on the Left, others simply because they advocated the unity of working-class political forces (Naylor 1993, 26-27). CCF opposition to unity with CPC was driven by a mix of motives, including outright anti-communism, resentment of Communist sectarianism, socialist criticisms of Stalinism

issued as ultimatums designed to open up rifts between CCF members and their leaders, the CPC became increasingly interested in improving its relations with the Liberals. Indeed, the CPC was preparing to support the reelection of the Liberals in the next federal contest (Penner 1988, 155). Like many other aspects of Popular Front politics, this opening to Mackenzie King's party hardly fostered a sensibility of class antagonism.

Thus, as vehicles for advancing community campaigns, building solidarity, and helping workers develop class-based generalizing understandings of society out of their experiences and aspirations, both the CCF and CPC had major limits. The orientation of the CCF itself was primarily, though not exclusively, parliamentary. Party leaders appreciated that the community and union activism of CCF members gave the CCF publicity and credibility, but it was not central to the party's strategy. This was based on winning governmental office. "Making socialists" through education was a means to that end. The CPC placed greater emphasis on community activism and was not so deeply attached to respectable and legal forms of political activity. Yet Stalinist ideological monolithism and the weakness of internal democracy made the CPC less hospitable for independent-thinking activists than the looser CCF.[33] The mutual hostility and sectarian self-interest of the two parties did not foster class unity. James Naylor's contention that from 1935 "neither of the

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and the Popular Front, and fear that association with the CPC would stand in the way of CCF electoral advance.

[33]See Alfred Edwards's recollection of the rigidity of a Communist discussion group (1995, 287).

large organizations of the left spoke the language of class as understood by the labour and socialist parties of the early 1930s or before" and that "without such a politics, the distinctiveness of left parties was increasingly compromised" (1993, 29, 30) is also important for an analysis of the place of the Left in class composition.

So too is the failure of these parties, or any organized current within them, to formulate counter-hegemonic ideology. This claim may seem harsh. After all, CCF and CPC leaders criticized capitalism, supported union and community organizing to improve workers' conditions and held out the promise that, if elected to government, they would use the state to build socialism. However, Gramsci is clear that capitalist hegemony cannot successfully be broken by politics for which "the transformation of the subordinate class into a dominant one is excluded, either because the problem is not even considered (Fabianism, De Man,[34] an important part of the Labour Party), or because it is posed in an inappropriate and ineffective form (social-democratic tendencies in general)" (Gramsci 1971, 160-161). He writes that "though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity" (161). In other words, politics capable of constructing the hegemony of the working class to replace that of the capitalist class must involve a strategy for replacing the rule of the latter by that of the former along with those social groups with which it has formed a genuine alliance or bloc. In this period, neither the CCF's politics nor

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[34]Henri de Man (1885-1953), a Belgian advocate of parliamentary socialism.

those of the CPC challenged capitalist rule in paid workplaces with ideas of workers' self-management or recognized the class character of the existing state's political administration of civil society, even if they did denounce pro-business government policies and advocate the replacement of market regulation by state planning. With the exception of encouraging the spread of unionization, working-class self-activity was not an acknowledged element of either party's strategy. No doubt some members of both parties had different political conceptions, but they do not seem to have constituted themselves as even loosely-organized currents. So while it is fair to say that both parties challenged capitalist legitimacy in various ways, the politics of the CCF and CPC could not ultimately be counter-hegemonic because they did not pose the problem of how subalterns could abolish their subordination.[35]

This assessment ought not to lead to a dismissal of the importance of the two parties of the workers' movement. The very existence of the CCF and CPC as organizations genuinely rooted in working-class communities in English Canada and anglophone Montréal[36] and active in many community and union struggles created a space for

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[35]The underlying similarity of CCF and CPC politics is discussed briefly in McDougall 1984 (10) and at greater length in McKay 2000a (95-98). My interpretation differs from McKay's in framing the issue around capitalist rule rather than liberal rule (the latter is not the only conceivable form of the former). For a presentation of McKay's thought-provoking perspective on liberal rule, which shapes his 2000a, see his 2000b. Schwarz and Durham 1985, which examines British socialist politics in relation to the state between 1910 and 1924, is noteworthy in light of the influence of British socialism on Canadian socialism. The interpretation of the history of socialist thought in Draper 1992 also informs my own.

[36]On the basis of interviews, Fournier 1979 estimates the 1939 membership of the CPC in Québec as 200 French Canadians and 800 others (47). The CCF in Québec was

independent working-class politics and meant that in 1939 leftists who sought class unity,[37] built new parties separate from the "old line" parties and promoted an alternative to capitalism were more influential than they had been since the early 1920s. The two parties of the Left, along with the workers' organizations in which many of their members participated and from which they derived support, made the working-class movement in English Canada a force in the community sphere that could not be ignored, though not a real threat to the men who ruled Canada in the Great Depression. The rifts of skill, gender, ethno-racial identity, nation, and party allegiance among workers - who had not asserted themselves as the largest class in society - were still wide and deep.[38]

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weak and largely made up of anglophones (Horn 1984, 143-145).

[37]As noted earlier, the meaning given to class unity was inflected by the subordination of racially-oppressed people and women. When sexist or racist practices were challenged by white male workers, it was usually because such practices were seen to divide workers - which they did - and not because they were also instances of specific kinds of oppression distinct from class exploitation. See Sangster 1989 (182-183, 229-235).

[38]No adequate mapping of class locations in Canadian society in the late 1930s has been carried out. Johnson refers to the "numerical predominance" (1972, 151) of the petite bourgeoisie in the 1930s. But 1931 census data (Meltz 1965, 119), the best original source for the 1930s, indicates that the labour force in agriculture, forestry and fishing (a minority of whom were wage-earners, not independent commodity producers) was 1 221 500 while that in mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas and water, transport and communications, trade, finance and services (some of whom were middle or ruling class, not proletarians) was 2 695 600. Although these industrial aggregates are extremely broad and abstract, they suggest that the income-earning official labour force contained more wage-workers than independent commodity producers by the beginning of the 1930s. A small majority of the total labour force of 3 917 100 probably occupied proletarian class locations in 1931. Even after the expansion of waged work in the 1940s, a federal civil service memorandum, probably from 1949, estimated that 40% earned a living through means other than wages (Struthers 1998, 195).

4.2 The War Years

Wartime political administration and the development of a war economy brought considerable changes to workers' household and community lives. The new state security regime was immediately apparent. The DOCR criminalized statements that could be construed as endangering the war effort or the state and made possible official press censorship, the closing of newspapers and preventive detention without trial, including the suspension of the rights to *habeas corpus* and legal counsel (Whitaker 1986, 138). Canadian residents of German birth who had not become British subjects by 1922 were deemed "enemy aliens" and ordered to register with the RCMP. In June 1940 RCMP officers were given the power to issue warrants for searches related to banned organizations (Whitaker and Kealey 2000, 129). By early 1941, nine periodicals published in Canada had been banned (Whitaker 1986, 141). Harassment of the Left intensified. One anarchist of Italian origin would even have been deported to fascist Italy if a defence campaign had not been mounted (143-144). In May 1940, an Ottawa judge ruled the CPC illegal and sent a member to prison. Later the same month, PC 2363 officially banned the CPC and fourteen associated organizations (145; Penner 1988, 169). About one hundred Communists, mostly people who held leadership positions, were arrested and interned (Radforth 2000, 194). Others went underground. Such actions cast a chill on left-wing activity in general,[39] but specific ethnic

[39]It should be recalled that the DOCR was not used exclusively against the CPC. As noted in 3.2, SWOC leader Millard and other unionists were arrested early in the war.

groups were singled out, particularly Ukrainians and Finns (Whitaker and Kealey 2000, 130). As public expressions of nativism abounded along with unfounded fears of treasonous "Fifth Columnists," hundreds of people of German and Italian origin were also interned. Many, though not all, were sympathetic to fascism (132-137; Liberati 2000). These arrests created a climate of fear among German and Italian Canadians in general.[40] Under the DOCR, doing or even simply saying anything that might be considered unpatriotic became more difficult than it had been during peacetime.[41]

Gearing up the economy for war production soon brought higher levels of employment and better, more steady incomes for many working-class households, a welcome relief from the hardships of the 1930s. State regulation through the Wartime Prices and Trade Board (WPTB) set up in September 1939 did not have a major impact on working-class life until sweeping price controls were imposed at the beginning of December 1941. Prior to that point the WPTB's most significant measure had been to freeze rents, initially in the cities of Halifax, Kingston and Calgary in January 1940, then in fifteen others later that year, and across Canada in 1941 (Keshen 1994-95, 117). It did this in response to the large-scale migration from rural regions to urban areas to take civilian jobs and military postings.

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[40]The use of anti-German and anti-Italian sentiments by employers to intimidate and fire workers, shown in 3.2, made this fear quite justifiable. The treatment of Japanese Canadians will be discussed below.

[41]The "Civil Liberties" column in the magazine *Canadian Forum* during the early years of the war records many of the charges laid under the DOCR, often with a sardonic tone.

Not surprisingly, this population movement, estimated at 300 000 between 1940 and 1943 (115), led to a housing crisis.

The influx of wage-workers and their dependents was an opportunity for landlords to gouge tenants, and many did just that even after WPTB rent controls were put in place. Minor fines for the few who were prosecuted were an ineffective deterrent. Overcrowding and exorbitant rents were endemic (116-119). The "widespread resentment, social tension and frustration among those residents who could afford decent housing but could not get it, or those who were accustomed to cheap depression rents and house prices" (White 1992, 125) observed in Halifax also occurred in other cities and towns. The federal state's creation in early 1941 of Wartime Housing Limited (WHL), a crown corporation that "functioned more like a large independent builder in the private sector than a federal housing agency" (Wade 1986, 44), did not get at the roots of the housing shortage: the production of housing for profit by private business. The nearly 26 000 units of housing the WHL built and rented between 1941 and 1945 were intended for the households of war workers, not as the first step in the massive state plan for housing demanded by the CCF (46, 44, 53).

It was not only housing that was overcrowded. In cities, buses and streetcars were often filled to capacity as columns of workers packed public transit and car travel was restricted by the rationing of gasoline and tires. The result was not pleasant. In the words of one female war worker who took the streetcar in Toronto, "we're packed like sardines... The used smell of people who have been up all night, their sweat (and mine) is nauseating, but at least I can't fall" (qtd. Davis and Lorenzkoski 1998, 437). In many large cities, "rush

hour" was now at least three hours long due to the staggered ends of different shifts. Cultural conventions dictated that men and women and passengers of different classes and ethnicities not intermingle on public transport, yet wartime crowding made this inevitable. Sexual harassment increased. There were other gendered consequences of overcrowded public transit: women carrying bags and parcels were urged to not travel at times when they might take spaces from more "deserving" male workers, although they themselves might be wage-earners, and complaints about smoking (438-447). With more workers commuting, sometimes in new and unfamiliar surroundings, travel became an additional source of aggravation.

By the time price controls were introduced in December 1941, the Consumer Price Index had risen 17.8% since the beginning of the war (Keshen 1994-95, 112). This was noticeably more than the growth of pre-wage control pay rates. Higher prices were particularly hard on poor working-class households, such as those in which less-skilled wage-earners were not putting in longer hours at better wage rates. Not only did workers have to pay higher prices, but the steadily falling exemption threshold for federal income tax, along with the National Defence Tax and forced savings - 8% of taxable income for unmarried earners, 10% for married (113) - meant that taxation bit deeper into household income. There was strong pressure to buy Victory Bonds; between 1941 and 1945 almost $10 billion was raised this way (Choko 1994, 50). People were also urged to collect scrap metal, paper and other items for use in war production.

As the war wore on, rationing was imposed. Sugar, tea and coffee quotas, at first

voluntary, were made compulsory in 1942. Butter, alcohol and gasoline were added to the list that year, and beef and preserves in 1943 (Keshen 1994-5, 120, 124). Meat was not sold on Tuesdays and Thursdays (127).[42] After years in which high unemployment and low wages had forced so many households to lower their expectations and cope with poverty or at least spend very carefully, having more money but not being able to spend it on basic consumer goods was a source of frustration. A common way around this problem was to barter coupons or rationed products. Another was to eat in restaurants, where total spending rose from $157 to $211 million between 1942 and 1945 (124, 127). Household production of food and clothing was "intensified, reinvigorated, and ratified" (Parr 1999, 85). Some people resorted to various illegal practices in the underground economy in order to circumvent controls on consumption. Legal prosecution for violation of WPTB rules was fairly rare, especially for minor infractions, so "black market" food or other goods that made daily life a little more enjoyable found their way into many working-class households (Keshen 1994-5, 119-132, 114).

In order to counteract resentment and complaints - possibly most common in Québec where support for the war was weakest - stemming from prices and shortages, state agencies constantly exhorted citizens to be patriotic and accept such difficulties as merely "inconveniences." Active participation to assist in the political administration of

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[42]From August 1945, in response to the complaints of observant Catholics who abstained from meat on Fridays, the meatless days were changed to Tuesdays and Fridays (Keshen 1994-95, 134).

consumption was solicited. Over 16 000 women signed up to monitor prices for the Consumer Branch of the WPTB, whose publication had a circulation of 350 000 (Parr 1999, 85; Fahmi 2001, 252-253).[43] The state's broader propaganda efforts were handled by the Bureau of Public Information (later, the Wartime Information Board (WIB)), military information services and the Red Cross (Douglas and Greenhous 1995, 281).[44] Radio, posters,[45] newspapers, newsreels and other films saturated the population with calls to pull together as a united nation for victory. The officially-recognized features of "democratic propaganda" included "pride in Canada," "confidence in Canadian institutions," personal identification with the war effort, belief in freedom and "a cheery, serene, buoyant spirit" confident in victory (qtd. 280). Emphasis was placed on the independent role of Canada in the war effort. Anglo-Celtic citizens were reminded of the loyalty of other European immigrants. They too were Canadians, and deserving of the respect and interest of citizens who traced their origins to Britain. Publications and broadcasts used the slogan "Canadians All" (Young 1981b, 198-199; 1988, 35-37). As in all matters ideological, the effects of this immense effort on working-class consciousness are difficult to assess. There was very little

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[43]Such public attention to household consumption, hitherto generally treated as private and individual, would change the way some working-class women thought about their purchasing, as discussed in 4.3 below.

[44]The independent working-class radio broadcast *Labour Forum* on the CBC was a casualty of state control of the mass media: direction of this wartime broadcast by the WEA was first diluted, then eliminated, and the WIB then tried to use the show as another mouthpiece for its own aims (Klee 1995, 117-128).

[45]See Choko 1994.

sympathy for fascism or the enemy powers among workers, and the Allied war effort undoubtedly enjoyed widespread support outside Québec. However, popular repudiation of fascism did not necessarily translate into obedience of wartime political administration, as the wartime strike wave and underground economy proved. Compliance with wartime regulations cannot simply be equated with willing consent. Unfortunately, the hidden history of the individual and collective attitudes and behaviour of members of working-class households during the Second World War has not yet been excavated.[46]

It is clear, though, that the wartime condemnation of fascist policies did not do much to combat racism in Canada. The war subjected non-Anglo-Celtic residents to what could be called a loyalty test. As mentioned previously, chauvinistic sentiments against Germans and Italians were not uncommon. The entry of Japan into the war fanned racism against people of Japanese origin, most of whom lived in British Columbia. The fishing boats of Japanese Canadians in the province were seized in December 1941. The next month the state ordered "male enemy aliens of military age" (Sunahara 1981, 37) to be removed from coastal areas. Japanese Canadians were banned from fishing for the duration of the war, and their boats ordered sold (37). PC 1486 in February 1942 allowed the Minister of Justice to have anyone removed from the British Columbia coastal zone and detained, citizen or not (47). By November, nearly 21 000 Japanese Canadians had been moved to detention camps in

[46]Challinor 1995 explores some of this social and political history of wartime Britain.

other parts of British Columbia, settled on the Prairies or relocated further east (76).[47] There was no organized protest from any section of the working class. Far from it: *The Fisherman*, jointly published by two Pacific fishers' unions (North 1974, 12) and a voice for the banned CPC (Cohn 1985, 4-5), wrote in January 1942 that "the Japanese should give proof of their loyalty not by exclaiming how hurt their frustrated pride is, but by accepting in good spirit any measures the Canadian Government may deem necessary in order to protect this country from any fifth column activities or sabotage on the part of Japanese, whether Canadian born or not" (qtd. 7). The British Columbia CCF leadership, including left-wingers Colin Cameron and Dorothy Steeves, backed the mass expulsion (12-15). There was more opposition to the subsequent federal government decision in 1944 to deny the franchise to Japanese Canadians living in provinces where they had not previously been disenfranchised (*History* 1997, 81). Yet overall, the pre-war drift away from class politics along with racism and loyalty to the war effort seem to have buried the commitment to class solidarity across ethno-racial lines that had been a hallmark of the radical wing of the working-class movement in the 1930s.

No other ethnicity was subjected to the kind of racist collective punishment meted out to Japanese Canadians. In fact, some moved up in the racial hierarchy during the war. Ukrainian Canadians, for instance, were seen in a relatively positive light because they

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[47]As Sunahara 1981 demonstrates, the treatment meted out to Japanese Canadians was driven by racism. The federal cabinet ignored officials who suggested that the Japanese-Canadian population was no threat (27-48). Granatstein and Johnson 1988 is an unpersuasive attempt to criticize the "received version" of the forced evacuation.

volunteered for military service at a higher than average rate, perhaps more because of high unemployment than other motives (Palmer 1982, 18). Because China was aligned with the Allies against Japan, anti-Chinese racism became less intense (1980, 158). Yet French-Canadian self-assertion was still often met with English-Canadian chauvinism: in early 1945, an attempt to set up a French-language radio station and incorporate the French-Canadian Association of Alberta evoked such widespread hostility, including the opposition of the two CCF MLAs, that the provincial legislature refused the request for incorporation and passed a motion opposing the granting of a license by the CBC to the francophone station (1991, 9-14).

State activity directed at working-class households and communities in the early years of the war was not restricted to propaganda, controls, housing and policing. New social wage programmes became available. From the beginning of the war, the state supplemented its cash transfers to the working class by providing dependents' allowances to the wives of men in the military. No means test was applied, nor did the woman have to have children to receive an allowance. A wife's income did not reduce her entitlement.[48] Common law wives were eligible if they had lived with the soldier, sailor or airman for at least two years. The only demand placed on income-earning children living at home was that they pay for their room and board; beyond that they were not required to contribute to the household (Christie 2000, 254-256). Although a dependents' allowance was not a legal right, its payment was

[48]Fahmi 2001 suggests that many women did indeed consider themselves entitled to dependents' allowances, even though it was not technically a right (181-182).

in effect treated as "an extension of the husband's work for the nation and his citizenship rights" (254). However, because the allowance was initially set at a level that would support a wife and two dependents, larger families were forced to turn to charities for help. Only in 1942 was a process established for families to apply to the state for additional support (256-258). Some provision was also made for dependent mothers. A mother who could prove that she had been solely supported by her son before he signed up could also receive five days worth of his assigned pay each month. It was much harder for mothers to qualify for this payment than it was for wives to obtain dependents' allowances; this, and the small size of the sum involved, was seen as an indignity by many mothers (254). The difference between the social wage measures for wives and mothers stemmed from the commitment of state officials to the ideology of the male breadwinner. The state would stand in for men in the military and provide the support that a breadwinner would otherwise have brought in. In order to maintain soldiers' morale, officials avoided making moral judgments about the character of wives and paid out allowances to women who had illegitimate children or otherwise transgressed gender norms (258-263). While breaking from the punitive stance of relief administration in the way it paid out money to many working-class women, the dependents' allowance scheme also underscored the reliance of women on breadwinner husbands, thereby reinforcing the supremacy of sexist and heterosexist family arrangements.[49]

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[49]Fahmi argues that Christie "underestimates the degree to which questions of 'morality' continued to play a role in the administration of dependents' allowances" (2001,

The other social wage programme introduced early in the war was Unemployment Insurance (UI). Passed in 1940 by the federal parliament, UI would pay benefits beginning in January1942 (Cuneo 1979, 156) to workers who had made contributions and who were not excluded by the UI Act. For those without dependents, benefits ranged from $4.08 to $12.24 per week, depending on the workers' insured income (157). This was 85% of the rate for those with dependents (Pierson 1990a, 94). Those deemed ineligible included workers with "permanent" jobs - federal, provincial and municipal employees, and teachers -, and those who worked in logging, fishing and agriculture, nursing and domestic service (98-99). In these ways UI reflected the prevailing stratification of the working class by wage levels, which itself was intimately tied up with racial and gender oppression. UI excluded altogether some of the poorest sections of the working class, such as domestic servants and agricultural labourers. Benefit rates were deliberately set so low that most workers who did qualify for UI could not possibly survive on benefits, in keeping with the notion of "less eligibility" (Struthers 1983, 212). Thus UI was a classic example of the dynamics of political administration. It was won as a result of the struggles of the unemployed in the 1930s. Yet it responded to workers' needs and demands in such a way as to minimize the increase in working-class social power that would come from granting wage-earners a new right to non-market access to subsistence. It also served the state's wartime interest in raising money. Because UI was brought in as unemployment was plummeting, the UI fund into which

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186). She also notes the ideological heritage of this programme in "an older conception of citizenship that emphasized loyalty to the nation expressed through military service" (180).

workers, employers and the state paid was seen by the federal government as a way to generate additional funds for the war effort. This turned out to be correct: by the end of 1945, workers had received benefits worth 6% of the value of the UI fund ploughed into investments (Cuneo 1979, 156).

On a smaller scale than UI and dependents' allowances, in 1942 a cost-sharing arrangement with provincial governments to fund the establishment of child care for the children of women war workers was created by the federal Minister of Labour at the request of the Women's Division of the NSS. Parental fees for the service would be minimal. While only the Ontario and Québec governments set up day nurseries for preschool children and day care centres for those of school age, their very existence was remarkable: there was no precedent for such state intervention in the hitherto-private organization of this aspect of social reproduction. By September 1945, there were twenty-eight day nurseries and forty-four school units in eight Ontario cities and five day nurseries in Montréal. Some private companies also opened day nurseries for their women workers. The motivation of the officials who put the programme in place was far from emancipatory: women workers were needed because of the shortage of male wage-workers, especially in munition factories. Perhaps because such official state encouragement of mothers working for wages conflicted with gender norms for married women, the NSS Day Nurseries Agreement was not publicized (Prentice 1993, 62-64; Pierson 1986, 50-55). Another ramification of the larger number of mothers working for wages was something approaching a moral panic around "juvenile delinquency." Statistics which revealed that the number of young people arrested

actually fell from 1943 to 1945 were passed over in the midst of heightened concerns about the conduct of urban youth, whose numbers swelled as rural familes moved to cities and towns for war work (Keshen 1997b, 370-372).

During the war years, social peace in paid workplaces was strained and then broken; in the community sphere capitalist rule was never contested to anything close to the same degree. There was very little community protest during the war. Certainly the organized Left was mostly unable or unwilling to support or initiate community struggles, although it was involved in neighbourhood organizations of various kinds (Brushett 1999, 52). The CPC's initial response to the outbreak of war was consistent with the line of the Popular Front against fascism. "This is OUR war, workers and farmers of Canada! Close ranks in invincible unity of the entire nation for the defeat of Hitler" (qtd. Penner 1988, 162), proclaimed the *Mid-West Clarion* on September 9, 1939. But by the end the month, the party had swung behind the Communist International's directive that "the present war is an imperialist and unjust war for which the bourgeoisie of all the belligerent States bear equal responsibility" (qtd. 161). The non-aggression pact and friendship treaty signed by the USSR and Germany in August and September 1939 respectively, along with the CPC's about-face, cost the Communists members and supporters (Muldoon 1977, 31). Even among people with questions about the war aims of the British Empire, the CPC's anti-war line and its denunciations of the CCF as warmongers were generally ineffective. In the March 1940

federal election, most CPC candidates did poorly (Penner 1988, 175-176).[50] Soon afterwards the ban on the party and affiliated groups disrupted the CPC and forced it to organize clandestinely, though party members were able to operate through the legal National Council for Democratic Rights to agitate for the release of Communist internees (172-174). The formally-independent *Canadian Tribune*, launched in January 1940, gave the party an unofficial weekly mouthpiece; the paper concentrated on economic issues and civil rights, with some success. The anti-war line was carried by underground publications and in the anti-conscription *La Voix du Peuple*, published in Québec by the Congress of French Canadians[51] for three months before it was banned in June 1941 (168-169; Comeau and Dionne 1982, 7-8; Fournier 1979, 85-93; Avakumovic 1975, 139-146).

Outside of Québec, where there were strong anti-conscription and anti-war sentiments among francophone workers, Communists were further marginalized and not very active until the CPC reversed its position on the war following the invasion of the USSR by Germany in June 1941. Not only did the party suddenly become pro-war, but it ardently argued for a "National Front for Victory" made up of anti-Hitler people of all political tendencies, regardless of their social position. Supporting workers' demands that might conceivably interfere with Canada's war effort was now out of the question. The CPC

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[50]Dorise Nielsen, secretly a CPC member, was elected to the House of Commons as a Unity candidate (Penner 1988, 173-175).

[51]This organization was made up of a variety of nationalist and workers' associations. Communists, who from late1940 to mid-1941 argued that French Canada was an oppressed nation (Penner 1988, 167; Fournier 1979, 89), were active participants.

supported the Liberal federal government and demanded the legalization of the party and the release of interned members so Communists could make the greatest possible contribution to mobilizing for total war. In spite of these displays of patriotism, the CPC remained illegal. However, in 1943 the state gave tacit approval to the launch by the Communists of the legal LPP (Penner 1988, 182-196; Comeau and Dionne 1982, 8-14; Fournier 1979, 93-99; Muldoon 1977, 42-44; Avakumovic 1975, 152-158). The organized current in the working class that had most energetically championed community struggles in the 1930s now opposed them. Communists returned to the ideological blurring of class conflict first espoused during the Popular Front years, now even more emphatically.[52]

The CCF, whose first truly nation-wide coordinated campaign had been a 1937 petition to cut arms spending and nationalize arms manufacturing, dropped its anti-war position in September 1939.[53] At first opposed to Canadian troops being sent overseas, the CCF became increasingly supportive of the war effort while generally remaining critical of restrictions on civil liberties. Caution reigned as officials feared the banning of party publications under the DOCR. The conservatizing impulse of the early war years was seen in the 1940 federal election, in which CCF support fell slightly from its 1935 result, to 8.5% (Young 1969, 319). By 1942, official CCF reticence about the war had evaporated; only a

[52]On the LPP during the war, see Muldoon 1977 (64-104), Comeau and Dionne 1982 (11-15) and Penner 1988 (193-197).

[53]Thus CCF leader JS Woodsworth's anti-war stance in the House of Commons was at odds with the new CCF policy (Naylor 1997, 231).

few prominent members publicly dissented. The participation of the Manitoba CCF in an all-party coalition government between 1940 and 1942 was opposed by most CCF members. However, it was a consequence of the party's political orientation to the war effort as well as the provincial CCF leadership's fear of isolation (Wiseman 1983, 24-36; Naylor 1997, 231-237; Young 1969, 103-105). CCF concerns about civil rights probably mitigated the silencing of political dissent imposed by the DOCR. The party's insistence (outside Manitoba) on refusing to form governments of national unity was also a measure of resistance to wartime political conformity. Otherwise, the CCF tended to go along with the state's mobilization of the working class for war while calling for the "conscription of wealth" as well as of people.

The year 1942 saw the most bitter wartime fight in official politics. In January the federal government called a plebiscite to release it from its earlier promises not to implement conscription for overseas service, embodied in the National Resources Mobilization Act of 1940. In Québec, nationalist anti-conscriptionists formed the League for the Defence of Canada to rally "No" voters. It created an impressive activist network. In Montréal, this was organized in each polling area to build the campaign in francophone working-class neighbourhoods. With this grassroots movement, the League was able to mount an effective effort despite being denied fair access to most of Québec's newspapers and the state broadcaster (Granatstein and Hitsman 1977, 142-144, 165, 168-169). But the League was the only "No" force of any consequence; both the CCF (Young 1969, 106) and the CPC, organized through Tim Buck Plebiscite Committees (Penner 1988, 190), called for a "Yes."

The results of the April vote - over 2.9 million in favour and 1.6 million opposed, with 80% "Yes" in English Canada and 72.9% "No" in Québec, and "No" majorities outside Québec in six largely francophone ridings and two containing many non-Anglo-Celtic residents (Granatstein and Hitsman 1977, 171) - indicated the rift within the working class between Anglo-Celtics and others. In contrast to the 1917 federal election fought on conscription (75-82), French Canadians and the labour movement in English Canada had not found themselves lined up on the same side of the issue. In the wake of the plebiscite, French-Canadian nationalists in Québec launched the Canadian Popular Bloc, a populist nationalist party demanding social reforms (Comeau 1982, 91-100).

Yet the conscription plebiscite reflected only one aspect of working-class consciousness. In February 1942, in the midst of the conscription debate, the CCF won an upset by-election victory in the largely Anglo-Celtic Ontario working-class riding of York South against former Prime Minister Meighen, now the Conservative Party leader again. The Liberals had not fielded a candidate, and Liberal support had been divided between the CCF and Conservatives, but the success nevertheless gave the CCF renewed hope and dynamism. Over the course of the year, Ontario CCF membership rose four-fold. This was not an aberration: in 1943, the CCF took 32.4% of the vote in the provincial election of traditionally-Tory Ontario and became official opposition (Caplan 1973, 92-95, 104).

Rising support for the CCF was not simply the result of the evolution of popular consciousness or of an institutionally-stronger party, the explanations traditionally

proposed.[54] Working-class expectations and political ideas began to change at the same time as more wage-earners organized themselves and took action on the job in 1942 and 1943. Clashes over workplace issues did not occur in isolation from the flow of the ideological tide in Canadian society, and vice versa. Open conflict with employers and the state on a scale not seen since 1919 shook assumptions about workers' place in the sphere of the paid workplace, reverberating beyond company property. As discussed in the previous chapter, wartime rhetoric about democracy and anti-fascism was interpreted by some workers as legitimizing efforts to limit managerial power; many also understood it as legitimizing post-war reconstruction on lines that would address their needs. While the hegemonic ideologies of capitalist rule influenced how class struggle and post-war reconstruction were understood by workers, so too did the ideological conceptions promulgated in the community sphere by what Gramsci calls the "organic intellectuals" (Gramsci 1971, 6, 15-16) of the working class, namely the politically-committed and knowledgeable radical minority of CCF and CPC members and supporters identified in the first section of this chapter In this way, class

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[54]See Brodie and Jenson 1988 (201-204), who point to the CCF's ties to the growing CCL and a change in popular consciousness to "pervasive apprehension about the future" (201-202) and contend that "the emergence of the CCF in Canadian politics had clearly broadened the range of political alternatives available to the population" (204). While CCL support and broad concern about post-war society were important factors, the authors miss the significance of the fact that CCF support grew at the same time as massive numbers of workers engaged in strikes. Caplan 1973 (90-91) notes the growth of union membership, especially in the CCL, but not the struggles associated with it. Young 1969 (106-113) ignores the social roots of the growth of the CCF, except to suggest that it was "the product of abnormal times" (113). Similarly, Horowitz 1968 does not stray beyond institutional considerations of inter-party competition and a political culture lacking "Lockean monotheism" (39).

recomposition was ideologically mediated by political forces.

In the minds of many, the demonstrated capacity of state planning to do away with mass unemployment and reorganize the economy for war production without abolishing liberal democracy weakened traditional "rugged individualist" free enterprise ideology. If it was possible to finally put an end to Depression conditions to make war, why could social wealth not be used in peacetime to pay male workers family wages and provide affordable housing, public health care and other reforms to improve the quality of life for all? More workers were becoming sympathetic to the kind of thinking articulated by the author of the WEA pamphlet *The Permanent War or Homo the Sap*, who wrote that "with the same sense of public spirit, the same unity of class interests, the same spirit of individual sacrifice, the same disregard of the usual and the conventional, the same singleness of purpose *that we have shown in this war*" a Canadian economy under public ownership could "produce a civilization which would be a glorious chapter in man's long history" (Morgan 1943, 25).[55] In short, the ideological terrain of official politics shifted as working-class recomposition took place.

The willingness of the CCF to identify itself with strikes and many, though not all, of the issues over which they were fought, as well as with a radical agenda of social reform, positioned it in such a way that it was quite successful at translating the wartime shift in working-class consciousness into party support, though not in Québec where its presence

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[55]The same theme is evident in, for instance, the preamble of the CCL's political action programme (*Political* 1944).

among francophones remained negligible.[56] Communists were less able to take advantage of the leftward impulse among workers, even though the entry of the USSR into the war on the side of the Allies led to a softening of state anti-communism (Whitaker and Marcuse 1994, 9-12). Though Communists were quite active, they lacked an open party through which to organize during the period between the banning of the CPC in May 1940 and the creation of the LPP in August 1943. Also, the official policy of opposing strikes and unswervingly supporting wartime sacrifice likely did not endear Communists to the many workers who felt that employer intransigence and state policy sometimes left them no choice but to strike, or who simply felt cynical about having to get by with less while businessmen enriched themselves. The most politically-aware people in working-class communities were also familiar with the history of sudden Communist line changes, which probably damaged the party's credibility among the class's organic intellectuals.[57] So while the LPP grew, tried to give itself a real presence in community life and elected a number of members to municipal and provincial office,[58] it was overshadowed by the thriving CCF. Even if the

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[56]The CCF managed to run candidates in 24 of 91 ridings in the 1944 Québec provincial election, winning 2.6% of votes cast but actually electing one member in the mining constituency of Rouyn-Noranda (Horn 1984, 150).

[57]The CCF took advantage of the history of Communist line changes to undermine the LPP; see the 1945 leaflet entitled "What is the LPP really after?" reproduced in Wiseman 1983 (xiv)

[58]For instance, one Communist MP and two Ontario MPPs were elected just prior to the launch of the LPP (Penner 1988, 193). The LPP soon held three Toronto municipal seats (Brushett 1999, 48) and regained one in Winnipeg (Smith 1990, 108). Party commitment to community work can be seen in articles in the LPP's *Club Life*, such as Carr 1944, SG

September 1943 survey that found that pan-Canadian CCF support in a federal election would be 29% - 42% in the "labour" occupational category, 19% from "white collar" and 25% among "farmers" - with the Liberals and Conservatives at 28% each (Caplan 1973, 110-111) is taken as a rough approximation rather than a precise figure, it is clear that the CCF was very popular among workers in English Canada. The Popular Bloc, while not an organizational expression of independent working-class politics, enjoyed some support among French-Canadian workers, especially CCCL unionists and the young. It won 18.1% of the vote in Montréal and 13.7% elsewhere in the 1944 Québec election (Comeau 1982, 317, 357-364).

The Canadian ruling class did not remain idle in the face of the leftward movement among workers, just as state officials had been forced to respond to the strike wave. The most dramatic changes were made, surprisingly, by the Conservatives, stung by the defeat of Meighen by the CCF in York South. Following the unofficial policy conference held at Port Hope, Ontario in September 1942, which came out for collective bargaining, a national

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1944 and Manitoba Provincial Committee 1944. Gord 1945 is an interesting critical assessment of the activity of the Harbord Club in Toronto by one of its members. The best appraisal of LPP wartime membership has been made by counting the initiation stamps issued to members to place on their membership cards upon joining. In the first year of the LPP's existence, August 1943-August 1944, 6797 stamps were issued. In the subsequent year, 2103 more were issued. An unknown number would have dropped out (Muldoon 1977, 159-160). The gap between this and the membership target of 25 000 by the beginning of January1944 (Avakumovic 1975, 175-176) is remarkable, though it should be recalled that the party enjoyed the sympathy of a periphery who did not join. Jack Scott recalled that many members who joined during the war were middle-class people impressed by the USSR (Palmer ed 1988, 76).

labour relations board, union rights, a state-assisted affordable housing plan and a contributory system of medical care as well as full conscription for overseas service, the Conservatives chose a new leader, Manitoba's Liberal-Progressive Premier John Bracken, and a new name, Progressive Conservative. The central aim of this overhaul was to shed the party's reactionary identity so it could undermine the CCF (Granatstein 1967, 113-150). The governing Liberals were in organizational disrepair; in 1943 work began to put the party on a firmer footing (Whitaker 1977, 139, 144). It took the defeat of all four Liberal MPs in by-elections in August 1943 to stir the party.[59] The following month the National Liberal Federation declared that "Labour is not a commodity but a partner in industry and a principal mainstay of national life" (qtd. 147). King, "whose lifelong conception of the historical role of Liberalism was the co-optation and absorption of the political left" (138), relied primarily on civil servants for the Liberals' ideological rearmament (143).

Since early in the war, state officials and academics had been making policy preparations for the eventual arrival of peace.[60] Nothing like the economic slump and Workers' Revolt that followed the conclusion of the First World War could be allowed to

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[59]The CCF was elected in two, the Popular Bloc in one and the LPP in one (Granatstein 1975, 265).

[60]On planning for post-war reconstruction, see the articles by McKenzie, Mackenzie, Slater, McInnis and Marshall in Donaghy 1996; Guest 1987; Finkel 1993; Brandt 1982; Christie 2000 (249-309).

happen again.[61] The Beveridge Report released in Britain in December 1942, with its proposals for extensive social security programmes, and Leonard Marsh's *Report on Social Security for Canada* of March 1943, were widely noticed because of the degree of popular support for post-war social change.[62] The 1943 Speech from the Throne promised post-war social security (Finkel 1993, 123). In January 1944, the government's Speech from the Throne announced that the "post-war object of our domestic policy is social security and human welfare" (qtd. Granatstein 1975, 275), and this time made a commitment: a family allowance programme would be implemented (Kitchen 1981, 45). PC 1003 was issued the following month.

Family allowances had been recommended by the majority report of the NWLB the previous year as a way to assist poorer households without giving in to labour movement pressure to lift wage controls on low-waged workers. Therefore, to avoid the accurate perception that family allowances were being introduced as an alternative to raising low wages, the Liberals were careful to present them as entirely separate from labour policy (40-45; Ursel 1992, 190-198). Stimulating spending at the end of the war to generate more jobs for male breadwinners was also part of the federal government's rationale for this plan to provide payments for every child, which were expected to have widespread appeal (Christie

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[61]Guest 1987, while noting the influence of the Depression and wartime hardships on popular desires for social reform, fails to mention the recession and upsurge of class struggle that followed World War One, or their influence on ruling-class figures.

[62]On these and other documents and their reception in Canada, see Christie 2000 (270-290).

2000, 297-298; Jean 1992, 402-405). As it turned out, the Liberals' expectation was correct. Although some conservative Anglo-Celtic citizens worried that French Canadians had high birthrates and would benefit disproportionately, the CCF, CPC, CCL and TLC all approved.[63] The first universal assistance scheme in Canada was well-received in the working class as well as by farming families (Christie 2000, 287-288, 298; Gölz 1993, 19-24; Kitchen 1981, 47-49). Allowances, like other rights involved in relations of political administration, did not come as free gifts. In this case, the law required that children six years old and up attend school in order to qualify for family allowance payments (Marshall 1998, 58).

Also part of the federal government's response to working-class desires for change was the 1944 National Housing Act. As with family allowances, this too aimed to stimulate the economy at the end of the war (Guest 1997, 120). Like the pre-war housing acts, it offered mortgage assistance, but on a wider basis than before (Wade 1994, 101). This was in keeping with the economic philosophy of the government's *White Paper on Employment and Income* presented in April 1945, which promised prosperity through export-led economic growth and Keynesian fiscal measures to offset recessions (Wolfe 1984, 54-55). Accompanying these actions of 1944-1945 were the propagandistic energies of the WIB, which deployed the slogan "Building a New Social Order for Canada" and encouraged people to support wage and price controls to dampen inflation and avoid a repetition of 1919

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[63]The CCF did object to clauses in the Family Allowance Act that regulated the spending habits of recipients (Marshall 1998, 155) and pressed for a more comprehensive welfare state (Gölz 1993, 20).

(Young 1981, 202-206).

The Liberals had been pushed to grant social reforms by the strike wave, the rise of the CCF, and the growing aspirations born of working-class recomposition. Community-based activism to demand the construction of affordable housing, the extension of rent controls and a halt to evictions was also revived in 1944, notably in Vancouver (Wade 1994, 138-141). During the 1945 federal election campaign, King promised more: medical insurance, universal pensions and public works to avoid post-war unemployment (Finkel 1993, 123). These deeds and promises of more to come allowed the Liberals to win reelection in June 1945. The CCF drew only 15.6% of the vote, taking twenty-eight seats in the House of Commons (Young 1969, 319). The defeat of the Prime Minister by his CCF opponent and the CCF plurality among military voters[64] was little consolation (Caplan 1973, 193). Why did the CCF, buoyed by its 1944 provincial election victory in Saskatchewan, not do better? In ten constituencies, mostly in British Columbia, LPP candidates running against CCF candidates received enough votes to prevent CCF wins (Young 1969, 277).[65] The LPP, pledged to a Liberal-Labour coalition tactic and blaming the CCF for refusing to be part of this anti-Tory front, actively sought to weaken the CCF, which it denounced for promoting

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[64]The military vote in Europe saw the CCF take 61 000, the Liberals 47 000 and the Conservatives 41 000 (Caplan1973, 193). Support for the Labour Party in Britain (see, for instance, Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo 1995), where many Canadians were stationed, may have boosted CCF support in the military.

[65]In Ontario, a provincial election was held one week before the federal vote; the LPP cost the CCF eight provincial seats (Caplan 1973, 191). For a study of the CCF in the 1945 elections in an area, Windsor, where the LPP was relatively strong, see MacPherson 1969.

class strife and encouraging radicalism: "The CCF has, by its 'socialism now,' 'socialization,' anti-monopoly and anti-national unity propaganda encouraged the strike moods and fed the sentiments - and in some unions carried the policies - which would have *sharpened the class conflict, disrupted war production and made impossible the establishment of proper labor-management contractual relations in industry*" ("Labor" 1944, 6).[66] Yet LPP competition, while a factor in some of the record 101 ridings in which the LPP presented candidates (Penner 1988, 204), does little to explain the fall in the CCF's share of the popular vote from to its wartime peak of support. It was not primarily the LPP that took votes from the CCF, but the "old line" parties, in particular the Liberals.

A number of explanations have been advanced for the CCF's poor showing in 1945. CCF election literature both held up the threat of post-war depression and promised abundant material goods under a CCF government.[67] The party ran a more moderate and conventional campaign, in which the CCF matched the promises made by the other parties, and may have suffered from its lack of credibility as a party of government. From 1943 on it was the target of a torrent of free enterprise criticism from the press and right-wing propagandists. The Liberals appropriated the WIB's slogan and made it their own: "Vote Liberal and Keep

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[66]See also the LPP's pre-election self-defence against the charge of splitting the labour vote in Morris 1945a, which criticizes the CCF for equating the Liberals and Conservatives, and the article by E.C.T. (1944). Buck 1944 presents the LPP's justification of its "national unity" line.

[67]See Parr 1999 (34-37) on a CCF vision of household consumer goods to meet the needs of women "on their terms" (37).

Building a New Social Order in Canada." The CCF's slogans "Security with Victory" and "Jobs for All" were not dissimilar. The TLC officially endorsed the Liberals (Young 1969, 118-119, 201-203; Caplan 1973, 156-165; Brodie and Jenson 1988, 208-210). While all of these may have had effects, they fail to probe a deeper level, the social roots of official politics.

Naylor's previously-discussed contention that in the 1930s the CCF generally ceased to speak a language of class and adopted a liberal-democratic idiom suggests another interpretation. Although many workers were radicalized to some extent during the war, the CCF as a whole did not consciously seek to articulate workers' experience in class terms or popularize a class analysis of politics. This is evident in such CCF publications as the recruitment brochure *Why Should I Be Interested in Politics?* and David Lewis's pamphlet *For a People's Victory* (1943) as well as the books *Make This Your Canada* (1943) by Lewis and Frank Scott and *Left Turn Canada* (1945) by MJ Coldwell.[68] As a result, wartime

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[68]*Why Should I Be Interested in Politics?* appeals for readers to join "Canada's Farmer-Labour party," "the people's party in the full meaning of that term" (2) because "We, the people, have it in our power to determine what kind of government we shall have. It is because most of us have not taken our politics seriously that our government is controlled by big business and operates in its interests" (1). Lewis and Scott's book - which sold 25 000 copies in less than a year - is discussed in McKay 2000a (99-107). Only by employing an exceptionally elastic definition of Marxism can McKay claim that "it was, for all intents and purposes, a Marxist text - albeit a Marxism shaped by the imperatives of the national management formation" (99) while also noting the text's populism and the absence of class struggle in its politics. Within the interpretive framework proposed in Draper 1992, *Make This Your Canada* is a classic text of socialism from above. Lewis's pamphlet *For a People's Victory* is similar, though such phrases as "the people's revolution which will make the twentieth century 'the century of the common man'" through "*a basic transference of power, both economic and political, from the small group of those who have held it till now,*

support for the CCF generated by its promise of social reforms and support for demands for union rights was more susceptible to being siphoned off by other parties that promised similar reforms than it would have been if the CCF had actively encouraged workers to think in class terms. That neither the CCF nor the LPP[69] aimed to develop the radical features of workers' wartime consciousness into a coherent political ideology of class independence clearly structured by class analysis, thereby furthering working-class recomposition, would have consequences beyond their performance in the 1945 federal election.

4.3 Contesting Post-War Society, 1945-1950

The transition from wartime social conditions and political administration was neither quick nor uncontested.[70] The official cost of living index, which had risen by 3.2% between 1942 and 1945, jumped by 35.3% between 1945 and 1948 (Leacy 1983, K1-7), outpacing the average composite weekly wage, which grew by roughly one-quarter, from $32.04 to

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to the people as a whole" (2) display a greater rhetorical radicalism than the book he co-wrote with Scott.

[69]There is more class language in texts such as Morris 1945b, a pamphlet for recruiting to the LPP, than in CCF literature of the time. Yet the LPP's wartime advocacy of social peace and subordination of the defence of workers' interests in paid workplaces and communities to cooperation with the war effort, and its support for the Liberals in 1945, meant that it did not clearly promote independent working-class politics.

[70]Two historians who cannot be accused of radicalism have written that "there was bitterness just below the surface of life on the Home Front... [and] a fear still lurking in the minds of many that peace might bring depression upon the land again. But... [i]t was, on the whole, a time of high optimism" (Douglas and Greenhous 1995, 283).

$40.06 (E86-103). The removal of most price controls in 1947 was followed by sharp increases in the prices of most necessities purchased for consumption in working-class households. The flood of demobilized military personnel placed further pressure on the housing market, where there was far too little good quality affordable housing available. For example, in Montréal, where a higher than average percentage of working-class households lived in rental housing, over 70% of veterans' families lived in overcrowded dwellings (Choko 1980, 168).

Among the first changes in state relations were those intended to get women who had taken waged jobs during the war to leave and return to the home. The federal government announced it would be withdrawing funding for childcare (Pierson 1986, 55-61; Prentice 1989, 117). The income tax rule, enacted in 1942, which had allowed married men to claim the full marriage deduction when their wives were employed full-time was revoked in 1946 (Russell 1984, 64). The Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act (RCEA) of 1942 gave veterans the right to go back to the jobs at which they had been working before going into the military, and to count time served towards their seniority (Stevenson 1998, 96). Other state programmes assisted those who had served in the military - over 95% of whom were men (Neary 1998, 10) - to return to civilian life, establish new families or return to those they had left behind. These also had the effect of encouraging women to leave the paid workforce and rely on male breadwinners. This reinforced an important structure of gender inequality and division within the working class that had narrowed slightly during the war.

A range of programmes was created to prevent unemployment among demobilized

men on the scale seen after the First World War. In addition to the RCEA, veterans were guaranteed that time in the military would count as insurable time worked for the purposes of UI. Those who had served abroad could claim cash gratuities and reestablishment credits. Veterans could also apply for access to land, education and training or business loans. Some qualified for preferential hiring in jobs listed through the National Employment Service and positions in the civil service. Pensions were also available (8-9). These benefits - dubbed the "Veterans' Charter" - constituted a massive short-term investment to return veterans to wage-labour or self-employment, in order to minimize long-term claims on the state for support and avoid unrest. Once reestablished, veterans' spending on household consumption would stimulate the economy (11-12).

As mentioned above, these and other state programmes for post-war reconstruction, including the decision to turn wartime housing over to the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation for sale or rent and the building of housing for veterans' families (Wade 1986, 46-47, 54), had the effect of encouraging working-class people to form families in which women were supposed to make the household their primary focus while men assumed the breadwinner role. Family allowances functioned in the same fashion: by supplementing what male paid workers brought in, they made the ideal of a household in which the wife did not work for wages - ideologically promoted in brochures mailed out with allowance cheques - more of a practical possibility for some working-class families. However, the value of family allowances was too low to allow many more households to live up to the breadwinner family wage ideal. Some poor households were still compelled to turn to private charities

for help. Nevertheless, higher and more regular household incomes did further the trend away from producing clothes and food in the household and towards buying more consumption goods as commodities (Marshall 1998, 182, 186; Jean 1992, 420-424; Ursel 1992, 197-198; Fahmi 2001, 111-114, 313, 330-332).

Higher wages, low unemployment, Veterans' Charter programmes, family allowances, the sale of wartime housing and the displacing of women from paid work all contributed to the constitution of the material basis for an important phenomenon of the post-war household sphere: a flourishing of domesticity. Doug Owram has suggested that "a romanticized and idealized vision of family was a natural human reaction to years of disruption. It was strengthened, though, because this was a society that placed a high premium upon marriage and family" (1996, 12). As Alvin Finkel has pointed out, such a psychological explanation ignores state policy and employers' practices (2000, 189-191). It also fails to recognize the existence of a historically-specific order of racialized social relations of gender and sexuality. Family life and intimate relationships are profoundly shaped by such relations, so Owram's resort to a semi-naturalistic explanation is unsatisfactory. The undeniably elevated importance of family life after 1945 can be seen as the product of social relations within the prevailing order of gender and sexuality.

It is true, as Owram writes, that family life had been disrupted to a considerable extent by the upheavals of the Depression and World War (1996, 8). These disturbed

relations of gender and sexuality.[71] The separation of many men from their wives and girlfriends led to a great deal of social anxiety about sexual infidelity, especially by women (Fahrni 1998, 191-199). It is likely that women did enjoy a somewhat greater degree of sexual autonomy during the war, due to the absence of male partners and easier access to paid work. At the end of the war, the divorce rate rose sharply (Adams 1997, 26). These developments, the disturbance of gender roles during the war years and "the homosocial nature of life for many Canadians in wartime" (Fahrni 1998, 207-208) meant that consolidating heterosexual male supremacy after the war required considerable energy.

Measures that reinforced working-class men's ability to assume the breadwinner role were part of this effort, irrespective of whether or not they were consciously intended to function in this way. So too was the "ideological package of domestic retrenchment" (Gölz 1993, 28), which told women that they would be equal partners and a "national asset" in the home (28). There ensconced, women would secure their own femininity and the masculinity of their wage-earning husbands (Strong-Boag 1991, 483). Another source of the renewed emphasis on the importance of family life was the Cold War. Beginning in 1946, the confrontation between "Free" Western "Christian civilization" and "totalitarian"

[71] Little research has been done on sexuality in Canada during the Second World War. See Kinsman 1996 (148-157), which contains some hints about the formation of same-gender sexual networks among people freed from family constraints, in the military and large cities.

Communism soon came to dominate social and political life in Canada, as elsewhere.[72] Both state agencies and non-state institutions became increasingly preoccupied with identifying and regulating all manner of "deviance." In this context, the "normal" family was upheld as the moral foundation of a free and democratic society. For adults, forming a family and having children came to be seen as "at root, a patriotic obligation" (Adams 1997, 25).

The paucity of socially-acceptable alternatives to marriage and family life, a consequence of the suppression of other ways of living by law, schooling and medical, scientific and religious authorities,[73] meant that real working-class needs and hopes would be channeled through a particular sanctioned kind of family.[74] Thus the post-war resurgence of domesticity was not a natural reflection of demographic trends. Statistics did register a record marriage rate of close to 11 per thousand people in 1946 and a rate of live births that in 1947 reached 28.9 per thousand, up from 24.3 in 1945 (Owram 1996, 18, 4). What needs to be emphasized is that the rush to get married and have children was shaped by hegemonic social relations renovated in the years immediately following the end of the war.

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[72]Whitaker and Marcuse 1994 provides an overall political history of the first decade of the Cold War in Canada.

[73]See Adams 1997 (18-38). Gleason 1997 focuses on the role of psychology in shaping "normal" families in accordance with "the hegemonic values and priorities of the middle class in post-war Canada" (443).

[74]Barrett and McIntosh's observation that "just as the family has been socially constructed, so society has been familialized" (1982, 31) is relevant here. The absence of a political critique of the hegemonic order of gender and sexuality on the Left meant that there was no effective challenge to this process - see Sangster 1989 (179-183, 198-202).

Cold War conformity was not immediately imposed on the working class. It took some time for the various forces of capitalist rule to establish the Cold War regime, using measures of coercion as well as of consent. As mentioned previously, major strikes often became community-wide class struggles, with many working-class people rallying to the support of those who walked off the job. The immediate post-war years were also marked by struggles that emerged outside the paid workplace sphere. These community-based efforts most often took the form of movement organizing to put demands on the state. If this activism did not unfold on the same scale as the strikes of wage-workers in their workplaces and was less successful at winning material concessions from capital, it still represented a significant moment of class recomposition.

One little-noticed field where working people tried to assert their needs was that of the few state agencies which allowed a certain level of popular participation. Opportunities for participation in the running of state services were (and are) unusual, precisely because the basic character of state power in capitalist societies is one of insulation from the population it politically administers. Shirley Tillotson's study of public recreation uncovers one example of workers trying to gain greater control over their everyday lives in the community sphere in Brantford, an Ontario town in which a left-wing skilled worker was elected mayor in 1946 and more than a third of paid workers were unionists (Tillotson 2000, 108). There, the dominant understanding that public recreation contributed to "democratic living" through "a sort of organized helpfulness" (105), in which citizens from various backgrounds would work together united by their adoption of the viewpoint of state officials, clashed with the

notion that working-class citizens needed to participate in order to challenge elites and make liberal democracy serve the interests of workers (106). Friction developed in 1948, as people involved in neighbourhood Community Committees, organized in a Council, obtained a seat on the largely middle-class municipal Recreation Commission and used it to try to shape policy. The Council was able to obtain more seats, but on an enlarged Commission that Council activists could not possibly control. Unable to prevent actions such as the sale of a playground by the local Board of Education so that a private building could be erected on the site, the hopes of the reform-minded recreation director who had initiated the Community Committees and the volunteers who joined them, among them a very active male CCF member, were frustrated. By 1953, when the Council lost its seats on the Commission, the early optimism of working-class volunteers that they could, through their own actions, gain a modicum of control of local programmes had dissipated (106-127). While it would be rash to generalize much from this one local case, it is noteworthy because of what it suggests about the hopefulness of the mid-1940s, a moment when a significant number of workers believed that they could act collectively and actually make a difference in the places they worked and lived - a symptom of class recomposition. The fact that in mid-1940s Toronto community councils emerged from local CCF and LPP clubs, ratepayer associations, Air Raid Patrol groups and similar organizations in working-class neighbourhoods with the aim of organizing recreational facilities, especially for young people, also illustrates this willingness to act collectively (Brushett 1999, 51-53).

The rising cost of living was another motivation for working-class community action

in the years following the end of the war. Demands for more and better housing had begun to be raised before the cessation of hostilities in Europe. The issue of housing shortages became more prominent with the occupation of the disused old Hotel Vancouver in January 1946 by a group of LPP-led veterans who had earlier tried picketing and camping on a courthouse lawn to pressure federal authorities to convert the empty building into shelter for homeless veterans. Within days, the demand was won. Its tenants resisted rent increases with a rent strike in 1947. In the fall of 1946, squatting - a tactic used at the time by Communist housing activists in Britain - spread to Canada. A few people squatted in Vancouver's Little Mountain barracks (Wade 1994, 143-145, 148-149). Direct action for housing also took place in Ottawa and Montréal. In Ottawa in September, a Veterans' Housing League occupied two mansions that had been used as barracks and demanded that rent "must not exceed a fifth of the man's wages" (Johnson 1946, 1). There was much sympathy for the action and a League leader's statement that "The city will provide shelter for these people, or else we'll see that they get it; and you know what I mean" (qtd. 1). Later that month, the League went on to lead a truck convoy loaded with members' furniture to occupy two more military buildings. This time its two leaders were arrested and charged ("Gov't" 1946, 1).

In Montréal, the Homeless Veterans' League (HVL) agitated for housing using similar tactics. Its central figure, Henri Gagnon, was one of the LPP's French-Canadian leaders. Beginning in October 1946, the HVL began to house homeless families by squatting illegal gaming premises and declaring a readiness to pay rent. At the same time, it demanded

affordable housing, the continuation of rent controls and an end to evictions. It continued its militant housing activism into 1947, turning to the CSU for guards for occupied buildings, winning the support of a Legion branch and garnering public support with actions that included a road blockade by sympathetic taxi drivers. Although the total number of people housed was not that large - about 300 adults, plus their children - the HVL had a high profile and supporters in other Québec cities. In contrast, the anti-communist CWL tried to organize housing cooperatives and asked for the provincial government to provide a credit to build single- family homes for French Canadian workers (Choko 1980, 169-179; Collin 1996, 163-165; Fahrni 2001, 277-284). The overall level of activism was not powerful enough to force a change in the federal government's policy of leaving most housing development in the hands of private developers and landlords. Still, this grassroots agitation did house some people. It also served as a counter-weight to the landlord lobby and helped maintain federal rent controls until 1951, when they passed into provincial jurisdiction (Wade 1994, 153-154).

Rising costs for working-class households were also the focus of a larger movement around prices spearheaded by the Housewives' Consumers Association (HCA). Formed in the pre-war Popular Front era, this LPP-led organization had been part of the popular base of the WPTB during the war (Sangster 1989, 185). In 1946, it began to press for price controls on foods basic to the diet of working-class households (Parr 1999, 90). By the following year, it was active in cities including Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon and Toronto (Sangster 1989, 185). After trying to lobby the federal government without success, the HCA organized a march to Ottawa around its demands. The Liberals

dismissed what was depicted in the Cold War press as an unseemly group used by dangerous Communists to dupe women (Guard 2000, 77-80; 82-83). The HCA then turned to local boycott campaigns against small businesses, achieving some short-lived price reductions. Communist youth joined in with a "Bring Back the Five Cent Chocolate Bar" campaign. In 1949, the HCA mounted another "On to Ottawa" protest around a petition for price controls and brought over 500 supporters to the capital. Again, it was ignored (Sangster 1989, 187), although the decision to create a federal Prices Commission to look into inflation may be attributable to HCA activism (Azoulay 1997, 28).[75]

Although they won few immediate gains, the HCA's campaigns did represent an episode of class recomposition in the community sphere. The strength of the HCA lay in the ability of the LPP's working-class women members to organize other women in their neighbourhoods around "implicitly class-conscious demands for policies that more equitably balanced the needs of ordinary families against the interests of big business" (Guard 2000, 74). In so doing, they drew on the heightened politicization of working-class women, especially married women, around consumer issues that was an unintended consequence of the state's wartime enlistment of their support for the WPTB's Consumer Branch (Fahmi 2001, 257-259). Because the LPP did not consciously challenge prevailing gender relations in the working class, Communists had no qualms about seeking to mobilize women as

[75]This is another example of the logic of political administration exemplified by PC 1003: the attempt to subsume class struggle by state power, in this case by the establishment of a body without significant authority.

mothers and wives in defence of family well-being and were able to lay claim to domestic maternal respectability (Sangster 1989, 185; Prentice 1993, 85; Guard 2000, 75-76).

There were several reasons that the HCA was not able to mobilize collective action on a larger scale and with greater success. The opposition of capital to price controls was the greatest obstacle. Another was the attitude of the CCF. Some CCF members initially supported the HCA, but the CCF leadership, its anti-communism fanned by the Cold War and busy breaking LPP influence in the unions at the time, maintained its policy of forbidding cooperation with organizations thought to be Communist-led. Some CCF women involved in the HCA were directed to withdraw and threatened with expulsion if they refused (Azoulay 1997, 29-43). The CCF counterposed its electoral strategy to the HCA's activism: "Good homemakers today must take political action. For politics is the key to the kitchen cupboard. Only a CCF government can unlock the door to plenty for every family" (qtd. Parr 1999, 92). CCF opposition isolated the HCA, cost it the support of many unions and other groups, and reduced its already-diminished respectability in the Cold War political climate. In several provinces, CCF women were told by their leaders to participate in the HCA's main rival, the Canadian Association of Consumers (CAC), though some balked at the prospect (Azoulay 1997, 32; Sangster 1989, 220).[76] Formed in 1947 with the active support of the federal government, the CAC supported the Liberals and cooperated with state agencies. Led by middle-class women, it opposed price controls in the name of free

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[76]By 1949 the CCF had concluded that neither of the two consumers' organizations was worthy of support (Parr 1999, 93).

enterprise and presented a classless view of consumers' interests (Parr 1999, 93; Fahrni 2001, 259-261). In addition to the opposition of these groups and Cold War hostility in general, the HCA also had to contend with the difficulties of mobilizing working-class women burdened with household responsibilities and a dominant ideal of domesticity that disapproved of social protest. Also, since household consumption was considered women's business, working-class men did not actively participate in struggles on this front. Considering these obstacles, the significance of the activity of the HCA and other women's activism around consumption[77] is more easily apparent.

On a smaller scale, LPP women also played a prominent role in a movement against the closing of daycare facilities in Toronto, where about half of all the state-run centres were located. In January 1946, social service agencies and community groups began to speak out against the closures. The following month, the Day Nurseries and Day Care Parents Association (DNDCPA) was formed. Communist-led but, unusually, also involving members of the CCF, this organization provided leadership to the broader front of groups prepared to defend state-run daycare services, among them the middle-class-dominated Toronto Welfare Council. Through lobbying, petitions, letter-writing campaigns, study groups, public meetings - including one held at the same time in four places in Toronto to facilitate the participation of working-class mothers - and two rallies, the DNDCPA set about mobilizing working-class women. Much as the HCA did not challenge the maternal and

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[77]For instance, the boycott of grocers and butchers in Montréal in 1947-1948 and the effort to legalize margarine (Fahrni 2001, 268-276).

familial positioning of working-class women, the DNDCPA, like other daycare supporters, argued that daycare would prevent juvenile delinquency. It was able to maintain the city's thirteen day nurseries, though most of the daycare centres for school-age children were shut down in 1946 after the provincial-municipal cost-sharing arrangements of the Ontario Day Nurseries Act came into effect. The DNDCPA did not disband, but pressed the municipal government for more day care facilities and, when it seemed clear that more were forthcoming, against the doubling of user fees in 1947. This it was unable to prevent.

In the years 1947-1949, daycare activism became oriented to lower-profile lobbying of state officials around eligibility criteria and other aspects of daycare as political administration. The Cold War ideological climate called daycare and the DNDCPA into question, and both were marked out for anti-communist denigration. As a *Globe and Mail* editorial stated in 1949, "What is ultimately to be determined is the degree to which the state will be allowed to usurp the functions of the home" (qtd. Prentice 1989, 128). School kindergartens open to all children, not just those whose mothers had paid work, and therefore free of the taint of communism, were proposed by the Board of Education as a more acceptable alternative to daycare. Finally, the prioritization of LPP energies on the 1949 federal election campaign and the peace movement took Communists away from the issue of daycare. By the time means-testing was imposed on daycare in 1951, the DNDCPA could only organize ineffectual protest (Prentice 1989, 115-133; 1993, 77, 108-124, 137-138, 150).

The last field of post-war community struggle that deserves mention is anti-racism. This is important given the mediation of class by relations of racial oppression. In this period

of class recomposition, the hierarchy of stratification created by white supremacy was altered in small ways, but not substantially shaken, with consequences for working-class formation. Public discussion of discrimination and prejudice had been growing since the closing years of the war. While this has often been seen as more or less a reflection of such developments as the war against fascist states, public awareness of the Holocaust, the United Nations' Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Carmela Patrias and Ruth Frager contend that initiatives against racism "were not spontaneous reactions against the horrific consequences of racism that had manifested themselves during the war, but the result of campaigns that were carefully and painstakingly orchestrated by small groups of Anglo-Canadian activists, and especially by key minority groups" (2001, 2-3).

African-Canadian working-class men and women were one such group. The Canadian League for the Advancement of Coloured People (CLACP), which by 1940 had become an Ontario-based charity, was revived in 1943 by members of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) and its Ladies' Auxiliary. In 1945, CLACP activists used a cross-country tour by the BSCP's leader A. Philip Randolph in celebration of the BSCP's first contract with Canadian Pacific to build CLACP chapters in areas where the BSCP had members (Chateauvert 1998, 173). Another group central to post-war anti-racist efforts was Jewish workers. In 1947, members of the CCF-aligned Canadian Jewish Labour Committee (CJLC) brought together union members from the TLC and CCL (and, in Winnipeg, the OBU) in several cities in local Joint Labour Committees to Combat Racial Intolerance, each with a full-time or part-time paid staffer. At first, their primary activity was public

education; with time, they also began to lobby for anti-discrimination legislation (Lambertson 2001, 45-60; Patrias and Frager 2001, 19-21).[78] In 1946, Japanese Canadians and white civil rights supporters in the Cooperative Committee on Japanese Canadians campaigned against the attempt to deport Japanese Canadians. Nearly 4000 were sent to Japan before the federal government, noting a popular outcry, decided that to continue with the deportations would cost it political support and therefore abandoned the policy. It did, however, manage to retain controls on the free movement of Japanese Canadians until 1948 (Sunahara 1981, 131-148).[79]

Such activism influenced a number of legal changes in the late 1940s. The repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act (1923) in 1947 was a significant anti-racist gain.[80] In 1948, Japanese Canadians were granted the franchise for federal elections; British Columbia followed suit the following year. By 1950, the Ontario Conservative government was convinced by lobbying to pass what would be the Fair Employment Practices Act of 1951.[81]

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[78]The first such law was Ontario's Racial Discrimination Act of 1944, which banned signs expressing racist or religious discrimination (Patrias and Frager 2001, 24).

[79]Though the CCF did support the campaign, the existing literature does not reveal how much working-class involvement there was in the campaign against deportations. The Cooperative Committee was made up of representatives of religious and professional groups, with some union involvement (Sunahara 1981, 134).

[80]So restrictive was this exclusionary piece of legislation that only forty-four Chinese were allowed to enter Canada in the twenty-four years in which it was in place (Backhouse 1999b, note 80 to Ch. 5).

[81]This made it illegal for employers to make "race, creed, colour, nationality or place of origin" a factor in hiring, dismissing, promoting and paying workers (Patrias and Frager 2001, 29).

On the level of popular ideology, blatant acts of racism, such as those in Dresden, a deeply segregated Ontario town where people of colour were routinely denied services by small businesses (Lambertson 2001, 61-65), were more likely to receive moral condemnation.

The anti-racism of the late 1940s did have real limits. Notions of natural differences between "races" were commonly accepted, which led some to support overtly discriminatory immigration laws. Sexism was generally ignored because women's supposed essential difference from men was taken for granted (Patrias and Frager 2001, 3-8). Racism was not understood as a social structure of oppression, but in more liberal terms, as discrimination and prejudice on the part of individuals. Sometimes anti-discrimination had a class tone, as in the case of JLC material that attempted to show white male workers that racism weakened unions and lowered wages, even though it did not challenge them to fight white supremacy as such.[82] Racism remained deeply embedded in social relations, sometimes overtly.[83] That said, greater post-war attention to intolerance and discrimination was in part a result of the actions of racially-oppressed people themselves, many of them working-class activists. It was progressive in comparison with the earlier widespread acceptance of blatant racism, and likely contributed in a minor way to working-class recomposition, though without presenting

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[82]See Lambertson 2001 (55-58). My point in noting the limits of JLC anti-racism is not to suggest that a more radical anti-racist perspective was on offer in Canadian society at the time, but simply to clarify the political character of post-war anti-racism.

[83]Note, for example, the case of Viola Desmond, a middle-class African-Canadian woman convicted in 1946 for sitting in the "wrong" section of a segregated Nova Scotia cinema (Backhouse 1999a, 226-271).

a radical challenge to racial oppression and the racialization of class in Canada.

The relationship of the two left-wing parties to workers outside paid workplaces in the early years of the Cold War is the final issue to be addressed in this chapter. Supporting community struggles and movements was not part of the CCF's fundamentally electoral strategy, although some CCF members were involved in such activism. CCF clubs and poll units[84] were encouraged to be involved in community life. Yet their work was to be geared to building the party as an electoral machine, not to furthering working-class self-organization: "Only by improving their own knowledge and experience can CCF members widen their influence in the community. Only by working in the community can CCF members hope to gain that support for our movement which is essential for taking power as a government to build a better social order" (Cooperative 1948, 18). The kinds of community involvement that CCF members were encouraged by federal headquarters to undertake included forming credit unions, "buying clubs" (to purchase in bulk and reduce household consumption costs), lending libraries, day nurseries and play groups, as well as supporting local unions and holding CCF study groups (36-40). Worthy though many of these activities were, the political conception that underlay them was one in which CCF support at election time was the paramount consideration. The limited development of working-class capacities, primarily by political education, that did take place through official

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[84]The CCF's 1948 handbook for members described the ideal organizational structure as clubs composed of polling units, "small group[s] whose functions should be to build up that little area for which [they] will be responsible at election time" (Cooperative1948, 9).

party activity was a consequence of the party officialdom's need for an articulate CCF community presence that could deliver votes.[85] As for the CCF's policy proposals themselves, most were for social welfare reforms; some of these, leaders noted, were implemented by the Liberals in office. Criticism of private enterprise diminished (Young 1969, 122-126; Wiseman 1983, 76). Thus such post-war CCF activity contributed little to class recomposition.

From the beginning, CCF participation in the Cold War anti-communist drive was not confined to its role in the union movement, examined in the previous chapter. In effect, "Canadian social democrats played the same role in legitimating the Cold War as liberals south of the border" and "did much to poison the atmosphere of thought and debate on the left, just as the Communists had by their leaden subservience to Moscow" (Whitaker and Marcuse 1994, 267, 270). The CCF did not speak out in 1946 at the time of the Gouzenko affair, when the RCMP and the Royal Commission created to investigate Communist spying were trampling on civil rights; in fact, CCF civil libertarian Frank Scott discouraged others

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[85]On the concept of developing working-class capacities to change society, see Gindin 1998 (76-83). Readings on socialism recommended in the 1948 *CCF Handbook* included, in addition to the writings of CCF figures Coldwell, Lewis and Scott, certain works by GDH Cole, Fred Henderson, Harold Laski, John Strachey and, evidence of the residual traces of Marxism remaining in the party, Karl Kautsky's *The Labour Revolution* (Cooperative 1948, 90-92). Books by Marx, Engels and others were removed from the literature table at the 1950 federal CCF convention (Melnyk 1989, 146-147). The evaluation of the CCF's electoral orientation here should not be read as an argument that electoral campaigns are inherently unable to develop working-class capacities or promote class recomposition; the effects of such campaigning depend on the ideological content and practical activity involved.

from doing so. The CCF supported the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the US state's Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe as part of its sphere of influence. The CCF did, however, hold back from demanding that the LPP be banned. CCF members critical of NATO and the Marshall Plan were purged from the party, along with others suspected of communist sympathies. These included several who held seats in provincial legislatures (266-272; Wiseman 1983, 51-62).[86] Such anti-communist zeal was corrosive of class solidarity and stifled critical thinking in the working class.[87] It encouraged sentiments that led to the silencing of dissent.[88] Yet neither displays of loyalty to the Western alliance

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[86]In Manitoba, the CCF expelled two MLAs in 1945 for agreeing with the LPP federal election line. One later joined the LPP; the other was reelected under an "independent CCF" banner, allowed to rejoin the party, and then in 1949 expelled again for opposing the Marshall plan and NATO, along with another MLA. As mentioned in 3.6, Carlin, a Mine Mill leader and Sudbury MPP, was expelled in 1949. These expulsions led to the loss of hundreds of CCF members. Some anti-NATO figures in the CCF who were clearly anti-LPP as well, such as Fred Tipping, were not expelled (*Case* n.d.; Whitaker and Marcuse 1994, 271;Wiseman 1983, 41-51, 55-59).

[87]To avoid a possible misinterpretation: this evaluation of anti-communism is not meant to imply that criticism of Stalinist Communism was necessarily complicit with Cold War red-baiting. However, left-wing currents critical of both the Western bloc and Communism had little influence in Canada at the time; this was related to the earlier weakening of class politics already noted. One such tendency, that around *Labor Challenge*, did oppose anti-communist attacks on the LPP - see Bowman 1948, Brent 1948, "Hooligan" 1948 - but appears to have sided with the CCF "right" against the LPP "left" in the UAW (Yates 1993, 66) and IWA (Lembcke 1980, 135-136n).

[88]Cold War pressure was not limited to the actions of state authorities, the mass media, employers and right-wing associations in civil society. Acts of vigilantism were not unknown, among them the vandalism, ignored by police, of the LPP office in Windsor, Ontario in April 1948 by a crowd of hundreds of high school students (Bowman 1948). In Québec, the LPP had difficulty even renting meeting halls and faced arrests under the Padlock law (Comeau and Dionne 1982, 43).

nor an ongoing presence in the paid workplace and community spheres could prevent the party's decline after 1945. The CCF's total membership was never over 40 000 after 1946 (Wiseman 1983, 66), and dropped following the 1949 federal election - in which its support fell to 13.4% of the votes cast - to just over 20 000 in 1950 (Young 1969, 320, 318). Party club activity was reduced as falling morale and less participation accompanied the shrinking membership (Zakuta 1964, 82-83). The CCF's "responsible" electoralist ideology and practice mitigated against growing class combativity and collective self-confidence, which might in turn have strengthened the party's roots in a layer of the working class. However, it did allow the CCF to avoid repression and function as a relatively respectable and reliable institution of Cold War Canada.

For their part, as has been evident throughout this chapter, Communists made community struggles a priority, though party work in this sphere was not considered as important as union activity.[89] In comparison with the approach of the CCF, theirs was a militant conception of community activism. At the same time, the tactics of the LPP through the HCA and DNDCPA - like those of the CPC in the late 1930s - were usually more restrained than the militant, sometimes unwisely confrontational, actions for which the party

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[89]See the articles in the LPP's internal publication *Club Life* cited in footnote 58 of this chapter. The charge of "neglect[ing] industrial work" was leveled at Henri Gagnon (Comeau and Dionne 1982, 64). The political prioritization of the majority-male world of the paid workplace over the community sphere had a gendered character, reflected in which LPP members carried out what kinds of political work.

was known in the 1930s.[90] Housing and prices were the main themes of Communist working-class community agitation in 1946-1947, and there is no doubt that dedicated LPP women and men animated many of the campaigns to improve the conditions of life in workers' households and neighbourhoods.[91] Against a storm of anti-communist propaganda, harassment and persecution (Fournier 1979, 109-111), they kept working-class community struggles alive.

Following the adoption in 1947 by the international Communist movement of the analysis that the world was now divided into the US-led "imperialist and anti-democratic" camp and the USSR-led "anti-imperialist and democratic" camp (Claudin 1975, 467), in January 1948 the LPP adopted the slogan "Keep Canada Independent" and declared that the federal Liberals, whom the party had supported less than three years earlier, were dragging the country behind the US. Also as a result of this new line, the LPP emphasized work through the Canadian Peace Congress, formed in 1949. The Congress mounted mass petition campaigns to "ban the bomb" (Penner 1988, 222, 226, 229-230; Comeau and Dionne 1982,

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[90]Jack Scott claims that "after the war there was a lot of playing to the upper middle class who came into the party in some numbers as a result of Russia's involvement in the war" (Palmer ed 1988, 76). If true, this probably moderated Communist militancy to some extent. LPP leadership concerns about the militancy of the Montréal HVL contributed to the conflict that caused much of the French-Canadian membership to leave the party in 1947 (Comeau and Dionne 1982, 59-60).

[91]Smith n.d. is an example of LPP literature for community agitation.

39-40).[92] This work highlighted the adherence of the by-then politically isolated and embattled LPP to the official viewpoint of the rulers of the USSR (Penner 1988, 226). The party's Stalinism was always noticeable but became more significant with the onset of the Cold War, since it sided with the super-power against which NATO was arrayed. This was a considerable political liability for LPP members, whose response to anti-communism tied uncritical support of the USSR and its rulers to a critique of the West's Cold War policies.

While many LPP members were involved in organizing movements because they were sincerely committed to struggling for a better world, the party leadership did not build movements as ends in themselves but in order to advance its strategic goals, which reflected the political positions adopted by the international Communist movement at the behest of the Soviet state.[93] This primacy of the party and its aims, as determined by its leaders, had definite effects on the contribution of the LPP to community-based struggles, as it did on the party's union work. This rarely took the form of approaching movements as merely recruiting grounds for the party, since LPP members in practice often did not promote their explicitly Communist politics or "contented themselves with repeating the usual clichés about the victories of socialism in the USSR" (Comeau and Dionne 1982, 49). Instead, it

[92]On the Cold War, the 1947 change of line and Western Communism, see Claudin 1975 (465-479) and Westoby 1981 (52-67). The 1947 position reflected not a desire "to unleash a world-wide revolutionary struggle" but Stalin's goal of pushing the US to "recognize the division into 'zones of influence' within the framework of a world-wide compromise guaranteeing bipartite control of the world by the two super-powers" (Claudin 1975, 466).

[93]The editor's introduction to Palmer ed. 1988 presents a similar interpretation (5-7).

was seen in the way the party tended to operate in the community sphere through broader organizations it led politically and often controlled organizationally.[94] Given the CCF policy of non-cooperation with the LPP, perhaps this was inevitable. Nonetheless, the control of workers' organizations by either party imposed barriers to the development of workers' self-activity and capacities; neither party made these its central commitments. The two mutually-hostile parties and the absence of significant alternative organizations ultimately weakened the radical political minority in the working class that provided leadership for so many paid workplace and community struggles.

If these were the effects on the working-class formation of the activity of the two parties of the Left, to what extent were working-class activists able to use the CCF and LPP to advance class interests outside paid workplaces? Electoral support for the CCF offered workers a fairly safe and acceptable way to express their disagreement with the parties that supported, and were funded by, capital. However, the CCF leadership's concern to distance itself from most of the community mobilizations around the needs of working-class families, together with the party's general anti-communism, made the CCF quite unhelpful for radicals

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[94]For instance, the president and secretary of the DNDCPA were both LPP members (Prentice 1993, 112-113). Guard 2000, a recent publication on the important HCA, unfortunately does not go beyond defending the HCA against anti-communism to venture a judgment about the extent to which the HCA was dominated by the LPP. The fact that the charge of "Communist domination" was a staple of Cold War anti-communism ought not to prevent critical researchers from assessing the party's relationship to unions and community organizations, which was arguably affected - though not solely determined - by the LPP leadership's sectarian elevation of its own interests above those of mass working-class organizations.

who sought a political organization that would assist them in their struggles to improve household and neighbourhood conditions and which tried to unite workers to contest the nature of post-war society. The LPP's energetic community agitation attracted some working-class activists. However, association with Communism during the Cold War was a penalized option. In addition, the lack of internal democracy and the LPP leadership's prioritization of party aims over movement interests and Stalinist dogmatism caused problems for Communist activists.[95] Neither party was particularly open to working-class women's concerns or concerned about their political development. The internal life of both the LPP and the CCF was male-dominated. Few women were theoreticians or elected leaders, but women were disproportionately involved in lower-profile logistical and other work (Sangster 1989, 179-182, 203-223, 226-228). Male workers who were neither Anglo-Celtic nor French-Canadian encountered fewer problems in the parties than did women; the CCF was distinctly more dominated by Anglo-Celtic members than the LPP (Melnyk 1989, 104-107; Penner 1988, 276-278). On balance, then, just as in the paid workplace sphere, neither was a reliable vehicle for class struggle in the community sphere.

This chapter has explored the changing nature of the Canadian working-class formation in spheres that have often been given short shrift in class studies but which deserve as much attention as the paid workplace sphere. There was no equivalent in community and

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[95]The departure of some 300 of the LPP's 700 French-Canadian members after the expulsion of Gagnon and others in 1947 was the single most damaging consequence for the party of these characteristics and its resistance to the militancy of the HVL (Comeau and Dionne 1982, 60-66; Fournier 1979, 99-109).

household life to the remarkable upsurge of struggle in paid workplaces in the 1940s. This does not mean that working-class recomposition did not take place during this period, but rather that it was a decidedly uneven process. The wartime regime of political administration and the support of both the CCF and, from mid-1941, the Communists for the war effort meant that no significant community-based protests or movements grew out of the soil of workers' dissatisfaction in the war years. Racism and popular loyalty to the state were such a potent combination that the forced relocation of Japanese Canadians was carried out without the opposition of any stratum of workers of European heritage. However, the growth of wage-workers' power through paid workplace struggle did influence the radicalization that led to a reshaping of the ideological terrain of official politics in which traditional free enterprise ideology gave way before demands for a welfare state. That the ideological dimension of class recomposition took this form was in no small part due to the influence of social reform proposals originating from "old line" parties and state officials concerned about workers' loyalties and dissatisfaction, as well as to the CCF, which was the primary beneficiary in the workers' movement of this leftward impulse. However, the fact that the CCF did not link its demands for social reform with efforts to foster class-analytic politics among workers made it easier for the "old line" parties to recoup some of their lost support by coming out in favour of similar policies. In many ways, the recompositional effects of the wartime radicalization were limited. In part, this was because neither the CCF nor the LPP sought to use such opportunities as did exist to develop working-class capacities and because neither had counter-hegemonic politics. The mediation of class relations by

gender, race and sexuality meant that both parties were also stamped by the male dominance and white supremacy prevalent in the working class and in workers' organizations dominated by white men. Together with the character of the CCF and LPP, the small scale of the self-organization of women, racially-oppressed people and other oppressed groups placed tremendous limits on the extent to which hierarchies of sexism, racism and heterosexism in the working class were disrupted. After the war, community-based struggles did take place, many with considerable LPP involvement. Yet these same limits, along with the dedication of considerable state resources to reconstruction, the reconsolidation of domesticity and heterosexual male supremacy and the onset of the Cold War kept mobilizations around housing, prices, daycare and racism from developing into mass movements. As a result, although there were some significant changes that ought not to be ignored, from the perspective of the divisions and inequality in working-class communities and households rooted in gender, racial and sexual oppression the new class formation that existed at the close of the 1940s was much the same as that of the inter-war period.

CHAPTER 5: A WORKING CLASS REMADE

As the preceding chapters have shown, the Canadian working-class formation changed significantly during the 1940s. Even the enhanced wartime powers of the state were unable to prevent determined wage-workers from taking advantage of conditions of practically full employment to organize and win collective agreements that placed some constraints on the exercise of managerial power. Change outside the paid workplace was less dramatic, yet during this decade more workers than ever before seriously considered backing a left-wing alternative to the "old line" parties. Some, refusing to leave the shaping of the post-war world to politicians and business figures, engaged in collective action in the community sphere. Having demonstrated in the previous two chapters that a real, albeit uneven and circumscribed, process of class recomposition took place on a mass scale between 1941 and 1947, in this chapter I will explore two aspects of this remaking of the working class in more detail: the changed nature of unionism and the intertwined issues of nation and citizenship. These particular features are worthy of specific consideration because of their long-term significance to the Canadian working-class formation. The chapter will also analytically depict the class composition that crystallized in the late 1940s once the ruling class was able to bring the phase of recomposition to an end, and conclude by arguing that to understand the new class composition as that of an "incorporated" class is ultimately unsatisfactory.

5.1 Unionism Entrenched and Enchained

Some theoretical clarification is necessary in order to be able to properly assess the form of paid workplace unionism[1] that came to exist by the end of the decade. The heart of the matter here is the role of union organization and activity in working-class formation. Most scholarly work on unions fails to pose this question clearly, for the simple reason that unions are usually considered in relation to labour markets or particular groups of employees or workers or as formal organizations, rather than situated in a broader field of social processes in time, specifically in relation to working classes as historical formations. While this is most often true of research informed by liberal economics and institutionalist theory or post-structuralism, it is also the case with much Marxist and *marxisant* work. This failure occurs across the academic disciplines that study unions, all of which usually define research questions in ways that orient studies away from considering unions in relation to the large-scale historically-specific class formations within which they exist and which, as I shall argue, they play an important role in constituting.[2]

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[1]Aspects of union activity relevant to politics outside the paid workplace sphere will be discussed in 5.3.

[2]Recent Canadian examples include Black and Silver 2001 and Morton 2000; classic earlier studies include Commons 1905, Logan 1948 and Perlman 1966. The political stances of these authors vary, but it is the underlying theoretical conceptualization of how unions are studied to which I am drawing attention. Studies which do consider unions in relation to working-class formations include Cole 1920, Berger and Broughton 1995 and Heron 1996.

To clarify the role of unions in class formation, the complex character of unionism must be understood. Five issues are worth highlighting here. As Katznelson notes (1986, 20), wage-workers in capitalist societies invariably form unions of some sort. This phenomenon is not difficult to explain. Richard Hyman argues that:

> The essential insight of Marx and Engels, the significance of which subsequent writers have tended to minimise, is that trade unionism necessarily articulates the conflicts generated by capitalist industry. More specifically, unionism can be seen as embodying workers' revolt (however tentative) against the deprivations inherent in their role: a revolt which can challenge the fundamental basis of capitalism on two fronts (1971, 38).

Class exploitation leads workers to organize collectively in order to raise the price for which they sell their labour power, a reality recognized by those who deny the existence of class exploitation. It is less often appreciated that, through unions and in other ways, workers also try to limit capitalist power in the paid workplace sphere where they spend so much of their waking lives. As Carter Goodrich observes in his classic *The Frontier of Control*, "*Control* is a political word" and thus the demand "*not to be controlled disagreeably*" which "runs through all trade union activity" is a political one (1920, 36, 37). The "real but less immediate" "*demand to take a hand in controlling*" and the rarer "*demand not to be controlled at all*" (37) can also arise in unionism. Thus the first issue can be summarized in this way: wages and benefits, along with control and other facets of conditions on the job, are the elemental concerns of unionism because of the existence of labour power as a commodity and the fact that capitalist rule is exercised directly in the sphere of paid work,

as discussed in Chapter 2. Also, because labour power is commodified and wage-labour subject to the rule of capital, there are important pressures that limit what workers can achieve through unions. In the words of Perry Anderson, "as institutions, trade unions do not *challenge* the existence of society based on a division of classes, they merely *express* it" (1967, 264).[3] While all this may seem obvious, it is worth restating in light of the tendency in contemporary social and political thought to explicitly or implicitly treat social phenomena specific to capitalism in ahistorical or transhistorical ways.

Second, the basic - though not the only - way in which class struggle in capitalist societies takes place is that of the paid workplace and unionism.[4] This too is a consequence of the structure of capitalism as a mode of production. Wood notes that:

> Throughout most of history, the central issues in class struggle have been surplus extraction and appropriation, not production. Capitalism is unique in its concentration of class struggle "at the point of production," because it is only in capitalism that the organization of production and of appropriation so completely coincide. It is also unique in its transformation of struggles over appropriation into apparently non-political contests (1995, 44).[5]

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[3]In unusual circumstances, specific kinds of collective action by workers may challenge capitalist rule itself. However, that is a different matter than the characteristics of unions as working-class organizations.

[4]Acknowledging this should not obscure the fact that strikes over workplace issues can in some circumstances grow into broad class-wide mobilization, or that, for instance, street protests against a government can spill over into paid workplaces as wage-earners gain confidence to challenge their employers too.

[5]Recall Wood's argument, presented in 2.2, that the separation of "economics" and "politics" in capitalism can be understood as a historically-specific division of the ruling-

Unionism, emerging as it does in the "economic" sphere of production and appropriation, is shaped by the distinctive character of class struggle in this realm. This, Wood suggests, is generally "*local* and *particularistic*" (45) because capitalist economies are composed of numerous units in which goods and services are produced.

The third issue flows from the second: class struggle in the sphere of paid work tends to generate, as VI Lenin famously contended (Hyman 1971, 35, 41n), a sectional consciousness of the common interests of workers who share a workplace, employer or occupation. Its more coherent variety is what Huw Beynon dubs "working-class *factory consciousness*" or "factory class consciousness," and "its least developed form... is revealed in sporadic bloody-mindedness and 'malingering'" (Beynon 1975, 98). Often maligned as "economism" by critics on the Left, this workplace consciousness is better understood as a political view of the world arising from the lived experience of paid work in capitalism. Although it is only a partial perspective on class and capitalism, perspectives which restrict "politics" to the affairs of governments or states are equally one-sided. Nor is paid workplace consciousness the sole form of consciousness associated with unionism. Union struggle can also generate a broader "recognition of the common interests of *workers* as a class and the opposition of these interests to the existing structure of society" (Hyman 1971,

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class political (in the sense of involving power or domination, "about who does what to whom" (Beynon 1975, 87)) functions of production and appropriation from other political functions.

41n).[6] Such consciousness is less common than a narrower, more sectional one precisely because of how the experiences of class struggle and unionism are most often structured by the social relations of paid work.

Fourth, as brought out in the discussion of Gramsci's theoretical contribution in Chapter 1, unions do not passively reflect classes but actively shape their development. Due to the pervasiveness of capitalist competition and divisions created by gender, racial and other forms of oppression, working-class unity against capital is never a "natural" condition. Unity can never be assumed, but must always be forged in circumstances of greater or lesser difficulty. As Geoffrey Eley writes, "the crucial strategic problem confronting labour movements... [is] how to mobilize the maximum solidarity from a socially defined constituency which has no *essential unity* in the sphere of consciousness, but on the contrary a series of particularistic loyalties and preferences and a widely differing experience of everyday life, a mosaic of individual histories" (Eley 1990, 26).[7] Similarly, Hyman maintains that "the construction of broader solidarities has always required a deliberate and

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[6]This should be distinguished from "the hegemonic vision and will to create a new social order" (Anderson 1967, 274). Such consciousness is rare in most working-class formations, including that of Canada in the 1940s. The conditions for its emergence have been debated: for example, see Mann 1973 (71-72), Molyneux 1986 (46-50) and Seccombe and Livingstone 2000 (109-112).

[7]This formulation has the weakness of obscuring the fact that forms of oppression such as racism and sexism are responsible for some of this particularity. "Particularistic loyalties" differ in their relationships to power: for example, reluctance on the part of racially-oppressed workers to unite with white workers has a different character than the racial exclusivity of the latter.

precarious *effort*" (Hyman 1992, 159). Thus unions, as the most widespread kind of organization in working-class movements, are crucial to the collective organization of class against capital.

Having made these theoretical generalizations, the fifth and final point is a warning against making too much of general claims about unions. There are many kinds of unionism. Gramsci argues that a union "*becomes* a determinate institution, that is, it assumes a definite historical form to the extent that the strength and will of the workers who are its members impress a policy and propose an aim that define it" (qtd. Hyman 1975, 151). This is only partially true, since, for example, employers, the structure of labour markets and state power also shape union form. Unions always exist concretely, as organizations of workers who belong to a particular historical class formation, shaped by past struggles and forms of capitalist power and mediated by social relations other than class. The unions criticized by Lenin in Tsarist Russia were quite different from the British ones with which Hyman and Beynon were most familiar; all of these were substantially different from the unions that emerged from the remaking of the Canadian working class in the 1940s, to which I now turn.

In 3.4, I analyzed industrial pluralism, the regime of industrial legality inaugurated by PC 1003, as a new mode of political administration, a contradictory achievement wrung from the Canadian state by workers' struggles in a period in which class recomposition was taking place on a large scale. Industrial pluralism gave workers rights to union recognition and collective bargaining, along with procedures for resolving disputes that arose during the life of a contract. It also prohibited the effective solidaristic methods of struggle with which

the new rights were won. Also banned were "quickies" and the other kinds of direct action sometimes used by workers to resolve conflicts with management on the job. Union officials were now compelled by law to uphold collective agreements. Labour boards could impose sanctions on unions for violations of contractual provisions by their members, and they gained the authority to define wage-worker collectivities by determining the scope of bargaining units.

This new legal framework was not the only important change for unionism. As ever-larger numbers of wage-earners joined unions and negotiated collective agreements, there was a shift in the contents of the contracts. Clauses specifying the rights of management - "the single most important item which defines authority in the workplace" (Warrian 1986, 144) where a recognized union exists - became increasingly common. In Warrian's sample of 176 contracts negotiated between 1939 and 1949, 58.8% of those dating from 1939 to 1943 had no such provision whatsoever. In 1944, the year of PC 1003, management rights clauses began to appear more often. Of the collective agreements signed after the end of the war, a mere 7% had no clause specifying management rights (146-148). A similar trend took place with respect to clauses banning strikes during the term of an agreement, which were not uncommon during the war. Of the contracts analyzed by Warrian, 48.1% of those from the 1939-1943 period did not prohibit such strikes. This figure began to fall in 1944, and only 23.3% of the agreements negotiated after the war's end did not have no-strike clauses (149-151). The enshrining of managerial power and ban on mid-contract strikes were evidently seen by employers as necessary once they were compelled by law to negotiate with

recognized unions. In turn, contractual recognition of management rights and the renunciation of strikes during the life of agreements was a badge of "responsible" unionism, a theory and practice that also endorsed private property, free enterprise and liberal democracy (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 305). The widespread acceptance of such restrictions in exchange for the new regime of industrial legality is the background to the observation, made by an author who had worked for nine years for Smith-Corona in Toronto in the 1950s, that unions:

> accept the lay-off as inevitable, something over which the union has no control, like the vagaries of the weather. There is very little else that the individual unions can do in the present situation. It is a basic policy principle of our Canadian unions that all business decisions of any company, apart from those that directly affect employer-employee relations, are strictly the prerogative of management (Boyle 1961, 6-7).

Control over the labour process and economic decision-making was what capital would insist on in return for its acceptance of new legal rights for unions.[8] The unionism shaped by this outcome was not necessarily what most of the workplace activists who had struggled for industrial unionism before and during the Second World War had sought, although it was similar to what most leaders of the CCL had envisaged as their goal.

A related feature of "responsible" unionism under industrial pluralism was the narrowing of the scope of union demands and the consolidation of their gendered and

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[8]These goals, especially control over wage-workers on the job, were by no means always fully achieved, as I will discuss below.

racialized dimensions. Once managerial rights were written into collective agreements, it became harder for workers to limit capitalist rule in the paid workplace sphere in officially-binding ways. This left wages and benefits as the major areas for negotiation. Seniority rights were a widespread union demand, and understandably so: they afforded valuable protection against arbitrary treatment. However, seniority represented at best a small restriction on capitalist rule on the job. Due to the way the union movement in the 1940s was gendered and racialized, separate seniority lists for men and women remained the norm, along with separate pay scales. Job classifications were often gender-specific, with workers of colour effectively confined to the worst jobs (Forrest 1995, 146-150; Sugiman 1994, 2001). Indeed, for the Office Employees' Association (OEA) at BC Electric, which obtained collective bargaining rights in 1944, the "first order of union business was to stabilize the gender order in the office" (Creese 1999, 60-61); the OEA demanded that married women not be employed, and agreed to an employer proposal that the married women retained would be classified as temporary workers, even though temporary workers were not represented by the union (61). This is simply one illustration of the pressure exerted by working-class men and some women, discussed in 3.4, to consolidate the male-dominated gender order in paid workplaces in the final years of the war and the immediate post-war period. Thus the kind of unionism that developed was one that by and large accepted a restricted range of demands that bore the stamp of sexism and racism. By abandoning demands that infringed on management's authority to organize the workplace, this unionism in fact imposed a new

barrier to challenges by workers to such instances of institutionalized sexism and racism.[9]

Apart from these influences on the making of collective agreements, there were other changes in Canadian unions. Notable here was the spread of the Rand Formula, the arbitrator's resolution to the contested issue of union security in the 1945 Ford Windsor strike that was found in 6.8% of collective agreements included in a sample compiled in 1951 by the federal Department of Labour. The importance of this form of union security in agreements signed by the new large union locals of the less-skilled can be seen in the fact that the agreements in which it was included covered 18.8% of the workers represented in the sample (Russell 1990, 227). The Rand Formula's distinctive package of rights and obligations would later be included in labour legislation and become "the hegemonic form of security" (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 290). Among unions that did not have the Rand Formula in their contracts, employer check-off of union dues in association with other variants of union security also became more common.

The causes of this change in the nature of unionism need to be specified. The most common interpretation advanced by critical social scientists is that unions changed as a result of the imposition of a new labour relations regime by the state, acting on behalf of business.

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[9]For example, sex-specific contract language in Ontario was only removed after it became prohibited by a 1970 amendment to the provincial Human Rights Code pushed for by women in the UAW (Sugiman 1994, 165-167). Sugiman's valuable study is sensitive to how industrial unionism was male-dominated and therefore simultaneously "pushed women forward and drew them back" (134), but it does not develop a critique of the bureaucratization of industrial unionism and therefore does not make explicit how this particular form of unionism limited the workplace struggles of unionized workers in general and women specifically.

John Godard focuses exclusively on the labour relations regime inaugurated by PC 1003 (1994, 120-121). Daniel Drache and Harry Glasbeek suggest that "the state had acted positively to give workers more countervailing power than they had before and had granted unions new standing and respect. The promise for worker advancement was real" (1992, 10). That this was not the outcome is explained by how Canadian governments, responding to the "overriding logic" (17) of an economy driven by exports to the US, developed labour relations policy in a coercive direction (10-12, 17-18). Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz present a more radical version of this line of interpretation, in which the legalism produced by the focus of union officials on labour boards, the ban on mid-contract strikes and compulsory arbitration of disputes during the life of collective agreements, along with the influence of the Cold War (1993, 18-20), created a unionism that "bore all the signs of the web of legal restrictions which enveloped it" (20). "Its practice and consciousness were highly legalistic and bureaucratic, and therefore, its collective strength limited" (20). Historians Michael Earle and Ian McKay (1989, 14-15) offer a similar analysis, while noting that this kind of state regulation of unions was pioneered in Nova Scotia before the Second World War.

This line of interpretation has the merit of highlighting the fundamental contribution of state power to reshaping Canadian unionism. Unfortunately, by explaining the changing nature of the unions as essentially *externally-imposed*, this approach misses a significant dimension and so presents a one-sided explanation. As I argued in 3.4, the new regime of industrial legality made unions simultaneously subjects of new rights and objects of new

forms of administration which were inextricably linked to these rights by virtue of the nature of capitalist state power, as theorized in 2.3. This did matter, but it is not by itself a satisfactory explanation. Similarly, the fact that before the Second World War CIO officials in the US began to clamp down on direct action in paid workplaces immediately following union recognition (Brecher 1972, 202-206; Green 1980, 159, 166; Edsforth 1987, 177-178, 193-198; Zieger 1995, 70-71) cannot easily be explained by a theory that sees the state's labour relations regime as the primary cause of union bureaucratization and conservatism, since US law did not compel such measures at the time. The changing nature of political administration in Canada does not explain why most union officials and rank and file activists demanded and welcomed the new labour relations order. Nor does it account for the finding that "much of what the state-enacted regime proclaimed and sanctioned had already been developing out of the class struggles of the 1940s" (Palmer 1992, 283). Before PC 1003, collective agreements were already growing in length, with some including seniority rules, grievance procedures and management rights clauses (283; Matheson 1989, 139-143). In short, the industrial pluralist form of the political administration of labour amplified and generalized impulses that had already emerged *from within* paid workplace conflict, while also drawing on the US Wagner Act model of industrial legality and elements of pre-war Canadian legislation.

To understand the emergence from within the relations between unions and employers of aspects of the new regime of industrial legality prior to PC 1003 (and the short-lived 1943 provincial reforms to the political administration of unions), and the general

acceptance of industrial pluralism, the place to begin is the commodification of labour power and the control of the labour process by capital. The subordination of wage-earners to capital in the paid workplace sphere leads workers' organizations - with the exception of those unusual workplace organizations that refuse to sign contracts[10] - to seek to regulate aspects of their working lives through collective agreements with their employers. The unequal balance of power between capital and labour is the reason why workers tend to try to codify wage levels and conditions of work which they consider to be to their advantage in contracts. Only when their collective power and willingness to confront employers is so strong as to make it unnecessary or even undesirable to fix wages or conditions will workers tend not to try to embed such matters in contracts. For this reason, when less-skilled wage-workers in Canada began to win union recognition from employers during the war, it was not surprising that their demands included, for example, seniority rules that introduced an element of predictability and protection for longer-serving workers. Grievance procedures that offered the promise of being able to defend workers' rights without the need to engage in direct action made sense to those groups of workers who did not have a great deal of workplace power.

Once contracts are in place, employers, who are concerned with the ongoing

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[10]North American examples have included the Industrial Workers of the World, some early CIO locals, and workplace organizations that highly militant workers have on occasion created to struggle independently of existing unions, such as the Revolutionary Union Movements of African-American wage-workers in the late 1960s (Brissenden 1957, 115, 324, 330, 371; Lynd 1996, 5; Georgakas and Surkin 1998).

uninterrupted production of goods and services, have strong incentives to try to prevent disruptions of work by inserting provisions banning strikes in collective agreements. Similarly, management rights clauses shore up capitalist rule, protecting it against incursions of workers' control in the labour process. Since the balance of class power in the paid workplace sphere in capitalist societies is rarely such as to give workers a decisive advantage - after all, this is the fundamental reason why workers seek collective agreements in the first place - unions face pressure to agree to no-strike rules and definitions of managerial rights.

For some of the employers forced to concede union recognition in wartime, such provisions were intended to reinforce their control over the labour process in the presence of new unions and workers who were militant, or might become so. That workers accepted these restrictions without much opposition was in keeping with the prevailing politics of the working-class movement. During the war, unionists had experienced many state policies and practices they had reason to dislike, but since these had been brought in by parties of the ruling class they did little to provoke a critique of the nature of the existing state power itself, as opposed to the parties in question.[11] Although class recomposition was taking place and workers were in practice weakening managerial authority to varying degrees, explicit rejection of the right of employers to manage was also quite rare. Few unionists were able or willing to raise such a radical ideological challenge to capitalist rule over paid workplaces,

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[11] As a contrast, consider how the use of repressive state power during the First World War by Australian Prime Minister Hughes - a Labour Party member until he and other supporters of conscription were expelled from the party in 1916 - led to a questioning of the assumption of state neutrality (Irving 1999, 206).

even if managerial authority was sometimes undermined by wage-workers' self-activity. Simply obtaining reforms that obliged employers to sit down and negotiate with unions in Canada had been difficult enough.

The existence of a union officialdom with interests in some ways distinct from those of workers in general is also important in explaining the acceptance of a regime of industrial legality that entrenched the institutional existence of unions while placing limits on union activity.[12] Where a collective agreement exists that prohibits strikes during its term, union officials objectively find themselves in a social location in which they have a structural interest in avoiding contract violations by workers. In such circumstances, the consequence of infractions is likely to be employer sanctions, up to and including the abrogation of the contract, unless workers have a power advantage vis-a-vis an employer that is large enough to prevent the employer from effectively meting out punishment. The burden of dealing with employer sanctions falls foremost on official union leaders and associated union staffers, regardless of whether they are elected or appointed, radical or conservative. If the law or state administration imposes penalties on unions for violating contracts, the union officials affected also have an interest in worker compliance with contractual obligations. When employer or state sanctions target officials personally, for instance by threatening them with fines or imprisonment, the interest becomes more compelling. Because this kind of interest

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[12]By "union officialdom," I am referring to all holders of union office, including stewards and others who remain on the job ("lay" officials in English parlance) as well as full-time leaders and staff. Hyman 1989 presents a case for not focusing solely on full-time officials.

is structural, it exists irrespective of the ideology of union officials themselves.[13] Of course, it is by no means guaranteed that when officials have such an interest they will automatically practice or even advocate "responsible" unionism. Their ideological commitments, pressure from union members or their own pragmatic evaluation of a particular conjuncture may lead them to refuse to conform with the rules of industrial legality. However, the existence of such an interest, which varies in strength according to the specific consequences that may be visited on union officials, is a material basis for a theory and practice among officials in which adherence to collective agreements is of great importance. This helps explain why the ideology of "responsible" unionism arose long before industrial pluralism. Since this was the viewpoint of most of the CCL's official leadership, especially above the local level, and therefore of many industrial union activists - not to mention the leaders of the more conservative TLC and CCCL - there was little overt opposition when the new regime of industrial legality obliged officials to police contracts and banned wildcats, sympathy strikes and the use of job action to resolve grievances.

If the internal and external forces that reshaped Canadian unions in the 1940s were

[13]This final point that the union officialdom has independent interests by virtue of its social location is well-argued in Brenner 1985 (esp. 43-46). My brief theoretical discussion here attempts to clarify that these interests arise from the relations that exist between officials and the workers they represent, employers and state power (rather than only one or two of these three, as is sometimes assumed). Kelly 1988 (147-183) criticizes theories of the bureaucratic conservatism of union officials. His work does not engage with the line of argument I develop and is focused on British experience; he does not consider how the state's law and administration creates specific interests for union officials as a distinct social layer.

the actual balance of class power in paid workplaces during the Second World War, the general ideological acceptance in the workers' movement of management's right to control the labour process, the commitment of most union officials and many rank and file activists to "responsible" unionism, and the important new mode of political administration of unions by state power, what were the specific effects of the changes? How did the new kind of unionism, which I will refer to as bureaucratic as well as "responsible," affect class formation?

A concept that helps to clarify the effects of the changes is that of "cultures of solidarity." Formulated by Rick Fantasia, this refers to:

> more or less bounded groupings that may or may not develop a clear organizational identity and structure, but represent the active expression of worker solidarity within an industrial system and a society hostile to it. They are neither ideas of solidarity in the abstract nor bureaucratic trade union activity, but cultural formations that arise in conflict, creating and sustaining solidarity (Fantasia 1988, 19).

Cultures of solidarity may include "tactical activities, organizational forms, and institutional arrangements" (20), "potentially durable associational forms" (238). "*In practice*" they represent "a clear opposition to existing class relations" (22). The concept does not point to workers' consciousness in an abstract or individualized sense, but to the intersubjective consciousness of associated individuals. It is consistent with the idea that consciousness is "an aspect of the material, an aspect of being: it is 'conscious being'" (Jakubowski 1976, 23). Cultures of solidarity are sites of self-activity, social spaces marked by a praxis of direct

action.[14]

This concept highlights a distinctive feature of the union movement. Prior to the establishment of industrial pluralism, cultures of solidarity could be found across Canadian unions, though their boundaries cannot be said to have been congruent with those of the unions. Cultures of solidarity proliferated in the strike wave of 1941-1943.[15] Successful efforts by workers during the war to win union recognition and first contracts in the face of employer and state hostility were rooted in cultures of solidarity on various scales, not skillful negotiating by a corps of union officials; so too were many worker victories in the post-war strike wave. This is not to say that they existed in every workplace or union local, or even most, or that they were usually strong and sustained. Nor were they necessarily associated with political radicalism or a broad class outlook. Solidarity could be limited to men with a common ethno-racial identity and occupation. It might involve only a single department within a factory, a single workplace or members of the same union, though it did sometimes extend beyond these horizons.

Union conformity with the requirements of industrial pluralism soon began to

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[14]While Fantasia develops the concept of cultures of solidarity primarily to explore class praxis in the US in an age of bureaucratic unionism, it does not refer to the conventional activities of contemporary unions, including most legal strikes. This point is missed by Langford in his criticism of Fantasia's approach for its inconsistency with his findings about the 1987 strike of a local of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (Langford 1994, 119).

[15]The evidence for this is presented in Ch. 3. They also existed in the community sphere, in some of the movements discussed in Ch. 4.

suppress cultures of solidarity, although they were not eliminated.[16] This was no accident, since "responsible" unionism promised employers smooth-functioning workplaces in exchange for collective agreements and union rights. Unless wildcat strikes and other prohibited forms of collective action were eliminated, or at least greatly reduced, the fledgling arrangements of the new industrial legality would be put in jeopardy. Therefore, for bureaucratic unionism, cultures of solidarity represented a problem to be contained and replaced by adherence to the norms of industrial pluralism and the directives of official leaders. If militancy still had a role for some officials, it was usually the strictly delimited one of a force held in reserve lest an employer threaten the existence of a union when its contract expired.

The kind of unionism that came into being from 1944 was notably more bureaucratic than its predecessor. As mentioned in 3.1, I understand bureaucracy in the workers' movement as a social relation that concentrates control, expertise and initiative in the hands of a small number of leaders, be they union officials or not. Where working-class capacities for self-organization are strong, bureaucracy is weak. In addition, the above argument suggests that the stronger the interests of officials as a stratum, the more likely they are to promote bureaucracy in order to increase their independence from rank and file workers. Bureaucracy in this sense is not necessarily tied to timidity; it is possible for a union to be

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[16]Wells 1995 analyses this process in the UAW in Canada. Sobel and Meurer 1994 (118-127) documents the persistence of a culture of solidarity in and around the Inglis plant in Toronto during the post-war years.

both bureaucratic and militant. Bureaucracy also needs to be distinguished from leadership. The latter is best defined as deciding "the orientation as well as the methods of a collective action... Leadership is this directing activity itself; it is also... the subject of this activity, the body or organ that brings this activity to bear. This subject can be the group or collectivity in question; it can also be a particular body, inside or outside the group, acting 'by delegation' or on its own" (Castoriadis 1988, 202). Thus an anti-bureaucratic union leadership body is one that strives to "*stimulate* the collective awareness, activism and control of the mass of workers, to *combat* their dependence on its own superior commitment and expertise" (Hyman 1989, 159); other leaderships rest content with the existing relationship with their base, or try to make the organization more bureaucratic.

Proponents of "responsible" unionism, both craft and industrial, had always advocated bureaucratic organization. However, before the mid-1940s few unions had the stability and income to be able to employ many full-timers at any level, and therefore had no choice but to rely on the active participation of members and "lay" officials. By placing unions on a firmer institutional basis, imposing legal obligations on union officials to keep workers under control, and orienting officials away from direct action and towards formal grievance procedures and labour relations boards, the new industrial legality both promoted and enabled a greater degree of bureaucratization. Notable in this regard was the spread of the dues check-off under the Rand Formula and other models of union security. By replacing the time-consuming collection of union dues by stewards and sub-stewards with the automatic deduction of dues by employers so long as union officials maintained order in paid

workplaces, the check-off weakened officials' ties to dues-paying workers and increased their dependence on managers (Wells 1995, 212-214; Palmer 1992, 284).

The spread of bureaucratic unionism far beyond its handful of pre-war enclaves in some TLC affiliates and a few industrial unions across the body of a much larger and more secure union movement was a historic development in Canadian working-class formation. In the union struggles of the 1940s, workers - especially less-skilled male workers of European heritage - made many gains. Unionization reduced competition among wage-earners, curbed the arbitrary authority of managers and led to better pay and benefits for workers covered by collective agreements.[17] Through self-activity, many gained confidence in their own power to make changes in the world of the paid workplace, and some came to appreciate what militancy could achieve. On the occasions when solidarity spilled over workplace, occupational, ethno-racial and other lines, unionists experienced a broader class unity, although this experience was not often given a conscious political articulation and elaboration in class-analytic terms by the ideological currents in the working-class movement. Nevertheless, the establishment of a bureaucratic unionism governed by "responsible" leaders and staff was from the beginning corrosive of the workplace cultures of solidarity that nurture class capacities for self-activity and self-organization. On the job, workers were to respect management rights, spurn direct action and rely on administrative

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[17]Union pay levels were sometimes matched by employers wishing to remain union-free, perhaps most famously in the case of Hamilton's Dofasco matching gains made by USW members at Stelco (Storey 1987, 381-382).

procedures to resolve grievances. By upholding management rights, this unionism ratified workers' subordination in the labour process, including sexist and racist features of the organization of paid work. It also rejected attempts to combine particularistic workplace conflicts into broader struggles, not to mention the use of workplace power to obtain gains for the entire working class from the state. Nowhere did class-wide mobilization figure in its theory or practice. "Politics" was a separate affair to be left to the parliamentary parties, whether the CCF or the Liberals. As a result, most unions would not, by and large, promote a practice or consciousness reaching beyond their own workplaces or occupations in more than token ways. This kind of unionism, which to a large extent defined the Canadian working-class movement, was to an unprecedented extent both entrenched and enchained.

5.2 The Working Class, Nation and Citizenship

The relationships between workers, the existing configuration of state power and the nation or nations within a state's territory play a significant role in working-class formation. While state power has figured in the analysis thus far, one specific aspect of it - citizenship - deserves greater attention. As I will explain, the close connection between the social relations of citizenship and those of nation in developed capitalist societies justify considering the two together, while not conflating the one with the other. The question of how the working class's relationships to the state through citizenship and to the national formations in Canada changed during the 1940s is the central concern here. Addressing this historical issue first requires some theoretical clarification of its terms. Unfortunately, the

sheer paucity of historical research on matters related to nationalism, citizenship and workers in Canada in the 1940s means that the following discussion must of necessity be more tentative than the previous analysis of unionism.

For more than a decade, it has been commonplace in much critical social scientific work in the English language to cite Benedict Anderson's definition of a nation as an "imagined community." Anderson's definition is indeed compelling, and for that reason is worth citing in full. A nation is "an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (1983, 15). The priorities of this dissertation suggest that Anderson's explication of the nation as community is also worth repeating: "it is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (16). Nations, therefore, encompass people across class lines. Even in situations in which most members of a nation are working-class while its ruling class is drawn entirely from a different nation, the former nation will most likely include some members of other classes, such as independent producers or middle-class professionals. Historical evidence suggests that the mass influence of strong forms of nationalism in working-class formations tends to be associated with a dulling of class antagonism within nations, except in cases in which rulers are drawn from nations other than those to which most of the ruled belong, or are clearly identified as not genuinely national.[18] The multi-class character of nations is the basis of the

[18]See the essays in Berger and Smith 1999 and Berger and Broughton 1995.

classical Marxist critique of nationalism, at whose heart is the social-theoretical contention that nations are made up of classes with different and often conflicting interests (Löwy 1998, 53).[19]

Nationalism in its strong or exclusive form, which holds that the nation is the sole, or at least primary relevant, identity of its members is the antithesis of this critique. Eric Hobsbawm distinguishes this kind of nationalism from the "conglomerate national/citizen, social consciousness which, in modern states, forms the soil in which all other political sentiments grow" (1992, 145). While one must raise a note of caution about the lack of clarity in Hobsbawm's formulation about "modern states" and the implication conveyed by his metaphor that national/citizen identity is *always* the most basic of all political identities in such states, the non-exclusive kind of national identity to which Hobsbawn draws attention is an important phenomenon. That said, Hobsbawm does not stress a point which needs to be emphasized, namely that these two kinds of nationalism exist, as it were, on a continuum of national consciousness. Neither is static, and either can potentially evolve into the other among groups of people as a result of shifting social conditions. The relationship of people to their national community is subject to change.

Nations themselves, like classes, are historical formations. As Otto Bauer argues,

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[19]There is also a political-strategic dimension to the critique, grounded in the belief that Marxist socialism's "supreme loyalty is not to any nation, but to an international historical subject (the proletariat) and to an international historical aim: the socialist transformation of the world" (Löwy 1998, 53). This differs from the official "proletarian internationalism" of the Communist movement in the 1940s, whose supreme loyalty was to the USSR.

they are "*open historical realities*" (Löwy 1998, 47). A nation, in Bauer's words, is the "never completed product of an unending process" (qtd. 46). Unlike classes, which have their roots in objective antagonistic social relations, national formations are socially anchored in ways that are less precise, harder to specify. In social reality, nations are, in the last instance, defined as such by their members.[20] They are not less real because they exist in this way, and the formation of a nation always takes place in definite historical conditions (43). Chief among these conditions is state power. While acknowledging that various popular proto-nationalisms existed before the development of modern states (1992, 46-79), Hobsbawm maintains that "nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round" (10).[21] The nation "is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern state, the 'nation-state,' and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it" (1992, 9-10). This suggests the connection between nation and citizenship.

Although citizenship studies is a growth area in contemporary social science, its

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[20]This recognition of the importance of collective subjective self-definition in no way negates the fact that not all members of a national community exercise equal influence in the making of a nation. Those with greater wealth and social power have greater access to the means of formulating and disseminating nationalist ideology, though not necessarily exclusive access, as Anderson 1983, Hobsbawm 1992 and the essays in Bannerji, Mojab and Whitehead 2001 and Berger and Smith 1999 show.

[21]Thus Hobsbawm defines nationalism as the belief that national and political (state) units should be congruent (9). An important force fueling nationalist consciousness is national oppression, the domination of a nation (or proto-national group), whether as a colony or within a multi-national state dominated by one nation (or more than one).

central object has not always been specified with sufficient theoretical clarity.[22] Charles Tilly provides a helpful definition of citizenship as "*a continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in which each has enforceable rights and obligations uniquely by virtue of (1) the person's membership in an exclusive category, the native-born plus the naturalized and (2) the agent's relation to the state rather than any other authority the agent may enjoy*" (Tilly 1995, 8). Although citizenship is connected to "categories, roles and identities," Tilly maintains that it should be conceptualized "as a kind of tie" in order to avoid losing sight of "state practices and state-citizen interactions" (9). In the conceptual vocabulary of this dissertation, citizenship ties are social relations. More precisely, within the theoretical framework developed in 2.3, relations of citizenship in capitalist societies are aspects of class relations between, on the one hand, citizens belonging to particular classes and, on the other, the capitalist state, a form of capital. The "enforceable rights and obligations" to which Tilly refers can be understood in terms of "the simultaneous emergence of citizens as subjects of rights and objects of administration" (Neocleous 1996, 111). Of course, relations of citizenship are, like other forms of class relations, mediated by various social relations other than class. Citizenship is organized in historically-specific structural arrangements, sometimes conceptualized as citizenship regimes (Jenson and Phillips 1996, 113-115; Jenson 1997, 631-633).

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[22]An interesting theoretical engagement with contemporary citizenship studies is Mooers 2001. While suggestive in places, in considering citizenship in relation to the sphere of exchange in capitalism it pays little attention to the state form.

Tilly writes that citizenship ranges between thick and thin forms (8). Another typology of citizenship, which has been used widely in recent studies, is that found in TH Marshall's essay "Citizenship and Social Class" (Marshall 1950). Marshall proposes that citizenship has evolved through three phases in the modern era. Civil citizenship entails liberal "rights necessary for individual freedom" (10); political citizenship introduces the electoral franchise and the right to hold elected office; social citizenship spans all manner of social services and public education (11). Although Marshall's classification is found within what Michael Mann has rightly criticized as an evolutionary model drawn exclusively from British history (Mann 2001, 126), it has the merit of highlighting salient aspects of citizenship rights. The exclusively legal rights-based view of citizenship presented by Marshall and taken up in many later works,[23] does, however, ignore the political administration of civil society by state power that accompanies citizenship rights. It also treats struggles for citizenship rights as struggles between principles, not social classes (Neocleous 1996, 129-132). Conceptualizing citizenship within capitalist state relations as theorized earlier avoids these problems in Marshall and makes it possible to use his terminology of civil, political and social citizenship in a different overall framework.

From this perspective, Magda Fahrni's addition of "economic citizenship" to Marshall's three-fold typology involves a mistake characteristic of citizenship studies that do not adequately theorize citizenship itself. There is no reason to doubt the finding that

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[23]For example, Turner 1986.

there was a widespread development among families in Québec during the war and immediate post-war years of "the conviction that they were entitled to participate in a capitalist economy on reasonable terms" and that "Canadians expected the rewards of citizenship to include such tangible benefits as an acceptable cost-of-living" (Fahrni 2001, 288-289). But, as Tilly argues, citizenship by definition involves relations with states. To call the ideological sentiment to which Fahrni refers "economic citizenship," as she does, confuses the matter. It is indisputable that such convictions led to demands on the state for services, benefits and consumer price regulation, and to demands placed directly on employers and businesses for lower prices and higher wages. The former were demands for social citizenship. The latter were demands directed at capitalists, large and small, but they were not claims for the enforceable rights which are the stuff of citizenship. This is not to deny that such demands were historically associated with a sensibility that "Canadians"[24] ought to be able to enjoy certain conditions of life. Instead, the essential point is that this sensibility involved both claims for social citizenship and other demands. The distinction between the two is blurred by the term "economic citizenship."[25]

Turning now to the little-studied question of the working class's relationship to the

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[24]More specifically, in the 1940s the "Canadians" with such entitlements encompassed, at most, people of European origin.

[25]Within the theoretical framework outlined, "economic citizenship" could be used to refer to claims for rights pertaining to genuine control by citizens over the economy through state power. Since such rights are incompatible with capitalist production and state relations, and were rarely raised in the 1940s, I will not discuss this kind of citizenship further.

state through citizenship and its relationship to the national formations in Canada during the 1940s, it is obvious that the war effort was central.[26] From 1939 to early 1943, the state's approach to mobilizing the population for war was framed in intensely patriotic terms, not unlike official rhetoric in the First World War. "Appeals to the nation and Empire were blatant during the war" (Woodman-Harvey 2000, 31). Activities to mark Empire Day, a date of declining significance before 1939, were revived (Stamp 1973, 41). The BPI "portrayed the war as a struggle reaching biblical proportions, an eschatological battle, that reduced the latitude for public questions about Canada's participation. 'If we do not destroy what is evil,' warned Mackenzie King, 'it is going to destroy all that there is of good'" (Young 1981a, 122). The distinctive contribution of Canada to the Allies was also emphasized. At the same time, official ideology made much of embattled Britain to appeal to Anglo-Celtic Canadians (122). It was the duty of all Canadians to unite, take part and make sacrifices for the cause. Citizenship rights were given much less attention than national obligations. It is important to recall that Canadian citizenship as such did not formally exist during the war. Instead, the law recognized "British subjects," "Canadian nationals" and "aliens." Canadian

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[26]Very little historical research on this topic has been conducted to date. One of the few studies of the ideologies of nation and citizenship that covers this period, Bourque and Duchastel 1996, is focused exclusively on the official utterances of federal and provincial politicians. Resnick 1977 is typical of the work on English-Canadian nationalism and class by New Left scholars in English Canada: it ignores the period prior to 1945, and of the years 1945-1955 it concludes "there was little working-class based nationalism in this decade of Cold War and bourgeois hegemony" (96). As a result, a positive understanding of the notions of nation and citizenship prevalent in the working class in the 1940s is generally lacking.

national status was conferred on persons born in Canada and those born elsewhere who successfully applied for naturalization, which required residence in Canada for five years and knowledge of English or French. All Canadian nationals were by definition British subjects (Pal 1993, 65, 79).

Agencies of political administration showed a deep concern, as they had during the First World War, about the participation and loyalty of the portion of the population that was of European origin but neither Anglo-Celtic nor French-Canadian (Dreisziger 1999, 9-13). Contrary to policy in the earlier war, in the interests of national unity some state officials were now prepared to advance a conception of Canadian identity other than the ideology officially-sanctioned before the war. The latter, dominant in English Canada, was one which Richard Day calls "Anglo-conformist" because it "held that all 'new Canadians' must be assimilated, or at least *assimilable*, to an English-Canadian model" (Day 2000, 7).[27] In order to promote a different notion, in early 1941 the BPI published a pamphlet entitled *Canadians All: A Primer of Canadian National Unity*; it was accompanied by CBC radio broadcasts on the same theme. *Canadians All* listed the various "national groups" of European origin that, it claimed, composed over 98% of the population, describing them as "the varied human ingredients that history has poured into the huge mixing-bowl of Canada's national life" (Kirkconnell 1941, 7). "No one element predominates; even the Anglo-Saxons are now less

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[27]That this was the goal of state officials is not in doubt. A 1941 report by Tracy Philipps, an advisor to the BPI (Pal 1993, 70), stated: "A. *Immediate Aim*. To win the war. B. *Ultimate aim*. Unity of the Canadian nation" (qtd. Day 2000, 159). On the racialized character of pre-war assimilationism, see Knowles 1996 (905-907).

than one-half the total; we are all minorities but all Canadians, entering, each with his own capacities, into the richness of the national amalgam" (7). So long as "the two major conspiracies against civilization" (14), Communism and Naziism, could be vanquished, Canada could achieve true national unity. Some 300 000 copies of *Canadians All* were distributed for the edification of the populace, or at least the majority that could read English. The "mosaic" conception of Canadian identity it articulated was not itself new, but it had not been propagated by state agencies before. During the war, it was taken up by the Advisory Committee on Co-operation in Canadian Citizenship and the Nationalities Branch of the Department of National War Services (DNWS), and widely disseminated by the BPI and its replacement, the WIB (Day 2000, 158-165; Pal 1993, 64-77). In a similar spirit, in late 1941 the DOCR "enemy alien" regulations were amended so that they did not apply to Finnish-, Hungarian- and Romanian-Canadians; Italian- and Austrian-Canadians were exempted at the end of 1942 (Dreisziger 1999, 12-13).

In spite of these efforts to solve what Etienne Balibar calls the problem of how "to produce the people" or "more exactly" how "to make the people produce itself continually as national community" (Balibar 1991, 93), the state "could not undo its peacetime failure to integrate Québécois and ethnic Canadians [*sic*] into the larger [i.e. pan-Canadian] community with clumsy propagandizing crafted under the stress of war" (Granatstein 1993, 44). Some concerned professionals, politicians and civil servants became convinced that the publicity machine was not achieving the desired results. They detected a lack of popular enthusiasm for the war effort and rising support for the CCF (Young 1981a, 124-125). The

divergent voting patterns inside and outside Québec in the 1942 referendum on releasing the federal government from its commitment not to conscript for overseas service were also clear. The large-scale strike wave and growth of unions likely also fed concerns in some circles about the weakness of working-class national loyalties. Perceptions of low enthusiasm are not easy to evaluate but were probably accurate. One oral historian has concluded that "Canadians did not seem to care about the major events" of the war (Broadfoot 1974, viii).[28] Many bought Victory Bonds but others did not. The latter were very far from being fascist sympathizers; pragmatic concerns about material interests and a skepticism or cynicism bred by the First World War, the Depression and endless patriotic calls from ruling- and middle-class figures are enough to explain working-class reticence to sacrifice for the nation.[29] There is no evidence that the repudiation of patriotism of the kind that had enjoyed some influence in the era of the Workers' Revolt retained any significant support, yet many workers showed in daily actions ranging from striking to violating WPTB rules that they did not accept the kind of exclusive nationalism they were exhorted to adopt.

Some in the middle class lobbied for a different approach, convinced that "as long

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[28]This is not to suggest that Broadfoot 1974 is an unproblematic historical source, but simply that Broadfoot's view on this point is a reasonable evaluation of the attitude of much of the working class.

[29]As one person recalled, "V-Bond days were big then. Everybody was supposed to buy, and if he didn't then he was a traitor. I spent any money that would have gone on bonds for booze." Referring to one bond drive, "I can't remember if they got their war bond money but I guess they did. They always seemed to, even if they had to put the Prime Minister on the radio and get him to cry his eyes out for the people to give" (Broadfoot 1974, 35-36).

as the war effort remained [in the words of Manitoba Liberal Edgar Tarr] 'largely an organization of the classes asking the masses to respond without giving them any say'" (Young 1981a, 125) it would be impossible to overcome apathy and halt the growth of support for the Left. As a result, the WIB changed tack in 1943. Now film, radio and other "propaganda was supposed to show how the war had become a people's war and midwife to a new social order" (Evans 1984,108). Victory abroad was linked to social reform at home that would benefit all Canadians. WIB printed material now argued that citizen participation in public life was necessary, and even explained that "ordinary citizens had to form well-organized groups that neither the media nor the government could ignore" (Young 1981a, 126).

This shift, which elevated the importance of the rights of citizens and was eventually made concrete in family allowances and other late-war federal measures and promises, can be interpreted as, in part, a response at the level of state policy to class recomposition, including the strike wave, the dynamic expansion of the unions and the CCF, and a host of everyday acts by increasingly-assertive working-class people. Fahrni's social history of Montréal families in the 1940s reveals in detail how "in pushing to ensure that the material needs of their families were met, they pried open public purses, demanded a broader range of public provisions, and expanded the kind and number of 'private' claims that were viewed as legitimate and appropriate to make in public" (2001, 376). To say that "these families, as much as their political or clerical leaders, shaped the character of postwar Québec" (376) seems an optimistic exaggeration, since it implies an equivalence of social power that surely

did not exist between rulers and ruled. Still, to neglect or minimize the role of working-class agency in the reconfiguration of citizenship relations is a mistake. Sensing dissatisfaction, disturbances and demands among large numbers of people, the federal state reacted by pledging to inaugurate a new social order for Canada. Social citizenship rights had become an integral part of both popular and official ideologies. Certainly the obligations of citizenship were never in doubt. In the words of a Canada and Newfoundland Education Association committee report on "a democratic school system"quoted approvingly in "Blueprint for Good Citizenship," an editorial in *Maclean's*, "the principles of morality should be firmly established" and "the attitude must be thoroughly implanted that all must work and that good workmanship is necessary at all times" ("Blueprint" 1943, 1). What did change were the rights that would accompany these duties and the heightened expectations that workers attached to both.

In the immediate post-war years, reconstruction, including an expanded role for state power in the provision of social citizenship rights,[30] was acknowledged as the order of the day. The boundaries of citizenship were subject to renegotiation as the federal government moved to pass the 1946 Citizenship Act (Fahrni 2001, 374). This created the formal status of Canadian citizen, although Canadian citizens remained British subjects. The Act also abolished knowledge of English or French as a requirement for naturalization and modified

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[30]It was at this time that the hostility of Québec's National Union government of Maurice Duplessis to an expanded welfare state most clearly set it apart from the Dominion government and other provincial governments (Fahrni 2001, 126).

a number of other rules (Martin 1993, 72-73). In British Columbia, political citizenship rights were extended to Chinese Canadians in 1947 and Japanese Canadians two years later (Lee 1976).

However, the beginning of the Cold War soon brought to an end the limited degree of flux that had existed in relations of citizenship and nation. The anti-communist elements in the official conception of Canadian identity were pushed to the fore. The national loyalty of those who dissented from the emerging orthodoxy of Cold War anti-communism was called into question by employers, the leaders of the major political parties, journalists and much of the population at large. Pat Conroy, CCF-aligned Secretary-Treasurer of the CCL, exemplified this attitude when, during a debate on NATO at the CCL's 1948 convention, he exclaimed "I would like to know if the delegates to this convention are Canadians or Russians!" (qtd. Whitaker and Marcuse 1994, 272). The officials at the Canadian Citizenship Branch of the Secretary of State (formerly the Nationalities Branch of the DNWS), who saw their task as working in coordination with other state and non-state agencies for the cultural integration of those who were neither Anglo-Celtic nor French Canadian, were much concerned with the allegiances of European immigrant workers (Pal 1993, 78-80; Day 2000, 166-171).[31] The underlying racialization of nation and citizenship

[31]Fears about Communism among Eastern European immigrants were overblown. Communist influence fell with the spread of Stalinist rule to Eastern Europe and the start of the Cold War; many post-war immigrants to Canada were strongly anti-communist. Some indication of this can be seen in Kolasky 1979 (178-180, 184, 194-195). The strengthening of anti-communism in these ethno-racial communities may have hastened their full assimilation into whiteness, given the identification of communism as un-Canadian.

was vocalized by the Prime Minister himself. In 1947, when immigrants were beginning to be admitted after many years in which immigration had been negligible,[32] King stated in the House of Commons that "Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens... There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population" (qtd. Satzewich 1991, 123). Thus, by the late 1940s, relations of Canadian identity and citizenship were again officially codified, though not in their pre-war shape.

Interpreting the interplay between the evolution of nation and citizenship and the remaking of the working class in the 1940s is, at present, a difficult task given the inadequacy of the existing body of historical research. Consequently, the conclusions reached must be regarded as more tentative than others in this dissertation. One major point is clear, though: the working-class upsurge of 1941-1947 coincided with a redefinition of the Canadian nation by the state in terms of integration into something of a "mosaic" instead of coercive assimilation into Anglo-conformity, and with the official adoption of a liberal version of social citizenship.[33] These were historically novel developments. During the

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[32]In 1946, anti-communist Poles who agreed to work as farm labour for two years were the first major group admitted after the war; many Eastern European "Displaced Persons" followed, along with some Dutch migrants (Iacovetta 1992, 25; Satzewich 1991, 86-99).

[33]To call Canadian social citizenship liberal (as do Jenson and Phillips 1996, 116) is to distinguish it from the social democratic social citizenship regimes established in some European states. The latter explicitly recognize the working class or its mass organizations.

period of class recomposition at the close of the previous world war, workers did not experience state power as willing to deliver new social rights and benefits. State coercion and calls for national loyalty were openly arrayed against the Workers' Revolt[34] and the hegemonic ideology of nation remained solidly Anglo-conformist.

In contrast, in the 1940s the first steps were being taken to invite non-Anglo-Celtic, non-French-Canadian workers into the Canadian "imagined community" on terms other than straightforward and unconditional assimilation. Noting this should not be misread as uncritical praise for the emerging "mosaic" conception of Canadian identity, precursor of post-war state multiculturalism policy.[35] This opening was neither immediate nor total; given the historical place occupied by Eastern and Southern European immigrants in the hierarchy of racial power, it could not have been otherwise. Nor should one place too much emphasis on the ideology of "Canadians All." As the two previous chapters have demonstrated, Italian Canadians, Ukrainian Canadians and others continued to experience various forms of oppression in this period. In light of this, the relative effects of union struggles that improved the conditions of less-skilled workers, war mobilization and the changing official definition of Canadian identity, and other factors that moved the non-Anglo-Celtic, non-

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[34]"The Canadian state never flinched in the face of the escalating, widely based labour revolt," note Heron and Siemiatycki (1998, 34). Workers' struggles were tarred as "Bolshevik," the antithesis of British/Canadian (Heron 1998, 289). Workers themselves tried to redefine nation and citizenship (277-278; Mitchell and Naylor 1998, 211-214; Reimer 1993) or, on the far left, transcend them (e.g. McKay and Morton 1998, 69-70).

[35]On the latter, see Bannerji 2000.

French, Euro-Canadian working class towards greater inclusion in whiteness deserve to be scrutinized in future scholarship.[36] Such inquiry would contribute to the understanding of the historical development of class relations as mediated by race and nation in Canada.

The issue of the French-Canadian working class's national experience in the 1940s should not be collapsed into the preceding discussion. French Canada had a place within the Canadian national community as this had been officially-defined since Confederation, but it was far from recognition as a nation. French-Canadian identity had been shaped by an ideology of clerical nationalism produced by intellectuals of the church and the traditional middle class, as well as by a federalist vision of a bi-cultural Canadian nation. French-Canadian nationalism invoked Roman Catholicism, rural life, class harmony and the centrality of the family as essential features of the nation. This ideology, which can be characterized as conservative liberalism, was as racially-exclusive as the Anglo-conformist nationalism of English Canada (Bourque and Duchastel 1996, 55-59; Monière 1981, 177-227).[37] Since there were no influential political currents inside French Canada that advocated national self-determination or independence or which linked national demands with independent working-class politics, in the 1940s French-Canadian nationalism found its chief

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[36]There are no Canadian equivalents to US studies such as Lichtenstein 1988 and Göbel 1988.

[37]Unlike French-Canadian nationalism, however, the latter, the nationalism of state power and the dominant nation, considered itself as "Canadian" in an unhyphenated sense and did not acknowledge French Canada as a national entity. The bi-cultural federalist conception was held by only a small minority within English Canada.

political reflections in the National Union's defence of provincial autonomy, the anti-conscription campaign and the Popular Bloc's combination of a liberal-modernizing agenda with traditional provincial rights' demands. Through the polarized conscription debate, the French-Canadian working class was further alienated from the Canadian national community. The English-Canadian national chauvinism expressed in the booing of Montreal Canadiens hockey player Maurice Richard in Toronto - "he was French, he was not overseas in uniform, and therefore he was both a traitor and a coward" (Broadfoot 1974, 344) in the eyes of many English-Canadians - and in discrimination against French-Canadians in the military (Douglas and Greenhous 1995, 257-258) had the effect of repulsing French-Canadian workers at the same time as special efforts were being undertaken to win the support of non-Anglo-Celtic, non-French-Canadian workers for the war effort. Yet the willingness of some French-Canadian wage-earners in Québec to choose the more aggressive CCL industrial unions over those of the CCCL, thereby establishing new ties to the pan-Canadian workers' movement, is evidence of the limits to the influence of clerical nationalism among urban workers. Repelled though they were by the federal government's conscription plebiscite and English-Canadian chauvinism, the response of most French-Canadian workers was not to embrace a strong version of nationalist ideology.

The implications for working-class formation of the extension of social citizenship rights are perhaps clearer than those related to nations and nationalism. Together, UI, family allowances and the Veterans' Charter contributed in limited but nonetheless meaningful ways to mitigating capitalist rule in the abstract form of money. These programs, and from 1948

the example of hospital insurance introduced by the CCF government of Saskatchewan, provided a material basis for gendered and racialized conceptions of citizens' entitlements to federal state services in a way that earlier means-tested pensions, relief and provincial workers' compensation plans had not. When the rights of the new mode of industrial legality are also considered, such measures probably led to more working-class people than ever before experiencing state power as a force more benevolent than repressive and intrusive. Taxes were higher, but so too were incomes for most working-class households. The CCF could criticize the social reforms of the 1940s as insufficient, but without some kind of critique of capitalist state power it could not question the limits of capitalist citizenship itself. The workers' movement, concerned to defend its recent gains, was content to promote active and "responsible" participation within the structures of liberal democracy. As a WEA pamphlet, *Citizen Trade Unionist*, explained, "The experience of bargaining with the employer and in the day-to-day settlement of disputes and negotiation on new issues gives the union member a realistic approach to his citizenship responsibilities" (Wilson 1945, 10). By the late 1940s, the sense of greater inclusion for working-class citizens, in conjunction with the Cold War, had likely generated a higher level of consent to capitalist rule outside the paid workplace than had hitherto existed.

5.3 The New Class Composition

The spread of bureaucratic unionism, a shifting official definition of identity in the dominant nation and social citizenship in a liberal vein were three significant features of the

class composition left in place when the 1941-1947 wave of recomposition definitively came to an end, a composition that remained in place until a new period of recomposition began in the middle of the 1960s.[38] Depicting the shape of this new class composition across social spheres at the end of the 1940s highlights the remarkable elements of both change and continuity in the Canadian working-class formation. Created by the remaking of the working class in the 1940s, it was shaped by contradictory gains that altered class relations in significant ways. Consequently, how this new formation is interpreted is a matter of some importance. The view that union rights, social citizenship and higher living standards amounted to the incorporation of the Canadian working class is not uncommon. While it is a mistake to gloss over the ways in which the class formation was changed, I will argue that this conceptualization is flawed and suggest an alternative.

By the close of the 1940s, the material conditions of the working class had improved in a number of meaningful ways. A basic context for this was a civilian labour force (aged fourteen and over) of 5.092 million in 1949, up from 4.649 in 1939, of whom the number officially without jobs and looking for work was 101 000, compared to 529 000 in 1939. The number of people toiling in agriculture was declining in both absolute and relative terms (Leacy 1983, D124-133). The most dramatic change in occupational distribution from pre-war patterns lay in manufacturing, which in 1949 accounted for 1.212 million jobs, nearly

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[38]The many paid workplace and community struggles of the mid-1960s through to the mid-1970s have not yet received much scholarly attention. Palmer 1992 (311-339) and Heron 1996 (85-106) survey some of this history.

twice the 627 000 of 1939. Buoyed by post-war growth, construction work now employed 271 000, up from 127 000 a decade earlier (D318-328). In manufacturing, the average weekly wage had almost doubled: it had been $22.79 the year the war began and was $43.97 in 1949. In 1939, manufacturing workers had lagged behind the industrial composite wage of $23.44; in 1949, on average they were ahead of its $42.96 level (E86-103). Although such averages conceal many disparities, they do indicate that less-skilled workers were generally better-off. While the cost of living (1935-1939 = 100) had risen by about 60% between 1939 and 1949, from 101.5 to 161.6 (K1-7), the pace of wage increases had outpaced inflation. This was not only true for wage-earners in manufacturing. For instance, the wages of service workers, the most poorly paid category, had not risen as dramatically as those of manufacturing workers. Nevertheless, they averaged $16.33 per week in 1939 and $28.05 ten years later. While service workers' wages had risen slightly more than the total cost of living in percentage terms, the gap between their weekly earnings and those of manufacturing workers (who themselves tended to take home less than the more highly-paid groups, such as miners, railway workers and public utility employees) had increased from $6.46 to $15.92 (E86-103). Unionization had made far fewer inroads among low-paid service workers, who were more likely to be women and not Anglo-Celtic, than elsewhere. This explains the aggregate statistics that indicate an accentuation in sectional wage differentials.

Outside the paid workplace sphere, material circumstances were also better than they had been before or during the war. Following the cessation of hostilities, there was a noticeable shift in urban single detached housing from rental tenure to owner-occupancy

despite the increasing urbanization of a population that was growing as people married younger. Considerable renovation and new construction also began to improve the quality of the housing stock after years of Depression and war during which much deterioration and overcrowding had taken place. The number of households with six or more members fell from 25% in 1941 to 20% in 1951 (Miron 1988, 42-46, 168-170, 92). Federal family allowances and Veterans' Charter programmes now figured in the survival strategies of many working-class families. More married women - 11.2% - were in the labour force in 1951 than before the war, although most working-class women's lives were still clearly defined by unpaid labour in the home (Strong-Boag 1991, 479-480). Their domestic labour continued to play a vital role in the household economies of the working class, including those of the less-skilled workers who had benefitted most from the struggles of the 1940s. The overall picture at the close of the decade is one of a working class that was increasingly well-off and secure, though by no means affluent.

While such material measures of living standards do tell us something about the everyday lives of workers, they are only one aspect of class. Such indicators tell us little or nothing about the relational dimensions of class, about how workers related to capital and to each other. They do not reveal anything about class capacities and the scope and patterns of collective action. It is these and other characteristics of relations within the working class and between it and capital that are central to the analysis of class composition, and so it is to these that I now turn.

The new class composition was marked by a higher level of unity in comparison to

that of the pre-war period. In the paid workplaces where unionism was now firmly established, and to a lesser extent in the community, the working class presented a more solid front to capital than had been the case in the late 1930s. In 1949, 29.5% of non-agricultural paid workers were unionized, up from 17.3% in 1939 (Leacy 1983, E175-177). Union membership crossed the one million mark for the first time in 1949, nearly three times the 1939 total in absolute terms (E175-177). The impression that unions were now generally welcomed by management is a false one. Some employers stubbornly resisted organizing drives and sometimes collective bargaining as well.[39] Once ensconced, however, the new regime of industrial legality endowed unions with greater institutional stability than ever before. The enormous expansion of industrial unions, whose locals usually organized workers in skilled jobs along with production or other less-skilled workers, also softened occupational divisions inside paid workplaces. Outside the workplace, the level of support suggested by 782 410 votes for the CCF in 1949, 13.4% of the total cast, was certainly lower than the party's 1945 results (Young 1969, 319). Still, this was not negligible as a minority expression of the English-Canadian working-class movement, which simply did not have a common national mass party in the 1930s. Experiences of class solidarity in wartime and post-war strikes, the small anti-racist gains noted in 4.3 and a limited form of social citizenship with its associated sense of entitlement all contributed to a level of working-class cohesion against the atomizing and divisive forces of capitalist rule that was greater than

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[39]As seen in the 1950s at Eaton's (Sufrin 1982) and in strikes by miners in Québec (Rouillard 1989, 282-285) and lumber workers in Newfoundland (Jamieson 1968, 366-367).

what had existed in the pre-1941 class composition. This judgment should not obscure the persistence of major divisions rooted in gender, national and racial oppression, or regional, occupational and ideological differences. Heterosexual white male supremacy was most likely stronger in the post-war climate of prosperous domesticity than it had been between the wars. Yet, taking this into account, it remains the case that in paid workplaces and in official politics a stronger, wide-reaching unity against capital at the most elementary level, albeit one with many fault lines and weaknesses, was a defining feature of the new class composition.

At the same time, central to this class composition was a political division *within* the working class of unprecedented depth. There was now a gulf between the great majority of the working-class movement that lined up, whether reluctantly or enthusiastically, with NATO, "responsible" unionism and moderate social democracy or social-reform liberalism, and those on the Left who dissented from these politics. Certainly, infighting and splits in working-class organizations were not new: recall, for instance, the 1939 expulsion of CIO affiliates from the TLC or debates between supporters of the CPC and the non-Communist Left in the 1920s and 1930s. While radical industrial unionists, non-Communist Marxists and others had experienced political marginalization along with repression between the wars, Cold War anti-communism involved more than this. It was different because it succeeded in drawing almost all working-class organizations into a social bloc in which the ruling class was hegemonic, and in pushing dissenters to the very margins of the workers' movement. This success was predicated on the gains of industrial pluralism and social citizenship

achieved through struggles in the 1940s; without these reforms, it is doubtful whether the ruling class could have obtained the consent of so many labour officials and activists to anti-communism. Stronger identification with the nation may also have played a facilitating role in this process. The post-war anti-communist drive in the movement decisively weakened the influence of Communists and other radicals in the working class through its use of dismissals, state repression, expulsions and ideological demonization. It created ideological and organizational divisions that greatly reduced the ability of the LPP and others to function as currents within the working-class movement and made joint activity with Communists for all intents and purposes impossible. With most union officials, the major political parties, churches and other institutions in civil society united behind the cause of anti-communism, dissenters, whether Communist or not, risked intimidation and punishment from employers or the state and had little prospect of receiving solidarity.

Related to the grip of anti-communism was the role of the working-class movement in organizing the working class in accordance with the recently-reconfigured legal and administrative order of capitalist society. As discussed earlier, bureaucratic unionism accepted narrowly-defined collective bargaining as its defining purpose. It imposed new limits on workers' actions as well as bringing some workers higher wages, benefits and relief from abuses such as the "vicious system of favouritism, paying off to the foreman with bottles of whisky, kickbacks on overtime to the foreman, etc." (Lenihan 1998, 159). Bureaucratic unionism also began to weaken cultures of solidarity in paid workplaces. Securing adherence to contractually-defined procedures dictated that union officials,

particularly executive members who were the legal representatives of locals, maintain tighter control over workers. Because industrial legality now entailed state support for unions that conformed to its legal and administrative framework and threatened penalties for those that did not, union officials had far more at stake in playing by its rules than in the past. This gave them real incentives to try to stamp out the praxis of cultures of solidarity, which often transgressed the boundaries of industrial pluralism. The beginning of a decline of militant workplace self-activity also meant a change in the social environment in which union radicals were active.

In sum, the change in the relations of labour within and against capital upheld by the union officialdom simultaneously altered the relationship between workers and their organizations. As previously discussed, the strengthening of bureaucracy within the unions gave more power to full-time officials and reduced their reliance on membership initiative and involvement. In particular, the anti-communist purge was the occasion for various restrictions of union democracy. Most importantly, now that officials were pledged to police the workers they represented and faced penalties for failing to do so,[40] there was now a social basis for a working-class experience of unionism that was potentially more distant, even antagonistic, than it had tended to be in the past.

Outside the paid workplace sphere, by the close of the 1940s, in addition to electoral

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[40]The Rand Formula gave this an additional twist, since it made officials responsible for the discipline of workers in their bargaining units, including those who were not union members.

politics the activity of the working-class movement included organizing recreation, education courses, ladies' auxiliaries and services for union members, assisting private charities, and conducting research and education on welfare issues (Tillotson 1997). With the decline of the Communist-led community campaigns of the immediate post-war years, activist networks in working-class neighbourhoods of the kind that had organized solidarity and direct action withered. In general, "helping," citizen participation, tightly-controlled legal strikes and carefully-modulated protest - all sanctioned by legitimate authority - replaced rather than complemented the kind of self-organization in the workplace and community that nurtured working-class capacities.

The place in this class formation of what was now the undisputed party of labour requires attention. The CCF simultaneously organized workers independently of the parties of big business and helped position the workers' movement within capitalist order. By expelling critics sympathetic to the LPP or communist-identified causes and playing an important role in the anti-communist drive in the unions, the CCF leadership protected the party from state repression and won it a place as a minor respectable player in the official politics of Cold War Canada. With organizational links to the CCL unions, no backing from major capitalists and an official commitment to social reforms, the CCF remained an English-Canadian force for working-class politics with a significant base of Western agrarian support. In this sense, it represented a force for working-class independence from the parties backed by manufacturing, commercial and financial interests. However, by the late 1940s this independence was more firmly within the material and ideological limits of capitalist

social relations than it had been during the 1930s. No longer did the CCF have links with rebellious extra-parliamentary struggles, as had been the case until the mid-1940s by virtue of the involvement of some CCF members in workplace and community organizing. On the ideological side, as discussed in the previous chapter, the CCF leadership articulated working-class politics in a liberal-democratic idiom rather than in class terms. Thus it saw no fundamental reason to mobilize workers on a class basis rather than as citizens or unionists. While there were CCF members who considered the leadership conservative and advocated policies in line with the Regina Manifesto rather than the official policy of a more selective extension of state ownership (Young 1969, 123), the party did not contain a minority current for which working-class politics were a politics of class struggle.[41] In fact, by promoting bureaucratic unionism and opposing assertive consumer activism, CCF leaders were actively engaged in trying to suppress militant self-activity. In short, within the new class composition the CCF existed as a translation of the social forces of many but not all unions along with some English-Canadian non-unionized workers, farmers and the intelligentsia into a social democratic exponent of expanding the rights of social citizenship and "responsible" unions through parliamentary politics. The only left-wing alternative of any size, the LPP, retained pockets of support in unions like UE and in some urban

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[41]See 4.1. No doubt individual CCF members held such views, but there was no current in the CCF similar to that which still existed in the 1940s in the British Labour Party around such political centres as the National Council of Labour Colleges, publisher of *Plebs*. The1941 *Plebs* article "The Class Struggle in Peace and War" is an interesting statement of the politics of this current in Labour.

neighbourhoods. Communism was reduced to a very weak and isolated current whose influence in the new class composition was much reduced.[42]

Finally, the contours of the new class composition were marked by a different mode of organization of the rule of the Canadian capitalist class than that which existed between the wars. In the many strikes of 1941-1947, wage-earners had made it clear that they were no longer willing to be ruled on the job as they had been before: subject to the harsh dictates of supervisors with little recourse, usually unable to negotiate their pay and conditions collectively, and often working long hours for much less than the breadwinner income to which men felt themselves entitled. Although the majority of paid workers remained non-unionized, and women workers and workers of colour were less likely to be union members than were men of European heritage, the growth of unions within the framework of industrial pluralism, particularly among the less-skilled, forced many employers to change how they managed their employees. Even employers who did not face unionized workers had to at least consider that it was now easier for disgruntled employees to organize legally than it had ever been. Nonetheless, one should not overstate the extent to which these changes weakened capitalist rule in paid workplaces. Although they were compelled to recognize certified unions, employers found their power reinforced in other ways. Labour relations boards could not oblige employers to enter into collective agreements, only to show proof

[42]As one indication of LPP influence, consider the votes for its candidates in elections for Toronto's municipal Board of Control. Peaking in 1946 at 17.6%, its support then fell steadily. Its 5.6% score in 1951 was lower even than its share of the vote in 1940 during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact (Penner 1988, 298).

that they were negotiating in good faith. Employers could still turn to the administrative and legal institutions of the state to uphold their rights against unions, and could expect that state power would enforce these rights as well as prosecute individual workers for criminalized acts that might take place in strikes and other times of conflict. The only kind of unionism that was permitted by industrial pluralism was "responsible" (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 305-307). Many managers and owners had to adjust to running their workplaces in accordance with a new mode of industrial legality, but they could be confident that the unions it permitted would not mobilize the potential power of the organized working class against them. While often forced to yield some ground to wage-workers on the frontier of control, capital also fortified its commanding positions.

Outside the sphere of wage-labour, Canada's expanded regime of liberal social citizenship - chiefly public schools, UI, family allowances, Veteran's Charter programmes, workers' compensation, mothers' allowances and the Old Age Pension - amounted to a change in the character of the political administration of civil society. Many more adult Canadian citizens could now expect financial support from the state that came with relatively little stigma attached. The arrival of monthly family allowance cheques in households with children and the ability of many wage-earners to apply for UI made for quite different experiences of income support than asking for relief, even though neither family allowances nor UI were free of intrusive moral regulation in working-class households.[43] By the late

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[43]On family allowances and moral regulation, see Marshall 1998 (131-157). Little 1998 (125-138) discusses how the moral regulatory dimension of a long-standing

1940s, state power no longer commonly appeared in such negative forms as police harassing transient unemployed men, as it had during the Depression, or controls on household purchasing, as during the war. Coupled with the emphasis in official politics and the language of state administration on the current prosperity of Canadians and optimistic expectations for the future, this probably enhanced the fetishised appearance of capitalist state power as neutral and autonomous from class.

This state was a national security state as least as much as it was a welfare state. Cold War political administration did not simply offer a number of social citizenship benefits; it sought to ensure that the population would be composed of loyal and moral normal citizens of Canada and the Free World.[44] In attempting to carry out this ideological mission, governments and top state bureaucrats could rely on the anti-communist consensus in civil society and official politics, to whose construction the leaders of the mass organizations of the working-class movement had lent a hand. The multifaceted effort to enlist workers and all other residents within Canada's borders in a more inclusively-defined national community in which anti-communism was an article of faith became a central feature of capitalist rule. It was backed by a variety of formal and informal coercive sanctions that made political conformity attractive, including the threat of losing one's job and social respectability. The

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programme, Ontario's mothers' allowance, changed in the years following the war.

[44]Adams 1997, Kinsman, Buse and Steedman 2000 and Whitaker and Marcuse 1994 provide evidence of different aspects of post-war political administration of household and community life.

attempts by state and non-state agencies to forge national unity on anti-communist lines hampered political dissent and working-class mobilization to change the conditions of life, as did the fostering of "responsible" unionism and corresponding suppression of alternative forms of class self-organization.

Presiding over this reconfigured state power at different levels of government were political leaders who accepted that their role was to govern within the modified framework of class rule that had emerged from the struggles and contention of the 1940s, not to roll it back or alter it in a radical direction.[45] While the Liberals were most strongly associated with expanded social citizenship and industrial pluralism, thanks to the King government's role in implementing them, Progressive Conservatives also embraced the new order (as reflected in their name itself). The conservative liberalism of Social Credit and Québec's National Union made them particularly hostile to unions and resistant to the provision of more social services by the state; in practice, though, both accepted that the mode of political administration of the inter-war years had been superseded and therefore accommodated themselves to the new regime.[46] At the other end of the spectrum of official politics, CCF leaders, only in government above the municipal level in Saskatchewan, sought to introduce

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[45]Finkel 1993 illuminates how at the close of the war the federal government was concerned to limit social reforms during postwar reconstruction, and therefore happy to blame the premiers of Ontario and Québec for failure to reach agreement on constitutional arrangements necessary to institute health insurance, universal pensions and other programmes.

[46]See Rouillard 1989 (259-262), Marshall 1998 (53-60) and Finkel 1988 (132-138).

more social reforms, not to undermine the power of capital. Despite their ideological differences, all the major parties accepted the basic shape of the manner in which class rule was now organized.

McKay's argument that "in the middle years of the twentieth century... confronted with a serious quasi-revolutionary challenge to its hegemony, the liberal state executed far-ranging changes in its social and political project to 'include' some of those previously excluded, with the *quid pro quo* that they divest themselves of the most radical aspects of their oppositional programs" (2000b, 643) has the merit of recognizing that not only was what I refer to as capitalist rule and he calls liberal rule[47] reorganized in the 1940s, but that this shift also involved concessions from subalterns as well as the introduction of reforms. However, it is an exaggeration to say that a "quasi-revolutionary" challenge was posed in Canada, where in this period the class struggle did not reach the heights seen in France and Italy, for example.[48] What was effected in Canada in response to class recomposition was a reconfiguration of capitalist rule whose reforms to political administration in the fields of social welfare and industrial legality softened aspects of class domination and weakened

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[47]As mentioned in passing in footnote 35 of the previous chapter, it is my contention that liberal rule (the organization of class power in accordance with the ideology of liberalism) is one form of capitalist rule. While common, it is not the sole form in which ruling classes exercise their social domination in capitalist societies, as demonstrated by the experience of, for example, fascism. I also disagree with the implication of McKay's formulation that states are the agents of hegemony; however critical state power may be, hegemony is not maintained by state power alone but also by other forms of capitalist rule.

[48]See, for instance, Noiriel 1990 (182-184) and Behan 1997.

working-class power while leaving the liberal-democratic federal structure of government essentially unchanged. These reforms also made it easier for the ruling class to bring most of the top officialdom of the unions and the CCF onside in its efforts to construct national unity against external and internal enemies under the banner of anti-communism and good citizenship.

A question remains: how should the class formation that emerged in the late 1940s within these arrangements of capitalist rule be understood in broader theoretical terms? This question has not been directly posed in previous scholarship. Some Marxist thinkers decline to ask this kind of question, perhaps because doing so is incompatible with their assumption that the working class - notwithstanding its exploited, alienated and divided concrete existence - by definition exists against, or even outside and against, capital.[49] Whatever the political consequences of this view and its textual basis in some of Marx's writings, it is vulnerable to the charge that it posits an essential proletariat far removed from historical working-class formations. The reason most scholarship does not offer an answer is different: historical studies are typically conducted at a lower level of abstraction than the one at which discussion of this question must take place. Bryan D. Palmer argues that "what had once seemed a mobilization of workers that promised large social change was reduced to a more pragmatic business unionism" (1992, 297-298). Craig Heron writes that "however long its shadow over Canadian industrial life, the labour movement would remain a restricted

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[49]Consider the discussion of the conceptions of the working class in the work of CLR James and Trotskyist thought in 1.4, and of autonomist Marxism in 1.6.

segment of the Canadian working class for the next twenty years" (1996, 84). While these conclusions are sound, they are not formulated at the level of abstraction ultimately demanded by the approach of theorizing working classes as historical formations adopted in this dissertation.

One possible interpretation, appealing to analysts of various theoretical persuasions, is to analyze the struggles of the 1940s as producing a class that was for the first time truly incorporated in Canadian capitalist society by virtue of receiving new rights of industrial legality and social citizenship. Whether these rights are seen as bestowed upon workers too weak to fight for more, in line with the genre of interpretation of the British working class identified with Perry Anderson (1964) and Tom Nairn (1964a, 1964b, 1964c),[50] or as wrung from state power by class struggle, following the devastating critiques of Anderson and Nairn offered by Thompson (1978b) and Neocleous (1996, 98-107), the conclusion reached is similar: the working class becomes more deeply integrated into capitalist society, in Marcel van der Linden's sense that "a working class is completely integrated if it accepts all hegemonic institutions and the essence of their ground rules" (1988, 288). Neocleous offers a sophisticated Marxist version of the incorporation thesis in his work on state power and

[50]A similar view of the Canadian working class is implied in English-Canadian left-nationalist writing, such as Resnick 1977, which suggests an interpretation that resembles the Anderson-Nairn view of the working class as "supine, deferential and lacking a hegemonic ideology" (Neocleous 1996, 98) in part because of the character of the ruling class. While I have argued that the ideology of the Canadian working-class movement in the 1940s was not counter-hegemonic, the working class was neither supine nor deferential. As argued in 2.4, the absence of counter-hegemonic radical ideology should not be equated with active ideological assent or incorporation.

class struggle. In its terms, the working class is incorporated by the expansion of political administration caused by its own efforts. Industrial legality, unemployment insurance and other measures of law and administration actually constitute "the organizations and subjects of struggle as part of the very action of the state itself" (165). "Thus," Neocleous argues, "in its struggle to become a class of civil society, the class discovers itself also to be a class of the state" (107). It is interesting that, although the theoretical route taken by Neocleous is much more rigorous, this conclusion is in some respects not unlike positions held, explicitly or implicitly, by scholars of Canadian labour whose theoretical frameworks are non- or anti-Marxist.[51] Important differences of explanation can exist among those who ultimately accept the notion that the working class that emerged from the1940s was now incorporated or became decisively more integrated in Canadian capitalist society than it had been between the world wars.

The difficulty with such an interpretation lies not with much of the evidence produced in its support, but in the concept of incorporation itself,[52] even though its precise meaning is rarely clarified. In the hands of Neocleous and many others, what is proposed is a relation between the working class and capitalist society that is overly totalizing and closed. It is suggested that a new condition of incorporation is established which is either the culmination

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[51]See Black and Silver 2001 (24-26), Horowitz 1968 (3-57) and Morton 1998. McKay 2000b (especially 641-645) is a *marxisant* contribution which could be assimilated to the incorporationist interpretation but is open to other readings.

[52]It is not necessary for the word "incorporation" to be used; what matters is the adoption of an interpretive framework organized around the concept I am discussing.

of a process or a transition to a stage of qualitatively-greater integration. The working class is, as it were, swallowed up by a society structured by capital. In arriving at this conclusion, astute researchers may attain valuable insights about the terms within which this situation is created and on which its maintenance may depend. However, what is missing in incorporationist interpretations is adequate appreciation of the ceaseless efforts that must be devoted to reproducing what this dissertation conceptualizes as capitalist rule. In certain historical periods of greater or lesser duration, capitalist rule is undoubtedly stronger than in others. This is determined by the outcome of struggles waged in conjunctures composed of specific material and ideological circumstances. When the various forms of capitalist social power are especially strong, a combination of consensual and coercive means can produce a working-class formation in which open resistance is uncommon and muted and radical politics have no following to speak of. Yet even in such cases, capitalist rule is not established once and for all, no matter how "obvious" such a conclusion may appear at the time. Any number of factors can weaken the power of management, state agencies or non-state organizations that support class rule. Recession, a shortage of workers relative to employers' demands, religious dissent and conflict between ruling-class factions that becomes heated and draws in subalterns are but a handful of examples. Workers can also, on their own initiative, devise or rediscover more effective methods of struggle, such as the sitdown strike in the US during the Great Depression.[53] Practices of political administration

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[53]See the discussion of sitdown strikes in Brecher 1972 (180-183, 211-212).

once adhered to by all can become the target of mass defiance, as in the case of orders in council restricting strikes in Canada in the Second World War. Cracks can appear in a hitherto-impervious shell of "incorporation."[54]

Class happens as a relational and mediated process. Since labour exists within and against capital, class formation is also antagonistic. Capital in its various forms seeks to maximize profit and maintain its social domination. Simultaneously organized by social relations other than class as well as by class itself, workers in their paid workplaces and communities try to meet their various needs, sometimes engaging in struggles that assert the social logic of labour against that of capital.[55] The dynamics of class formation from above and below, so to speak, involve different aspects of class relations, not independent forces interacting. Instead of considering the Canadian working-class formation that came into existence in the late 1940s as incorporated, it is better to think in terms of a specific class composition and forms of capitalist rule. Anti-communism, heterosexist and male supremacist domesticity, Canadian nationalism no longer simply equated with Anglo-conformity, industrial pluralism, bureaucratic unionism, a liberal regime of social citizenship, the CCF, low unemployment and steadily rising living standards underpinned a class composition that lasted nearly two decades, until the middle of the 1960s. Within the social

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[54]Turner 1986 (35-44) provides a critique of the notion of working-class incorporation from a perspective that is, in my view, insufficiently critical of capitalist rule and overly optimistic about the radical potential of citizenship rights in liberal democracies.

[55]On this, see Lebowitz 1992.

relations shaped by these powerful realities, workers were objects of more extensive political administration as well as subjects of new rights. With the important exceptions of Québec francophones, aboriginal people and racially-oppressed people, workers were ideologically included within the Canadian national community more than ever before. To argue that the working class in Canada became incorporated in the 1940s highlights certain features of class formation at the cost of obscuring others whose existence suggests that, whatever the long-term effects of developments in this era, this was not the End of History as far as the working class is concerned. In capitalist societies, workers are never the rulers, always the ruled, though the terms on which they are ruled vary and this matters a great deal indeed. Only in rare moments of profound social crisis do the foundations of capitalist rule themselves shake (and that alone does not guarantee that the crisis will be resolved in a progressive manner[56]). Interpretations of working-class formations framed around the concept of incorporation risk orienting research away from the kind of analysis that can reveal the concrete means by which capitalist rule in its different social forms is maintained, and which might also inform strategies for its eventual abolition.

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[56]As recognized by Gramsci (1971, 210-211, 235).

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has sought to achieve two objectives. First, to develop adequate social and political theories of class as a structured process and relationship mediated by gender, race, nation and other social relations in specific contexts, of working classes as historical formations, and of capitalist rule. Second, to use these theories in an analysis of the making of a new class formation in Canada in the 1940s. This interdisciplinary study, which can be considered a political sociology of the working class, has adopted the kind of approach that Miliband calls class struggle analysis. It focuses on such issues as the character of struggles in a certain historical period, their participants, and the nature of organizations and ideologies, with the goal of illuminating the dynamics of change in working-class formation.

In carrying out the inquiry, I have used this theoretical approach and the existing body of scholarship on relevant topics to develop an interpretation of a process that has received little attention as such: the remaking of the working class between 1941 and 1947 that included two major waves of frequently illegal strikes, a certain amount of community-based mobilization around issues affecting working-class households, and a broad political radicalization in favour of changes to Canadian society to address some of the needs and aspirations of workers. Once the threat of mass unemployment was dissipated by the war economy, repressive wartime regulations and a series of increasingly-restrictive orders in council were unable to break the determination of wage-earners to win the union recognition

and collective agreements they sought as means to curb managerial power. Wage-workers often defied legal and administrative barriers that were intended to dampen and regulate their struggles with their employers, some of which generated broad class solidarity in local communities and beyond. In the context of a war officially justified as a crusade against Hitlerism and for democracy, many workers interpreted these legitimating notions in ways that expressed their desires for change in paid workplace, household and community life. Traditional free enterprise nostrums suffered a loss of credibility, and the ideological terms of official politics were recast along welfare state lines. But in the absence of any organized political current that aimed to nurture class capacities or develop the radical elements of workers' consciousness into an independent working-class politics of struggle, the depth of political radicalization among workers was limited. The CCF quickly gained support but soon lost much of it to "old line" parties after they pledged themselves to reconstruction for a new social order. Concerned to stem the rise of industrial unionism and the CCF while avoiding social explosions and a deeper radicalization resembling what had taken place at the close of the First World War, the ruling class was compelled to yield and implement a number of reforms it had long resisted.

These measures altered capitalist rule in ways that were far from trivial, even though the liberal-democratic federal structure of government remained the same. In the paid workplace sphere, many employers had to abandon the harsh and arbitrary supervisory practices of the past and accept collective bargaining between unions and management. State power was also reshaped. An expanded regime of political administration was created whose

pillars included industrial pluralism and a liberal version of social citizenship; its official world-view was animated by anti-communism and a conception of Canadian identity no longer equated with Anglo-conformity. Because of the implementation of such reforms as well as state planning to facilitate peacetime economic growth, the ruling class was not confronted by a dangerous sharpening of class struggle after the war and faced little opposition from the leaders of the unions and the CCF while it reconstructed its hegemony in Cold War terms.

In the class composition that stabilized in this framework, after a real but uneven rupture with the composition dating back to the end of the Workers' Revolt in the early 1920s, the working-class movement was significantly different from the one of the inter-war years. By the late 1940s, unionism had been changed from within and without. Almost all unions were now committed to a "responsible" and bureaucratic practice, with the officialdom as a social layer strengthened in relation to the rank and file. In English Canada, the movement was characterized by institutionally-stable industrial and craft unions enrolling a large minority of less-skilled wage-earners, predominantly men of various European ethno-racial identities, rather than the pre-war combination of craft unions of skilled Anglo-Celtic men alongside a smaller current of often-militant and democratic industrial unionism. In Québec, the unions of the CCCL continued to have an important presence and were distancing themselves from Catholic corporatism.

The situation had also changed with respect to the parties that represented class independence from those backed directly by corporate interests. In the 1930s the CPC had

rivalled the young and heterogeneous CCF for influence in the unions and community-based activism and had a social base in a small number of urban working-class areas. At the close of the 1940s, the CCF, now a social democratic party that conducted independent working-class politics in liberal-democratic terms strictly within the existing legal and administrative boundaries of Cold War capitalist rule, had vanquished Communist influence to become the party of the English-Canadian workers' movement. Political radicalism had been weakened and decisively marginalised.

The class formation that had come into existence was generally better-off in material terms, though not affluent, and was more united against capital at the most elementary level. Although it is misleading to suppose that the working class was now "incorporated," working-class capacities to change society had been constrained and undermined in new ways. This class formation continued to be shaped and divided in important respects by various forms of oppression. The kind of racism directed against people of Eastern and Southern European heritage, who between the wars were not generally regarded as genuinely white, was significantly eroded; racism against people of aboriginal, Asian and African heritage was rather more resilient. The social relations of male supremacist and heterosexist domesticity were strengthened in the immediate post-war years. The social position of male breadwinners was materially and ideologically boosted by the displacement of women war workers from their jobs, the availability to men of better-paid work and Veterans' Charter programmes, the arrival of family allowances and the sale of wartime housing. Divisions between workers in French Canada, the target of much ire for their opposition to

conscription, and those in the rest of the country also remained significant.

This study has implications for at least three bodies of research. For social and political theory, it demonstrates that the kind of skepticism voiced by many contemporary thinkers about the ability of Marxism to understand class can be shown to be unwarranted.[1] At the same time, it argues for a conception of class unlike that found in most Marxist thought: one that emphasizes that class is not just a relation of exploitation but an historical process which takes place through specific material and ideological channels in communities and households as well as paid workplaces, and maintains that this cannot be properly grasped by the notion of class in itself/for itself. Class always happens through gender, race, nation and other social relations and therefore cannot be understood apart from them. It also insists that the "epistemology of absence" that measures working classes against ahistorical yardsticks should be dispensed with in order to better comprehend how class formations have actually been made and remade. In addition, it proposes a way of theorizing capitalist rule as having several differentiated modes of existence whose ideological dimensions should not be ignored, even though class rule is not primarily a matter of ideology.[2] The approach taken in this dissertation suggests a different direction for the development of theory than that often

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[1]For instance, Foucault: "what I find striking in the majority - if not of Marx's texts then those of the Marxists (except perhaps Trotsky) - is the way they pass over in silence what is understood by *struggle* when one talks of class struggle" (Foucault 1980c, 208).

[2]Since in the Introduction I endorsed the view that Marxism is a project of theory and practice, it is appropriate to note here that the social-theoretical approach developed in this dissertation has implications for theory oriented to strategy for the practice of progressive social change, but that these are not explored here.

taken in contemporary academic Marxism: for a closer relationship with the study of concrete social processes in time, rather than more engagement with other theoretical schools along with a greater distancing from the analysis of class, capitalist production and reproduction and state power.[3]

This dissertation also has relevance for the interdisciplinary field of labour studies or, as I prefer, working-class studies. It advances the above-mentioned theoretical approach to the complex, mediated reality of class in capitalist society which, whether or not it is explicitly recognized by labour studies scholars, constitutes the heart of the field. By doing so, it seeks to stimulate critical examination of the theoretical perspectives used in contemporary working-class studies. It implies that researchers need to seriously consider the broad terrain of class formation and capitalist rule in the paid workplace, household and community spheres, on which work relations, employer and employee organizations and labour-management conflicts take place; without an appreciation of these large-scale, historically-specific social relations, it is harder to draw out issues of general significance from case studies of class phenomena. Also of direct relevance to labour studies is the interpretation developed here of the remaking of class in Canada in the pivotal 1940s.[4] It

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[3]In other words, this study points in a direction opposite to the one taken by "Western Marxism" (see Anderson 1976), whose lack of interest in such issues has only increased in the quarter-century since the publication of Anderson's classic examination.

[4]This, I believe, makes this study relevant to historical research pertaining to Canadian workers in the 1940s. More such research will undoubtedly make it possible to evaluate and refine the major arguments of this dissertation as well as matters of detail.

presents an analysis of how the particular kinds of unionism, labour politics, labour relations and social citizenship distinctive to the post-war Canadian working class came into being. While all these have undergone major changes in past half-century, better understanding their formation can provide insight into their subsequent evolution.

The third area of scholarship to which this dissertation speaks is research on society and politics in Canada and elsewhere, within such disciplines as political science and sociology. Insofar as studies of social movements and contentious politics,[5] political parties, states and related matters need to consider issues of class and capitalist rule, the theoretical framework developed here is of broad relevance. It suggests the importance of investigating the social roots of politics, using an approach centred on analysing diachronic structured processes rather than synchronic indicators, such as opinion surveys and static maps of social locations.[6] Research on twentieth-century Canadian politics and society would benefit from taking into account the recomposition of the Canadian working class in the 1940s (as well as in the earlier Workers' Revolt and later, in the years between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s). Doing so would enrich our knowledge of class conflict and its relationship to state formation and other aspects of the development of Canadian society. The analysis in this study of the remaking of the working class in the 1940s casts new light on, to give two examples, the birth of the social citizenship of the broad welfare state in post-war Canada

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[5]See, for example, Tarrow 1998 and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001.

[6]Such as those that figure prominently in Clement and Myles 1994.

and the character of Canadian social democracy.

Although the political forces committed to social change by and for workers are weak at the beginning of the twenty-first century, class remains a powerful force shaping the lives of billions. Classes continue to be made and remade in the age of an unprecedentedly global capitalism. Ignoring class relations will not undermine them or lessen their effects on people, only make it more difficult to understand the tumultuous changes taking place in societies worldwide and respond appropriately. Against the contemporary denial or underestimation of the significance of class both today and in the past, it is important to persist with efforts to develop class theory and to use it to analyse social reality. This effort to do so has been conducted in the belief that "only that historian [or other intellectual] will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that *even the dead* will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious" (Benjamin 1968, 255).

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