

A STUDY OF
EGYPTIAN RULE IN EASTERN ARABIA
(1814-1841)



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ABSTRACT

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As a result of the expulsion of the Ottomans from the Holy Cities of Makkah and Madīnah by 1803, Sultan Mahmūd II ordered his Egyptian viceroy, Muḥammad 'Alī, in 1809 to recover the Cities and restore Ottoman prestige. Due to the continued Su'ūdī threat to the Turkish rule even after the recovery, the expedition had to be extended to the Su'ūdī capital and farther to eastern Arabia. After the destruction of Dir'iyah and the occupation of al-Hasā and Qatīf in 1818, the bulk of the Egyptian army was withdrawn which occasioned Su'ūdī resurgence. Consequently Muḥammad 'Alī organized another expedition in 1836, occupied Najd, al-Hasā and Qatīf, secured the submission of Bahrayn, Qatar and Trucial 'Uman and won the cooperation of Kuwait. His General, Khurshīd, was all set for a march on 'Irāq in 1839 when European pressure and British diplomacy obliged him to recall the bulk of his army from Najd and eastern Arabia in April 1840 for the defence of Egypt. The skeleton Egyptian force of 800 troops could not effectively resist new Su'ūdī contenders of Najd and eastern Arabia and the Egyptian rule came to an end by the close of 1841.

This dissertation is an attempt to study the Egyptian rule over eastern Arabia during 1814-1841 and to examine the causes necessitating the despatch as well as the withdrawal of the expedition in 1840 after Egyptian rule had been firmly established there.

SOMMAIRE

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A la suite de l'expulsion des Ottomans des Villes Saintes, Makkah et Madīnah, en 1803, le Sultan Mahmūd II commanda en 1809 son vice-régent en Egypte, Muhammad 'Alī, de reprendre les Villes et de restituer le prestige Ottoman. Vu la résistance continue des Su'ūdīs à la suprématie turque même après la reprise, l'expédition égyptienne a dû s'étendre à la capitale Su'ūdī et plus loin à l'est en Arabie. Après la destruction de Dir'īyah et l'occupation de al-Hasā et de Qatīf en 1818, la grande partie de l'armée égyptienne fut retirée, ce qui amena une résurgence Su'ūdī. Par Conséquence, Muhammad 'Alī organisa une autre expédition en 1836, occupa Najd, al-Hasā et Qatīf, obtena la soumission du Bahrayn, de Qatar et du 'Uman Trucial et réussit à avoir la coopération du Kuwait. Son général, Khurshīd, était prêt pour pénétrer l'Iraq en 1839 lorsque des pressions européennes et la diplomatie britannique l'obligèrent à retirer la grande partie de son armée du Najd et de l'est de l'Arabie en avril 1840 afin de défendre l'Egypte. Les 800 troupes qui restèrent n'étaient que la squelette de l'armée égyptienne et ne pouvaient pas résister de façon effective aux nouveaux prétendants Su'ūdī de Najd et l'est de l'Arabie. Ainsi le règne égyptien prit fin en 1841.

Cette thèse se propose d'étudier le règne égyptien sur l'est de l'Arabie de 1814 jusqu'à 1841 et d'examiner les causes de l'envoi de l'expédition et sa retraite bien que le pouvoir égyptien avait été solidement établi dans ces régions.

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND ABBREVIATIONS

In transliterating Arabic and other oriental words and names I have used the Transliteration Table of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal.

I have also used the following abbreviations in the thesis:

- R.E.A. to denote Royal (now, National) Egyptian Archives, Records. preserved at Cairo.
- F.O. for British Foreign Office, Records at London.
- I.O. for British India Office, Records at London.

CHAPTER I

GEOPHYSICAL AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Sir Arnold Wilson has rightly remarked that:

No arm of the sea has been, or is of greater interest, alike to the geologist and archaeologist, the historian and geographer, the merchant, the statesman, and the student of strategy, than the inland water known as the Persian Gulf.....^I

The Persian Gulf has been a trading channel between the ancient centres of civilization and the outer world, ever since the dawn of history. Most of its hinterland is barren and sandy, with little fresh water or rain. It is thus unable to support many lives and depends, for its food requirements, upon other countries. It has been renowned for its pearl fishing and the trade of pearls for the necessities of life. The conditions of this region have remained unchanged and primitive for the last many centuries primarily due to lack of resources. The recent changes and developments are the result of ^{the} discovery of oil.

It was evidently not its resources and economic value, as in the case of India, but its strategic position which prompted foreign governments to exercise control over the Persian Gulf. Its importance during the last three centuries was as a result of its being situated at the point of intersection of the Persian, Indian, Ottoman and most recently the rising Wahhābī, empires; its proximity to the expanding Russian empire, as well as the influx of European conquerors and traders thus rendering it the gateway of the East and a sea and land route from east to west. This same strategic situation necessitated Muhammad 'Alī Pasha of Egypt and the Ottoman Turks to exert their respective influences there and to attempt

effective and exclusive control of the area.

It is not possible here to capitulate a fuller background of the Persian Gulf region, its tribes, chiefs and governments, nor to dwell upon its geophysical and socio-economic features. Nevertheless it is pertinent to give a brief account of the historical events immediately preceding the period under review in so far as it is relevant to the ensuing events. It is also necessary to describe briefly the geophysical position of the area and its surroundings.

Geophysical Features

This landlocked sea laps the shores of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates on its western coast, Iraq in the north and Iran on its eastern coast. Commencing from the Shatt al-'Arab at about 30 degrees North latitude it covers an area of approximately 97,000 sq. miles and a distance of about 500 miles south-easterly to the Straits of Hormuz at about 25.5 degrees North. Here it empties into the Gulf of 'Uman which falls into the Arabian Sea another 300 odd miles from Hormuz. Its width varies considerably. At the Straits it is at its minimum of about 29 miles wide, while at its widest point it is 180 miles. The shore is full of shallow creeks, shoals, reefs and islands ideal for defence and piracy and difficult for navigation, especially by vessels of a higher draught.²

On both sides of the Gulf lie the two great plateaus of Iran and Arabia respectively. The Iranian plateau, with its base in the south-east, commences much closer to and about 1,000 miles along the coast, rising towards the north-west as well as inland towards the north with intervening valleys here and there. Its elevation ranges from 3,000 to 13,000 feet.

Flat alluvial plains with occasional marshes or salt lakes fill the upland valleys where the sturdy tribesmen lead nomadic lives grazing their flocks. The port towns of Bandar 'Abbās, Qishm, Linjah, Abūshahr (Bushire) and Bandar Rīq and the provinces of Lāristān, Fārs and Khūzistān lie on its Iranian coast. The Iranian province of Makrān is situated along the coast of ^{the} Gulf of 'Umān and the Arabian Sea.³

The Arabian plateau on the other hand rises to the broad central highlands rather gradually. Its long drainage slopes face north-eastwards. It reaches its maximum heights of 4,000 feet in the basaltic and granite uplands of Jabal Shammar and the limestone ridge of Tuwayq about 300 miles in from the coast. In the south along the 'Umān coast runs a precipitous range about 5,000 feet in elevation, conspicuous among which is Jabal Akhdar which terminates at Rās Musandam in the Straits of Hormuz.

On the northwestern end of the Gulf lies the delta of the Euphrates, the Tigris, Karkheh and Kārūn rivers and their tributaries, in the southern tip of which are Fāo and Abādān towns and the islands of Būbiān, Abādān and Failkēh. To their north, farther inland, lie the towns of Hindīān, Falāhīyah, Muhammerah, Zubayr and Basrah. The area west of the Shatt al-'Arab and along the coast to a distance of about forty miles is part of 'Irāq. Beyond it and around the northwestern corner of the Gulf lies Kuwait. West of Kuwait and in the south extending to the southern end of the promontory of Qatar lies the Sa'ūdī Arabian province of al-Hasā with its principal ports of Qatīf, Sayhāt, Dammām and 'Uqayr and its oilfields of Dammām, Zahrān etc. Qatīf is the capital of the province. In the nineteenth century, however, al-Hasā and Qatīf constituted two separate provinces. Hufūf was the capital of al-Hasā, while the Qatīf province was governed from Qatīf. To the west beyond

al-Hasā is Najd.⁴

The coastal region southeast of the base of Qatar right to Rās Musandam in the Straits of Hormuz has, of late, been known as Trucial 'Umān or the Pirate Coast. Prior to the nineteenth century its name was al-Shamāl or al-Sīr. It extends 150 miles, at first west easterly and then to the northeast. It comprises the states of Abū Zabī, Dubai, Shāriqah, 'Ajmān, Um al-Qaywayn and Rās al-Khaymah which together form the United Arab Emirates. Between the Qatar peninsula and Dammām lies the Gulf of Bahrayn containing the Bahrayn archipelago consisting of the important islands of Bahrayn and Muharraq. Muharraq and Manāmah are the main towns and ports, the former being the capital of the state of Bahrayn. South of the United Arab Emirates is the Sultanate of 'Umān.⁵ Iran, 'Irāq and 'Umān, however, are beyond the scope of our study.

Historical Background

Banī Khālid

In the first half of the eighteenth century the Banī Khālid tribe was the strongest power in eastern Arabia. It ruled the area long and was strong enough to hold off the Sharīfs of Makkah in 1581 when the latter tried to raid and conquer al-Hasā. Its rule extended from Basrah in the north to some parts of Najd in the west and to Qatar in the south bringing them in contact with the Ottomans of Mesopotamia, the petty provinces of central Arabia and the 'Umān Sultanate. Many Najd people owned farms in the more fertile al-Hasā. Such a farm of 'Uthmān b. Mu'ammār, the 'Uyaynah chief, obliged him to expel Muhammad b. 'Abd al-

Wahhāb, the Wahhābī reformer, on the warning of the Banī Khālid chief. This expulsion eventually became the cause of a series of raids and severe fighting culminating in the fall of Banī Khālid by the close of the eighteenth century. Besides owning the fertile al-Hasā oases they also controlled trade, mostly of sugar, coffee, spices and grain from India and the Yaman to central Arabia through the ports of Qatīf and 'Uqayr. The tribe belonged to the Rabī'ah branch of the 'Adnānī Arabs.⁶ It was that in different places of the Banī Khālid territory/ the 'Utūb Arabs settled and built their states under the protection and authority of the former.

'Utūb

The 'Utūb belong to 'Anazah, another 'Adnānī Arab tribe, inhabiting Najd and north Arabia. Before migrating to the east, principally Qatar, around the end of the seventeenth century, they inhabited Haddār in al-Aflāj, Najd. They then sailed to and settled at Kuwait under the direct rule of the Banī Khālid paramount chief. In about 1752, with the approval of the chief, the local population selected in the tribal manner Sabāh b. Jābir of its al-Sabāh branch as their head to administer justice and the affairs of the thriving town. The other two branches of 'Utūb which soon became prominent were al-Khalīfah and al-Jalāhimah. They vowed to follow the occupation of merchants and agriculturists and to share the profits equally. Al-Sabāh were to exercise the functions of government, al-Jalāhimah to supervise and control the maritime traffic and al-Khalīfah the mercantile trade.⁷ This marks the foundation of the 'Utūb states in eastern Arabia.

As early as 1758 Sabāh's authority was well-established in Kuwait

and its vicinity. His rule was further consolidated by his successor and son 'Abd Allāh (r. 1762-1815) who must be credited for his friendly relations with the British and for repulsing Su'ūdī raids. It will be in order to point out here that in April, 1793, perhaps due to their duplicity or changing partiality in the Turco-Persian conflict, the British were obliged to move their Basrah Factory to Kuwayt as a place of refuge. After a rapprochement was achieved it returned in August 1795 to Basrah. The British despatches from India to England had also been passing through Kuwayt, which had become an important port of call for desert caravans from Aleppo to the East. Kuwayt is also said to have withheld tribute payable to the Su'ūdīs, who attacked the town in 1808, but were repulsed. The Pasha of Baghdād ordained a robe of honour and gifts to 'Abd Allāh for his success.⁸

Certain developments in Kuwayt led to the emigration of the al-Khalīfah clan to the south, followed by other 'Utūb families notably the al-Jalāhimah. 'Abd Allāh's succession to Sabāh in disregard of the al-Khalīfah claim, envy of the neighbouring Arabs over the wealth and flourishing trade of Kuwayt and consequent molestation of and piracy against 'Utūbī men and materials or a desire to singly enjoy the fruits of their mercantile enterprises may be one or more of the reasons for such emigration. Consequently, with the consent of their confederates, the al-Khalīfah headed by Khalīfah b. Muḥammad set sail and settled at Zubārah on the west coast of Qatar in 1766 after a futile attempt to stay in Bahrayn. Political turmoil in Arabia, Persia and Ottoman 'Irāq made it possible for them to establish and expand their pearl fishing, trade and wealth. Its prosperity, however, lasted for 44 years only as it was destroyed by the Sultan of Masqat in 1810-II.⁹

Bahrayn was ruled by the Banī Madhkūr Arabs of Abūshahr (Bushire) paying irregular tribute to Persia. The rapid Zubārah prosperity caused by pearl fishing and free trade aroused the jealousy of other Qatar tribes, Bahrayn and other coastal chiefs and invited attacks. A joint unsuccessful attack by the Arabs of Abūshahr, Bandar Rīq, Dawraq and the Qawāsīm in 1782 caused a retaliatory joint attack by Zubārah, Kuwait and other friendly tribes on Bahrayn and its capture in 1782-3. Al-Khalīfah became its ultimate rulers.¹⁰

Shaykh Ahmad b. Khalīfah the new ruler of Bahrayn and Zubārah distributed some of the plunder among his allies but the al-Jalāhimah expected a greater share in the booty as well as a share in the administration of the islands. Unsatisfied with the reward they left indignantly. After a short stay at Khārij and Abūshahr they returned to Qatar and settled at Khōr Hasan, about five miles north of Zubārah. Rahmah b. Jābir, their chief, chose piracy and animosity towards the al-Khalīfah as professions for his tribe's livelihood and revenge. He soon became "the scourge of the al-Khalīfah".¹¹ Qatar remained in the al-Khalīfah hands during the period under review. After Ahmad's death his two sons 'Abd Allāh (r. 1796-1843) and Salmān (r. 1796-1825) became co-rulers of Bahrayn and Qatar.

In 1802 the ruler of Masqat captured Bahrayn. It was recovered with Su'ūdī help, but on the pain of converting it into a Su'ūdī satellite for a decade. When it tried to withhold tribute and evade Su'ūdī demands to raid Basrah, the Wahhābī Amīr in 1810 appointed 'Abd Allāh b. 'Ufaysān governor of Bahrayn, Qatar and Qatīf with headquarters at Bahrayn and instructions to collect revenue. The Bahrayn rulers were summoned to Dir'īyah, the Su'ūdī capital, and detained. Their sons fled

to Masqāt asking for help.¹² Because of the Egyptian attack then commencing in the Hijāz the Su'ūdīs were forced to reduce their forces in eastern Arabia. This encouraged Masqāt to join the Shaykhs' sons and capture Bahrayn, Zubārah and Khōr Ḥasan in 1811, while the Su'ūdī governor was taken prisoner to secure the Shaykhs' release. Rahmah, who fought on the Su'ūdī side, was obliged to take refuge at Dammām. Zubārah was burnt during the expedition.¹³

Trucial 'Umān

The tribal structure of the region is very complex. Suffice it to say that two confederacies, the Qawāsīm in the north and the Banī Yās in the south, shared authority though the former were the stronger. The Qawāsīm, descendents of Banī Nizār branch of Banī Ghāfir of Najd, included all tribes subject to the authority of the Qāsīmī Shaykhs of Shāriqah and Rās al-Khaymah. They carried on trade, became powerful and the Gulf enjoyed every degree of tranquillity till the beginning of the nineteenth century. After the death of his father in 1803, Shaykh Sultān b. Saqar (r. 1803-1866) became the paramount chief by assuming authority over the chiefs of, inter alia, Shinās, Fujayrah, and Khōr Fakkān along Hajar in the 'Umān Gulf, Rās al-Khaymah, Um al-Qaywayn, 'Ajmān, Shāriqah and Abū Zabī on the 'Trucial coast' and Linjah on the east coast of the Persian Gulf. Rās al-Khaymah, the most strategic and secure place in the Straits of Hormuz, was his principal seat. We are little concerned with Hajar and the Persian coast. In internal affairs the Shaykh's authority ceased at Dubay and that of the Abū Zabī chief commenced and extended southeast to the base of the Qatar Peninsula.¹⁴

The Banī Yās tribe of Abū Zabī was composed of many sections. Its ruler belonged to al-Būfalāh, a small clan. They engaged themselves mostly in pastoral and agricultural pursuits according to the availability of pasture, water and oases. They visited the coast during summer for fishing and pearl diving. Their first coastal habitation started in 1761 at Abū Zabī where better drinking water was discovered. By the middle of 1802 'Umān, the Qawāsīm as well as Masqat, acknowledged the supremacy of the Su'ūdīs. Under the latter's pressure or emboldened by their support the Qawāsīm increased their piratical depredations and lawlessness, even against the British vessels. This resulted in the British expeditions of 1806 and 1809, which failed, however, to leave any impression on the Qawāsīm, much less on their protectors, the Su'ūdīs.¹⁵

The Su'ūdīs

An Islamic revivalist movement in Arabia greatly influenced the history and politics of ^{the} Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century. Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, its founder, was born at 'Uyaynah, Najd, in 1703. He was educated by his father, a Qādī of the district, and other local 'Ulamā' during his first twenty years. During the next twenty years he travelled extensively visiting most of the Muslim centres of learning.¹⁶ His teachings started with his return to 'Uyaynah. Following the Syrian Hanbalī scholar, Taqī al-Dīn Ahmad ibn Taymīyah (1262-1328), he sought to revive the orthodox school of Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855 A.D.). He recognized no authority other than the Qur'ān, the prophetic traditions and the practice of the pious companions of the prophet, and refuted innovation, saint worship, vows and the visiting of shrines.

He claimed himself to be a Muwahhid (unitarian) but his opponents dubbed him Wahhābī.¹⁷

His teachings and decisions under the patronage of 'Uthmān b. Mu'ammār, the 'Uyaynah chief, provoked the opposition of lax Muslims and neighbouring chiefs. The execution of an adulterous woman according to Islamic Law, led to further protests by his enemies and religiously lax and imperiled chiefs, who appealed to the dominant Banī Khālid chief, Shaykh Sulaymān b. Muḥammad al-Ḥumayd, for his aid to suppress the movement before it spread to other areas. Sulaymān's power was so great and the threat to confiscate 'Uthmān's farms and property in al-Ḥasā was so far-reaching that the former instantly yielded to Sulaymān's order and expelled the reformer from 'Uyaynah.¹⁸

His eventual arrival at Dir'iyah proved a blessing for him and his mission as he soon succeeded in allying himself with the local chief, Muḥammad b. Su'ūd. This alliance (c. 1745) of the reformer and the ruler (or of the spirit and the sword) brought about the spread of his teachings and the ultimate clash with the Banī Khālid. By 1765 most of Najd had sworn obedience to them and the Wahhābī doctrines. The Su'ūdīs played off the Banī Khālid chiefs one against the other before a decisive attack. Their first raid on al-Ḥasā in 1784 was followed by another on Qatar and 'Uqayr in 1787. The raids were characterized by surprise, ferocity and terrorism. By 1793 the Banī Khālid were rent asunder by their internal strifes nurtured by Su'ūdī diplomacy.¹⁹

In 1793, Barrāk b. 'Abd al-Muḥsin, a Banī Khālid chief, played an important role in serving the Su'ūdīs when they attacked Zayd b. 'Uray'ir, his cousin and chief in the south, whom the Su'ūdīs had formerly supported. When the capture of Hufuf, Mubarrāz and Qatīf seemed impossible, Barrāk

was able to enter Mubarrāz by a ruse forcing 'Uray'ir's sons out and implanting himself there.²⁰ The Su'ūdīs appointed their own governor in 1795. However, Qatīf together with Sayhāt and Tārūt Islands, one of the strongest Banī Khālīd positions, resisted until 1800, when it fell to treachery; yet its opposition to Su'ūdī rule continued for some time.²¹

Kuwayt was raided between 1793-5 while Bahrayn and a part of 'Umān were annexed in 1802. The Qawāsīm and Masqat acknowledged Su'ūdī supremacy and the Būraymī oasis was captured in the same year.²² In 1801-2 they sacked Karbalā' and Najaf, alarming the Shi'āhs. Late in 1802, Tā'if was captured; on April 27, 1803, the holy city of Makkah was taken, and Madīnah was desecrated the following year. The expulsion of the Turks from, and the desecration of, the holy cities startled the whole Muslim world which demanded action.²³

To say that there was consternation in the Muslim world inadequately describes the utter turmoil and dismay. It was as if Oliver Cromwell had suddenly seized the Vatican.²⁴

This marks the climax of Su'ūdī power which saw a strong reaction totally annihilating them for a while and an end of the first phase of their ascendancy at the hands of Muhammad 'Alī Pasha of Egypt who was ordered by the Ottoman Sultan to expel the Su'ūdīs from the Hijāz.²⁵

The Ottoman Sultanate

The Ottoman rule over Arabia dates back to 1517 when Sultan Salīm I conquered Egypt, to which was attached the Hijāz. It was the only province of any consequence in Arabia due to the importance of the holy cities of

Makkah and Madīnah. Its control commanded great political and religious honour and prestige. After the conquest the Sultan carried with him some relics such as sacred robes and articles dating back to the early Islamic period. He thus became the guardian of the two holy cities (Khādīm al-Haramayn al-Sharīfayn) thus entitling himself caliph. He conquered the Yaman as well.

His successor, Sultan Sulaymān the magnificent (r. 1520-66), extended his boundaries in all directions in Eurasia. By 1529 a Turkish naval fleet visited the Persian Gulf and touched at Basrah. In 1534 the Persian provinces of Tabrīz and 'Irāq were conquered. While still at Baghdād in 1534 Sulaymān received Rāshid, the son of the ruler of Basrah, who offered him the keys of the city and obsequious messages. Similar homages came from the Jazā'ir and Gharrāf regions, Lūrish Hills, Huwayzah marshes as well as Qaṭīf, Bahrayn and perhaps Hormuz. In 1538 a Turkish fleet raided the Indian Coast around Goa. Masqaṭ was also occupied for some time.²⁶ However, Turkish control over eastern Arabia for the most part lapsed, and in central Arabia it never existed. But for their garrison stationed there, the Hijāz itself was almost autonomous. Except for the capture of the holy cities and the expulsion of the garrison in 1803-4, the Turks cared little for Su'ūdī expansion in Arabia.

Egypt itself was an even more striking example of Turkish misrule. It was entrusted to the tyranny of the Mamelukes headed by Ottoman's nominal viceroy. Under such conditions Napoleon occupied Egypt in 1798, and Nelson followed him immediately. The Sultan drafted armies from his dominions to expel the British and French from Egypt. The governor of Kavala in Albania sent 300 troops under his son, 'Alī Āghā, who bore many privations in his attempt to land at Abū Qīr. The disgusted commander

returned home, entrusting his troops to his lieutenant, Muhammad 'Alī, who was destined to become viceroy of Egypt and the founder of modern Egypt. The Treaty of Amiens restored Egypt to Sultan Salīm III (r. 1789-1807) after the British and the French withdrawal in 1803.²⁷

The Sultan appointed Khusrū Pasha as his viceroy there. The Mamelukes were determined to destroy each other and possess Egypt exclusively. The troops would obey no one, not even Khusrū, but their own Albanian chiefs, Tāhir and Muhammad 'Alī. A mutiny among the troops resulted in the murder of Tāhir, the appointment of 'Alī Pasha as the new viceroy and Muhammad 'Alī's sole charge over the Albanians. Upon his murder enroute to Cairo, 'Alī Pasha was succeeded by Khurshīd Pasha, who was promised support by Muhammad 'Alī. Thus in Cairo, Khurshīd depended on the latter. The troops were already restive for their pay and the population was famished. In his own interest, Muhammad 'Alī started flattering and canvassing the 'ulamā' and notables who were pressing Khurshīd for various demands. When Khurshīd rejected their demands, they declared Muhammad 'Alī to be the ruler instead, but the latter preferred to seek the Sultan's approval. An emissary, sent to honour the stronger of the two rivals, approved Muhammad 'Alī and Khurshīd left Cairo on August 7, 1805.²⁸ This marks the start of the era of Muhammad 'Alī. It should be pointed out that the occupation of Egypt by the French followed by the British was not a solitary event but part of a larger process by which the European powers were attempting to gain supremacy over the entire East. A brief account of some of their activities will be in order.

The European Powers

Ottoman ascendancy had blocked the traditional overland routes to the East in the early 15th century, compelling the West to find alternative routes to India, which was considered a repository of great wealth and provisions. Columbus and De Gama thus discovered America and India by sailing westward and eastward. The Portuguese soon conquered Masqat and Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, Malacca, Aden and a few coastal towns of southern India, about 1505-7, by their superior naval power and artillery. With the mastery of the Gulf Coast, their monopoly over the sea route, trade and wealth and their tyrannical rule there continued for a century. The Dutch then appeared on the scene as a scourge of their pride and covetousness. After the defeat of the invincible Armada in 1588, the British epoch of enterprise and activity commenced with the grant of the Royal Charter of the (English) East India Company. Their first Factory was opened at Surat, India, in 1613 and another in Jask, Persia, in 1616. However the Portuguese prevailed and intrigued everywhere. In 1622, a joint Persian, British and Dutch attack on Hormuz ousted the Portuguese confining them to Masqat. Nevertheless, their military strength still alarmed the English. In 1640 the Portuguese opened a Factory at Basrah. They were driven out of 'Umān by 1650, after which they could not maintain their smaller enterprises and later vanished.²⁹

The British monopoly in silk and other Persian trade was snatched by the Dutch by 1630 by bribes and higher prices. Though four successive wars in the second half of the 17th century with the British and the French weakened them considerably, yet the Dutch continued to predominate over the British in Persia until 1688, when they began losing that position. They had two major Factories at Bandar 'Abbās and Basrah. Due

to losses and disturbed conditions the former was closed in 1759 while the latter was moved to Khārij in 1753. They were obliged to close it in 1765 and to leave for Batavia.³⁰

About 1677 the French opened a Factory at Bandar 'Abbās. They had another Residency at Basrah but the trade at both was negligible. They had considerable possessions in India and diverted more attention and energies there, but in the Anglo-French wars of the 18th century, they lost Quebec and most of their Indian possessions to the British.³¹

The British sailed to the East as merchants and traders seeking trade and fortune but they soon felt the need for naval fleets and standing armies. Sir Thomas Roe's accreditation in 1615 at the court of "the Great Moghul Emperor" marked the start of their political activity. The decline of the Moghul empire in the 18th century facilitated the rise of the European powers at remoter coastal areas of India during the second half of the 18th century. All British possessions west of Bombay, including the Gulf region, Basrah, Baghdād and farther north and Aden in the south, were under the direct control of the governor of Bombay.

Returning to an earlier period and the Persian Gulf region, the British opened another Factory, after Jask, at Bandar 'Abbās to handle their increasing volume of Persian trade. However, Dutch intrigue soon obliged them to search for a place outside Persia. So they opened a Factory at Basrah. The one at Bandar 'Abbās was closed a number of times and reopened for similar reasons. At last an agreement was worked out to establish a Factory at Abūshahr in 1763. This later became the principal seat of British commerce and administration in the Gulf. By 1788, when the British were assured of security and Persian confidence, the Dutch hold there had waned and the former's grip in India and the

Gulf was becoming firmer. However, their interests in the Gulf were still confined to safe passage of their vessels and materials. It was Napoleon's march to the East which alarmed them and they hastened to conclude a treaty in 1798, and another more favourable one in 1800, with Masqat. They also increased the number of their vessels and cruises in the Gulf.³²

Until the turn of the century there was no molestation or act of piracy against their vessels:

.....even upto the year 1797 the molestation which the British trade experienced....may be attributed to that interference which the government exercised in the disputes between the petty states in the Gulf. Whenever we preserved a strict neutrality, we derived every advantage from the observance of that policy.....
 Until the year 1796, I have been unable to trace a single act of aggression, even on the part of the Joasmees, against the British flag. The attack of the Bassein Snow, and of the Viper cruiser, in 1797, was supposed to have been by Arabs in the interest of the deposed Prince of Oman,.....nor was it until 1804 that the Joasmeescommenced their piratical depredations.³³

Actually the trade and the transport of the trade goods had gone in cheaper hands of the Qawāsim. This necessitated the British expeditions of 1806 and 1809. The :

Truth of the matter is that behind the humanitarian mask the British desired to eliminate competitors of their trade and shipping.³⁴

In any event, the two expeditions of 1806 and 1809 proved ineffectual before long and increased piracy against the British shipping. A mention of more British involvement in the Gulf affairs will follow as our study proceeds to discuss the reasons for the Egyptian expedition in Arabia, in general and eastern Arabia in particular, the subject of this thesis.

CHAPTER II

CAUSES NECESSITATING THE EXPEDITION

We must point out from the outset that the causes necessitating the Egyptian expedition to eastern Arabia cannot be separated from those for mounting the expedition on Makkah and Madīnah or the one directed at Dir'iyah, the Wahhābī capital, because the immediate and paramount objective in the three areas ^{was} not only the recovery of the two Holy Cities but also guaranteeing their security. The Su'ūdīs were no doubt expelled from the Cities during 1812-1813, but their continued resistance even after their rout from the Hijāz necessitated a further action against Dir'iyah in 1815-1818. As we shall see in the next chapter, the destruction of Dir'iyah in 1818 did not accomplish its objective because many Su'ūdī leaders and supporters fled to north, south and eastern Arabia and the conquest had to be extended thence. Thus the paramount aim of the east Arabian campaign was to secure Makkah and Madīnah, and to erase the disgrace of the Ottoman expulsion from the holy cities.¹

It may seem from what has been said above that the sole reason for mounting the Egyptian expedition was to free the holy places from the Wahhābīs' grasp. But certainly this was not the only reason. I am therefore proposing to enumerate various other incentives which propelled the despatch of the expedition. It seems best to study these incentives under three

main headings, namely, (a) The Motives of the Sublime Porte (b) Muhammad 'Alī's Aims and (c) Others.

A. THE MOTIVES OF THE SUBLIME PORTE

I. Religious Honour

The recovery of Makkah and Madīnah was not motivated by high hopes of any economic gains but out of religious expediency and strategic necessity. The Sultan's title of Khādīm al-Haramayn al-Sharīfayn presupposed possession of the Holy Cities, while that of Khalīfah and Zill Allāh (shadow of God) enabled him to claim the allegiance and support of the religious scholars and the 'ulamā' who could move the masses in any direction by their speeches and Friday sermons. Due to his control over the cities the Sultan's name with his titles used to be recited in such sermons all over the Muslim world. The Su'ūdīs had forbidden such recital in their domains, including the Holy Cities.² To retain his titles, honour and allegiance, it became obligatory for the Sultan to recover the Cities.

2. Restoration of Pilgrimage

Moreover, the Turkish-led pilgrim caravans to the Cities were also stopped by the Su'ūdīs from 1802. Only those who would strictly adhere to the Wahhābī tenets were allowed to make the pilgrimage.³ This was another blow to the Sultan's dignity and caused a commotion demanding retaliation and restoration.

3. Arresting Su'ūdī Expansion

The Sultan's authority had further been challenged by successive raids and successful plunder deep into the Ottoman provinces of 'Irāq and Syria. The Su'ūdīs had not yet accomplished their expansionist designs. Evidently their raids were to be followed by conquests in the Fertile Crescent and elsewhere on the ruins of the Turkish Empire.⁴ It was therefore a question of life and death for the Porte to arrest Su'ūdī expansion, and enhance and restore Turkish influence.

4. Threat to Turkish Authority

The earliest Su'ūdī threat to the Sultan's authority was felt in eastern Arabia itself where the Banī Khālid were routed by the Wahhābīs about 1793. Their raids farther north into 'Irāq had been causing alarm since 1784, obliging the Sultan to order his 'Irāqī wālī to reduce them effectively and to destroy Dir'īyah.⁵ The Pasha entrusted the first two expeditions to Thuwaynī, the Muntafiq chief. The first one of 1787 was indecisive while the second of 1797 was considerably better equipped. The Pasha supplied a contingent of Turks and artillery while the Banī Khālid under Muhammad b. 'Uray'ir and Barrāk b. 'Abd al-Muhsin also joined Thuwaynī.⁶ At Jahrā in Kuwayt, he amassed more arms, ammunition and provisions, dispatched a fleet with stores to Qatīf and recruited mercenaries. Columns from Kuwayt, Bahrayn and Zubayr also joined him. The march continued to Shibāk al-Hasā, where Thuwaynī was murdered on July 1, 1797, by a negro slave. The resulting lack of unity, discipline and leadership occasioned premature and instant dispersal of the army.⁷ In

1798, Sulaymān organized another army under his Kahyā, 'Alī Pasha. The Shaykh of Kuwayt transported their infantry, artillery and ammunition in his vessels to al-Hasā. Fresh Su'ūdī help obliged 'Alī to raise a two month successful siege. A short lived truce was later concluded.⁸ The Su'ūdīs extended their raids to Najaf, Karbalā' and the outskirts of Baghdād but the Pasha did not dare facing them. Soon thereafter Makkah, Madīnah and the Yaman were captured and the Turkish and Persian pilgrims stopped.⁹ In Syria, the Su'ūdīs raided Jawf al-'Āmir and Hawrān, within 30 miles of Damascus, and sacked 35 villages there in 1810-II. Aleppo was also held to ransom. Yūsuf Pasha, the Syrian Wālī was replaced by Sulaymān only because of Yūsuf's failure to conduct the pilgrim caravans to, and expel the Su'ūdīs from the holy cities and Sulaymān's assurance that he could accomplish this. But the Porte's threats and orders failed to exert even the slightest impression on the Su'ūdī mind.¹⁰

5. Eliminating Muhammad 'Alī and the Su'ūdīs

The capture of Makkah and Madīnah by the Su'ūdīs and Muhammad 'Alī's rise were simultaneous. The Sultan had condoned his intrigue and his succession to Khurshīd 18 months later, only when the Sultan sensed an imminent Russian attack.¹¹ When the Porte's consolidation, Egyptian stability and the European menace ought to have been his paramount concerns, the Sultan chose instead to involve the Pasha with the Su'ūdīs. Furthermore, he refused any Syrian military or material aid, though well-aware of its potential benefit.¹² From the point of view of the Porte, the Pasha was as ruthless and ambitious as the Su'ūdīs. By playing off the two upstarts against each other, in an exhausting desert war, the

Sultan could expect the draining of power and resources of each belligerent and the eventual restoration of his own supremacy in Egypt and Arabia.

6. Internal and External Dangers

Besides the Su'ūdīs and Muhammad 'Alī, the Pashas of Barbary, 'Irāq and Syria cared but little for the Sultan, while his Grand Vazīr and the military commanders were intriguing against each other for supremacy over the rest. Furthermore, although the British and French did evacuate Turkish soil under the Treaty of Amiens, nevertheless each was equally anxious to grab and annex Turkish domains. Their contention did not lie with the " Sick man of Europe " but among themselves each hoping to exclude the other.¹³ If the Sultan could close his rank and file and consolidate his administration and authority, he could then exert effective control and ward off internal and external dangers. The recovery of the Holy Cities was the only issue of sufficient religious sanctity and necessity around which he could rally and unite his forces and the entire Muslim world.

We thus conclude that in the name of the restoration, freedom and security of the pilgrimage and the liberation of Makkah and Madīnah from the " sacrilegious " Su'ūdīs, the Sultan aimed at consolidating his power to help rid himself of his recalcitrant and mutually antagonistic subordinates, as well as internal and external threats and autonomous tendencies.

B. MUHAMMAD 'ALI'S AIMS

Contemplating one or more of these objectives, Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-39) turned, in 1809, to the Pasha, exhorting him in the name of the glory accruing to him and Egypt on his saving Islam from the Su'udis.¹⁴ Muhammad 'Ali, so far a silent spectator of the Su'udi incursions, sensed in this an answer to his ambitions and a clear solution of his problems. Let us examine them.

I. Religious and Political Glory

Indeed the proposed campaign carried great attraction and weight. By expelling the Su'udis from the Holy Cities, he could rightly expect a hero's stature as defender of Islam, practical statesman and military strategist. However, it involved sacrifices and risks which even the well established Walis of Syria and 'Iraq dreaded. He was also well aware of the intrigues in Egypt of various Mamelukes and 'ulama' for supremacy. However he accepted the challenge, sensing more security, autonomy and honour for himself.

2. Securing the Porte's Pleasure

Whether impelled by sheer allegiance or fear of the Sultan, the Pasha's paramount aim was to secure the Sultan's pleasure and perpetuate his own rule in Egypt. Accordingly he would pose as an active, zealous and obedient servant of his august master.¹⁵ However, before sending though under the pretext of an expedition, he would ensure the removal of all possible threats to his authority in Egypt, and to secure military, political and financial gains.

3. Ridding Himself of Mamelukes and 'Ulamā'

His next anxiety lay in the Mameluke struggle for supremacy. He had failed to pacify these 1000 odd rulers spread throughout Egypt. Accordingly he advocated disposing of them and thus securing Egypt from their intrigues and conspiracies, before parting with his troops. On March 1, 1811; he was thus enabled to collect and massacre 460 Mamelukes present in the Cairo Citadel, followed by the slaughter of the rest wherever they were found.¹⁶

The second group of his rivals in Egypt was that of the 'ulamā' and Shaykhs through whom he had manoeuvred his entry. They had now started intrigues against him. The Pasha artfully succeeded in dividing them, exiled his own fortune maker, 'Umar Makram, from Cairo and deprived others of lucrative posts and salaries, thus arresting their effectiveness.¹⁷

4. Albanian Troops

A much greater danger to his stability lay in another echelon of his own making, the Albanian Bāshī Buzūks, who were nothing more than an undisciplined armed rabble. They rioted a number of times and were kept in check by nothing but regular pay and severe punishment.¹⁸ Realizing the superiority of European warfare, he decided to build a new disciplined army equipped with a modern fleet and hardware; but no one expected the Albanians to adapt to or accept such norms. For a similar attempt Sultan Salīm had been deposed and murdered in 1807.¹⁹ Their absence and expected casualties during the expedition would facilitate the establishment of a new disciplined force- the Nizām al-Jadīd.

5. Financial Advantages

On attaining power, Muhammad 'Alī took over huge liabilities with apparently no assets. The Mameluke misrule, extavagant donations and expenses of former rulers and Anglo-French wars there resulted in enormous economic problems and huge debts. This order enabled him to request the Sultan for military supplies, a loan of 10,000 purses (£. 50,000) and remission of Egypt's annual tribute of about 2,800 purses on the ground of drought and off-setting repairs to Alexandria harbour and the debts.²⁰

6. Maximum Autonomy and Security

The Porte's assent to his demands emboldened the Pasha and ensured his stability. His next target was maximum independence and autonomy within or outside the Turkish Empire.²¹ Availing himself of the precedent of a quasi-autonomous Barbary walāyat, he advocated the same status for Egypt by claiming it to be in the best interests of the campaign to avoid the British blockade. He assured the Porte of a return to the ordinary status after the war.²² It may be noted here that he had also tried in vain to elicit French and British recognition of his independence in 1810 and 1812 respectively.²³ He was thus always ambitious to expand his authority.

7. His Expansionism

Muhammad 'Alī thus developed his strategy step by step, from crushing his opponents and securing maximum financial and military gains to asking for autonomy. But for religious honour and the control of land

and sea routes to the East, Arabia had no appeal nor resources for his aggrandisement, while the four Syrian Pashalics, the Fertile Crescent, were repositories of wealth and military personnel, at the centre of great powers and along the direct route from the East to the West. By possessing them he could control the communications and thus the military and commercial designs of any power. Sulaymān Pasha's intrigues with the Mamelukes against him had added impetus to his expansionist designs. Accordingly in 1810 he started complaints against Sulaymān.²⁴

At first he demanded that Sulaymān be replaced by Yūsuf Pasha, who had earlier been superseded for his failure and on Sulaymān's assurance to conduct the pilgrim caravan; but the Porte promised to pardon and assign Yūsuf in Arabia.²⁵ The Pasha waited until the Egyptian army met with a disaster in early 1812 between Yanbu' and Madīnah. He then unsuccessfully asked for another expedition under Yūsuf from Syria while he himself offered to lead an Egyptian army to ensure complete victory.²⁶

Sixteen months of his planning finally unveiled his frank and explicit request of investing him Syria as well, because the destruction of Dir'īyah could only be achieved by a two pronged attack of Egyptian and Syrian armies, forcing the Su'ūdīs to fight on two fronts. Because of Sulaymān's ignorance of Arab demeanour, he argued, the Syrian troops could more effectively be deployed under his own single command.²⁷ This request was also turned down by the Porte allegedly to "protect him from the envy and ill-will of other Pashas".²⁸ After another futile attempt of 1816, in the name of Arabian expedition, he gave up all hopes to possess Syria by persuasion and pretexts.²⁹ We will refer to Muhammad 'Alī's conquest of Syria elsewhere. This brings us to other multifarious causes of the expedition.

C. OTHER REASONS

I. To Restore Lost Glory and Balance of Power

The Sultan and Muhammad 'Alī were well aware of the decline and impotence of the Ottoman Empire, mainly because of the European Powers' mastery over the seas, their superior modern armaments, well disciplined armies and diplomacy. Both were anxious to restore the lost glory. Previously when Sultan Salīm attempted to enforce a new military code on European models, he had been declared an infidel, deposed and killed.³⁰ Muhammad 'Alī had the same plans but he carried them through only after weakening the 'ulamā' and sending his troops to Arabia, as discussed above.

As for the sea power, both developed it greatly. Admittedly the Pasha was " the only eastern ruler who recognised the importance of sea power " and who set out to accomplish it.³¹ In brief, he had military vessels built at Bombay and Suez for an imposing Red Sea fleet and hired a notable Arab pirate chief for his navy.³² For the Mediterranean, he purchased in the Levant several vessels and had more built in Genoa and Venice. England and France refused to sell him frigates and the latest superior models, though he had two frigates and a brig built at Marseilles.³³ He thus reorganized his army and founded a modern navy comparable with European ones. He was a single minded practical man with sincere and trusted officers, such as Ibrāhīm - " the lion of the brave whose counsel hath always proved fortunate "³⁴ - and Sulaymān, the convert Capt. Sève; all efforts to bribe whom - even with a hereditary Pashalic - failed.³⁵ He also succeeded in purging his administration and country from destructive elements.

The Sultan, though equally ambitious, was overwhelmed by selfish and intriguing courtiers and recalcitrant subordinates whose lethargy and stupidity made him as impotent against 'infidel' Greeks as with 'heretic' Su'ūdīs. He was well aware of the need to reorganize and purge his administration but failed to do so. His habit of dividing authority to avoid intrigue proved fatal.³⁶ Muhammad 'Alī was the only person, despite his own ambitions, who obeyed the Sultan scrupulously, rose to his commands and posed as his active, zealous and obedient servant.³⁷ By recovering the lost glory they hoped to regain the Balance of Power in their favour. As we see below, this expedition was also a step in that direction:

(a) With a formidable navy and the occupation of Arabia, they could control the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea; for

His military action in Arabia and the Sudan affected three regions they (the British) were already interested - the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and Abyssinia.³⁸

(b) Capt. Sadleir, a British emissary, was sent by the Bombay government in 1819 to solicit Egyptian cooperation against the 'Pirate Coast'. The Turkish interests being detrimental to it, the mission failed. Apart from Ibrāhīm's attitude towards Sadleir, the Sultan had instructed Muhammad 'Alī to support the Gulf pirates.³⁹

(c) In strict compliance with the Sultan's orders Muhammad 'Alī prohibited Bombay vessels from sailing north of Jeddah.⁴⁰

(d) On the British capture of Mokha, Yaman, the Sultan reprimanded him severely for neglect of duty and ordered him to occupy all Red Sea ports upto Aden.⁴¹

(e) In 1823, when three British ships anchored at Bahrayn, Muhammad 'Alī ordered his governor to 'keep an open eye on their movements'.⁴²

It is thus evident that both of them had the common motive of gaining mastery over the seas and land in the East, enabling them to tilt balance of power and thus to reinstate the lost glory.

2. Sole Feasible Base and Pasha

A question arises as to why Muhammad 'Alī was chosen when he lacked both experience and the Sultan's confidence. Since vast deserts in the north and seas separate Arabia from the outer world, it was almost impossible to transport sufficient provisions and war materials for a regular campaign from Syria or 'Irāq.⁴³ Moreover, the direct Wādī al-Bāṭin route to Dir'īyah was infested by staunch Wahhābīs.⁴⁴ We have already seen the outcome of the 'Irāqī expeditions of 1787-1799 through al-Hasā.⁴⁵ Consequently on the default of 'Irāq and Syria, it was Muhammad 'Alī alone with his base in Egypt who could impose terms.

3. Resurgence of Su'ūdīs

The initial expedition to the Holy Cities soon proved ineffectual because of the Su'ūdīs' continued depredations. As we will see in the next chapter, the Tusūn-'Abd Allāh truce of 1815 also collapsed soon, while in the south Hasan Pasha, the Egyptian commander, failed to quell new disturbances and Wahhābī uprisings. Ibrāhīm was therefore sent with reinforcements to destroy Dir'īyah after the fall of which many Su'ūdī princes and supporters fled, inter alia, to the east and the expedition was extended thence. After the recall in 1819 of the bulk of the army, the Su'ūdī resurgence in Najd and eastern Arabia necessitated another Egyptian expedition.⁴⁶

4. Post Rupture Intrigues of 'Irāq and its Conquest

Muhammad 'Alī's capture of Syria in 1832-3 caused rupture of his relations with the Sultan.⁴⁷ 'Irāq, now his enemy, could strike his armies in the rear. He had to guard three fronts, Asia Minor, Arabia and 'Irāq. The conquest of 'Irāq would not only further his expansion, it would also relieve two or rather three sided pressure on his army in Syria. Moreover, the Egyptian commander Khurshīd's letters from Arabia to Cairo speak of intercepted letters against them. A message from a Kuwayt trader, 'Abd Allāh al-Faddāgh, to Faysal b. Turki revealed that the Pasha of 'Irāq, with whom the former had close ties, was trying to get the Sultan's Ferman for Faysal's restoration in Najd and that the 'Irāqī Pasha would send the military to expel Khurshīd from there.⁴⁸ Bahrayn's treaty of 1839 with Khurshīd establishes that, even prior to the east Arabian conquest, Muhammad 'Alī the envisaged capture of 'Irāq for which eastern Arabia had to be the base.⁴⁹

5. Need for Provisions And Food Supplies

As seen in chapter I, local food resources did not support half of the Najd population, necessitating imports from India through Qatif.⁵⁰ During the Najd war (1817-8) all these resources and plantations were destroyed or depleted. So the Egyptian army was in desperate need of food-stuffs. Camels for the transport of soldiers, arms and food from the Hijāz and Egypt as well as horses and other provisions were also needed, for most of these had been destroyed in the war and what was left had been taken away by the fleeing Su'ūdīs.⁵¹ When the Egyptian gunpowder blew up during the Dir'iyah siege some supplies were procured during the emergency from eastern Arabia which highlighted the need to occupy it.⁵²

6. Marine Communications with Egypt

In view of the hostility of Arabs, the long hazardous desert route through Arabia, and transporting provisions, arms and troops safely and quickly to and from the Hijāz and Egypt, the sea link with Najd and the occupation of east Arabian ports was a matter of dire necessity. This point was strongly made in 1838, when instead of a number of expected supply vessels only one Kuwaytī Ghunchah arrived.⁵³

7. Egyptian Ambitions to Control the Persian Gulf

Besides the sea link, Muhammad 'Alī was opposed to British influence in the Gulf. The General Treaty of Peace of 1820 with the 'Pirate Coast', the Chesney expedition in the Euphrates and the Russian descent to the south had augmented his anxieties and doubts.⁵⁴ The Gulf was indeed a matter of vital importance for his empire, necessitating the expedition.

8. Importance of Bahrayn

Muhammad 'Alī attached paramount importance to Bahrayn. He gave special instructions to Khālid and Khurshīd while dispatching them in 1837-8 for its conquest on, inter alia, the following grounds:

(a) Bahrayn commanded the most strategic position because a comparatively small garrison based there could easily control the whole Gulf.⁵⁵ The second place of vital importance, of course, was the Strait of Hormuz, the reduction of which was as much emphasized by Muhammad 'Alī.

(b) Bahrayn had become a centre of intrigue against Egyptian rule in Najd and al-Hasā because of the flight there of many Su'ūdī chiefs, including

'Umar b. 'Ufaysān and Muhammad b. Sayf al-'Ajjājī, respectively the governors of al-Hasā and Qatīf during the Su'ūdī rule. They were now in league with 'Irāq.⁵⁶

(c) These fugitives had taken with them the wealth, treasury and belongings of Amīr Faysal, which had to be delivered to the rightful owners, the new ruler, Khālīd.

(d) It was a part of Najd and tributary to the Su'ūdīs and hence to their successors.

(e) It was a place of great economic importance due to its pearls and trade.

(f) Muhammad 'Alī planned to make it the main port of eastern Arabia because Manāmah had good anchorage facilities while all other Gulf ports, including Qatīf, Sayhāt, and 'Uqayr, the three al-Hasā ports, were hampered by shallows without good anchorage.⁵⁷

It is thus evident that the Persian Gulf (and for that matter eastern Arabia) was of paramount importance, and Muhammad 'Alī was eager to bring it under his control.

CHAPTER III

THE CONQUEST OF EASTERN ARABIA

The Egyptian expedition can more advantageously be dealt with by dividing it into three periods, namely,

- a. From its dispatch to the fall of Dir'īyah, 1811 to 1818,
- b. First period of Egyptian rule in eastern Arabia, 1814-1835,
- c. Second period of Egyptian rule and administration, 1836-1841.

The first period, a retrospect outside the scope of our study, is necessary to elucidate the progress, the intensity and nature of opposition and the difficulties involved in the expedition. An account beginning with the fall of Dir'īyah is apt to be wanting in as much as it will leave impressions that the Su'ūdīs were no match for the Egyptians and that the formers' authority filled only a vacuum in the Arabian desert.

Actually the seven-year wars in the Hijāz, 'Asīr and central Arabia had culminated in a six month vehemently resisted siege before the fall of Dir'īyah. This Egyptian victory had smashed, at least for a time, the Su'ūdī power. Moreover, 'Abd Allāh, the Su'ūdī ruler, had drafted armies from all of his supporters and possessions including al-Ḥaṣā and the 'Trucial Coast'. These chiefs and armies had efficiently participated in the defence of the Su'ūdī capital. These depressed fugitives could not dare to confront the Egyptians again, especially when the latter had, during the siege, already reached eastern Arabia. Consequently we begin our account with the actual combat between the belligerents.

A. SU'UDĪ EGYPTIAN WARS OF 1811 TO 1818

As seen in our historical overview, the Su'udīs held in 1810 all of central Arabia, most of the Hijāz, including the Holy Cities of Makkah and Madīnah, portions of the Yaman, a part beyond the oasis of Jawf al-'Āmir in Syria, parts of 'Umān, the whole of al-Hasā, Qatar and Bahrayn. The Turkish provinces of Bāghdad and damascus and their dependencies were occasionally threatened with their raids. The Su'udī authority over al-Šīr, later known as Trucial 'Umān, was little shaken by the British expeditions of 1806 and 1809. The only area which managed to escape their occasional efforts at reduction was Kuwayt.¹ This could only be explained by the Su'udī invaders' lack of interest in it rather than its invincibility. This climax in Su'udī expansion was destined to be eclipsed very soon.

Soon after receiving the Porte's command in 1809 to save Islam from the Wahhābīs and to share the glory of recovering the Holy Places, Muhammad 'Alī started his preparations to advance on the Su'udī lands.² In the next two years 26 vessels were built at Suez to transport troops, armaments and provisions.³ The Red Sea ports on the pilgrimage route from Cairo to Yanbu' were garrisoned and posts established.⁴ All was ready by August 1811, when the command was entrusted to Muhammad 'Alī's son, Tūsūn. In order to win the Arab hearts with presents and religious homogeneity, a diplomatic mission of four 'ulamā' representing the four Schools of Muslim Jurisprudence, as well as Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahrūqī, the first merchant (Naqīb al-Tujjār) of Cairo, had to accompany the expedition.⁵ On the 9th of August, 1811, an infantry of about 14,000, mostly Albanians, sailed in 63 ships from Suez while a cavalry of 800 headed by Tūsūn himself marched on the 4th of September, 1811.⁶

Egyptian Conquest of the Hijāz

The infantry arrived off Yanbu' which capitulated after two days of feeble resistance in October 1811. Tūsūn arrived there two weeks later.⁷ Sharīf Ghālīb of Makkah, in spite of his earlier assurances to join, was found to be insincere, waiting to join the victor.⁸ After three months of fruitless negotiations and troop inactivity, Tūsūn marched towards Madīnah in January 1812. Badar and al-Safrā were taken each after slight skirmishes. While passing through a narrow defile of mountains at Judaydah, they were caught unawares by the joint Harb and Su'ūdī forces of 18,000 infantry and 800 horse and met with a complete disaster. They returned to Yanbu' after great distress and loss of all ammunitions, provisions and 4000 dead.⁹

Fresh reinforcements of men and arms were soon sent by Muhammad 'Alī to revitalize the army. The Banī Ṣubh and Banī Sālim sections of Harb tribe, who occupied the fateful passes, were at last won over with Mahrūqī's efforts and gold.¹⁰ Moving his base to Badar, Tūsūn attacked Madīnah and after a siege of two weeks captured it in mid-November, 1812, by mining a part of the fortifications.¹¹ The bulk of the army then advanced to Makkah while a few hundred were detached for Jeddah. 'Uthmān al-Madā'ifī, the Su'ūdī commander of Makkah, finding himself too weak to resist, retired to Ta'if a few hours before Mustafā Bey, the Egyptian commander, entered on the 13th of January, 1813.¹² Seventeen days later Ta'if was taken, al-Mudā'ifī fled to Bisil. In a later battle he was captured and sent along with the keys of the Holy Cities and valuable offerings to Cairo enroute to Istanbul where he was beheaded.¹³ After the recovery of Makkah and Madīnah the recital of the Sultan's name in Friday sermons and the annual pilgrimage stopped for non-Su'ūdīs since 1802 were restored in 1813.¹⁴

Muhammad 'Alī Arrives in the Hijāz

However the Su'ūdī threat to Egyptian rule there continued. Sharīf Ghālib's conduct was also far from satisfactory. Mustafā Bey's defeat at Turbah added to it. To establish tranquillity and his supremacy, Muhammad 'Alī sent a cavalry of 2,000 by land while he himself arrived with 2,000 men at Jeddah on the 28th of August, 1813.¹⁵ Sharīf Ghālib was arrested and deported with his sons and retinue, arriving Cairo on January 9, 1814. Sharīf Yahyā, Ghālib's nephew, was later appointed to pacify his kinsfolk and followers.¹⁶ Muhammad 'Alī's generous gifts, tax reforms, donations to students, 'ulāmā' and others and the repair of holy places won him respect and allegiance.¹⁷ His initial march towards Turbah met with disaster; but the death of Su'ūd in April 1814 and consequent factional fights at Dir'iyah and the south paved the way for an early and easier capture of the southern Su'ūdī strongholds of Turbah and Qunfudhah. Bīshah, Ranyah and 'Asīr were forced to yield, thus smashing the southern Wahnābīs and most of the Yaman.¹⁸ Returning to Makkah, Muhammad 'Alī appointed officers and arrived at Madīnah on April 14, 1815. Apprehending an attack on Alexandria, he sailed on May 20, reaching Cairo post haste on the 25th of June, 1815.²⁰

March Towards North and East

While Muhammad 'Alī was in the south his son, Tūsūn, was campaigning in northern Hijāz and Qasīm. A garrison under Ibrāhīm Agha (the former Thomas Keith), while heading north to join Tūsūn, was surprised by a large army under 'Abd Allāh b. Su'ūd himself at al-Rass. This disaster, however, led to a truce in June 1815, whereby 'Abd Allāh conceded the Holy Cities and his own allegiance to the Sultan while Tūsūn admitted 'Abd Allāh's authority

over areas still under him. Soon the truce proved a dead letter as 'Abd Allāh started reinforcing his army and collecting tribute even from areas ceded to the Egyptians; also, Muhammad 'Alī would not confirm it unless Dir'iyah and al-Hasā were placed under his rule.²¹ After the withdrawal of the Pasha's cavalry from Turbah, Hasan Pasha, the Egyptian commander, failed to quell the new Su'ūdī disturbances in the south.

Ibrāhīm's Arrival

Fresh reinforcements of 2,000 infantry and 1,500 horse under the command of Muhammad 'Alī's second son, Ibrāhīm, set out from Cairo on the 16th of August 1816, with clear orders to destroy Dir'iyah. Two French officers and four doctors accompanied them.²² After restoring peace in the Hijāz, they marched on Hanākiyah where Ibrāhīm punished hostile elements, established law and order and secured the caravan routes for his supplies and communications. Advancing towards Najd, Ibrāhīm dealt a crushing defeat on 'Abd Allāh b. Su'ūd at Jabal Māwiyah between Hanākiyah and al-Rass. Capt. Sadleir, the British emissary, who traversed the area 20 months later in September 1819, testifies to the stiff fight evidenced by abundant bleaching skeletons of the armies.²³ 'Abd Allāh fled to 'Unayzah from the Jabal.

Arriving at al-Rass, Ibrāhīm besieged it on the 9th July, 1817. Despite urgent requests by the defenders, 'Abd Allāh did not stir from 'Unayzah. The siege and stiff resistance continued until October 25, when after considerable losses on both sides the besieged sued for peace. 'Abd Allāh then withdrew to Buraydah and Ibrāhīm rapidly captured 'Unayzah. The 'Anazah tribe, Shaykh's of Mutayr and Harb tribes joined Ibrāhīm there with many camels and provisions.²⁴ 'Abd Allāh then hastened to Dir'iyah to fortify

it and Buraydah submitted to Ibrāhīm. Thus the whole of Qaṣīm came under his sway within two weeks of the fall of al-Rass, Mudhnib, Ushayqir and Fara'ah submitted in turn on Ibrāhīm's appearance. The next march was on strongly fortified Shaqrā in January 1818. After a stout fight the defenders were forced back into the town and about a month later sued for peace.²⁵

This reduction of Washm hastened the submission of Sudayr, Majma'ah, Huraymalā, and Mahmal. Durmā, the strongest place in Najd after Dir'iyah, was besieged next on February 20. Four days later Ibrāhīm manoeuvred entry from the rear. Certain events led to the massacre of its inhabitants. Marching by Haysīyah Pass down wādī Hanīfah, past 'Uyaynah and Jubaylah, the army camped at Malqā, an hour's ride to Dir'iyah on the 10th of March, 1818. It moved farther to 'Ilb, the following day and opened attack on Dir'iyah.²⁶

The Siege of and Battle for Dir'iyah

The battle for Dir'iyah continued for ten days on the front line without a break or appreciable advantage to either side. Ibrāhīm then deployed another strategy. He would change the avenue as well as the mode of his attack and strategy many times a day. The next day, for instance, he attacked the northernmost positions in wādī Ghubayrā. Keeping the defenders busy in front, he brought a strong cavalry attack in their rear, causing disorder and retreat at the main front with high casualties (including among the royal family). This was immediately followed by a vigorous attack engaging the Su'ūdī units on the left bank of the wādī, and by an artillery attack on Sambah fort, on the destruction of which 'Alī Azan (an Egyptian commanding cavalry and infantry on the right bank of the wādī) rushed to occupy it before the knowledge of Su'ūdī armies under 'Umar b. Su'ūd in the rear of the fort. 'Alī Azan then attacked 'Umar's rear, obliging his troops to break and retreat.

Capturing 'Umar's position, the cavalry led another attack in the rear of Paysal b. Su'ud on the main front and after a fierce fight routed his troops who fled leaving guns and equipment. This created panic in Su'udī troops on both sides of the wādī causing their flight. Similar fight continued daily.²⁷

An Egyptian attack on Ghasībah quarters failed in April with heavy losses. Another action on June 21 was lost when a gust of wind caused a fire and terrific explosion in the entire Egyptian magazine, obliging them to abandon the attack. A Su'udī counter-attack was repulsed only by Ibrāhīm's unshaken courage and by infusing his own spirit in the troops. His immediate arrangements to be supplied by 'Irāq as well as Hijāz and the stimulus of Muhammad 'Alī who sent immediate reinforcements and ammunition under Khalīl Pasha, enabled his quick recovery. Attacks were intensified. Supplies continued pouring in while the defenders were running short of food. Deserters from the Su'udī camp grew daily. One of the strongest Su'udī supporters, the 'Utaybah chief, also joined Ibrāhīm. Ghasībah, Sāhil and Tarafīyah were taken one by one. Tarā'if quarter, where in the citadel 'Abd Allāh himself was in command with artillery, resisted until September 9, 1818. On earnest request of his advisors, clamour of the besieged, and the bleak situation of provisions, he hoisted a white flag. He surrendered and left captive for Cairo with his retinue under the escort of 400 troops. After a city parade, in Istanbul, he was beheaded on the 19th of December, 1818.²⁸

The fall of Dir'iyah hastened the conquest of the rest of Najd and central Arabia. With the liberation of Makkah and Madīnah, restoration of annual pilgrimage and the fall of Dir'iyah, Muhammad 'Alī had indeed acquired a stature of great consequence in the entire Muslim world as the deliverer and protector of the Holy Land. We now turn to the first period of Egyptian rule and administration in eastern Arabia.

B. FIRST PERIOD OF EGYPTIAN RULE IN EASTERN ARABIA, 1814 TO 1835

After the fall of Dir'iyah, Ibrāhīm stayed there for nine months overseeing and organising the state of affairs. Under his father's directions he pursued a policy of conciliation and gentleness towards the population and the regional chiefs and of pacification by rewards and payments. This policy, together with his harsh treatment of opponents and his scrupulous adherence to his word won for him the hearts of the proud Arabs.²⁹ He sent his armies to reduce Jabal Shammar, al-Harīq, al-Hasā and every other vestige of Su'ūdī influence. Eastern Arabia was his paramount aim.

As seen above, Ibrāhīm was receiving provisions and reinforcements from 'Irāq during his Najd campaign. When in June 1818, the whole of his ammunition caught fire, he was immediately supplied from, inter alia, Basrah and Zubayr.³⁰ Though our sources do not give the route through which the supplies came, it is probable that they passed through al-Hasā and Kuwayt since the direct route to Dir'iyah via Wādī al-Bātin was infested with Su'ūdīs.³¹ Evidently eastern Arabia came under Egyptian influence much before the fall of Dir'iyah. The participation of Mājid and Muhammad of the Banī Khālīd on the Egyptian side in the siege also supports our view.³² Moreover, 'Abd Allāh had drafted armies from his possessions upon the siege; consequently the bulk of the armies of al-Hasā and Qatīf with Fahd al-'Ufaysān and Ibrāhīm b. Ghānim, the respective governors, would have been away thus facilitating the occupation of the area by Banī Khālīd chiefs.

Al-Hasā

In any event Mājid and Muhammad, the two sons of 'Uray'ir, the pre-Su'ūdī Banī Khālīd ruler, had by the fall of Dir'iyah occupied al-Hasā

and Qatīf without much difficulty, while Sayf b. Sa'dūn became the ruler of his own Sayāsib tribe and its area. However their rule was shortlived, for within a few weeks, Ibrāhīm sent his armies there to take possession of all the Su'ūdī funds and properties. Muhammad Āghā Kāshif was appointed with a small force of 240 men as the governor of al-Ḥasā at Hufūf. He was accompanied by 'Abd Allāh b. 'Isā b. Mutlaq of the Mutayr tribe who had previously served the Su'ūdīs in 'Umān. Another garrison of similar strength was sent to Qatīf under Khalīl Āghā as its governor.³³ It is pertinent to note here that the strength of the Egyptian force in the east and the participation of the Banī Khālid, especially the al-'Uray'ir brothers with Ibrāhīm in the siege of Dir'īyah, clearly indicate that there was no opposition to the Egyptian rule there. It is said that the Banī Khālid and Sayāsib chiefs fled on the arrival of the Egyptians. However, Sadlēr's account of his passing in June 1819 through the Banī Khālid habitations at Sayhāt and Hufūf leads us to believe that these tribes and chiefs remained there and cooperated with Ibrāhīm's armies, though they were relegated to lower ranks than rulers.³⁴ Ibrāhīm won over Muhammad and Mājid and reinstated their family dignities and properties. They were sworn enemies of the Su'ūdīs due to religious differences and the humiliating wars which had culminated in their expulsion from al-Ḥasā. They joined Ibrāhīm in perpetrating atrocities against common enemies.

In about June 1819, Muhammad 'Alī ordered Ibrāhīm to get rid of all fortifications and suspected Su'ūdī sympathisers. Ibrāhīm made a personal excursion in the country to ascertain compliance. He then recalled the bulk of his armies from central and eastern Arabia. He appointed Muhammad and Mājid al-'Uray'ir as the new Egyptian rulers of al-Ḥasā and Mushrif, their nephew, as Qatīf governor. They had to pay a part of their revenues to cover war expenses and for their reinstatement.³⁵ Ibrāhīm then left al-Rass for

the Hijāz on August 24, 1819, only two days before Sadleir's arrival at al-Rass.³⁶ From the Hijāz Ibrāhīm proceeded home where his father had some other plans lined up for him. Muḥammad 'Alī appointed his nephew, Aḥmad Yakan, as the new governor of Makkah and commander-in-chief of his army in Arabia.³⁷ Ismā'īl Bey had to act as vice governor of Najd but he proved a failure before long.

It appears that Muḥrif was soon superseded in Qatīf by Majid's son, Sa'dūn, who well received the Sayāsib chief, Sayf b. Sa'dūn, his family and tribe on their arrival at Qatīf; but Sayf and important members of his retinue were put to death at night, most probably because of anticipated rivalry. Majid's attempt to capture and rule Najd failed, though the Bani Khalid rule in al-Hasā continued until 1830.³⁸

Citing one incident of Bedouin attack on and seizure of an Egyptian convoy carrying treasury, Capt. Sadleir reported on June 9, 1819:

The revolt of many tribes of Bedouins has, in a great measure, deranged the resources of Ibrāhīm Pacha, and will of course cramp his movements, but I am happy to learn that these revolts are not to be attributed to any acts of cruelty countenanced by the Pacha. On the contrary he has pursued the wise policy of attaching to his interests the principal tribe of Binee Khalid.....³⁹

However this report from Abūshahr differs from that from al-Hasā of July 17;

The political state of this country differs materially from the reports which were current in India at the period of my departure...the Turks are viewed with much jealousy by these Bedouins who...consider them..as intruders. The Turks have ruled here with very arbitrary sway and have been accustomed to enforce their commands over the Bedouins who are an uncivilized, barbarous race probably the most difficult people in the universe to rule or keep in subjection.

In view of his remarks about the Arabs one or two cases of their attacks on the Egyptian or local caravans should not, in our view, connote general

revolt. As for his own mission of seeking Egyptian cooperation to punish the Pirate Coast, Sadleir was well aware of Ibrāhīm's intended retreat to Cairo via Makkah and of Ibrāhīm's successors even when Sadleir was at Abūshahr and was himself convinced of the futility of his mission:

It is evident that the district of Ul-Ahsa, the port of Kateef, and the advantages of the communication by Anjeer, present more favourable prospects than any advantages which could be expected by the accession of Ras-ul-Khima. If the Pacha has found it necessary to abandon these acquisitions, it is not to be expected that he will enter upon any projects.....⁴⁰

In any event the combined retreating Egyptian force of Qatīf and al-Hasā left Hufūf on July 22 which marks the evacuation of the bulk of the Egyptian army. However, they left al-Hasā province at Remah on July 28, 1819, while the last Egyptian units were withdrawn about 1824 from eastern Afabia.⁴²

The same year witnessed the beginning of the Su'ūdī resurgence. This time their rule, perhaps as Egyptian tributaries, was marked by tolerance and devoid of such terror as used to be exhibited. The first Su'ūdī-Banī Khālid confrontation took place in 1827 on the latter's initiative when Mājid and Muhammad al-'Uray'ir crossed Dahnā, Najd, and occupied al-'Atk wells of Hafar near the 'Iraq-Najd-Kuwayt border. It was repulsed by the Su'ūdīs. The first Su'ūdī attack, in 1829, under Muhammad b. 'Ufaysān was to pillage a rich caravan between 'Uqayr and Hufūf. In early 1830, Muhammad and Mājid again penetrated with a large force in Najd and occupied the 'Aqlā wells between Dahnā and Summān. In the battle that ensued Mājid was killed on February 24, 1830. With new spirit and reinforcements under Turkī, the Su'ūdī ruler, Muhammad was obliged to retreat on March 20 in a complete rout. In the chase that followed, Turkī occupied Hufūf without opposition. Muhammad, who was holding only the great fort Qasr al-Kūt in the northwestern corner of Hufūf, finally surrendered on Turkī's offer of honourable terms. Thus al-Hasā

came under Su'ūdī control again with 'Umar b. 'Ufaysān as its governor.

Qatīf also surrendered soon. 'Abd Allāh b. Ghānim became its Su'ūdī chief.⁴³

In 1831, the 'Amā'ir section of the Banī Khālid unsuccessfully attacked Qatīf and Hufūf simultaneously. In 1833 Bahrayn instigated the 'Amā'ir, who blockaded Qatīf, obliging its governor to seek Turki's help. Reinforcements under Turki's son, Faysal, obliged the 'Amā'ir to raise the siege and take refuge at Sayhāt, then under Bahrayn. During the ensuing siege of Sayhāt, Faysal captured Tārūt and Dārīn Islands but these were soon recovered by the Bahrayn 'Utūb when Faysal raised the siege. The 'Utūb constantly supplied and assisted the besieged. The siege continued until Faysal learnt of Turki's murder by his cousin Mushārī. Without disclosing the news, Faysal raised the Sayhāt siege, hurried to Hufūf with Qatīf chief, gathered all local chiefs and announced his father's murder and Mushārī's usurpation of Najd. With their backing, he marched on Riyād, murdered Mushārī and became the Najd ruler on the 18th of June, 1834.⁴⁴

Bahrayn and Qatar

It seems that the Egyptians did not turn to Bahrayn during this period. However, its importance was very much in Muhammad 'Alī's mind in 1823 when the visit of three British ships there obliged him to order Ahmad Yakan to "keep an open eye on these English movements".⁴⁵ A brief account of Bahrayn will be in order. On the demise of his brother and co-ruler, Salīm, 'Abd Allāh b. Ahmad was joined by Khalīfah b. Salīm (r. 1825-34) but principally the administration remained in 'Abd Allāh's hands, who became the sole ruler after Khalīfah's death, despite protests of Khalīfah's heirs. During the British-Masqat expedition of 1819 against the Qawasim, Bahrayn was much

alarmed. It therefore submitted to Masqat. It also volunteered to sign the General Treaty of Peace with the British in 1820.⁴⁶

Our account of Bahrayn would be incomplete without the mention of Rahmah b. Jābir who had been conducting a grim war of attrition against the trade and shipping of Bahrayn since 1783. To achieve this object, he allied himself with Abūshahr Arabs, the Qawāsīm, Masqat rulers, the Su'ūdīs, the Persians, the Egyptians and even sought the aid of British Residents. He consciously avoided antagonizing a bigger power. He joined Ibrāhīm in 1818 when the Su'ūdīs were weakened. With his guns and vessels he landed at Qatīf and aided Ibrāhīm in its occupation. In reward, Ibrāhīm consented to his settling at Dammām and rebuilding its fort, which the Su'ūdīs had destroyed in July 1816 to please Bahrayn and to avenge Rahmah's joining Masqat.⁴⁷

When Sadleir's vessel was stuck in the sandbanks off Qatīf on June 18, 1819, Rahmah sent "two intelligent pilots who conducted the vessel with the morning's tide into the channel".⁴⁸ The British Resident at Abūshahr, after continuous efforts, brought about a short lived compromise between Rahmah and Bahrayn in February 1824. It lasted until the end of 1825. By provoking the Banī Khālid rulers Rahmah waged simultaneous war with Bahrayn and al-Hasā. He was finally confined only to Dammām. Masqat distrusted him while the Su'ūdīs were too occupied in Najd. He approached the British Resident at Abūshahr for aid, failing which he eventually hired 25 to 30 Balūchī mercenaries for a final battle. The combined Bahrayn and al-Hasā forces under the command of Mājīd al-'Uray'ir and 'Abd Allāh al-Khalīfah besieged Dammām from land and sea in 1826. Returning from Abūshahr, Rahmah fired an insulting salute at the besiegers. This intimidated Ahmad b. Salmān al-Khalīfah, the commander of the Bahrayn fleet, who immediately, laying his Baghlah along Rahmah's, embarked with his troops onto Rahmah's vessel. Consequently,

After a desperate action of some hours, finding that he had no chance of success or escape, Bin Jauber set fire to his magazine and blew up himself, vessel and crew.⁴⁹

The survivors jumped into the sea, were picked up by the remaining Bahrayn vessels and the enemies put to death. After Rahmah's death, his son Bishr soon surrendered to the combined forces.⁵⁰ This strengthened the Banī Khālid rule in al-Hasā for a time and relieved Bahrayn of a 40 year menace. Dammām came under al-Khalīfah.

As seen in al-Hasā affairs, Bahrayn instigated and aided the 'Amā'ir against the Su'ūdīs. It blockaded Qatīf and 'Uqayr and annexed Tārūt Islands in 1834. The blockade continued until the middle of 1836, when the Persian threat obliged Bahrayn in agreeing to pay the annual tribute of 3,000, as fixed in 1831. Bahrayn then raised the siege. However, Dammām, Sayhāt, Tārūt and Dārīn districts on the Qatīf coast remained Bahrayn territories.⁵¹

Qatar remained calm during the period, except for a revolt in 1835 of Hawaylah under 'Isā b. Tarīf obliging them to take refuge in Abū Zabī.⁵²

Kuwayt

We have seen that Ibrāhīm received immediate supplies from 'Irāq on the explosion of his magazine during the siege of Dir'īyah. Najd refugees at Basrah and Zubayr conveyed these supplies with the aid of Shaykh Jābir b. 'Abd Allāh (r. 1815-59) of Kuwayt. Ibrāhīm appointed his representative there to ensure the safety and safe conduct of his troops and supplies to al-Hasā and its ports.⁵³ Kuwayt remained free from external threats. However, it is said to have acknowledged Turkish authority in 1829 by agreeing to pay 40 bags of rice and 400 frasilas of dates annually in return for a robe of honour. In January 1831, Amīr Turki's march on Subayhīyah obliged Shaykh Jābir to

buy time by paying tribute. Turki stayed there for a considerable time receiving the homage of local chiefs.⁵⁴

'Trucial' 'Uman

After submitting to the Su'udīs, the Qawāsim were engaged in piracy against Masqat and the British in the name of holy war. The Su'udīs found Sultān b. Saqar, the Qawāsim chief, guilty of duplicity, summoned and detained him at Dir'iyah in 1809. Sultān managed to escape the captivity and joined Muhammad 'Alī in the Hijāz who sent him as his envoy to Masqat asking Imām Sa'id to occupy the 'Uman coast and to reinstall Sultān there. The Imām and the Banī Yās of Abū Zabī led two expeditions in 1813 and 1814 against Rās al-Khaymah. The latter met with partial success. Shaykh Sultān was thus appointed chief of Shāriqah and Linjah and the Qawāsim agreed to abstain from piracy on either side of the two Gulfs below Bahrayn.⁵⁵ This brought about Egyptian influence on the 'Uman coast in 1814. The Su'udī influence there was still considerable, though they could not exert it effectively because of Egyptian wars. The effects of British expedition of 1819 to Rās al-Khaymah and the consequent General Treaty of Peace, 1820, were no different.⁵⁶

The Qawāsim provided military services to the Su'udīs during Ibrāhīm's campaign. Their last reinforcements of men, arms and provisions in 17 war vessels, however, reached Qatif too late, in November 1818.⁵⁷ After the British expedition, Shaykh Sultān again became the paramount chief of the Trucial coast and by 1823 Rās al-Khaymah came under his direct rule. On the resurgence of the Su'udīs in 1824, he was much alarmed and sought British support but was warned against any piracy or an alliance against Masqat. The Su'udī reconquest of al-Ḥasa in 1830, further alarmed the Pirate chiefs who vainly sought British aid. This led the 'Ajman and Umal-Qaywayn chiefs to

declare themselves Su'ūdī partisans. The 'Ajman chief, Rāshid b. Humayd, urged Su'ūdīs for his headship there; but they recognized Shaykh Sultān and Imām of Masqat as the only two heads of 'Uman.⁵⁸ In 1831 Sultān and Rāshid became intermediaries for the Su'ūdī Amīr's amical ties with the British.⁵⁹

After murdering Shaykh Tahnūn in 1833, his brothers started oppression in Abū Zabī which led to secession of Dubay under Bū Falāsah chief.⁶⁰

Adverting to Ibrāhīm's departure from Arabia, we would point out that Muhammad b. Mushārī of 'Uyaynah proclaimed himself Najd ruler in September, 1819. However, Mushārī b. Su'ūd's escape from Egyptian escort to Cairo and arrival in March 1820, obliged Muhammad to acknowledge him Amīr. Turkī b. 'Abd Allāh b. Muhammad, ^{al-Su'ūd} who had fled to 'Uman after the fall of Dir'iyah, marched northward with the support of Riyād, Huraymalā and al-Kharj chiefs and Isma'īl Bey failed to stop him. In December 1820 Turkī arrested Muhammad and his son, put them to death, disposed of Mushārī as well and proclaimed himself the Najd ruler.⁶¹ Isma'īl's successor, Husayn Bey, occupied Riyād; but his cruelty and neglect of Muhammad 'Alī's instructions led him to a disaster in the sandhills of Harīq. Turkī re-entered Riyād in October 1824 which marks the Su'ūdī resurgence.⁶² Muhammad 'Alī's pre-occupations in Greek wars and Turkī's paying tribute might have contributed to the former's letting Najd remain in Turkī's hands, thus leading to a Su'ūdī revival in eastern Arabia by 1833.

Ahmad Pasha, the Egyptian governor in the Hijāz, farmed out the Qatīf revenues in 1835 to a Bahrayn trader, 'Abd Allāh b. Mushārī for about M.T.\$ 20,000. Amīr Faysal hastened to defend his rights, frustrating Egyptian designs. Also, the 'Asīr chiefs in Yaman plundered the Egyptians there and sent the booty to Faysal. Muhammad 'Alī's efforts to collect tribute from Faysal by sending Dawsarī Abū Nuqtah, an Arab captive at Cairo, also proved futile.⁶³ This was enough for Muhammad 'Alī who was already anxious to control the region. Consequently he organized another expedition in about 1836.

C. SECOND PERIOD OF EGYPTIAN RULE OVER EASTERN ARABIA, 1836-1841.

In the entourage of 'Abd Allāh b. Su'ūd to Cairo in 1818, his young brother, Khālīd, marched as a captive. Muhammad 'Alī's kindness inculcated in him pro-Egyptian feelings. To facilitate the division of loyalties and to perpetuate Egyptian supremacy, he was picked as Amīr of Najd.⁶⁴ This strategy achieved the desired effects and Najd was captured without much difficulty. Khālīd landed at Yanbu' late in 1836, joined Ismā'īl Āghā, the governor of Madīnah, who accompanied him with 2,000 troops as commander. Faysal's tactics, similar to 'Abd Allāh's in 1818, led him to avoid a confrontation and continue retreating to al-Hasā while Khālīd occupied Riyād in May 1837. However, on an Egyptian repulse at Hawtah-Harīq in July, Faysal rushed to Riyād and besieged it on September 7, 1837. A strong assault on October 5 was foiled by the besieged but not without a very desperate fight. Fresh reinforcements to the defenders obliged Faysal to end the siege and withdraw to Manfuhah.⁶⁵

By the end of 1837 the command of the Egyptian army was entrusted to Khurshīd. His arrival in Qasīm with reinforcements and provisions was known at Riyād on January 3, 1838. By pacification and diplomacy, Khurshīd led Faysal to an understanding for apportioning central Arabia between Khālīd and Faysal. Khurshīd then returned to Madīnah.⁶⁶ Proceeding eastward once again, Khurshīd arrived in June 1838 at 'Unayzah where a trifling matter caused new hostilities. Many chiefs tendered their allegiance to Khurshīd there. Marching towards Riyād in October, he met Khālīd and his army at Washm.

The combined army then advanced to Dilam and besieged it. The Hīnah fort changed hands many times and fierce fighting continued. On November 25, Faysal's sortie was co-ordinated with a fierce attack in the rear of the Egyptian army by the combined force of 'Umar b. 'Ufaysān, the al-Hasā Su'ūdī

governor, and Hawtah-Hariq troops. After an initial Egyptian setback, 'Umar was forced to retreat. He then directed an attack on Zumayqah which fell to the combined Su'ūdī forces; but its seizure proved so futile that it caused dissensions among 'Umar's allies, who left for their homes. 'Umar returned to Sulmīyah enroute to al-Hasā while the Zumayqans hurried to Khurshīd suing for peace not only for themselves but also those of their kin with Faysal. Fearing desertions Faysal soon surrendered and was sent to Cairo on December 20, 1838 under the escort of Hasan al-Yāzjī, arriving on March 26, 1839.⁶⁷

Muhammad 'Alī had expressly directed Khālīd and Khurshīd to capture the whole of eastern Arabia and to scrupulously collect all the tribute from each part, especially Bahrayn, which was previously paid to the Su'ūdīs.⁶⁸ This emphasis on Bahrayn leads one to think that Muhammad 'Alī might have been planning to use Bahrayn's major seaport for his own navy. It has been surmised by some writers that by the late thirties he envisaged an invasion of 'Irāq through eastern Arabia.⁶⁹ In furtherance of this objective Khurshīd lost no time in executing his master's plans. He took ^{the} following steps:

(a) As Bahrayn carried paramount importance, the earliest steps were directed towards it. It appears that, soon after the Khurshīd-Faysal compromise of January, 1838, Khurshīd appointed his most trusted and zealous commander, Muhammad Rif'at Effendī, as his roving minister with multifarious military, political and commercial duties. He had to make purchases of foodstuffs, stores and provisions for his army not only from eastern Arabia but from Iran and 'Irāq as well. During the purchases he had to survey all areas of interest. He had to occupy any areas with his accompanying troops and to negotiate the submission of Bahrayn at the earliest time.

(b) 'Abd al-Rahmān Hamalī was despatched two days after the Dilam peace to secure the submission of al-Hasā chiefs and Ahmad Sudayrī's posting;

- (c) A similar deputation was sent to Qatīf after the fall of Dilam, and
 (d) Sa'd b. Mutlaq was sent to Trucial 'Umān. We discuss al-Hasā first.

Al-Hasā and Qatīf

The first recorded Egyptian contact with al-Hasā and Qatīf during this period, excepting of course the participation of Banī Khālid and other anti-Su'ūdī elements in the Egyptian expedition in Najd, was that of Muhammad (Rif'at) Effendī in December, 1838, when he was sent to Bahrayn to secure its submission with further orders " to inspect the ports on the coast of al-Hasā and Qatīf, and to inspect the state of affairs in Bahrayn, and to inform you of the results...". Muhammad proceeded to al-Hasā, occupied Hufūf, stayed with his troops in the fort, Qasr al-Kūt, for some time, set out for 'Uqayr, gathered all information, arrived at Qatīf and collected necessary data prior to sailing for Bahrayn. Muhammad also reported that the defeated 'Umar b. 'Ufaysān returned to al-Hasā, collected every thing in the al-Hasā treasury and the fort and escaped with them 15 days before the arrival of Muhammad's force there.⁷⁰ We will see a different version about 'Umar very soon.

Two days after the fall of Dilam, Khurshīd sent 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Hamālī to 'Umar b. 'Ufaysān and the chiefs of al-Hasā granting them a general amnesty and summoning them to Dilam after securing the treasury. After the submission 'Umar, who was afraid of the Pasha due to his war efforts against him, is said to have collected and delivered all properties and treasury to al-Hamālī. They then set out for Dilam. Coming out of al-Hasā in January 1839, 'Umar told the accompanying chiefs that " my plans are different from yours. You go and seek peace for your lives and country; but I sense danger for me". He then set out for Bahrayn; but later went to Kuwayt. The al-Hasā chiefs set out for the Pasha who granted amnesty and leave to return home.⁷¹

Khurshīd then appointed Ahmad al-Sudayrī with Sudayr troops and 130 Egyptian cavalry under Ibn Khazām al-Maghribī, in al-Hasā. Ahmad soon established peace and tranquillity there. About six months later he was however transferred as head of the al-Hasā treasury while the military and administration functions as its governor devolved upon Muḥammad Effendī who had by then accomplished his mission of procuring provisions and stores and securing the submission of Bahrayn. His rule is said to have been very cruel and harsh, due perhaps to exacting exorbitant taxes. His reign proved to be shortlived as he was killed in a conspiracy. He was proceeding one night in Sha'bān 1255 (September 1839) with five men from Qasr al-Kūt to Hufūf. At 'Ayn Najm, he was approached at close range by three horsemen who suddenly opened fire, killed him instantaneously and fled. Ahmad al-Sudayrī announced a reward of Riyals 500 for information leading to the culprits. The evidence incriminated Barghash and Mushrif al-'Uray'ir and Talāl, the three Banī Khālid chiefs whose request for a share in al-Hasā rule was turned down by Khurshīd. Ahmad imprisoned them. On the news of the murder, al-Fākhirī, the Egyptian commander in 'Ajman, rushed to al-Kūt. The Banī Khālid chiefs appeared to offer loyalty. He disarmed and imprisoned them but they were later released.⁷² In October 1839, Khurshīd sent another Muhammad Effendī with reinforcements as the new governor. His reign is also said to have been ^{one of} terror and cruelty. Perhaps on suspected involvement in the murder, Ahmad al-Sudayrī was replaced in November 1839, by the Jabal Shammar chief, 'Isā b. 'Alī, to head treasury.⁷³

As in the case of al-Hasā, Khurshīd sent for the chiefs and notables of Qatīf. 'Alī b. 'Abd al-Rahīm, Amīr of Sayhāt; Sa'd b. Ghānim, Amīr of Qatīf, the latter's brother and others went and offered their allegiance to Khurshīd. He then appointed a Kāshif, governor, with a force to keep peace. He later posted Abū Tāhir as the commander of his army in Qatīf.⁷⁴

Administration and Economic Policy

Except for a single case of highway robbery in Sudayr valley, Najd, by the Suhul Bedouins, which was soon dealt with properly by Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Sudayri, our sources (even the biased Su'udi chronicler, Ibn Bishr) mention no disturbance in Arabia in general and eastern Arabia in particular.⁷⁵ This indicates the peace that prevailed there.

Khurshid introduced most of the agricultural and economic practices prevalent in Egypt. To secure his army and animals with maximum local food-stuffs, he instructed his governors in Arabia to utilize every inch of commandable land in growing crops. Special attention was diverted to al-Hasa and Qatif, the granary of Arabia. He appointed his assistant, Hasan, to assess all crops from Qasim to al-Hasa, with the help of north African experts in his army, and to purchase half of all produce which was then collected at his headquarters at Tharmadah. He also introduced the Egyptian system of revenue and taxation. A sort of sales tax on all transactions of animals, grain and the like, another on professions, artisans and shops and an 'Ushr or Tithe were imposed and collected.⁷⁶

Bahrain and Qatar

By 1836, the al-Khalifah rulers, though nominal tributaries of the Su'udis, had reached the climax of their expansion by possessing Qatar peninsula, Sayhat and Dammam on and Tarut and Darin Islands off, the Qatif coast, besides the archipelago of Bahrain. Bahrain was much alarmed by the Egyptian progress in Najd. The British were eager to dominate it but their struggle with other European powers, the Turks, Persia, China and, to crown all, the external dangers to and the final wars in and around India did not

permit them to open another front here. The Imām of 'Umān had done his best since 1783 to rule Bahrayn. He had lately offered Muhammad 'Alī to conquer it for him. We are unaware of the latter's response to this but it positively did not find favour with the British. He then sought British accord to occupy it for their sake. To add to this, 'Abd Allāh's own maladministration and his sons' extortions even from the British agents and merchants resulted in a British expedition in 1834 to seek reparations. There was an Abū Zabī-supported Huwaylah revolt in Qatar in 1836 besides piracies in 1837 on the Qatīf coast. The Egyptian danger and the British anxiety and manoeuvres made matters even worse. 'Abd Allāh, however, succeeded in early 1839 to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Abū Zabī which obliged the Huwaylah Arabs to take asylum elsewhere.⁷⁷

It appears that eastern Arabia figured in Muhammad 'Alī's thoughts since long, though he was preoccupied by the Greek revolt. The British hoped he would settle for Greek tribute and a Syrian Pashalic for Ibrāhīm, rather than pressing for exterminating the Greeks. The Austrian Commissioner's advice to Muhammad 'Alī in April 1833 attempted to divert his energies "to establish a kingdom extending from Nubia in the south to Syria in the north with the Persian Gulf and the right bank of Euphrates river forming its eastern border." This in the Commissioner's view could be accomplished through negotiations with the tribal chiefs of Baghdād and of the Euphrates right bank areas, and of Arabia and the Imām of 'Umān. He further stressed that the British would be at a loss to oppose or frustrate such a plan.⁷⁸

Muhammad 'Alī's interests in the plan were highlighted by the end of the year when he sent one Syyed Khālid Effendī with messages to the Imām of 'Umān, the prince governor of Shīrāz and the Shaykhs of the Banī Ka'b and Muntafiq tribes of the lower 'Irāq, claiming that the Porte had conferred

upon Muhammad 'Alī the government of Baghdād and all areas on the west coast of the Persian Gulf and that the Pasha of Baghdād had consented to it. It was said to take effect from the end of 1250 A.H. (April 1835). When asked about this by Campbell, the British Consul General at Cairo, Muhammad 'Alī avoided a direct answer and told him that the people of 'Irāq had become very restive under Turkish rule and had approached his Syrian governor to occupy 'Irāq as well.⁷⁹ Bahrayn and the Straits of Hormuz are the two places from which relatively small forces can control both sides and all navigation of the Gulf. Consequently, Muhammad 'Alī sent Khālīd and Khurshīd one after the other to eastern Arabia to subdue it by negotiations or else by force.

Bahraynī-Egyptian Negotiations for Peace and British Reactions

It appears that, soon after the Khurshīd-Faysal accord of January 1838, Khurshīd took steps to execute Muhammad 'Alī's orders to subdue Bahrayn. He sent Muhammad Effendī who succeeded in persuading the Bahrayn ruler to submit. We are at a loss to trace the initial communications between the parties, but the following support our proposition:

(a) On May 21, 1838, Muhammad 'Alī assured Campbell that the whole of Arabia had yielded to him and that Faysal was willing to join hands in reducing 'Asir and Basrah. Only four days later, the Pasha told the British and French Consuls that he intended to declare himself independent of the Sultan.⁸⁰

(b) Khurshīd assured Muhammad 'Alī that the Bahrayn ruler had earlier undertaken to become the Egyptian vassal. This letter of April 7, 1839, recounted 'Abd Allāh's refusal to submit on Muhammad Effendī's visit of January 1839.⁸¹

(c) " 1839...These demands much alarmed Shaikh Abdoolla, who evaded compliance with them, as well as those previously made for tribute..."⁸²

(d) Khurshīd's letter to 'Abd Allāh of the 20th Jamāda I, 1254 (July 1838):

We have received your letter of the end of Safar 1224(sic), informing us of what had taken place between you and Muhammad Efendī regarding Su'ūd, Turkī and Faysal, and that you and Turkī agreed to pay 3000 dollars for the Zakāt of Al-Bahrein. It is not a question of money at all, and we are quite agreeable to your offer. The money is needed only for repairs and public works. As regards the Persian and English, they had nothing to do with our agreement. As to Sayyid ibn Sultān the Imām of Mascat, he is a friend of Efendīna and when he has been informed of our agreement with you he will not interfere. You need not worry at all about this. Muhammad Efendī our deputy will make the necessary agreements.⁸³

This establishes that 'Abd Allāh was contacted at the latest by Safar 1254 (April 1838), exactly one year before 'Abd Allāh signed the treaty of 23 Safar 1255(May 7, 1839). Five factors might have contributed to this delay:

- (a) Intervening revival of the Khurshīd-Faysal hostilities,
- (b) Khurshīd might have been too much pre-occupied to send his envoy again,
- (c) The route to Bahrayn was in enemy hands and thus unsafe,
- (d) 'Abd Allāh might have set the Najd conquest a condition precedent to his submission, or (e) 'Abd Allāh might have succumbed to Baghdād and British pressure against his submission, as pointed out in the above letter.

Khālid Effendī's visit and subsequent Egyptian march in Najd had alarmed the British representatives at Baghdad and Abūshahr. They informed their government that the Egyptians were about to cross the peninsula to occupy Bahrayn. Without waiting for government instructions Hennell, the Abūshahr Resident, hastened to the coastal chiefs and Bahrayn to sound them out. 'Abd Allāh, who was much alarmed, asked Hennell for a firm assurance to aid and defend Bahrayn in case of an Egyptian attack. On Hennell's evasive reply, 'Abd Allāh stressed sending a member of his family to wait on Khurshīd. On Hennell's response to use his own best judgement and wisdom,

'Abd Allāh lost all hope of British support.⁸⁴

Because of the renewed war with Faysal, the resultant insecurity of the Bahrayn route and the preoccupation of Khurshīd and Rif'at in Najd, it appears that Khurshīd could not send his letter of July 1838 to 'Abd Allāh, of whose submission he was certain. Before sending Muhammad Effendī with the treaty for 'Abd Allāh's signatures, Khurshīd sent his physician, Artón, to inform Hennell that Khurshīd intended to reduce Bahrayn, explaining:

Many traders are connected with the English and that a great part are agents of British merchants, I have considered it my duty to communicate ...in order that these merchants may be made aware... not wishing that... they should sustain any loss... I hope that from the moment this Island submits... many more advantages will be derived by these merchants and the English government itself.⁸⁵

On the fall of Dilam, Muhammad Effendī set out with a contingent, took possession of al-Hasā, visited 'Uqayr and Qatīf, collected necessary data and sailed to Bahrayn in January 1839. It will be in order to quote from him:

Item 5. We stayed in the Island for seven days and I knew for certain that a representative of the commander appointed by the Shah of Persia in Bandar Abū Shīr had visited the Island and also a representative from Baghdād carrying messages for 'Abdallāh ibn Ahmad to persuade him not to come to an agreement with us. I saw these representatives myself, and I asked 'Abdallāh and his clan Banī 'Utba, whether they were under the government of Najd before and they admitted that they had been. They admitted that they had been under the rule of Su'ūd, 'Abdallāh, Turkī and Faysal, but they said that those were Arabs like themselves and that up to that day they had not come under any non-Arab rule. They said that they had always been independent, that the sea separated them from us and that with their ships they would be able to fight us.

Item 6. I saw in Bahrein many criminals who were in Al Hasā before, among them were 'Umar ibn 'Ufaysān, and the former governor of Qatīf, Muhammad ibn Saif Al 'Ajjāji, and the adherents of Faysal, totalling between 300 and 400 who had escaped earlier...

Item 7. ...Its subjection to our rule will put an end to all the misdeeds. It will also help to revive the ports of Al Hasā and Qatīf. This, in its turn, (will) benefit and profit the Egyptian civil and military interests in Najd.⁸⁶

'Abd Allāh is said to have tried to buy off Muhammad with a sum of \$ M.T. 13,000, failing which he declared himself a Persian subject and refused to yield to Egyptian demands comprising return of Tarūt Islands, Dammām and other Qatīf coast areas, all fugitives and properties of the mainland and the despatch of 'Abd Allāh's sons to Khurshīd. Failing in his Bahrayn mission, Muhammad returned to Qatīf, sent his report to Khurshīd and set out on the fourth leg of his mission of purchasing grain and provisions for the army.⁸⁷

Transmitting the report to Cairo, Khurshīd stressed the necessity of capturing Bahrayn once more on the grounds of setting at rest the intrigues of Baghdād and the fugitives and using it as the port of al-Hasā and Qatīf.⁸⁸

Contrary to the alarm of British officers in the Gulf, Campbell at Cairo (allegedly on Muhammad 'Alī's assurance not to extend his influence farther east) asserted to London that Muhammad 'Alī's word could not be doubted. Lord Palmerston was therefore constrained to reprimand and direct Campbell to ascertain the Pasha's plans and to seek a clear explanation about the fears expressed by the Gulf Residents and to interdict him from any further advance. This letter apparently prompted Muhammad 'Alī to direct Khurshīd to abandon the plans of capturing Bahrayn by himself and leave the matter in Khalīd's hands who would manoeuvre submission according to Muhammad 'Alī's initial instructions.⁸⁹ However, by the time of the receipt of these instructions, Bahrayn had finally yielded.

The government of India approved the directions of Bombay government to Hennell "to exert his influence to check further encroachment", and instructed to apprise Maitland, the commander-in-chief of the Indian Navy

already visiting the Gulf, of the situation. Furthermore:

The admiral was authorized strongly to use his influence to deter them from such an attempt, and in the event of their persisting in their designs, and the government of Bahrein inviting or calling for his assistance, to afford that government every encouragement to resistance and all support short of placing himself in actual collision with the Egyptian authorities.

The Government of India would not, in the absence of specific instructions from time(sic) authorize more decisive measures, felt satisfied that the expression of wishes of the British commander and the exhibition of naval strength would for the moment have all the effect which could be desired in regard to the Island of Bahrein.....

The Governor General was not disposed at the time to enter into any new engagements with the chief of Bahrein; but in the event of such engagement being tendered, the Admiral was desired so far to encourage his proposals as to transmit them for the consideration and orders of the Government of India.

Transmitting the above instructions of March 13, 1839, the government of Bombay complemented them on April 1, by directing Hennell " to strongly remonstrate with the Egyptian commander against preserving in his designs ".⁹⁰

Hennell was already trying his best to check Khurshid's advance . In reply to Khurshid's letter, Hennell advised him that any hostile action would probably be viewed with concern, that Bahrayn was a signatory of the General Treaty of Peace of 1820, that he needed time to receive Bombay instructions and that in the case of an attack on Bahrayn, Khurshid should warn him well in advance to enable Hennell to send the Gulf squadron for the protection of life and property of British subjects there.⁹¹

Learning of Palmerston's letter to Campbell to remonstrate with Muhammad 'Ali, the Governor General upheld his previous directions and added:

In the event however of the chief of Bahrein having, as Capt. Hennell anticipates, claimed our interposition and offered to place the Island

under British protection, the Governor General will authorize Sir Fredrick Maitland to assure him of the temporary protection of Her Majesty's squadron in the Gulf and to intimate to Khorshed Pasha that he has done so and that it will be incumbent on that General to abstain from further military proceedings till both officers shall have time to receive orders from their respective governments....If it should fail and Khorshed Pasha should persist in his design, Admiral Maitland will be justified in declaring that the Egyptian General, if he attempts to cross over to the Island of Bahrein, must hold himself responsible for commencing hostilities against the British government whose officers are empowered to defend Bahrein against his invasion... After this declaration the Admiral must exercise his discretion as to the most expedient method to be adopted for the defence of Bahrein.⁹²

It may be pointed out here that the Indian instructions of March and April, cited above, were too late and perhaps inadequate for Bahrayn.

'Abd Allāh expressed anxiety about an apprehended Egyptian-Masqatī attack in May 1837; but he received little support during the next two years. The British government was perhaps confused about the prevailing situation and was indecisive about which alternative would best suit its interests in view of the important and delicate international situation, which was its first concern. It was in fact a very difficult time for the British government; but for petty Bahrayn, with so many claimants, it was too much. 'Abd Allāh's promise, about April 1838, to pay tribute to the new Najd rulers was withdrawn due to pressure from Baghdād, the British and Persians. In view of an imminent danger of attack from the nearest and seemingly the strongest and more resolute power in the area, the Egyptians, Bahrayn could not wait indefinitely. Three months had further elapsed since 'Abd Allāh sought a definite British pledge for support. Hennell was still without clear orders except "to exert his influence". Before the Indian instructions could reach Hennell, 'Abd Allāh had made his final decision.

After delivering Hennell's reply for Khurshid at Qatif in March 1839, Hennell's assistant, Edmunds, sailed to Bahrayn. He surprisingly found 'Abd Allah unperturbed, claiming that he could resist the Egyptians for a year, though he wished the British to stop Khurshid's further advance. 'Abd Allah added that he did not want to ally himself with the Egyptians who wanted Bahrayn as a base for their expansion to 'Iraq but, to buy peace, he had offered them a trifling annual tribute of \$ 3,000. Similarly, before receiving the Indian letters, Maitland stressed an early demonstration of British might, since his fleet had to leave the area for reprovisioning by the end of April. Consequently on April 22, Maitland was met on board his fleet off Bahrayn by 'Abd Allah's two sons, who informed him of 'Abd Allah's absence in Qatar and of there being no new developments after Edmunds' visit a month earlier; also, there was no apprehension of fresh Egyptian demands. Maitland noticed that Bahrayn had taken no defence measures.⁹³

The Egyptian-Bahrayn Treaty of 1839

One is led to an inescapable conclusion by these two visits that, some time after Muhammad's departure in January but before Edmunds' visit of March, 'Abd Allah had reconsidered the repercussions of rejecting Egyptian Supremacy and the advisability of patching things with Khurshid, and that soon after the removal of Baghdadi and other pressure, he might have sent his sons, as desired, to wait on Khurshid and to offer their allegiance to the new Najd rulers. It is also possible that 'Abd Allah had himself gone to see Khurshid at the time of Maitland's visit off Bahrayn.

In any event, as soon as Muhammad Effendi returned after his purchases he was ordered to proceed to Bahrayn. Whether convinced by the force of Muhammad's arguments or forced by the incontrovertible demands and invincible

atleast for him, strength of the Egyptians. 'Abd Allāh finally submitted to the latter alleging that the British were non-Muslims while the Persians were Rāfidīs. Peace was thus established and a formal Treaty was signed by 'Abd Allāh on May 7, 1839 (23 Safar 1255) when he was handed down the part already signed by Khurshīd. It had the following main clauses:

1. Shaykh 'Abd Allāh b. Ahmad, the Shaykh of Bahrayn agrees to pay an annual tribute (Zakāt) to the government of Najd.
2. He agrees to be a friend of Muhammad 'Alī's friends and enemy to his enemies.
3. He would give Muhammad 'Alī's army every aid to facilitate the transport of soldiers in the case of any Egyptian expedition to places such as 'Uman or Basrah, by supplying transport ships.
4. If any of Muhammad 'Alī's subjects, fugitive from justice or escaping from government payments, fled to Bahrayn, he would return them to Najd, and that the Egyptians would do the same in the case of the Bahrayn subjects.
5. An Egyptian agent will reside in Bahrayn to execute Muhammad 'Alī's orders.⁹⁴

Almost simultaneously, 'Abd Allāh wrote Khurshīd a letter as follows:

I have received your letter you sent by Muhammad Efendi.....I herewith declare that peace has been established between us through Muhammad Efendi, your representative. We agree that your enemies are our enemies, your friends are our friends, and that you would do for us what we would do for you. We shall pay you the Zakāt as mentioned in the paper which we signed, in exchange for the paper which we received, signed by your name.⁹⁵

Khurshīd soon informed Hennell of the Treaty. He visited Bahrayn, met 'Abd Allāh, satisfied himself of the fact and asked him the cause of his "so readily accepting the supremacy of Muhammad 'Alī". There was a long discussion with arguments, counter arguments and even warnings, about which it is not necessary to elaborate here. A part of his report to Bombay is as follows:

The impression I have received from this interview is, that Shaik Abdoolah being now advanced in years is unwilling to be placed in any situation calling for active and personal exertion, and that to avoid this he is prepared to make considerable sacrifices. He is evidently overawed by the almost invariable success which has hitherto attended the intrigues and military operations of Khorshed Pasha.... I am inclined to think he is doubtful whether the English could cope with the Pasha prosperously by land, however, superior they may be by sea....

... In concluding the subject of Bahrein I have only to observe that the tone of my conversation and the terror of my protest have made Shaik Abdoolah aware that I consider he has placed himself in a somewhat ambiguous position with reference to us. It must however remain for the government to decide whether it is advisable to detach him altogether from the Egyptians by giving him the written pledge of protection he asks.⁹⁶

It thus appears that Hennell tried to justify or excuse the Shaykh's action to some extent. 'Abd Allāh had, however, to pay the price of this submission. "The possibility of his being displaced by a more favourably disposed Shaikh was discussed with equanimity by the Secret Committee of the Directors of the East India Company". A struggle of discontented members of his tribe, which was aided by the British who also permitted 'Isā b. Tarif of Huwaylah tribe and Bishr b. Rahmah al-Jalāhimah to join and help the opponents of 'Abd Allāh, culminated in 'Abd Allāh's expulsion and ^{the} rise to power of Muhammad b. Khalī-fah, the former's grand nephew, in April 1843.⁹⁷

After the Khurshīd-'Abd Allāh Treaty of 1839, the Nu'aym tribe of Qatar refused to pay Zakāt to Bahrayn in early 1840. To subdue them as well as their kin of Buraymī, an Egyptian expedition was sent from Hufūf. It was gaining ground when the murder of Muhammad Effendī, the governor of al-Hasā, necessitated its recall prematurely.⁹⁸

Kuwayt

Khurshid's mission demanded complete submission of Arabia, a necessary corollary of which was Baghdad with Kuwayt as its land and sea route. Kuwayt and Bahrayn had considerable and well-equipped naval fleets besides good defensive and offensive points, provisions and facilities. With a hold over them, the Egyptians could control not only the Gulf area but also the trade and traffic of east and west. Kuwayt families, who had relatives in Zubayr and Basrah, could further serve as conduits to help secure not only reconnaissance but also the submission of the area. Certain Basrah elements were rendering military services to the Egyptians. One Muhammad Agha al-Muradi of Basrah with 1,000 fighting men was eager to join Khurshid but, due to transport problems, arrived at Kuwayt with seventy men, and joined Muhammad Effendi in purchasing grain and provisions. Shaykh Jabir of Kuwayt refused to comply with the Basrah demand to repatriate them. After the purchases they accompanied Muhammad to Tharmadah and joined Khurshid's army.⁹⁹

The British viewed that the real functions of Khurshid's agent at Kuwayt were political, rather than provisioning, and that he was given a distinctive honour and a seat beside the Amir, in his court. The Amir had always been very courteous and friendly with the British. However in 1839, when Edmunds came to sound him out against the Egyptians and to arrange a British mail route across the desert to ^{the} Mediterranean, he was shown a marked discourtesy by the failure to return the British vessel's salute. He was not taken care of for three days. When at last an interview was granted, Edmunds met with further discourtesy, neglect and estrangement. Edmunds attributed this unusual conduct to Jabir's "believing Muhammad 'Ali to be the greatest potentate on earth". Agreeing with Edmunds' report, Hennell observed:

Shaik Jabir, like the ruler of Bahrein, appears completely overawed by the extra-ordinary success attending Mahomed Aliy's measures and evidently possesses but a very inadequate idea of the power of Great Britain..... If any one of the chiefs of this Gulf deserves more than another to be deprived of the advantage of our protection, it is the Shaik of Bahrein.

These views and recommendations were approved by the India government and the Court of Directors at London.¹⁰⁰

Trucial 'Umān

In order to stop hostilities during the pearl season, Hennell arranged the Maritime Truce of 1835 among the Trucial chiefs and a Restrictive Line, in 1836, within which no warfare was permissible. Then in 1838-9 the British secured from them the treaties for the Suppression of the slave trade, under which the British had the right to detain, search, seize and confiscate vessels and the property involved.¹⁰¹ Thus the British influence in the region during this period was growing steadily.

After the fall of Dilam, Khurshid lost no time in taking control of the 'Umān coast. In March 1836 Faysal had sent Sa'd b. Mutlaq to reduce Buraymī and Suhār. He joined Faysal in the Najd war, after which he surrendered to Khurshid who commissioned him to 'Umān. Sailing from Qatif with 150 troops he arrived at Shāriqah in March 1839. Sultān b. Saqar welcomed and provided him with a fort for his army and a respectable quarter for his residence. Sa'd's mission was to reconquer Buraymī from the Nu'aym tribe. Rulers of Abū Zabī and Shāriqah promised him help, each eager to become more favoured by the new masters, the Egyptians. With Sa'd's establishment on the 'Umān coast, the British became more anxious to see the end of the Egyptian rule in eastern Arabia. Muhammad 'Alī had assured Campbell that the expedition would

not extend to the Gulf coast. The latter tried in vain to allay London's fears. His counterparts at Baghdād and Abūshahr, on the other hand, were assuring their government that the Egyptians were "about to cross the peninsula". On the report of the Abūshahr Resident to Bombay about the threat to Bahrayn and 'Umān, he was advised in February 1839 to exert his influence to check further encroachments. When the news of Sa'd's arrival at Shāriqah reached Abūshahr, Maitland was already visiting the Gulf. Without waiting for Bombay's instructions Hennell persuaded Maitland to tour the area with Edmunds to exhibit British might to the Trucial chiefs, each of whom solemnly undertook to oppose and sever connections with Sa'd.¹⁰²

A three way struggle was going on. The English and the Egyptians were trying to appease each other while endeavouring to win the chiefs, each of whom was equally eager to placate and win the favours of these powers. The chiefs were overawed and more inclined towards Egypt but made efforts not to offend the British. Sultān's act of welcoming Sa'd was dictated by internal politics as well, that is, not allowing the Abū Zabī ruler, his foremost enemy, to win Sa'd's favour. But to Maitland Sultān expressed his dismay on Sa'd's arrival. We have already recounted the instructions of the government of India to Hennell and Maitland regarding the region. The line of action adopted by the Governor General was necessitated by the constrained world situation. The British commitments and ventures in Afghanistan, Persia, Aden, and within India, with an added altercation with China, demanded many more troops, vessels and financial resources than which the India government could actually muster and sustain. Consequently Auckland could not venture another front in the Gulf on a relatively lesser matter. As for the London government, it was much involved in the European struggle for supremacy, in America and with the Turks. It had expressed its inability to aid India.¹⁰³

Though Sa'd failed to subdue the Nu'aym of Buraymī, despite Sultān's support and mediation, Maitland's visit left little effect on the coast itself. By the end of June 1839, Hennell learnt of the continued coastal support to Sa'd who was claiming himself not only an agent of Khālīd b. Su'ūd but also an appointed governor for the 'Umān coast and Buraymī, having no intention to depart. Hennell was further alarmed and feared Bahrayn's fate for the coast. Hennell sailed on the modern armed steamer, "Hugh Lindsay", to Bahrayn, as stated in the Bahrayn account above. He then visited Abū Zabī on July 1, 1839. Its chief, Khalīfah, denied any connection with Sa'd and gave a written pledge to resist any Egyptian move and to remain under British influence. Hennell received similar pledges from Dubay and Um al-Qaywayn on his visits. At Shāriqah Hennell learnt of Khurshīd's recent message promising early Najd reinforcements to Sa'd and of Sultān's staunch support to Sa'd. At Rās al-Khaymah on July 3, 1839, however, Sultān stressed on Sa'd's intimate connections with Khalīfah and his own apprehensions of some Sa'd-Khalīfah intrigue against him. He showed an intercepted letter from Khalīfah to Sa'd promising openly to place Abū Zabī resources at Sa'd's disposal. On Sultān's request, Hennell gave Sultān a written order to expel Sa'd and another on his own addressed to Sa'd directing him to depart from the coast and to stop interfering with the Nu'aym who had allegedly come under British protection. Sultān's pledge, as those of other chiefs, had added clauses not to enter into any agreement or negotiations with any other power without British consent and to consider the friends and foes of the British as his own. Sultān was given in return a verbal promise of a supply of arms in case of any confrontation with the Egyptians. A written pledge was made conditional on Sa'd's departure. In his report to Bombay government Hennell remarked:

I feel quite assured that Shaik Sultan b. Suggur at the present

moment is sincere in the professions and promises he has made to me, and I think it likely he will take immediate steps to induce Sued bin Mootluk to quit his territory, in which object, aided as he will be by the support and wishes of the Shaiks of the neighbouring districts, he will probably be successful. But the character of the Joasmee chief is so hollow and faithless, and at the same time, so vacillating that it would not very much surprise me to find him again changing his intentions and policy.

However this may be, I entertain every hope that I have succeeded in giving a check; at least for the present, to the intrigues of Sued bin Mootluk, . . . , by having infused confidence and courage into those disposed to uphold their connexion with the British. . . . I consider it however my duty to explicitly lay before the government my opinion that this favourable reaction is not likely to be permanent, unless supported by firm and decided measures by the Indian and Home authorities. The report of Ibrahim Pasha being successful in his impending conflict with the Sultan - the arrival of reinforcements in Oman either by land or sea from Khorshed Pasha or the return of Sued bin Mootluk (supposing him now removed) with a larger and better equipped body of troops - all or any one of these not improbable contingencies would be sufficient to turn the scale, and give the final blow to our already unsettled influence in these parts. Previously. . . it was my opinion, as expressed in a late communication to the Hon'ble the Secret Committee, that the only effectual check to the encroachments of Mahomed Ally, in this direction, could be given by H.M.'s ministers making serious and peremptory remonstrances to Cairo. I am, however, inclined now to think that this alone will not be sufficient, unless some demonstration be likewise made by the Indian in this side. . . . I would most respectfully suggest for consideration that in the event of Shaik Sultan bin Suggur not removing Sued bin Mootluk voluntarily, . . . he should be forced to expel him, and supported by our naval and military means . . . The naval force in the Gulf should be sufficiently increased . . . and at the same time to keep two vessels of war cruising off the Arabian Coast until the present crisis be past. In the event of Sued bin Mootluk's return to Katif and Khorshed Pasha again preparing to despatch him by sea, with a larger force to the coast of Oman, authority should be given to blockade that port as well as those of Ajeer and Lohat. If these measures were authorized, and at the

same time an explicit intimation given to Mahomed Ally by H.M.'s government that he would be held responsible for any loss of life which might arise from carrying them into operation; it/ I venture to think, at once put an end to the temporizing policy he has so long successfully pursued, and by compelling him to issue peremptory orders for the withdrawal of his troops and agents ... and thus establish the influence and reputation of Great Britain in this part of the world....¹⁰⁴

At Masqat, the Imām told Hennell of having received a letter from Sa'd with Khurshid's letter asking the Imām to extend every assistance to Sa'd who was described therein as Khurshid's governor for the 'Umān coast and Buraymī. These efforts of Hennell did not achieve much because soon after that Abu Zabī attacked Nu'aym. Shāriqah and Dubay likewise did not abide by their commitments. However, Hennell's action was strongly endorsed but his requests for military and naval aid, naval increase or cruises were refused due to the inability then of the government to afford while his promises to Buraymī and Sultan were disapproved.¹⁰⁵

In early August 1839, Sa'd sailed with his troops to 'Uqayr ostensibly to return with more reinforcements. Sultan is said to have assured Sa'd of joining him and placing all Sultan's resources at Sa'd's disposal upon his return with reinforcements. It is also said that Sa'd was distrusted and kept under surveillance although he remained in constant contact with the coastal chiefs. Many intercepted letters pointed to his promise to return with a new army. Another letter from the Shāriqah chief to Sa'd condemned the Nu'aym. Some letters from Khālid and Khurshid were also intercepted. Landing at 'Uqayr, Sa'd proceeded straight to Khurshid and was well received.¹⁰⁶

Egyptian Withdrawal from Eastern Arabia

A change in the Egyptian position was to begin unexpectedly and suddenly, for in April 1840 Khurshid received instructions from Egypt to return immediately with most of his army. His anxiety and amazement were great for he had been lately begging for permission to march on 'Iraq. Once more he begged his master to review his orders and grant him leave to stay in Arabia and capture 'Iraq. Nevertheless, he hastened to appoint Hamad b. Mubarik, the Huraymalā chief, as governor of al-Hasā instead of Muhammad Effendī. A year after Khurshid's departure, however, Khālid b. Su'ūd replaced Hamad by Mūsā al-Hamālī as governor while 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Mānī' succeeded 'Isā b. 'Alī, since deceased, as head of treasury, perhaps, to win Banī Khālid support, as both incumbents were Banī Khālid chiefs.¹⁰⁷

Reverting to the recall order, Khurshid began the process of withdrawing his troops from their positions in eastern Arabia. He ordered them, in the first instance, to regroup at Tharmadah, carrying with them the stores, provisions, camels and horses. He requisitioned more camels and horses from Arab chiefs for the transport. Eastern Arabia, being the farthest possession, was evacuated first and immediately. In May 1840, he marched with some of the troops to Shanānah while the remainder joined him in mid-July. He summoned Khālid there for a final meeting in August, soon after which he left for Cairo. A total of 800 Egyptians with 20 at Tharmadah were left in eastern Arabia and Najd to support Khālid. The last act that the Egyptians performed before their departure from al-Hasā was the execution of Barghash al-'Uray'ir, believed to be the killer of Muhammad Effendī.¹⁰⁸ Khurshid expected four Egyptian military vessels full of military stores, provisions and reinforcements from the Red Sea on the al-Hasā coast. Eventually only one ill-supplied Kuwait

Ghunchah, with ammunition, arrived in November 1839 with " news of 18-20 vessels carrying men and arms to follow".¹⁰⁹ This sudden change in Muhammad 'Ali's plans was necessitated by the European pressure which, along with other reasons of recall, we propose to study in the next chapter.

Khālid b. Su'ūd, who was left in charge of Najd and eastern Arabia, visited al-Hasā coast in October 1841, ostensibly to send an expedition to 'Uman. New trouble in Najd, however, obliged him to hasten to Riyād which was threatened by his cousin, 'Abd Allāh b. Thunayyān. By the end of 1841 Khālid was finally expelled from Riyād with his Egyptian army. The al-Hasā chiefs were already negotiating peace with 'Abd Allāh. So he arrived at Qatīf. It seems that Khālid attributed the estrangement of the chiefs and the people to his foreign army. Under the pretext of bringing aid for another offensive, Khālid deserted his Egyptian troops and sought refuge at Dammām with its governor, Shaykh Mubārīk, Bahrayn ruler's son. On Khālid's visit with the ruler at Khōr Hasan, he was assured help to recover Qatīf. After initial successes in al-Hasā and Qatīf, Mubārīk's army was finally repulsed. Khālid then left for Kuwayt and later to Makkah where he died.¹¹⁰

It would be advantageous to note British reaction to the Egyptian withdrawal from eastern Arabia:

Just when the blockade of Katif and Ojeer, held by the Egyptian troops, began seriously to be contemplated by the British government, intelligence was received (May 1840) that Iahsa had been evacuated, and that the main body of Egyptian troops had actually left Najd; which being corroborated by the declaration shortly before made by Mahomed Ali..... rendered the adoption of this measure un-necessary. The grossly oppressive and extortionate conduct of the Pasha and his agent further afforded a plausible reason for the belief that the Egyptians no longer contemplated the permanent occupation of Arabia.¹¹¹

CHAPTER IV

REASONS FOR THE RECALL OF THE EXPEDITION

Different writers have given several reasons to explain why the Egyptian expedition was finally withdrawn from eastern Arabia. Since we do not find ourselves in total agreement with some of these reasons, it is our intention to discuss them here and then to see which of them seem most valid and plausible. We will suggest more cogent reasons towards the end of the chapter. It will be useful to divide the reasons into two groups:

A. Mediate or General and B. Immediate or Direct

A. GENERAL REASONS

I. Administrative and Economic Problems

For the recall of the first Egyptian expedition to eastern Arabia, Capt. Sadleir has given the following reasons:¹

The Pacha appears to have found that his troops were too widely extended; that the difficulty of keeping open extended communications in a country which is for the most part a desert would require a large force, to meet the expenses of which the revenues are insufficient, and that little dependence could be placed on the fidelity of the Bedouin tribes.

If these problems contributed to the recall of 1818-19 expedition, they could as well contribute to that of 1836-40, because the troops continued to be as widely extended, the communications as difficult and the local resources

as insufficient. Had this been the case, Muhammad 'Alī would never have wasted his energies, resources and troops a second time after his own Hijāz experience. Hence in our view these factors did not contribute to any recall. His army did meet with local hostility and increasing audacity of marauding Bedouins during the early period; but many tribes were pacified by the time the Egyptians reached eastern Arabia. The Banī Khālid and the Sayāsib of al-Hasā joined Ibrāhīm and Khurshīd even in their Najd wars. The Banī Khālid, Bahrayn and the 'Uman coast chiefs were not consenting parties to submission. Once the Su'ūdī power was broken, most of the tribes, as well as some of the Su'ūdī princes joined the Egyptians. Moreover, a military expedition presupposes problems of local hostility, sacrifices and risks before any gains. This one was not mounted for economic gains but politico-religious reasons.

Lorimer has given some additional reasons which are as follows:²

- a. Khurshīd expected four armed vessels full of military stores from the Red sea but received only one Kuwait boat bringing a single cargo.
- b. It became clear to Muhammad 'Alī that the British would not permit the reduction of Bahrayn, perhaps his main object in the Gulf.
- c. Muhammad 'Alī regarded Khurshīd's successes with jealousy and dislike.
- d. The blockade of Qatīf, 'Uqayr and Sayhāt was being seriously contemplated by the British government.

Since some sort of administrative questions are involved in the first three, we will discuss them under this sub-head.

As for the expected arrival of four armed vessels with military stores on the al-Hasā coast, we would point out that they were needed for Khurshīd's march on 'Irāq or to the south. He had no problems in eastern Arabia, the whole of which submitted without any use of force soon after the fall of Najd. It appears that Muhammad 'Alī changed his plans to conquer 'Irāq under the

altered situation. Besides this, Bahrayn undertook to put its naval fleet in the Egyptian service in the event of an attack on 'Irāq or 'Umān.³ So there was no need of the diminished supplies to compel recall.

As for the second ground, the signing of the treaty with Bahrayn makes this ground infructuous. The British then had no better title to Bahrayn. Khurshīd was recalled in May 1840, a year after the treaty.

Coming to Muhammad 'Alī's alleged jealousy and dislike towards Khurshīd, we would point out that Khurshīd was well aware of his master's plans of reducing not only eastern Arabia but 'Irāq as well. He was entrusted with the task because of Muhammad 'Alī's faith in him and we find no hint of diminishing confidence in him. The zeal and astuteness with which he accomplished the conquest of eastern Arabia bear witness to it.⁴ In any event Muhammad 'Alī was at liberty to replace him by another general. Lorimer's assumption may be based on the apparent contradiction of Muhammad 'Alī's assurance to Campbell of non-interference in areas of British interest, while Khurshīd marched in just such areas. However, this can readily be explained as part of Egypt's temporizing policy. But in our view, the lack of or delay in reaching explicit directions of Muhammad 'Alī overriding the initial orders might have kept Khurshīd as much anxious to subdue ^{the} whole of eastern Arabia and 'Irāq as Ibrāhīm in Syria to possess all Turkish areas as soon as possible.

2. Contemplated Blockade of Qatīf, Sayhāt and 'Uqayr

The claim that the British planned a blockade of east Arabian ports is baseless and unfounded. The only hint that can be traced is contained in Hennell's request to the Bombay Government to permit blockade of these ports

in the event of Sa'd b. Mutlaq's departure from and later return with more reinforcements and naval force to the 'Uman coast. We have reproduced this and other requests of Hennell in the last chapter.⁵ During this period the Court of Directors at London directed the Indian Government

to follow a cautious but determined policy in counteracting the Egyptian designs in the Persian Gulf without coming ... to serious aggressive measures...

While the Secret Committee observed, " Preservation of these places....(we) leave to your discretion,... to adopt measures... from your means...".

The Governor General on his part eventually informed the Bombay governor on January 13, 1840, " Due to other engagements of Indian Navy in Indian Seas more naval aid from the British Navy will be necessary for special service in the Persian Gulf...". Finally it should be stated that all of Hennell's requests were turned down, as Auckland and Maitland indicated their inability to help Hennell. The Governor observed, " ... with our present means we must rest quiet".⁶ Similarly the British Foreign office warned its Baghdad Resident not to promise aid to Baghdad in the event of Egyptian attack since the British had no means. Only a protest against the Egyptian occupation was authorized. It may be stated that the Indian Navy fleet had sailed in November 1839 to the Far East due to the breakdown of Sino-British relations. As for the local strength, there were only two small vessels for guarding Kharij and Abushahr, Hennell had requested for two more vessels for local station duties but failed.⁷

3. Muhammad 'Ali's Rupture with the Sultan

For the first twenty years, inspite of his ambitions for Syria, Muhammad 'Ali scrupulously obeyed the commands of the Sultan in liberating

the Holy Cities, reducing Arabia and the Sudan and suppressing the Greek revolts. Muhammad 'Ali was enchanted by the military strength and naval supremacy of England and France and strove to ally himself with both or either of them. The latter however did not eye his Greek expedition with satisfaction. He was therefore lured to neutrality in the Greek war when the Greek rebels, despite outside aid, were almost crushed. Despite ^{the} Sultan's repeated orders to deal a final blow to the Greeks and the grant of exclusive control of the war, Muhammad 'Ali's army and navy deployed there remained inactive for over two years. This resulted in the independence of Morea.⁸

Though his rupture with the Sultan was not yet apparent, he had already become a puppet in British and French hands. He was almost involved in an attack on Barbary Africa by the French when the British sensed dangers to their India routes and in Muhammad 'Ali's becoming a French stooge. The British were also resolved to maintain a weak Turkish empire instead of letting it be apportioned by Egypt, Russia, Austria and France and endangering their Asian interests. He was therefore led to march on Syria, in October 1831. Ibrāhīm captured Acre, Damascus, Homs, Aleppo and Beylan pass, in succession, by July 1832. He advocated march on Istanbul but his father disagreed in the hope of European sponsored recognition of his autonomy. This was a clear rupture with the Sultan. However neither the belligerents nor the Europeans were happy. De facto he was a ruler, de jure he was a vassal or rather a traitor, liable to be routed and executed whenever the Sultan or the big powers could or wished.⁹ In his endeavour to buy British and French amity he converted himself from the Liberator of Holy Cities and pillar of the Empire to a rebel, a usurper and an enemy of the entire Muslim world. This had to affect his future career.

It should be remembered that while Khurshid was pushing his forces

eastward in Arabia to reach the shores of the Persian Gulf, Ibrāhīm was in control of Syria and Asia Minor. The Sultan's mere existence was therefore at stake. Though this is not the place to discuss the European intervention on behalf of the Sultan against Muhammad 'Alī in Asia Minor and Syria, it became evidently clear to the latter that he had been subjected to a conspiracy which aimed at his downfall. He had therefore to take the hard decision of pulling his forces out of Arabia before losing them.

4. Conflict of British and Egyptian Interests

The paramount British ambition had constantly been professed since the Elizabethan era to be the greatest trading nation, which depended on its political supremacy and the smooth flow of trade. Its trade route to India via the Cape of Good Hope involved about five months. A second route through Alexandria, Suez and Mokha was shorter and easier, while the ancient route through Syria, 'Iraq and the Persian Gulf was the shortest. It could also serve to control Turkish and Egyptian influences and the Russian march to the south, especially to India. The British were therefore exploring the navigability of the Euphrates river for a regular steamer service.

For their expansionist designs the British had to use the same diplomacy in the Turkish Empire which they had been resolutely using in India since the 18th century, that is, playing off one local ruler against the other to facilitate British take over at the opportune time. Any dismemberment of "the Sick Man of Europe", before ridding British rivals, could only convert the Adriatic Sea into an Austrian lake and Istanbul into a Russian port, would shake the status quo in Europe, and could result in threatening British Suez and Euphrates routes to India. However that sudden

change took place with the rise of Muhammad 'Alī, who attached as much importance to these routes. It thus seemed likely that the British and Egyptian interests in the area would clash. He also apprehended British occupation of the Euphrates region and a drastic fall of his revenues with the disuse of the Red Sea route. He therefore employed tactics to frustrate British designs.

Another sharper clash occurred in the Yaman when the revolt of some Albanian officers (headed by Turki Bilmez) culminated in the Egyptian expedition of 1833-40. This amounted to a direct threat to British trade and navigation and placed Egypt in a stronger position to control Bab al-Mandab at the southern end of the Red Sea. It may be recalled that the defeated rebels took asylum in a British warship in 1834, and that not too much later the British, despite Egyptian protests, occupied Aden on January 18, 1839.¹⁰ Each of them was trying to placate the other, while remaining wary. However, the British made it very clear to Muhammad 'Alī that the Red Sea and the Gulf were a concern of England alone while the Syrian question involved all great powers.¹¹ It thus became clear that the British wanted to reduce Muhammad 'Alī's presence not only in eastern Arabia and the Gulf but also in the Red Sea and southern Arabia. This added to the pressure on him to recall his army.

5. "Ill Timed Moves Accompanied by Unfortunate Events"

Dodwell goes into some detail to suggest Muhammad 'Alī's alliance with India, Persia, Russia, the Sultan and France against England ostensibly to liberate the Muslim world as follows.¹² At about the same time British relations with Persia had been strained to the point of collision, which did not take place due to the former's inability to spare forces for an outright

war. Dodwell points out that Persia contemplated in 1835 sending an envoy to Cairo. In 1838 a member of ^{the} Persian Istanbul embassy visited Cairo and a year later it was allegedly sending 50 students there, while a messenger with valuable gifts for the Pasha arrived in 1840. This allegedly coincided with Russian influence in Persia and the Persian attack on Afghanistan, then under British influence, necessitating a British expedition to occupy Khārij Island in 1838. Two Indian Muslims, reportedly ^{sent on the} Mughal Emperor's behalf to oust the British from India, visited Russia, Istanbul and arrived at Alexandria in 1835-6. One of them, Mahmūd, disappeared after being seen at Cairo, while the other, Husayn, carrying very important political papers, chose to stay with the British Vice Consul there. A letter in Turkish to Muhammad 'Alī and many letters in Persian to various Indian chiefs from the Porte were discovered in his baggage. These events, in our view, provided good excuses to stage an attack, but not sound reasons.

Dodwell's claim to Muhammad 'Alī's intention of joining Russia by capturing Syria and the proposed war on 'Irāq cannot stand up to scrutiny. Had this been the case, Russia and France would have joined Egypt at the height of its conquests in Arabia, Syria and Asia Minor in 1839, and the Pasha would not have stopped Ibrāhīm at the gates of Constantinople. As a matter of fact the reverse is true since Russia and France joined hands with Britain in every action concerning war and peace between him and the Sultan. It should also be noted that long before the Syrian war and the Turco-Egyptian rupture, the hatred and enmity of the Pasha towards the " pig headed Sultan" and the " ass like Vazirs" had been well known since 1820.¹³ Their alliance at the peak of the hostilities is inconceivable.

6. Failure to Pressure the British and the Sultan

As discussed in chapter II, Muhammad 'Alī's motives lay in (a) aggrandizement and expansionism, (b) maximizing his autonomy and (c) neutralizing the British menace. Muhammad 'Alī expanded his frontiers as far as he could. If he had not toppled the Sultan, it could have been for strategic reasons. As for his autonomy, he was still endeavouring to get recognition from the Sultan and from the big powers, especially England of whose military and naval power he was well aware. Whether he really hoped to arrest the British expansion is an open question. All we are sure of is that he seems to have always sought British friendship, for which the British had imposed two conditions, namely, (a) their relations with the Sultan must be severely strained, if not absolutely broken and (b) the Pasha must have some clear and substantial advantage to offer or withhold.¹⁴

Evidently Muhammad 'Alī was unsuccessful in winning the British amity even by his inactivity in the Greek war and consequent treachery to his master. He failed likewise ^{to} gain autonomy even by conquering Syria and parts of Asia Minor. Failing in his motives by direct means, the Pasha might have used pressure tactics. His efforts to frustrate Euphrates navigation and his conquests of Arabia and the Yaman were all in very sensitive areas of British interests. His control of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea would have been a substantial advantage which the Pasha ^{could} offer or withhold from the British. We have already seen the British anxiety over the Egyptian advance towards eastern Arabia. Whatever the real motive behind Muhammad 'Alī's expeditions ^{was,} in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf regions, the interests of two apparent friends collided. The net result was that British amity became the very factor in frustrating his plans and in the ultimate recall of his army.

B. IMMEDIATE CAUSES

Apprehending a British attack on Egypt in 1815, Muhammad 'Ali had expressed his sentiments to Burckhardt, the British traveller, that "Great fish swallow the small". According to the Pasha, Egypt was then necessary to the British for supplying corn to Malta and Gibraltar. He also observed that he was the friend of the English and that great men might exchange compliments while possessing little sincerity.¹⁵ Although this was not the case then, it was by 1840, it was not only Egypt's corn on which the British had an eye, but other more important factors such as its geographical position on the India route and its wealth. The British could not endure the sight of any strong power which may obstruct their position in India. Thus the British had become one of the most immediate causes necessitating the Egyptian withdrawal. We will soon see this aspect.

I. Muhammad 'Ali's Declaration of Independence

One of the immediate causes lies in Muhammad 'Ali's declaration of his independence. It may be useful to expand on this. Prima facie, Egyptian autonomy looks more beneficial for the European expansionists who could manipulate a divided empire more effectively. The danger that Palmerston sensed in it was the possibility of the Adriatic Sea becoming an Austrian lake and Istanbul a Russian port. The uncertainty of the mode, amount and beneficiaries of the spoils intrigued these powers. England, being farthest and much pre-occupied elsewhere, had to be the greatest loser, though it wished the lion's share. Autonomy, though at times encouraged by Britain, meant to the powers the creation of a strong state within the Ottoman areas to replace "the Sick Man of Europe". They were therefore unwilling to

accept an independent Egypt under Muhammad 'Alī and tended to unite by the late 1830's in stopping such an action, if necessary, by military force. This is what exactly happened when Muhammad 'Alī at last made his formal declaration of independence from the Sultan on May 25, 1838.¹⁶

2. Dangers at Home

This declaration was fraught with dangers to the five European powers who would forfeit areas of Asia and Africa in Muhammad 'Alī's possession. By suffering his succession to the Turkish Empire their interests were in jeopardy. Any area escaping his domination could give rise to war for apportioning it among the powers. His autonomy was also apt to be followed by his interference in British spheres of interest in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Euphrates region and possibly the Mediterranean. He could also stop Russian descent to the south, endanger French influence in Barbary Africa and elsewhere. In short it could deprive them of most of the Turkish Empire and occasion the renaissance of the East. Consequently, the five powers found in Muhammad 'Alī a common enemy. They sank their mutual differences, hatreds and personal preferences to join hands in eliminating their Levantine rival from the world political scene.

France was a little sympathetic to and favoured a limited recognition of his autonomy. Britain and Austria stood firm against his independence. Russia and Prussia were looking for their own best interests and opportunities. It may be in order to state here that the European merchants in the area were one in praise for Muhammad 'Alī's peaceful and just administration. They wanted to see him independent, maintaining all his possessions and possibly Iraq. But the Powers had to guard general European interests, not those of

the merchants, and had to crush any possible upsurge of the East. Consequently their stimulations and provocations led to the Nazib battle of June 24, 1839 which, despite the Powers' general aid coupled with Prussian military personnel in the Turkish army, culminated in the smashing of the Turkish attack and Ibrāhīm's capture of all Turkish armaments and provisions.¹⁷

This was immediately followed by Sultan Mahmūd's death on July 1, 1839 and the succession of his 16 year old son, 'Abd al-Majīd. Also, the Turkish fleet deserted the Empire and sailed to Alexandria due to the commander's apprehensions of treachery by the Grand Vazīr. Muhammad 'Alī's suspension of march, and the anxiety of the belligerents for rapprochement brought about a compromise, but this was against the Powers' interests and designs. A united European fleet arrived at Constantinople while the Austrian ambassador manoeuvred a joint note obliging the Porte to stop any action without the allies' concurrence. Muhammad 'Alī was also warned of naval coercive measures.

Muhammad 'Alī, now 70, under tremendous mental strain, had already reached the climax of his expansion. He had turned down every argument of his able son, Ibrāhīm - "the lion of the brave whose counsel hath always proved fortunate" - regarding an early declaration of his independence and a march on Istanbul to force recognition or a later honourable treaty. The British ministry at London and its officers in the East had become totally hostile even to a friendly move of the Pasha. Palmerston's "nervous irritability" and "highly virulent Russiophobia" were adding to the already combustive situation. England manoeuvred the exclusion of France from the allies' treaty of July, 1840, under which Muhammad 'Alī had to accept, within 10 days, his hereditary Pashalic in Egypt and a life tenure for Syria, to forfeit the latter if accepted in the next ten days while on his rejection to be blockaded by the joint command. Much before that the English pressure

for Egyptian withdrawal from the Yaman and eastern Arabia had been redoubled. The Pasha was still holding his head high, was calm and in good spirits but the time for the " great fish to swallow the small " had arrived.

Another British manoeuvre, Campbell's transfer in December 1839, further annoyed and intimidated the Pasha. Campbell, a realistic, intelligent, and well-mannered Consul, was a close watcher of the Pasha since 1833, and was the only British officer who had a cautious admiration for the Pasha. He would criticise the Pasha with due severity; but his persuasive speech, his commanding presence, conciliating manners and his sound and just judgement had made him a personal friend of Muhammad 'Ali. The British now wanted another type of man " to show a stiff upper lip to the Pasha ". So, Campbell was replaced by Hodges, a hot tempered, blustering and quarrelsome Consul.¹⁸

The trouble with which we are most concerned culminated in February 1840, when Hodges, in the Pasha's court, urged the Turkish naval officers, who had deserted to Egypt with Turkish fleet, to rally round their Sultan. This annoyed the Pasha who vowed to shoot the first deserter. Hodges immediately warned him not to carry his orders into effect. This proved the last blow on the Pasha's restraint and patience. Hodges' challenge was real because on his posting in October 1839, Palmerston had briefed Hodges to report the number and efficiency of Egyptian troops and the strength of the British naval force essential to capture Alexandria.¹⁹

Muhammad 'Ali could not run the risk of endangering Egypt for the sake of other areas. So, he ordered, on February 17, 1840, the immediate recall of the bulk of his Yaman army and the raising of new forces. Soon a camp of 36,000 disciplined and orderly men was formed at centrally located Damahur, much beyond the imagination of Hodges. In April, 1840, the Pasha found it

wise and judicious also to recall the bulk of his disciplined and trusted army and able Generals including Khurshid from central and eastern Arabia in order to marshall his energies and resources in Egypt for any eventuality. The recall order was a great shock for Khurshid at a time when he was set for a march on 'Irāq. Unaware of the situation at home, he urged Muhammad 'Alī once more to review his orders and to accord him permission for further conquest.²⁰ At last he left his camp at Shanānah on September 30, 1840, on his way to Egypt.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

During the early years of the nineteenth century the Su'ūdī expansion in Arabia had reached its climax. The Su'ūdīs captured Makkah and Madīnah, the holiest places in Islam, in 1803-4 and stopped Ottoman, Persian and most other non-Wahhābī Muslims from performing annual pilgrimage there. They were plundering and threatening Turkish possessions of 'Irāq and Syria and had eliminated the recital of the Turkish Sultan's name in Friday sermons throughout their expanding realm, thus challenging and striking at the root of the Ottoman authority. Failing in his efforts to punish and stop the Su'ūdīs through his Pashas of 'Irāq and Syria, Sultan Mahmūd II ordered Muhammad 'Alī Pasha of Egypt in 1809 to drive away the Wahhābīs from the Holy Cities, to recover the Hijāz from them and to restore Ottoman prestige.

The initial Egyptian expedition of 1811 was sent under the command of Tūsūn, Muhammad 'Alī's son, who captured Makkah and Madīnah in 1812-3, and in 1813 restored the pilgrimage and the recital of the Sultan's name there. Nevertheless, the continued Su'ūdī resistance in the region necessitated Muhammad 'Alī's own arrival in the Hijāz. During 1813-15, Muhammad 'Alī reduced the areas of Su'ūdī influence south of Makkah to submission while Tūsūn marched to the north and in the Qasīm. A shortlived truce was concluded about June 1815 at al-Rass between Tūsūn and the Su'ūdī ruler, 'Abd Allāh b. Su'ūd, under which 'Abd Allāh conceded the Hijāz and his allegiance to the Sultan and Tūsūn admitted 'Abd Allāh's rule over the

areas still under him. Muhammad 'Alī and Tūsūn returned to Cairo by the end of June 1815, soon after which fresh disturbances in the north and south of Hijāz obliged the Sultan to instruct Muhammad 'Alī to smash completely the Su'ūdī power.

This part of the expedition was entrusted to Ibrāhīm, another son of Muhammad 'Alī, whose steady march during 1816-18 from Madīnah to Dir'īyah won him the submission of Su'ūdī opponents and supporters one by one. The siege of Dir'īyah, the Su'ūdī capital, was strongly contested for six months, during which Ibrāhīm established liaison with 'Irāq and eastern Arabia and reduced the adjoining Su'ūdī areas. The overwhelming Egyptian power, continued reinforcements from Egypt and 'Irāq and the intensity of the attacks on the besieged disheartened the tribes and chiefs supporting the failing Su'ūdī cause. By the time of 'Abd Allāh's surrender in September 1818, most of these chiefs and Su'ūdī princes had joined Ibrāhīm while the rest had made good their escapes in different directions. Banī Khālid, the pre-Su'ūdī rulers of eastern Arabia, had also joined Ibrāhīm in the siege to avenge the Su'ūdīs and restore their rule in al-Hasā and Qatīf. The Egyptian influence on the " Trucial 'Umān " was also introduced with the restoration of Sultan b. Saqar at Shāriqah and Linjah in 1814 with the collaboration of Muhammad 'Alī and the ruler of Masqat. Kuwait acted as a conduit for supplies from 'Irāq to Dir'īyah but Bahrayn escaped Ibrāhīm's attention. All Su'ūdī fortifications in central Arabia including Dir'īyah were destroyed to obviate any possibility of Su'ūdī resurgence. After establishing his supremacy in Najd and eastern Arabia, Ibrāhīm appointed Egyptian officers in Najd and Banī Khālid chiefs in al-Hasā and Qatīf. He then withdrew the bulk of his army and returned to Egypt.

This attempt of indirect rule over eastern Arabia proved futile as the Banī Khālīd rulers succumbed to the Su'ūdī resurgence under Turkī by 1830. Moreover, during the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, Muhammad 'Alī's expansionist designs had taken new meanings. He cast away the Ottoman vassalage, conquered Syria, marched into Asia Minor and sent his armies to the Yaman. Eastern Arabia and 'Irāq were his next targets to complete a mutation of the Turkish Empire into a new and strong Egyptian Empire. On the failure of measures to bring Faysal b. Turkī, the then ruler of Najd and eastern Arabia, under Egyptian control, Muhammad 'Alī picked Faysal's cousin Khālīd, late in 1836, to act as new Egyptian ruler after Faysal's rout and to accompany his army under the command of Isma'īl Bey.

The dread of the Egyptian army and the division of Su'ūdī supporters and princes among Khālīd and Faysal facilitated Faysal's steady withdrawal without confrontation before the advancing Egyptian army from Qasīm to al-Hasā and Khālīd's occupation of Riyād by May 1837. An Egyptian repulse in Hawtah-Harīq, however, encouraged Faysal to march back on Riyād. The indecisive hostilities that ensued obliged Muhammad 'Alī to send fresh reinforcements under Khurshīd. Arriving in Najd, Khurshīd soon pacified Faysal by apportioning northern and southern Najd to Khālīd and Faysal respectively. Khurshīd then sent his assistant, Muhammad Rif'at Effendī, to Bahrayn to secure its submission. Though the Bahrayn ruler readily consented to pay to Khālīd the tribute previously agreed with Faysal, yet the actual payment and the execution of the treaty were delayed for about a year due to the resumption of fighting between Khurshīd and Faysal in June 1838 which culminated in the Egyptian conquest of the whole of Najd and deportation of Faysal to Cairo in December 1838. Soon thereafter the provinces of al-Hasā and Qatīf surrendered to Khālīd where new administration was established.

During this period the British influence in the Persian Gulf region was increasing. 'Iraq and eastern Arabia lay on their direct route to India and carried paramount importance for free flow of trade and communications. However, their involvement in the Far East, India and elsewhere did not permit them to send reinforcements to bolster the spirits of the chiefs of Trucial 'Uman and Bahrayn or to stop the Egyptian advance. Though Bahrayn backed out of its earlier undertaking to pay tribute and submit to the Egyptians for some time, yet on the failure of the British authorities to pledge British support in the event of an Egyptian attack on Bahrayn and the Trucial Coast, their chiefs had no alternative but to succumb to the Egyptian pressure. After a futile attempt to resist in January 1839, Bahrayn finally yielded and executed a treaty of peace with Khālid in early May 1839, inviting British protests. Khurahid also sent Sa'd b. Mutlaq, a former Su'udī governor in 'Uman, with 150 troops as his governor for Trucial, 'Uman and Buraymī. With his arrival in March-April 1839, the coastal chiefs acknowledged Egyptian supremacy, endeavouring at the same time to placate the British to avoid British wrath and countermeasures. Kuwait extended every help and cooperation to the Egyptians during the two expeditions. Its ruler showed a marked discourtesy and estrangement towards the British emissary who visited Kuwait in 1839 to sound out the ruler against the Egyptians.

The local British pressure on the Egyptians and the local chiefs failed to arrest the Egyptian influence there. Nevertheless, the intense British pressure and manoeuvres and combined European actions against Egypt itself obliged Muhammad 'Alī to order Khurahid to stop a further march on 'Iraq, late in 1839, and to withdraw with the bulk of the army from Najd and eastern Arabia in April 1840. Commencing his recall from al-Bassā and Qatif in May 1840, he left Arabia for Egypt in September, 1840.

Khālid, who was left behind with 800 Egyptian troops, could not maintain his position for long. He was visiting al-Hasā in October 1841, when he learnt of the march of his cousin, 'Abd Allāh b. Thunayyān, on Riyād. He hastened to its defence, was expelled from there and returned to Hufūf, where he met a cold reception. He then arrived at Qatīf, got rid of his Egyptian troops and set out for Dammām to enlist Bahrayn support. After initial successes, his Bahraynī supporters were repulsed. Thus by the end of 1841 the Egyptian rule over eastern Arabia finally came to an end; almost coincidentally with the active career of Muhammad 'Alī, though he ruled Egypt for about another decade. Thus the Egyptian expedition to Arabia is almost co-extensive and concomitant with the rise and fall of Muhammad 'Alī.

Though we have to some extent differed from Dodwell's emphasis on Muhammad 'Alī's intrigues against the British interests, Dodwell has rightly and judiciously related the life and active career of Muhammad 'Alī, his relations with the British and French governments, and the manoeuvres adopted to bring his active life to a close. In our view, Dodwell will always be reckoned an important authority on his active career, expeditions and wars in general and the Anglo-Egyptian relations during the period in particular. Since the east Arabian expedition is a small part of the whole work, the book does not provide us with many details. Dodwell admits that the British government could not adequately credit the Pasha's services during his active career. However, soon after his downfall their mutual relations notably improved and

in 1843 the government resolved to send the Pasha a steamboat as a token of national gratitude. The East India Company presented him with a silver fountain. The Queen sent him her portrait set with brilliants. And what is his claim to our remembrance? On my title page I have set a phrase of his own, comparing his work with that of my own countrymen in India.¹

Dodwell's work is unique in depicting Muhammad 'Alī's active career and relations with European Powers especially the British, similarly Batrik's Ph. D. thesis is unique in constructing the account of Muhammad 'Alī's campaign to Arabia from the Royal Egyptian Archives. Though later writers, prominent among whom is Abu Hakima, have taken great pains in sifting and studying the Archives records for constituting the histories of different areas, yet Batrik will perhaps always be reckoned a fore-runner in that endeavour. Also, Batrik's original research at the British Foreign Office and India Office libraries is as great and complete. Since his thesis has mainly been constituted from the intergovernmental letters, it confines itself to the end results of the wars rather than going into more details.

In depicting and describing minute and complete details of the Su'ūdī-Egyptian wars in Najd and eastern Arabia and the Egyptian administration we must credit Ibn Bishr for providing us with the complete account. Being a Wahhābī chronicler, we do not find him much concerned with events in which the Su'ūdīs were not involved. We also find in him pro-Su'ūdī sentiments against the Egyptian administration and personnel. To him any non-Arab tax or officer is cruel, harsh and unjustified.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

¹Arnold Wilson, The Persian Gulf, (London, 1928), p. I.

²Ibid. pp. 2-3; J. B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880, (Oxford, 1968), pp. 1-188.

³Ibid.; D. Hawley, The Trucial States, (London, 1970), pp. 7, 17-23.

⁴Ibid.; R.B. Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, (New York, 1965), pp. 29-31; J. Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, (London, 1955), pp. 25, 83.

⁵Ibid.

⁶A. M. Abu Hakima, History of Eastern Arabia, (Beirut, 1965), pp. 38-42; U. Ibn Bishr, 'Unwān al-Majd fī Ta'rīkh Najd, (Riyād, 1388), V. I, p. 24; S. H. Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq, (Oxford, 1925), p. 25.

⁷Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 49-54, 57, 65; J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Omān, and Central Arabia, (Calcutta, 1915), Vol. I, p. 1001; Bombay Selections - Selections from the Records of Bombay Government, Vol. XXIV - New Series, (Bombay, 1856), p. 362.

⁸Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 54-57, 145-7; Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 1007, 1073. For a different version please see, R. Hewins, A Golden Dream, (London, 1963) pp. 13-20, 74, 85, 91.

⁹Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 63-8; Bombay Selections, p. 362.

¹⁰Abu Hakima, op. cit., p. 115; Lorimer, op. cit., p. 634.

¹¹Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 116-7; Kelly, op. cit., pp. 26-7.

¹²Winder, op. cit., p. 31; Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 423, 790, 843, 948; Ibrāhīm Ibn 'Īsā, Ta'rīkh Ba'd al-Hawādith, (Riyād, 1386/1966), p. 134; Zāmil al-Rashīd, " A Study of Su'ūdī Relations with Eastern Arabia and 'Umān (1800-1871)", Ph. D. thesis, McGill University, 1979, p. 101; Bombay Selections, V.XXIV, pp. 434, 368.

¹³Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 791, 843, 948; al-Rashīd, op. cit., p. 102. Muhammad al-Nabhānī, Al-Tuhfah al-Nabhānīyah, (Cairo, 1342), p. 136.

¹⁴Kelly, op. cit., p. 17; Bombay Selections, p. 300; Wilson, op. cit., pp. 199 et seq.

- ¹⁵ Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 638-49; C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. XI (Delhi, 1973), pp. 198, 239; Bombay Selections, pp. 462-3.
- ¹⁶ Kelly, op. cit., p. 46; Philby, op. cit., p. 33; Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 127-8; Abu Hakima, (ed.), Lam' al-Shihāb, (Beirut, 1967), pp. 7-33.
- ¹⁷ Winder, op. cit., pp. 8,9; Philip Hitti, History of the Arabs, (London, 1943), pp. 399, 689; W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, (New York, 1957), p.42.
- ¹⁸ Abu Hakima, op. cit., p. 127; Lam' al-Shihāb, pp. 60-66.
- ¹⁹ Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 133-6; Lam' al-Shihāb, pp. 155-61; For more details, please see, Husayn Ibn Ghannam, Rawdat al-Afkar wa al-Afhām, Cairo, 1368), Vol. 2, pp. 158-9; Ibn Bishr, op. cit., pp. 83-5.
- ²⁰ Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 138-9; Ibn Ghannam, op. cit., pp. 188-90; Ibn Bishr, op. cit., pp. 88-100.
- ²¹ Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 140-41; Lam' al-Shihāb, p. 165.
- ²² Bombay Selections, p. 429; Wilson, op. cit., p. 197; Lorimer, op. cit., p. 197; Kelly, op. cit., pp. 99-101; Winder, op. cit., p. 6.
- ²³ Ibid. ; Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 947-8, 635-6.
- ²⁴ Hewins, op. cit., p. 97.
- ²⁵ Grand Vazir to Muhammad 'Alī, 12th Safar, 1224 A.H. (1809 A.D.), R.E.A. doc. 13: quoted by A.H. Batrik, " Turkish and Egyptian Rule in Arabia (1810 - 1841)", Ph. D. Thesis, London University, 1947, pp. 82, 88.
- ²⁶ Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 24, 25, 40; Batrik, op. cit., pp. 12-3.
- ²⁷ Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt, (Cambridge, 1931), pp. 7-II.
- ²⁸ Ibid., pp. 13-20.
- ²⁹ Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 1-39, 836; Abu Hakima, op. cit., pp. 27-9; Wilson, op. cit., pp. 160, 169; Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. XIII, p. 1.
- ³⁰ Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 40-133; Wilson, op. cit., pp. 158-189. ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Wilson, op. cit., pp. 163, 178; Bombay Selections, pp. 248 et seq.; Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. XIII, pp. 4, 41-4; Vol. XI, pp. 287-8, 269, 198.
- ³³ Bombay Selections, pp. 57, 58.
- ³⁴ Malcolm quoted by A. Farouhy, The Bahrein Islands, (New York, 1951), p. 79.

Chapter II

- ¹ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 43; P. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1519-1922: A Political History, (London, 1966), p. 179.
- ² J. L. Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, (London, 1831) Vol. II, pp. 207, 218.
- ³ Ibid., pp. 327, 335; Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 190, 1068; Ibn Bishr, op. cit., pp. 7, 54-5; Jean Raymond, Mémoire Sur l'Origine des Wahabys, (Le Caire, 1925) p. 15; M. al-Dimashqi, Ta'rikh Hawādith al-Shām wa Libnān, p. 17.

⁴Dimashqī, op.cit., p. 46; Lammens, La Syrie, (Beyrōuth, 1921), V. 2, p.136.

⁵Al-Rashīd, op.cit., pp. 75, 105; Longrigg, op.cit., p. 213; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 1057; H.J. Brydges, An Account of His Majesty's Mission to the Court of Persia, 1807-1811, to which is appended a brief History of the Wahauby, (London, 1834), Vol. II, p.17, 12.

⁶Abu Hakima, "An Ottoman Expedition to Eastern Arabia in 1798" A paper presented at the 185th meeting of the American Oriental Society on April 24, 1975; p. 3; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 132; Rasūl Kirkuklī, Dawhāt al-Wuzarā', Tr. by Musā Kazīm Nūr, (Beirut, 1963), p. 204.

⁷Longrigg, op.cit., p. 214.

⁸Brydges, op.cit., pp. 3, 23-7; Kirkuklī, op.cit., p.205; Holt, op.cit., p. 173; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 1059; Burckhardt, op.cit., p. 184.

⁹For more details please see: Burckhardt, op.cit., pp. 337 at seq.; Batrik, op.cit., p. 78; Playfair, Arabia, p. 128; Harris, Journey, p. 63.

¹⁰Dimashqī, op.cit., p. 45; Lammens, op.cit., p. 136; Hewins, op.cit., p.98.

¹¹S. Ghorbal, The Beginning of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Muhammad 'Alī, (London, 1928), p. 227.

¹²Please see page 25 below.

¹³Page 20 above.

¹⁴Grand Vazīr to Muhammad 'Alī, 12 Safar 1224 (1809 A.D.) R.E.A., doc. 13.

¹⁵Dodwell, op.cit., p. 39.

¹⁶Muhammad 'Alī to Grand Vazīr, 3 Rajab 1225 A.H. (Aug. 4, 1810) & 20 Rabī' I 1226 A.H. (Apr. 4, 1811), R.E.A. doc. 18 & 41, reg. I: quoted by Batrik, op.cit., pp. 87-8.

¹⁷Ghorbal, op.cit., p. 279.

¹⁸Dodwell, op.cit., pp. 41, 63.

¹⁹Ghorbal, op.cit., p. 280.

²⁰Muhammad 'Alī to Grand Vazīr, 1st Muharram 1223 A.H. (Feb. 28, 1808) R.E.A. doc. 2; reg. I: quoted by Batrik, op.cit., p. 89.

²¹Dodwell, op.cit., p. 83.

²²Muhammad 'Alī to Najīb Efendī, 27 Shawwāl 1225 (Nov. 25, 1810) R.E.A., doc. 54, reg. I, quoted by Batrik, op.cit., p.90; Dodwell, op.cit., p. 39.

²³Dodwell, op.cit., p. 39.

²⁴Muhammad 'Alī to Grand Vazīr, 5 Shawwāl 1225 (Nov. 3, 1810) R.E.A. doc. 48, reg. I; Also the letter at Note 22 above.

²⁵Grand Vazīr to Muhammad 'Alī, 3 Muharram 1226 (Jan. 29, 1811) R.E.A., doc. 3, reg. 2, quoted by Batrik, op.cit., p. 93; Dimashqī, op.cit., p. 45.

²⁶Muhammad 'Alī to Grand Vazīr, 13 & 26 Rabī' I, 1227 (March 27 & Apr. 19, 1812) R.E.A. doc. 7, reg. 2 & doc. 63, reg. I, quoted by Batrik, op.cit., p.94.

²⁷Muhammad 'Alī to Grand Vazīr, 21 Sha'bān & 5 Shawwāl 1228 (Aug. 19 & Oct. 1, 1813) R.E.A. doc. 118, 122, reg. I, quoted by Batrik, op.cit., p. 95.

²⁸Grand Vazīr to Muhammad 'Alī, 4 Dhul Qi'dah 1228 (Oct. 29, 1813) R.E.A. doc. II, reg. 16, quoted by Batrik, op.cit., p. 96.

²⁹ Muhammad 'Alī to Grand Vazīr, 15 Šafar 1231 (Jan. 16, 1816) R.E.A. Doc. 4, reg. '3; Najīb Efendī to Muhammad 'Alī, 17 Rabi' I, 1231 (Feb. 16, 1816) R.E.A. doc. 8, r. 4, quoted by Batrik, op. cit., p. 97.

³⁰ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 62.

³¹ Ibid., p. 66.

³² Ibid., p. 67; Burckhardt, Nubia, p. XCIII & Notes, V. 2, p. 220.

³³ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 67.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 46.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 64.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 72.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 39, II3, I28.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 55.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 60; Sadleir, Diary, (Bombay, 1866), pp. 76, 45, 71.

⁴⁰ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 58.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 61.

⁴² Muhammad 'Alī to Ahmad Yakan, 27 Shawwāl 1238 (July 11, 1823) R.E.A. doc. 282, r. 7, quoted by Batrik, op. cit., p. 193.

⁴³ Burckhardt, Notes,^{v2} p. 338.

⁴⁴ Abu Hakima, op. cit. "paper" p. 6.

⁴⁵ Please see page 19 above.

⁴⁶ Batrik, op. cit., pp. 137, 184.

⁴⁷ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 108.

⁴⁸ Abu Hakima, Ta'rikh, V.2, part I, p. 147.

⁴⁹ Batrik, op. cit., pp. 197, 183.

⁵⁰ Abu Hakima, History, p. 40.

⁵¹ Sadleir, Diary, pp. 63, 66, 85.

⁵² Ibn Bishr, op. cit., p. 204.

⁵³ Saldhana, Precis of Egyptian Conquest of Najd and Katif and Hasa Coast and their Intrigues in the Persian Gulf - The British Policy and Operations, 1838-1842, (Simla, 1904), Article 399, p. 223.

⁵⁴ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 138.

⁵⁵ Batrik, op. cit., p. 188.

⁵⁶ Khurshīd to Muhammad 'Alī, 9 Dhul Hijjah 1254 (Feb. 23, 1839) R.E.A. doc. 137, r. 287; Also of April 4, 1839 in Campbell's F.O. 78/374

⁵⁷ Batrik, op. cit., pp. 284, 189.

Chapter III

¹ Lorimer, op. cit., p. 189.

² Batrik, op. cit., p. 85.

³ Burckhardt, Notes, Vol. 2, p. 220.

⁴ Ibid.; Lorimer, op. cit., p. 1070.

⁵ Burckhardt, op. cit., p. 222; Muhammad 'Alī to Grand Vazīr, 1st Ramdān 1226 (Sept. 19, 1811) R.E.A. doc. 72, r. 1, cited by Batrik, op. cit., p. 100.

⁶ Muhammad 'Alī to Grand Vazīr, 9 Sha'bān 1226 (Aug. 29, 1811) & Tūsūn to Muḥammad 'Alī, 15 Sha'bān 1226 (Sept. 4, 1811) R.E.A. doc. 20 & 4, r. 1, cited by Batrik, op. cit., pp. 100 & 102; Ibn Bishr, op. cit., p. 157; Burckhardt, op. cit., p. 224.

⁷ Burckhardt, op. cit., p. 225; Lorimer, op. cit., p. 1070.

⁸ Burckhardt, op. cit., p. 226; Batrik, op. cit., p. 101.

⁹ Ibn Bishr, op. cit., p. 157; Burckhardt, op. cit., p. 230; Dodwell, op. cit., p. 43.

¹⁰ Burckhardt, op. cit., p. 237; Batrik, op. cit., p. 104

¹¹ Burckhardt, op. cit., p. 240; Ibn Bishr, op. cit., p. 160; Lorimer, op. cit., p. 1071.

- ¹² Lorimer, op.cit., p. 1080; Burckhardt, op.cit., p. 244; Batrik, op.cit., p. 107, quoting Mustafa Bey to Muhammad 'Alī, 15 Muharram 1228.
- ¹³ Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 161-4; Burckhardt, op.cit., p. 248; Batrik, op.cit., p. 108, quoting Najīb Efendī to Muhammad 'Alī, 20 Jamadā I, 1228 (May 21, 1813) R.E.A. doc. 130, r. 3; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 1083.
- ¹⁴ Lorimer, op.cit., p. 190; Dodwell, op.cit., p. 44.
- ¹⁵ Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 165; Burckhardt, op.cit., p. 251; Batrik, p. 109.
- ¹⁶ Batrik, op.cit., pp. 110-8; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 165; Dodwell, op.cit., p. 44; Burckhardt, op.cit., pp. 255-267.
- ¹⁷ Muhammad 'Alī to Habīb Efendī, 2 Safar 1229 (Feb. 24, 1814) R.E.A. doc. II3, r. 6; cited by Batrik, op.cit., p. 117.
- ¹⁸ Dodwell, op.cit., p. 45; Batrik, op.cit., pp. 119-25. ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ Burckhardt, op.cit., pp. 336, 348; Batrik, op.cit., p. 129; Abu Hakima, Ta'rikh al-Kuwayt, Vol. 2, part, I, (Kuwayt, 1393/1973), p. 37.
- ²¹ Batrik, op.cit., pp. 134-7; Burckhardt, op.cit., pp. 300, 338-352; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 1085; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 186.
- ²² Burckhardt, op.cit., p. 356; Abu Hakima, op.cit., pp. 36-8; Batrik, op.cit., p. 139; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 1085.
- ²³ Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 188; Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 191, 1086; Lam' al-Shihāb, pp. 120-122; Abu Hakima, op.cit., p. 38.
- ²⁴ Batrik, op.cit., p. 140; Philby, op.cit., p. 133; Sadleir, Diary, p. 118.
- ²⁵ Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 190-2; Philby, op.cit., pp. 134-6; Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 191, 1086.
- ²⁶ Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 193-6; Philby, op.cit., p. 136.
- ²⁷ Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 196-211; Philby, op.cit., pp. 138-145; Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 1087-9; Hewins, op.cit., pp. 108-9.
- ²⁸ Ibid.; Batrik, op.cit., p. 143; Winder, op.cit., pp. 7, 16.
- ²⁹ Batrik, op.cit., p. 145.
- ³⁰ Lorimer, op.cit., p. 1087; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 204.
- ³¹ Abu Hakima, "Ottoman Expedition"- Paper of April 24, 1975, p. 6.
- ³² Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 211, 214.
- ³³ Philby, op.cit., p. 148; Winder, op.cit., pp. 29, 51; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 949; Kelly, op.cit., p. 140; Sadleir, Diary, pp. 26, 28.
- ³⁴ Sadleir, Diary, pp. 22, 33, 37, 41; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 215.
- ³⁵ Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 219; Sadleir, Diary, pp. 28, 44; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 949; Palgrave, Narrative, Vol. 2, p. 147.
- ³⁶ Sadleir, op.cit., pp. 72, 29, 45; Philby, op.cit., p. 149.
- ³⁷ Batrik, op.cit., p. 150, quoting Muhammad 'Alī to Ahmad Pasha.
- ³⁸ Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 219-21. ³⁹ Sadleir, Diary, p. 22.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 44-5.

- 42 Sadleir, Diary, pp. 54-59; Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 207, 953.
- 43 Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. 2, pp. 35-7; Philby, op.cit., pp. 162-3
- 44 Ibn Bishr, op.cit.; pp. 48-51; Philby, op.cit., p. 167; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 955.
- 45 Batrik, op.cit., p. 193.
- 46 Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 846-8; Bombay Selections, pp. 79, 84.
- 47 Kelly, Britain, p. 26; Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 789-92, 851, 951; Bombay Selections, p. 142; Abu Hakima, Ta'rikh, Vol. 2, part I, p. 50.
- 48 Sadleir, Diary, p. 25.
- 49 Abu Hakima, op.cit., pp. 60-66; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 27; Philby, op.cit., p. 160; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 952; Bombay Selections, pp. 85, 376, 525.
- 51 Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 48-51, 69; Philby, op.cit., pp. 166-8; Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 207, 856-8.
- 52 Bombay Selections, p. 384.
- 53 Ibn Bishr, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 205; Al-Rashid, op.cit., p. 212.
- 54 Ibn Bishr, 'Unwan, Vol. 2, p. 38; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 1008; Abu Hakima, Ta'rikh, Vol. 2, part I, pp. 94-107; Philby, op.cit., p. 163; Hewins, pp. 116, 86.
- 55 Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 445, 651; Miles, Countries, p. 314; Hawley, op.cit., p. 105; Bombay Selections, p. 435.
- 56 Al-Rashid, op.cit., p. 143; 136; Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 658, 670, 949.
- 57 Al-Rashid, op.cit., p. 144; Memorial, Vol. I, p. 143.
- 58 Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 207, 687, 1096. 59 Ibid.
- 60 Kelly, op.cit., p. 163; Bombay Selections, pp. 57, 301, 362.
- 61 Palgrave, op.cit., p. 62; Batrik, op.cit., p. 176; Philby, op.cit., p. 150.
- 62 Philby, op.cit., p. 158; Batrik, op.cit., p. 179.
- 63 Lorimer, op.cit., p. 956; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 68; Hewins, op.cit., 115.
- 64 Batrik, op.cit., p. 180; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 69; Philby, op.cit., 175.
- 65 Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 70ff; Philby, op.cit., pp. 175 ff.
- 66 Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 77; Winder, op.cit., pp. III-115.
- 67 Lorimer, op.cit., p. 1097; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 80-84; Batrik, op.cit., p. 181; Winder, op.cit., pp. 117-120; Kelly, op.cit., p. 290.
- 68 Batrik, op.cit., pp. 181, 187.
- 69 Abu Hakima, op.cit., p. 125.
- 70 Abu Hakima, op.cit., p. 258; Batrik, op.cit., p. 273. (Items I-2)
- 71 Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 85.
- 72 Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 85-7; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 957. 73 Ibid.
- 74 Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 86.
- 75 Ibid., p. 86. 76 Ibid.

77. Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 210, 857-61, 956; Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 69.
78. Dodwell, op.cit., p. 83.
79. Kelly, op.cit., p. 276.
80. Ibid., p. 292; Dodwell, op.cit., p. 171.
81. Abu Hakima, op.cit., p. 136.
82. Bombay Selections, p. 387.
83. Batrik, op.cit., p. 279.
84. Lorimer, op.cit., p. 862.
85. Batrik, op.cit., pp. 284, 191.
86. Abu Hakima, op.cit., pp. 131, 258; Trans. by: Batrik, op.cit., p. 273.
87. Kelly, op.cit., p. 303.
88. Abu Hakima, op.cit., p. 136.
89. Saldhana, Precis of Egyptian Conquest, Art. 369, p. 201; Kelly, op.cit., p. 302; Abu Hakima, op.cit., p. 137.
90. Saldhana, op.cit., Art. 370-375, p. 202.
91. Kelly, op.cit., p. 304.
92. Saldhana, op.cit., Art. 388, p. 206.
93. Kelly, op.cit., pp. 291, 305, 313.
94. Batrik, op.cit., p. 197 (quoted here); Abu Hakima, op.cit., p. 138.
95. Abd Allah to Khurshid, 23 Safar, 1255, quoted by Batrik, op.cit., p. 278.
96. Saldhana, op.cit., Art. 389, p. 207.
97. Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 866-8; Saldhana, op.cit., Art. 394, p. 221.
98. Saldhana, op.cit., # 398; Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 795, 958; Kelly, Britain, 328
99. Abu Hakima, op.cit., p. 155.
100. Saldhana, op.cit., # 390-91, p. 213; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 1009.
101. Lorimer, op.cit., pp. 695, 701.
102. Kelly, op.cit., p. 313; Bombay Selections, p. 335; Saldhana, op.cit., Art. 369-375, pp. 201-2; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 702.
103. Ibid.; Kelly, op.cit., p. 327.
104. Saldhana, op.cit., Art. 389, p. 207.
105. Ibid.; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 703; Winder, op.cit., p. 129; Hawley, op.cit., 158
106. Lorimer, op.cit., p. 705; Kelly, op.cit., p. 327; Saldhana, op.cit., # 400
107. Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 89-91; Philby, op.cit., p. 183.
108. Ibid.
109. Saldhana, op.cit., Art. 402, 399, p. 223; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 958.
110. Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 96; Philby, op.cit., p. 189; Lorimer, op.cit., p. 958
111. Saldhana, op.cit., Art. 401, p. 224.

Chapter IV


- ¹ Sadleir, Diary, p. 44.
- ² Lorimer, op.cit., p. 958
- ³ Abu Hakima, Ta'rikh, Vol. 2, part I, p. 138, clause 3.
- ⁴ See pages 44 ff.
- ⁵ page 67 of the thesis(above)
- ⁶ Saldhana, Precis of Egyptian Conquest, Art. 392-3; Kelly, op.cit., pp. 314-318, 328.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Dodwell, op.cit., pp. 88-93.
- ⁹ Ibid., pp. 102, III, 115-7.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 134-8, 141, 149-151; Batrik, op.cit., pp. 231-4.
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² Dodwell, op.cit., p. 143.
- ¹³ Ibid., p. 93.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 77, 138.
- ¹⁵ Burckhardt, Travels, Vol. I, pp. 133, 144.
- ¹⁶ Dodwell, op.cit., pp. 133, 171-4.
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 46, 175-182; Batrik, op.cit., p. 235.
- ¹⁹ Dodwell, op.cit., p. 185; Batrik, op.cit., p. 233 footnote.
- ²⁰ Batrik, op.cit., pp. 249-50.

Chapter V

- ¹ Dodwell, op.cit., pp. 260, 263.

APPENDIX I


Abbreviated Genealogy of the House of Su'ūd*
 (Numbers and capitalisations indicate the rulers)



* For very complete genealogies of the Su'ūd family please see
 Philby, Arabian Jubilee, pp. 250-265; and Winder, Saudi Arabia, p. 279.

APPENDIX II

Photostat copy of Muhammad Rif'at Effendi's report of 9 Dhī al-Hijjah, 1254, attached to Khurshid's letter of 21 Muharram 1255 (April 7, 1839) R.E.A. doc. 3, reg. 267, referred to at page 56 above.



EGYPT

JORDAN

SUDAN

AL HAFUD

NEUTRAL ZONE

Hajara

ABYAN

SUDAIL

MANHAJIL KHAFI MUTAIR

JUBAIL

ARBA

ARBAH

BAITADH (SUDAN)

AFLAJ

ABU DANH

SAHM

SINAN

YAM

WABA'A

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
BAHM

HASHID

KARAB

A Part
 Arabian Pen
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 Important P

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A. Egyptian National Archives preserved in Cairo. Formerly they were called Royal Egyptian Archives (R.E.A. used in this work following Batrik). These records consist of registers, correspondence, instructions and reports communicated between the Ottoman Sultan and Muhammad 'Ali, their respective officers and generals and other governments.

B. British Foreign Office (F.O.) and India Office (I.O.) Records and correspondence between the British government, Supreme Government of India, Bombay Government and the British representatives abroad.

Except for a few original documents, some samples of which have been appended heretofore, I have mainly benefitted from A.M. Abu Hakima's book, Ta'rikh al-Kuwayt and A.H. Batrik's unpublished Ph.D. thesis, " Turkish and Egyptian Rule in Arabia (1810-1841) " on the above sources.

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