THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND
STATE IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI   ARABIA

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation examines the relationship between religion
and state in Saudi Arabia. More than any other country in the Muslim
world, Saudi Arabia is identified with Islam. It is the state religion,
its source of political legitimacy, it shapes state policies and
activities, and serves as the moral code of society.

The findings of this study support the hypothesis that the state,
because of its monopoly of force and resources, and the need to maintain
autonomy, can not tolerate an autonomous religious domain that would
compete with it for the loyalty of citizens. The state will extend
its authority to the religious domain and utilize religious leaders
and institutions to perpetuate its policies. This state will make
use of religious values to strengthen its authority and legitimacy.
It will not hesitate to suppress religious institutions if they challenge
its authority.

ABSTRAIT

Nome: Ayman Al-Yassini
Titre: La relation entre la religion et l'état au Royaume d'Arabie Saoudite
Départment: Sciences Politiques
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Cette thèse a examiné la relation entre la religion et l'état au Royaume d'Arabie Saoudite. Plus que tout autre pays Islamique, l'Arabie Saoudite est identifié à l'Islam. C'est la religion d'état, sa source de légitimité politique, elle façonne les politiques de l'état et ses activités, et agit comme code moral de la société.

Les conclusions de cette étude appuient l'hypothèse que l'état en raison de son monopole de forces et ressourcés, et le besoin de maintenir son autonomie, ne peut tolérer un domaine religieux autonome qui compétitionnerait avec lui pour la loyauté des hommes. Cet état étendra son autorité au domaine religieux et utilisera les chefs religieux et institutions afin de perpétuer ses politiques. Cet état utilisera les valeurs religiuses pour renforçir son autorite et sa legitimité. Il n'hésitera pas a subjuger les institutions religieuses si son autorité est défieé.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

In this study, I used the spelling most
commonly accepted in the literature on
Saudi Arabia. For example, Riyadh, Jeddah,
Ibn Saud.

PREFACE

This study deals with the relationship between religion and
state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. More than any other country
in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia is identified with Islam. In
addition to the presence of Mecca and Medina, the centre of Muslim
prayers and pilgrimage, the Kingdom's religious character was
reconfirmed in 1745 when Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab allied
himself with Al Saud, rulers of Dar'iya in central Najd. This
alliance continues today. Islam is the state religion, its source
of political legitimacy, it shapes state policies and activities·
and serves as the moral code of society. Because of its fundamentalist
ideology, the kingdom is viewed by many Muslims as fundamentalist.

The findings of this study indicate   that despite its fundamentalist
ideology, the Saudi Kingdom is secular. The state expanded its
jurisdiction to many areas that were formerly regulated by religion
and the religious establishment. The ulama became incorporated in
state administration and state laws regulate ulama activities. The
state, because of its monopoly of force and resources, and the need
to maintain autonomy, does not tolerate an autonomous religious domain
that may compete with it for the loyalty of citizens. The state
extended its jurisdiction to the religious domain and utilized religious

leaders and institutions to perpetuate its policies. The state made use of religious values to strengthen its authority and legitimacy. It did not hesitate to suppress religious institutions when they challenged state authority.

My interest in the relationship between religion and state was inspired by reading Professor Thomas C. Bruneau's book The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974). My gratitude to Professor Bruneau, who acted as my academic advisor and Director of Research at McGill University, is of a kind which can hardly be expressed adequately in the form of acknowledgment. His moral support, knowledge and perception were invaluable sources of guidance and inspiration throughout my study at McGill University, teaching, and the conception, formulation and completion of the project. Without this support, the study may not have been completed. To Professor Charles Adams of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, I owe a special debt of appreciation for assisting me at various stages of research with advice and interest in the project. I also thank Professor Hani Faris of Kuwait University for reading the outline of the project and commenting on chapters one and two; Dr. William Millward, for reading chapters three and four; Dr. Thomas Eisemon, for reading chapters six and the conclusion.

Research for the dissertation was undertaken in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, between 1979 and 1980. Thanks are due to a large number of

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The actual writing of the thesis was completed between 1980 and 1982, thanks to the ideal study conditions at the Centre for Developing Areas Studies, McGill University. My affiliation with the Centre since 1974 as a Research Fellow, its excellent research facilities and the emotional and intellectual support provided by the fellows is most appreciated. To the Centre's Director and Associate Director, Drs. Thomas C. Bruneau and Thomas Eisemon, thanks for their support. To the Centre's most efficient secretary, Linda Anderson, my appreciation for her helpful attitude. To my colleagues Mary Mooney and Gul Rukh Selim my thanks. Although Dr. Suraj Bandyopadhyay is no longer affiliated

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To my parents, my gratitude for their emotional and financial support.

INTRODUCTION

The theory of the Islamic polity in its classical form did
not envision the separation of religion and politics. Since Islam
had no hierarchical religious institutions analogous to the organization
of the Christian Church, the historical experience of Muslims shows
the concentration of authority in the hands of temporal power. The
Caliph was prince of the faithful as well as successor to the Prophet.
He was entrusted with the administration of justice and the implementa-
tion of the dictates of the shari'ah /¯Islamic law_/ . Religious
scholars, however, began to remove themselves from state authority in
order to maintain a measure of autonomy. This was brought about by two
developments: (1) The gradual transfer of power positions to non-Arab
elements during Abbasid rule, such as the Persians, Turks, Mongols;
(2) the general decline that befell the Muslim state. Alarmed by these
developments and fearing the effect on their discipline and status, the
ulama / religious scholars_/ set themselves as the guardians and sole
interpreters of the shari'ah.

In recent times, Muslim societies faced new realities. First, the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire following World War I resulted in
the loss of the major political entity which had provided semblance of
unity. Second, Muslim societies encountered a more dynamic Western

civilization which threatened their survival. Consequently, Muslims had to meet the challenges which they faced through the establishment of modern states. In view of their historical experience, Muslims raised the following question: what changes would be introduced into the relationship between religion and state in order to accomodate the new realities? The experience of Muslim states suggests that the relationship between religion and state are in line with the following set of propositions:

1- The state, because of its monopoly of force and resources, and the need to maintain a high level of autonomy, can not tolerate an autonomous religious domain that would compete with it for loyalty.

2- The state will extend its authority to the religious domain and utilize religious leaders and institutions to perpetuate its policies.

3- The state will make use of religious values to strengthen its authority and legitimacy.

4- The state will not hesitate to suppress religious institutions if they challenge state authority.

The above propositions are appropriate to the study of the relationship between religion and state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This country is one of the few surviving monarchies whose political and social system still rest to a great extent on traditional principles and practices. Legitimacy of the ruling House of Saud is primarily based on a combination of tribal-dynastic and religious factors. More than any other country in the Muslim world, the Saudi Kingdom is identified with Islam. In addition to the presence of Mecca and Medina, the centre of Muslim prayers and pilgrimage, the Kingdom's Islamic character was reconfirmed in 1745 when

Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab allied himself with Al Saud, the rulers of Dar'iyah in central Najd. The Kingdom is considered today as Islamic fundamentalist, with the Quran as its constitution and the shari'ah as the source of its laws and regulations.

With the discovery of oil in the 1930s, change occurred in the areas of education, urbanization, industry and bureaucracy. The political elite sought to maintain traditional values while seeking material development. This study will examine the complex process by which the traditional relationships between society, polity and religion have been altered in the modern Saudi state. Will there be an increase in differentiation between the roles of religion and state? Alternatively, will a modus vivendi and mutual accomodation between the two evolve, where the state will slow down the pace of material change, and the religious elite forced to accept some degree of change?

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The analysis of the relationship between religion and state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has received limited attention in scholarly literature.[1] A substantial number of the early works dealing with

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[1] Although the relationship between religion and state in Saudi Arabia has not been specifically dealt with in the literature, there are numerous works that deal with socio-economic, religious and political aspects of the Arabian Peninsula. Because of the enormous amount of literature on this subject, the following review concentrates on works of relevance to this thesis. For detailed bibliographies on the Arabian Peninsula, see the following: Harry Hazard et. al., Bibliography of Arabia (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956); C. L. Geddes, Analytical Guide to the Bibliographies on the Arabian Peninsula (Denver, Colorado: American Institute of Islamic Studies, 1974); Eric Marco, Bibliography of the Arabian Peninsula (Florida: University of Miami Press, 1958).

Saudi Arabia have been either "impressionistic literature, or
political memoirs." [2]

Most of the early twentieth century literature on the area
has concentrated on the teachings of Wahhabism and the structure
of its society. [3] Of these works, the writings of H. St. J. Philby
provide the most penetrating analysis of the emergence and characteristics
of the Wahhabi state. [4] In his book, Saudi Arabia, for example, Philby

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[2] See, Derek Hopwood, ed. The Arabian Peninsula (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), p. 13. The following is a representative
list of impressionistic travel literature on the Peninsula and memoirs
of political officers who served in the region. C. M. Doughty,
Travels in Arabian Deserta (Cambridge: 1888); C. Niebuhr, Description
de l'Arabie, Faite sur des Observations Propres et des avis Accueillis
sur les Lieux Meme (Amsterdam-Utrecht, 1774); Lady Anne Blunt, A Pilgrimage
to Nejd, the Cradle of the Arab Race (Lodnon: 1930); J. L. Burckhardt,
Travels in Arabia, Comprehending an Account of those Territories in Hedjaz
Which the Mohammedans Regrad Sacred (London: 1929); Sir Richard Francis
Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Mecca (London:
1898).

[3] See, for example, R. E. Cheeseman, In Unknown Arabia (London: 1926);
Wyman Bury, Arabia Infelix (London: 1915); Louis P. Dame, "Four Months in
Nejd", Moslem World, Vol. XIV (1924); Ameen Rihani, Arabian Peak and Desert
(London: 1930).

[4] For a list of Philby's published and unpublished works see, Elizabeth
Monroe, Philby of Arabia (London: Faber and Faber, 1973).

chronicles the rise of Saudi power and examines the confrontation between a puritan-Islamic state and the secular world.[5] On the fiftieth anniversary of Ibn Saud's rule, Philby published <u>Arabian Jubilee</u> which presented a portrait of a king disturbed by the process of change he started and bewildered by the inroads of a world he did not comprehend.[6] In other and more recent books, Philby expressed his dismay with the "increasingly prevalent laxity, extravagance and corruption" found in the Saudi state.[7]

Colonel Gerald de Gaury is another prolific writer who devoted considerable attention to Saudi Arabia. Less committed to the Saudis than Philby, he nevertheless expressed obvious sympathy for a country in the process of change.[8]

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[5] H. St. J. Philby, <u>Saudi Arabia</u> (London: Benn Publishers, 1955).

[6] H. St. J. Philby, <u>Arabian Jubilee</u> (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1952).

[7] See, for example, Philby's <u>Forty Years in the Wilderness</u> (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1957). For works by travelers contemporary with Philby see the following: Lord Belhaven, <u>The Uneven Road</u> (London: 1955); Douglas Carruthers, <u>Arabian Adventure</u> (London: 1935); Hans Helfritz, <u>Land Without Shade</u> (London: 1935); Harold Ingrams, <u>Arabia and the Isles</u> (London: 1966); Philippe Lippens, <u>Expédition en Arabie Centrale</u> (Paris: 1956); Alois Musil, <u>The Northern Hejaz</u> (New York: 1926); Eldon Rutter, <u>The Holy Cities of Arabia</u> (London: 1928), in two volumes; Freya Stark, <u>The Southern Gates of Arabia</u> (London: 1936); Wilfred Thesiger, <u>Arabian Sands</u> (London: 1959); and K. S. Twitchell, <u>Saudi Arabia</u> (New York: 1958).

[8] Gerald de Gaury, <u>Arabia Phoenix</u> (London: George C. Harrap and Co., 1951), and <u>Rulers of Mecca</u> (London: George C. Harrap and Co., 1955).

In more recent years, the impact of modernization on the traditional society of Saudi Arabia, including the growth of nationalism and the expansion of the new middle class, began to receive the attention of several scholars. Among the earliest was R. H. Sanger's The Arabian Peninsula , which examined the "impact of Western civilization" on Arabia. [9] It was followed by other works dealing with the same theme. In a volume prepared in 1963 by the American Universities Field Staff, Richard Nolte dealt with the impact of the discovery of oil on Saudi society. [10] One of the consequences of the sudden stimulus and wealth provided by oil is the growth of Saudi nationalism as an important social value. Of equal importance as well has been the expansion of the new middle class. This class, as William Rught suggests in his article "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia", is distinguished from other classes in society by its reliance on secular, non-traditional knowledge to achieve its position. [11]

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[9] R. H. Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula (Ithaca, New York: 1954).

[10] Richard Nolte, "From Nomad Society to New Nation: Saudi Arabia", in K. H. Silvert, ed., Expectant Peoples, Nationalism and Development (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 77.

[11] William Rugh, "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter, 1973). For more information on the emergence and characteristics of the new middle class in the Middle East see, Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), especially chapter 4; James Bill, "Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October, 1972); George Rentz, "Saudi Arabia: the Islamic Island", in Jack Thompson and Robert Reischauer, eds., Modernization of the Arab World (New York: Van Nostrand Company, 1966); John A. Shaw and David E. Long, Saudi Arabian Modernization (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982).

The political role of the new middle class is relatively marginal, for politics in Saudi Arabia remains highly personalized and centralized in the hands of the King, the royal family and the religious establishment. Within the study of religion and politics in Saudi Arabia, reference may be made to Soulié and Champenois, le Royaume d'Arabie Saoudite facé à l'Islam Révolutionnaire, 1953-1964 . In this short but highly informative volume, the authors contrast Nasser's "revolutionary Islam" with Faisal's "traditionalist Islam." For the authors, the conflict between Egypt and Saudi Arabia--the first adopted secular socialism and the second has the Quran as its constitution--was not an ideological one. It was a "secular antagonism" between sedentary and nomadic peoples, with "progressive secular" and "reactionary religious" over-tones.[12]

Soulié and Champenois' book does not attempt to establish a theoretical framework to assess the relationship between religion and state within Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Addressing himself to this issue, Humphreys suggests that "what is needed is a more systematic sense of how political issues are felt to be religious issues among many groups in the Arab Muslim societies."[13] The approach

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[12] G. J.-L. Soulié and L. Champenois, Le Royaume d'Arabie Saoudite face à l'Islam Révolutionnaire, 1953-1964 (Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1966). The authors have published a more recent and general book on Saudi Arabia entitled: Le Royaume d' Arabie Saoudite àl'épreuve des Temps Modernes (Paris: Albin Michel, 1978). This book presents a survey of Saudi socio-economic and political developments in the period following the death of Ibn Saud and until 1977.

[13] R. Stephen Humphreys, "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria", The Middle East Journal , Vol. 33, No. 1 (Winter, 1979), p. 2.

which he suggests is first to define the elementary religious-
political orientations available to contemporary Muslim statesmen,"
and second "exploring how these orientations are reflected in the
political structure and policies" of the countries under examination.[14]
What the author is suggesting here is to examine the way Islam may
influence political values from three perspectives: (1) as a religion
strictly speaking--i.e. as a system of ideological beliefs and
transcendentally fixed ethical values; (2) as an ideology; and (3)
as a symbol of cultural identity. It is the interaction of these
three modes of religion, Humphreys suggests, which produces distinctive
religious-political orientations.

Humphrey's study of the impact of religion on political values
may be considered a serious addition to the literature. It departs
from the strictly descriptive and historical type of analysis. It
is, however, limited to the study of the impact of religion on political
values, and fails to analyze the overall relationship between religion
and politics.[15]

Most of the existing writings on Saudi Arabia are of a descriptive
rather than an analytic nature. They simply record and describe events
as they occurred in the country without attempting to base their analysis

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[14] Ibid.,

[15] In his article "Religion and Politics in Israel and Egypt", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring, 1979), Bruce M. Borthwick presents a dynamic analysis of the interaction between the religious and political spheres in both countries.

on structured frameworks. Several commentaries have appeared on the history of the Kingdom. Others have dwelt on oil politics and economic development. But none have specifically examined the relationship between religion and state. The literature also fails to relate the interaction between religion and politics in the kingdom to the process of nation-building.[16] This failure is difficult to explain because no complete study of religion and state can be made without examining the process of change which began in Saudi Arabia with the discovery of oil in the 1930s. Moreover, it would be a futile exercise to deal with social and economic change, as two isolated variables, without considering the response of the religious and political establishments.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To establish a theoretical approach for the study of the relationship between religion and state in Saudi Arabia, it is necessary first to define the meaning of religion and state. It has been suggested that "definitions cannot by their very nature, be either 'true' or 'false', only more useful or less so."[17] In scholarly literature, for

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[16] For a somewhat limited, but still informative, survey of American literature dealing with political and economic development in Saudi Arabia see, Fouad al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia, a Case Study in Development (London: Stacey International, 1978), pp. 173-194. More critical and analytical works on Saudi Arabia have appeared in recent years, but remain oblivious to the question of religion and state. See, for example, Willard A. Beling, ed., King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1980), and Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand (London: Ithaca Press, 1978).

[17] Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy, Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1969), p. 175.

example, religion has been :

> Viewed as man's response to supra-natural
> forces, as a disease of language, as the
> outgrowth of fear and the drive for security
> and assurance, as an instinctive mechanism
> for the enshrinment of the main values of
> a society, as a principal means for social
> integration, as response to an inherent
> sense of the infinite in man's conscious,
> as commitment to the deepest values that
> men recognize, and so on. 18

Milton Yinger sums up the different interpretations and definitions of religion into three categories: (1) valuative definitions-- they describe what, in the writer's opinion, religion ought to be. (2) Descriptive and substantive definitions--designating certain kinds of belief and practices as religion without, on the one hand, evaluating them, or, on the other, indicating their functions. Here attention is drawn to religions as cultural systems. Their doctrines, rites, sacred texts, typical group structures and the like, are described, contrasted and compared. Substantive definitions can be of great value, particularly for those who are concerned with religion as a pan-human phenomenon. (3) The functional definition deals with the function of religion in society. [19]

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(18) Charles J. Adams, "Islamic Religious Tradition", in Leonard Binder, ed., The Study of the Middle East (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), p. 32.

(19) J. Milton Yinger, Religion and Society in Interaction (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), pp. 174-175.

For our purposes, religion is defined as a set of ideas and institutions premised on the belief in the existence of the supranatural, and these ideas and institutions influence the ideas and institutions in society and are influenced by them in return. As for the meaning of state or politics, we may note the existence of consensus about at least two characteristics found in the literature. First, politics--as state or government--consists fundamentally of ideas and institutions. The ideology of the political system, ways of reaching political decisions, procedures for carrying out certain tasks, expectations about rights and privileges are all important elements to consider. Second, politics is more concerned with societal norms that stipulate how and by whom coercive power shall be used in the pursuit of societal goals. The use of coercive power by government seems necessary primarily because the available supply of rewards that people strive for, both individually and collectively, is limited. Politics and government, therefore, may be described as the norms and institutions that designate the ultimate coercive power and the process by which the norms that regulate the exercise of power and authority are implemented. This definition corresponds well with Harold Lasswell's classic definition of politics as "Who Gets What, When, and How"--that is, the process of determining the distribution of society's rewards and balancing power relationships and claims.[20]

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[20] Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When and How (New York: Meridian Books, 1958). It must be noted that "state", "politics" and "government" are used interchangeably.

The problem of the relationship between religion and state has been of long standing concern in the social sciences. The work of Max Weber, although more explicitly focused on the relations between economics and religion, has contained as well an analyses of the inter-action between religion and politics in general and between specific types of religious and political systems in particular.

In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber tackled three major issues: (1) the effect of major religious ideas on the secular ethic and economic behaviour of the average believer; (2) the effect of group formation on religious ideas; and (3) the determination of what was distinctive for the West by a comparison of the causes and consequences of religious beliefs in different civilizations.[21]

As for the relations between religion and state, Weber believed it to be of conflictual rather than of cooperative nature. "The state's absolute end is to safeguard /¯or to change_7 the external and internal distribution of power; ultimately this end must seem meaning-less to any universalist religion of salvation."[22]

While Weber was concerned with the role of religion as an accelerating or retarding factor in the rationalization of the economy, Karl Marx was chiefly interested in the role of religion in expressing or hindering the growth of class consciousness among the exploited. For Marx,"religion is the moan of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, the

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(21) See, Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Anchor Books, 1962), pp. 83-84.

(22) H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds., From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 334.

sense of a senseless conditions. It is the opium of the people."[23]

Rejecting the Marxist analysis of religion as a derivative of more fundamental social variables, and accepting Weber's premise that religion has a profound effect on the attitude and behaviour of men, the structural-functionalist approach examines the role of religion and religious institutions in maintaining the equilibrium of the social system. Religion is seen in this approach as contributing to the cohesiveness and stability of society in a number of ways. First, it performs an important identity function. Kingsley Davis wrote that "religion gives the individual a sense of identity with the distant past and limitless future. It expands his ego by making his spirit significant for the universe and the universe significant for him."[24] Second, religion may also act to reinforce the unity and stability of society by supporting social control, enhancing established values and goals and providing the means of overcoming alienation.[25]

The application of this approach to the study of the relationship between religion and state is not satisfactory; it assumes that social systems are completely integrated and that all elements are functional and indispensable, thus providing only a partial explanation of social reality.

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[23] Karl Marx, "Critique in the Hegelian Philosophy of Law", in Marx, Engels, On Religion (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 39.

[24] Kingsley Davis, Human Society (New York: MacMillan Co., 1948), pp. 531-533.

[25] For information on the structural-functionalist approach in the study of religion see, Thomas O'Dea, The Sociology of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966).

In an attempt to provide a model to study the specific problem
of the relationship between religion and state, J. Milton Yinger
suggested three possible relationships ranging from partnership to
conflict.[26] Describing Yinger's typology as "extremely general" and
lacking precision, Johnstone presents an alternative model. This
model suggests six possbile relationships which vary from pure
theocracy to total separation.[27]

Although Johnstone's typology takes into consideration the many
possible relationships between religion and state, it is still descriptive
and lacks dynamism. Indeed, both Yinger and Johnstone fail to take into
account the factors that might weaken the position of the religious
sphere in one system and strengthen it in another. They also fail to
specify the conceptual tools needed to examine the complex processes by
which the traditional relationships between society, polity and religion
are being radically altered.

Dissatisfaction with previous typologies led Donald Eugene Smith to
develop a substitute model. He differentiated between organic and
church religious systems. In organic systems, there is a fusion of
religious and political functions performed by a unitary structure. The
ruler exercises both temporal and spiritual authority, and his chief

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[26] op.cit.,see also by the same author, The Scientific Study of Religion
(New York: MacMillan, 1970).

[27] Ronald L. Johnstone, Religion and Society in Interaction (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), especially pp. 176-179.

function is to maintain the divine social order according to sacral law and tradition.[28]

Church systems, on the other hand, project a structure that is within society but distinctly separate from it. Because of its separate structural identity, the Church's power relationship to government can take one of three forms: (1) church over government; (2) government over church; and (3) bipolar balance of power.[29]

Because of their concern with the development of ecclesiastical organization, Smith maintains, church systems are better equipped to respond to a multitude of problems created by social change. For instance, church systems are prepared to oppose government-sponsored secularization efforts, to play an active role in politics through clerical interest groups and clerically-led mass organizations, and to reformulate the chrurch's social doctrine under the auspices of ecclesiastical authority.

Organic systems, on the other hand, have low ecclesiastical organization, thus they respond much less coherently and effectively to the challenge of secularization and change.

Although the Smith framework is among the first serious attempts at developing a dynamic model in which key variables are spelled out, such as the interaction between religious and political actors and religious

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[28]Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970); and by the same author, ed., Religion and Political Modernization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

[29]Smith, Religion and Political Development, p. 8.

values and political culture, a few reservations are in order. The model is restricted to the exploration of different kinds of relationships between religion and political development. As such, it does not examine why a certain polity is more secular than another, or what factors contribute to the weakening of the authority of the religious sphere in one country and its strengthening in another?

A further shortcoming in this model is its inability to relate the interaction between religion and politics to the larger and more complex process of nation-building. Can the interaction between religion and politics be treated as an isolated process? Or should the changing patterns of this interaction be considered as part of a larger and more complex phenomenon? It is necessary to identify not only the key variables involved in the complex relationship between religion and state, but also the extent of interdependence among these components and how one affects the other. [30]

For our purposes, and following the Weberian tradition, religion is dealt with in terms of ideas and institutions, as beliefs and actions. Ideas are not developed in a vacuum but by a structured organization that acts upon, and reacts to, its environment. [31] Environments, and

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(30) For an excellent comparative review of Smith, Religion and Political Development, and the works of Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973); John N. Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), see David Laitin, "Religion and Political Culture, and the Weberian Tradition", World Politics, Vol. XXX, No. 4 (July, 1978).

(31) Thomas C. Bruneau, The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 4.

more specifically political systems, change and the religious sphere
may either support this change or oppose it. It may act as a focus
of change, or it may play a conservative role. Consequently, three
questions will guide our study: (1) What is the nature of the interaction
between religion and state? (2) What are the factors that affect and
shape this interaction? (3) What is the outcome of the interaction?

RESEARCH METHOD AND PLAN

This study attempts to link a specific problem, the changing
pattern in the relationship between religion and state in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia to developments and changes occurring in the social
system. It is a study based on the use of primary sources such as
Saudi governmental reports, statistical data, interviews, and relevant
published and unpublished materials. Guided by the questions concerning
the nature of the interaction between religion and state, the factors
that affect and shape this interaction, and the outcome, this thesis is
divided into two parts: In part I, Chapter I examines the historical
relationship between religion and state in Islam. This is intended to
provide an insight into the interaction between the two spheres, as well
as delimit the constraints within which this relationship operates.
Chapter II deals with the rise and decline of the First Saudi State
/¯1745-1818_7, with special reference to the principles of Wahhabism and
the relationship between Al Saud and Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

Part II is divided into four chapters. Chapter III contains a study of the resurrection of the Saudi Kingdom in 1901, and examines the role of religion as an instrument of expansion and control. Chapter IV is a study of the factors that affected and influenced the expansion of state control and the incorporation of the ulama in state administration. Chapter V examines the changing pattern in the composition and orientation of the Saudi political elite. As such, it provides a basis for assessing the direction of change in the role and position of the ulama in the Saudi political system. Finally, Chapter VI addresses itself to the process of nation-building and its impact on the role of religion in society.

PART I

RELIGION AND STATE IN ISLAM: CONFLICT AND HARMONY BETWEEN VISION

AND REALITY

ISLAM: CONFLICT BETWEEN THE VISION AND REALITY

Traditional Islamic political theories are based on the premise
that the purpose of government in Islam is to preserve the shari'ah
and enforce its dictates. The theories maintain that only God is
sovereign and the source of all authority. Consequently, Islam knows
no separation between religion and state, or the sacred and the profane.
Members in the Muslim community /¯ummah_7 are God's subjects; the
community's laws are divine; its property is God's property; its army is
God's army; and its enemies are God's enemies.[1] To maintain and
enforce the shari'ah, a temporal ruler is needed, "whose office is...
part of the divine plan for mankind."[2] As the Muslim community transcends
all cultural and political boundaries, and is distinct from and in direct
opposition to the community of unbelievers, there must be one ruler
to govern the community, and obedience to him is a religious obligation.

The death of Muhammad in 632 AD, with no succession arranged,
confronted the ummah with three main crises which affected the traditional
assumptions in the relationship between religion and state. First, there

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[1] Bernard Lewis, "Politics and War," in Joseph Schacht and C.E.
Bosworth, eds., The Legacy of Islam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974),
p. 159; and Majid Khadduri, "Nature of the Islamic State," Islamic Culture ,
Vol. 21 (October, 1947), p. 327.

[2] Lewis, Ibid., p. 160.

was the conflict between the Muhajerun and the Ansar, as each group
insisted on its right to nominate Muhammad's successor from among its
ranks.[3] Second, some tribal leaders argued that their allegiance to
Muhammad ended with his death; consequently, they asserted their
independence. Third, the civil war between Ali, Muhammad's cousin
and son-in-law, and Mu'awiya, governor of Syria, and Ali's murder in
661 AD, permanently shattered the unity of the Islamic community.
The schisms which emerged had a direct bearing on the conception of
ruler and conduct of the state. A number of political theories evolved,
all of which were based on the premise that the purpose of government
is to maintain the shari'ah and enforce its principles, but differed
on who should be caliph and how he should be chosen.[4] These theories
focused on the ruler and his relation to society, used religion and
religious symbols to justify the ruler's position, and were written
in support or condemnation of one or another ruler. It is the purpose
of this chapter to examine the interplay between the Islamic ideal of
government and reality and relate the result of this interaction to
the evolution of government in the modern Arab world.

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[3]The Muhajerun are Muhammad's early followers who left Mecca with him in
622 AD to escape the consequences of embracing Islam. The Ansar are the
Medinans who gave refuge to Muhammad and were credited for the initial success
of Islam.

[4]Lewis, op.cit., p. 160.

THE ISLAMIC BODY POLITIC AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

THE HISTORICAL SETTING

The Prophetic State

Muhammad's emigration to Yathrib /¯Medina_7 in 622 AD marks the beginning of the first Islamic state. [5] This state had a dual character.. On the one hand, it was a religious community and as such was defined by its members' acceptance of Muhammad's prophethood and their submission to Islam. On the other hand, it was a political community headed by Muhammad, the statesman. In administering the daily affairs of the ummah, Muhammad made a distinction between his religious and temporal roles. All religious matters were to be decided by him alone in accordance with the revelation he received from God. Temporal matters, however, were dealt with in his capacity as the temporal head of the community. This dual character of Muhammad's rule was expressed in his hadith /¯saying_7 "whatever concerns your religion bring it forth to me, but for your temporal affairs you may know the best." [6] Putting this principle into practice, Muhammad

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[5] Yathrib is the pre-Islamic name of Medina. Muhammad's prophetic mission is divided into two periods. First, his Meccan period, the city of his birth in which he began to receive the revelation to the day he left Mecca with some of his followers, fleeing from persecution. The second, covers his life in Medina. Muhammad's years in Medina are of importance to students of Islamic political theory because it was in that city that the first Islamic ummah was created and Islamic principles were implemented. Because Muhammad's emigration to Medina marks the foundation of the Muslim community, the Caliph Umar chose this year of hijra /emigration/ to begin the Islamic calendar.

[6] See Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, al-Musnad (Beirut: Dar al-Nashr, n.d.), Vol. III, p. 152.

conducted some of the non-religious affairs of the community through
shura /¯consultation7 with his companions. The majority's decision,
even if it went against Muhammad's inclination, was implemented.
Abu Hurayrah, a close companion of Muhammad and an authority on hadith,
confirmed this view by stating that in dealing with public matters,
"no body could consult his companions as much as the Prophet did."[7]

The Caliphate as an Elective Institution

With the death of Muhammad in 632 AD, his prophetic mission was
completed. His legacy consisted of a unified state with a strong
drive for expansion. In the leadership of the community, a deputy
or successor to Muhammad was needed. Despite the apparent unity of
the community, two groups with different social and ideological back-
ground emerged--these were the Muhajerun and the Ansar. Both contested
the leadership of the community, but finally, and after long deliberation,
consensus was reached and Abu Bakr, from the Muhajerun, was proclaimed
by the elders as Muhammad's successor /¯khalifat rasul al-lah7. Except
for direct communication with God, the Caliph was to maintain the same
authority and responsibility assumed by Muhammad. He played the religious

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[7]Cited in Ibn Taymiyah, al-Siyasa al-Shar'iya _ (Cairo: al-Matba'ah
al-Salafiyah, 1378 AH), p. 88. For a reference to the incidents in which
Muhammad consulted his companions see, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, The Life
of Muhammad (Washington, D.C.: North American Trust Publications, 1976),
and William Montgomery Watt, Muhammad, Prophet and Statesman (London:
Oxford University Press, 1961).

role of _Imam_, and was the symbol of Islamic unity. As head of
the state, the Caliph was Commander of the Faithful. It was his
responsibility to take charge of all activities related to the
internal and external affairs of the state. He was responsible for
the maintenance and implementation of the principles of the shari'ah,
to develop the material welfare of the community, and to defend and
expand the land of Islam. He was accountable for all aspects of state
administration and carried out these functions in accordance with
the shari'ah.[7]

Once Abu Bakr assumed office he announced the principles which
were to guide his government:

> I have been made a ruler over you though I am
> not the best of you. Help me if I go right,
> correct me if I go wrong. Truth is faithfulness
> and falsehood is treachery. The weak one among
> you will be strong with me till I have got him
> his due, if God so wills; and the strong one among
> you will be weak with me till I have made him what
> he owes, if God so wills. Beware, when a nation
> gives up its endeavors in the way of God, He makes
> no exception but brings it low, and when it allows
> evil to prevail in it, undoubtedly He makes it
> miserable. Obey me as long as I obey God and His
> Prophet; if I do not obey them, you owe me no
> obedience. [8]

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(7) Erwin I. J. Rosenthal, _Political Thought in Medieval Islam_ (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 61-62; and Lewis, _op.cit._, p. 159.

(8) Cited in Abul A'la Maududi, "Political Thought in Early Islam," ed.,
M. M. Sharif, _A History of Muslim Philosophy_ (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz,
1963), Vol. I, p. 662.

Abu Bakr's statement embodies an important principle of Islamic government which was to characterize Islamic political thought even when government in fact had become purely hereditary and based on naked force. This principle maintains that obedience to the ruler is binding upon the ummah as long as the ruler upholds the shari'ah; if he violates or ignores its principles, the community is justified in dismissing him.

Before his death in 634 AD, Abu Bakr nominated Umar Ibn al-Khattab to succeed him, and his choice was ratified first by the elders of the community and second by the community as a whole. In conducting the affairs of the ummah, the Caliph Umar /⁻634-644 AD_7 demonstrated a remarkable ability to apply the principles of the shari'ah to new situations which were created by the expansion of Islam. He encouraged his deputies to base their legal decisions on the Quran, the Sunna /⁻Muhammad's conduct and hadith_7 and reason. "Do not hesitate," Umar instructed his deputies, "to change a decision once you realize that it was not equitable. This is better than to persevere in error. Be guided by reason."[9] As for deciding a method of succession, Umar appointed an electoral college composed of six prominent community members and delegated to them the duty of choosing the caliph from among themselves.

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[9]Amir Hassan Siddiqui, "Islamic Institutions During the Pious Caliphate," The Voice of Islam, Vol. X (January, 1961), pp. 188-189.

The Emergence of Factionalism and Development of Hereditary Rule

Following Umar's death, Uthman was elected caliph. Pious and benovolent. but weak and undecided, he was dominated by his relatives, and corruption among his officials led to a growing discontent against his rule. In 655 AD, a delegation from Egypt came to Medina, the Capital, and asked Uthman to step down. He refused claiming for the first time in Muslim history what could be viewed as a divine right to rule. "I shall never take off a mantle," Uthman told his opponents, "that God himself vested me with." [10] Eventually, he was murdered; with his death, the religious bond which had held together the Muslim community was irrevocably destroyed. [11]

In the aftermath, Ali was elected to the caliphate, but Mu'awiya and Aisha, Muhammad's wife, refused to pay him allegiance. A long and bloody civil strife ensued, and ended with the victory of Mu'awiya and the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty. [12] With the Umayyads

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[10] Muhammad el-Rayes, al-Nazariyat al-Siyasiya al-Islamiya. (Cairo: 1966), p. 42.

[11] Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 60.

[12] On the verge of defeat, Mu'awiya called for arbitration, and Judge Abu Musa al-Asha'ari recommended that both contenders should step down, with the understanding that new election be held according to the principle of consultation. The result of the arbitration was bound to be in favour of Mu'awiya who already possessed political power in Syria and had at his disposal sophisticated administrative machinery in Damascus. Ali's position was further weakened by divisions within his ranks. His supporters split into the Legitimists, the group which was later to develop into the shi'i sect, and the Kharijites who were angered by Ali's acceptance of arbitration and declared war on both contenders.

in power /¯661-750 AD_/, the Caliphate was changed into worldly
kingship. Their rule, however, ended in 750 AD when the Abbasids
seized power. Although under Abbasid rule /¯750-1258 AD_/ Islamic
civilization came into full blossom and this period is considered
as "the Golden Age of Islam," the Islamic empire became fragmented
and non-Arab elements dominated the political arena. Where once all
the lands of Islam had been effectively under the rule of a single
caliph, the provinces were now controlled by independent rulers,
often hereditary.[13] For example, in 756 AD, an Umayyad prince, Abd
al-Rahman, established his rule over Muslim Spain in defiance of the
Abbasid Caliph. Following Spain, and between late eight to early
tenth centuries, other autonomous dynasties emerged in Morocco, Tunisia,
eastern Iran, Egypt, Syria and even parts of Iraq, where the Caliphs
had established their capital Baghdad. To accomodate the powerful
governors of these autonomous regions and maintain the semblance of
unity, a tradition developed whereby provincial leaders recognized the
titular supremacy of the Caliph as head of the Muslim community, who
in turn issued them a "diploma of appointment" legitimating their rule.[14]
The disintegration of the political system was aggravated by another
development. While historically the land of Islam was governed by
a single caliph, by 929 AD there were, for a while, three caliphs: the
Caliph in Muslim Spain, the Fatimid Caliph in Egypt, and the Abbasid
Caliph in Baghdad.

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(13) Lewis, "Politics ...," p. 166.

(14) Ibid.,

During Abbasid rule, and because of the influence of non-Arab administrators, some Perso-Byzantine court ceremonies and administrative practices were introduced. Through shrewed and falsified interpretation of some Quranic verses, the position of the caliph was glorified. For instance, based on the Quranic verse in which God addresses his angels and says: "I am placing in the earth a caliph," meaning Adam, some individuals attempted to place the position of the ruler above that of both the angels and the prophets. [15]

It was during Abbasid rule also that the institution of the ulama evolved. Islam as revealed by Muhammad did not provide for a priesthood, and the caliphs were successors of Muhammad as heads of the community, not as religious authority. Gradually, however, a body of men developed with specialized religious functions--mainly reciters of the Quran and experts in the Traditions. A number of theological schools evolved, each with its own interpretation of the principles of the shari'ah. With the expansion of Islam during the Umayyad and Abbasid rule, the need for legal scholars and jurists increased. [16] Describing the emergence of the ulama as an institution, Watt wrote:

> If judges were to be taken from men 'trained' in the
> various schools of law, the training had to become...
> formal. Just how this happened is not altogether clear,
> but some men came to be recognized as authorities in one

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[15] See, The Quran, Sura II, verse 30. Cited in William Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), p. 37.

[16] See, Nikki Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints, and Sufis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

or other of the specialized religious disciplines which were developing. Those who had been adequately 'trained' under recognized masters may be said to have entered the corps of ulama...or 'scholars' from whom judges and similar officials were selected. This corps of the ulama was the religious institution, and it claimed that it alone /acting through those of its senior members who were recognized as authorities/ could formulate the application of the shari'a to particular issues. [17]

While the ulama claimed to be the sole interpreters of the precepts of the shari'ah, they became part of the state administration and consequently lost the autonomy to which they aspired. In its relation with the ulama, the state recognized the paramountcy of the shari'ah, avoided open contravention of its principles, and occa· sionally consulted leading ulama and elevated them to positions of authority. On their part, the ulama came to abstain from involvement in political life. When they accepted office, they did so with reluctance. The ulama refusal to serve the state was primarily caused by their view of the state as an "oppressor." Al Ghazzali noted that state revenues are obtained by oppression and extortion. Anyone, therefore, who accepts a paid position under the state becomes an accomplice in oppression and is thus a sinner.[18] Of course, there were many ulama who served the political authority, but the general feeling of the ulama body was that the state was a contamination to be avoided.

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(17)William Montgomery Watt, The Majesty that was Islam (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 109.

(18)Bernard Lewis, Islam and the Arab World (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1977), p. 14.

Decline of the Caliphate Institution and Emergence of the Sultanate

Theoretically, the caliph and his officials could function only within the confines of the shari!ah, as interpreted by the ulama. In practice, however, the ulama were powerless to challenge the abuse of power. In addition, the traditionally powerful and prestigious position of the caliph became restricted by 935 AD to heading prayers and sanctioning the authority of de facto rulers in the various provinces of the Abbasid empire. In 946 AD, for example, the Shi'i-Persian Buwayhids, the new de facto rulers of Baghdad, assumed the title of amir al-umara /¯amir of amirs/ , which came to be a title of imperial sovereignty, distinct from and in practical terms superior to, the Abbasid Caliph. Independent holders of power also abrogated the title of Sultan, so as to demonstrate that they are not appointed by a superior authority.[19] With the Seljuqs in power in the eleventh century, the division of authority between the caliph, as religious head of the community, and the sultan, the ruler responsible for the government, was institutionalized. It was the Sultan who would choose and appoint the Caliph, and then the Sultan would swear allegiance to the Caliph as head of the community. But it was the Sultan who ruled, and the Caliph legitimated this rule. In other words, "the Caliph reigned but did not rule; the Sultan did both."[20] The dual authority between

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(19)Lewis, "Politics...," p. 168.

(20)Ibid., p. 172.

the Sultan and the Caliph, however, ended in 1258 AD when the Mongol invaders of Iraq executed the Abbasid Caliph and abolished the caliphate institution.

From the Mongol invasion on, the sultans ruled alone as the undisputed sovereigns of their states. Meanwhile, the Egyptian Mamluks installed their own "shadow caliphs" long before the title of Caliph became one of the many titles used by Muslim rulers. It was not until the nineteenth century, and only for a brief period, that the Ottoman Caliphs lay claim to the allegiance of Muslims.[21] With the continued decline of Ottoman rule, it was only a matter of time before the Caliphate institution was abolished. In November 1922, the Grand National Assembly in Ankara deposed Muhammad VI and, two years later, abolished the caliphate.[22]

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[21] The Ottoman state began as a principality governed by military leaders in 1299; succeeded in conquering Constantinople in 1453; and by the 1500s was able to control, among other territories, Greece, the Balkans and even to lay siege to Vienna. The Ottoman Sultan-Caliphs based their claim to the Caliphate on the theory that the last Abbasid Caliph in Cairo transferred the Caliphate to Sultan Selim I /1512-1519/, conqueror of Egypt. The Ottoman claim to the caliphate was most diligently pursued in the nineteenth century in the hope that the institution will become a rallying point for Muslims controlled by the European powers, including the Muslims in British India. Under Ottoman rule, the ulama became fully incorporated in the state machinery and formed a distinct and separate corps with clear hierarchy and ranks. As they moved closer to the state, they lost their autonomy and became subservient to political interests.

[22] A resolution adopted by the Grand National Assembly on November 1, 1922 declared that "By the law of fundamental organization, the Turkish Nation having transferred its sovereign power to the moral personality of the Grand National Assembly, the Sultanate ended for all time on March 16, 1920," when the Republic was proclaimed. Quoted in "The Institution of the Caliphate and the Spirit of the Age," in John R. Mott, ed., The Moslem World of Today (New York: Smith, 1925), pp. 47-48.

THE IDEOLOGICAL SETTING

ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT: A REACTION TO POLITICAL FACTIONALISM

Movements of Opposition to Islamic Orthodoxy

Differences within the Islamic community began to emerge during the rule of Uthman, and assumed a distinctive theological and political character when Ali took office which resulted in civil war. A number of sects and schools of thought evolved, dealing not only with theological issues but also with questions related to the nature of the Islamic state as well as the authority and legality of the caliphate institution. At one extreme, the Shi'is /¯Party of Ali_7 maintained that Muhammad's descendants through the marriage of Fatima to Ali are the sole legitimate inheritors of the Caliphate. To these hereditary imams, the Shi'is ascribed not only the divine right of succession, but also the exclusive ability to interpret the law properly, since they were by nature infallible. In other words, the Shi'i theory of government posits the necessity of permanent divine guidance of the community through the perpetuation of the prophetic mission by a series of divinely inspired imams. It is opposed to the Sunni /¯Orthodox_7 view which vested the right to install the Caliph in the community. [23]

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[23] For a study of Shi'i and Sunni theories of government see, Andrea M. Farsakh, "A Comparison of the Sunni Caliphate and the Shi'i Imamate," The Muslim World, LIX (1969).

At the other extreme, the puritan Kharijites /¯Seceders7
maintained the right of the community to be the sole judge of
the ability of the imam to hold this position. This group
asserted that every believer, even a "black slave," can become
caliph as long as he is morally and religiously irreproachable
in character. They insisted that no tribe or race can enjoy more
inherited superiority than another. They particularly opposed
the theory of the inherited right of the Quraishites to the
caliphate. [24]

The doctrinal beliefs and methods used for the realization
of their goals, set the Kharijites apart from the majority of
Muslims. By resorting to violence, ab rogating to themselves
the right to be the sole interpreters of the shari'ah, and question-
ing the beliefs of all those who differed with them, the Kharijites
turned into a radical minority faction alienated from the Islamic
community. While their slogan was "rule belongs to none but God,"
they in fact sat in judgment on their fellow Muslims. Their fanaticism
ultimately led to their extinction as a political movement.

The extremism and frequent resort to violence of the Shi'is and
the Kharijites forced the general body of the Muslim community to adopt
positions not only against both armies, but also against their ideas.

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(24)
    For the political theory of the Kharijites see, Elie Salem,
Political Theory and Institutions of the Khawarij (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1956).

The excesses of the Kharijites in particular contributed to the consecration of the very system against which they revolted, and were instrumental in shaping the "authoritarian" theory of government advanced by the Sunni jurists in the tenth and eleventh centuries.

The first reaction to the Kharijites' fanatical idealism was the strengthening of an earlier doctrine put forward by a group of pacifists called the Murji'ites. This group separated religion as belief from religion as works. A believer would remain part of the community, even though he may evade his religious obligations or commit sin. It is not the responsibility of the community, the Murji'ites believed, to determine whether or not a sinner belonged to Ahl al-Jahim /¯People of Hell_7, and consequently to expel him from the community. Such a decision is the responsibility of God to be rendered at the Day of Judgment. In practical terms, this group refused to see in the suppression of the shari'ah by the Umayyad caliphs a justifiable cause for denying them the allegiance due to de facto political leaders of Islam. Uthman, Ali and even Mu'awiya were all servants of God, and by God alone they will be judged. [25]

The Mu'tazilites /¯Withdrawers 7 and the Ash'arites /¯Sunni Political Theory7

Cutting across the Shi'i, Kharijite and Murji'ite positions are two factions whose religious and political rivalry dominated medieval Islam.

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[25]Philip Hitti, History of the Arabs (London: MacMillan Press, 1974), p. 247.

First, the Mu'tazilites, who asserted that he who comits a

mortal sin /¯kabirah/ secedes from the ranks of the community,

but does not become an unbeliever; he occupies a medial position

between the two.[26] Second, the Ash'arites who sought to reconcile

the religious ideal of the caliphate with the reality of politics.[27]

While the Shi'is asserted the hereditary nature of the Imamate, the

Mu'tazilites noted that the community could choose any morally

qualified person, even a non-Quraishi. In opposition to the Murji'ite

stand which rejected the principle of revolt against unjust rulers,

the Mu'tazilites regarded it as an obligation on the part of community

members to revolt against an unjust caliph, provided that the success

of the revolt is certain.[28] Opposed to the Ash'ari view of the

Caliphate as a religious duty and necessity, the Mu'tazilites noted

the rational basis of the caliphate. Some Mu'tazilite writers noted

that the enforcement of law is the only raison d'être of the caliphate.

If all people observed the shari'ah, the scholars remarked, the

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(26)Hitti, Ibid.,

(27)Although the philosophical formulation of each group concerning the nature of God, the Quran and the ummah had affected their view of the Caliphate institution, my interest in this chapter is restricted to their political thought. Moreover, despite the presence of a variety of opinions within each group, it is possible to delineate their main ideological characteristics.

(28)Maududi, op.cit., p. 670.

caliphate would be unnecessary.[29] To the Ash'arites, however, the caliphate commanded obedience simply because it is a divinely inspired institution.

Despite its insistence on reason and free will, the Mu'tazilite movement turned into an instrument of suppression. Under the rule of the Abbasid Caliph al-Ma'mun /¯813-833 AD_7, the Mu'tazilite creed became the "state religion." In 827 AD, al-Ma'mun issued a proclamation adopting the Mu'tazilite dogma of the creation of the Quran, in opposition to the traditional view that the Quran is the identical reproduction of a $_{celestial}$ original.[30] Six years later, the Caliph issued an edict which stipulated that judges had to pass a test in this dogma. An inquisitorial tribunal for the trial and conviction of those who denied the "creation of the Quran" was established, thus initiating the mihna. As a result, many ulama removed themselves from state service and began to distinguish clearly between the religious and political spheres. Obviously, Mu'tazilite principles were popular among Abbasid court officials of the period. The movement's end, however, occurred in 348 AD when the Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakil deprived it of court support.

THE ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE IDEALISM WITH REALITY

The eclipse of the Mu'tazilites was followed by the consolidation of the Ash'ari tradition, which came to be considered as the Sunni doctrine

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(30)Hitti, op.cit., p. 429.

of the caliphate. The Sunnis were the latest of all Muslim groups to develop a detailed political theory, which evolved as an apologia for the historical caliphate. Their theory contained, therefore, a blend of abstract general principles deduced from the shari'ah and of provisions derived from the historical experience of Muslims.[31]

The ideological foundation of this theory is the supremacy of the shari'ah and the infallible authority of the ijma' /¯consensus of the community7. To maintain and enforce the shari'ah, a caliph is needed, whose appointment and obedience are the religious duties of the community. If the caliph violates the dictates of the shari'ah, his removal becomes a necessity. Such was the ideal and the principle, but the caliphate became hereditary, rulers deviated from the divine law and the land of Islam became fragmented. Reacting to the accusations of other factions, and in an obvious attempt to vindicate Sunnism and to preserve the unity of the ummah, the ulama rationalized the policies of existing governments. They agreed that "the caliphate was elective, but the caliph could be nominated by his predecessor; the Caliph was the sole supreme sovereign of all Islam, but ministers or governors might acquire and hold office by seizure."[32] As the gap between the ideal and reality widened, Sunni ulama continued to rationalize the policies of existing governments until the principle "tyranny is better than anarchy" dominated their writings.[33]

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[31] Sir Hamilton A.R. Gibb, "Constitutional Organization," in Majid Khadduri and Herbert Liebesney, eds., Law in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1955), p. 6.

[32] Lewis, Politics..., op.cit., p. 163.   [33] Ibid.,

al-Mawardi and al-Ghazzali

A rationalization for the disparity between the theory and practice was provided by al-Mawardi /¯d. 1058 AD_7, whose al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya /¯ Principles of Government_7 is treated by Sunni scholars as the classical exposition of Islamic government.[34] This book was written to support the position of the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad /¯ al-Qadir bi al-Lah d. 1031,and his successor_7 against Buwayhid rule.[35] As such, its argument is based on a combination of Islamic tradition and political reality. The caliphate office and its institution, al-Mawardi noted, is a necessary requirement of the shari'ah and it is not a matter of reason alone. It is an obligatory requirement of the community to appoint an imam. This appointment could be made by one person or an electoral college whose members should possess specific qualifications.

The caliph himself should also meet certain requirements --. majority.age, a Quraishi background, physical and mental competency, justice, courage and knowledge. Once elected, the caliph cannot be displaced in favour of a worthier candidate.[36] In support of the Abbasid

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[34]In "Some Considerations on the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate," H.A.R. Gibb rejects the assertion that al-Mawardi's writing is the final and definitive Ash'arite political doctrine. "On the contrary," Gibb wrote, the writings "are an apologia or adaptation inspired and shaped by the circumstances of /al-Mawardi's/ own time. And what is important, by the argument with which al-Mawardi endeavored to accomodate the Asharite theory to these rather unhappy circumstances..., he took the first steps on the downward slope which was to lead to the collapse of the whole theory." See, Hamilton H.A.R. Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 142.

[35]Ibid., p. 152.   [36]This principle condoned the many historical examples of unworthy caliphs.

position against its opponents, al-Mawardi insisted upon the illegality of having two caliphs ruling the land of Islam at the same time. To justify Abbasid hereditary rule, al-Mawardi noted that the assumption of the caliphate in virtue of nomination by the preceding caliph is legal; the nominee, however, must accept the nomination. If the incumbent did not designate a successor, he might limit the choice of the electors after his death to certain persons, and designate the electoral college.

Once elected, the caliph should perform specific religious, legal and military functions. In administering the affairs of the community, the caliph may delegate authority to governors and subordinates, who should act in accordance with the principles of the shari'ah. If a governor seizes power as was the case of most of the governments in al-Mawardi's time, but maintains the shari'ah in word and deed, the caliph should grant him recognition. "Necessity dispenses with stipulations which are impossible to fulfill," al-Mawardi wrote.[37]

Maintaining the general principles introduced by al-Mawardi, and reflecting the political climate of his time, al-Ghazzali /¯d. 1111/ stated that the jurist is forced to acknowledge the existing power

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(37)
    A. K. S. Lambton, "Islamic Political Thought," in Joseph Schacht and C.E. Bosworth, eds., The Legacy..., op. cit., p. 413.

since the alternative is anarchy and the stoppage of social life for lack of a properly constituted authority.

> Which is worse, I ask you /‾al-Ghazzali wrote7
> to declare void the Imamates of our days,
> because of lack of the requisite qualifications,
> ...and thus declare that judges are divested of
> their authority, that all governorships are
> invalid, that no marriage can be legally contra-
> cted and all executive actions in all parts of
> the /Muslim/ world are null and void, and that
> the people are living in sin; or to say that the
> Imamate is held by a valid contract, and therefore
> all executive acts and jurisdictions are valid,
> given the present circumstances and the necessity
> of these times? [38]

In his writings, al-Ghazzali acknowledged that de facto authority belongs to the sultan, who with the approval of the ulama designates the caliph. The validity of the sultan's government, however, is dependent upon his oath of allegiance to the caliph and his appointment by the caliph. But satisfactory as this theory might have been to al-Ghazzali and other ulama, the caliphate ceased to have even institutional power, and government by seizure became the pattern until the advance of European rule and the destruction of traditional society. As a result of the continuation of the disparity between the ideal and reality, Muslim scholars continued to search for answers.

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(38)
    G. E. Von Grunebaum, _Medieval Islam_ (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1946), p. 168.

(39)Lambton, _op.cit._, p. 414.

Islamic Reform Movements and the Development of Secularist Tendencies

Islamic movements that sought to reform society have adopted one of two strategies: (1) either to invoke traditional Islamic sources, or (2) to reconcile Islamic beliefs with modern notions.[40] One of the earliest movements emerged in eighteenth century Arabia in the writings and activities of Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This was followed by another movement, the Sanusiyah, that appeared in early nineteenth century North Africa and was manifested in the creation of Sanussi cooperative communities along Islamic lines. The Sanussi movement differed from Wahhabism both in content and approach, although the two are considered reformist-fundamentalist. Both movements, however, provided a point of reference to a more recent generation of reformists who reasserted the overriding authority of the Quran and the Tradition.

Unlike the founders of the Wahhabi and Sanussi movements who were totally inspired by Muslim traditions, other Muslim reformers were influenced by the West and their writings demonstrated this influence. Shaykh Rifa'ah Rafi al-Tahtawi /¯1801-1873/, for example, showed great interest in the European systems of government. He

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(40)
      See, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in the Modern History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), especially chapters two and three; and Hassan Sa'ab, "The Spirit of Reform in Islam," Islamic Studies ,Vol. II (March,1966).

travelled abroad and sought to popularize European ideas and techniques in Egypt.[41]

In addition to writing a number of books himself, al-Tahtawi and his students translated some 200 books and pamphlets which were published by the first Arabic printing press, established in 1822 in the outskirts of Cairo.[42] In his writings, al-Tahtawi believed that the ruler should possess extensive power, but act in accordance with the dictates of the shari'ah and the public interest. The subjects, on the other hand, owed allegiance to the ruler as a corollary to their obedience to God and the Prophet.[43] As to the role of the ulama in the Islamic state, al-Tahtawi urged them to be innovative and adapt the shari'ah to new circumstances. He also noted the similarity between the principles of the shari'ah and those of natural law on which the legal codes of modern Europe are based. This identification enabled him to legitimize recourse to other systems of law to modernize Islamic law.

Al-Tahtawi's attempt to modernize Islamic law and society was further pursued by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh who appeared in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Muhammad Ali,

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[41] On the role of al-Tahtawi in shaping the political mind of Egypt see, Jamal Muhammad Ahmad, The Intellectual Origin of Egyptian Nationalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

[42] See, Anwar G. Chejne, "The Intellectual Revival in the Arab World: an Introduction," Islamic Studies , Vol. II (December, 1963).

[43] Leon Zolondek, "al-Tahtawi and Political Freedom," The Muslim World, Vol. LIV (April, 1964).

the founder of modern Egypt /⁻1805-1849_7, did not attempt to reform the old centres of religious learning. Instead, he created a parallel system of schools along Western lines. Since army officers, civil servants, and government officials were recruited from these new schools, the religious institutions continued to decline and to attract only the mediocre students. The result was the creation of two distinct educated classes in Egypt: the traditional ulama, deriving their knowledge from old manuals, commentaries and texts; and the modern Western educated class. Both were incapable of reinterpreting Islam in the light of modern conditions. It was at this critical moment that Shaykh Muhammad Abduh appeared.[44] Abduh asserted that the Quran yielded categorical guidance in matters of worship, while it prescribed only general principles in the area of human relations. As a reformer, Abduh was a gradualist. He maintained that the Islamic response to Western pressures, whether cultural or political was education not revolt.[45]

On the political front, Abduh wrote that the Quranic command to obey lawful authority was misunderstood by the people to mean unconditional obedience to the leaders. They failed to realize that their duty to obey was predicated on the ruler himself being committed to follow the rule of law and to wield power in the interest of the

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[44]For a biography of Muhammad Abduh see, Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tarikh al-Ustadh al-Imam (Cairo: al-Manar Press, 1931).

[45]Osman Amin, Muhammad Abduh (Washington,D.C.: Council of Learned Societies, 1953), p. 40.

people.[46] Islam, Abduh noted, does not ascribe infallibility to the ruler, who is not a theocrat and does not possess a divine right to rule.

The works of Muhammad Abduh proved to his contemporaries the legitimacy, and indeed, the duty to interpret the shari'ah in all aspects which relate to worldly affairs. One of the immediate results of Abduh's writings and activities was the emergence of a reformist movement, which under the leadership of Abduh's disciple and biographer Rashid Rida was to gravitate gradually towards the rigidity of Wahhabism. Like other reformers, Rida and his movement called for the reactivation of <u>ijtihad</u> as a point of departure towards the adaptation of the shari'ah to modern conditions as well as the restoration of the Caliphate. However, the movement's rigid fundamentalism prevented it from realizing its objectives.

In contrast to Rida's conservative views and his call to restore the caliphate, the Western-educated Azharite Ali Abd al-Raziq published <u>al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukum</u> in 1925 in which he noted that there is no specific form of government which can be called Islamic and rejected the need for the caliphate.[47] So unorthodox were the views of Abd al-Raziq that the Grand Council of al-Azhar tried him and ultimately expelled

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(46) See, Muhammad Abduh, <u>al-Islam Din al-Ilm wa al-Madaniya</u> (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, n.d.).

(47) Ali Abd al-Raziq, <u>al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukum</u> (Beirut: Dar al-Hayat, n.d.).

him from this foremost seat of Islamic learning. Abd al-Raziq rejected
the traditional view that the caliphate was necessary and that Muslims
were under an obligation to nominate or choose a caliph. The
institution of the caliphate, he noted, has no canonical basis, either
in the Quran or the shari'ah. The author noted that the verses often
cited to give the caliphate a religious sanctity mean no more than
that among Muslims there must be some leaders to whom the affairs of
the community should be entrusted. Moreover, no consensus on the
need to establish or maintain the caliphate was reached. Abd al-Raziq
noted that there were dissenting voices even at the time of selecting
the first Caliph, and such consensus was never established by the
jurists. The views of the Kharijites and some Mu'tazilites who held
that the duty of Muslims is to obey the shari'ah, and that if all
the members of the ummah could maintain justice among themselves there
would be no need even for government, support this view. Historical
evidence shows that the caliphate was always based on force, Abd al-Raziq
noted. Even when a consensus on its establishment was formally obtained,
it was invalid as canonical proof, since it was always elicited under
duress. Abd al-Raziq emphasized the view that Islam was a universal
religion, and that it did not need the protection of universal power.

The most important implication of Abd al-Raziq's study is the
separation between religion and state. His position was revolutionary,
from an orthodox point of view, for he insisted that Islam was a purely
spiritual religion, that the political office of Muhammad was not an

essential part of his prophetic office, and that the caliphate, as a temporal and spiritual institution, was not necessary.

A quarter of a century following Abd al-Raziq's condemnation, the call for the separation between religion and state was raised again by Khalid M. Khalid in his book Min Huna Nabda'.[48] Khalid, however, remained attached, like Abd al-Raziq, to the traditional faith of Islam whose spiritual basis he appears anxious to preserve. The difference between the two advocates of the separation between religion and state is that Khalid, while endorsing the secular thesis of Abd al-Raziq, is not content with subtle theological polemics, but attacks the ulama themselves and advocates their total expulsion from public life. In the words of Khalid, "there is no other course open to governments and societies which respect themselves than to rapidly exclude this insidious priesthood from their midst, by all means at their disposal and to cleanse religion from all the corrupt elements clinched to it."[49] By doing so, Khalid continued, adherence to religion will be safeguarded. To eliminate the religious establishment is no easy task. The ulama have succeeded through deceptive means in entrenching themselves in

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[48] Khalid M. Khalid, Min Huna Nabda' (Cairo: al-Khangi Press, 1951
This book was translated into English by Ismail R. Faruqui, From Here
We Start (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953).

[49] Khalid, Min..., p. 47.

society. One of their subtle methods is to preach "holy poverty"
and resignation in the name of religion. They also, Khalid noted,
condone social injustice and popular misery and suffering as the
inevitable dictates of Providence which must be borne with fortitude
in preparation for the eternal happiness of the world to come.

In his study of Muslim history, Khalid concluded that the theocratic
state had been an instrument of repression and intimidation throughout
the ages; it has failed in maintaining Islamic principles and those
who aspire to revive it are the misguided fanatics who desire to
surrender the freedoms of thought and belief which have been won
at the cost of many sacrifices. Finally, Khalid maintained that the
curtailment of ecclesiastical authority and the separation of religion
and state are two necessary conditions for all forms of progress and
an ultimate safeguard to the survival of religion itself. Religion
is a body of spiritual truths which are universally and permanently
valid and are accordingly independent of the conditions of change or
development. Political systems and political objectives, on the other
hand, are not static and while they might apply to one period they
may not be valid for another.[50]

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[50]Khalid's radical statement concerning the separation of religion and
state led to the confiscation of the book at the order of the censor of
al-Azhar who claimed that it constituted an "attack on the ecclesiastics
and the capitalists in the traditional manner of the Communists." See,
Majid Fakhry, "The Theocratic Idea of the Islamic State in Recent
Controversies," International Affairs, Vol. XXX, No. 4 (1954).

CONCLUSION

Because traditional Islamic political theory maintains
that religion and state are one and indivisible, no proper study
of Muslim politics can be complete and realistic unless it is
examined in relation to religion. With this fact in mind, an
attempt has been made to examine the historical and theoretical
development of the relationship between religion and state in
Islam. The main objective was to search for answers to the ever
present questions of what is an Islamic state? What kind of relation-
ship exists between the religious and political spheres in that state?
According to Islamic traditional political theory, the purpose of
the state is to maintain the shari'ah and enforce its ordinances.
The political authority is obliged not only to accept the shari'ah,
but also to maintain and enforce its principles. Such was the theory,
but the reality of Muslim politics was different. By the end of the
first Islamic century, tension between vision and reality heightened,
and government by seizure became the order of the day.

There are several underlying causes for the continued disparity
between the religious ideal and reality. First, while the shari'ah
was originally a progressive instrument to further Islam, it gradually
lost its dynamism and degenerated into a rigid, archaic law because
of the ulama's inability to innovate and adapt religious law to
reality. Second, while there was an institutional de facto separation between

religion and state, Islamic political thought continued to maintain
that there is a fusion of religious and political functions performed
by a unitary structure. As for the ulama themselves, they never gave
up their claim to influence political authority. The secular rulers
tacitly accepted this claim in order to receive the ulama's consent
and approval of their authority.

The ulama's failure to adapt the shari'ah to changing circumstances
may be found in the organizational structure of their establishment.
As Smith has noted, there has been a relatively low level of ecclesiatical
organization among Muslim ulama. This low level of organization renders
the ulama's response to change less coherent and effective than if
they were highly structured and organized.[51] Third, the preservation
of the socio-religious order is delegated to the political authority
which is dominant in society. As a result, the ulama have, with
some exceptions, depended on the state for their survival. Indeed,
the ulama's raison d'être was tied to the state's function of enforcing
the shari'ah. Resulting from this symbiotic relationship between the
ulama and the state, ulama's political participation was confined to
the accepted and legitimate level of political activity.

The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the advance of
European imperialism into the Muslim world, and the resultant disruption
of the traditional system, altered the historical pattern of the

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[51] Donald Eugene Smith, ed., Religion and Political Modernization
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 6.

relationship between religion and state. While in the past, governments needed the legitimacy provided by the religious establishment, they became less dependent during the period of nation-state on religion for legitimation. This, however, was not the only change. Humphreys noted that three main responses to the break-down of the traditional society have manifested themselves in the Arab world: (1) the fundamentalist response; (2) the religious-modernist; (3) the secularist. [52] The fundamentalist approach insists that "change must be governed by traditional values and modes of understanding." The Wahhabi and Sanussi movements are an example of this trend.

The second response to the disruption of traditional society was the emergence of the modernist trend. Its proponents engaged in the search for an accommodation of the shari'ah with the needs of modern life. Al-Tahtawi, for example, pointed out the progressive character of the shari'ah and insisted that many of its aspects are suitable for contemporary life. Finally, the secularist' response, as projected in the writings of Khalid, insists that the political obligations of the individual should not be defined by his religious affiliation.

The unity of the religious and political spheres advocated by Islam has existed primarily at the theoretical level rather than in

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[52] Stemphen Humphreys, "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Winter, 1979).

practice. A startling disparity has always existed between the
ideal and the reality of Islamic government. The Wahhabi government
arose to protest this disparity and initiate a new political
experiment. It succeeded in forming the state of Saudi Arabia and
continues until today to provide it with ideological legitimacy.
This study of the relationship between religion and state in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia examines the manner in which the Islamic
ideal affected the politics of the Kingdom and the extent to which
this ideal has been realized.

CHAPTER TWO

WAHHABISM AND THE FORMATION OF THE SAUDI STATE: REALIZATION OF THE VISION

The founding of new religious formations invariably ushers in a measure of social discord. The development of this discord depends on the extent to which these formations challenge the established norms and institutions.[1] The challenge is most apparent when an attempt is made to redefine the boundaries and membership of a new community and to establish a new code of behaviour for followers, or advocate a revival of old beliefs. Understandably, such attempts lead their proponents to break with the past; they entail the develop- ment of belief systems, rituals and organizational structures that differentiate these groups from their counterparts in society.

To ensure their survival and expansion, new religious movements cannot remain oblivious to the political sphere. A relationship of mutual dependency or confrontation evolves between these movements and the existing political authority depending on whether common or exclusive objectives develop. Religious movements might seek, for instance, the protection and help which the institutions of state can offer, and, in return, provide these same institutions with legitimation and

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[1]See, A. D. Nock, <u>Conversion</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

support. Even when a policy of interdependence is pursued, the relationship that emanates is often subject to serious strains. "This fact of mutual dependence of relatively autonomous spheres," noted S. N. Eisenstadt in his wide-ranging survey of the political relationships of religion in centralized empires, "could easily create many tensions between them as each would desire to control those structural positions of the other through which it could provide its own needs."[2] In other words, the religious and political institutions are potential competitors for economic and manpower resources, and for the active political engagement and support of different groups and strata in society.

This chapter examines the rise, ideology and consolidation of Wahhabism and the relationship between its founder; Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and his political patron, Amir Muhammad Ibn Saud and his successor, Amir Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud. The bond between the Shaykh and the Prince was forged in 1745. It provided Ibn Abd al-Wahhab with a political arm for his religious teachings and assured Al Saud of sanction from a recognized theologian as well as a body of converts that he could use to expand his political authority and control of the Arabian Peninsula. More specifically, the following

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[2]S. N. Eisenstadt, "Religious Organizations and Political Process in Centralized Empires," The Journal of Asian Studies , Vol. XXI, No. 3 (May, 1962), p. 283.

questions will be addressed: (1) What is Wahhabism? (2) How did the established religio-political orders react to its emergence and principles? (3) What role did it play in the formation and consolidation of the Saudi state? (4) What was the nature and outcome of the relationship between the Shaykh and the Prince?

MUHAMMAD IBN ABD AL-WAHHAB

Eighteenth century Arabia was within the domain of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman officials, however, did not exercise effective control beyond the regions bordering the Red Sea and the pilgrimage route. Najd and the area eastward led a sovereign form of existence in which the various districts were ruled by local chiefs. The region was characterized by political fragmentation and incessant tribal conflicts. Religious beliefs and practices had deviated from Orthodox Islam. The Najdi historian Ibn Bishr wrote in the eighteenth century that:

> It was common for trees and rocks to be invested with supernatural powers; tombs were venerated and shrines were built near them; and all were regarded as sources of blessing and objects of vows....Moreover, swearing by other than God, and similar forms of both major and minor polytheism were widely practiced. [3]

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[3] Uthman Ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd (Riyadh: Maktabat Riyadh al-Haditha, n.d.), p. 6. Exept otherwise noted, the section on Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Wahhabi principles is based on Dr. Abd Allah al-Salih al-Uthaymin, al-Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Riyadh: Dar al-Ulum, n.d.).

It was into this environment that Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was born in 1703 in al-Uyayna in Najd. He belonged to a prestigious family of jurists, both theologians and qadis /‾judges7. Under the tutorship of his father, young Muhammad studied Hanbali jurisprudence and read classical works on tafsir /‾exegesis7, hadith /‾tradition7 and tawhid /‾monotheism7 .[4] In his early twenties, Muhammad began to denounce what he described as the "polytheistic beliefs and practices of his society."[5] He rejected "the corruption and laxity of the contemporary decline.../‾and7 insisted solely on the /‾shari'ah7.[6]

The beliefs of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab alienated him from the establishment ulama and led to the dismissal of his father from the qada. Subsequently, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's family, including his father, had to leave al-Uyayna to neighbouring Huraymila in 1726. Muhammad remained in al-Uyayna for a while, but because the ulama "were able to defame his call and reputation, and instigate the common folk who beset him with ridicule, abuse, and insults...," he left al-Uyayna to Hejaz.[7]

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[4] Ibid., Ibn Bishr noted that the most outstanding scholar in Najd during the mid-eighteenth century was Sulayman Ibn Ali, the grand-father of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Abd al-Wahhab Ibn Sulayman, Muhammad's father, too, was a scholar of considerable local reputation.

[5] Ibid.,

[6] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 42. For a detailed and annotated bibliography of the Wahhabi movement, see Hisham Nashshabah, Islam and Nationalism in the Arab World (an Unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, 1955), pp. 7-26.

[7] Ahmad Abd al-Ghafour Attar, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Mecca: Mu'assasat Mecca li al-Nashr, 1979), p. 23.

In Hejaz, Muhammad made his pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, where he attended lectures on different branches of Islamic learning. Ibn Bishr reported that he studied under Shaykh Abd Allah Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Sayf and Shaykh Hayat al-Sindi, both of whom were admirers of the Hanbali Ibn Taymiya. Like Ibn Taymiya, Sayf and Sindi opposed taqlid /¯imitation7 which was commonly accepted by the followers of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence. Both scholars felt the urgent need to reform the socio-religious situation of Muslims in Najd and elsewhere.[8] Their teachings had a great impact on Muhammad who began to take a more aggressive attitude toward the establishment ulama.

Another important event which seemed to have influenced the intellectual evolution of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was his visit to Basra. In Basra, he widened his study of hadith and jurisprudence, and came into contact with the Shi'ites, who venerate Ali's shrine in al-Najaf and the tomb of Hussein in neighbouring Karbala. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's call to reform the Muslim world was rejected by the ulama of both Basra and Karbala, and he was ultimately forced to leave the area.[9]

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[8] Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 7.

[9] There is no mention by Najdi sources that Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's travels extended beyond Najd, Hejaz and Basra. Some authors claim that he visited Baghdad, Kurdistan, Hamadhan, Asfahan, Qumm, Turkey, Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem and Egypt. See, for example, Lam' al-Shihab fi Sirat Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab , by an unknown author, ed., by Shaykh Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abd al-Latif Ibn Abd Allah al-Shaykh (Riyadh: Darat al-Malik Abd al-Aziz, 1974), pp. 3-17. For rejection of this view see, Hamad al-Jasir, "Muarikhu Najd," Majalat al-Jami'a, Vol. III (1959), pp. 39-49.

Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab returned to Huraymila to rejoin his father and immediately began to criticize the innovations and polytheistic acts practiced by Najdis and others. His criticism seems to have been so bitter that he was met with strong opposition from the ulama and even his own father. During this period, Muhammad composed his most famous work, Kitab al-Tawhid /¯Book of Monotheism/, copies of which circulated quickly and widely in Najd.[10]

THE SHAYKH AND THE PRINCE: AN ALLIANCE THAT FAILED

The year 1740 witnessed the death of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's father and the consolidation of the Wahhabi movement.[11] The death of his father allowed the Shaykh to adopt a more aggressive line, because he felt less constrained than before.[12] He declared war on those who by word or act were violating the doctrine of monotheism.

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[10] This book can be viewed as the manifesto of Wahhabi doctrine. It is divided into sixty-nine chapters each of which advances Quranic verses and ahadith /traditions/ of the Prophet to support the views of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Following the Quranic verses and the ahadith, quotations from the companions of the Prophet or their immediate successors are presented in support of the author's interpretation of these verses and traditions, and occassionally reference is made to later scholars such as Ibn Taymiya and Abu al-Qaym al-Jawziya. Finally, the author advances what he considers to be the appropriate conclusions to be drawn from his quotations.

[11] Ibn Bishr, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

[12] Ibid.,

In a relatively short time, the influence of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab spread widely. The consolidation of his movement took place when the ruler of al-Uyayna, Uthman Ibn Mu'ammar, offered him protection. The Shaykh accepted the invitation to reside in al-Uyayna because it allowed him to return to the place of his birth where his family enjoyed a high social status, and provided the protection he needed to propagate his ideology. To cement his ties with the town's leader, the Shaykh married al-Jawhara, Uthman's aunt.

The ruler of al-Uyayna ordered his townsmen to observe the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.[13] Once the protection of a political leader was secured, the Shaykh implemented the principles of his call. Among his earliest acts was the destruction of the spot where Zayd Ibn al-Khatab was believed to be buried, as well as the tombs of other Companions, all of whom were objects of veneration. He also revived the Islamic law of stoning an adulterous woman to death.[14]

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(13) H. St. John Philby, Arabia (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), p. 9. See, also, M.A. Khan, "A Diplomat's Report on Wahhabism of Arabia," Islamic Studies, Vol. VII (1968), p. 34.

(14) Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 9-10. For refutation of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's views and activities see, Sayd Ahmad Ibn Zayni Dahlan, al-Durar al-Saniya fi al-Rad ala al-Wahhabiya (Cairo: Matba'at al-Bab al-Halabi, 1950). It must be noted at this point that the word Wahhabism was first used by the opponents of the movement, but later on it became an accepted term. The Wahhabis describe themselves as Muwahidin, or unitarians. See, Munir al-Ajlani, al-Dawla al-Saudiya al-Ula (Riyadh; n.d.), pp. 279-281.

Both incidents mark the establishment of a Wahhabi society in which the doctrines of tawhid were strictly observed.

The Shaykh's activities, and the protection he received from the leader of al-Uyayna, antagonized the ulama of the region, and led them to intensify their attacks on the Wahhabi movement. Ibn Ghanam, a Najdi historian and contemporary of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, quoted the charges which Ibn Suhaym, the judge of Riyadh and a leading opponent of Wahhabism, made against the Shaykh:

> .....He burned the book Dala'il al-Khayrat[15] because
> its author referred to the Prophet as our master and
> our lord....; he also burned the work Rawd al-Rayahin
> and renamed it Rawd al-Shayatin. 16 He says that the
> people have not been following the religion...; he
> does not consider the differences of view among the
> religious imams as mercy but as misfortune...; he
> abandoned the praise of the Sultan in the Friday sermon,
> claiming that he is dissolute...; he considers as inno-
> vation the salat /prayers/ for the Prophet on Friday..... 17

The Shaykh accused the ulama of opposing his movement because they feared the loss of social prestige and reputation. He reproached them for not taking the initiative in criticizing offensive practices that he considered un-Islamic. He also attributed the opposition of the

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(15) Dala'il al-Khayrat was written by Muhammad al-Jazuli / d. 1441/.
This work has been persistently recited in many parts of the Muslim
world. It praises the Prophet Muhammad.

(16) Rawd al-Rayahin was written by Abd Allah al-Yafi'i al-Yamani / d. 1366/.
It praises the Prophet Muhammad as well as his Companions.

(17) Hussein Ibn Ghanam, Tarikh Najd al-Musama Rawdat al-Afkar wa al-Afham
li Murtad Hal al-Imam wa Ta'dud Ghawat Dha'i al-Islam (Cairo: n.p., 1949).,
p. 80.

ulama to his denunciation of the acceptance by qadis of payment from persons who sought their legal advice or arbitration.[18] The ulama of the region intensified their attacks on the Shaykh and warned the rulers that "it was their obligation, as Muslim leaders responsible for the preservation of the shari'ah, to put an end to Wahhabi errors and innovations." Pointing to the threatening character of the movement, the ulama noted that the Shaykh's purpose was "nothing less than to stir up the common folks to revolt against the authority of the established leaders."[19]

The appeal to eliminate the Wahhabi movement found a positive response from Sulayman Ibn Muhammad, tribal leader of the Banu Khalid and ruler of al-Ahsa region. Sulayman was concerned with the rapidly increasing number of followers who joined the Wahhabis. Ibn Bishr noted that Sulayman wrote to Uthman Ibn Mu'ammar, ruler of al-Uyayna, demanding that the Shaykh be expelled or killed. If not, Sulayman warned, all economic assistance to al-Uyayna will be cut-off.[20] Fearful of Sulayman's reprisal, the ruler of al-Uyayna terminated his alliance with the Shaykh and expelled him from the town.

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(18) Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had criticized his own father, as well, for accepting fees from litigants. This criticism had strained the relation between the two.

(19) Ibn Ghanam, op.cit., p. 32.

(20) Ibn Bishr, op.cit., pp. 10-11.

THE SHAYKH AND THE PRINCE: AN ALLIANCE THAT SUCCEEDED

After his expulsion from al-Uyayna, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought refuge in Dar'iya. Its rulers were in conflict with Sulayman Ibn Muhammad, and, more importantly, the Shaykh's doctrine had already been adopted by some notables of the town, among whom were the brothers and sons of Muhammad Ibn Saud, the ruler.

Shortly after his arrival in Dar'iya, the Shaykh was visited by Muhammad Ibn Saud who offered him "protection equal to that of the chief's own women and children." [21] In return for his support, the ruler of Dar'iya asked the Shaykh not to leave Dar'iya once other towns followed his teachings, and not to opppse his taxation of the inhabitants of the principality. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab agreed to the first condition but reluctant to give a clear answer to the second, he said: "...may God grant you victories, the booty from which will be greater than these taxes."[22] The agreement arrived at between the Shaykh and the Prince may be considered as the cornerstone of the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance according to which, as the author of Lam' al-Shihab indicated, the temporal power was left to Muhammad Ibn Saud and his successors, while the spiritual was reserved for Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his descendants.[23]

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(21) Ibn Ghanam, op.cit., p. 3.

(22) Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 12.

(23) Lam' al-Shihab, p. 12.

The Shaykh spent the first two years at Dar'iya propagating his views and writing letters to various rulers, scholars and tribal leaders of the Peninsula.[24] The response he elicited was as much a product of political and economic considerations, as it was a question of religious dogma. Some leaders joined the new movement because they saw it as a means of gaining an ally against their local rivals. Others feared that their acceptance of the call would diminish their authority in favour of Ibn Saud and oblige them to pay him at least part of the revenues they collected from their subjects.

By 1746, the time seemed ripe for Al Saud and the Shaykh to resort to force in order to achieve what they had not been able to do by means of persuasion and argument. The Shaykh's prestige was now firmly established. The inhabitants of the region had been indoctrinated to believe that opponents of the Wahhabi cause were enemies of Islam who should be fought and whose properties were lawful spoil.

Since the region was beyond the reach of organized political authority, it offered the Wahhabis the opportunity to pursue their designs by military means. Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad Ibn Saud declared jihad /¯holy war¯/ on their opponents. [25] One principality after another fell under the attacks of the Saudi forces.

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[24] For a complete collection of the Shaykh's letters to rulers, scholars and tribal leaders in the Peninsula see, Mu'alafat al-Shaykh al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Riyadh: Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, n.d.), Vol. V.

[25] Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 14.

By 1773, the Principality of Riyadh fell and its properties were incorporated by the treasury of Dar'iya.

The fall of Riyadh marked a new period in the career of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. He delegated some of his powers to Abd al-Aziz Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud, who succeeded his father in 1765, and concentrated on teaching and worship until his death in 1791.[26] The death of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, however, did not stop the expansion of the new state. Not only was the movement able to resist its opponents and gain territories in neighbouring principalities, it was able within a relatively short period to subjugate both Mecca and Medina which were captured in 1805 and 1806 respectively.

WAHHABI DOCTRINE

The Shaykh wrote on a variety of Islamic subjects such as theology, exegesis, jurisprudence and the life of the Prophet. His works consisted of books, treaties, letters and sermons.[27] A set of issues dominated the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and distinguished Wahhabism from

[26] Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 89.

[27] For an account of the expansion of the Saudi state see, Ibrahim Ibn Salih Ibn Issa, Tarikh Ba'd al-Hawadith al-Waqi'a fi Najd (Riyadh: Dar al-Yamamah, n.d.); Munir al-Ajlani, Tarikh al-Bilad al-Arabiya al-Saudiya , in three volumes, (Riyadh: n.d.,n.p.); and Abd al-Rahim Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Saudiya al-Ula (Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-Jami'i,1979).

other Islamic movements. These were: (1) <u>Tawhid</u> /¯monotheism7;
(2) <u>Tawasul</u> /¯intercession7; (3) <u>Ziyarat al-Qubur</u> /¯visitation
of graves and erection of tombs7; (4) <u>Takfir</u> /¯charge of
unbelief7; (5) <u>Bid'a</u> /¯innovation7; and (6) <u>Ijtihad</u> and
<u>Taqlid</u> /¯original juristic opinions and imitation7. Although
this thesis is not concerned with the study of theological
differences and disagreements between the Wahhabis and their
opponents, it is still necessary to outline the main ideolocical
characteristics of the movement. These characteristics have
influenced the development of the Saudi state and shaped its
Islamic character.

(1) <u>Tawhid</u>

Tawhid is the central theme in the Wahhabi doctrine.
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab considered it "the eternal religion
of God"; it is "the religion of Islam itself." [28] The Shaykh
maintained that the unity of God reveals itself in three
distinct manners. First, there is <u>tawhid al-rububiyah</u> which
is the assertion of the unity of God and His action. "He alone
is the Creator, the Provider and Disposer of the universe."[29]
The second is <u>tawhid al-asma' wa al-sifat</u>. This concept deals

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[28] Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, <u>Kitab al-Tawhid</u> (Beirut: The
Holy Quran Publishing House, 1978), p. 14.

[29] Cited in Shaykh Sulayman Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Muhammad Ibn
Abd al-Wahhab, <u>Taysir al-Aziz al-Hamid fi Sharh Kitab al-Tahid</u>
(Riyadh: Directorate of Academic Research, Ifta', Propagation
and Guidance, n.d.), p. 17.

with God's characteristics. He is "The Beneficent, the
Merciful..., the One"; He is "the Knowledgeable." [30] He is
"established on the Throne,"[31] and "unto Him belongeth
whatsoever is in the heavens and whatsoever is in the earth,
and whatsoever is between them, and whatsoever is beneath
the sod."[32]

The third aspect in tawhid is described as tawhid al-
Ilahiya. Worship of God should be to God alone: "There is
no god but Allah, and man should...serve thy lord till the
inevitable cometh unto thee."[33] The assertion that "there
is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the Prophet of God,"
means that all forms of worship should be devoted solely
to God; Muhammad is not to be worshipped, but, as an
apostle, should be obeyed and followed.[34] The Shaykh
maintained that Muslims should distinguish between God, the
Lord and Creator, and the Prophet, the servant and created.
By virtue of his Prophethood, however, Muhammad occupies
an exceptional position among all humans. He is infallible,

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(30) The Quran, Sura XX, Verse 110.

(31) The Quran, Sura XX, Verse 5.

(32) The Quran, Sura XX, Verse 6.

(33) The Quran, Sura XVI, Verse 99.

(34) Shaykh Sulayman Ibn Abd Allah, op.cit., p. 20.

and Muslims should follow his way in faith and behaviour.[35]

(2) Tawasul

Wahhabis strongly disagreed with their opponents on the question of intercession. For Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, ibada /¯worship/ refers to "all the utterances and actions--inward as well as outward--that God desires and commands."[36] In Kitab al-Tawhid, the Shaykh wrote that to seek protection from trees, stones and the like is a major polytheistic practice. Similarly, help or aid and protection or refuge are not to be sought from anyone except God. Intercession, the Shaykh noted, cannot be granted without God's permission and His satisfaction with the one for whom it is asked, who has to be a true monotheist. The intercession commonly sought from dead saints is prohibited. As for invoking the Prophet to intercede for individuals before God, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab pointed out that the Prophet Muhammad was neither able to guide those he liked to Islam without the will of God nor was he allowed to ask forgiveness from Him for polytheists.[37] The Shaykh warned the believers against showing excessive devotion to saints and the use of their graves as places of worship.[38]

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(35) For more information on the manner in which the Wahhabis view the Prophet, see Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Sirat Rasul al-Lah, in Mu'alafat al-Shaykh..., Vol. III.

(36) Shaykh Sulayman, op.cit., p. 30.   (37) Ibid., pp. 40-41.

(38) Ibid., pp. 45-47

(3) Ziyarat al-Qubur

The doctrine of intercession led the Wahhabis to
view the widely followed practice of visitation of graves
and the building of domes near graves with utter indig-
nation. To start with, Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab considered visitation, if performed in the true
spirit of Islam, a pious and praiseworthy act.[39] Practices
of visitation are divided by the Wahhabis into recommended
and objectionable. The former are considered to be in
accordance with the teachings of the Prophet and are said
to serve three purposes: (1) as a reminder of the world-to-
come; (2) as a source of mutual benefit for both the
visitor--because of his observance of the Prophet's tradition--
and for the visited, because of the prayers offered, and
(3) as a means of keeping the memory of the dead alive.

People, the Shaykh wrote, have changed the prayers
for the dead to prayers to the dead; grave sites became
places of assembly for worshippers. The excessive
veneration of the deceased who enjoyed a holy reputation,
the Shaykh wrote, was the first step which led people to
idol-worship in the past.[40] To avoid polytheism, the
Wahhabis considered it an obligation to destroy all the

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(39) The book of Shaykh Hamad Ibn Nasif Ibn Uthman Ibn Mu'amar,
Irshad al-Muslimin fi al-Rad ala al-Quburiyin (Riyadh:
Mu'assasat al-Nur, 1973), argues the Wahhabi view on this issue.

(40) Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Kitab..., pp. 42-43.

tombs which were built. They insisted that burial
grounds should be level with the ground and writings,
decoration or illumination of graves should be avoided.[41]

(4) Takfir and qital

The Wahhabi doctrine of takfir states that mere
affiliation with Islam is not sufficient in itself to prevent
a Muslim from becoming a polytheist. The person who utters
the shahada /¯proclamation of faith7 and still practices
polytheism , as defined by the Wahhabis, should be denounced,
as an infidel and killed.[42] In support of this position,
the Shaykh listed some Quranic verses which indicate that
the "hypocrites" uttered the shahada, performed the daily
prayers and even fought alongside the Prophet. Yet, they
"will be in the lowest depth of the fire, and thou wilt
find no helper for them." [43] In a letter Muhammad Ibn Abd
al-Wahhab wrote to one of his opponents, Sulayman Ibn
Suhaym, he defined an infidel as the one "who has known
the religion of the Prophet and yet stands against it,
prevents others from accepting it and shows hostility to

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(41)Ibid., pp. 43-44.

(42)See, the Shaykh's letter to Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim, Mutawi'
Murat in al-Washim district, informing him of the need to
attack the infidels and to confiscate their properties.
Mu'alafat..., Vol. V, pp. 204-210.

(43)The Quran, Sura II, Verse 145.

those who follow it."[44] As for fighting, the Shaykh
considered it the duty of every able believer to
fight infidels and "hypocrite" Muslims.

(5) Bid'a

Innovation is defined by the Wahhabis as any doctrine
or action not based on the Quran, the Tradition or the
authority of the Companions.[45] The Shaykh condemned all
forms of innovation and rejected the views of those who
maintain that an innovation could be good or praiseworthy.
He invoked the authority of the Quran and the Tradition of
Muhammad to support his views. In Usul al-Islam, Muhammad
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab quoted the Quranic verse: "Verily, in
the messenger of Allah ye have a good example for him who
looketh unto Allah and the Last Day, and remembereth
Allah much."[46] This verse, according to Muhammad Ibn Abd
al-Wahhab, enjoins Muslims to base all their beliefs and
acts on the Quran, the word of God. The Shaykh also
quoted the Prophet as saying: "Every muhditha /¯innovation7
is bid'a, and every bid'a leads astray."[47] The Wahhabis

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(44) op.cit., Vol. V, pp. 226-237.

(45) See, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Fadhl al-Islam ,
in Mu'alafat..., Vol. I, pp. 225-227.

(46) The Quran, Sura XXXIII, Verse 21.

(47) Mu'alafat..., Vol. I, pp. 262-263.

rejected as bid'a such acts as celebrating the Prophet's birth, seeking intercession from saints, reciting the _fatiha_ on behalf of the founders of Sufi orders after the five daily prayers, and performing the five daily prayers all over again after the final Friday prayer in the month of Ramadan.

(6) Ijtihad and Taqlid

According to Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his followers, God commanded people to obey Him alone and follow the teachings of the Prophet. This complete adherence to the Quran and the Tradition, which Wahhabis demanded of Muslims, entailed also a rejection of all interpretations offered by the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence /¯madhahib/ including the Wahhabis' own Hanbali school if it is not in accordance with the two prime sources.[48]

The Wahhabis developed strict procedures to direct the discussion of doctrinal issues. In judging religious questions, they will first search the texts of the Quran and the Tradition and define their views accordingly.

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    In a letter sent to the "Learned Men of Mecca," the Shaykh rejected innovation by stating: "We are followers, not innovators." See, Mu'alafat..., Vol. V, p. 40. In another letter sent to his followers, the Shaykh wrote: "As for ijtihad , we are imitators of the Book, the Tradition, the Virtuous Ancestors and the Four Imams," Ibid., p. 96.

If reference is not found in these texts, they will·
look for the consensus of the "Virtuous Ancestors"
particularly the "Companions and their Successors,"
and the ijma' /¯consensus̲/ of the scholars. Ijma',
however, is restricted only to those who follow the
Quran and the Tradition.

As for ijtihad, the Wahhabis reject the idea that
the "doors of ijtihad" are closed. Although they follow
the Hanbali school, they do not accept its precepts as
final. If any Hanbali interpretation can be proven wrong,
then they must be abandoned. In support of their argument,
the Wahhabis quote Quranic verses which stress that the
Quran and the Tradition constitute the only bases of Islamic
law.[49]

WAHHABISM AND THE DYNAMICS OF POWER

When Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab launched his
movement in the 1720s, he denounced the social values and
religious practices of his society. He accused Najdi
political leaders of not enforcing the dictates of the
shari'ah. The movement gathered converts because it

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[49]See, for example, Shaykh Sulayman Ibn Abd Allah,
op.cit., pp. 481-491.

"advocated something old in a new way."[50] Indeed, as
A. D. Nock has indicated, "the originality of a prophet
lies commonly in his ability to fuse into a white heat
combustible material which is there, to express and
to appear to meet the half formed prayers of at least
some of his followers."[51] Wahhabism advocated the old
in a new cloak--both militant and uncompromising. The
success of the movement, and its transformation into
a state ideology, took place when Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab allied himself with the rulers of Dar'iya. The
alliance provided Wahhabism with needed support and
protection and offered Ibn Saud the ideological plat-
form and recruits needed to effect his designs. Attacks
on neighbouring principalities, and indeed, the whole of
the Peninsula, were justified by the invocation of the
tradition of takfir and qital. More importantly, Wahhabi
teachings justified and consolidated Saudi rule over Arabia.
In his writings, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab stressed that
obedience to rulers is obligatory, even if they are
oppressive. The rulers' commands should be followed as
long as they do not contradict the rules of religion, of

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(50) Nock, op.cit., pp. 9-10.
(51) Ibid.,

which the ulama are the interpreters. The Shaykh advised
patience with the oppression of rulers and denounced armed
rebellion against them.[52] He, however, warned the rulers
to be just. The ruler's main objective, the Shaykh wrote,
should be the application of the shari'ah and this can
be done through cooperation with the ulama.

The views of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab on the role
of the ulama in the Islamic state are based on Ibn Taymiya's
definition of the ideal Islamic state as containing two
holders of authority: the ulama and the umara.[53] Because
of their knowledge of Islamic law, the ulama constitute
the premier directive class in the community, and the
rulers must govern with their advice and cooperation.[54]
Neither Ibn Taymiya nor Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, however,
suggested that the ulama should constitute a sacred clergy
or enjoy special privileges. In brief, the ruler is
responsible for the upholding of correct religious obligations

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[52]See, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, _Kitab al-Kaba'ir_ , in
which he devotes two chapters to advice Muslims to obey their
rulers and to warn them against rebellion, in Mu'alafat...,
Vol. I, pp. 45-46.
[53]
For information on Ibn Taymiya and his position on the
caliphate, consult the writings of Ibn Taymiya himself, including
al-Siyasa al-Shar'iya (Beirut: Dar al-Katib al-Arabi, n.d.).

[54]
Cited in Qamaruddin Khan, _The Political Thought of
Ibn Taymiyah_ (Islamabad, Islamic Research Institute, 1973),
p. 138.

which are expected of Muslim rulers--the fast, the
paryers, the pilgrimage, the application of hudud /‾punishment_s/,
the collection of zakat, etc. The ulama, on the other
hand, are to advise the ruler and support him as long as
he applies the word of God. As Ibn Taymiya suggested
"the authority to rule over people is obtained either by their
willing obedience to the imam or by his compulsion over
them. And when he becomes able to rule over them..., he
becomes the ruler, to whom obedience is due, as long
as he orders obedience to Allah."[55]

The relationship between Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and
the rulers of Dar'iya corresponded closely to the principle
of cooperation advocated by Ibn Taymiya. The Najdi
historian Ibn Bishr noted that the Shaykh's authority
was as important as the amir's. "A fifth of all the booty,
the alms and all revenues brought to Dar'iya was handed over
to Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who would use them at his
discretion. Neither Abd al-Aziz nor anyone else received
anything without his permission. The moves for peace
as well as the moves for war were made by him. The opinions
and statements made by Muhammad Ibn Saud and his son, Abd
al-Aziz, were based on the Shaykh's statements and thinking."[56]

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(55)Ibid., p. 134.   (56)Ibn Bishr, op.cit., p. 15.

Although Najdi sources inform us that Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab delegated some of his powers to Abd al-Aziz in 1774, they fail to indicate the reasons for this decision. What is known, however, is that Abd al-Aziz continued to consult the Shaykh on major matters. Moreover, religious and educational affairs remained under the direct supervision of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Linked to religious affairs, and falling under the Shaykh's jurisdiction as well, was the justice system. He appointed the mutawi'a /‾religious-morality enforcers/. The mutawi'a were the enforcers of justice and financed by the public treasury. Any community member who did not fulfill his religious obligations or who violated the principles of the shari'ah was harshly punished.[57]

According to Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, as well as Ibn Taymiya and other Muslim scholars, Islam is based on the principle of "Commanding the Good and Forbidding Evil." The observance of this principle is an obligatory duty on Muslim leaders and every Muslim capable of its exercise.[58] To enforce this principle, the Wahhabis instituted the mutawi'a

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[57] See, Lam' al-Shihab, op.cit., pp. 92-93.

[58] See, the Shaykh's letters to his followers in the Sudayr region in which he informs them of the need to enforce this principle, in Mu'alafat al-Shaykh..., Vol. V, p. 296.

network. Each mutawi' was assigned to a district, and
his duties included the enforcement of public attendance
of prayers, prevention of objectionable acts, e.g. drinking
of alcohol, smoking tobacco, wearing silk clothes or gold
jewelry, and playing or listening to music. This system
proved successful in controlling the society and consoli-
dating Saudi rule. Each mutawi' was instructed to compose
a list of names of all adult male members of his district.
At each prayer, names were called out in the mosque. Absent
members were visited at their homes by the mutawi', the
imam and some leading members of the community. Repeated
abstention from public prayers invited reprimand or
penalty.[59]

CONCLUSION

When Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab began his movement
in the 1720s, his immediate objectives were to gain
recognition and protection from a political leader in the
Arabian Peninsula. The alliance he forged with Prince

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(59)
    It is necessary to note that the mutawi'a system is
similar in spirit and structure to the hisba system in
Islam. For information on hisba see, Ibn Taymiya,
al-Hisba fi al-Islam (Beirut: Dar al-Katib al-Arabi, n.d.,n.p.);
Nicola Ziyadah, al-Hisba fi al-Islam (Beirut: Dar al-Katib
al-Arabi, n.d.). For a study of hisba in Islam and an
examination of the evolution of this institution in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, see Abd al-Aziz Ibn Muhammad Ibn Murshid,
al-Hisba fi al-Islam Ma'a Ard li Tatawur al-Hisba fi al-
Mamlaka al-Arabiya al-Saudiya (Riyadh: Imam Muhammad Ibn
Saud Islamic University, Higher Institute of Justice, 1973).

Muhammad Al Saud in 1740 fulfilled both objectives. It
provided Al Saud with an ideological rationalization of
their rule in Arabia.

Once the Saudi state became institutionalized, the
Shaykh continued to play an important role in the affairs
of the polity. Indeed, Al Saud found the doctrinal formulations
of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab to be highly instrumental in the
propagation of their rule. The dependency of Muslim
political leaders, including the Saudis of the eighteenth
century, on religious movements for legitimacy is not
surprising. The Abbasid and Fatimid caliphs, for example,
came to power on the crest of religious movements. What
is surprising, however, is that the relationship between
religion and state in eighteenth century Arabia was
harmonious. Both the religious and political spheres
shared a complementarity of objectives. The existence
of one was dependent on the survival and continued support
of the other. ·The durability of this alliance, however,
needs to be tested by reference to twentieth century
developments, when Ibn Saud resurrected the Saudi kingdom.
The question is thus: to what extent can the modern state,
because of its monopoly of force and resources, and its need
to maintain a high level of autonomy, tolerate an autonomous

religious domain that could compete with it for loyalty?

P A R T   II

RELIGION AND STATE IN PATRIMONIAL SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION

All forms of political domination are admixtures of charismatic, traditional or legal authority. The specification and attributes of these ideal type categories provide a useful analytic tool for the comparison, classification and understanding of political systems.[1] Charismatic authority may be defined as a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which its holder is "set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities."[2] To be a charismatic leader, the individual must be viewed by his followers as such, and he must demonstrate, from time to time, his leadership qualities. If he fails to do so over a long period, his charismatic authority may erode or disappear altogether.

Traditional domination is based on the belief in the legitimacy of an authority that "has always existed."[3] The leader exercising power enjoys authority by virtue of his inherited status. His commands are legitimate in the sense that they are in accordance with customs.[4]

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(1) Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber an Intellectual Portrait (New York : Anchor Books, 1962), p. 329.

(2) Max Weber, The Theory of Social Organization (New York : The Free Press, 1947), p. 358.

(3) Bendix, op.cit., p. 295.

(4) Ibid.

Legal domination, on the other hand, consists of a set of rules which are applied judicially and administratively in accordance with clearly defined principles to all members of society. The leaders are elected by legally sanctioned procedures and are themselves subject to the law.

The belief of the followers in the legitimacy of their leader is supported by the latter's ability to satisfy the needs of their societies.[5] "Every system of domination", Weber observed, "will change its character when its rulers fail to live up to the standards by which they justify their domination and thereby jeopardize the beliefs in those standards among the public at large."[6] Under legal domination, for example, the ruler himself is subject to the law, but he may undermine the beliefs sustaining the legal order if he uses the law to extend his authority.

The predominance of one or another tendency of legitimation is determined by the type of historical configurations existing in society. In pursuance of their material and ideal interests, rulers may emphasize the type of legitimacy that is most suited to the existing situation. A leader may, for example, emphasize the traditional base of his legitimacy over the legal one to accomodate changing circumstances.

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[5] Legitimacy here is defined as the citizen's conviction "that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime." See, David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 278. Gurr considers regimes legitimate "to the same extent that their citizens regard them as proper and deserving of support." See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 183. For an excellent study of legitimacy in the Arab world see, Michael Hudson, Arab Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

[6] Bendix, op.cit., pp. 296-297

Max Weber's ideal types are useful to the understanding of the shift in forms of political domination experienced in modern Saudi Arabia. In the process of shaping the political system and its territorial base, Ibn Saud invoked a legitimacy based on a combination of charismatic and traditional elements.[7] He utilized his charisma to mobilize the bedouins, and invoked his family's traditional domination of the area and ties to Wahhabism to justify his conquests and the consolidation of his power. As the territorial development of the country neared completion, Ibn Saud created modern administrative structures to meet the demands of a modern nation state. The new pattern of authority that evolved in the late 1920s and early 1930s corresponds to what Weber termed patrimonial rule.

In his study of traditional authority, Weber suggested the existence of two types which he labelled patriarchal and patrimonial systems.[8] The patriarchal system constitutes the core of all traditional systems and is generally found in household kinship groups in which the head of the household :

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[7] For a study of Ibn Saud's charismatic authority see, Bakr Omar Kashmeeri, Ibn Saud: The Arabian Nation Builder (an unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Howard University, Washington D.C., 1973).

[8] A third type is the feudal system which was dominant in medieval European societies. For Weber's study of patriarchal and patrimonial societies see, Weber, The Theory..., pp. 341-358

> has no administrative staff and no machinery to
> enforce his will... The members of the house-
> hold stand in an entirely personal relation to
> him. They obey him and he commands them in the
> belief that his right and their duty are part of
> an inviolable order that has the sanctity of
> immemorial tradition.[9]

The patrimonial system displays a different attribute, one in

which an identifiable administrative structure develops and spreads

throughout society. The tasks of government become more specialized,

complex and elaborate. As a result of the specialization of roles

and complexity of institutions, the ruler's relation with the ruled

is conducted through a network of bureaucrats. Although differences

between the patriarchal and patrimonial system are well marked, the

patrimonial form of rule remains an extension of the patriarchal system.

Reinhard Bendix, therefore, defines patrimonial rule as "an extension

of the ruler's household in which the relation between the ruler and

his officials remains on the basis of paternal authority and filial

dependence.[10]

> Under the patrimonial system, the ruler treats
> all political administration as his personal
> affair, in the same way in which he exploits
> his possession of political power as a useful
> adjunct of his private property. He empowers
> his officials from case to case, selecting
> them and assigning them specific tasks on the
> basis of his personal confidence in them and
> without establishing any consistent division
> of labor among them. The officials in turn
> treat their administrative work for the ruler
> as a personal service based on their duty of

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(9) Bendix, op.cit., pp. 330-331.

(10) Ibid.,

> obedience and respect... In their relations
> with the subject population they can act as ar-
> bitrarily as the ruler acts towards them, pro-
> vided that they do not violate tradition and
> the interest of the ruler in maintaining the
> obedience and productive capacity of his
> subjects.[11]

The personal dimension of patrimonial leadership manifests itself

in what Manfred Halpern has described as a "relationship of emanation."[12]

The politics of emanation involves an "encounter in which one treats

the other solely as an extension of one's self."[13] In brief, then,

the leader in a patrimonial system is the centre and source of

authority. He is "the model, the guide, the innovator, the planner,

the mediator, the chastiser, and the protector."[14] Although he may

develop a complex administrative structure to assist him in the

implementation of policies, the leader remains the centre of power.

The questions to be addressed in this part are : (1) What

strategy did Saudi rulers adopt in their use of religion and the

religious establishment to create the Saudi state and consolidate

their rule ? (2) What was the position of the ulama towards the

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(11) Ibid., pp. 345-346.

(12) Manfred Halpern, "Four Contrasting Repertories of Human Relations
in Islam", in eds., L. Carl Brown and Norman Itzkowitz, Psychological
Dimensions of Near Eastern Societies (Princetown: Darwin Press, 1977).

(13) Ibid., p. 64.

(14) James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, Politics in the Middle East
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), p. 152.

political authority that was instituted ? (3) What was the outcome
of the interaction between the political authority and the ulama ?
(4) What changes did Saudi rulers introduce to the pattern of legi-
timacy as a result of the discovery of oil ? (5) What administrative
institutions did they establish ? (6) How do these institutions
function in a patrimonial society ? (7) What is the position of the ·
ulama in the new structures ? (8) How did the ulama react-to changes
in Saudi laws ? (9) What areas are they the most/least influential ?
(10) What policies did Saudi rulers introduce and for what objectives ?
(11) How did the ulama react to these policies ? Finally, (12) what are
the future prospects of the existing process of interaction between the
ulama, the state and society at large ?

CHAPTER THREE

RELIGION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF EXPANSION AND CONTROL

The recapture of Riyadh by Ibn Saud in 1902 marked the beginning
of the territorial shaping of the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In
his attempt to expand and consolidate his rule, Ibn Saud revived
Wahhabism as a state ideology, stressed the traditional right of his
family to rule the area, and used his charisma to buttress his claims.
In using religion and the religious establishment to enhance his
political objective, Ibn Saud adopted a two-pronged policy. On the
one hand, he founded and promoted religiously-inspired institutions
which provided him with general support, created group consciousness
and promoted a common identity that cut across ascriptive ties, offered
symbols that linked society to the Saudi family, provided an organiza-
tional network to control and direct society, and offered the ruler a
loyal fighting force that enabled him to expand his rule. On the other
hand, he prevented these institutions from constituting independent
centers of power lest they challenge his authority in the future. The
political structures and relationships that evolved shattered the hopes
of the religious establishment to keep the king united to them by
common cause in return for maintaining their autonomy in the determi-
nation and transmission of values and dogma to the populace.

THE TERRITORIAL SHAPING OF

MODERN SAUDI ARABIA

Apart from Rashidi Najd, the Arabian Peninsula was divided before Ibn Saud's conquest of Riyadh in 1902 into six regions: (1) the Hejaz, extending along the Western coast of Arabia on the Red Sea, was ruled by the Sherif of Mecca and formed part of the Ottoman domain; (2) Asir, on the Red Sea between Hejaz and Yemen, was ruled by the Idressi dynasty, and was also part of the Ottoman domain; (3) Northern Arabia, ruled by the Rashid dynasty of Ha'il, was a tributary to the Ottoman empire; (4) Hasa, along the Gulf between Kuwait and the Trucial Coast, was a province of the Ottoman empire; (5) Yemen, under the Zaidi Imams of San'a, was part of the Ottoman empire; (6) the Gulf and South Arabian principalities, sultanates, and shaykhdoms, which included Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Trucial Coast, Muscat and Oman, Hadhramout, and Aden, were all under British protection. Of these territories, only Yemen and the British protected areas did not eventually fall under Saudi rule.[1]

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[1] The successful founding of a Saudi dominion in 1902 was presaged by two failed attempts. The first of these attempts followed the alliance that was forged between Al Saud and Al Shaykh leading to the creation of the first Saudi state. However, Saudi conquest of Mecca and Medina in 1803 and 1804, respectively, brought them into direct confrontation with the Ottoman Sultan who regarded himself as the Guardian of the Holy Places. Subsequently, the Sultan requested Muhammad Ali, governor of Egypt, to put an end to Saudi control of the Holy Places. In 1812, Muhammad Ali's forces took Medina and in the following year Mecca. In 1816, the Egyptians invaded Najd, and two years later the Saudi capital Dar'iya was razed to the ground.
    . The second attempt to found a Saudi state dates to 1824, when Turki Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Muhammad Al Saud seized Riyadh from Muhammad Ali's forces. The experiment ended in 1889. In that year, the Rashidis of Ha'il expelled Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abd Allah Al Saud from Riyadh. Abd al-Rahman and his family, including his son Ibn Saud, sought refuge in

When Ibn Saud was about twenty-two years old, he marched on Riyadh with forty men and defeated the Rashidi garrison on January 12, 1902. Ibn Rashid was preparing to attack Kuwait, in an attempt to annex it to his domain, when he received the news of the fall of Riyadh and the death of his governor Ajlan at the hands of Ibn Saud. He, however, refrained from taking action against Ibn Saud because he believed that it was within his power to recapture Riyadh at any time he wished. Taking advantage of Ibn Rashid's inaction, Ibn Saud began to fortify his position in the city. To enhance his legitimacy among the city's inhabitants, and to devote his time to expanding Saudi rule, Ibn Saud entrusted his father, Imam Abd al-Rahman, with the administration of Riyadh.

One town after another fell under Saudi attack. By the Spring of 1904, Ibn Saud had become the ruler of central Najd and pushed his boundaries to the confines of Jabal Shammar. The Ottomans were apprehensive of Ibn Saud and the spread of his domain. Subsequently, they increased their support to the Rashidis, but Saudi forces were able to continue their push to control the Peninsula.[2]

Kuwait. It was Ibn Saud, who was born around 1880, who reestablished his family's rule in Riyadh in 1902 and created the modern state of Saudi Arabia, thus initiating the third Saudi state. For information on the first Saudi state consult, Munir al-Ajlani, Tarikh al Bilad al-Arabiya al-Sau'diya ; al Dawla al-Saudiya al-Ula, in four volumes, (Riyadh: n.p., n.d.). Abd al-Rahim Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Saudiya al-Ula (Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-Jami'i, 1979). For information on Muhammad Ali's expeditions to the Arabian Peninsula see, Muhamad Adib Ghalib, Min Akhbar al-Hejaz wa Najd fi Tarikh al-Jabarti (Riyadh: Dar al-Yamama, 1975). Information on the second Saudi state is available in Ibrahim jum'a, al-Atlas al-Tarikhi li al-Dawla al-Saudiya (Riyadh: Darat al-Malik Abd al-Aziz, 1977).

(2) For information on the relationship between Al Saud and the Rashidi family see, George Khairallah, Arabia Reborn (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1953), p. 85.

By 1913, the Ottomans were unable to restrain the expansion of the Saudi state. The Ottoman empire was engaged in war with Italy over the possession of Libya as well as some Mediteranean islands, thus allowing Ibn Saud to annex the Hasa region. Ibn Saud's position was further strengthened when the British government concluded a treaty with him in 1914 recognizing Najd, Hasa, Qatif, Jubail and its dependencies as part of the Saudi domain. During the war, Ibn Saud aided the Allies' war effort by avoiding military action against Sherif Hussein, ruler of the Hejaz and supporter of the British. However; continued British support to Sherif Hussein in the years that followed the First World War led Ibn Saud to devise plans to conquer the Hejaz. The British had already installed Hussein's two sons, Faisal and Abd Allah, as rulers of British-dominated Iraq and Transjordan respectively. Moreover, in 1924, Sherif Hussein proclaimed himself "Caliph of the Muslims" in addition to his previous title "King of the Arabs."

Realizing the urgency of conquering Hejaz, Ibn Saud called the ulama of Riyadh and tribal leaders on June 2, 1924 to a conference and stated that "it is time to put an end to the follies of him who calls himself the Sherif of Mecca. Never in the history of Islam has a man so corrupt dared to clothe himself with the dignity of Caliph."[3] Few months later, a Saudi force consisting of 3,000 warriors set out to Ta'if and captured it after slaughtering its Hashemite garrison. The news of how Ibn Saud's army massacred the

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[3] Ibid., p. 81.

Ta'if garrison reached Jeddah. Fearing for their life, the city's
merchants and ulama deposed King Hussein and installed in his stead
Amir Ali, Hussein's son. Ali, however, had little time to exercise
any authority. The forces of Ibn Saud occupied Jeddah and the holy
cities of Mecca and Medina in 1926; in the same year, Ibn Saud
proclaimed himself King of Hejaz. Six years later, Ibn Saud was
proclaimed King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.[4]

THE CONSOLIDATION OF SAUDI RULE: LEGITIMATION OF RULE THROUGH THE ULAMA

Ibn Saud's skillful use of charisma and of the Wahhabi ideology
proved to be extremely helpful tools in the conquest of the Arabian
Peninsula and the consolidation of his rule throughout the newly
conquered territories. As leader, Ibn Saud alluded to the mission he
was called upon to perform.[5] His advocacy of a revivalist movement
in search of lost glory supplemented this charismatic authority, and
capitalized on his family's traditional association with Al Shaykh
and Wahhabism.

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[4] For a detailed account of the fight for Mecca see, David Howarth,
The Desert King: Ibn Saud and His Arabia (New York: MacGraw Hill, 1974),
pp. 135-138. For information on the Hashemites see, James Morris,
The Hashemite Kings (New York: Pantheon Books, 1959). For information
on Britain's position in the Peninsula and its relations with the Saudis
see, Gary Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, Britain and the Rise of
the House of Saud (London: Frank Cass, 1976).

[5] A charismatic authority may be defined as "a certain quality of an
individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary
men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least
specifically exceptional qualities." See, Max Weber, On Charisma and
Institution Building, ed. by S.N. Eisenstadt, (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1968), p. 80.

Ibn Saud's personality enabled him to galvanize the bedouins to action; his knowledge of and aptitude in desert warfare and in the handling of bedouins, led to victories. Success gave his claims additional legitimacy and furthered his charisma in the eyes of his followers. Ibn Saud used his knowledge of the history of the area and of the workings of its society to justify his conquests and consolidate his position among the tribes of the Peninsula and the area's urban inhabitants in both historical and religious terms. Dankwart Rustow tells us that "if a leader is to be a major innovator, /¯he needs_7 a particular attitude toward the recent and the more distant past of his society."[6] To the outstanding leader, "the remote past may become a powerful ally against the immediate past for a better future."[7] Indeed, Ibn Saud was well aware of his family's history, the vicissitudes of his people, the psychology of the urban and bedouin inhabitants of the Peninsula, and the difficulty of controlling the bedouins. It was to expand his rule and consolidate his authority that Ibn Saud deliberately set out in his revival of Wahhabism to destroy the tribal organization and create in its place a sense of national cohesion.

It was not too long, however, before the ideals of Wahhabism were shattered under the impact of political reality and the demands of modern social and political organization. Ibn Saud realized the

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(6) Dankwart Rustow, ed., Philosphers and Kings: Studies in Leader-ship (New York: George Braziller, 1970), p. 26.

(7) Ibid.,

need to introduce modern vehicles to facilitate the transport of pilgrims to the holy places and to mechanize his army, but the ulama objected in principle to any changes. Similarly, while Ibn Saud aspired to modify the country's laws and administrative institutions, the ulama insisted that answers to comtemporary situations be sought in the shari'ah and traditional Islamic institutions.

Ibn Saud's position vis-a-vis Wahhabism and his relations with the ulama were determined by his political objectives and the type of social and historical configurations which existed. As for the ulama themselves, their general position toward political authority was endorsment and support of policies which did not contradict Wahhabi principles, and limited opposition to policies which they viewed as un-Islamic. To understand the factors contributing to the ulama's docile position vis-a-vis Ibn Saud, it is necessary to examine the structure and composition of the ulama establishment in Saudi society.

Najdi and Hejazi Ulama: Composition and Background

Generally speaking, the ulama may be defined as those theological and legal experts who through their personal conduct and knowledge gained the respect and recognition of the community in general and the political authorities in particular. Accordingly, and in Najd, there were ulama in urban centers, small towns and villages, and in bedouin settlements. At no time, however, did a structured religious hierarchy, similar to the Egyptian ulama, for example, exist. Despite the absence of a hierarchical organization, Najdi ulama were differentiated according to a set of informal criteria. Among their ranks,

some were recognized by their colleagues as more learned, and Al Saud sought their advice and support. Philby noted in 1918, for example, that the leading ulama consisted of "six at Riyadh, three in the Qasim, a similar number in the Hasa, and one in each of the other districts or provinces of Najd some twenty or more in all."[8] The number of the leading ulama was not the same at all times. Some fatwas contained names of fifteen ulama, while others had more or less names. It is certain, however, that the Riyadh ulama enjoyed a position of preeminence among their colleagues. This preeminent position may be attributed to their presence in the capital and proximity to the ruler.

Another group that enjoyed a privileged position among the ulama were the descendants of Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This group supported Saudi rule and identified its survival and fortunes with their own. As table I shows, Abd Allah Ibn Shaykh Muhammad, for example, served three Saudi rulers. He accompanied Imam Saud in his conquest of Mecca in 1803 and authored pamphlets and tracts propagating Wahhabi principles. His son, Sulayman Ibn Shaykh Abd Allah, was appointed judge of Mecca by Imam Saud in 1810. He endorsed Saudi rule of the holy cities and condemned all opponents of Saudi rule as infidels.

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(8) H. St. John Philby, The Heart of Arabia (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1923), Vol. I, p. 297.

TABLE I

The Religious Elite
Al Shaykh (9)

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Children	Education	Career	Relation with Al Saud
Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab	b. 1704 in Najd	Ali, Hussein, Abd Allah, Hassan, Ibrahim, Abd al-Aziz. (10)	Was tutored in Hanbali juris-prudence by his father.	Co-founder of the first Saudi State.	Co-ruled the first Saudi State.
Abd Allah Ibn Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab	b. 1751, d. 1856; Dar'iya	Sulayman, Abd al-Rahman	Was tutored in the principles of Wahhabism by his father.	Succeeded his father as propagator of Wahhabism, Chief Mufti, and head of the judicial system.	Served under three Saudi rulers: Imam Abd al-Aziz, Imam Saud, Imam Abd Allah. Accompanied Imam Saud in the conquest of Mecca. Authored pamphlets propagating Wahhabism and rejecting Zaidi Shi'ism.
Sulayman Ibn Shaykh Abd Allah	b. 1785; d. 1817; Dar'iya	No children	Was tutored in the principles of Wahhabism by his father.	Lectured princi-ples of Wahhabi-sm in Dar'iya. Was appointed by Imam Saud as Judge of Mecca	Supported Saudi rule. Urged the Imam not to deal with infidels, i.e. all non-Wahhabis.

(9) Information on Al Shaykh is derived from Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abd al-Latif Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Abd al-Latif al Shaykh, Ulama' al-Da'wa (Cairo: Midani Press, 1966).

(10) Ali, Hussein, Abd Allah and Hassan became leading ulama. Ibrahim and Abd al-Aziz had no children.

TABLE I

The Religious Elite

Al Shaykh

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Children	Education	Career	Relation with Al Saud
Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hassan	b. 1779; d. 1868; Dar'iya.	Muhammad, Abd al-Latif, Abd Allah, Isma'il. (11)	Was tutored in the principles of Wahhabism by his grandfather, Shaykh Muhammad. (12)	Became judge of Dar'iya Lectured Wahhabism After his return from Egypt, he became Mufti of Riyadh	Accompanied Imam Abd Allah in battle against Egyptian forces. Was taken hostage with his son Abd al-Latif to Egypt. When Turki Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Muhammad Al Saud recaptured Najd from the Egyptians, he returned to the area in 1825 and provided Imam Turki the support he needed to consolidate his rule Authored a number of books propagating Wahhabism.
Abd al-Latif Ibn al-Shaykh Abd al-Rahman	b. 1848; d. (?); Dar'iya.	No information	Was tutored in the principles of Wahhabism by his father.	Lectured in Ha'il became Chief Mufti of Riyadh during the reign of Ibn Saud Organized and the Mutawi'a.	When the Rashidis attacked Riyadh in 1890, he was taken hostage to Ha'il. The Rashidis allowed him to return to Riyadh in 1891. Following Ibn Saud's conquest of Riyadh in 1901, he endorsed Saudi rule. Ibn Saud renewed the alliance between Al Saud and Al Shaykh by marrying Abd al-Latif's daughter, mother of King Faisal

(11) Abd al-Latif and Ishaq became leading ulama.

(12) He in turn tutored four members of the family· Abd al-Malik Ibn Hussein Ibn Muhammad, Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hussein Ibn Muhammad, Hussein Ibn Hassan Ibn Hussein, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ali Muhammad. All four became leading ulama.

TABLE I

The Religious Elite

Al Shaykh

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Children	Education	Career	Relation with Al Saud
Abd Allah Ibn Hassan Ibn Hussein Ibn Ali Ibn Hussein Ibn Abd al-Wahhab	b. 1870, Riyadh d. (?)	(14) Muhammad, Abd al-Aziz, Hassan, (15) Ibrahim, Ahmad (16)	Was tutored by his father principles of Wahhabism and Islamic sciences.	Imam of Riyadh Mosque. (13) Was sent by Ibn Saud to instruct the Ikhwan of Artawiya principles of Wahhabism. Became Qadi in Ibn Saud's army. Was appointed by Ibn Saud Imam and Khatib of the Mecca Mosque. Became Chief Qadi of Hejaz. Controller and supervisor Holy Places in Mecca and Medina. Supervised religious education in the Mecca and Medina Mosques.	Supported and advocated Ibn Saud's policies among the ulama and the Ikhwan.

(13) He also oversaw the education of the ulama as well as many members of his family, including Salih Ibn Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hussein future Mufti of the state; Abd al-Latif Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Abd al-Latif; Omar Ibn Hassan, future head of the Committees for Commanding the Good and Forbidding the Evil in the Central and Eastern Provinces; and Abd Allah Ibn Hassan, future Chief Judge of the Hejaz region.

(14) No children.   (15) Became a leading alem.   (16) Became a leading alem.

TABLE I

The Religious Elite
Al Shaykh

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Children	Education	Career	Relation with Al Saud
Muhammad Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Hassan Ibn Hussein Ibn Ali Ibn Hussein Ibn Abd al-Wahhab	No information	No information	Tutored in the principles of Wahhabism by his father.	Director of religious affairs Western Province	Supported the rule of Al Saud
Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Hassan Ibn Hussein Ibn Ali Ibn Hussein Ibn Abd al-Wahhab	No information	No information	Tutored in the principles of Wahhabism by his father.	Minister of Education; Khatib at the Mecca Mosque	Supported the rule of Al Saud
Hassan Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Hassan Ibn Hussein Ibn Ali Ibn Hussein Ibn Abd al-Wahhab	No information	No information	Tutored in the principles of Wahhabism by his father.	Minister of Education.	Supported the rule of Al Saud

In brief, then, Al Shaykh justified the policies of Al
Saud by authoring pamphlets and texts amplifying Wahhabi doctrines,
acting as judges and administrators in conquered areas, and more
importantly, identifying the rule of Al Saud with Wahhabism.
Because of their close identification with Al Saud, the fate
of Al Shaykh was determined by the wishes of Al Saud and by the
fate of Al Saud themselves. For example, Abd al-Rahman Al Shaykh
was appointed by Imam Abd Allah as judge of Dar'iya. When the
forces of Muhammad Ali attacked the city in 1818, Abd al-Rahman
accompanied Imam Abd Allah in battle against the Egyptian army
and was subsequently taken hostage to Egypt. When Turki Ibn Abd
Allah Ibn Muhammad Al Saud recaptured Najd from the Egyptians in
1824, Abd al-Rahman escaped from Egypt and returned to Najd the
following year. He was appointed Mufti of Riyadh, for Dar'iya
was razed to the ground by the Egyptians. In his new post, he
provided Imam Turki with the religious legitimacy he needed to
justify his rule, and authored a number of pamphlets propagating
Wahhabism.

Abd al-Rahman's son Shaykh Abd al-Latif, followed more or
less the same pattern in his relation with Al Saud as his father.

When the Rashidis attacked Riyadh in 1890, Abd al-Latif was taken
hostage to Ha'il, the Rashidi capital. He was allowed to return
to Riyadh a year later, provided that he confined his activities
to religious instruction. When Ibn Saud conquered Riyadh in 1902,
however, Abd al-Latif became instrumental in providing Ibn Saud
with the religious sanction and support he needed to legitimate
his regime. To symbolize the durability of the alliance between
the Saudi family and Al Shaykh, Ibn Saud married Shaykh Abd al-
Latif's daughter.

The ulama of Hejaz differed from their Najdi counterparts
in their social background, education and outlook. These diffe-
rences were influenced by the disparity in the social and political
settings between the two regions. While Najdi society was mostly
tribal and was hardly subject to any foreign influence, Hejaz was
urban in its politics and outlook, its power was concentrated in the
cities of Mecca, Medina and Jeddah, and it had always been subject to
the influence of cultures external to the Peninsula. Economically,
Hejaz was prosperous in comparison with Ibn Saud's impoverished Najd.
Yearly pilgrims to the holy cities constituted the primary source
of wealth in Hejaz, and the pilgrimage worked as means of cultural
contact with the outside world. Because of this cultural richness,

Hejazis, including their ulama, were less rigid in their social out-
look and less austere in their daily life.

Hurgronje identified Hejazi ulama as those who specialized in
fiqh /⁻jurisprudence_7, Quranic exegesis; Tradition, Arabic grammar,
syntax, prosody, logic, and philosophy.[17] The region's leading
ulama were mostly Azhar graduates, or studied in the Mecca and Medina
mosques. Najdi ulama, on the other hand, had concentrated in their
learning as well as teaching on the principles of Wahhabism and
Hanbali fiqh with little interest in grammar, syntax, or other
traditional subjects of Islamic sciences. Moreover, the religious
education of Al Shaykh was handed down from father to son, with
little contact with outside scholars. Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd
-al-Wahhab, instructed his son Abd Allah who in turn instructed his
son Sulayman. Shaykh Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hassan was tutored by his
grandfather, Shaykh Muhammad. He, in turn, instructed his son Shaykh
Abd al-Latif Ibn al-Shaykh Abd al-Rahman.[18] The difference in the
educational background between the Najdi and Hejazi ulama made the

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(17) S.C. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th
Century (Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1931), pp. 190-203.

(18) See table I

former more fanatical and literal in their understanding and application of religion. It was not surprising, therefore, that while the Najdi ulama opposed the introduction of any innovation, their Hejazi counterparts were more willing to depart from tradition.

Nothwithstanding the differences between the two groups of ulama, both relied and depended on political authority for survival. As with the Najdi ulama who drew their salaries from the state, many Hejazi ulama received salaries from their political benefactors. Others survived on donations, pilgrims' gifts, awqaf revenues, or engaged in commerce. Those receiving salaries from the political authority in Hejaz were viewed by their colleagues and the population as a whole as most prominent. This may be attributed to their promixity to political authority and, consequently, greater influence.

While some Hejazi ulama survived on donations, gifts or awqaf revenues, and enjoyed relative autonomy in the conduct of their daily affairs, Najdi ulama were totally dependent for their material existence on state subsidies. The dependence of Najdi ulama on state financial support arose from the principles of Wahhabism itself which prohibit the ulama from receiving gifts, donations or to survive on awqaf revenues.

Although Najdi ulama supported the cause of Al Saud, leading Hejazi ulama took it upon themselves to defend the authority of their rulers. Ibn Ghanam recorded a debate which took place between Najdi and Hejazi ulama during the reign of Sherif Ghalib (1788-1813). The leading ulama of Mecca, in an attempt to refute Wahhabism, criticized their Najdi counterparts for declaring non-Wahhabi Muslims

to be infidels.[19] By focusing on this issue, the Mecca ulama did not challenge the tenents of Wahhabism as much as reject Wahhabi denunciation of other Muslims as infidels. In other words, the Meccan ulama attempted to convince their Najdi counterpart that to fight other Muslims, including their own Amir of Mecca was un-Islamic. According to them, the Amir of Mecca is a Muslim ruler who applies the shari'ah, and his authority should be accepted.

Following Ibn Saud's conquest of Hejaz, the region's ulama submitted to Saudi rule. Their leaders issued a fatwa sanctioning Ibn Saud's take-over of the holy places and urged all Muslims to obey the new ruler.

In addition to their role as legitimators of political authority, both Najdi and Hejazi ulama acted as mediators between the rulers and their subjects. Because of their proximity to political authority, the ulama's conduct played a crucial role in the process by which social communication was carried on and thus contributed to the integration of society into a working whole.[20] Shaykh Ahmad Zayni Dehlan, the Mufti of Mecca, for instance, was the religious leader through whom the Ottomans legitimated their policies in the area.

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(19) Cited in Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur al-Attar, Saqr al-Jazira (Mecca: n.p., 1979), p. 572.

(20) I.M. Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 52.

In addition to issuing the appropriate fatwas required of him, Dahlan
was authorized to appoint professors and instructors in the Mecca
Mosque, to supervise the educational system in the city's mosques, and
to look after the affairs of the ulama in general. Informally, he
was the mediator between the merchants and the authority, the rich
and the poor, the ruler and the ruled.

Although Najdi ulama were generally supportive of Saudi rule,
their relation with Ibn Saud was far from harmonious. For example,
in 1925 the Riyadh ulama issued a fatwa calling on Ibn Saud to refuse
the Shi'is of Hasa the right to worship publicly, to force them to
appear before ulama representatives to submit to the "religion of
God and His Prophet", to compel them to cease calling upon members
of the House of the Prophet, including Ali and his sons Hassan and
Hussein, to halt their celebrations on the anniversaries of the
birth and death of Muhammad and Ali, to prevent them from visiting
Karbala and Najaf, to force them to attend the five prayers in mosques,
to compel them to undergo instruction in the writings of Shaykh
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and to destroy   Shi'i worship places
in the Hasa.[21]

Ruling by the force of his personality and the strength of his right
arm, Ibn Saud rejected the ulama's fatwa. Instead, he taxed the

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[21] For the complete text of the fatwa see, Shaykh Muhammad Ibn
Ibrahim Al Shaykh, al-Majmu'a al-Ilmiya al-Sa'udiya (Cairo: Matba'at
Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhamadiya, 1946), pp. 1-15. It must be noted that
the Hasa region contains a heavy concentration of Shi'is numbering in
1955 about 130,000. For information on the Shi'is of Hasa see, F.S.
Vidal, The Oasis of al-Hasa (Dhahran: ARAMCO, 1955), pp. 16-18, 34.

Shi'is for the protection he granted them. Ibn Saud's rejection of
ulama demands was not limited to this incident. Indeed, as Armstrong
has noted, "in matters of religion /¯Ibn Saud_7 submitted to the
wishes of the ulama, but when they rendered him advice on political
or military matters, which he disagreed with, he sent them back to
their books."[22] In June 1930, the ulama met in Mecca to discuss Ibn
Saud's educational policies. They issued a fatwa protesting the
inclusion of foreign languages, geography and drawing in the
curricula of the newly founded Directorate of Education. They
objected to the study of foreign languages because they believed
that this would enable Muslims to learn the religion of unbelievers;
to geography because it presupposed that the earth is round, while
a Quranic verse indicates that it is flat; and to drawing because it
is the same as painting, reproduces God's Creation. Ibn Saud was not
inclined to eliminate these subjects. He was determined to create,
in addition to the already existing Quranic schools, a modern educa-
tional system. He informed the ulama that their fatwa demonstrated
ignorance of Islam, which urges believers to acquire knowledge, and
asked Hafez Wahbah, the Head of the newly-founded Directorate, to
include all three subjects in the curriculum.

In summary, Ibn Saud's attitude towards the ulama was influenced
by his political objectives. On the one hand, he sought ulama support
and endorsement of his rule; on the other, he rejected their tradi-
tional right to judge and evaluate the ruler's policies. Although

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(22) H.C. Armstrong, Lord of Arabia (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1934),
p. 214.

the ulama identified themselves with Saudi authority, they disagreed
with many of its policies. They expressed their disagreement through
the issuance of fatawas or in private audiences with the king.
Because of their close relation with all strata of the population,
through public prayers as well as the Friday sermon, and their
control of the traditional educational system, the ulama could have
mobilized the masses against Ibn Saud's authority. It seems,
however, that they adopted a passive attitude towards political
authority and continued to hope that the King's policy would express
Wahhabi principles.

THE CREATION AND SUBSEQUENT SUBJUGATION OF THE IKHWAN

While the ulama provided Ibn Saud with the religious legitima-
tion he needed to consolidate his rule, Wahhabi ideology was
instrumental in mobilizing the bedouin society to expand Saudi
domain. With the restoration of Saudi rule in Najd, Ibn Saud
realized that no central authority and modern political structure
could be established in an unstable tribal society. The majority
of the Peninsula's population was tribal, people who mistrusted and
rejected any central authority because of their fear of taxation,
military conscription and the general loss of autonomy. The eclipse
of the Saudi state in the 1800s permitted the bedouin to revert to
the intertribal feuding and superstitious practices which Ibn Abd
al-Wahhab thought he had obliterated. Based on his understanding
of bedouin society, Ibn Saud realized that the bedouin could
become a powerful fighting force if means could be found to motivate

them. Wahhabism became the ideology, jihad the instrument, and the Ikhwan were Ibn Saud's warriors.

Describing the genesis of the Ikhwan, Wahbah wrote:

> Wahhabi teaching was formerly preached amongst town-
> dwellers only. Consequently, Bedouins were respon-
> sible to a great extent for much of the upheaval that
> had taken place at different times. They always sided
> with the party whom they dreaded most or who promised
> them most booty. That is why they were sometimes
> counted as Egyptians or Turkish or Wahhabis or Rashidites.
> The onus of defence fell thereby on the shoulders of
> towns-dwellers. King Ibn Saud thought fit to tackle
> this Bedouin question by establishing special dwellings
> for them to follow agricultural pursuits, ... and
> whereas they were formerly a danger to whichever
> party they elected to support, they have now become
> staunch and reliable in the face of death itself. [23]

In creating the settlements, Ibn Saud deliberately emphasized a militant Wahhabi spirit among the bedouins. The belief system which rationalized and inspired the Ikhwan movement was developed by Shaykh Abd Allah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Latif Al Shaykh. He amplified Wahhabi principles to coincide with Ibn Saud's political objectives and organized a network of religious instructors who propagated these principles. Above all, his writings emphasized the dual duty to obey God and the Imam. He stressed the evils of innovation and the religious obligation of believers to fight infidels. [24]

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(23) Hafez Wahbah, "Wahhabism in Arabia: Past and Present", Journal of Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XVI (October, 1924), p. 465. See also, Armstrong, op.cit., p. 110.

(24) See, Shaykh Sulayman Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Taysir al-Aziz al-Hamid fi Sharh Kitab al-Tawhid (Riyadh: Directorate of Religious Research, Ifta', Propagation and Guidance, n.d.), espe-cially pp. 481-491. For information on Jihad in Islam see, for example, Abu al-A'la Maududi, Jihad in Islam (Damascus: The Holy Publishing House, 1977).

To indoctrinate the bedouins, instructors were sent to the tribes with the message that "Islam is a sedentary religion" /‾ al-Islam din hadari_7.[25] Moreover, Ibn Saud summoned tribal shaykhs to Riyadh and told them:

> "...in blunt terms that /‾their_7 tribe had no
> religion and that they were all 'juhal' /‾ignorant
> of Islam_7. He next ordered the /‾shaykhs_7 to
> attend the local school of ulama which was attached
> to the great mosque in Riyadh, and there undergo a
> course of instruction in religion. At the same
> time half a dozen ulama, attended by some genuinely
> fanatical /‾I_7 khwan ... were sent off to the tribe
> itself. These held daily classes teaching the
> people all about Islam in its original simplicity ...
> When the Shaykh of the tribe was supposed to have
> received sufficient religious instruction, he was
> invited to build a house in Riyadh and remain in
> attendance on the imam. This again was part of the
> control scheme.[26]

Linked closely to the notion of Jahlliyah /‾ignorance of Islam_7 was the concept of hijrah /‾migration_7. In emulation of the Prophet's flight to Medina which led to the creation of the first Islamic community, the ideology of the Ikhwan viewed migration from the land of polytheism to the land of Islam as a duty incumbent upon all Muslims. In Thalathat al-Usul, Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab cited the following Quranic verses to urge believers to migrate from the land of shirk /‾polytheism_7 to the land of Islam :

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(25) Ahmed A. Shamekh, Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlements in Al Qasim Region Saudi Arabia (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky, 1975), pp. 46-47.

(26) H.R. P. Dickson, Report to the Civil Commissioner, MSS, Foreign Office, Vol. 5062. Cited in John Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), p. 30.

> Lo! as for those whom the angels ask: in what
> were you engaged? They will say: we were oppressed
> in the land. / The angels 7 will say: was not Allah's
> earth spacious that you could have migrated therein?
> As for such, their habitation will be hell, an evil
> journey's end; .... Whoso migrateth for the cause
> of Allah will find much refuge and abundance in the
> earth, and whose forsaekth his home, a fugitive unto
> Allah and His messenger, and death overtaketh him,
> his reward is then incumbent on Allah...."
>
> 27

Structure and Organization of Ikhwan Settlements

The first Ikhwan settlement was founded in December 1912 at
al-Artawiya, an area that possessed good pasture land and wells. This
area was within the domain / dira 7 of the Mutayr tribe. Certainly,
were Ibn Saud to succeed in leading this tribe to give up its tribal
nature, his accomplishment would come to be regarded as a remarkable
feat. It was a tribe known for its warlike traits, its frequent
raids against neighbouring areas and its rejection of central autho-
rity. By a skillful use of force and indoctrination, Ibn Saud settled
this tribe along with a sub-group of the Harb tribe, thus weakening
tribal ties and promoting relations based on a subscription to a
common ideology.

Two hundred and twenty other settlements followed the experiment
that begun at al-Artawiya.[28] The majority of these settlements were

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(27) The Quran, Sura IV, Verses 97-100. See, Shaykh Muhammad Ibn
Abd al-Wahhab, Mu'alafat al-Shaykh al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab
(Riyadh: Islamic University of Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud, n.d.), Vol. I,
pp. 193-194.

(28) Although Hamzah suggested that there were about 122 settlements,
Habib conducted field research in Najd and identified 222 settlements.
See, Habib, op.cit., p. 111, and Fouad Hamzah, Qalb Jazirat al-Arab
(Riyadh: Maktabat al-Manan, 1968), p. 379.

founded in Najd and on the fringes of the Hejaz and the Saudi-
Transjordanian borders. The broad geographical distribution of these
settlements in the region made Ibn Saud's physical presence felt across
the Peninsula, and provided him with military bases, supply bases and
religious outposts.[29]

In a record of his travels to the Peninsula, Amin al-Rihani
remarked that the population of the hujar /‾settlements‾/ was divided
into three groups: (1) the bedouin who had become farmers; (2) the
mutawi'a; and (3) merchants and craftsmen."[30] The distinction between
the farmers and the merchant-craftsmen group was tribal in origin.
Members of noble tribes became agriculturalists, while those of
ignoble origin functioned as merchants and tradesmen.[31] Despite
Ikhwan assertions that theirs was a community of equals, members of
ignoble tribes did not participate in ghazw /‾raids‾/ ; they remained
in the settlement performing necessary services such as shoeing
horses, making swords and spears, and repairing weapons and utensils.[32]

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(29) Habib, op.cit., p. 59. See also, J.B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian
Frontiers (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), p. 125.

(30) Amin Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1928), p. 194.

(31) It is necessary to note that among the bedouins a distinction is
made between noble and ignoble tribes. The noble tribes are camel
breeders, have a warrior tradition and intermarry only with those of
noble lineage. The ignoble tribes, on the other hand, are semi-
sedentary, non-warriors and perform menial work which noble bedouins
shun.

(32) Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud..., p. 194.

It is not exactly clear which social elements made up the'
mutawi'a who were under the direct control of the Riyadh ulama and
were normally recruited from outside the tribal units of the
settlement. Each mutawi', however, had a tilmidh /¯a mutawi trainee_7
who was recruited from the local settlement. The mutawi'a did not
enjoy any administrative or judicial functions. Rather, they
distributed themselves usually in a ratio of one to fifty among
members of the settlements and conducted sessions of religious
instruction. They also enforced the general principles of Wahhabism.

Each settlement was governed by an amir and a hakim /¯administrator_7.[33]
The amir was responsible for the implementation of administrative decrees
emanating from the Consultative Council in Riyadh /¯majlis al-shura_7.
This council was composed of Mufti Abd Allah Al Shaykh, the leading
ulama, tribal leaders as well as some urban notables. Council decisions
became effective only after ratification by Ibn Saud, who held the
title of President of the Council. As for the hakim, he was
responsible for the general application of the dictates of the
shari'ah. In addition to the amir and the hakim, each settlement
had a qadi /¯judge_7, who was appointed by Ibn Saud. The majority
of qadis were drawn from Al Shaykh.[34]

The Ikhwan as a Military Force

Daily life in the settlements was dedicated to prayer, study of
al-tawhid, cultivation of land and constant preparation for war. The

(33) Habib, op.cit., p.61.

(34) Ibid.,

Ikhwan viewed the world and its inhabitants in term of believers, i.e. Ikhwan, and unbelievers. All non-believers should be converted by the sword. This vision of the world and its inhabitants served Ibn Saud's interest in justifying the expansion of his domain. To accomplish the objective of territorial expansion, he divided the inhabitants of each settlement into three classes: (1) those personnel in a state of semi-alert who responded to the first call of jihad; (2) the reserve forces, composed of herdsmen and tradesmen; and (3) all those who remained in the settlement to maintain daily business. Ibn Saud had the right to call up the first and second groups, while the ulama's approval was needed to mobilize the third.[35]

The Ikhwan's first appearance as a military force in the battle of Jirab in 1914 had radically altered the balance of power in the area. In the Hejaz, Sherif Hussein relied militarily on an urban-regular army, trained by the Ottomans and the British and officered by Syrians and Iraqis. This army, however, lacked the Ikhwans' dedication to their cause and the mobility of bedouins.[36] The Ottoman-equipped Rashidi army was composed mostly of the Shammar tribe whose allegiance to the Rashidi cause was based on convenience rather than ideological commitment. The Ikhwan, on the other hand, considered themselves the guardians of state

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(35) Ibid., p. 63.

(36) Ibid.,

security and morals. Their increased political and military power
created among their ranks a group consciousness which did not exist
among the forces of Sherif Hussein or the Rashidis. They were
highly mobile and well trained in desert warfare.

Schooled in the notion that Wahhabism is the only path for
Muslims to follow, the Ikhwan were able to win for Ibn Saud every
battle in which they were engaged between 1914 and 1927. He was
their Imam, and Wahhabism was their cause. In the conquest of
Hejaz, the Ikhwan leaders as well as the ulama, tribal shaykhs
and urban notables were called to a conference in Riyadh on June
5, 1924. Ibn Saud informed them that the Ikhwan had expressed
their desire to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina but Sherif
Hussein prevented them from performing this religious duty. After
presenting his position, Ibn Saud requested the ulama's fatwa
concerning the validity of waging war to guarantee the right of
believers to perform their religious duty. The ulama supported
Ibn Saud's position, and their fatwa was in reality an order to the
Ikhwan to wage war against Sherif Hussein. Four thousand Ikhwan,
all dressed as pilgrims carrying arms, attacked Ta'if. They
massacred its garrison and systematically destroyed everything
they viewed as contravening Wahhabi principles. Following Ta'if,
Mecca fell under Ikhwan control, and strict observance of Wahhabism
was enforced.[37]

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(37) For information on the Ikhwan's conquest of Hejaz and their
enforcement of Wahhabism see, Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur al-Attar, Saqr
.al-Jazirah (Mecca: n.p., 1979), pp. 559-563.

The End of Wahhabi Fanaticism and the Assertion of Moderation:
The Subjugation of the Ikhwan

With the conquest of the Hejaz, Ibn Saud's territorial
shaping of the Kingdom was completed. He no longer needed the Ikwan
as a fighting force, and their religious fanaticism became a potential
threat to his regime. Ibn Saud had fired the Ikhwan into a fanatical
and uncompromising force precisely because that was what he needed.
Having accomplished his political objective, he needed to diffuse
the Ikhwan fanaticism. The Riyadh ulama recalled their mutawi'a
from the Ikhwan settlements and instructed them to preach that
Islam is the religion of the middle road, /¯al-Islam din wassat_7,
and that Islam is not against material comfort and wealth. The
implication of the new dogma was two-fold: First, the Ikhwan were
expected to shun their religious fanaticism; second, the Ikhwan
were to devote their time and resources to the cultivation of the
land and the acquisition of wealth.

The Ikhwan rejected the moderate interpretation of Islam.
They claimed jihad against Transjordan, Iraq and Kuwait. It was
their leader's dealings with the British, however, that angered
them and escalated their conflict with Ibn Saud. The first
indication of the gravity of the situation surfaced in 1925, in
Mecca. Over five months had elapsed since the Ikhwan had conquered
this city, but Ibn Saud refused their request to advance to Jedda
and Medina, a task which was easily within their reach. He felt
that a negotiated surrender might be secured from the leaders of

Medina and Jeddah, but the Ikhwan insisted that conversion by the sword was the only way. On April 24, 1925, Faysal al-Duwaish, an Ikhwan leader, warned Ibn Saud that the swords of his warriors are prepared to deal with those who might perpetuate the misdeeds of the deposed Sherif Hussein.[38]

Reaffirming their belief in jihad as incumbent upon male-adult Muslims, the Ikhwan met in December 1926 in al-Artawiya and censured Ibn Saud for not continuing the war against neighbouring areas. They also censured their imam for: (1) sending his son Saud to Egypt, a land controlled by the British; (2) sending his son Faisal to London in 1926 to curry favour with the British; (3) introducing the telegraph, telephone and automobile, all viewed as instruments of the devil, into the land of Islam; (4) levying custom taxes on the Muslims in Najd; (5) granting permission to the tribes of Jordan and Iraq to graze their herds in the land of Islam; (6) prohibiting commerce with Kuwait. The Ikhwan informed Ibn Saud that if the people of Kuwait were infidels, then he should wage holy war against them; if they were considered Muslims, then the ruler should not prevent commerce with them; and finally, (7) tolerating the shi'is of Hasa. They should be either converted to Wahhabism or killed.[39]

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(38) Hafez Wahbah, Jazirat al-Arab fi al-Qarn al-Ishrin (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriya, 1961), pp. 298-299.

(39) Ibid.,

Because of the gravity of the Ikhwan's complaints, the Riyadh
ulama found it necessary to explain their position. They issued a
fatwa adopting a neutral stand on the question of the telegraph,
radio and the automobile, but advised the King to follow Wahhabi
principles and destroy the Mosque of Hamza, which was a Shi'i shrine,
forbid the entrance of the Egyptian mahmal into the holy cities of
Mecca and Medina, force the shi'is to submit to Islam or be expeled
from the Kingdom, prevent the Shi'is of Iraq from grazing their herds in
the land of Islam, and to return the taxes the government had collected
from the inhabitants of Najd. While the ulama supported the Ikhwan
position in their fatwa, they insisted that it was the Imam's respon-
sibility alone to declare jihad.[40]

Rejecting the fatwa's insistence that the Imam alone has the
responsibility to declare jihad, the Ikhwan, on November 6, 1927,
raided an Iraqi police post near the Saudi border and massacred all
its members. They also raided Kuwait as well as Transjordan. To
halt further Ikhwan raids, the British government ordered its air
force to pursue the Ikhwan raiders across Najd. The situation
developed exactly as the Ikhwan leader Faisal al-Duwaish had desired.
Ibn Saud could only be accused of religious laxity if he refused to
meet the British infidels on the battlefield.

Having completed the territorial shaping of Saudi Arabia, Ibn
Saud was not interested in confronting the British or expanding his

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(40) For the full text of the ulama's fatwa see, Umm al-Qura,
February 12, 1927.

domain. To harness Ikhwan fanaticism, he called for a general
assembly on November 6, 1928 in the city of Riyadh. More than
eight hundred Ikhwan attended, as well as the ulama and urban
and tribal notables. Ibn Saud addressed the assembly recounting
his religious and political achievements, including his unification
of the Peninsula. In an attempt to elicit support Ibn Saud offered
his resignation on the condition that the assembly select a successor
from Al Saud. Wahbah noted that no one really believed that Ibn Saud
was willing to abdicate. The ulama and notables refused Ibn Saud's
offer of resignation and endorsed his rule.

Following the Riyadh Conference, the Ikhwan realized that naked
force was the only way to depose Ibn Saud. Their leaders spread
the word among the settlements that they alone, i.e. the Ikhwan,
remained the true defenders of Wahhabism. The Ikhwan leaders,
Faisal al-Duwaish of the Mutayr tribe, Sultan Ibn Humaid Ibn Bijad
of the Utaiba, and Didan Ibn Hithlin of the Ujman, launched a series
of military attacks against not only Iraq and Kuwait, but also some
Najdi tribes that were loyal to Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud and the Ikhwan
confronted each other on March 31, 1929 in the battle of Sibila.
Ibn Saud's army, composed of urban and rural recruits as well as
loyal bedouins, defeated the Ikhwan and asserted Ibn Saud's rule.
The settlements were dismantled, and the Ikhwan were converted into
the National Guard.

CONCLUSION

In his attempt to expand Saudi rule and consolidate his
authority, Ibn Saud reaffirmed Wahhabism as a state ideology
and established religiously-inspired institutions to promote
and implement his policies. By maintaining the traditional
alliance between his family and Al Shaykh, he projected his
rule as a continuation of the first Saudi state in which the
relationship between religion and state was harmonious. Ibn Saud
created the Ikhwan and indoctrinated them with militant Wahhabism,
so as to identify the expansion of his rule with the expansion
of Wahhabism.

While the ulama were generally supportive of Ibn Saud's rule,
their relationship with him was far from harmonious. The ulama, as
well as the Ikhwan leaders, aspired to keep Ibn Saud united to them
by common cause, but the reality of political life shattered their
vision. Ibn Saud needed Wahhabism to legitimate his rule, but
innovation was also needed if Saudi Arabia was to keep abreast of
the twentieth century. As a result, while Wahhabism continued to
be the state ideology, the ulama were stripped of their traditional
heritage. Ibn Saud was the source of all authority in the state,
and the religious institutions were to act according to his
political needs. It was not surprising, therefore, that whereas
Ibn Saud established and/or strengthened religious institutions at
the earlier stages, he dismantled some of these institutions and

restricted the activities of others at the later period. The
challenge that confronted Ibn Saud and his successors was to
continue the use of Wahhabism as state ideology yet develop a
modern state.

CHAPTER FOUR

EXPANSION OF STATE CONTROL AND INCORPORATION OF THE ULAMA IN STATE ADMINISTRATION

For over two decades from its proclamation as a unified kingdom
in 1932 until 1953, Saudi Arabia survived without any elaborate
administrative institutions. During this period, Ibn Saud ruled
personally and informally. He administered the country as a gigantic
personal household not allowing power to be concentrated at any
point in the system. The expansion of the oil extracting industry in
the 1950s and the subsequent increase in government revenues, however,
brought about an increasing complexity in governmental institutions
and the expansion of government jurisdiction over a large number of
societal areas. The death of Ibn Saud in 1953, however, was not
followed by the disintegration of the state he founded. Instead, the
Saudi state survived its founder's death and Ibn Saud's successors
/¯Saud, 1953-1964; Faisal, 1964-1975; Khalid, 1975-1982; Fahd, 1982-
till the present/ have continued to establish modern administrative
structures to enhance governmental performance which complement the
traditional base of the regime's legitimacy. Indeed, the development
of complex and modern administrative institutions has enabled Saudi

rulers to control society and maintain their traditional rule.

· The creation of complex administrative institutions has led to two fundamental changes affecting the traditional relationship between religion and state in the Saudi kingdom. First, it increased role differentiation between the religious and political spheres. Second, it resulted in routinizing state control of a broad range of areas that were formerly dominated by religion and the religious establishment. Subsequently, the ulama lost many of their traditional functions and became a pressure group limited to exerting influence over the government's activities and policies, but never acting as an autonomous centre of power.[1] To understand the position and role of the ulama in the newly-founded structures, it is necessary to outline the evolution and characteristics of the country's administrative system.

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITY

The 1932 declaration of Saudi Arabia as a unified kingdom did not in reality affect the traditional administrative structures that

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(1)
    Interest group may be defined here as "a group of individuals who are linked by particular bonds of concern or advantage, and who have some awareness of these bonds." See, Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 75.

had existed in the country. Indeed, the transition from
fragmented regional governments to a centralized administrative
structure took place only two decades later. Prior to the
1950s, and despite the existence of some ministries and central
administrative agencies mainly in the Hejaz region, the remaining
regions and localties continued to be administered differently.
Some administrative structures were created in the 1930s in Hasa
and Najd, but were largely limited in scope and were ad hoc in
nature.

Because of the diversity of administrative structures in the
country, the extent of role differentiation between the religious
and political spheres and the degree of the extension of government
jurisdiction over areas that were traditionally controlled by religion
and the religious establishment varied from one region to another.
In Najd, functional differentiation between the religious and political
domains was minimal. This region was hardly subjected to external
influences prior to the 1930s and consequently preserved its cultural
homogeneity. It was ruled by Ibn Saud through Crown Prince Saud who
acted as an administrative governor and the personal representative
of the King. A number of local umara acted as the King's representatives
in their areas. Assisting the umara in the day-to-day activities, there
was a corps of ulama, who acted as judges and imams of mosques, and
some financial administrators and police officers. With the exception

of the ulama who were responsible to their superiors in Riyadh,
all other administrators were accountable to the amir, who was
accountable to the governor, who in turn was accountable to the
King.[2]

In contrast to Najd, Hejaz was influenced by foreign
administrative systems, especially those of Egypt and Turkey. A
number of administrative structures existed prior to Saudi conquest
of the region. For instance, Mecca had several departments such as
health, municipal affairs, water supplies and the judiciary, all
coordinated by the City Council under the direct control of the
Sherifi ruler. These structures remained intact after Saudi take-over,
but fell under the direct control of Faisal, the Governor of Hejaz.[3]

The difference in the administrative background between the
Hejaz and Najd regions would not be of great significance had it not
been for differences in the educational systems of the two regions
which subsequently determined, enforced and perpetuated certain patterns
in the newly-founded administrative structures. While Hejaz had a
number of secular schools at the turn of the century, it was not until
1938 that secular elementary education was introduced into Najd.[4]
Moreover, while the ulama were influential in shaping the educational

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[2]Ahmad Assah, Mu'jiza fawqa al-Rimal (Beirut: al-Matabi' al-Ahliya, 1972), p. 110.

[3]Mutlib al-Nafisah, "Ba'd al-Mabadi' al-Ra'isiya al-Lati Tartakiz Alayha Anzimat al-Khidma al-Ama fi al-Mamlaka al-Arabiya al-Saudiya," Majalat Ma'had al-Idara al-Ama (March, 1971), p. 6.

[4]Fouad Hamzah, al-Bilad al-Arabiya al-Saudiya (Riyadh: al-Nashr, 1946),p. 229.

system in Najd and consequently maintained the religious orientation of the curriculum, the Hejazi educational system was more secular in nature and was oriented towards satisfying the needs of a differentiated and complex administration.

The immediate outcome of the differences in the educational system between the two regions was the control by Hejazis of key administrative positions which required secular education. Moreover, while Najdis saw in religious education a vehicle for social mobility, many Hejazis attended secular schools and were in a better position to meet the demands of the newly structured institutions.[5] With the centralization of administration in the 1950s, however, and following the increase in the number of Najdis who attained secular education, Najdi representation in the country's administration witnessed a shift in favour of this region.

Oil Economy as a Determinant of Administrative Change

The development of an oil economy affected not only the creation of complex administrative structures but also the over all orientation of the political system. Prior to his death in 1953, Ibn Saud witnessed

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[5]For instance, more than seventy percent of the students attending Dar al-Tawhid, a religious institution concerned with the teaching of principles of Wahhabism as well as other Islamic sciences, in 1930 in Ta'if were from Najd. The students received monthly stipends from the government, and upon graduation they were assigned administrative and religious positions.

the drastic increase in his country's wealth--from $200,000 prior.
to World War I, $10 million in the interwar period; $60 million
in 1948; $160 million in 1952; and $250 million in 1953.[6]

The emphasis on oil revenues as a factor which affects the
government services as opposed to the development of
new social classes in Saudi Arabia, is dictated by the nature of
the Saudi society and the oil industry itself. Three factors have
minimized the impact of the oil industry: First, the background of[7]
the Saudi society. The oil industry penetrated a society which had
no industrial tradition . Legislative and institutional mechanisms
were developed in recent years to regulate industrial activities to
satisfy existing needs and demands. A second factor which minimized

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(6)
     The Impact of Petroleum on the Economy of Saudi Arabia (Riyadh:
Ministry of Information, 1979), p. 4.

(7)Kamal S. Sayegh, Oil and Arab Regional Development(New York:
Praeger, 1968), pp. 81-82. The first concession to exploit Saudi
oil was granted in 1933 to the Standard Oil Company of California,
which in 1936 sold a half interest to the Texas Company, with
which it was jointly renamed in 1944 the Arabian American Oil Company
(ARAMCO). Four years later, the shareholdings in ARAMCO were
redistributed among Standard of California (30%), Texas (30%),Standard
of New Jersey (30%), and Socony Mobil (10%). In 1949, another
concession was granted to the Pacific Western Oil Corporation (J. Paul
Getty, 100%), covering all Saudi Arabia's half interest in the
Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Zone. In 1950, the agreement with ARAMCO group
was revised, increasing the Saudi share to 50% of the total profits.
In 1957, Saudi Arabia granted a third concession to a Japanese company
covering the offshore area of Saudi half interest in the Neutral Zone,
with Saudi Arabia receiving 56% of total profits, including those
derived from refining, transportation, and marketing operations.

the socio-political impact of the oil industry is attributed
to the nature of the industry. As Schultz wrote, this industry:

> /¯is/ not particularly effective in transmitting
> new knowledge to other sectors or in training
> workers who acquire skills which serve them well
> when they enter upon other kinds of work. The
> techniques of production in mining and oil tend
> to be specific and do not lend themselves to
> useful application in other sectors. Accordingly,
> as far as the needs of other industries are
> concerned, few of the techniques of mining and oil
> are useful to them and few workers are trained in
> mining and oil from which others can recruit their
> skilled labor force. [8]

In addition, the oil industry is a one-sided developer because
it does not require a drastic expansion of the transport and
power systems. It uses its own facilities and requires little in
way of public services.[9]   Third, the remote location of the
industry limits its impact on the society.

Despite the minimal effects of the industry, the mighty
spending power that resulted from oil revenues had shocked the
stationary economy of the country. [10] Oil revenues became the most
significant single source from which the state's revenues were

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[8] T. W. Schultz, "Economic Prospects of Primary Product," cited in
Sayegh, Ibid.,p. 82.

[9] Ibid.,

[10] For a study of the economic impact of oil industry on Saudi society
see, Fayez Bader, Developmental Planning in Saudi Arabia: A Multi-Dimensional
Study (an Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Southern California,
1968).

drawn. In 1932, Saudi government revenues reached 12 million riyals, 60% of which came from the hajj. By the year Ibn Saud died, state revenues were 757 million Saudi riyals, 90% of which was drawn from oil.[11]

The major problem associated with the tremendous increase in wealth was the fact that until 1959 no distinction existed between the finances of the state and those of the royal family. True to Weber's ideal type of patrimonial rule, Ibn Saud and his successor, King Saud, considered the country's wealth as their own. Even in the first budget ever to be introduced in Saudi Arabia in 1958-1959, the royal household was assigned 17% of the budget, to be spent at the discretion of the king; an additional 19% was entered under "other expenditures," to be decided by the king as well.

Instead of spending this wealth on development projects, Ibn Saud singled out for special favours and privileges his forty-two sons, his five brothers and their descendants, and the large clans of the Jiluwi, Sudayri and Al Shaykh, all of whom are related to the royal family. Wahhabi puritanism which integrated the tribal society and legitimated Ibn Saud's conquests and rule proved to be incompatible with extreme affluence.

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[11] Figures are to be calculated four and a half Saudi riyals equal to one $US. For information on state revenues see, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report 1978 (Riyadh: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 1079).

One by one /¯Philby wrote⁊, at first furtively
and later more brazenly, the inhibitions of the
old Wahhabi regime went by the board. In the
name of military efficiency, the once forbidden
charms of music were openly paraded on the palace
square....The forbidden cinema reared its ogling
screens in scores of princely palaces and wealthy
mansions to flaunt the less respectable products
of Hollywood before audiences which would have
blushed or shuddered at the sight but ten or
fifteen years ago. Liquor and drugs have penetrated,
more or less discreetly, into quarters where, in
the old days, people had been slain at the sight
for the crime of smoking tobacco, which has become
now a substantial source of State revenue. Even
the seclusion of women has been tempered to the
prevailing breeze of modernism; and the motor-car
provides facilities for visits to some beach or
desert pleasance where they dance or frolic to the
tunes of a gramaphone /another prohibited article/
in the latest summer frocks from Paris, or dine
alfresco in strapless bodices. [12]

While Ibn Saud was able to maintain his patrimonial rule

through his charismatic personality and the disbursement of financial

favours, when King Saud attempted to emulate this pattern of authority,

he failed miserably. Saud lacked both the charisma and the ability of

his father to persuade men and recognize pressing needs. Despite

colossal oil revenues, there were few improvements in the living

conditions of Saudis; the country's economy became handicapped by

serious inflationary pressures. [13] A weak leader with extravagant

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(12)H. St. John Philby, Saudi Arabia (Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 1968),
p. xiii.

(13)For information on the Saudi economy of the period see, The United
Nations Mission for Technical Assistance Program, A Report on Administration
in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh: Institute of Public Administration, 1961), pp. 30-39.

habits, Saud was unable to arrest the social and moral disintegration of Saudi society, nor was he skillful enough to meet the external socialist challenge posed by Nasser.

In an attempt to avoid increased popular dissatisfaction with Saudi rule, the royal family and ulama leaders transferred the executive functions of Saud to Crown Prince Faisal in 1958. Although Saud recovered these powers in 1960, Faisal continued to be the decision maker in the polity. It was the not until 1964, that Saud was deposed and Faisal proclaimed King by the royal family and leading ulama.[14]

Under Faisal, the erosion of Saudi political legitimacy was controlled, and the system he bequeathed to King Khalid in 1975 proved to be capable of adapting to change and confronting external political challenges. Faisal reasserted the traditional legitimacy which is the sine qua non of patrimonial rule and developed a complex bureaucratic structure parallel to, but interlocked with and subordinate to the royal family, to enhance the system's capabilities and performance.

The structural changes that occurred in the Saudi political system took place after the discovery of oil in the Kingdom and after the realization by Saudi rulers of the need for political change.

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[14] Text of the fatwa deposing King Saud is found in Hafiz Wahbah, Arabian Days (London: Arthur Barker, 1964), pp. 176-180.

The resultant change, however, must not be seen as a conscious desire to radically transform the society; rather, it was more in the nature of sporadic adjustive responses of patrimonial rule to preserve the regime's basic values and characteristics in a changing environment.

ROLE DIFFERENTIATION AND INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY

The presence of differentiated and complex administrative structures enhances the capability of the political system to manipulate its environment. As the political system confronts a wide range of areas that require state intervention, the pressures to develop complex administrative institutions become tremendous. If the political elite desire to maintain its position in society, it must develop these institutions.

Prior to the 1950s, when Ibn Saud realized the need to develop modern administrative institutions, political life in the kingdom was centered around the king, through whom both the executive and legislative powers were exercised. He surrounded himself with advisers who enjoyed his personal trust. The advisers "never demanded, seldom suggested, and only advised when advice was actively sought" by the King.[15] Indeed, Ibn Saud's advisers and administrators

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[15]James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, Politics, Middle East (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 155. Most of Ibn Saud's advisers were non-Saudis. Among them, we can note: Dr. Abd Allah Damluji from Iraq; Shaykh Yussef Yassin, Khalid Hakim, Dr. Mahmoud Hamdi Hamoudah, Dr. Midhat Shaykh al-Ard, Dr. Rashad Far'oun, and Khair al-Din al-Zirkli from Syria; Shaykh Fouad Hamzah from Lebanon; Shaykh Hafiz Wahbah from Egypt; Khalid Kirkam from Libya.

"belonged to the same category as the king's cooks, gaurdians, grooms, and valets. The public service of the state...was hopelessly confused with the domestic service of the court."[16]

Following the conquest of Hejaz in 1926 and the subsequent unification of the Kingdom in 1932, Ibn Saud needed a more effective administrative structure to meet the ever increasing economic and social needs generated by oil revenues. While preserving the patrimonial character of his authority, Ibn Saud laid the structural foundation for more differentiated and complex bureaucratic institutions. Although all legislative and executive powers are concentrated in the person of the king, who is the Chief-of-State, the Prime Minister, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and the imam of the community, the king's orders, decrees and policies are channeled downward and implemented by the Council of Ministers.[17]

The present Council of Ministers was preceeded by ad hoc committees and administrative institutions. Following the conquest of Mecca in 1924, the Domestic Council of Mecca was created and

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(16)T. F. Tout, "The Emergence of a Bureaucracy," in Robert K. Merton et. al., Reader in Bureaucracy (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1952), p. 69.

(17)There is also the Royal Court which is divided into six administrative divisions--General Administration, Personnel, Translation, Press, Office of Bedouin Affairs, and Political Affairs. The Court's activities, however, are limited to advising the king.

included in its membership twenty-five deputies representing
different interest groups in the city, including the ulama. This
Council was headed by Ibn Saud's son, Prince Faisal, and its
activities included the following: the review of the city's
judicial system, the issuance of regulations concerning pilgrimage
and awqaf, the supervision of religious education, the issuance
of commercial laws, and establishment of a judicial committee to
settle disputes according to Islamic and tribal laws.[18] Following
the annexation of Jeddah in 1925, the Domestic Council was replaced
by the Instructive Committee. This Committee too was headed by
Prince Faisal. It included three members appointed by Ibn Saud,
and eight elected in a secret ballot by representatives of the
major interest groups in the Hejaz, including the ulama. Ibn Saud
authorized the committee to assist Prince Faisal in administering
the region. Two years later, Ibn Saud established the Committee
of Investigation and Reform to review the government's organizational
structure.[19] The Committee recommended the unification of the
country's administrative regions as well as the creation of a
national advisory council to represent regional interests. These

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[18]Mohammad Sadek, Tatawur al-Nizam al-Siyassi wa al-Idari fi
al-Mamlaka al-Arabiya al-Saudiya (Riyadh: Ma'had al-Idara al-Ama,
1965), p. 28.

[19]Ibid., p. 34.

recommendations were implemented by the establishment of an
Advisory Council with eight members appointed by the King, four
of whom were appointed after consultation with community leaders,
including the ulama. To broaden national representation, the eight
members were drawn from the Hejaz and Najd regions. Ibn Saud
empowered the Council to formulate socio-economic policies, supervise
the expenditures of government departments and agencies, and
act as a legislative body.[20]

Despite the Council's formal powers, its decisions were subject
to approval by the King. The Council's jurisdiction and activities
were further weakened by two developments: first, a Council of
Deputies was created in 1930 to assist Faisal in the administration of
the Hejaz region; second, a Council of Ministers was established
in 1953 to act as Ibn Saud's cabinet.

The Council of Deputies was established in recognition of the
relatively advanced administrative background of the Hejaz. Its
jurisdiction was to act as a central agency for coordination of
activities between branches of government organizations in the Hejaz
region on the one hand, and the Advisory Council as well as other
national agencies on the other. As a result of the expansion of
government operations throughout the country, the Council of Deputies

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[20]Ibid., p. 36. See the Royal Decree ordering the establishment
of the Committee in Umm al-Qura, No. 186, July 12, 1928.

acquired legislative and executive powers which were derived
from the King.[21] Because of the creation of the Council of
Ministers in 1953 and the subsequent centralization of administration
in the country, the Council of Deputies was dismantled, and the
Council of Ministers became the single national decision making
agency.

The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers was created by Ibn Saud in 1953
to act as a central agency for all existing and future departments
and agencies. Its membership was made up of existing ministers
and headed by Ibn Saud. The Royal Decree establishing the Council
dealt with five areas: (1) Organization of the Council; (2) Juris-
diction of the Council; (3) the Council's Procedures; (4) Jurisdiction
of the President of the Council; and (5) Divisions of the Council,
i.e. Council Cabinet.[22] Accordingly, the Council is headed by the
King, and in his absence by the Crown Prince; it consists of the King's
ministers, advisers and all those whose attendance at the Council is
desired by the King; its jurisdiction is outlined in article 7 of
the Royal Decree which states that "state policy within the country

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[21] Abd al-Salam Hassan Abd al-Hadi, Tatawur al-Idara al-Ama fi al-
Mamlaka al-Arabiya al-Saudiya (Riyadh: Dar al-Ma'arif al-Saudiya,
1978), p. 110.

[22] See, Constitution of the Council of Ministers and Constitution of
the Division of the Council of Ministers (Umm al-Qura, No. 1508,
March 1954).

and abroad shall be under the surveillance of the Council of
Ministers."[23] All Council decisions "shall not come into effect
until they have been sanctioned by His Majesty the King."[24]

The structure and functions of the Council were modified by
a Royal Decree in May 12, 1958 which redefined and clarified the
Council's jurisdictions and created the post of Deputy Prime
Minister. The Decree stipulated that members of the Council
are responsible to the Prime Minister, i.e. the Crown Prince, who
is responsible to the King. Moreover, the Prime Minister has
the right to appeal to the King for the dismissal of any member of
the Council. The relative weakness of the King's powers as
expressed in the 1958 Royal Order came into existence as a result
of the royal family's dismay with King Saud's rule. It was
not surprising, therefore, that after Faisal's assumption of power
in 1964, the King again assumed the position of Prime Minister.

The fusion of all powers in the person of the King in 1964
reestablished the supremacy of the monarch and defined the role
of the Council as the only manager of the country's socio-economic,
administrative and political affairs. It is the effective arm of the
King, and, subject to the King's approval, it has the exclusive
jurisdiction to pass laws, initiate policies,and oversee their

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(23)Ibid., p. 7.   (24)Ibid.,

implementation.

The Council's policies and decisions are implemented by a complex bureaucratic structure which has evolved throughout the years from a small number of disjointed departments and ministries to the present system which exhibits phenomenal centralization. This structure is divided into three components: (1) Ministries; (2) Independent Departments and Bureaus; and (3) Public Agencies.[25]

Until 1951, only three ministries existed--Foreign Affairs /established in 1930/, Finance /1932/, and Defense /1946/. The structure and activities of these ministries was rudimentary. The Ministry of Finance , for example, was administered by Ibn Saud's treasurer Shaykh Abd Allah al-Sulayman whose main function was to meet Ibn Saud's personal needs and demands. Describing the financial activities of both Ibn Saud and his minister, Howarth wrote:

> Of all aspects of government, finance concerned /Ibn Saud/least. At the age of fifty, his only interests in money were still to buy weapons and indluge his royal generosity....To hoard it or count it, or worry where it came from or where it went, seemed to him intolerably sordid. Accordingly he delegated all the financial affairs of the Kingdom to his treasurer al-Sulaiman, and was only resentful or bored if al-Sulaiman had to bring them to his notice....As the Kingdom grew in size and its administration began to grow a little in complexity, al-Sulaiman became a powerful man.... The Kingdom was organized as a vast family estate.

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[25] Ibrahim Muhammad al-Awaji, Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia (an unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, the University of Virginia,1971), p. 127. For a study of procedures and activities of the Saudi bureaucracy see also, Mohammad A. Tawil, The Procedures and Instruments of Administrative Development in Saudi Arabia (an Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1970).

> All the gold that came in was the King's
> personal property, all that was paid out
> was his personal bounty. The first charge
> on the nation's resources was still the King's
> personal needs. So long as these were met,
> the King was satisfied, and al-Sulaiman's
> mission as a loyal servant was to keep him
> satisfied. [26]

The structure and activities of the Ministry of Finance today bear no resemblance to those of its predecessor. This ministry has become the most complex and influential of all governmental institutions. It is staffed by highly qualified personnel whose activities and decisions have a direct bearing upon all other departments and ministries.[27]

During the period from 1951 to 1954, the Ministries of Interior, Education, Agriculture, Communication, Commerce and Industry, and Helath were established. Between 1960 and 1962, the Ministries of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Labour and Social Affairs, Pilgrimage and Awqaf, Information, and Justice were created. Finally, in 1975, six additional ministries, as well as three Ministers of State Without Portfolio were established, thus bringing the total number to twenty three. Among the minstries created in 1975 were Public Works and Housing; Industry and Power; Telegraph, Post and Telephone; Planning; Higher Education; and Municipal and Rural Affairs.

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[26] David Howarth, The Desert King (Beirut: Continental Publications, n.d.), p. 178. For a description of the royal family's extravagant living after the discovery of oil see, Ibid., pp. 210-237.

[27] For the Ministry of Finance and National Economy's organizational chart see, Fouad al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development (London: Stacey International, 1978), p. 119.

Independent departments and bureaus exist in the state
administration. These include the General Personnel Bureau,
the Central Planning Commission, the Grievance Board, the
General Department of Intelligence, the Advisory Council, the
National Guard, and the Committee for the Commanding of Good and
Forbidding Evil.[28] These departments and bureaus enjoy relative
autonomy, for they report directly to the Prime Minister, i.e. the
King, but general personnel rules and procedures apply to these
organizations as if they were ministries.

Finally, to avoid general governmental rules and procedures
which may hinder the activities of certain agencies, the Council of
Ministers created public agencies in the 1960s. These include the
Railroads system, the Institution of Petroleum and Minerals,
Saudi Arabian Airlines, the Institute of Public Administration, King
Saud University, the Petroleum and Minerals College, the Institution
of Social Security, the Centre for Research and Economic Development,
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Agricultural Bank and the Red Crescent.
Though formally attached to a ministry, each agency is governed by
an executive board which, in several cases, is headed by a minister,
and includes the membership of deputy ministers as well as the
director-general of the agency itself.[29]

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[28] Ibrahim al-Awaji, op.cit., p. 128. For a study of the structure
and function of these departments as well as the general public personnel
administration see, Sulaiman al-Mazyed, The Structure and Function
of Public Personnel Administration in Saudi Arabia (an Unpublished
Ph. D. dissertation, Claremont University, 1972).

[29] Awaji, op.cit.,

THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE ULAMA

The expansion in government administrative structures was
accompanied by increased jurisdiction over a large number of
societal areas, including those formerly regulated by religion
and the religious establishment. For example, the jurisdiction
and activities of the Domestic Council profoundly affected the
position of the ulama in two ways: first, although the ulama were
represented in the Council, their representation was limited to
two members, which rendered their presence and influence minimal.
Second, the Council's jurisdiction affected areas that were formerly
under the exclusive control of the ulama, such as the administration
of awqaf, religious schools and education. The extent of the
ulama's participation in the newly-founded structures was influenced
by the needs and orientation of the political sphere--the ulama were
given prominence when religious legitimation was needed, and assumed
a secondary position when their stance contradicted the ruler's, or
when other sources of legitimacy were invoked. As the process of
territorial shaping neared completion, the ulama lost whatever limited
autonomy they had enjoyed; they became paid civil servants whose
status, income and general activities were governed by state
regulations and objectives.

The incorporation of the ulama into the state administration
routinized the use of religion and the religious establishment as a

source of legitimacy. The ulama's role in society and their activities in the administrative structure are channelled through the following fields and agencies: the Committee for Commanding the Good and Forbidding Evil; the Directorate of Religious Research, Ifta', Da'wa and Guidance; religious education; the Ministry of Justice; Preaching and guidance of Islam at home and abroad; supervision of girls' education; supervision of mosques and awqaf, notaries public; and finally, consolidating Saudi international prestige through the activities of Muslim organizations such as the World Muslim League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. A study of the general activities of three of these agencies, as well as the role of the ulama in the present judicial system, will enable us to assess their role and position in the country's administrative system.

The Committee for Commanding the Good and Forbidding Evil

The need to establish effective structures of political authority became more imperative as the process of territorial expansion advanced. Ibn Saud realized the necessity of developing an administrative system that would meet the peculiar needs of Wahhabism as well accomodate his political objectives. Consequently, his position vis-à-vis the religious establishment was modified to meet emerging needs. Thus, the Committee for Commanding the Good and Forbidding

Evil, initially established to enforce Wahhabi principles, was incorporated into the state machinery. Moreover, whenever Wahhabi principles conflicted with Ibn Saud's political needs, the latter prevailed. The conclusion of agreements with the British, the elimination of the Ikhwan, the introduction of secular education, and the influx of non-Muslims into the Kingdom to develop the oil industry, are instances where Ibn Saud's objectives prevailed.

The initial impulse for founding the Committees for Commanding the Good and Forbidding Evil is attributed to Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd al-Latif Al Shaykh who, in :903, enforced the observance of Wahhabi principles in Riyadh.[30] As the Saudi state expanded throughout Najd and the Hasa, Ibn Saud institutionalized the Shaykh's activities by formally establishing committees with similar functions. These committees were headed by Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Al Shaykh and included Shaykh Abd al-Rahman Ibn Ishaq Al Shaykh, Shaykh Omar Ibn Hassan Al Shaykh and Shaykh Abd al-Latif Al Shaykh. The Committees were empowered to arrest, bring to trial and imprison those found guilty of offending Wahhabi teachings.

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Information on the Committee for Commanding the Good and Forbidding Evil was gathered through two interviews with the Deputy Director of the Committees in Riyadh, 11-12 March, 1980.

A number of posts for the enforcers /¯mutawi'a7 were opened
in Riyadh and other Saudi cities and towns. A police officer
and a director were installed at each post. The director was
responsible to the Committees' Director General, a position
usually held by a member of Al Shaykh. All key matters pertinent
to the Committees were decided by the Committees' Director General
who, in turn, received instructions from the King. Despite
the existence of an organizational network, the exact duties of
enforcers remained undefined, and the promotion and dismissal
policies were never specified. It was not until the 1960s that
the general regulations governing the Saudi civil service were
extended to the Committees.

In enforcing Wahhabi principles and establishing control over
society, the activities of the mutawi'a often covered a wide range
of areas. They policed market areas to prevent men-women mingling,
insured that no individual violated public morality, that merchants
and traders did not defraud the consumer, that no places of enter-
tainment were established, that no musical instruments were manufactured
or sold, that no paintings depicting humans or animals were made
or sold, that men did not wear silk or gold, that members of the
community attended public prayers. They also enforced the prohibition
of smoking, drinking alcohol, and made certain that men followed the

Sunnah in lengthening their beards and shaving off their moustaches.

The restrictions enforced by the mutawi'a were in compliance with Wahhabi principles. The application of these principles enabled Ibn Saud to control all activities of his citizens, and consolidate his rule. It was not surprising, therefore, that Ibn Saud extended the mutawi'a system to the Hejaz region in the late 1920s. The task of forming this network in the Hejaz was delegated by Ibn Saud to Chief Qadi Abd Allah al-Bulayhid, who in turn requested Shaykh Abd Allah al-Shaybi to organize Committee posts throughout the region. To justify the extension of the Committees to the Hejaz, Abd Allah al-Bulayhid asked Shaykh Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar, a leading Meccan theologian, to compose writings explaining the principle of commanding the good and forbidding evil and the duties of the mutawi'a.[31] Although Shaykh Abd Allah al-Shaybi headed the Committees in the Hejaz, ultimate repsonsibility for the direction and policies of the committees rested with Prince Faisal, Governor of the region. In turn, Faisal was accountable to his father, Ibn Saud.

While Ibn Saud was interested in the mutawi'a as a mechanism of social control, some mutawi'a viewed themselves as guardians of

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[31] Shaykh al-Bitar's text was based on the writings of Taki al-Din, Ahmad Ibn Taymiya, especially his work al-Hisba fi al-Islam (Beirut: Dar al-Katib al-Arabi, n.d.).

Wahhabi principles and beyond the control of the ruler. In their
diligent attempt to enforce Wahhabi principles, the mutawi'a
opposed some of Ibn Saud's policies. To curb the mutawi'a,
Ibn Saud issued a royal decree in 1930 incorporating the Committees
for Commanding the Good and Forbidding Evil into the Directorate
General of the Police Force. He stripped the mutawi'a of the
power of arrest which they had hitherto enjoyed, and restricted
their function to reporting violations to the police. In case
of a dispute between the Committees' Director General and the Director
General of the Police Force, the decree provided for the King to
act as arbitrator.

The 1930 decree established the modality which defined the
position of the mutawi'a in the Saudi administrative structure and
the nature of their activities. Although the Committees are considered
an independent bureau and its Director General, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz
Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Hassan Al Shaykh, was assigned ministerial status
in 1976, their role was relegated to a status subservient to the
state bureaucracy. As the country's administrative structure became
more complex in recent decades, the mutawi'a were restricted to
enforcing public attendance at prayers. The ministries of Commerce,
Interior, Health, Finance and National Economy, Agriculture and
Justice, as well as the municipalities, perform today the many duties

that were traditionally undertaken by the enforcers. A considerable number of the Committees members are now aged, illiterate and lack the basic education expected of religious enforcers. The general decline in the calibre of the mutawi'a may be attributed to the lack of specific policies governing recruitment, promotion and dismissal. Mutawi'a recruits are not required to pass entrance exams or possess any academic training. Entrance eligibility is confined to "good religious and social behaviour"; promotion is determined by seniority; and dismissal is rare.

The Committees for Commanding the Good and Forbidding Evil were initially created by Ibn Saud to enforce observance of Wahhabi principles, and subsequently to control social behaviour of members of the community. The Committees' duties covered a wide range of areas of social conduct and provided Ibn Saud with the mechanism to consolidate his authority. As Ibn Saud's authority became well entrenched in the region, and as the process of creating a modern administrative structure succeeded, the mutawi'a institution was no longer needed. Instead of eliminating the mutawi'a, a measure that might antagonize the ulama, Ibn Saud incorporated this institution into the civil service and stripped it of effective power.

The Directorate of Religious Research, Ifta', Da'wa and Guidance

Like the Committee of Commanding the Good and Forbidding
Evil, the Directorate of Religious Research, Ifta', Da'wa and
Guidance is an independent state department which accounts directly
to the King in his capacity as Prime Minister.[32] It publishes
religious books propagating Wahhabi views and principles and
distributes them upon request. The Directorate also sponsors
research projects on Islam and Wahhabism, organizes seminars for
training preachers, and sends preachers to foreign assignments.
The symbolic consequence of the publication and distribution of
religious texts is the projection of Saudi rule as the propagator
of Islam, as well as the reaffirmation of its identification with
Wahhabism. Among the books published and/or distributed by the
Directorate, we can note the following:

-. a number of books written by or about Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd
   al-Wahhab.

-Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Qasim al-Asmi al-Hanbali, Tahrim Halq
   al-Lihi /The Religious Prohibition of Shaving Off Beards/.

-Shaykh Sulayman Ibn Muhammad al-Hamidi, al-Turuq al-Shar'iya li hal al-
   Mashakel al-Zawjiya /Legal Ways of Solving Marital Problems/.

-Shaykh Hamad Ibn Nasser Ibn Uthman Ibn Mu'amar, Irshad al-Muslimin
   fi al-Rad ala al-Quburiyin /The Guidance of Muslims in Answering those
   who Advocate Visitation of Graves/.

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[32] Information on the Directorate is compiled from an interview with
the Directorate's Assistant Director, in Riyadh, October 10, 1979.

-Muhammad Sultan al-Masumi al-Maki, <u>Hal al-Muslim Mulzam bi Itiba'</u>
<u>Madhhab Mu'ayan mina al-Madhahib al-Arbi'a ?</u> /Is the Muslim
Obliged to Follow a Certain School of the Four Islamic Schools?

-Abd al-Rahman Ibn Nasser al-Sa'di, <u>Hukm Shurb al-Dukhan</u> /The Religious
Opinion on Smoking Tobacco/.

In addition to its publication and distribution of religious

texts, the Directorate issues fatwas on questions submitted to

it by the King, government agencies and the public at large. Its

activities and members are controlled by the King. The Royal Decree

number 1/137, issued in 1971, specified that members of the Higher

Council of the Ifta' are to be appointed by the King. Their function,

the Decree noted, is "to express opinion based on the shari'ah regarding

matters submitted to them by the <u>wali al-amr</u>, i.e. the King, to

recommend policy on religious matters to guide the <u>wali al-amr</u>; and

to issue fatwas to guide Muslims in the areas of <u>aqida</u>, <u>ibadat</u>,

and <u>mu'amalat</u>. " [33] The same decree named fifteen leading ulama to

the Committee.[34] What is interesting in the Committee's composition

is that of the fifteen members only one is from Al Shaykh. The minimal

representation of Al Shaykh in this vital religous body is surprising,

but it could be viewed as a continuation of Ibn Saud's policy of not

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[33]<u>Majmu'at al-Marasim al-Malakiya</u> (Riyadh: Government Printing
Office, 1980), p. 81.

[34]The present Higher Ifta' Council is composed of the following:
Muhdar Afifi, Abd al-Razaq Afifi, Muhammad Amin al-Shanqiti, Abd
Allah al-Khayat, Abd Allah Ibn Humid, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saleh, Abd al-Majid
Hassan, Muhammad al-Harkan, Abd Allah al-Ghadyan, Muhammad Ibn Jubayr,
Abd Allah Ibn Mani', Salih Ibn Luhaydan, Sulayman Ibn Ubaid, Ibrahim
Ibn Muhammad Al Shaykh, Rashid Ibn Hanyn.

allowing any one group to wield more power than the royal family.

Indeed, the representation and influence of Al Shaykh in religious

activities has declined since the 1940s. While members of

Al Shaykh are presently ministers of Higher Education, Justice,

and Agriculture and Water, the major religious positions of the

Director General of Religious Research, Ifta', Da'wa and Guidance,

the President of the Muslim League, as well as the more junior

positions in religious or religiously-inspired institutions are no

longer held by Al Shaykh. Moreover, while the traditional career

pattern of Al Shaykh has been in the religious profession, some

Al Shaykh members are increasingly receiving secular education and

hold secular positions. A survey of 33 names of Al Shaykh students

registered at Riyadh University in 1979-1980 showed that only 13

were registered in religious studies while the remaining 20 were

pursuing secular studies ranging from business administration to

dentisry.[35]

World Assembly of Muslim Youth

While the activities of the Directorate of Religious Research,

Ifta', Da'wa and Guidance are mostly confined to Saudi Arabia, other

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(35)
Information was gathered from Student Affairs Bureau, Riyadh
University, 1979-1980.

agencies are established by the Saudi government to enhance

its prestige among world Muslims. Although Wahhabism is the

Saudi point of reference at home, Islamic solidarity is projected

as a prime consideration affecting Saudi foreign policy. In a

memorandum submitted by al-Ma'had al-Islami in Riyadh in 1979 to

the Islamic Secretariat for the Celebration of the Fourteenth

Hijirah Century, Islamic solidarity is defined as:

> The mobilization of the intellectual, material
> and spiritual resources of the ummah in pursuit
> of commonly and clearly defined socio-economic and
> cultural goals. Islamic solidarity can be pursued
> in a framework that involves total acceptance of
> the requirements which arise from total commitment
> to Islam; the creation of, and commitment to, new
> institutions....which undertake specialized functions
> for the ummah as a whole across national, ethnic,
> linguistic and other boundaries that now divide the
> Islamic community.... [36]

To achieve Islamic solidarity, as defined by the Saudis, a number

of permanent agencies and organizations were established. [37] An important

but little known government organization whose activities attempt

to assert Saudi leadership among Muslim states is the World Assembly of

Muslim Youth /WAMY/. Headquartered in Riyadh, WAMY was established

in December 1972 following a meeting of the representatives of World

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(36)
    al-Ma'had al-Islami, Memorandum Submitted to the Islamic Secretariat
for the Celebration of the Fourteenth Hijirah Century (Riyadh: 1979), p. 8.

(37)For information on Saudi sponsored Islamic conferences
and organizations see, Nihad Chodri, The Great Challenge (Jeddah: n.d.,n.p.).

Muslim youth organizations which was sponsored by the Saudi

Ministry of Education. The objectives of WAMY are

> To serve the ideology of Islam through the
> propagation of tawhid; to strengthen the
> sense of pride in Islam among Muslim youth
> and to arm them with rational bases and full
> confindence in the supremacy of Islamic system
> over all other systems; and to help them practice
> Islamic teachings in all their activities; to
> support Muslim youth and student organizations
> all over the world and to help them implement
> their plans and programs whenever possible; to
> guide and help Muslim youth to set up professional
> organizations; to take a leading part in the
> existing professional organizations and to help
> them perform their Islamic role in building the
> Islamic nation and to confront the existing challenge. [38]

The Saudi government finances WAMY's activities which include

the building of mosques and religious schools abroad, the sponsoring

of preachers' visits to Muslim communities abroad, hosting annual

conferences for representatives of Muslim youth organizations, and

the publication and distribution of religious texts.[39] These activities

are mostly symbolic--they identify Saudi Arabia with the promotion

of Islamic values and solidarity, but do not radically alter the

socio-economic or political conditions of the Muslims.

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[38]Information on WAMY was gathered from interviews with Dr.
Abd al-Hamid Abud Sulayman, Director General of WAMY, in Riyadh,
October 26, 1979, and two WAMY members in Riyadh.

[39]The 1977 conference, for example, was held in Kuala Lumpur and
was attended by Muslim youth organizations from Afghanistan, Australia.
Bangladesh, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan
Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Korea and Turkey.

Constant with the government's two-pronged policy of affirming the religious character of the state while not allowing the ulama to direct or judge state's activities, WAMY's policy and activities are planned and administered by secular-educated Saudis. WAMY's Director-General, for example, holds a Ph. D. in International Relations from the University of Pensylvania, and almost all the organization's personnel have a secular education.[40] In addition, a survey of the books published and/or distributed by WAMY shows the ⁍ symbolic use of religion as an instrument of legitimation. While most of these books are introductory texts on Islam, others deal with specialized subjects such as jihad, the Islamic economic order, and the Islamic legal system. The most prominent of these books are the writings of Sayid Qutub, Abul A'la Maududi, Muhammad Qutub and Abd al-Qadir Awda.[41] They carry a message which is consistent with the Saudi ideological interpretation of Islam-- "Islam is the best system to be found on this earth....⌈It⌉ is the only means to regain honour, leadership and social justice...."[42]

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[40] For the director's views on Islamic concept of international relations see, Abd al-Hamid Abu Sulayman, The Islamic Theory of International Relations: Its Relevance, Past and Present (an unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Pensylvania, 1973).

[41] A representative sample of the books include: Muhammad Qutub, Shubuhat Hawl al-Islam (al-Itihad al-Islami al-Alami, n.p.,n.d.); Abd al-Qadir Awda, al-Islam wa Awda'una al-Qanuniya (Damascus: The Holy Koran Publishing House, 1977); Sayid Qutub, al-Mustakbal li hadha al-Din (Damascus: The Holy Koran Publishing House, 1978).

[42] Muhammad Qutub, op.cit.,p. xi.

The Ulama and the Judicial System

The interpretation of the shari'ah principles has traditionally been the ulama's exclusive domain. The importance of this function is dictated by the fact that the shari'ah regulates all human activities. As outlined in the Quran and the Sunnah, and elaborated by the ulama through ijma' /¯consensus/ and qiyas /¯analogy/, the shari'ah is a comprehensive code of God's commands and recommendations laid down for human guidance. The principles of the shari'ah cover all areas of human activities and conduct:

> How and what to eat, when to wash, what to wear, how and when to pray and fast--these and similar matters are treated on the same basis and with just as much meticulous concern as matters more strictly legal, such as marriage and divorce, or commercial transactions, or crime. Governing the whole range of man's relations with God and society, and in the absence of any organized Muslim church hierarchy, the shari'ah is incomparably the central institution of Islam. [43]

When Ibn Saud extended his rule over the Hejaz region, and prior to the unification of the Saudi judicial system in 1927, three distinct systems of law existed. The first was that of the Hejaz, with an Ottoman orientation in which the Hanafi and Shafi'i interpretations were predominant. The second was the system of Najd, where each governor, assisted by a qadi solved disputes submitted to him, or referred

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[43] Richard H. Nolte, "The Rule of Law in the Arab Middle East," The Muslim World, Vol. 48 (October 1958), pp. 295-296.

them to the qadi.[44]   The rigid Hanbali tradition prevailed in
this region.   The third judicial system was the tribal law,
under which conflicting parties referred disputes to the head
of the tribe whose decisions were based on traditions and customs.[45]

While Ibn Saud's initial desire was to maintain Ottoman
laws in the Hejaz, the Ikhwan considered these laws antithetical
to the shari'ah and demanded their abolition.   To counter the
Ikhwan's demands, Ibn Saud solicited the opinion of his ulama hoping
for a more tolerant and temperate attitude.   The ulama, however,
issued a fatwa on February 11, 1927 which supported the Ikhwan's
position by noting,"...and as to the laws, if there be any of them
/¯Ottoman laws_/ in the Hejaz, it will be immediately abolished
and nothing except the pure shari'ah will be applied." [46-]

Neither the fatwa nor the demands of the Ikhwan were able
to influence Ibn Saud's decision to maintain Ottoman secular laws.
Indeed, Ibn Saud was in no mood to allow the ulama control his
political objective of initiating change in his realm.   Consequently,
a royal order was issued four months after the proclamation of
the fatwa, sanctioning the existing laws of the Hejaz.   Instructing

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[44] Subhi al-Mahmasani, al-Awda' al-Tashri'iya wa al-Qada'iya fi
al-Bilad al-Arabiya (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm li al-Malayin,1965), pp. 443-464.

[45] Ibid.,

[46] Arabic text of the fatwa is found in Hafiz Wahbah, Jazirat al-Arab
(Cairo: n. p. n.d.), pp. 319-321.

Prince Faisal, Governor of the region, the order noted:

> The legal rulings of Ottoman law should remain
> in effect. We have not repealed them nor have
> we issued laws replacing them....We accept
> your suggestion concerning the maintenance of
> these laws. [47]

In addition to the retention of Ottoman laws in the Hejaz region, the Saudi legal system of the period was not confined to the Hanbali school. As early as August 1927, Ibn Saud instructed his judges in the Hejaz that:

> As to what school of law /¯the court⁷ should apply,
> it is not restricted to any particular school. Rather,
> the court decides according to what appears to it
> applicable from any of the schools and there is no
> difference between one school or another. [48]

The same theme was reiterated two years following the unification of the country when Ibn Saud noted that "We are not bound by one school of law to the exclusion of another. Whenever strong evidence is lacking, we adopt the opinion of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal."[49]

In the early period of the creation of the Saudi state, Ibn Saud maintained the Ottoman laws that prevailed in the Hejaz region and instructed his ulama not to restrict themselves to the Hanbali school. By doing so, Ibn Saud demonstrated his willingness to depart from the rigid Wahhabi interpretation of the shari'ah in order to accomodate changing circumstances and needs.

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[47] Majmu'at al-nuzum fi Qism al-Qada' al-Shar'i (Mecca: Umm al-Qura, 1938), p. 8.

[48] Umm al-Qura, August 5, 1927.

[49] Umm al-Qura, March 24, 1934.

Modification of the Judiciary and the Loss of Ulama Control

The increase in state jurisdiction and the complexity
in its administrative structures affected all areas of governmental
activities, including the judiciary. While the country's judicial
system was simple and lacked differentiation, and although the
ulama dominated all judicial activities, the system became highly
complex by the 1950s; the ulama's role was confined to the
interpretation of the civil and criminal aspects of the shari'ah
law. The transformation of the legal system from simple to
complex and the ulama's loss of their traditional position in
the legal system was attained gradually. The impetus of this
change was initiated in 1927 when Ibn Saud issued a decree urging
his citizens to bring their complaints to him personally. "Any
one who may have a grievance against whoever maybe...and then
hides it, he will be sinning only against himself."[50] The announcement
further added, grievances could be relayed to the ruler through a
"box of complaints" which is positioned at the door to the government
buildings in Mecca and Riyadh and the keys to the two boxes are
kept by the King himself.[51]

While the box system, may have been effective in 1927, changes
were needed in 1932. A Royal Order issued in that year noted that

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[50]Umm al-Qura,June 7 , 1926.   [51]Ibid.,

there are four manners through which citizens can express their grievances or bring complaints against individuals or government agencies.[52]

The organizational restructuring of the judicial system took place a year later when a Royal Decree was issued classifying the court system into three levels: Summary Courts, Shari'ah Courts and the Commission on Judicial Supervision.[53] These courts were confined to Mecca, Jeddah and Medina. Judicial affairs in Najd continued to be administered by a single judge who dealt with all cases.

The jurisdiction of Summary Courts covered cases involving misdemeanours, discretionary and statutory punishments. The Shari'ah Courts have jurisdiction over all cases that are not included in the jurisdiction of Summary Courts. The Commission on Judicial Supervision consisted of a chairman, a deputy chairman and three members, all chosen by the King from among the ulama. In addition to supervising and inspecting the courts, the Commission had the function of judicial review through the power of confirming or reversing judgments of the Shari'ah Courts. It also had the

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[52] The order noted that first, citizens can mail their complaints to the Royal Court; second, grievances can be brought directly to the Royal Court; third, the complainant may ask for an audience with the King for an oral presentation of his grievance; fourth, a complainant could wait and present his grievance to the King outside the royal palace.

[53] Majmu'at al-Nuzum, op.cit., pp. 9-12.

the power of giving legal opinions concerning matters not
included in the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Courts.[54]

This early classification and jurisdictional delimitation
of legal institutions in the Kingdom may be considered as the
organizational outline of the present system. Although amend-
ments to the first royal decree creating the judiciary were made,
the structural characteristics remain the same. For example,
while initially Ibn Saud instructed his ulama not to restrict
themselves to the Hanbali interpretation of the shari'ah, once
the unification of the country was accomplished and Ibn Saud's
authority became well entrenched, the ulama were instructed
that legal decisions should be based on the Hanbalite schools
"because of the easy accessibility of its books and its authors'
obligation to cite the legal evidence supporting their views."
Concurrently, Ibn Saud informed his ulama to draw upon the other
orthodox schools only in cases where it is found that the
application of the Hanbalite opinion would cause strain and
incompatibility with public interest. The invocation of public
interest is significant because it gave both the ruler and the
judiciary broad scope in interpreting the shari'ah.[55]

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(54) Soliman Solaim, Constitutional and Judicial Organization in Saudi
Arabia (an Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University,
1970), p. 94.

(55) Ibid.,

The judiciary's adherence to the Hanbalite school was
reaffirmed in a royal decree stating that what was cited
in Hanbalite texts should be applied by the courts. Cases
which require legal reasoning and are not covered in Hanbalite
texts, should be referred to either the Greater Shari'ah
Court or to the Commission on Judicial Supervision.[56] To
routinize the adoption of Hanbali interpretation, six Hanbalite
texts were adopted by the judiciary.[57]

Detailed regulations governing the judiciary were issued
in 1938. These affected the classification of judges. In 1952,
a Royal Decree elaborated on the classification of judges and
increased the complexity of the court system. The final restructuring
of the judicial system took place in 1962 when Faisal proclaimed
his Ten Point Reform Program which included, among other things,
the creation of a Ministry of Justice. The implementation of
this program took place in 1970 when the Grand Mufti died. A Royal
Decree was issued creating a Ministry of Justice and a Supreme
Judicial Council[58] Accordingly, the Minister of Justice replaced
the Grand Mufti.

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[56] Ibid., p. 132.

[57] The texts are: Musa al-Hijawi, al-Iqna'; Mansur al-Hanbali al-
Buhuti, Kashf al-Qina' an Matn al-Iqna'; al-Futuhi, Muntaha al-Iradat ;
Mansur al-Buhuti, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat; Shams al-Din al-Qudamah,
al-Mughni; Abd al-Rahman Ibn Qudamah, al-Sharh al-Kabir .

[58] See, al-Shari'ah fi al-Mamlaka al-Arabiya al-Saudiya (Riyadh:
Ma'had al-Qada' al-Ali, 1974), p. 28.

The Decline of the 'Role of the Ulama in the Judiciary

The discovery of oil and the resultant expansion of government services and jurisdiction proved too cumbersome for the shari'ah courts to handle. Although Ibn Saud dealt with many of the cases involving the interaction with foreigners in person, by the 1930s he was unable to deal with all situations. While the shari'ah courts were able to deal with civil and penal matters, they became helpless in confronting the many conflicts which resulted from the development of an oil economy. Consequently, Ibn Saud delegated judicial authority to committees, commissions, boards, councils and tribunals, but they all were originally of an ad hoc nature and distinct from the judicial system. In recent years, however, many of these structures have acquired a permanent status and constitute part of the judiciary. Some of these organs, such as the Grievance Board, the Commission on the Settlement of Commercial Disputes, and the Central Committee on Cases of Adulteration, were subsequently incorporated into the judicial system. The personnel responsible for the activities of these organs are secular educated individuals who have little background in the shari'ah law. Their activities dominate the judicial system and have displaced some of the ulama's judicial role.

The Grievance Board, for example, was established in 1955 through a Royal Decree. The King enjoys tremendous power over the activities of the Board. Not only are the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Board appointed by the King through a royal decree, but the decisions of the Chairman are subject to the King's ratification. In cases of a dispute between a minister or head of a department and decisions made by the board, the matter must be referred to the King.[59] In cases where no regulations exist concerning a certain situation, the matter can be settled only by order of the King. Moreover, the Chairman of the Board must submit a comprehensive report of the Board's activities every six months to the King.[60]

The Board's jurisdiction includes grievances by citizens against state departments or agencies.[61] The Board has jurisdiction to follow up its investigation of government officials and adjudicate on disputes pertaining to salaries, retirement and pensions, and decisions of administrative disciplinary councils.[62] In addition, the Board receives applications for the execution of foreign judgments. The Board has a representative in tribunals or commissions dealing with bribery offenses, disciplinary actions

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[59] Solaim, Constitutional..., op.cit., p. 134.

[60] Ibid.,

[61] Samir Shama, Diwan al-Mazalim (Riyadh: Ma'had al-Idara al-Ama, 1966), p. 230.

[62] op.cit., p. 140.

of military personnel, and violation of the Arab League's policy concerning the boycott of Israel.

The Grievance Board is perhaps the most important of the supplementary organs with judicial functions. This is in part due to its wide jurisdiction and its permanent character. Although not so designated, it is in fact a tribunal. The central position it occupies in the judicial system is the outcome of the expansion in state jurisdiction and activities and the inability of the shari'ah courts to deal with all issues in a complex society. The ulama's representation on the Board is limited to two shari'ah consultants.[63]

To summarize, the discovery of oil in the 1930s and the resultant expansion in government activities and jurisdiction necessitated the regulation of these activities through formal rules. It required the creation of institutions to arbitrate the interpretation and application of these rules. The promulgation of laws and the creation of modern administrative and judicial

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[63]An additional number of committees and commissions were also created to handle the ever increasing expansion in government activities and jurisdiction. The Committee on Cases of Forgery, for example, was created in 1961, amended in 1963 and 1966, and its activities cover all instances of forgery. It is composed of the Minister of Interior as Chairman, two members from the Grievance Board, one member from the Ministry of Interior, and a consultant from the Council of Ministers. The ulama are not represented in this body. See, Nizam Mukafahat al-Tazwir (Riyadh: Ma'had al-Idara al-Ama, 1968).

institutions stripped the ulama of their role as the only

guardian and interpreter of the most sacred of all Islamic

institutions--the shari'ah. Instead of enjoying an exlusive

monopoly over the interpretation of the shari'ah, the ulama

now share this role with secular educated individuals.

As a result of the loss of many of their roles, and resulting

from the introduction of laws that are not found in or derived

from the shari'ah, the ulama found themselves incapable of

exercising their judicial role. A most telling statement expressing

the ulama's situation was made in 1967 by the Chief Judge who

informed members of the Shari'ah Courts that:

> We have been informed that some judges have the
> habit of returning certain cases to the Labour
> and other offices under the pretext that they
> fall under the jurisdiction of these authorities.
> It is recognized that the shari'ah is completely
> equipped to solve disputes, and to end litigations
> as well as to clarify every issue. The submission
> of cases to those authorities implies recognition
> of the man-made laws and of the regulations
> repugnant to the provisions of the shari'ah. It
> also makes the courts appear incapable....You must
> look into all cases you receive and make your decisions
> according to the sublime shari'ah....Whenever you
> have difficulty in doing so, write to us about it. [64]

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[64] Quoted in Abd al-Karim al-Huqayl, Alaqat al-Muwatin bi al-Dawa'ir al-Shari'iya (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1967), pp. 189-190.

CONCLUSION

The development of an oil economy in Saudi Arabia has
ushered in a period of increased government activities which
necessitated the expansion of state jurisdiction over areas
that were formerly dominated by the religious establishment.
It led to the creation of a complex administrative structure
to implement these policies. The expansion of jurisdiction
and the corresponding increase in role differentiation between
the religious and political spheres meant the bureaucratization
of the ulama and their subjugation by the state. Indeed, the
ulama in the present Saudi state are totally dependent on the
state for their survival. They are paid civil servants whose
activities are determined by the needs of the political sphere.
Ulama leaders are appointed by the King, and ulama activities
are regulated by state laws.

Following the introduction of secular laws to regulate the many
state activities, the role of the ulama became confined to the
interpretation of the civil and criminal aspects of the shari'ah
while commercial, labour and international laws, to name only three,
are formulated and interpreted by secular-educated individuals.
The state took over religion for the purpose of restructuration to

bring its beliefs and institutions into conformity with national objectives. The activities of WAMY and the Directorate of Research, Ifta', Da'wa and Guidance are geared towards the presentation of Wahhabi principles which coincide with state objectives, and towards projecting the Saudi rulers as the protectors and propagators of Islam. In effect, the political sphere enhanced its legitimacy through the rationalization of policies in religious terms. The emergence and increased role of secular-educated individuals in the system reflects the over-all position of the political sphere towards the ulama--while religion remains an important source of legitimation, the ulama's traditional role to evaluate government policy and activities is denied.

CHAPTER FIVE

CHANGING PATTERNS IN THE COMPOSITION AND ORIENTATION OF THE POLITICAL ELITE

The study of the composition and orientation of the Saudi political élite provides a basis for assessing the extent to which the role and position of the ulama has changed in the political system. By political élite we mean "...those who are most powerful, ...who direct and control the political system and who are its model of political activity...."[1] Until the 1950s, the Saudi political élite consisted of the royal family, tribal leaders and the ulama. The expansion of government services and the complexity of administrative institutions in recent decades have affected the composition and orientation of the country's political élite. First, while the royal family continues to maintain its dominant position, the educational background and career pattern of its members have been altered to accomodate emergent needs. Second, the settlement of bedouins, and the invocation of Wahhabism as the state ideology, and the creation of national identity, weakened the role of tribal leaders. Third, as a result of the expansion of jurisdiction and the complexity of institutions, the ulama lost many of their traditional powers, some of which were incorporated in the newly-emergent structures. Fourth,

[1] James Bill, "The Patterns of Elite Politics in Iran", in George Lenczwoski, ed., _Political Elites in the Middle East_ (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), p. 17.

the creation of modern institutions necessitated the recruitment of secular-educated administrators whose educational background and skills bear little resemblance to those of the ulama.

For the most part, the higher civil service positions are held by secular-educated Saudis. While in the past Saudi education was largely religious, controlled by the ulama, by the 1950s the number of secular schools had increased, and their graduates began to assume key governmental positions. The first Saudi university which opened in 1949 was the Shari'ah Islamic Law College of Mecca. Its curriculum included the traditional subjects of Quran, Hadith, Arabic Language, Arab history, and Arabic literature. Subsequently, a Shari'ah and an Arabic Language college were opened in Riyadh in 1953 and 1954 respectively to train judges and teachers. Secular higher education was introduced only in 1957 with the opening of King Saud University in Riyadh. In subsequent years, the College of Petroleum and Minerals, King Abd al-Aziz University and Imam Saud Islamic University were opened.[2]

The increase in the number of secular-educated administrators was reflected in an increase in the number of ministerial positions which they held. Virtually, all of the major ministerial portfolios in the 1950s were held by members of the royal family. Only one of the nine ministerial positions during this period, the Minister of

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[2] For information on the number of graduates from Saudi religious and secular universities between 1945 and 1970 see, William Rugh, "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 27, No. I (Winter, 1973).

Commerce, was held by some one other than a prince or his dependent.[3]
The Minister of Commerce between 1954 and 1958 was a secular-educated
member of a prominent Jeddah family. Six of the ministers in this
period were princes, and the remaining two, Health and Finance, were
former personal advisors to the King. The Minister of Health after
1954 was the Syrian-born Dr. Rashad Far'oun who had been King Ibn
Saud's personal physician until the latter's death in 1953. The
Minister of Finance was Ibn Saud's personal treasurer, Abd Allah
Sulayman; his successor was another personal confidant of the King,
Muhammad Surur Saban.[4] The predominance in the 1950s of princes
and of the King's confidants in the ministerial roles reflects the
patrimonial character of the regime. Ministers and administrators
were selected primarily because of their proximity to the King rather
than for their abilities and achievements.

By the 1960s, the appointment of secular-educated commoners to
cabinet positions increased. In 1960, King Saud assigned five
ministerial posts, two of which had always been held by princes,
to non-royal family members. Four of these new ministers were
graduates from Cairo University in their early forties, and the
fifth was a 35-year old graduate of the University of Texas who
took over the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. The
four combined family background with the newly important asset of

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(3) Ibid., p. 12.

(4) Ibid.,

secular education to attain their position. The fifth was Abd Allah al-Tariki, Minister of Petroleum, a Najdi who had shown his abilities as Director of the Petroleum Department of the Ministry of Finance.[5]

Until 1975, members of the royal family retained five of the fourteen ministerial posts. These five--Interior, Defense, National Guard, Finance and Foreign Affairs--are the controlling agencies of the national government; with this control, the princes maintained their hold over the political system. Following the 1975 King Khalid cabinet, four of the five ministries continued to be held by family members, while the Ministry of Finance was assigned to a secular-educated Najdi, Aba al-Khail. Moreover, the Ministries of Municipal and Rural Affairs and Public Works and Housing were created and assigned to members of the royal family.

The royal family continues to control key administrative positions. In recent years, family members have begun to administer the more junior posts which require secular education and thus to assure the continuity of the regime's patrimonial character.

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[5] For an excellent article on the educational background, career pattern and social outlook of al-Tariki see, Stephen Duguid, "A Biographical Approach to the Study of Social Change in the Middle East: Abdallah Tariki as a New Man", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. I, No. 3 (1970).

THE ROYAL FAMILY

The exact size of the royal family is unknown. Some estimates place its number between three and five thousand males, while others suggest that there are "hundred of relatives--brothers and sons, uncles, nephews, cousins, and their wives and children--offspring of each of the three Saudi kings."[6] What is certain, however, is that the large size of the family may be attributed to Ibn Saud's numerous marriages as a way of consolidating his rule through forming alliances with the leading tribes. Ibn Saud, Howarth noted, had "more than three hundred wives, and most of these marriages were motivated by political considerations."[7] After the defeat of Ibn Rashid, for example, Ibn Saud "took all the remaining members of the family of Rashid as his guests to Riyadh, where they lived out their lives at his expense, in reasonable freedom, within his crowded court....He married the principal widow of his murdered rival and accepted the orphan children as his own."[8] One after another, Ibn Saud married into all the leading tribes and families. As table I shows, he had wives from the Sudayr tribe, the Mutair, Anaza and the Dawasir to name only four.

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[6] See, Norman Walpole, et.al., Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia (Washington, C.D.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 157. For a description of genealogical evolution of Al Saud see, Fouad al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia (London: Stacey International, 1978), pp. 63-66.

[7] David Howarth, The desert King (Beirut: Continental Publications, n.d.), p. 110.

[8] H.C. Armstrong, Lord of Arabia (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1934), p. 175.

TABLE I

CHILDREN OF IBN SAUD [9]

TRIBAL AFFILIATION: BROTHERS, HALF-BROTHERS

Names	Tribal Affiliation
Turki & Saud	Children of Wadha, daughter of Muhammad al-Urayr, Shaykh of Bani Khalid tribe
Faisal	Son of Tarfa, daughter of Shaykh Abd Allah Al Shaykh
Muhammad and Khalid	Children of Mukosara, daughter of Musa'id ibn Jiluwi Al Saud
Fahd, Sultan, Abd Al Rahman, Turki, Nasir, Salman, and Ahmad	Known as the "Sudayri Seven"; constitute the most influential faction within the Royal Family. Children of Hessa, daughter of Ahmad al-Sudayri.
Mansour, Mash'il and Mut'ib	No Information
Sa'd II, Musa'id and Abd Al-Muhsin	Children of Jawhara, daughter of Sa'd al-Sudayri
Abd Allah	Son of al-Fahda, daughter of 'Asi ibn Sharim, Shaykh of the Shammar tribe
Bandar and Fawaz	No Information
Talal and Nawaf	Children of Huya, daughter of Sa'd al-Sudayri (sister of Jawhara).
Thamer, Mamdouh and Mash'hour	Children of Nauf, grand-daughter of Nouri al-Sha'lan, Shaykh of al-Rewla tribe

(9) Information on the royal family was gathered through interviews during field research in 1979-1980.

To appreciate the importance of marriage as an instrument of alliance formation, it is necessary to outline the role of kinship as a determinant of social status and role in Saudi Arabia. It is the family, not the individual, that forms the basic social unit. The individual is responsible for the well-being of his family; he behaves according to his family's status and values; and his social status is dictated largely by that of his family.[10] Although the tribal character of the Saudi society has been radically altered in recent decades as a result of the development of an oil economy and the settlement of bedouins, the family remains the focus of loyalty.[11] In whatever familial group--a'ila /¯family_7, hamula /¯sub-tribe_7, ashira /¯a larger sub-tribe_7, or qabila /¯tribe_7, the status and interests of the individual are determined by and subordinated to those of the family.

The political significance of family ties in the case of Saudi. Arabia is that family members support one another in their quest for power and authority. Prince Abd Allah's position in the Saudi power structure, for example, is enhanced by his affiliation with the Shammar tribe, one of the most powerful and noble in the country. Members of this tribe owe allegiance to Abd Allah, who acts as an intermediary

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[10] Rodger P. Davis, "Syrian Arabic Kinship Terms", Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. V (Autumn, 1949), p. 249.

[11] For an examination of the changing character of the Saudi tribal society see, Motoko Katakura, Bedouin Village: A Study of a Saudi Arabian People in Transition (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977).

between them, the royal family, the King, and the bureaucracy. The position of king Fahd and his six full brothers, commonly known as the Sudayri seven, is considered the strongest among members of the royal family, not only because of this group's affiliation, through their mother, with the Sudayr tribe, but also because they are full-brothers who control key governmental positions.

Members of the royal family play vital role in the Saudi political process. Not all family members, however, are engaged in state administration, and not all of them enjoy equal status. The status of the individual within the family and his role in government are determined by two considerations: First, the individual's proximity to the King's immediate family; and second, the individual's generation. Since the death of Ibn Saud in 1953, kinship passed first to his son Saud, and beginning in 1964, from brother to brother. Saud was the oldest, followed by Faisal. As table II shows, Prince Muhammad should have succeded Faisal, but he renounced his claim in favour of his younger brother Khalid. Muhammad's renunciation of his claim was forced upon him by the senior members of the family and the ulama because of his personal conduct which seemed antithetical to Wahhabi puritanism. His disqualification may illustrate the role of the leading ulama in the patrimonial political system-- selective involvement and participation. The ulama's voice is important in determining the selection of the ruler, but once the ruler assumes power they become powerless. Muhammad's disqualification also demonstrated the powerful role of the senior members of the family in determining succession.

TABLE II

CHILDREN OF IBN SAUD

Name	Date of Birth	Education	Position
Turki	1900	Court education: religion, politics and chivalry	No position. Died 1919
Saud	1902 in Riyadh Died in exile in 1969	Court education	Governor of Najd; Crown Prince; King (1953-1964); was removed by members of the royal family and the ulama for his religious and moral laxity.
Faisal	b. 1906 was assassinated by his nephew in 1975	Court education	Governor of Hejaz, Foreign Minister; Crown Prince; President, Council of Ministers; President, Consultative Council; Chairman of Supreme Planning Board; King (1964-1975).
Muhammad	b. 1912	Court education	Governor of Medina, but did not assume position. Medina was governed on his behalf.
Khalid	1913	Court education	First Deputy Prime Minister; Crown Prince; King (1975-1982) and Prime Minister.
Nasir	1919	Court education	Governor or Riyadh
Sa'd	1919	Court education	No information
Fahd	1920	Court education	Minister of Education; Chairman, Administrative Committee in Council of Ministers; Head of Saudi Delegation to the Arab League; Second Deputy Prime Minister; First Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Interior; Crown Prince; King.

CHILDREN OF IBN SAUD

Name	Date of Birth	Education	Position
Mansour	1920; d. in Paris 1950	Court education	Chief of Royal Cabinet; Minister of Defence.
Abd Allah	1921	Court education	Commander of National Guard; Second,Deputy Prime Minister; Crown Prince.
Bandar	1922	Court education	Director General of Ministry of Interior; Prominent Businessman.
Sultan	1922	Court education	Member in the Supreme Council of Education, Council of Ministers; Head of Royal Guard; Minister of Agriculture; Minister of Defence and Aviation.
Mash'al	1925	Court education	Succeeded Mansour as Minister of Defence; Minister of Agriculture; Governor of Mecca; Retired.
Musa'id	1926	Court education	Major businessman; no official position.
Abd al-Muhsin	1927	Court education	Minister of Interior; resigned in support of "The Liberal Princes"; Governor of Medina.
Mushari	1930	Court education	Major businessman; no official position
Mut'ib	1931	Court education	Deputy Minister of Defence; Governor of Mecca.
Talal	1931	Court education	Minister of Transport; Saudi Ambassador to France; Minister of Finance; Led the "Liberal Princes" in favour of democratization of regime. Leading businessman.

CHILDREN OF IBN SAUD

Name	Date of Birth	Education	Position
Abd al-Rahman	1931	High School from Saudi Arabia; Military Cadet in California; Diploma of Military Academy, California; B.A. in economics and business administration, Berkley.	No official position. Leading businessman: Founder of the National Gypsum Co.; Owner and operator of "model farms" in various provinces; Founder and owner of Al Khat Publishing House in Jeddah; Founder and owner of Publication and Translation Co., in Damam; co-founder and major shareholder in the Riyadh and Jeddah Electric Power Companies; co-founder and major shareholder in the Eastern Province Electric Co.; Owner of a number of cement plants in the country.
Turki II	1932	Court education	Deputy Minister of Defence
Badr	1932	Court education	Deputy Commander of National Guard; Minister of Communications.
Nawaf	1933	Studied in the U.S.A., but did not obtain degree.	Chief of Royal Cabinet; Succeeded Talal as Minister of Finance; Adviser to King Faisal.
Nayef	1933	Court education	Governor of Riyadh; Governor of Medina; Deputy Minister of Interior; Minister of State for Internal Affairs.
Fawaz	1934	Court education	Governor of Riyadh; Deputy Governor of Mecca; Governor of Mecca.
Majid	1936	Court education	Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs.
Salman	1936	Court education	Governor of Riyadh

CHILDREN OF IBN SAUD

Name	Date of Birth	Education	Position
Abd al-Ilah	1938	No information	No information
Ahmad	1939	Court education	Deputy Governor of Mecca
Satam	1940	Court education	Deputy Governor of Riyadh
Thamer	1940	No information	No position. Committed suicide in the U.S.A.
Mamdouh	1941	No information	Leading businessman
Mash'hour	1941	Court education	Leading businessman
Hathloul	1941	No information	Leading businessman
Hamoud	1942	No information	Leading businessman
Abd al-Majid	1942	No information	Leading businessman
Muqrin	1942	Air Force Academy, Saudi Arabia, U S.A.	Air Force Commander

TABLE III

BROTHERS OF IBN SAUD

Name	Education	Position
Faisal Ibn Abd Al Rahman	Court	Died in 1890; did not hold any position.
Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Rahman	Court	Died in Riyadh in 1943. Did not hold any position.
Saud Ibn Abd Al-Rahman	Court	Died in 1965. Major businessman.
Abd Allah Ibn Abd Al-Rahman	Court	Elder of the Royal Family.
Sa'd Ibn Abd Al-Rahman	Court	Killed in battle in 1915. Commander in Ibn Saud's army.
Ahmad Ibn Abd Al-Rahman	-	No information
Musa'id Ibn Abd Al-Rahman	Court	Minister of Finance; Member in Council of Ministers; Chairman of Financial Committee, Council of Ministers; Chairman of Board of Directors, Public Administration Institute; Deputy Chairman of Supreme Planning Board; Chairman of Grievance Board, Ministry of Justice; Minister of Justice.
Abd Al Muhssen Ibn Abd Al-Rahman	Court	

Equal to Muhammad in status are Ibn Saud's living brothers. As table III shows, three of Ibn Saud's brothers are still living, two of whom had aided his drive to expand and consolidate Saudi rule. Because of their age and proximity to Ibn Saud, the three brothers constitute a distinct group whose opinion is highly valued.

The status and role of individuals within the royal family is also influenced by sibling group formations. One of the most influential of these groups is the "Sudayri Seven". In addition to the seven brothers, and as table IV shows, nine members of the Sudayri clan are presently governors of various administrative units in the Kingdom, and one was a Deputy Chairman of the Administrative Council of Medina.

A second collateral branch in the royal family is the Jiluwi group. They are descendants of a brother of Ibn Saud's grandfather. A member of Al Jiluwi, Abd Allah Ibn Jiluwi, was one of the forty men who recaptured Riyadh with Ibn Saud in 1902, and was subsequently appointed Governor of the oil rich Eastern Province. Following his death in 1941, his son Saud Ibn Abd Allah succeeded him in the governorship; following Saud's death, his other son Abd al-Muhsin, assumed the position. In addition to their control of the Eastern Province, the Jiluwis occupy positions as governors of minor regions. Their importance is reinforced by the fact that the mother of King Khalid and Prince Muhammad, and the mother of two of King Faisal's sons, are from the Jiluwi clan.

The third collateral branch, the Thunayan, are descendants from Thunayan, an older brother of the founder of the Saudi dynasty,

Muhammad Ibn Saud. This branch had one Saudi ruler, Abd Allah al-Thunayan /¯1841-1843_7, whose descendants moved to Constantinople following the dissolution of the second Saudi state. Although the Thunayans are small in number compared with the other two branches, their importance is derived from the fact that King Faisal's wife, Queen Iffat, is a Thunayan; her children hold key positions in the state administration as well.

Cutting across the collateral branches are the grandchildren of Ibn Saud. Whether Sudayris, Jiluwis or Thunayans, their views do not as yet carry the same weight as those of their elders. Collectively, however, they represent a distinct group of members of the royal family whose educational background, career pattern and social outlook differ from those of their elders. This difference reflects the extent to which the polity has undergone changes.

The Royal Family as a Microcosm of Change

The large size of the royal family has enabled it to play the role of the single-ruling party that exists in many Arab states, with ascriptive ties and mutual interests acting as a structural and ideological bond. As we have seen in table I, members of the family integrate the country's leading tribes through a network of marriage. Tables II and IV show the administrative positions they held, which enabled Al Saud to integrate the country's remote regions into the central administration and to administer the positions which assure the family's control of society.

TABLE IV

THE SUDAYRI BRANCH

Name	Position
Turki Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al Sudayri	Governor of Jaizan
Musa'id Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al Sudayri	Governor of Tabuk
Abd Al Aziz Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Nasir Al Sudayri	Secretary to the Governor of Tabuk
Kahlid Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al Sudayri	No information
Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al Sudayri	No information
Bandar Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al Sudayri	No information
Abd Al Rahman Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al Sudayri	Governor of Jauf and Sakaka Districts
Abd Al Rahman Ibn Musa'id Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al Sudayri	Deputy Chairman of the Administrative Council of Medina
Sulayman Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al Sudayri	No information
Abd Allah Ibn Abd Al Aziz Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al Sudayri	Inspector, Northwest Frontier, and Governor of Qaryat al-Milh
Nayf Ibn Abd Al Aziz Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al Sudayri	Governor of Amlaj

THE SUDAYRI BRANCH

Name	Position
Musa'id Ibn Khalid Ibn Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al Sudayri	No information
Abd Allah Ibn Sa'd Ibn Abd Al Muhsin Al Sudayri	No information
Nasir Ibn Sa'd Ibn Abd Al Muhsin Al Sudayri	Governor of Al Ghat
Ahmad Ibn Abd Al Muhsin Ibn Sa'd Al Sudayri	Governor of al-'Ula
Abd Al Rahman Ibn Ahmad Ibn Abd Al Rahman Al Sudayri	Governor of Jeddah
Sa'ud Ibn Abd Al Rahman Ibn Turki Al Sudayri	Governor of Baljarshi
Ahmad Ibn Turki Ibn Muhammad Al Sudayri	No information
Nasir Ibn Abd Allah Ibn Nasir Al Sudayri	Governor of al-Wajh

The ability of Al Saud to maintain control of society is also attributed to their willingness to adapt to and satisfy emergent needs. As table II shows, thirty-two of Ibn Saud's thirty-six children held positions with a direct bearing upon state security. With the exception of Abd al-Rahman, Nawaf and Muqrin, all had a court education which emphasized religious instruction. Table V, however, shows the drastic change in the educational and career pattern of members of the royal family. A number of Ibn Saud's grandchildren and nephews acquired secular education and assumed positions that require secular knowledge. It is erroneous to assume that educational background alone is the determinant of social and political outlook. As the case of Prince Talal demonstrates --he received court education, but subsequently headed the "Liberal Princes" faction, advocated the abolition of monarchy, and sought refuge in socialist Egypt in 1964. What is important is the royal family's ability to satisfy the needs of the newly created bureaucratic structures from within its ranks; this has enabled it to maintain its control of society.

The ability and success of the royal family in maintaining its position through the acquisition of secular education, and the resultant decrease in the importance of religious education, is best illustrated by the case of the late King Faisal's children. As table VI shows, of Faisal's eight male children, seven did their secondary education at the Hun or the Lawrencville schools in New Jersey. Following graduation, they continued their higher education

TABLE V

GRAND CHILDREN AND NEPHEWS OF IBN SAUD

Name	Position	Education
Abd al-Rahman Ibn Saud	Director General, Ministry of Finance	B.A., U.S.A.
Bandar Ibn Fahd	Director General, Ministry of Commerce	B.A., U.S.A.
Khalid Ibn Fahd	Deputy Minister of Education	B.A , U.S.A.
Faisal Ibn Abd al-Aziz	Director General of Scholarship and External Relations, Ministry of Education	No information
Muhammad Abd Allah Al Faisal	Director General, Ministry of Education	B.A., U.S.A.
Saud al-Faisal	Deputy Minister of Petroleum and Mineral resources; Secretary General of Higher Petroleum Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs.	B.A., U.S.A.
Fahd Ibn Sultan	Director General of Social Welfare, Ministry of Labour	B.A., Egypt
Faisal Ibn Fahd	Director General of Youth Affairs, Chairman of Saudi Olympics Committee	No information
Muhammad Al Faisal	Head of Water Supply Directorate; Deputy Director in Ministry of Agriculture	B.A., U.S.A.
Khalid Al Faisal	Governor of Asir	B.A., Britain
Sa'd Ibn Fahd Ibn Abd Al Rahman	Governor of Ha'il	No information

GRAND CHILDREN AND NEPHEWS OF IBN SAUD

Name	Position	Education
Fahd Ibn Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Rahman	Governor of Qassim	No information
Abd al-Muhsin Ibn Jiluwi	Governor of the Eastern province	No information
Muhammad Ibn Fahd Jiluwi	Governor of al-Ahsa	No information
Abd Allah Ibn Musa'id Jiluwi	Governor of Northern Territories	No information
Abd al-Aziz al-Thunayan	Major of Riyadh	B.A., U.S.A.
Musa'id Ibn Abd al-Rahman	Minister of Finance; Director of Grievance Board	No information
Khalid Ibn Sultan	Army Officer	Military Academy, Saudi Arabia, U.S.A.
Badr Ibn Abd al-Muhsin Ibn Saud	President of the Saudi Arab Arts Society	B.A., U.S.A.
Bandar Ibn Khalid	No official position. Leading businessman: Owner and chairman of al-Bandar International Corporation Ltd., for Construction and Real Estate. In 1975, al-Bandar was engaged in constructing 3,000 residential units in Jizan.	Court education
Saud Ibn Abd al-Muhsin	Deputy Governor of Mecca, Director of Health, Housing and Environment Departments, Central Planning Organization; Director of Coordination, Ministry of Health.	B.A. (Business Administration) U.S.A.

TABLE VI

CHILDREN OF KING FAISAL

Name	Education	Position
Abd Allah Ibn Faisal	Court education	Assisted his father in administering Hejaz; Minister of Interior; Minister of Health; Leading Businessman.
Muhammad Ibn Faisal	B.A., United States	Head of Water Supply Directorate, Deputy Director of Ministry of Agriculture.
Saud Al Faisal	B.A., United States	Deputy Minister of Petroleum and Minerals; Secretary General of Higher Petroleum Council; Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Sa'd Ibn Faisal	B.A., Britain	Prominent Businessman
Khalid Ibn Faisal	B.A., Britain	Director General of Youth Affairs and Sports; Governor of Asir
Turki Ibn Faisal	B.A., Britain	Legal Advisor
Abd al-Rahman Ibn Faisal	Military Academy, Britain	Army Officer
Bandar Ibn Faisal	B.A., United States; Royal Air Force, Britain	Air Force Officer

in the United States and England.[12] The first of Faisal's children
to study abroad was Prince Muhammad who attended both the Hun and
the Lawrencville schools. He earned a B.Sc. in Business Administra-
tion from the United States, worked first at the Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency, then as Governor of the Saline Water Conversion
State Corporation, and finally went into private business.

Another of Faisal's sons, Prince Khalid, now Governor of Asir,
graduated from the Hun School, studied at Princeton, and transferred
to Oxford where he obtained a B.A. degree. Sa'ud Al-Faisal, presently
Minister of External Affairs, studied at Hun and Princeton. Following
graduation in 1965 with a B.A. degree in economics, he served for
10 years in the General Petroleum and Minerals Organization and in
the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources as a deputy to
Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani.

Military careers are also pursued by family members. Now an
officer, Prince Abd al-Rahman graduated from the Hun School and
the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Prince Bandar attended
Whittier College in California, obtained a B.A. from the United
States, and completed a Royal Air Force Pilot training program at
Cranwell, England.

The sixth of Faisal's children, Prince Sa'd, received a law
degree from Cambridge, was appointed Division Director in Petromin

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(12) Information on King Faisal's children was gathered during field
research in 1979-1980, from Who's Who in Saudi Arabia, 1977 (London:
Europa Publications, 1978), and ARAMCO World Magazine, Vol. 30, No.3,
(May-June, 1979).

and presently is a prominent businessman. Finally, Prince Turki who attended the Hun School, studied at Princeton, then at Cambridge where he graduated in Shari'ah Law in 1972. He now serves as a legal advisor in the present cabinet.

The change in the educational background and career pattern of members of the royal family indicates the family's concern with maintaining its position in society and its willingness to adapt to changing circumstances. Equipped with survival instinct, the family did not resist change; rather it controlled and manipulated its direction. Because of its large size, the family relied on its members to assume leadership positions in the newly-created institutions. In addition to maintaining monopoly over the key posts, including the first and second deputy Premierships, and the ministries of Defense, National Guard and Foreign Affairs, members of the family are increasingly assuming control of more junior positions. While in the early period of Saudi rule, Ibn Saud's sons acted as governors and ministers, members of the present family are in control of even secondary positions in state administration. Muhammad Ibn Abd Allah, for example, is a deputy director in the Ministry of Agriculture; Abd al-Rahman Ibn Saud, Bandar Ibn Fahd and Fahd Ibn Sultan, to name only three, are either directors or deputy-directors of state agencies.

SECULAR BUREAUCRATS

The creation of modern administrative institutions necessitated the recruitment of secular-educated administrators whose educational background and skills are not satisfied by or found among the ulama. While in the 1930s religious education was the necessary requisite for recruitment into the state administration in Najd, by the 1950s it was displaced by secular education. The secularization of the educational system to meet the needs of the newly created administrative institutions and the increase in the number of secular-educated administrators has continued well into the present. Of 44 high-level officials in 1972, 65 percent had a secular education. As table VII shows, while four ministers had traditional education, six were secular-educated.

TABLE VII

Educational Background   (13)
of High Level Saudi Officials, 1972

Ministries	Minister	Deputy Ministers'
Interior	Al Saud	Al Saud
Defense	Al Saud	Al Saud
Finance	Al Saud	B.A. (Cairo)
Pilgrimage	Al Saud	B.A. (Cairo)
Foreign Affairs	Traditional	B.A. (U.S.A.)
Education	Traditional	B.A. (U.S.A.)
Communications	Traditional	B.A. (U.S.A.)
Justice	Traditional	Traditional
Commerce	B.A. (Cairo)	M.A. (U.S.A.)
Health	B.A. (Cairo)	DDS (Cairo)
Labour	B.A. (Cairo)	M.A. (U.S.A.)
Information	B.A. (Cairo)	B.A. (U.S.A.)
Petroleum	M.A. (U.S.A.)	B.A. (U.S.A.)
Agriculture	M.A. (U.S.A.)	M.A. (U.S.A.)

(13)William Rugh, op.cit., p. 12.

The number and influence of secular-educated administrators is even greater at the relatively more junior positions. Only three deputy-ministers, including two members of the royal family, in the 1972 cabinet received traditional education; the remaining eleven are secular-educated, eight of whom studied at American universities. Moreover, with the exception of the heads of the National Guard and religious organizations, all directors of the country's major agencies and corporations are secular-educated. The directors of Petromin and the Central Planning Organization in 1972 were two Saudis who received a Ph. D. and an M.A. from the United States.

Of the twenty three ministers in King Khalid's cabinet, excluding members of the royal family, only three received religious education. As the following biographic table shows, the ministers of Justice, Pilgrimage Affairs and Awqaf, and Higher Education were educated in religious institutions, while the remaining cabinet members received higher education in the United States, Britain, Egypt or Lebanon.

The increase in the number of secular-educated ministers should not be viewed as precipitating a dramatic shift in the political system's basic values or orientation. On the contrary; the patrimonial character of the political system persists. The King remains the centre of power and loyalties; ministers act more as advisors than initiaters of policy; and ascriptive considerations remain important in determining recruitment to the political system. Moreover, the use of religion and religious symbols to enhance the regime's legitimacy remains a vital and important frame of reference even among the secular-educated ministers and their deputies.

TABLE VIII

KING, KHALID'S CABINET [14]

REGIONAL AND EDUCATIQNAL BACKGROUND

(1) Dr. Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Shaykh, Minister of Agriculture.
Ph. D. U.S.A.

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(2) Dr. Sulaiman Abd al-Aziz al-Sulaim, Minister of Commerce.

Was born in 1938. Received his primary and secondary education in
Basra, Iraq. Received a B.A. in Political Science from Cairo
University in 1962; an M.A. in International Relations in 1966
from the University of Southern California, and a Ph. D. in Law
from Johns Hopkins University in 1970.

Joined the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs as Director of
Foreign Relations in 1962. In 1963, he became member of the Saudi
Delegation to the United Nations Conference on "The Application of
Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed
Countries." In 1968, was appointed Delegate to the United Nations
Conference of Ministers of Social Affairs. Appointed by King
Khalid Minister of Commerce in the 1975 Cabinet.

In his Ph. D. dissertation, "Constitutional and Judicial Organiza-
tion in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia", al-Sulaim noted that the
Shari'ah is compatible with the modern world. The problem, however,
is the existence of "a communication gap between the ulama on the
one hand and the technocrats and intellectuals on the other. The
latter seem to be unaware of the contribution of the ulama to the
stability and continuity in a traditional society; nor are they
always appreciative of the wealth of Islamic jurisprudence. The
ulama, on their part, have not found the right mode of conveying
these qualities to the intellectuals." Ibid., p. 169.

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[14] Biographic information is derived and compiled from Who's Who
in Saudi Arabia 1976-1977 (Jeddah: Tihama, 1978); al-Dara (Riyadh:
Darat al-Malik Abd al-Aziz), and through interviews during my field
research in Saudi Arabia in 1979-1980.
Information on ministers from the Royal Family is dealt with in
the table pertaining to the Royal Family.

(3) Dr. Abd al-Aziz Abd Allah al-Khuwaiter, Minister of Education

Was born in Najd in 1927. Received his elementary and secondary education in Saudi Arabia; and a Ph. D. in history from Britain.

In 1965, he headed the Directorate of Supervision and Follow Up; a year later he was appointed by the Minister of Education Vice-Rector of Riyadh University. In 1967, al-Khuwaiter jointed Faisal's Cabinet as Minister of Health; and in 1975, became Minister of Education.

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(4) Muhammad Aba al-Khail, Minister of Finance and National Economy.

Was born in Najd; Received a B. Com. in 1956 from Cairo University.

Between 1956 and 1962 he served as Assistant Director in the Bureau of the Minister of Communications, then as Director of the same bureau. In 1962, Faisal delegated him to establish an Institute of Public Administration in Riyadh. He headed this Institute between 1962 and 1965. In 1970, he became Deputy Minister of State for Finance and National Economy; Joined King Khalid's Cabinet in 1975.

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(5) Dr. Hussein Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, Minister of Health.

M.D., U.S.A.

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(6) Hassan Abd Allah Al Shaykh, Minister of Higher Educatiion.

Was born in Mecca in 1933. Tutored by his father Shaykh Abd Allah and received secondary education in Mecca. Obtained a B.A. in Arabic Language and Islamic Studies from the Mecca Shari'ah College.

He was appointed by his father as a member of the Judiciary Presidium in the Hejaz region (1956-1958). After his father's death in 1958, he became President of the Presidium. In 1962, Crown-Prince Faisal appointed him Minister of Education; in 1975 he joined King Khalid's cabinet as Minister of Higher Education. In addition to his ministerial position, Al shaykh was appointed by King Faisal to head the Supreme Council of King Abd al-Aziz Research Centre / Darat al-Malik Abd al-Aziz 7.

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(7) Dr. Ghazi al-Qusaibi, Minister of Industry and Electricity.

Was born in 1940 in the Hasa region. Received his elementary and secondary education in Saudi Arabia; an LLB from Cairo University; M.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California and a Ph. D. in International Relations from London University.

In 1965, al-Qusaibi jointed the University of Riyadh as lecturer of Political Science. Became Dean of the College of Administrative Sciences at the same university in 1971. In 1973, he was appointed Director General of the Saudi National Railroad Organization, with a deputy ministerial rank. A year later, he was appointed Chairman of the Daman Port Authority. Joined King Khalid's Cabinet in 1975 as Minister of Industry and Electricity.

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(8) Dr. Muhammad Abdu Yamani, Minister of Information.

Was born in 1939 in Mecca. Received his elementary and secondary education in Saudi Arabia. Obtained a B.Sc. in geology from the University of Riyadh, and a Ph. D. in the same field from Cornell University.

Between 1972 and 1973, Yamani lectured at the University of Riyadh; in 1973, he became Deputy Minister of Education; 1974-1975 served as Rector of the University of King Abd al-Aziz. Joined King Khalid's cabinet in 1975.

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(9) Ibrahim Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Al Shaykh, Minister of Justice.

Traditional Education

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(10) Ibrahim al-Anqari, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs.

Received his elementary and secondary education in Saudi Arabia, and a B.A. from Cairo University.

1950-1974: Director of Bureau of the Minister of Education; diplomat at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C.; Director General of the Ministry of Interior; Minister of Information in King Faisal's cabinet.

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(11) Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources.

Was born in Damam in 1938. Received his elementary and secondary education in Saudi Arabia. Obtained an LLB from Cairo University, and LLM from Harvard University.

In his Islamic Law and Contemporary Issues (Karachi: Elite Publishers, 1958), Yamani noted that there is no contradiction between the Shari'ah and modern situations. Indeed, Yamani asserted, progress and development will be attained only through the application of the Shari'ah. Reflecting the views of Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyah, a noted Hanbali jurist, Yamani suggested that the shari'ah is a system based on the welfare of the individual in the community, both in his everyday life and in anticipation of the life thereafter. The shari'ah, Yamani continued, "is all justice, all compassion, all benefits, and all wisdom.", Ibid., pp. 9-10.

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(12) Shaykh Abd al-Wahhab Abd al-Wasi', Minister of Pilgrimage Affairs and Awqaf.

Traditional Education

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(13) Hisham Nazir, Minister of Planning.

Was born in Jeddah in 1932. Received his elementary education in Saudi Arabia; completed his secondary education at Alexandria's Victoria College. In 1957, Nazir received a B.A. in International Relations from the University of California, and an M.A. in Political Science from UCLA in 1958.

Nazir joined the Directorate General of Oil and Mineral Affairs in 1959 as an adviser. In 1960, he was appointed Director General of the Ministry. In 1968, he became President of the Central Planning Organization; in 1971 was appointed by King Faisal member in the Council of Ministers. He joined Khalid's Cabinet in 1975.

Describing Nazir, Peter Hobday wrote that "/ he 7 has absorbed American fascination with the 'numbers approach' to everything. As long as the computer says that it can work, and as long as the numbers add up, there is little point in trying to imagine all the reasons why something will not happen." Peter Hobday, Saudi Arabia Today (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1978), p. 79. Nazir, however, sees no contradiction between Islam and modernity. On the contrary; economic development should be attained and harnessed to serve the Islamic community. Moreover, Nazir is willing to benefit from foreign advisers. The most known of his foreign adviser teams is the Stanford Research Institute of California which was partially involved in the drafting of the first and second Saudi five year development plans.

(14) Dr. Alawi Darwish Kayal, Minister of Post, Telegraph and Telephone.

Was born in Jeddah in 1932. Received his elementary and secondary education in Saudi Arabia; obtained a Ph D. in Political Science from the United States.

1959-1970: Served as Director General of Post; and Minister of Post, Telegraph and Telephone in Faisal's cabinet. He retained same post in King Khalid's 1975 Cabinet.

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(15) Muhammad Ibrahim Mas'ud, Minister of State Without Portfolio.

Was born in Jeddah in 1919. Received elementary and secondary education in Saudi Arabia; a B. Com. from the Lebanese National University.

In 1936-1937, Mas'ud taught in al-Falah School in Jeddah; in 1941 he was appointed head of a section in the Department of Minerals and Public Works; 1943-1948, he headed the Provisions Department, Ministry of Finance; 1958-1959, he became Minister Plenipotentiary and Inspector of Diplomatic and Consular Corps, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 1959-1961, Minister Plenipotentiary, at the Saudi Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq; 1961-1968, Ambassador; 1968-1975, Deputy Foreign Minister; joined King Khalid's Cabinet in 1975.

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(16) Dr. Abd Allah Muhammad al-Omran, Minister of State Without Portfolio.

Was born in 1935. Received his elementary and secondary education in Saudi Arabia, and a Ph. D. in Law from the United States.

Served as Legal Adviser to the Council of Ministers between 1970-1975, was appointed Minister Without Portfolio in 1975.

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(17) Dr. Muhammad Abd al-Latif al-Mulhim, Minister of State Without Portfolio.

Was born in 1936. Received his elementary and secondary education in Saudi Arabia; an M.A. and a Ph. D. in Business Administration from the United States.

Prior to 1975, he lectured at the University of Riyadh and was Dean of the College of Administrative Sciences at the same university.

The ministers of Commerce, Industry and Electricity, Planning, and Petroleum and Mineral Resources, rationalize many of their policies in religious terms. Hisham Nazir, Minister of Planning, for example, is the least exposed of all ministers to religious education and to the influence of the ulama in the affairs of his ministry. He still, however, rationalizes the type and direction of planning his ministry introduces in religious terms. The Second Five Year Plan, introduced in July 9, 1975, provided for the maintenance of a high rate of economic growth, maximization of oil earning, reduction of economic dependence on the export of crude oil, development of human resources, and creation of a physical infrastructure to support the objectives of the Plan. All these objectives are to be attained, "God willing, within an Islamic framework" to enhance the "capability and welfare of Muslims."[15] Another secular-educated minister, Shaykh Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani, reaffirmed this tendency by noting that the development of the material well-being of Muslims should be the objective of government, for the Shari'ah is "a system based on the welfare of the individual in the community, both in his everyday life and in anticipation of the life thereafter."[16]

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[15] Ministry of Planning, The Second Five Year Plan (Riyadh: Ministry of Planning, 1975), p. 1.

[16] See, Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Islamic Law and Contemporary Issues (Karachi: Elite Publishers, 1958), pp. 9-10.

While religious symbolism continues to constitute an important reference point among cabinet members, the same cannot be said of the relatively more junior officials. In a survey of the social attitudes and career preference of 271 key secular and traditional educated Saudi civil servants, the importance of the religious profession, and by inference religion, ranked poorly. The respondents were asked in 1970 to rank eleven occupations according to the anticipated return in terms of happiness and social respectability. As shown in table IX, government service as well as the religious profession were ranked below physcians and businessmen. Next to physcians (42%), the respondents ranked businessmen as a highly prestigious category (15%), followed by alem (9%), and government officials (8%). While the profession of alem was viewed as socially prestigious and desirable by 9% of the respondents, only 0.5% believed that the profession of imam /¯leader of prayers and administrator of mosque_7 is personally rewarding and socially prestigious.[17]

The decline in the prestige of the religious profession as projected in the low ranking of the professions of judge, imam and alem was not accompanied by the erosion of parochial and traditional

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(17) The survey was conducted in 1970 by Ibrahim al-Awaji, presently Deputy Minister of Interior. It included interviews with 271 key civil servants. The sample represents about 9 percent of a population of 3000 civil servants in grades 2 to 4 who work for 19 central state organizations in Riyadh. See Ibrahim al-Awaji, Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1971).

TABLE IX [18]

Ranking of Career Preference

Occupation	No.	Percentage
Doctor	113	42
Businessman	41	15
Alem	26	9
Government Bureau Chief	22	8
Landlord	20	7
Engineer	19	7
Peasant	19	7
Judge	5	2
Small Merchant	3	1.5
Labourer	1	0.5
Imam	1	0.5
Undecided	1	0.5
Total	271	100

values and attitudes. Objective considerations are of little importance in determining the selection of civil servants and in assuring the necessary cooperation within the organization or between government agencies. It is common, for example, that friends and relatives of key officials are recruited to the official's department or ministry. Identification of public offices with the private properties of the official heading them is an accepted and expected practice. The results of Awaji's questionnaire disclosed that 45% of the respondents had friends and/or relatives who had worked in their agencies before assuming their position. Moreover, 31% of the respondents admitted having their closest friends working in the same department or agency.[19]

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(18) Ibid., p. 192

(19) Ibid., pp. 228-229.

Another prevalent parochial phenomenon in the Saudi administrative system which reflects the patrimonial character of the polity is that one or two personalities attract a social clique in the same organization. A clique's activities may extend from personal interaction and cooperation in the inter or intra departmental arena to social gatherings and activities. 66% of Awaji's respondents noted that personal relationships based on social or regional considerations are likely to motivate a strong _esprit de corps_ among civil servants.[20] In contrast, only 32% felt that objective and professional considerations are the primary incentive in achieving a higher degree of cooperation.

The study of the social attitude and behaviour of senior civil servants has demonstrated that while modern institutions have been created, parochial attitudes prevail. The persistence of these values and attitudes is not surprising, for studies of public administration in developing countries have shown similar findings.[22]

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(20) Ibid., p. 188.

(21) Ibid.,

(22) See, for example, Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), and by the same author, "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model", in Ferrel Heady, ed., Papers in Comparative Public Administration (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan Press, 1962).

What is surprising in the case of Saudi Arabia is that while traditional values have continued to exist, the prestige and activities of the religious profession have declined. This decline may be attributed to two factors: First, it reflects the policy of limiting the role of the religious establishment in the newly created institutions, and by implication the decline of the religious profession as a vehicle for social mobility. Second, it reflects the over all decline in the social status of the ulama and the religious profession.

CONCLUSION

Despite the expansion of government jurisdiction and the increase in role differentiation, the patrimonial character of the Saudi polity remains unchanged. The King is the locus of authority. The direction of political activities is decided by him personally, aided by senior royal family members and a complex bureaucratic structure. Because of its large size and willingness to adapt to changing demands, the royal family has been able to maintain its traditional role. Senior members of the family are in control of major cabinet portfolios, and the numerous children and grandchildren of Ibn Saud control the more junior positions that assure continuity. In recognition of the needs generated by the creation of modern administrative institutions, the younger generation of Al Saud, exemplified by the children of King Faisal, have attained secular and specialized education and skills. Religion and religious instructions are no longer the necessary educational background which members of the

family need to maintain their prominence.

The introduction of secular education, should not be viewed as precipitating radical changes in the regime's socio-political values. On the contrary, there is little correlation between secular education and the regime's orientation. Religion continues to constitute an important source of political legitimacy, and change is rationalized in religious terms.

The survey of senior civil servants shows that despite the creation of modern institutions, parochial values and attitudes remain prevalent. The persistence of these values among civil servants is a reflection of the patrimonial rule that dominates the society. The society is an enlarged household; the personal ties which dominate the activities of the royal family are the model for relationships in other social units.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PROCESS OF NATION-BUILDING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The process of nation-building and Al Saud's desire to initiate and control change has profound effects on the role and position of religion in society. These effects are both functional and dysfunctional for building the legitimacy of the regime and its ability to maintain its patrimonial character. The process of change manifested itself in increased urbanization, literacy, education, and a higher standard of living.[1] The result of these changes were three-fold: first, an increase in government capabilities and ability to satisfy emergent needs. Administrative institutions were created, the educational system was expanded, and health and social services increased and became accessible to citizens. Second, traditional culture was challenged by alien socio-political values and relationships. Wahhabi puritanism and extreme affluence seem so antithetical to each other, that present-day Wahhabi society bears little resemblance to its predecessor. Third, emergent groups, such as the workers and intellectuals, began to demand political participation. Although Saudi workers and intellectuals are limited in number, their demands and activities are constant reminder of the dilemma confronting modernizing ruling monarchies.

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[1] See, Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", _American Political Science Review_, Vol. 55, No. 3 (September 1961), pp. 498-50

Noting the dilemma of ruling monarchies, and indeed that of Al

Saud, Huntington suggested that the centralization of power is

necessary for regime survival to promote social and economic reforms.

This centralization made difficult the expansion of the polity and its

assimilation of new groups. The participation of these groups in

politics could come at the price of the monarchy. "This is the king's

dilemma--must he be the victim of his own achievement?.... What

strategies are open to the monarch to avoid regime instability or

destruction."[2]

Generally speaking, nation-building consists of two major functions:

breaking through and political integration.[3] Breaking through refers to

the "decisive alteration or destruction of values, structures, and

behaviors which are perceived by /‾the élite_7 as threatening have been

effectively constrained or eliminated."[4] On the other hand, political

integration means the "creation of a new political formula, new

political institutions, and new patterns of political behavior -- a new

community based on norms of reciprocity, on shared sentiments and on

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[2] Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 177.

[3] Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National
Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 7.

[4] Ibid.,

mutual recognition--all of which receive some institutional expression."[5]
The nature of the breaking through and the character of political
integration, i.e. the type of political community that is created, are
determined by the strategy that the leadership employs.

The strategies of nation-building usually employed by the leadership
can be classified into two categories, reformism and revolution. Each
of these strategies emphasizes different procedures for effecting change.
Reformism stresses the values of compromise and bargaining. It is a
strategy of muddling through and shifting alliances, where the regime's
goals emerge, in the fashion of the market place, out of conflict among

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(5) Ibid., In his article "Political Integration and Political Development",
Myron Weiner analyzes the various uses of the term integration and shows
how they are related. According to Weiner, integration covers a vast
range of human relationships and attitudes. It may refer to the
development of a sense of nationality, the integration of political units
into a common territorial framework with a central authority, the inte-
gration of the rulers and the ruled, the integration of the citizen into
a common political process, and finally, the integration of individuals
into organizations for purposive activities. For our purposes, we are
interested in integration in the context of linking government with the
governed. The presence of differences in values and goals between the
governing élite and the governed mass does not constitute a gap as long
as those who are governed accept the right of the governors to govern.
See, Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development", in
Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political Development and
Social Change (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1971), pp. 643-654.

many groups with different aims.[6] Where the élite adopts a reformist strategy it accepts society as it is and provides some guidelines for the process of development. Economic and social development can proceed only at a rate that is acceptable to major groups in society.

Viewed as an alternative strategy, revolution directly confronts what are conceived to be the obstacles to change and development. The atmosphere of revolutionary strategy is one of crisis and attack.[7] No opposition is tolerated, and the whole state apparatus is controlled by a militant, disciplined party organization which has the monopoly of power. The objectives of economic development are of the greatest importance in this system, with emphasis on austerity, discipline and sacrifice.[8]

A reformist strategy, depending as it does on shifting alliances and bargaining, reduces the ability of the leadership to attain its objectives. The need of bargaining creates an atmosphere in which issues can rarely be dealt with decisively. Moreover, a reformist strategy of bargaining and compromise can result in the absence of

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[6] See, Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through", Public Administration Review, Vol. 19 (September, 1959), and Baldev Raj Nayar, The Modernization Imperative and Indian Planning (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972), p. 16. It should be noted that this description of reformist and revolutionary strategies is derived from David Apter's classification of governmental systems. See David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965). For description of Apter's model, see Nayar, op.cit., pp. 11-23.

[7] Apter, op.cit., p. 360.

[8] Nayar, op.cit., p. 15.

effective leadership because of commitments to the various groups in society that seriously limit an élite's ability to deploy resources. This limitation is particularly important because of the élite's attempt to satisfy the demands of major societal groups. Consequently, the élite has less flexibility in formulating its policies. The adoption of reformist strategy may, therefore, constrain government performance and increase the base of dissatisfaction. While proponents of change seek more radical transformation of society, advocates of the status-quo insist on the preservation of the existing situation. Both, however, constitute potential threats to regime survival.

THE INITIATION OF CHANGE

Because of the Saudi rulers' two-pronged policy of engaging Wahhabism as state ideology and instituting limited administrative and social change, the Saudi polity has exhibited tensions and conflict between two groups: (1) the secular-educated who advocated more socio-economic and political reforms, and (2) the religiously-inspired traditionalists who desired to reaffirm the religious character of the polity. Balancing the tension between the two is the king who converts tension into balances and binds society together "through conflict no less than collaboration."[9]

Ibn Saud and his successors desired to maintain a viable socio-economic order based on Wahhabism but flexible enough to adjust to

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[9] Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 10.

changing circumstances. They introduced change to accomodate emergent
situations, but continued to invoke religion as a means to rationalize
that change. The first and most elaborate reform program was initiated
in 1962 as a result of internal and external pressures. Despite the
tremendous increases in oil revenues, King Saud did not introduce
noticeable change in Saudi living conditions. In the circumstance,
Nasser's Arab nationalism and socialism found fertile ground among
secular-educated Saudis who advocated secularization of the polity,
economic development and liberalization of the regime. Prince Talal
spear-headed this group; he sought refuge in 1962 in Cairo from where
he demanded the establishment of a Saudi republic.

While the advocates of change demanded republican rule and socio-
economic reforms, the ulama, merchants and tribal leaders supported the
prevailing conditions. To them, change means their displacement and the
loss of status. The immediate outcome of the inter-play between the
two groups was Saud's dismissal and Faisal's assumption of power in
1964.[10]

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(10) For information on the events leading to Faisal's assumption of
power and its consequences see, Richard H. Nolte, "Faisal Takes Over
in Saudi Arabia", The Reporter, Vol. XVIII (May, 1958); "A Saudi
Revolution", The Economist (April 30, 1960); and "al-Tatawur fi Ahd
al-Malik Faisal", al-Bilad (April 23, 1971). Saud's ouster reflected
the royal family's concern with survival and its willingness to adapt
to changing circumstances. This concern was voiced by a family member
to a Lebanese journalist--"the royal family had been faced with the
alternatives either of allowing the monarchy to disintegrate or of
bringing the conflict /between Faisal and Saud / to an end. We
preferred to sacrifice Saud rather than the country." Cited in Gerald
deGaury, Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1966), p. 134.

Once he assumed power, Faisal reunited the offices of King and Prime Minister and acquired the exclusive authority to appoint, dismiss and accept the resignation of ministers. This concentration of power in the person of the king seemed to be influenced by Faisal's desire to initiate change without having to accomodate conflicting demands. Controlled change was introduced in the 1962 Ten Point Reform Program which was rationalized in religious terms. Reform was introduced:

> ...in order to achieve a unified system of government based on the principles of the shari'ah. A Basic Law will be promulgated, drawn from the Quran, the traditions of the Prophet and the acts of the Orthodox Caliphs. It will set forth the fundamental principles of government and the relationship between the governor and the governed.[11]

More specifically, Faisal's program stipulated the following :

(1) while reaffirming the state's adherence to Islamic law, it promised to issue a Basic Law /⁻a constitution_7 and establish a consultative council.

(2) It pledged to enact regulations that would establish local governments.

(3) It proclaimed independence of the judiciary and promised to establish a supreme judicial council and a ministry of justice.

(4) It announced that the judicial council would be composed of twenty members chosen from both secular-educated jurists and the ulama.

(5) It promised to reinforce Islamic information and da'wa.

(6) It proclaimed the reform of the Committee for Commanding the Good and Forbidding Evil.

(7) It proclaimed the government's concern with developing social welfare policies, pledged control of retail prices, establishment of scholarship fund for students, social security regulation, a law protecting workers from unemployment, and provision of "innocent"

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(11) Cited in Norman C. Walpole et. al., Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 156-157.

recreational facilities.

(8) It announced the intention to regulate economic and commercial activities through appropriate legislation which would assure progress, economic development, and encouragment of capital investment.

(9) It pledged sustained endeavour to develop the country's resources and infrastructure.

(10) it abolished slavery in the kingdom.[12]

Although Faisal's program initiated a period of change, it was restricted to the educational and economic spheres, with limited social reforms. On the political front, neither a basic law, a consultative assembly, nor local governments were introduced.

Expansion of the Educational System

Educational facilities that existed in the various parts of present-day Saudi Arabia prior to the First World War accurately reflected the existing administrative and socio-economic conditions. The provinces had, in addition to the kuttab /‾elementary Qur'anic schools_7, specialized teaching circles known as the halaqa /circle_7 in the houses of prominent ulama and in major mosques, as well as several private schools sponsored by individual benefactors such as the al-Falah schools in Mecca and Jeddah.

The organization of formal secular education in the country took place in 1925 when Ibn Saud ordered the creation of the Directorate General of Education. The ulama opposed the introduction of secular

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(12) See George Lenczowski, "Saudi Arabia: Tradition and Reform", in ed., George Lenczowski, The Political Awakening in the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 171 and Dr. Fouad al-Farsy, "King Faisal's Concept of Saudi Arabian Development", Majalet al-Talib, Vol. I, No. II (Riyadh University, 1400 Hijirah).

education fearing that it would damage the fabric of Wahhabi society.
Through the persistence of Ibn Saud, however, significant progress
took place between 1925 and 1953, the year in which the Directorate
General was replaced by the Ministry of Education and headed by Prince
Fahd. These developments included the provision of primary and
secondary education, teacher training, technical education, a
scholarship program for Saudi students to study abroad and the creation
of the first two institutions of higher education, the Faculty of
Shari'ah and Teachers' College, both in Mecca.

In 1948, there were only 182 primary schools with an enrollment
of 21,409 students. By 1952, the number had risen to 301 schools with
an enrollment of 39,920 students.[13] In 1960-1962, the Saudi educa-
tional system began to experience even more rapid changes. These
changes were evident in increasing public expenditure, the number of
schools, teachers, student enrollment and graduation, emphasis on
technical training and higher education, and women's education. In
terms of public expenditure, while in 1960-61 only S.R. 168.8 million
were allocated for education, the amount reached S.R. 523.9 in 1967-68,
and 1265.6 million in 1974-75.[14]

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(13) UNESCO, Office of Statistics, Educational Studies and Documents,
Vol. IV, No. 53 (1965), p. 16.

(14) Department of Central Statistics, Statistical Yearbook, 1968
(Riyadh: Department of Central Statistics, 1969), p. 117; and The
Middle East and North Africa, 1975-1976 (London: Europa Publications,
Ltd., 1975), p. 605.

Other evidence of the growing emphasis on education is seen in the increasing size of school enrollment. In 1960, for example, 115,000 students registered at the primary level; 9,500 at the elementary general; 2,000 at the intermediary vocational; 3,500 at secondary-teacher training; and 1,300 at the college and university levels.[15] As the first five year plan projected, male enrollment increased from 40,300 to 67,500 a year over the five year period; female enrollment increased from 214,000 to 353,000.[16] In addition, 200 schools were built to accomodate the overall increase.[17]

Based on the religious character of the society, and consistent with Al Saud's justification of change in religious terms, Saudi educational planners indicate that:

> The purpose of education is to have the students understand Islam in a correct and comprehensive manner, to plant and spread the Islamic creed, to furnish the student with the values, teachings and ideals of Islam, to equip him with various skills and knowledge, to develop his conduct in constructive directions, to develop the society economically, socially and culturally...[18]

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(15) Ministry of Planning, Statistical Yearbook, 1980 (Riyadh: Ministry of Planning, 1980), pp. 88-89.

(16) Ibid.,

(17) Ibid.,

(18) Government of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Education, The Educational Policy In The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Riyadh: Ministry of Education, n.d.), article 153.

The same objectives were reiterated in the second five year plan which stressed "maintaining the religious and moral values of Islam over developing human resources."[19]

Although stated government policy is to affirm religious education, a brief examination of government expenditures in this sector demonstrates the opposite. Between 1959 and 1968, the allocation to religious educational institutions was as follows: 1959-60, S.R. 9.3 million; 1960-61, S.R. 9.4 million; 1961-62, S.R. 11.9 million; 1962-63, S.R. 16.1 million; 1963-64, S.R. 29.6 million; 1964-65, S.R. 24.9 million; 1965-66, S.R. 27.7 million; 1966-67, S.R. 30.9 million; and 1967-68, S.R. 31.4 million.[20]

While religious influence on education may be relatively easy to maintain at the primary and even secondary levels, it is more difficult to do so at the secondary or higher levels. Religious subjects cannot dominate the curricula of secular colleges, and students cannot be monitored at all times when they study abroad. An examination of Saudi universities and colleges shows that developing human resources is the most important goal of the government and that the number of students enrolled in religious programs is less than those in secular institutions.[21] The main secular institutions in the country are Riyadh

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(19) Ministry of Information, Outline of the Second Five Year Plan (Riyadh: Ministry of Information, 1980), p. 1.

(20) op.cit., p. 40.

(21) Information gathered from interviews with Saudi educators during my field research in 1979-1980.

University (1957), King Abd al-Aziz University, with faculties both
at Jeddah and Mecca (1967), the Islamic University of Imam Muhammad
Ibn Saud, at Riyadh (1974), King Faisal University at Dammam and
Hufuf (1975), and the University of Petroleum and Minerals, at
Dhahran (1975). Although these universities, with the exception of UPM,
offer degrees in shari'ah and religious studies, their main emphasis is
on human resources development. In terms of student enrollment, it may
be noted that the above universities had a total enrollment of more
than 24,000 students during 1979-80. The main religious university in
the country is the Islamic University of Medinah (1961), which had
an enrollment of about 380 students during the same period. There
are other institutions of religious studies which offer courses in
da'wa / preaching 7, shari'ah and Quranic studies, but enrollment
remains low. In addition to the 24,000 students in the country, it is
necessary to note that there are at present more than 13,000 government-
sponsored students at American universities.[22] The topics they study
range from computer science and engineering to nutrition and police
technology. Only a limited number of them study Islamic subjects. For
example, of 280 Saudi students in the United States during the academic
year 1979-80, only 7 were registered in Islamic studies.[23]

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(22) al-Jazirah, June 7, 1980. For information on the number and
fields of Saudis studying abroad see, "al-ibti'ath al-Khariji", in
Ibid.,

(23) Akhbar al-Mub'taith, No. 12, 1400 Hijirah.

Although the ulama have opposed female education, Saudi educational planners introduced female education in 1960. Education for women prior to 1960 was available only in the larger cities of Jeddah, Medina, Mecca and Riyadh. Girls received education from private female tutors or in the kuttab, where a small number of girls would attend classes given by a female instructor to memorize parts of the Quran and solve simple mathematical problems. Wealthy families would employ private tutors who lived with the family and who in many cases acted not only as tutor and adviser, but also as nurse and companion to the children.

A few private and more secular female elementary schools also existed in the Hejaz region, some of which followed the curricula of the Ministry of Education while others developed their own curricula. Over all, there were many who did not accept the education of girls and considered it conducive to the degradation and immorality of woman and to her revolt against the tradition of society.

The official recognition of women's right to formal education was granted in 1959 when a royal speech was delivered stating that it had been decided to open government schools for girls under the control of a committee to be responsible to the Grand Mufti.[24] The placement of female education under ulama control was a necessary measure to secure their approval. A year later, the General Presidency of the Schools of Girls was created. This body is effectively a ministry, governed by a Shaykh with the same powers, privileges and status as a minister.

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(24) Umm al-Qura, October 23, 1959.

The expansion of female primary and secondary education ultimately led to the creation of college and university facilities for women. In 1960-1961, only four women were enrolled in evening classes at Riyadh University. Five years later, this number increased to 118 students. Moreover, at Riyadh University female undergraduates may study at home and take degrees in arts or sciences. King Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah offers arts and science courses and the same university has a campus in Mecca which offers courses in arts and the shari'ah. Where female instructors are not available, as is the case most of the time, and because women are not allowed to mingle with men, closed circuit television is used to broadcast lectures given by male professors.

Despite the expansion of female education, the object of the education of women remains to bring her up "in a sound Islamic way so that she can fulfill her role in life as a successful housewife, ideal wife and good mother, and to prepare her for other activities that suit her nature such as teaching, nursing and the medical profession."[25] Moreover, Saudi educational policy stipulates that co-education is prohibited in all stages of education except nurseries.

The educational policies stated by the Saudis reflect the government's desire to develop materially, and yet retain Wahhabism as the guiding ideology, to create a young generation of Wahhabis versed in Islam and Wahhabi fundamentalism as well as engineering and computer science. The reality of the situation shows the erosion

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(25) The Educational..., op.cit., p.33.

of religious education and the increase in the number of secular

schools. The political implication of the increase of secular-

educated Saudis is two-fold: first, this group's desire for greater

political participation will exert pressure on the political system

and may eventually alter the regime's patrimonial character. Second,

the growing population of secular-educated Saudis means an emerging

"world view" at variance with that of their elders and the ulama.

Consequently, their role in government and society will heighten

tension and conflict between them and the traditionalists.

Socio-Economic Process

The oil revenues that in the 1950s began to change the country's

relatively poor and isolated society had, by the middle 1970s, increased

tremendously: $0.6 billion in 1965 to $1.2 billion in 1970 and $4.3

billion in 1973. In 1974, it increased to $22.5 billion as a result of

price quadrupling in the aftermath of the Ramadan War. In 1977, oil

revenues reached $37 billion, nearly doubled again to about $70 billion

in 1979 following Khomeni's revolution, and reached $90 billion in

1980.[26]

As the leader in oil production and revenues, and because of the

royal family's desire to introduce change and control its direction,

the country embarked on the most ambitious development and public

expenditure program in the Arab world. The 1975-1980 Five Year Plan

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[26] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, The New Arab Social Order (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1982), p. 95.

called for an expenditure of $145 billion. The Third Five Year Plan, 1980-1985, is budgeted at $250-300 billion.[27]

Government planning and expenditures had a profound impact on Saudi society. Until the 1940s, the country had a pastoral economy based on the raising of goats, sheep, and camels. The majority of the urban population lived' in small villages built of mudbrick and earned a living from subsistence agriculture. With the exception of the oil sector, no industrial activity existed; trade was an important activity in urban centers. In the cities of Mecca, Medina and Jeddah pilgrimage constituted a main source of income.

As a result of the tremendous increase in oil revenues and beginning in the 1960s, a number of development projects were under-taken to improve the living conditions of Saudis. In the last decade alone, 2,000 villages were electrified, 15,000 kilometers of paved roads were built, 700,000 telephones were installed, and 300,000 housing units were constructed.[28] The number of doctors grew from less than 1,000 to 4,000 within a three-year period. Two huge industrial complexes are underway in Yanbu and Jubail. The town of

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(27) al-Jazirah, No. 2880, 18 June, 1980.

(28) Ibrahim, op.cit., p. 105. For information on the tremendous expansion of the construction industry in Saudi Arabia see, ARAMCO, A directory of Construction Contractors in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Dhahran: The Local Industrial Development Department, ARAMCO, 1980); ARAMCO, The Central Region Construction Industry (Dhahran: The Local Industrial Development Department, ARAMCO, 1978); ARAMCO, The Saudi Arabian Market for Bulk Construction Materials (Dhahran: The Local Industrial Development Department, 1979).

Jubail will grow with industrial development. It is planned that 100,000 housing units be constructed to accomodate this growth.

Reflecting the role of religion in rationalizing change, the primary objective stated in the current five year plan is the "preservation of religious values and traditions." This objective is followed by "improving welfare and standard of living of Saudis, the preservation of national security, and economic stability."[29] While material and economic development was obtained, the process of change has led to far reaching consequences which: (1) eroded traditional values, and (2) threatened the regime's patrimonial character.

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(29) The above objectives are pursued by a strategy which calls for: (1) accelerating the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product, (2) manpower development, and (3) diversification of sources of income to reduce the economy's dependence on oil by increasing the contribution of the non-oil domestic production. The development policy is based on the principles of: (1) free enterprise and trade, (2) a balanced budget, and (3) building an emergency reserve of foreign exchange sufficient for maintaining the country's imports for 2 years. To implement these principles, government expenditures flow in three directions: (1) to finance physical and social infra-structures, (2) extend financial assistance to private enterprises and private consumers, and (3) build the country's holding of foreign exchange and assets. For information on government economic objectives see, Ministry of Information, Outline of the Second Five Year Plan (Riyadh: Ministry of Information, 1980), and A.M. Sharshar, "Oil, Religion, and Mercantilism: a Case Study of Saudi Arabia's Economic System", Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. XII, No. 3 (Fall, 1977).
It must be noted that oil is the major contributor to government revenues. This sector contributed 60 percent of the gross domestic product and 90 percent of government revenues in 1972. Information on Saudi economic development is derived from an interview with Dr. William Hostetler, ARAMCO, Local Industrial Development Department, Dhahran, February 20, 1980.

Erosion of Traditional Culture

Saudi Arabia had no colonial experience and most of its population remained insulated from external cultural influences intil the 1940s. The fact that Ibn Saud had to battle the ulama in the 1930s to introduce a secular educational system, the automobile, the radio and the telephone demonstrates the extent of cultural insularity. External cultural influences, however, penetrated Saudi society in two major forms: expatriates, and consumerism.[30] The tremendous increase in the number of foreigners visiting/working in the country, and the number of Saudis travelling abroad have eroded traditional culture. In 1979 alone, approximately 2.5 million worked in or visited the kingdom. This number equals about half of the total native Saudi population.[31] As many as 900,000 Saudis travelled abroad in the same year. That is nearly one fifth of the total population. To illustrate the impact of travelling abroad on traditional culture we can note that about 15 percent of those travelling abroad in 1979 were females. The percentage of females travelling abroad would be of little significance had it not been for the fact that Saudi women cannot

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[30] Imports rose from over $3 billion in 1974 to $ 17 billion in 1978-79.

[31] Ibrahim, op.cit., p. 107.

mingle with men and are mostly confined to their homes. These rules, however, are not observed abroad.[32]

To appreciate the impact of foreign labour on Saudi society, we can note that migrant labour accounted for 43 percent of the total working force in the mid-1970s.[33] As table X shows, in some sectors migrant labour share of employment is even higher: more than 50 percent in manufacturing, electricity, construction, trade and finance. The largest sector hiring expatriates is that of construction, employing about 240,000 in 1975, 85 percent of whom are expatriates.[34]

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[32] For information on the role and status of Saudi women see, Catherine Parssinen, "The Changing Role of Women", in William Beling, ed., King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), and Fatina Shaker, The Status of Women in Islam and their Changing Role in Saudi Arabia (an unpublished M.A. thesis, Texas Woman's University, 1966). This thesis found a great gap between Quranic verses on women's position and role in society and actual behaviour in Saudi Arabia.

[33] In some Gulf states, e.g. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, expatriates outnumber the native population. See, MERIP Reports, "Labor Migration in the Middle East", No. 59 (1977), and Ibrahim, op.cit.,

[34] Table X also shows that of the total Saudi manpower, 52 percent are engaged in agriculture and related activities. Despite the preponderance of agricultural employment among Saudis, however, this sector's contribution to the country GNP is no more than 5 percent. In other words, 52 percent of the local working force is engaged in activities covering less than 1 percent of the country's territory--99 percent of Saudi territory is barren--and contributing less than 5 percent of its GNP.

Another important feature demonstrated by this table is that the oil and mining sector, which generates more than 90 percent of government revenues, employs only 27,000 workers compared to the agriculture sector's 586,000. In relative terms, oil employs 1.5 of local manpower, compared with 52 percent in agriculture. This disequilibrium, however, could be expalined by : (1) oil industry is not labour intensive, and (2) most of the refining of crude oil and the related petrochemical industries are located outside the country. Most of Arab migrant workers are Yemenis (45%), Jordanian-Palestinians (23%), Egyptians (12%).

The high percentage of expatriates implies the introduction of alien culture into society. Many Wahhabi prohibitions are not observed by members of this group. Consequently, Ministry of Interior "instructions" are issued regularly reminding foreigners to observe and abide by Saudi culture.

A reflection of the scope of change in Saudi society is the astronomical increase in crime, divorce, alcoholism and other indicators of social problems. Between 1971 and 1975, the administrative manpower of Saudi prisons more than doubled. It increased from a total of 2,255 policemen and civilians to 5,541, a 146 percent increase in five years. Between 1975-79, the number of crimes officially reported increased by 169 percent. Leading the increase in murder related to honour and vendetta, 94 percent; economic and financial crimes 154 percent; and fraud 318 percent. Alcohol and drug offenses as well as "other crimes" witnessed even greater increase--1,400 percent by 1979. Reported "moral crimes", i.e. sexual, increased 150.5 percent during the same period.[35]

Following the worsening of relations between Egypt and Libya in 1975, the number of Egyptians increased tremendously making them rank second to the Yemenis. In addition, Pakistanis and Indians constitute 4% of non-Saudi work force, other Asians 1%, Europeans and American 2%, Africans 1.3%, Iranians 0.1%, and Turks 0.1%. See J. Birks and C. Sinclair, International Migration and Development in the Arab Region (Geneva: ILO, 1980), pp. 159-160.

(35) Indicators of social problems were derived from: Ministry of Interior, Statistical Yearbook, 1979 (Riyadh: Ministry of Interior, 1980), interview with Dr. Haydar Ibrahim, Department of Sociology, Islamic University of Imam Ibn Saud, Riyadh, May 24, 1980, and Ibrahim, op.cit.,

TABLE X

Employment by Economic Sector and Nationality 1975

Sector	Saudi Arabian		Non-National		Total	Saudi Arabians' share of all employment %
	No.	%	No	%		
Agriculture and fishing	530,700	51 7	54,900	7 1	585,600	90.6
Mining and petroleum	15,400	1 5	11 600	1.5	27,000	57 0
Manufacturing	21,550	2.1	94,350	12.2	115,900	18.6
Electricity, gas,& water	7,200	0 7	13,150	1.7	20,350	35 4
Construction	35,900	3 5	203,400	26.3	239,300	15.0
Wholesale & retail trade	30,600	5 9	131,500	17 0	192,100	31.5
Transport, storage,and communication	72,900	7 1	30,950	4.0	103,850	70.2
Finance and insurance	5,150	0 5	6,950	0 9	12,100	42.6
Community & personal services	277,100	27.0	226,600	29 3	503,700	55.0
TOTAL	1,026,500	100 0	773,400	100 0	1,799,900	57.0

Source: Saudi Arabia, Population Census 1974, Volumes I-XIV, Dammam: Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Central Department of Statistics -- and cited in J Birks and C Sinclair, International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Geneva: ILO, 1980, pp. 159-160
Cited in Ibrahim, op.cit., p. 96

Although most of the convicted are Saudis, foreigners account
for more than 40 percent of the crimes, 45 percent of which are finan-
cial and fraud cases. Another indicator of the erosion of traditional
values is the growing discrepancy between publicly sanctioned mores
and privately practiced behaviour. For years, Al Saud and the ulama
advocated the enforcement of Wahhabi prohibition of drinking, movies,
gambling, and general moral laxity. Members of the royal family and
a number of affluent Saudis, however, freely indulged in such behaviour
in the privacy of their palaces or while travelling abroad.[36] In recent
years, the same moral discrepancy has spread rapidly within the growing
middle class. While public theatres are still prohibited by law,
private cinema and video clubs are common; while Wahhabism prohibits
cigarette smoking, tobacco is subject to government taxation; while
photography is prohibited by Wahhabi teachings, photography stores are
widespread.

SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO CHANGE

Because of Al Saud's reformist policy of advocating material
change while retaining Wahhabism, the reaction to government-initiated
change manifested itself through two groups: the secularists and the
fundamentalists. Whether secularists or fundamentalists, both
advocated a distinct program which called for the abolition of
monarchical rule.

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(36) For information on the discrepancy between Wahhabi principles and the
social conduct of Fahd see, David Holden and Richard Johns, The House
of Saud (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), p. 386.

Secular Opposition

Labour

The first political challenge which confronted Al Saud's rule following the unification of the Kingdom in 1932 came from ARAMCO workers striking in 1953 and 1956. The significance of the two strikes must be viewed in the light of government regulations concerning labour, especially "The Labour and Workmen Regulations Act" of October 10, 1947. This act included sixty articles which regulated labour activities. Its most important provision is prohibition of the creation of labour unions, labour assemblies and introduction of the work permit.[37]

The early signs of labour protest surfaced in the summer of 1953 when a workers' committee was organized in Dhahran. The Committee claimed to represent 6,500 ARAMCO workers. Their demands were increased social services and higher wages.[38] Committee members requested the right to form a union from Crown Prince Saud in 1953. Their petition was rejected. Workers' spokesmen were jailed, and a royal commission was established to investigate the reasons behind the workers' request to form a union.

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[37] For description of the law see, George Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East (New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 258.

[38] For discussion of the socio-psychological causes of the strike see, Michael Cheney, Big Oil Man from Arabia (New York: Ballantine Books, 1958). pp. 215-225.

The imprisonment of the leadership of the workers transformed the initial request to unionize into labour protest with a specific cause and a ready-made set of martyrs. The arrest precipitated the strike of 13,000 ARAMCO employees in Dhahran, Abqaiq, and Ras Tanura, all vital oil areas. To counter the strike, armed troops were sent to the Eastern Province, and Crown Prince Saud ordered the strikers to return to work under the penalty of dismissal. Continued defiance by the workers of the return to work order precipitated more arrests. In the end, workers complied and returned to work.

What did ARAMCO workers gain? What was the significance of the strike? Although no formal concessions were made, the strike, which was the first in the Kingdom's history, had two implications: (1) ARAMCO introduced immediate socio-economic reforms--a housing program for workers; an increase in the minimum daily wages; improvement of promotion policies, restoration of food and clothing subsidies; construction of the first school for the workers' children; shortening of the work week; and a Communication Committee was established to act as channel between workers and management.[39] (2) Due to the imprisonment of its leaders, the strike was transformed from a purely industrial dispute into a challenge to the established political order.

While the 1953 strike was motivated primarily by economic factors, the 1956 ARAMCO strike was caused by the increasing sense of Arab nationalism. It occurred during King Saud's visit to Dhahran on June

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(39) Ibid.,

9, 1956. The protesters made no economic demands, nor did they express any overt criticism of the government. Rather, they "displayed nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiment."[40] The Saudi government reaction was immediate and repressive. Strike leaders were imprisoned, and an ultimatum was issued demanding immediate return to work. The Labour and Workmen Regulations of 1947 were supplemented on June 11, 1956 by a royal decree outlawing strikes under the penalty of imprisonment.

With the arrest of labour leaders in 1956, the imposition of restriction on labour assemblies, and since the majority of the work force is expatriate, labour activism has subsided.

Liberals in the Royal Family

The liberal faction was headed by Prince Talal, King Saud's younger brother, and included in its membership four junior princes. They proposed a draft constitution and the formation of legislative assembly in 1962. In his capacity as Prime Minister, Faisal rejected this demand. Consequently, his rejection seemed to create the conditions for a temporary alliance between King Saud and Talal. With the resignation of Faisal, Saud immediately formed a new Council of Ministers naming himself Prime Minister and assigning the ministerial posts of finance and national economy to Prince Talal, and the newly-created ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources to Abd Allah al-Tariki, an Arab nationalist. King Saud's ploy of manipulating the liberal

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(40) Lenczowski, op.cit., p. 272.

faction soon became apparent as he found himself at odds with their demands to establish an elected national council to draft a constitution. The conflict between Saud and Talal was further intensified as Talal began publicly to criticize Saud's rule, an act which led to his dismissal from the Council of Ministers. Talal relinquished his royal title and sought refuge in Cairo in 1962, where he formed a committee for "the liberation of Saudi Arabia." This committee was extremely weak and did not pose any serious threat to the regime's survival. It lacked both mass support and elaborate ideology. With the decline of Nasserism in the late 1960s, and Faisal's introduction of reform, Talal returned to the kingdom. He regained his royal status, and presently is engaged in business.

Military Support of the Established Order

The Saudi military has been an important factor of support for the royal family. To understand its role, it is necessary to inquire into the relationship between the military and society. The internal organization and external environment are both important because, on the one hand, organizations such as the military have a momentum of their own and, on the other, they exist in and respond to the society at large. Although the Saudi military organization has a life of its own it reflects the economic, political and social activities in the society.

In contrast to the majority of Arab armies, Saudi military establishment has not traditionally played any significant role in politics. Following the brief Saudi-Yemeni confrontation in 1934, when Ibn Saud annexed Najran, the Saudi army was reduced to a minimum.

In 1948, Ibn Saud allowed the United States to use military base facilities at Dhahran, where ARAMCO is located, in return for American training of the nascent Saudi air force. In 1951, the United States Training Mission was established, replacing an earlier British training mission.[41]

The desire of Al Saud to modernize the military and control its activities is greatly influenced by two considerations: (1) the royal family is acutely aware that military establishments in the Arab world have acted as a destabilizing force; (2) to protect the country's vast oil resources, it is necessary to organize and train an effective, modern military establishment.[42] The need for a modern military establishment was first realized during the 1962-1970 Yemen War, and second as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The Yemen war demonstrated the impotency of the Saudi military in confronting the Egyptian-sponsored Republican army; the 1967 War impressed upon Al Saud that Saudi participation in any subsequent Arab-Israeli confrontation would be a necessity for both domestic and Arab considerations. In addition, the 1968 British withdrawal from the Arabian Gulf created a power vacuum which the Saudis realized the need and urgency to fill.

Consequently, the Saudi political élite embarked on expanding and modernizing the military. The current strength of the armed

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(41) The base rights were cancelled in 1962 as a result of Arab pressures on Saudi Arabia and the rise of Arab nationalist among Saudis.

(42) John A. Shaw and David E. Long, Saudi Arabian Modernization (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1982), pp. 66-67.

forces is 53,000 of whom 34,500 are in the army, 17,000 in the air force, and 1,500 in the navy.[43] Actual defence expenditures quadrupled between 1973 and 1974, from $ 1,438 million to $ 6,771 million, representing a per capita expenditure of $ 1,692 /‾on the basis of a population estimate of 4 million_7. There is no indication of expenditure reduction in the 1980s. If the 1980-82 purchase orders are any indication, expenditure on the military may even rise. In 1980, for example, Saudi Arabia signed a $ 3.5 billion contract with France for the purchase of warships, supplyships, coastal defence equipment and helicopters for naval warfare.[44]

While the Saudi military is generally supportive of Al Saud, a number of attempted coups have taken place. In 1945, Abd Allah al-Mandeli, an airforce pilot, attempted to bomb Ibn Saud's encampment at Mount Arafat. He missed the target, was arrested and executed. A number of air force pilots were also arrested on suspicion of conspiracy to assassinate King Saud following the July 14, 1958 Iraqi revolution. In 1962, six officers were jailed for communicating with the Liberal Princes faction in Cairo; in 1969, an attempted coup was uncovered, and one hundred military personnel were arrested[45]; and in 1977, a number of army officers were court-martialled for their role in an attempted coup.[46]

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(43) Ibid.,

(44) The Gazette, October 15, 1980.

(45) Information on opposition within the military is derived from Saut al-Tali'a, Vol. II, No. 6 (June 1974), and Saut al-Tali'ah, Political Opposition in Saudi Arabia (San Francisco, n.p., 1980).

(46) Afro-Asian Affairs, November 9, 1977.

To avoid the potential threat of the military, Al Saud have adopted a two-fold policy. First, the National Guard is separated from the armed forces and is under the command of Crown-Prince Abd Allah, a brother of King Fahd. The Guard acts as a counterforce to the regular armed forces. It is a paramilitary force composed of 20,000 regulars and irregulars, with a sophisticated light and heavy arsenal. A key feature of the Guard is its tribal structure. All Guard recruits are of tribal background, and battalions are structured on a tribal basis. In addition to its role in countering the armed forces, the National Guard has an internal security function, especially in oil-producing areas. It acts as an internal security deterrent against any potential uprising.

The second policy adopted by Al Saud to neutralize the potential threat of the military is through financial rewards. Saudi enlisted personnel receive financial incentives to join the military. Enlisted men are given land and financial assistance to construct a house; officers are granted additional land and interest free loans for investment purposes. Moreover, military personnel pay rates were doubled in 1981--a lieutenant up to $2,445 a month, and a general up to $6,420.

The Saudi military is a newly created organization that has no tradition of its own, nor can it claim national liberation victories. It was Ibn Saud who mobilized the bedouins and led them to victory. In addition to its recent creation, the military is not politicized. It is closely identified with Al Saud, and the government policy of cooptation makes it an obvious beneficiary of the regime. Although

there were a number of reported attempted coups, these were isolated incidents. The military is supportive of Al Saud and it is unlikely to pose any threat to the regime's stability.

The Intellectuals

The prominence of intellectuals in the politics of developing areas may be attributed to their role in articulating nationalist sentiment and the impregnation of their countrymen with a sense of direction and purpose. "They created the political life of the underdeveloped countries; they have been its instigators, its leaders, and its executants."[47] This group includes "all persons with an advanced modern education and the intellectual concerns and skills ordinarily associated with it."[48] It is highly politicized and plays a vital role in shaping national politics.

Since Saudi Arabia was not subjected to any form of colonialism, and because of the recent character of the educational system, Saudi intellectuals have played little role in national politics. Although a number of underground opposition movements exist, they are rudimentary and weak. Most of their members are students in foreign countries, many of whom sever ties upon returning to the kingdom. This may be attributed to the political system's ability to integrate and satisfy the material needs of this group, and the effectiveness of Saudi internal security

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(47) Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States". in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971), p. 250.

(48) Ibid., p. 251.

forces.

In 1956, a number of Saudi communists and former members of the Workers' Committee established the National Reform Front (NRF). Two years later, the communist element within the NRF seceded and created their own National Liberation Front (NLF). Its objective was to introduce:

> Far reaching change in all aspects of Saudi
> Arabian life. We are for a state system
> that would speak for the people's interests
> and pursue a policy against imperialism,
> Zionism, and reaction. We demand a democratic
> constitution ensuring basic rights, including
> the right to set up political parties, trade
> unions and other mass public organizations,
> the right to strike, hold demonstrations,
> meetings, etc....We demand the dismantling
> of all foreign bases in our country and the
> abrogation of the shackling military agreements
> forces on it. The Front also wants revision of
> existing concession contracts with foreign oil
> monopolies to provide for the principle of broad
> state participation in the entire process from
> prospecting to marketing...The nation is in
> urgent need of a public sector of the economy.
> The Front stands for extensive political relations
> and close economic and cultural cooperation with
> the Soviet Union and all countries of the socialist
> community.[49]

In late 1975, the National Liberation Front changed its name to the Saudi Arabian Communist Party. It has a small membership, not exceeding 30, and is ineffective. Another opposition group which was active in the 1960s and is no longer operative is the Union of People of the Arabian Peninsula, a Nasserist organization led by Naser Sa'id.

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[49] Cited in Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand, a Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (London: Ithaca Press, 1978), p. 104.

The UPAP activities manifested itself through the issuance of statements condemning Saudi rule. [50]

A more active and better organized opposition group is the Saudi branch of the Baath Party. It was created in 1958, and became in 1963 the largest opposition group. Following the split between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath in the mid-1960s, many members left the organization altogether, while others followed the Iraqi line. The pro-Iraqi faction is most active among Saudi students in the United States. In addition to Saut al-Tali'a, a regular journal since 1978, this group publishes pamphlets and studies critical of Al Saud. A review of the literature shows the group's inability to present a cohesive ideology. In the pamphlets, and in an interview with three Tali'a members in the United States, there is no evidence of an ideological program. [51]

A more radical Saudi opposition group is the Popular Democratic Party which was created in 1970, and includes in its membership Marxists and Arab nationalists. The PDP advocates Marxist economic policy, and armed struggle to "liberate" not only the Arabian Peninsula

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(50) MERIP Reports, No. 91 (October, 1980).

(51) Among the literature we can note, Pillars of the Saudi Monarchy; Saudi Justice, the Execution of a Princes. Political Opposition in Saudi Arabia; The Neo-Ikhwan Seize the Grand Mosque in Mecca 'Saudi Arabia'. Interview with three Tali'a members in Houston, Texas, November 7, 1981. For this group's interpretation of Saudi politics see, Hassan Ali al-Yami, The Impact of Modernization on the Stability of the Saudi Monarchy (an unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1977). Al Yami is one of the Tali'a leaders. He is presently residing in the United States. In an interview with him on November 8, 1981 in Houston, Texas, he acknowledged his group's ineffectiveness and attributed it to "widespread illiteracy and the regime's cooptation policy."

but the whole of the Arab world. In 1971, the Popular Struggle Front

split from the Popular Democratic Party. It publishes al-Nidal, and

its activity is limited to this publication.[52]

All the above organizations are weak and their political role

is insignificant. Most of their members are students in the United

States or Arab countries, but some withdraw once they return to the

Kingdom. Despite ideological differences among these organizations,

they advocate the abolition of monarchical rule and the introduction

of some variation of a socialist order. The views of these groups

is best expressed by a statement issued by the Saudi Council for

Solidarity and Peace. In September 26, 1977, Tariq al-Sha'b, the

Council's newspaper, presented a number of points condemning Saudi rule:

> Fahd failed to implement the promise, made following
> King Faisal's assassination in 1975, to establish
> a consultative assembly; government liberalization
> policy is symbolic; some political prisoners were
> released following Faisal's assassination, but a
> campaign of arrests and political liquidation of
> opponents was initiated in 1977. We demand the
> promulgation of a constitution, the creation of
> political parties, trade union, and social and
> cultural organizations. We also demand the nation-
> alization of Saudi oil...[53]

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(52) MERIP, op.cit.,

(53) Tariq al-Sha'b, September 26, 1977. See also, Saut al-Tali'a,
Political Opposition in Saudi Arabia (San Francisco, n.p., April 1980).

Religious Opposition

While religion legitimates Al Saud's rule, religious opposition began to emerge in recent years demanding the overthrow of Saudi rule and the creation of a "genuinely Islamic republic". Two groups are of importance: the Organization of the Islamic Revolution, and the neo-Ikhwan. The Organization of the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula was founded in the late 1970s, and derives financial support from Iran. Its membership is confined to Shi'i Saudis. It follows Khomeni's vision of Islamic rule. In The World of People, a pamphlet distributed by members of the organization during the pilgrimage season of 1981 in Mecca, the organization outlined its objectives:

In the name of Allah:

As the time when the Muslim ummah is turning to real
Islam as the only hope for progress, freedom and
complete independence, the ummah faces a dangerous
enemy represented by ruling regimes of the so-called
Islamic states. The Saudi family is one of these regimes...
Their regime is the most dangerous enemy of Islam because
they use the cover of religion to legitimate their
otherwise unIslamic rule..Ask yourselves: does Islam
allow a royal family to have luxurious palaces and share
in commercial firms?

We demand: (1) an immediate end to the wave of indiscriminate
arrests in Qatif and Ahsa /‾both are Shi'i regions_7, and the
release of all political prisoners--especially those arrested
in the Eastern province while practising religious rites of
Ashoora. (2) we deplore the dictatorship of Al Saud and
demand that an Islamic constitution be introduced to secure
democracy and progress for people. (3) our Muslim people in
the Arabian Peninsula are one poeple, regardless of sect,
condemning the regime's sectarian policy of inciting Sunnis
against Shi'is. (4) we demand a cut-down in the rate of oil
production. (5) we demand social justice to end mass poverty.
(6) we demand the abolition of all treaties signed with the
United States.[54]

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(54) Organization of the Islamic Revolution, The Word of People (n.d.,n.p.).

Because of this movement's link with Iran and its representation of Shi'i interests in Saudi Arabia, its activities remain rudimentary and its following is limited.

THE NEO-IKHWAN: RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION IN ACTION

On November 20, 1979, the Grand Mosque of Mecca was seized by a group of fundamentalists who denounced the Saudi regime and proclaimed the appearance of a Mahdi /¯redeemer_7. Both then Crown Prince Fahd and Prince Abd Allah, Commander of the National Guard, were out of the country. The Saudi government was ill-prepared to face this type of insurrection. It was not an attack against government offices, army barracks or radio and television stations, where the government could act swiftly to eliminate the attackers. Nor was it a foreign inspired movement to be dismissed as such and be eliminated with ease. It was an Islamic uprising in protest of what its members described as religious and moral laxity and degeneration of Saudi rulers, and advocating the revival of seventh-century Islamic society.

The seizure of the mosque underscored the existence of three deeply rooted problems concerning the relationship between religion and state in the kingdom: (1) How to reconcile sudden and immense wealth, and rapid modernization with adherence to eighteenth century Wahhabism. (2) Religious fundamentalism and royal politics are not always compatible. (3) The royal family is vulnerable to attack from religious fundamentalists as well as from secular elements. A study of the identity of the rebels, their ideology and objectives will demonstrate Al Saud's dilemma in the maintenance of religion as state ideology, while fostering material development.

Background [55]

The organizer, military leader and theoretician of the movement was Juhaiman al-Utaiby, a former member of the National Guard and student of theology at the Mecca Islamic University. The proclaimed Mahdi, Muhammad Ibn Abd Allah al-Qahtani was a former theology student of Shaykh Abd al-Aziz al-Baz, head of the Higher Council of Ifta' and Research. Before joining Shaykh al-Baz religious studies circle in the early 1970s, al-Qahtani worked at Riyadh Shumaysi Central Hospital, was accused of theft, and imprisoned for a brief period. Following his release, he became extremely religious and joined the Islamic University, where he met Juhaiman. In 1979, he married Juhaiman's sister.

The exact number of the insurgents remains unknown. It is estimated, however, to be around 400.[56] From the sixty-three who were publicly executed, it is possible to ascertain that the majority are Saudi Najdis, in their early and mid-thirties. Among the non-

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[55] Information on the insurection was gathered from monitoring Riyadh Radio broadcasts during the seizure, Saudi press, and interviews with two Saudis who claim to have known Juhaiman.

[56] The first reference to the rebels number was made by Saud al-Faisal who noted that "from the information we have so far, the number of men inside the mosque does not exceed 200. They are of various nationalities, and lightly armed." al-Jazirah, November 22, 1979. Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Sabeel, Imam of the Mosque, estimated the number between 300 and 400. al-Bilad, November 24, 1979. Major Muhammad al-Nufai'ey, Ministry of Defence Spokesman, placed their number between 300 and 500. al-Jazirah, November 28, 1979. Prince Nayf, countered this estimate by noting that "from the information we have...their number is 200, or maybe a little more." al-Jazirah, November 28, 1979.

Saudis, there were 10 Egyptians, 6 South Yemenis, 1 North Yemeni,
3 Kuwaitis, 1 Sudanese and 1 Iraqi.[57]

As for the insurgents' social background, little information is
available. Based on the social background of the movement's leaders
and interviews with two imams at the Grand Mosque in Mecca who claim
to have known Juhaiman, it may be noted that some were unemployed,
others worked for shopkeepers or were full time students at Mecca
University.[58]

Financial support and military Training

The insurgents apparently received their financial support from
within the Kingdom. Three sources are suggested. As theology students
and "pious Muslims", they attended public prayers and participated in
discussion groups. They raised funds through the selling of religious
pamphlets and soliciting donations.[59] A second source is suggested by
Saut al-Tali'a. The insurgents received aid from dissidents in the
military, the religious establishment and even members of the royal
family.[60] This assertion remains unsubstantiated. Finally, Holden
and Johns noted that the son of a wealthy Jeddah merchant, Yusuf

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[57] al-Nahar reported that the 10 Egyptians are members in the takfir
wa hijrah group. al-Nahar, January 10, 1980. The sixty-three were
executed in eight Saudi cities on January 9, 1980. For names and
nationality of the sixty-three see, al-Jazirah, January 9, 1980.

[58] Interview with two imams at the Grand Mosque, Mecca, February
10, 1980.

[59] Ibid.,

[60] Holden and Johns, op.cit., p. 521.

Bajunaid, sold a property in Jeddah to cover the cost of the weapons.[61]

Acquiring arms posed no difficulty for the insurgents. Three possible sources helped them obtain weapons: (1) as a tribal society which takes pride in the possession of arms and hunting, most Saudis own weapons. Prior to the insurection, little restriction on the possession or movement of arms existed, and arms trade was a flourishing business in the kingdom. (2) smuggling arms from Syria, Jordan and Iraq facilitated the acquisition of arms.[62] (3) The insurgents attacked a National Guard base near Jeddah and stole light weapons.[63]

Objectives and Ideology

The objectives of the insurgents were clearly stated in the writings of Juhaiman and the lengthy pronouncements made over loudspeakers during the seizure of the mosque. The writings and pronouncements provide the ideological aspect of the movement and enable us ascertain how the insurgents justified the seizure, the

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(61) Holden and Johns, op.cit., p. 521.

(62) In a press conference, Prince Nayf noted that between 1977 and 1979 the following number of arms were confiscated from smugglers:
-7258 handgun with 720575 rounds of ammunition
-1127 rifels with 126489 rounds of ammunition
-1060 hunting rifle with 137120 rounds of ammunition
-363 small hunting weapons and 600 rounds of ammunition
-481 machine guns and 337034 rounds of ammunition
See, al-Jazirah, January 10, 1980.

(63) Saut al-Tali'a, Thawra fi Rihab Makkah (n.p., 1980), pp. 105-123.

timing of the attack, and the choice of Muhammad Ibn Abd Allah al-Qahtani as their Mahdi.

Seven pamphlets are known to have been written by Juhaiman. These pamphlets dealt with theological questions, presented a summary of two works by Ibn Taymiyah, denounced the rule of Al Saud, and condemned state ulama for collaboration with Al Saud. The central feature of the insurgents' ideology is the reconstruction of an Islamic society as it was known in seventh century Arabia. The revival of the society is to be achieved through the Mahdi. Juhaiman quoted a hadith attributed to the Prophet Muhammad which viewed the Muslim history as a degeneration of political authority from Prophethood, the Caliphate, illegitimate kingship, tyranical kingship, and finally a return to the Caliphate. The movement from one period to another is decided by God. The Mahdi will appear at the end of the period of tyranical kingship and govern with justice and compassion.

Juhaiman and his followers did not seize the mosque in the manner of a modern insurectionary movement, but with a fantastic dream of restoring a purified order to "corrupt Arabia." They rationalized their seizure by a hadith which suggests that the Mahdi will appear at the Ka'ba, at the turn of an Islamic century in the period of tyranical kingship.[64] The insurgents believed that once the Mahdi appears all Muslims will pay him allegiance, while the unbelievers'

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(64) The insurection took place as Muslims were celebrating the beginning of the 15th Islamic century. The Mahdi was proclaimed at the Ka'ba.

army will vanish. Again based on hadith which Juhaiman attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and read numerous times during the seizure, "... the earth would open to engulf the army of unbelievers who will come to dislodge the Mahdi."[65]

As for the choice of the Mahdi, the insurgents' claim that Muhammad Ibn Abd Allah al-Qahtani, others claim it al-Quraishi, has met the name requirement and the physical attributes specified by Muhammad the Prophet in his description of the Mahdi. "The Mahdi is from me", the Prophet noted, "he has a wide forehead, a hooked nose, and will fill the earth with justice and equity as it had been filled with injustice and tyranny."[66] Another hadith noted "Even if only one day were to remain to the Day of Judgment, God will lengthen this day until He proclaims a man from my family whose name corresponds with mine, and whose father's name corresponds with mine."[67] It was not surprising, therefore, that Juhaiman adopted Muhammad Ibn Abd Allah al-Qahtani /⁻or Quraishi_7, whose name and physical attributes correspond with those of the Prophet, as the awaited Mahdi.

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(65) It is not the intention of this thesis to ascertain the authenticity of the quoted hadith. What is important is the insurgents' justification of their movement in religious terms.

(66) This hadith is based on the authority of Abi Daoud and Abi Sa'id, and cited in Mu'alafat al-Shaykh al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Vol.3, (Riyadh: Islamic University of Imam Saud, n.d.), p. 241.

(67) On the authority of Abd Allah, cited in Mu'alafat...,op.cit.,p. 242.

The writings of Juhaiman and the action of his followers express
and reflect the confusion and rage that befell many Saudis as a result
of the rapid change that took place after the discovery of oil: "Who
are we?", asks Juhaiman in his pamphlet The Ikhwan:

> They slander us from all quarters and tell lies about
> us...We are Muslims who wanted to learn the Shari'ah
> and quickly realized that it could not be learned in
> government controlled institutions....We have broken
> with the opportunists and bureaucrats....We study the
> authentic Sunnah and tafsir al-hadith without blinded
> commitment to any certain mauhhab....[68]

In an other pamphlet entitled, Rulership, Payment of Allegiance,
Obedience and the Unveiling of the Ruler's deception of Commoners and
Seekers of Knowledge, Juhaiman rejected state-run religion and condemned
the ulama who are "bought up by a corrupt regime with money and promises
of promotion."

Juhaiman's ideology underlines the dilemma confronting Saudi rulers
in maintaining eighteenth century Wahhabism as state ideology while
developing materially. Many of the views presented by Juhaiman
concerning the Mahdi and the evolution of Muslim history are similar

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[68] Da'wat al-Ikhwan, Kayfa Bada'at wa Ila Ayna Tasir (n.p., n.d.).
The following pamphlets are attributed to Juhaiman:

(1) Al Imara wa al-Bayia wa Kashf Talbis al-Hukam ala talabat al
IIm wa al-Awam, in 37 pages.
(2) Da'wat al-Ikhwan, Kayfa Bada'at wa ila Ayn Tasir, in 36 pages.
(3) al-Mizan li-hayat al-Insan, in 27 pages.
(4) Mukhtasar al-Hasana li-Ibn Taymiyah, in 29 pages.
(5) Raf' al-Iltibas An Milat man ja'lahu al-Lah Imam al-Nas, in 20 pages.
(6) Mukhtasar al-Amr bi al-Ma'rouf wa al-Nahi an al-Munkar, in 34 pages.
(7) al-fitan wa akhbar al-mahdi al-dajal, in 30 pages
(8) al-fitra al-salima, in 10 pages.

if not identical to the doctrine of Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.
Prince Nayf described the insurgents as deviants from orthodox Islam
/⁻al-Islam al-sahih_/ and lunatics.[69] Reflecting government's
position, Salim al-Lawzi of al-Hawadith drew a parallel between the
insurgents and the religious fanatics of JonesTown in Guyana.[70]
Denying that the insurgents had any political demands or objectives,
then Crown Prince Fahd told al-Safir that "the insurgents had no
demands or objectives other than the proclaimed Mahdi, and the whole
matter does not exceed an empty dream and empty words."[71] A review
of the writings of Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, however, shows
his acceptance of the ahadith quoted by the insurgents concerning the
evolution of Islamic history, the appearance of a Mahdi and the
vanishing of the invader's army. Shaykh Abd al-Wahhab devoted an
entire chapter in Al-Mu'alafat to the Mahdi and his awaited
appearance.[72] This was and is the King's dilemma--how to adapt
eighteenth century Wahhabism to the realities of the twentieth
century.

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(69) al-Jazirah, November 22, 1979.

(70) al-Hawadith, January 18, 1980.

(71) al-Safir, January 9, 1980.

(72) See Mu'alafat ..., op.cit., pp. 234-245.

Consequences of the Insurection

Faced with the insurrection. King Khalid mobilized the support of state ulama. He convened the Higher Council of Ifta', headed by Shaykh Abd al-Aziz al-Baz, requesting the issuance of fatwa supporting Al Saud and authorizing military intervention in the sacred sanctuary. The ulama complied with the King's demand and noted that there will be a mahdi, but he would appear with clear signs, and in opposition to a corrupt ruler. The Saudi government, they noted, enforces the dictates of the shari'ah, and rebellion against its ruler is treason.[73]

Having secured the ulama's support, Saudi forces managed to dislodge the insurgents on December 3, killing the proclaimed Mahdi in the process and capturing the military leader and theoretician of the movement as well as some 170 individuals, including women and children.[74]

The seizure of the mosque underlined the government's vulnerability to attacks from religious elements. It underscored Al Saud's dilemma in accomodating traditional Wahhabism to present-day realities. To counter the insurgents' accusation that Al Saud had deviated from orthodox Islam, to moderate militant Wahhabism, and to balance the interests of secular and religious elements in the country, Al Saud adopted a two-fold policy: First, state ulama were instructed to

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[73] For the full text of the fatwa see, al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 26, 1979. The fatwa was signed by 30 prominent ulama. See also, Journal of Muslim World League, No. 7 (January, 1980).

[74] Women and children were put under state custody to be "taught" orthodox Islam." See al-Siyassa, December 13, 1979.

emphasize in their Friday sermons the destructive character of the

uprising, the religiosity of Saudi rulers and the fact that Islam

is a religion of moderation /¯al-Islam din wassat_7. In an interview

with Shaykh Thabit Ibn Abd al-Aziz, Imam at the Mustansiriyah Mosque

in Riyadh, the following themes were stressed:

(1) Because of Al Saud, Islam has become victorious /¯Nasar al-Lah
    al-Islam bi Al Saud_7.

(2) Rebellion against rulers is not allowed as long as the ruler
    enforces the shari'ah. Al Saud are Muslim rulers, Guardians of
    the Holy Places, and thanks to them the country has become prosperous.

(3) Islam is the religion of moderation. It rejects fanaticism of all
    sorts.

(4) God gave Saudis oil and its wealth. They should enjoy God's
    reward in moderation.

(5) Those who deprive themselves of enjoying life with moderation
    are sinful.[75]

The same themes were reiterated by other Saudi ulama. In a survey

of the Friday sermon at five mosques in Riyadh two weeks during and two

weeks following the insurection, the religiosity of Al Saud and the

moderate character of Islam were found to be the main themes. Prominent

ulama appeared on television and radio programs emphasizing the compa-

tibility between Islam and material well-being. In his weekly tele-

vision program, Shaykh Ali al-Tentawi ridiculed

> The fanatics who lengthen their beards, refuse
> employment, devote their time to prayers and
> fasting, and pretend to be devout Muslims. This
> is not Islam /¯al-Tentawi_noted_7 This is an
> imitation of priesthood /¯al-raħbanah_7. I
> myself enjoy material comfort, within my means,

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[75] Interview with Shaykh Thabit Ibn Abd al-Aziz, Riyadh, March
5, 1980.

> of course. I am married, work hard, and
> travel abroad. I also pray, fast, read
> the Quran regularly, and live according
> to the principles of the shari'ah. This
> is the sunnah of the prophet--to live
> your day as you will live for ever, and
> live for your tomorrow as if you will die
> today.[76]

To demonstrate its commitment to the enforcement of the shari'ah, the Saudi government reimposed the restrictions on females joining the work force, instructed foreigners to abide by the country's tradition and Islamic values, and closed down some video-stores which were accused of renting or selling films that contradicted Islamic values and morals. To gain ulama support, the government raised their salaries, allocated more funds to build mosques and to propagate Islam at home and abroad.[77] Funds were allocated to construct 241 mosques and for the renovation of 37 others.[78]

The second policy Al Saud adopted following the insurrection and in a clear move to pacify the secularists, a written Basic Law /¯Nizam Asasi_7 and Consultative Assembly were promised. On March

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(76) Riyadh Television, May 19, 1980. Shaykh Ali al-Tentawi is Syrian by origin, went on self-exile to Saudi Arabia in 1963 following the Baath coming to power in Syria.

(77) In an effort to defuse the protest against non-Muslim expatriates in the kingdom, Saudi press published reports showing expatriates respect of Islam. al-Jazirah, for example, noted on December 12, 1979 that Korean workers are highly respectful of Islam. "Some workers were seen stopping work during the call to prayers in reverence to Islam."

(78) al-Yom, April 12, 1980.

18, 1980, King Khalid ordered the creation of a committee to be headed by Prince Nayf, Minister of Interior, to "complete the drafting of the Basic Rules and a blueprint for a Consultative Assembly." The Saudi press was allowed to debate the issue. Consequently, a number of articles appeared outlining the virtues of a written basic law . and consultative assembly, showing that both are inherent in the Islamic political system.[79] Although a Basic Law and a Consultative Assembly were promised in Faisal's Ten Point Reform Program in 1962, they were not implemented. To date, they have not been introduced. Government reluctance to widen political participation may be viewed in terms of the king's dilemma--the widening of political participation will lead to Al Saud's loss of exclusive control; not to widen political participation will increase the emergent group's discontent and may lead to the loss of legitimacy.

CONCLUSION

The process of nation-building which was initiated by Al Saud is reformist in nature; it attempted to satisfy simultaneously the needs of both the religious and secular elements. Consistent with the regime's patrimonial character, Al Saud attempted to balance the interests and activities of both groups, without affecting noticeable change in the political sphere. While female education was introduced, for example, its control remains under the ulama.

Al Saud reasserted Wahhabism as a state ideology while developing

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(79) al-Jazirah, March 22, 1980.

materially. In the words of Ibn Saud to William Eddy, former American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia:

> We Muslims have the one, true faith, but Allah
> gave you the iron which is inanimate, amoral,
> neither prohibited nor mentioned in the Quran.
> We will use your iron, but leave our faith alone.[80]

Can the "iron of the West", however, be introduced without affecting the socio-political aspects of traditional society? The experience of Saudi Arabia has demonstrated that the process of nation-building resulted in two developments which were beyond government control or desire. First, emergent groups began to demand political participation. Although Al Saud developed a complex bureaucracy, expanded the educational system, and initiated some development programs, politics remains the exclusive preserve of the royal family. By monopolizing political activity, and proceeding with nation-building, Al Saud have become prisoners of their own making--nation-building is necessary to survive domestically and externally; the process of nation-building, however, will create groups which demand political participation. To share political authority with emergent groups means the erosion of patrimonial rule; not to share authority, will intensify opposition and lead to the loss of legitimacy. Fortunately for Al Saud, the Saudi working class is small and not politicized, the intellectuals are a recent phenomenon and weak, and the military is supportive of the regime.

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[80] William A. Eddy, "King Ibn Saud: Our Faith and Your Iron", The Middle East Journal, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (Summer, 1963), p. 257.

The second outcome of the process of nation-building is the erosion of traditional culture and relationships. Increased urbanization, literacy, influx of migrant workers, the number of Saudis travelling abroad, all have contributed to the erosion of traditional culture. Eighteenth century Wahhabism seem so antithetical to twentieth century reality that many ulama found themselves incapable of interpreting change or affecting its direction.

The continuous use of Wahhabi ideology without seriously modifying its content to suit reality have contributed to the weakening of the regime's legitimacy. The Mecca insurrection of 1979 was launched by a religious element which accused Al Saud of moral and religious laxity, and advocated the revival of seventh-century Islamic government. Revivalist movements are often created to express their member's dissatisfaction with existing conditions, and their desire for cultural regeneration. They are a "deliberate, organized conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture."[81] Members in these movements perceive their existing culture, or some major areas of it, as unsatisfactory; they attempt to innovate or revitalize a new or old cultural system which they perceive as most appropriate for their condition.

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[81] Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements", American Anthropologist, Vol. LVII, No. 58 (April, 1956), p. 265. For an excellent bibliographic study of these movements see, Weston La Barre, "Materials for a History of Studies of Crisis Cults: A Bibliographic Essay", Current Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 1 (February, 1971); and Johannes Fabian, "The Anthropology of Religious Movements: From Explanation to Interpretation", Social Research, Vol. 46, (1979).

The outcome of Al Saud's nation-building policy, and the inter-action between religion and state in the Kingdom, is a unique developmental experience--a quasicapitalist mode of development in a semitribal traditional society; abundant financial resources and extreme affluence in a society governed by an austere and puritanical ideology; a quasi-secular polity in which the ulama continue to influence national politics. The words of Imam al-Ghazali (1105 AD) may be an appropriate reminder to Al Saud that :

> There is no hope in returning to a traditional faith after it has once been abandoned, since the essential condition in the holder of a traditional faith is that he should not know that he is a traditionalist. Whenever he knows that, the glass of his traditional faith is broken. This is a breaking that cannot be mended, and a separation that cannot be united by any sewing or putting together, except it be melted in the fire and given another new form.[82]

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(82) Cited in Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 31.

CONCLUSION

Traditional Islamic political theory maintains that religion
and state are indivisible. The purpose of government, therefore,
is to preserve the shari'ah and enforce its dictates. God alone is
sovereign and the source of all authority. Consequently, members
of the ummah are God's subjects; the community's laws are divine;
its property belongs to God; its army is God's army; and its opponents
are the enemies of God. With this assumption in mind, we have
examined: (1) the historical and theoretical development of the
relationship between religion and state in Islam; and (2) the relation-
ship between religion and state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The main concern was to search for answers to the ever present
questions of what is an Islamic state? What kind of relationship
exists between the religious and political spheres in that state?

More than any other country in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia
is identified with Islam. In addition to the presence of Mecca and
Medina, the centre of Muslim prayers and pilgrimage, the kingdom's
Islamic character was reconfirmed in 1745 when Shaykh Muhammad Ibn
Abd al-Wahhab allied himself with Al Saud, rulers of Dar'iyah in
central Najd. This alliance continues today. Islam is the state

religion, its source of political legitimacy, it shapes educational and judicial activities, and serves as the moral code of society. The observance of the traditional forms of Islam, as defined by the Wahhabis of eighteenth century Arabia, remains an integral part of life. Business and government offices close for prayers, the mutawi'a make certain that Muslims attend public prayers and observe the moral code of Islam. Because of its fundamentalist ideology, and the fact that the government supports a large number of Muslim organizations, as well as hosting more than 2,000,000 annual pilgrims in Mecca and Medina, the Kingdom is viewed by Muslims as fundamentalist.

It has been noted by Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab that because of their knowledge of Islamic laws, ulama advice and cooperation with the political authority is imperative. The ruler is responsible for the enforcement of religious obligations which are expected of Muslims--the fast, the pilgrimage, the application of hudud /¯punishments/, the collection of zakat, and commanding the good and forbidding evil. The ulama are to advise their ruler and support him as long as he applies the word of God.

The relationship between Al Saud and the religious leaders in eighteenth century Arabia was harmonious and corresponded closely to traditional Islamic political theory and to the principles outlined by Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This harmonious relationship is

surprising for the study of the interaction between religion and
state in Muslim history has demonstrated persistent conflict. The
harmony in the first Saudi state may be attributed to the fact that
both spheres shared a complementarity of objectives. The existence
of the first was dependent on the survival and continued support of
·the second. This alliance provided Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab with
a political arm for his teachings and assured Al Saud sanction from
a recognized theologian as well as a body of converts capable of
expanding his political authority and control of the Peninsula. Territorial
expansion was justified in religious terms. More importantly, Wahhabi
ideology served as a basis for the consolidation of Saudi rule. Obedience
to ruler was stressed as a religious duty. Since the ruler's function
is to preserve and enforce the dictates of the shari'ah, rebellion
against him was viewed as treason.

The findings of this study support the hypothesis that the
state, because of its monopoly of force and resources, and the need
to maintain autonomy, can not tolerate an autonomous religious domain
that would compete with it for loyalty. The state will extend
its authority to the religious domain and utilize religious leaders
and institutions to perpetuate its policies. This state will make
use of religious values to strengthen its authority and legitimacy.
It will not hesitate to suppress religious institutions if they
challenge its authority

By maintaining the traditional alliance between his family
and Al Shaykh, Ibn Saud projected his rule as a continuation of
the first Saudi state. Ibn Saud identified the expansion of his
rule with the expansion of Wahhabism. While the ulama were generally
supportive of his rule, aspiring to keep the ruler united to them by
common ideology, Ibn Saud's objective and policy shattered their hope.
While he needed Wahhabism to legitimate his authority, innovation was
also needed if the rule of Al Saud was to survive. Consequently, religion
continued to be state ideology, the ulama were incorporated in state
administration, and material development was introduced.

As Ibn Saud's experience with the Ikhwan demonstrated, the political
sphere did not hesitate to suppress religious institutions when they
challenged state authority. The Ikhwan demanded of their leader to
comply with the principles of Wahhabism. Their rebellion and its defeat
in 1929 demonstrated the political sphere's determination to preserve its
interests and, indeed, survival.

Following the Ikhwan's defeat and incorporation of the ulama in
state administration, religion continued to constitute an important
source of legitimacy. In their attempt to enhance governmental performance
as a means to complement the patrimonial base of the regime, and to
control and direct the process of change which was precipitated by the
discovery of oil, Al Saud established modern administrative institutions
and initiated a nation-building program which included increased urbanization,
literacy, social services and a higher standard of living.

The process of nation-building led to two changes which affected the relationship between religion and state. First, it increased role differentiation between the religious and political spheres, and routinized state control of a broad range of areas that were formerly controlled by religion. The outcome of this change was a relative secularization of the polity.[1] Second, the initiation of nation-building policies resulted in events which were beyond government control and affected the regime's patrimonial character.

Because of the religious heritage of the Saudi state, and Al Saud's two-pronged policy of invoking religious legitimation of rule and justification of change while not allowing the religious establishment any measure of autonomy, secularization manifested itself through polity-expansion. State jurisdiction regulates societal areas that were formerly controlled by the religious sphere, and the ulama have become state administrators whose dogma and activities are supportive of the political leadership.

The initiation of nation-building policies led to outcomes which were beyond government desire. First, it produced new groups which challenged the regime's patrimonial character, and second, it eroded

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[1]Secularization may be defined here as: (1) the separation of the polity from religious ideologies and ecclesiastical structures; (2) the expansion of the polity to perform regulatory functions in the socio-economic sphere which were formerly performed by religious structures; (3) the transvaluation of the political structure to emphasize non-transcendent temporal goals and rational pragmatic means, that is secular political values; and (4) the dominance of the polity over religious beliefs, practices, and ecclesiastical structures. See, Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 85.

traditional culture. Nation-building strategies are guided and influenced by the country's historical and cultural experience as well as the interplay between reality and the aspiration of leadership. Al Saud adopted a reformist strategy which sought to maintain a viable socio-economic order based on Wahhabism though flexible enough to adapt to changing conditions. Subsequently, while change was introduced to accomodate emergent needs, Wahhabism was invoked to rationalize change. Al Saud's reformist strategy created tensions in society which threatened the regime's survival. There were those who advocated rapid change; and the fundamentalists who demanded the preservation of the traditional order and ideology. Within each groups, further tensions existed between supporters of Al Saud and those who advocated their ouster.

Supporters of Al Saud are mainly the secular-educated young Saudis, many of whom look to some of the younger and more liberal members of the royal family for guidance and support. This group advocates material change while retaining traditional values. They see no contradiction between Islam and material change. The size of this group is continuously increasing and it plays an important role in shaping present Saudi politics. In contrast, a more radical younger generation of Saudis have emerged in recent years demanding the abolition of monarchical rule and the creation of a socialist order. This faction lacks leadership and a sense of direction. In addition, due to the recent emergence of Saudi intellectuals and because of their small size and government cooptation policy, this group does not pose an immediate threat to the survival of Al Saud.

A more immediate and serious threat to regime stability is
the fundamentalist faction. This faction includes state ulama and
those fundamentalists who oppose both state ulama and Al Saud. Although
the ulama benefit from Al Saud and support their rule, they attempt to
control the public acceptance of innovations. They consider the
expansion of secular education as threatening to the Islamic character
of the state. They aspire to preserve and enforce Wahhabi principles.
In contrast, a more radical fundamentalist faction exist. It rejects
all change and oppose Al Saud's rule. The most radical manifestation
of this group's rejection of change as well as the authority of Al Saud
is their seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979. Their insurection was
defeated, but the dilemma confronting Al Saud remains unsolved--how to
reconcile sudden and immense wealth, rapid modernization and adherence
to Wahhabi principles. Excluding external factors, the survival of
the royal family depends on its ability to convert tensions into balances,
and maintain control over the religious and secular elements while at the
same time modernizing the country to meet future challenges.

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- التعليم
- الشرق الاوسط
- الاداره
- المجتمع
- الدعوه
- مجلة النفط
- اليمامه

٤ ــ الكتب

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