Political Demography of Ethno-nationalist Violence

by

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Abstract

This dissertation makes a probabilistic case for the explanatory and predictive power of the three basic demographic variables -- fertility, mortality, and migration – in the study of ethno-nationalist violence. It emancipates ethno-nationalist violence as an explanans distinct from ethnic conflict and political violence. The study of ethnic conflict is devoted to the broader phenomenon of mobilizing latent ethnic identities for political purposes. The study of political violence is devoted to aggressive acts meant to modify the behaviour of others in a bargaining situation with consequences for the society in which they live. The study of ethno-nationalist violence focuses more specifically on recurring acts of physical aggression directed against an identifiable ethnic group perpetrated by members of a group whose identity has already been mobilized politically according to nationalist ideals. In other words, it seeks to understand when and why an ethno-national group might resort to violence or become the victim of violent acts. In order to qualify as ethno-national, (i) a body of citizens bound by shared memories and a common culture (ii) must have been present in a country at the time it was founded. As such, ethno-nationalist violence is a *fait social* in its own right deserving of an explanation proper.

Yet, the present slate of explananda fares poorly. Supply-side explanations attribute ethno-nationalist violence to grievance. Cultural-distance explanations attribute ethno-nationalist violence to the differentiating effect of ties that bind. Yet, every example of ethno-national violence explicable either in terms of grievance or cultural distance can be countered by examples with

comparable grievances and/or cultural equidistance but no violence. Moreover, grievances and cultural distance are relatively constant. Episodes of ethnonationalist violence, by contrast, come and go.

This investigation posits demographics as having explanatory and possibly predictive value independent of grievance or cultural distance. That is not to say that elites, policies, political discourse, institutions, and the machinery and design of the state do not matter in mitigating or exacerbating the ethnonationalist violence and its demographic dimensions. To the contrary, from the inquiry emerges a close link between demographic factors and politics. Far from making a deterministic claim about a putative micro-causal relationship between demographic developments and ethno-nationalist violence, the findings imply that political decisions and a state's actions have a direct impact on demographic trends which affect the probability of ethno-nationalist violence in turn. At the same time, the findings warily dispel the stake placed by liberal democrats in institutional engineering as overly optimistic.

The investigation's case is built on youth, asymmetries in age structure, and on migration's potential to mitigate or exacerbate differential demographic trends. It tests the hypotheses that emerge using eight case studies: Northern Ireland, Israel, Estonia, Transylvania, the Xinjiang-Uighur and Tibet autonomous regions in China, Mauritius, and Fiji. Whereas the cases provide strong empirical support for political demography's potential as an explanatory approach and relevant predictor of ethno-nationalist violence beyond grievance and cultural distance, the findings face methodological constraints. These limitations are

surmountable. The current state of affairs, however, thwarts their resolution.

Methodological limitations notwithstanding, the patterns that emerge validate the

non-reducible value of demography in theorizing ethno-nationalist violence.

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It is perhaps inevitable that the more ambitious the task,
the more inadequate will be the performance.
On a subject as comprehensive as that of this book,
the task of making it as good as one is capable of
is never completed while one's faculties last. [...]
I will merely claim that I have worked on the book
until I did not know how I could adequately present
the chief argument in briefer form.
(Friedrich von Hayek 1960)

Introduction

Ethno-nationalist violence has emerged as a formidable source of political

instability in the post-Cold War era. Its consequences are lethal, long-term, far-

reaching – and costly to the international community. Yet, it has proven difficult

to prevent. Principal amongst the problems is a poor understanding of the

phenomenon. Without a clear understanding of the problem, it is difficult to

conceive the influence politics, institutions, the state, elites, and discourse have

over ethno-nationalist violence. The ultimate objective of this investigation is to

explore the role of politics and the state in attenuating ethno-nationalist violence

or in preventing its breaking out in the first place. Prior to this goal is an

improved understanding of ethno-nationalist violence.

Ethno-nationalist violence is all too easily dismissed as irrational. Not only

is that an uninformed appraisal of an intricate phenomenon, but it also fails to

recognize the potential for systematic preventative intervention. Yet, the current

slate of explanations fares no better. Supply-side explanations attribute ethno-

nationalist violence to economic, political or social grievances: One ethno-

nationalist group is being exploited, marginalized or discriminated against by

another ethno-nationalist group. Cultural-distance explanations attribute ethno-

nationalist violence to the differentiating effect of ties that bind people along ethno-nationalist lines: Values, norms, customs, traditions, practices, rituals, myths, language, religion, symbols, and so forth. Both explanations are empirically suspect. Every example of ethno-national violence explicable either in terms of grievance or cultural distance can be countered by examples with comparable grievances and/or cultural equidistance but no violence.

These conventional explanations may work in particular cases, but there are far too many exceptions for a theory of ethno-national violence grounded in grievance or cultural distance to obtain. Still, there appears to be a pattern: Groups that resort to violence tend to be predisposed towards more violence. More often than not, ethno-nationalist violence recurs. But the relative regularity of grievances and cultural distance in a given case contrasts unfavourably with the irregularity of violent intervals. Yet, so obvious, a behavioural pattern invites a social-scientific hypothesis that lends itself to empirical scrutiny.

In light of mounting reservations about the explanatory power of grievance and cultural distance, the investigation probes the non-reducible value of demographic variables as an explanans of ethno-nationalist violence. Concomitantly, it speculates about their predictive value. Hypothetically, violence is improbable unless

(i)   the ethno-nationalist groups quarrelling have young populations,
(ii)   the population of one group is younger than the population of the other group, and
(iii)   neither being is being depleted by co-ethnic emigration or subject to a surge in co-ethnic immigration.

Not every instance of ethno-nationalist violence is rationalizable in demographic terms. Differential development, elites, and policy are just a few of the factors that coalesce in a comprehensive explanation of ethno-nationalist violence in any *particular* instance. The novelty of the thesis, however, is to elevate demographics as a *theoretical* alternative to grievance *and* cultural distance.

The Structure of the Argument

The dissertation is divided into three parts. Part A is devoted to the problem of ethno-nationalist violence, the theoretical problems with grievance or cultural distance, and the hypothetical viability of demographics as a remedy. Part B subjects to empirical scrutiny the core hypotheses on youth and demographic difference and explores the role of migration as an intervening variable. For each case, it contrasts the explanatory power of demographics with that of grievance and cultural distance. Part C emphasizes the contingency of the patterns that emerge pending the availability of a broader set of reliable data and speculates on the findings' political implications.

Part A

The inaugural chapter defends ethno-nationalist violence as an object of inquiry. The first part of the chapter provides empirical evidence regarding the threat of ethno-national violence to domestic political order. It then draws on social psychology and modernization theory to explain why ethnic conflict is likely to endure as the central challenge.

The second chapter makes a case for treating ethno-nationalist violence as an explanadum distinct from ethnic conflict and political violence. It reviews the state of the literature on explanations for ethno-national violence and finds that explanations invoking culture and relative material deprivation do not explain the phenomenon satisfactorily. Explanations premised on political grievance are more viable, but the omnipresence of political grievance compared to the relatively low incidents of violent ethnic conflict suggests that even the presence specific political grievances is insufficient to trigger violence. That raises the question whether the political grievances identified by the literature may require a certain soil in order to flourish.

The third chapter explores demography as a possible soil. It contrasts the literature on ethno-nationalist violence with conventional "demography-is-destiny" arguments: Malthusian apprehensions about the relationship between overpopulation and violence; indiscriminate generalizations about the relationship between youth and violence; and the looming clash of civilizations precipitated by international differentials in a population's size and growth. It then shows that the investigation's alternative focus on dis-aggregated demographic data of size, growth, and inter-group differentials has been explored by isolated studies. Yet, these studies tend to focus either on just one of these variables or they advance more controversial claims about the relationship between these variables and political instability rather than exploring definitively how demographic variables relate to ethnic violence.

The fourth chapter dis-aggregates fertility and mortality in order to identify plausible hypotheses worth testing. The fifth chapter probes the plausible role of migration as an intervening variable in ethno-nationalist violence.

The sixth chapter frames a method for testing these hypotheses and conditions. The design of the research is premised on the contention that a political demography of ethno-nationalist violence does not lend itself to the obvious test of cross-national statistical correlation using multiple regressions. The chapter argues for a comparative approach that draws on evidence from select cases as the best possible alternative.

Part B
The second part of the dissertation has two comparative dimensions. On the one hand, it applies the hypotheses to different cases and compares the results. On the other hand, it compares the merit of the demographic method to that of competing grievance and cultural-distance explanations. It contrasts the demographic dimensions of internecine violence between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland with Jews and Palestinians in Israel-Palestine, the startling dearth of violence between Estonians and Russians in Estonia and Romanians and Hungarians Transylvania, the differences in violence between Han and Muslims in China's Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region relative to Han and Tibetans in China's Tibet Autonomous Region, and lulls in violence between Indians and Creoles in Mauritius with Indians and Melanesians in Fiji. Each of these pairs presents an inquisitive puzzle. Why did ethno-nationalist violence in Northern Ireland begin to subside when it escalated in Israel? Why was there no

ethno-nationalist violence in Estonia and Transylvania? Why has ethno-

nationalist violence become the order of the day in the XUAR but not in the TAR?

Why did the ethno-nationalist violence predicted for Mauritius not occur while it

was unanticipated in Fiji? Part B submits that, in answering these questions,

demographics succeed where grievance and cultural distance fail.

Part C
The dissertation's final section draws some tentative conclusions from the

investigation of ethno-national violence through the lens of political demography.

The trends and patterns that emerge raise many empirical questions that will

have to remain unanswered until cross-national data become available.

Meanwhile, the dissertation does not pretend to have the final word on the

political demography of ethno-nationalist violence. It can only hope to discern

patterns, develop a litmus test for their future verification, and reflect on the

contribution of politics and the state to the promotion and prevention of ethno-

nationalist violence.

Part A: A framework for a political demography of ethno-nationalist violence

The dissertation opens with a section that contextualizes and explains the relevance of the argument that demographic trends are a relevant predictor of ethno-nationalist violence. The first chapter explains why ethno-nationalist violence warrants being investigated as a phenomenon. The second chapter characterizes accounts based on grievance and cultural distance. The third chapter explores the political demography of ethno-nationalist violence as an alternative paradigm in explaining the absence and presence of ethno-nationalist violence. The fourth chapter argues for the plausible relationship between fertility, mortality, and ethno-nationalist violence. The fifth chapter introduces migration as a wild card. The sixth chapter reflects on method.

> We fight, therefore we are.
> (Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, 1977-1982)

Chapter 1: The Persistence of Ethno-nationalist Violence

This chapter seeks to validate ethno-nationalist violence as an object of inquiry. The first part of the chapter cites empirical evidence. Drawing on social psychology and the theory of modernization, the second part of the chapter contends that ethnic challenges to national political order will endure.

1.1. The Prevalence of Ethno-nationalist Violence

The modal form of inter-group conflict since the Second World War has been ethnic (Gurr 1993b). Half of the world's states have been marred by significant ethno-nationalist violence since the Second World War. Policy makers deem ethno-nationalist violence as the most serious threat to peace in the world today (Esman 1995). Ethno-nationalist violence is primarily a domestic affair; consequently, the dissertation focuses on national rather than international determinants.

Ninety per cent of wars and casualties of war during the 1990s, resulted from internal wars. The Clausewitzean type of Westphalian inter-state war is nearing extinction. Of the 94 wars between 1945 and 1988, 69 were intra-state conflicts (INCORE 1994). Seventy-seven per cent of the 164 wars during the half-century following the Second World War were internal (Holsti 1996:21-24). Other studies have arrived at similar conclusions (Nietschmann 1987; Copson

1991). Of the 47 armed conflicts in 1993, not one occurred between states

(Wallensteen and Axell 1994). The remaining interstate conflicts were often an

extension of internal wars. Over the ten years immediately following the Cold

War, there were 108 armed conflicts. Only seven were interstate conflicts.

Almost all took place in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, every one of the

interstate wars in sub-Saharan Africa had its origins in domestic conflict

(Goldstone 2001:51). The discrepancy between the substantial number of

domestic conflicts relative to the minute number of international conflicts in the

post-Cold War era confirms previous findings that domestic instability is unlikely

to precipitate international instability (Sorokin 1937; Rummel 1963; Tanter 1966).

When regions are unstable, that instability can usually be traced to

national minorities (Gurr 1993a:11). Most regional conflicts arise from domestic

ethnic disputes (Carment 1993). This has been explained the internationalization

of domestic conflict as the weapon of the weak (Levy & Krebs 2001:84). Such

cross-border dynamics can be found throughout Western Europe and North

Africa, including Israel and the Arab states, Greece and Turkey, Bosnia-

Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo (Gagnon 1994/95).

Instead of a world of international anarchy and domestic order, a world of

international order and domestic anarchy is more accurate (Jackson 1990; Buzan

1983; Ayoob 1983-1984):

> If we turn to the dimensions of ethnic and subethnic conflict in the present
> international system, three points stand out. First, we find an extraordinarily
> widespread occurrence of explosions. Second, ethnic and subethnic conflict has
> become a major disruptive factor both in international relations and in domestic
> affairs. In world politics, it destroys the status quo and produces a kind of
> universal "security dilemma": it puts into jeopardy existing borders; it creates
> headaches for other states concerning the recognition of new units; it raises
> questions about the devolution of treaty obligations to successor states. It

produces huge masses of refugees, thus provoking frequently hostile and inhumane reactions of closure in "invaded countries" and putting an almost unbearable strain both on the international regime for refugees and on the resources o the UN High Commission in Refugees. It fuels lasting conflicts among states [...]. It fosters unilateral external interventions [...]. It creates major problems for an international law and a UN Charter still founded on the norms of sovereignty and nonintervention [...]. Third, there is something intractable and often murderous about ethnic conflict. [...] It risks degenerating into [...] total war [or] genocide (Hoffmann 1998: 224-226).

John Mueller may be right. Humanity would learn to avoid war between major powers (1989). Contrary to the tenets of realist literature, political stability during the second half of the twentieth century has not been a function of the "security dilemma" nor the international system, but of the composition of state legitimacy and the nature of weak, strong, and failed post-1945 states (Holsti, 1991; 1995; 1996).

Neither "wars of the third kind" – wars where motivation is neither international nor ideological – nor their intensity have increased markedly since the end of the Cold War (David 1997:552-553; Gurr 1993b, 1994; Licklider 1995; Bowen 1996; Brown 1996; Brubaker 1998; Wallenstein & Sollenberg 1999). Their current prevalence is the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 1950s and 1960s rather than a sudden change associated with a new, post-Cold War international system (Fearon & Laitin 2003). Warfare in general (Mueller 1989) and ethnic warfare in particular, are receding (Jalali & Lipset 1992-1992; Gurr 2000). In *relative* terms, however, between 1985 and 1996 ethnonationalist wars and genocide have become more dominant than anti-regime wars or gang wars (Scherrer 1999: 64). Two-thirds of the conflicts between 1985 and 1996 were ethnic in character (1999: 66). Of the 37 major armed conflicts in 1991, 25 revolved around ethnicity (Eriksen 1993).

1.2. The Spirit of the Age

Social psychology and the theory of modernization suggest that the phenomenon of ethno-nationalist violence will endure. The causes of ethnic conflict (Williams 1994; Brown 2001), ethnic mobilization (Nagel & Olzak 1982) and ethnic identity (Yinger 1985; Poutignat & Streiff-Fenart 1995; Smith 1998) are controversial. As a result, this section's claims about the endurance of ethno-nationalist violence are more tentative than the defence of the salience of ethno-nationalist violence in the previous section.

1.2.1. Social-psychology

Psychology suggests that xenophobia may be natural. This idea is captured by Freud's concept of the uncanny. *Unheimlich* in Freud's German, translates literally as "un-homelike." Culture, including its linguistic and religious antecedents, is the human capacity to order, to separate, and to draw boundaries (Barth 1969; Gellner 1987:6-28; Bauman 1989). Ethnic relations, then, are about the societal coexistence and fear of "uncanny" people.

People who live together acquire a profound knowledge of their rival's peculiar traits (Gellner 1964:147-178). Differences between individuals or collectivities can occasion especially virulent animosities as these dissimilarities lend themselves to exploitation through collective action (Simmel 1918; Waldmann 1998). Max Weber (1968:385-398) distinguishes two processes of ethnic-identity formation. Differentiation may occur among neighbouring

populations with weak phenotypical differentiation. Conquest and long-distance migration bringing together populations that are strongly differentiated according to phenotypical criteria, may also give rise to differentiation. Intuition suggests that the latter should have nastier consequences than the former. Yet, the claim that the more distant human beings are, the more readily will they do violence to one another, is not generally valid (Simmel 1918:chapter IV; cf. Coser 1964:chapter 4 thesis 6). Internal conflict has been analogized to family relations (Licklider 1993:3-20). Far from being an idyllic haven, the family is frequently the locus of mistreatment. A majority of victims know their assailants.

Since modern civilization has a deficit of tribal associations, it has to take recourse to other bonds, notably fraternity. Fraternity conveys "certain attitudes of mind and forms of conduct without which we would lose sight of [...] values" (Rawls 1971:Part I, Chapter 2, Section 17). Fraternal and local loyalties are remarkably resilient and polarize the world (Lijphart 1977a:49). Aggression becomes a prerequisite for collective survival and killing is sanctioned along delineated tribal constructs. The challenge is to keep aggression from spiralling out of control. There are two dimensions to keeping aggression in check. First, strife between tribes must be avoided. Second, killing within the tribe is reprehensible. Without them, the tribe would decline to the point where its collective survival would be threatened. The tribe might find itself unable to fend off outside aggression.

Although killing is not a natural instinct, killing from a distance made the natural inhibitions that humans possessed inoperable (Lorenz 1967:233).

Conflict with another group reflexively defines a group's structure and its reaction to internal conflict (Coser 1964:95-104). Social values, usually cultural or tribal in nature, promote local and fraternal loyalties. To control aggression, the "militant collective enthusiasm" generated by these loyalties is directed outward.

1.2.2. The modernity of ethnicity

The socio-psychological precipitants are exacerbated by modernization. The first generation of modernization theorists held that modernization would cause differences between people to dissipate, with greater harmony ensuing as a result: "It has become an article of conventional wisdom that economic growth mitigates ethno-nationalist violence. Simply put, when there is more to go around, everybody benefits, thus relieving material grievances and reducing incentives for conflict" (Esman 1990:477). A functionalist tradition from "Durkheim to Deutsch" (Smith 1971) and a Marxist tradition, two models of social change, thus hold that modernization would cause ethnic heterogeneity to decline. Functionalism's underlying "contact hypothesis" is premised on nineteenth-century progressivism according to which economic and political modernization would eradicate conflict (Forbes 1997). The idea has four tenets:

1. Scarcity can be overcome, resulting in a more equitable distribution;

2. Class allegiances would replace ethnic ones;

3. The spread of liberal ideas would result in a more equitable treatment of disadvantaged groups; and

4. Interaction facilitated by the ease of "social communication" would diminish the threat of competition by bringing more people into contact with one another.

During the "end of ideology" fad, Almond and Verba endeavoured to show that social communication was in fact producing convergence in the form of <u>The Civic Culture</u> (1963; Bell 1961).

Sociologically, the claim that the spatial and even spiritual proximity of individuals and groups produces a climate of social harmony is suspect (Smith & Feagin 1995). Transformations in communication, and the advent of economic and cultural globalization, tend to have the opposite effect (Gellner 1995; Habermas 1998:114; Bornewasser & Wakenhut 1999; Beck 2000). At first glance, the global pursuit of the good life and material plenty appears to be levelling cultural difference.

The impact of globalization may be causing borders to "wither away" for currencies, capital and technology. The same does not hold for ethnicity. In its report entitled <u>Our Creative Diversity</u>, the UNESCO World Commission on Culture and Development concludes that cultural globalization has reawakened and reinforced ethnic frontiers (1996). The dynamics of modernity group people together, thus *reinforcing* collective differences (Hechter 2001). This dialectic between contact and differentiation produces the foreigner, the stranger in our midst (Simmel 1918, Kafka 1998, Camus 1973). As the political universe of impersonal rules, technocratic rationalization and a forced division of labour falls into crisis (Beck et al. 1994), the spirit of community reawakens, giving rise to a

re-communitarization -- a *Wiedervergemeinschaftung* in the spirit of Ferdinand Tönnies (1908) -- of the modern world (Tourraine 2000:31-36). Charles Taylor benignly refers to the dialectic between pluralism and monism as the "will of difference" (1994). Gilles Kepel (1991) prefers to call it God's revenge.

Ethnicity is no longer an epiphenomenon. As early as the 1930s there were indications that contact between people adhering to different value-systems engendered differentiation, not homogenization (Wirth 1931). It took more than three decades, however, for ethnicity to gain currency as a phenomenon in the literature on ethnic conflict (Conner 1972) on par with grievance. Modernization, it appears, accentuates conflict (Brass, 1976; Lijphart 1977b). It raises collective consciousness by upsetting "the balance of employment, distribution of resources, education opportunities, and economic advantages as a result of development, migration, expansion and mobility" (Bookman 1997:31).

In modern society ambiguity becomes a problem; eliminating it turns into a mission. Religious heterodoxy and political secularization have precipitated a pluralism of values which has eroded preconceived ethical foundations of the political system. Foundations have become contestable. Instead of building on them, politics now needs to forge them. In industrial society, nationalism is a functional necessity to that end (Greenberg 1980; Gellner 1983).

As traditional roles and allegiances erode, attachments based on ethnic affiliations emerge: "Ethnicity is a less demanding form of nationalism emphasizing common origin and descent, and shared characteristics based on language, race religion, place of origin, culture, values or history, but not state"

(Hobsbawm 1990: 63). These indicators seem strangely plastic. Communal ties used to be tangible, communal attachments well-defined, and the division of labour clearly delineated. Modernization has unbound communal ties. Social differentiation now occurs at a level of abstraction. Modernity is marked by the process of differentiation. One aspect of this is the differentiation among people. This happens exogenously and endogenously. Never before have people been as keenly aware of what makes them different.

The hypothesis that intellectual and commercial "progress" is attenuating the sort of human misunderstandings and grievances that used to cause wars is unproven by the international history of the first half of the twentieth century (Blainey 1988:chapter 2). Nor does the hypothesis hold at the national level (Hechter 1975; Nairn 1977). In effect, growing interdependence *enhances* the likelihood of conflict (Waltz 1979: chapter 7).

1.3. Conclusion

This chapter validated ethno-nationalist violence as an object of inquiry. The first part of the chapter provided empirical evidence that establishes ethnic strife as posing a serious challenge to *national* political order. It then drew on social psychology and modernization theory to explain why ethno-nationalist violence will prevail. The following chapter reviews explanations for ethno-nationalist violence.

Chapter 2: Grievance and cultural distance in critical perspective

Running through the literature on ethno-nationlist violence is a propensity to lay blame. Be it demagogues, the structure of political institutions, material deprivation, or cultural predispositions, there is an inescapble urge to point the finger. Not that people are looking for monocausal explanations; by and large, the literature is cognizant of the complexities underlying ethno-nationlist violence, thus shying away from deterministic accounts. Implicit to the way ethno-nationlist violence is currently treated in the literature is a liberal-democratic optimism about how to fix the situation: If demogagues are at fault, then what is needed are better leaders; if institutions are at fault, then these need to be re-engineered; if deprivation is at fault, then redistribution and more money are needed; if culture is at fault, then civic education should be part of the solution. There is no question that in most cases, many, if not all, of these factors contribute substantially to violence. But, as this chapter seeks to show, it would be wrong to identify them as the actual precipitants of violence for their presence does not necessitate violence. These problems are omnipresent. Violence, however, remains the exception. If these problems are essentially omnipresent but violence remains the exception, presumably they need a certain soil to flourish.

First, the chapter establishes ethno-nationalist violence as an explanandum in its own right, distinct from ethnic conflict and political violence. Then the literature on ethno-nationalist violence is reviewed. Two paradigms

emerge: grievance and cultural distance. Both are problematic on three separate counts: Their explanatory power in terms of exogenous and endogenous comparisons, and their predictive power.

First, one paradigm or the other, at times both, offers an adequate assessment of particular instances of ethno-nationalist violence. Pursuant to the scientific method, however, neither hypothesis qualifies to be elevated to the level of a theory: There are, quite simply, too many exceptions. For every case where one explanation or the other applies, there is a comparable place where it does not, that is, one with comparable grievances and/or one where cultures are equidistant, but where ethnic relations have not turned violent. Second, their explanatory power is equally questionable in terms of endogenous comparisons. Ethno-nationalist violence tends to be protracted in the sense that it tends to recur at irregular intervals. Grievance and/or cultural distance often propose sensible accounts of a particular episode, but they have great difficulty explaining the cyclical nature of the violence. Grievances frequently remain unchanged over time. The cultural distance between the groups remains similarly unchanged. Yet, violence comes and goes. This presents a real problem. A hypothesis on ethno-nationalist violence remains but a hypothesis if it fails to offer a reasonable explanation for such recurrences. Fearon and Laitin insist that a theory fails to explain the phenomenon of violence in conflictual situations unless it questions and explains the relative presence *and* absence of violence (1996). Finally, a hypothesis that runs into trouble when subjected to exogenous and endogenous scrutiny has little predictive power. This point is key. At best,

grievance and cultural distance amount to convenient *ex post facto* explanations.

At worst, they are tautological. The real value of a theory is not just as an

explanans of the same explanadum across time and space, but, by virtue of

those attributes, its ability to offer some tentative insights into what the future

might hold. The implication is not for grievance and cultural-distance

explanations to be jettisoned. But a fastidious *theory* of ethno-nationalist

violence must pass the exogenous test, the endogenous test, and intrinsically it

must have at least some predictive power.

2.1. Semantics of ethno-nationalist violence

One problem fundamental to research is that the target is either not clear or that,

upon careful examination, the target turns out to keep moving. This is a basic

problem with much of the research on what is commonly known as "ethnic

violence." All too often, the terms "ethnic conflict," "ethnic violence," and "political

violence" are understood to connote one and the same phenomenon. Injudicious

usage of this sort obfuscates the qualitative and quantitative differences that exist

between these phenomena. A seminal review of the literature found

> no clearly demarcated field or subfield of social scientific inquiry addressing
> ethnic and nationalist violence, no well-defined body of literature on the subject,
> no agreed-upon set of key questions or problems, no established research
> programs (or set of competing research programs). The problem is not that there
> is no agreement on how things are to be explained; it is that there is no
> agreement on *what* is to be explained, or whether there is a single set of
> phenomena to be explained (Laitin & Brubaker 1998:427, emphasis mine).

Much of the research on ethnic relations has taken its cue from Lipset and

Rokkan's fundamental question: Under what conditions do latent ethnic identities

become politically manifest (1967:Introduction)? Lipset and Rokkan's question is

concerned with what is known in the literature as social mobilization. By virtue of the ethnic identity being latent, it must have already existed in a social state prior to being mobilized (Huddy 2001, 2003). Mobilization is not a prerequisite for ethnic groups to come into existence. The notion of a group implies social construction. The first chapter, however, indicated that ethnic belonging is a basic part of human nature. In recognition of this distinction, anthropologists generally refer not to ethnic groups but to ethnies.[1] Strictly speaking, they become a group only upon mobilization.

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[1] Ethnic groups are a human collectivity with a distinct name, a sense of common ancestry, a shared historical memory, elements of a common culture, such as language, religion, and customs, a link with a common homeland, a sense of solidarity, and a sense of an ascriptive identity, that is, not just the way a group defines itself but also the way it is defined by others (cf. Ross 1980: 1 ff.; Rokkan & Unwin 1982: 66 ff.). Since the definition of ethnicity has objective and subjective components, ethnicity may thus be treated either as an independent or as a dependent variable, or a combination of the two.

Researchers who treat ethnicity as an independent variable are commonly called primordialists. They take ethnicity to be a priori – "given" –, ineffable – they just exist --, and affective – ethnic ties are different from other ties like class or lifestyle (Geertz 1973:255-310; Laitin 1986:chapter 1). Ethnic conflict is thought to be driven by peoples' *beliefs* in primordialist attachments (as opposed to the straw man of the inherent immutability of those attachments that is sometimes fallaciously put up by those looking to strike a knock-out punch against primordialism).

Instrumentalism, by contrast, treats ethnicity as a dependent variable. Strict instrumentalism at the macro level may focus on manipulative, rational, self-interested elites that exploit and exaggerate ethnic divisions for their own ends, through discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics, or the manipulation of symbols. Ethnic entrepreneurs appeal to their constituents' preferences for ethnic rather than generic consumption. Strict instrumentalism, therefore, places a particular emphasis on intention and outcome (Brass 1976).

Strict instrumentalism at the micro level may focus on rational-choice theories of identity. Rational-choice theory posits ethno-nationalist violence as a strategic choice in the pursuit of objective, instrumental interests such as power, wealth or territory (Hardin 1995:3-25). Yet, how rational is a choice where ethnies are quite prepared to *sacrifice* objective interests for symbolic gain (Pfaffenberger 1990:249)?

A modified form of instrumentalism may focus on process, institutions, unintended consequences, stability and change. Although his argument no longer works, David Laitin's attribution of ethnic conflict involving Nigeria's Yoruba to colonial structures and processes (rather than to religious identity) is a classic example of modified instrumentalism (1986).

The most popular way of approaching ethnicity is through a combination of objective and subjective traits. This approach, which nuances the element of choice, is commonly known as constructivism: Ethnic identities are constructed but behave as if they were real. Constructivists contradict the essentialist thesis that ethno-national identities necessitate antagonism towards other groups. Instead, they allow for variation across ethno-national groups and thus potentially

Ethnic conflict, then, refers to conflict between ethnies that have been mobilized. Ethnicity per se is not the cause of groups coming into conflict, it is their mobilization along ethnic lines that brings them into conflict. Ethnic conflict, then, may be defined in terms of mass mobilization, and centralized organization and control along ethnic lines (Williams 1994). There exists a voluminous literature on ethnic conflict thus defined which has been reviewed elsewhere (Yinger 1985; Poutignat & Streiff-Fenart 1995; Smith 1998).

But just because ethnies have been mobilized and are in conflict does not necessitate violent relations. As a matter of fact, large-scale protracted violence remains an exception. In contrast to conflict, violence has costly implications for all parties involved. When violence arises, it need not immediately be ethnic. It may be of a mere political character. Political violence is conventionally defined as

> acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behaviour of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system (Nieburg 1969:13, see also Graham & Gurr 1969; Nagengast 1994; Goldstone 2001, 2002).

account for observed contrasts in levels of ethno-nationalist violence and support for independence across these groups. Constructivists concentrate on the construction of fears and threats through highly selective and often distorted narratives, myths, rituals, commemorations, and other cultural representations as sources of ethno-nationalist violence (Atran 1990). As with instrumentalism, there are different paradigms of constructivist explanations for ethno-nationalist violence: Individual action and supra-individual discourse (Fearon & Laitin 2000). The former attributes ethno-nationalist violence to the construction of antagonistic identities by elites in pursuit of political power or at the production, reproduction and contestation of the content and boundaries of ethnic categories by mass publics. The latter attributes ethno-nationalist violence to the construction of actors and the motivation and definition of frames of action by the internal, ideational logics of supra-individual discourse.

Instrumentalists and constructivists can be difficult to keep apart because they arrive at similar conclusions; but the method by which they arrived at those conclusions differs. Instrumentalists are agent-centric; constructivists start with structure. Agent-centric approaches necessarily regard action as purposive. Structural approaches, by contrast, are more interested in unintended consequences.

Ethnic conflict and political violence are dissimilar phenomena. They do not lend

themselves to an aggregated analysis (Straub 2001): "The study of violence

should be separated from the study of conflict and treated as an autonomous

phenomenon in its own right" (Laitin & Brubaker 1998:426). Yet, violence has

thus far been conceptualized as a *degree* rather than as a *form* of conflict

(1998:425). Violence encompasses physical, cultural, and symbolic

manifestations. The concept's elasticity notwithstanding, "the difficulties and

ambiguities involved in characterizing or classifying violence as ethnic or

nationalist are even greater" (1998:427-28). In fact, "violence as such has

seldom been made an explicit and sustained theoretical or analytical focus in

studies of ethnic conflict." Instead, violence is surreptitiously treated as an

unintended consequence of ethnic conflict. Moreover, ethnicity figures only

incidentally and peripherally "in the study of political and collective violence"

(1998:426). Where the role of violence in ethno-nationalist conflict has been

analyzed, it turns out that many instances of "ethnic" violence are often but a

cover for other motivations with nothing intrinsically ethnic about them, such as

looting, land grabs and personal revenge (Fearon & Laitin 2000:874).

Violence takes on an ethnic character when its meaning comes to be

interpreted as

> violence perpetrated across ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not a state
> (or a representative of a state), and in which the putative ethnic difference is
> coded—by perpetrators, targets, influential third parties, or analysts—as having
> been integral rather than incidental to the violence, that is, in which the violence
> is coded as having been meaningfully oriented in some way to the different
> ethnicity of the target (Brubaker & Laitin 1998:428).

This definition singles ethnic and nationalist violence as a phenomenon distinct from ethnic conflict and political violence. It fails, however, in delineating a focused domain of research.

The conundrum is in part due to the obfuscation surrounding the qualifiers ethnic and nationalist. Implicit in the term ethnic violence is a recognition that an ethnie must have mobilized politically in order for the violence be perpetrated collectively or a recognition that the ethnie is being mobilized indirectly by having violence directed against it. For heuristic purposes, a national group is an ethnic group more narrowly defined by virtue of it having been present on a territory at the time the state was founded. Ethnic violence, then, may refer to violence perpetrated by or directed against any ethnic group within a state's territory, irrespective of whether the group was actually present within the boundaries when the state was founded. Yet, there are good normative and empirical reasons for distinguishing national groups – those present on a state's territory when the state was founded -- from immigrant groups – those that arrived on a state's territory after it was founded (Kymlicka 1995).[2] While this distinction is a useful heuristic device, is in controversial in the sense that it is not always clear what status a group has.

On the one hand, Russians in Estonia qualify as a national minority if the point of reference is its independence in 1991. Under international law, on the other hand, the Soviet occupation of Estonia was illegal. If Estonian statehood

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[2] Indigenous people form a third category because they do not fit neatly with either of the other two categories (Cairns 1995). Although indigenous violence and the motivations behind it warrant a comparative study of its own, for the purpose of argument they will be treated as a national group because the argument being advanced would remain unaffected.

predates the Second World War, then its Russian minority is an immigrant minority since most of the Russians residing on Estonian territory today arrived during and after the War.

Ethno-national violence connotes a confrontation between manifest political identities, that is, identities that have been mobilized. At the same time, the term ethno-nationalist violence narrows the field to of research to violence involving at least one ethnies that was present when a country was founded. For heuristic purposes it is also useful to distinguish nationalist from ethno-nationalist violence. A state, for instance, may wilfully direct acts of violence against an ethnic group. The state itself, however, may be a nation without a clearly identifiable ethnic component.

Narrowing the focus to ethno-nationalist violence as a field of research is useful because ethno-nationalist violence presents a unique challenge. To begin with, conventional monofactorial theories have enough trouble accounting for violent and protracted conflicts (Darnell & Parikh 1988), let alone violent and protracted ethno-nationalist conflicts. The literature is strong at explaining interethnic antipathy, anxiety, mistrust, or conflict, but weak at explaining ethno-nationalist violence. Yet, the shift from non-violent to violent modes of conflict is a shift in phase in need of particular theoretical attention (Williams 1994:62; Tambiah 1997:292). The associated questions and explanations need to be distinguished from questions and explanations of the existence, and even the intensity, of conflict (Brubaker & Laitin 1998:426). When do interactions among ethnic collectivities produce strong opposition and overt conflicts (Rule 1988:9-

10)? What dynamic(s) and rationale(s) occasion the eventual recourse to violence (Fearon 1995)?

For heuristic purposes, the explanations for ethno-national violence on offer in the literature can be grouped according to grievance and according to cultural distance. This distinction follows from a distinction between real and symbolic conflict established by a long line of research into intergroup relations (Simmel 1918; Coser 1956). Real conflicts arise over supply-side issues, such as power, wealth or territory. Symbolic conflicts tend to concern zero-sum issues that are not usually amenable to a negotiated settlement: Where two religious groups lay claim to the same holy site, control over the site usually resides with one group while it is off limits to the other group. Ian Lustick has applied this distinction to ethnic conflicts, differentiating them according to "other-directed" and "solipsistic" conflicts (Lustick 1990). The latter are preferable to the former precisely because, in theory, at least, they are amenable to a negotiated resolution.

2.2. Cultural-distance explanations of ethno-nationalist violence

Cultural essentialism is a sociological construct which posits that people are naturally emotionally attached to an ethno-national group. This attachment necessarily implies feelings of antagonism towards other groups that, sooner or later, become manifest through violence and/or, in plurinational states, in movements towards independence. This pedestrian variant of culturalist explanations for ethno-nationlist violence is rarely taken seriously by scholars.

Nonetheless, its ubiquity in the public sphere makes it a powerful explanation in popular discourse.

Most people essentialize ethno-nationalist relations because an identity that transcends the individual is a probable constituent of human nature. Experiments in cognitive psychology have shown that it is human nature to essentialize artefacts (Keil 1989:chapter 9). In fact, ethnicity is among the earliest-emerging social dimensions to which children attend (Katz 1982; Davey 1983; Ramsey 1987). The cognition of phenotypic patterns is modular. A boundary of norms premised on endogamous preferences derives from a common set of abstract principles that are remarkably stable across history, culture, and individual experience (Hirschfeld 1996:chapters 2, 4). It develops into a theory-like structure of knowledge which amounts to a coherent body of explanatory knowledge that sustains inferences about members of a category which transcend the range of direct experience (Allport 1954). In short, when humans perceive an ethnie, they count and process it as a species. This cognitive process is purposive because, by facilitating adaptation, it reduces the costs of transaction:

> It allowed us to learn a lot about out-groups in a very inexpensive way, in particular by making inductive inferences about nonobvious properties, and it made possible processes of discrimination that prevented us from incurring the costs of coordination failure. The reason these benefits have been obtained specifically by processing these groups as species results from the fact that ethnies exhibit the most diagnostic features of species: group-based endogamy and descent-based membership. [...] This is not, I think, how we think of social categories in general but only how we think of those categories which, as in ethnies, exhibit strongly diagnostic features of biological species, such as feudal classes and castes (Gil-White 2001:551).

Corporate identities, however, deny individuals the right to decide their degree of participation, by denying entry to outsiders, and by equating exit with treason

(Jowitt 2001). They are "greedy" in the sense that they are given and fixed as opposed to chosen or exchangeable (Coser 1974). Their primary imperative is to safeguard purity by isolating the ethnic group from possible contamination (Douglas 1966). The prototypical ethnie is thus "a descedant group bounded socially by inbreeding and spatially by territory" (van den Berghe 1981:24). The obession with contamination leads to barricaded social entities which take the form of preferential endogamy, extended nepotism, fictive kinship, descendent myths, and extension into large territories. The collectivism intrinsic to barricaded identities makes violence more likely (1) by undermining individualism, (2) by broadening the scope of violence -- violence done to any member of one group legitimates retaliation in the name of that group against any member of the other group (Chirot 1995) – and (3) by triggering a genealogy of violence. Glenn Bowman's accounts of ethno-nationalist violence in Yugoslavia are exemplary in this regard (1994a, 1994b).

But can essentialism be invoked as a viable explanation of ethno-nationalist violence? No serious culturalist theory today attributes violence directly to deeply encoded cultural predispositions towards violence or to the sheer fact of cultural difference (Brubaker & Laitin 1998). Cultural distance does not *cause* violence. There are a handful of world religions, some 5,000 ethnic groups, and even more languages in the world today. If cultural difference were solely responsible for ethno-nationalist violence, then pandemonium would reign supreme. In light of such cultural diversity, it is all the more remarkable that ethno-nationalist violence remains relatively infrequent. Culturalist explanations

of ethno-nationalist, therefore, must be sensitive to other contextually-specific factors that might cause cultural disputes to foment to the point where they turn violent.

They characterize ethno-nationalist violence as meaningful, culturally constructed, discursively mediated, symbolically saturated, and ritually regulated. They tend to draw on variants of socio-psychological theories of intergroup bias. Rage (Scheff & Retzinger 1991), humiliation (Miller 1993), fear (Green 1994), and other emotions and psychological mechanisms, such as projection, displacement, identification, implied in ethno-nationalist violence (Volkan 1991, 1997:3-49; Kakar 1990). In an attempt to discover the logic behind ethno-nationalist violence, representations of violence as chaotic, random, meaningless, irrational, or purely emotive, are rejected (McCauley 2002). Instead, crowd-centred anthropological approaches have explained the structure of ethno-nationalist violence in Sri Lanka in terms of cultural stereotypes about other communities, and in terms of local idioms of justice and retribution (Spencer 1990; Roberts 1994:317-327). Similarly, Das (1990a) and Tambiah (1997) emphasize the social-psychological dynamics peculiar to crowd behaviour, such as the circulation of rumours, in ethno-nationlist violence throughout Asia.

Ethno-nationalist violence in Sri Lanka (Kapferer 1988), in the Punjab (Juergensmeyer 1988), in Northern India (by van der Veer 1994; Engineer 1989, 1991, 1995; Kakar 1996; Das 1990b; Das 1991; Freitag 1989; Jaffrelot 1993, 1996) and in the Basque country (Zulaika 1988) has been explained in terms of

its meaningful relation to or resonance with symbolic perpertoires. It becomes meaningful once ethnically focused fear has been culturally constructed as in South Asia (Gaborieau 1985), India (Pandey 1992; Hansen 1996), Sri Lanka (Spencer 1990; Jeganathan 1998), and Yugoslavia (Glenny 1992, Denich 1994). Ironically, social struggles over the proper coding and interpretation of acts of violence (Brass 1996, 1997; Abelmann & Lie 1995) may legitimate future violence as in Burundi (Lemarchand 1996:chapter 2) and Northern Ireland (McGarry & O'Leary 1995a).[3]

Ethno-nationalist violence has also been explained culturally in terms of its ritualized aspects (Daniel 1996), deliberate provocation, and in terms of competing claims over the same sacred space. Ritualized aspects of violence have been invoked in explanations of the violent conflicts in the Basque country (Zulaika 1988), in India (van der Veer 1996), and in Sri Lanka (Schalk 1997). Deliberate provocation is thought to contribute significantly to religious violence in South Asia (Gaborieau 1985; Jaffrelot 1994; Tambiah 1997:240; McKenna 1998), Hindu-Sikh violence in the Punjab (Juergensmeyer 1988; Pettigrew 1995; Mahmood 1996), and Sinhala-Tamil violence in Sri Lanka (Roberts 1990), and sectarian violence in Northern Ireland (Sluka 1989; Aretxaga 1993; Feldman 1991:29-30). Conflicting claims to the same sacred spaces or times are prominent components of the justificatory discourse of violence in India (van der Veer 1994), Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan (Tambiah 1997:chapter 9; Das

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[3] As ethnicity cascades, integrated societies separate into ethnic segments between whom violence is much more likely to arise and spread (Laitin & Fearon 2000; Kuran 1998a, 1998b): The process of elites fomenting violence to buttress their political support has the effect of

1990b:9ff.) and Israel (Friedland & Hecht 1991, 1996, 1998, 2000). Gender(ed)

roles (Enloe 1989:62) and representations (Harris 1993:170 Pettman 1996) may

be perpetuating ethno-nationalist violence in Sri Lanka (Schalk 1994; Jeganathan

2001), India (Hansen 1996:153), Eastern Europe (Verdery 1994:248-49), the

Balkans (Nikolic-Ristanovic 2000), Yugoslavia (Meznaric 1994; Morokvasic-

Müller 1998), and Northern Ireland (Aretxaga 1995).

The evidence, however, suggests that nationalist protest derives more

from political units than from cultural bases (Brubaker 1996:17; Beissinger

1998a). In a seminal article Fearon and Laitin have published findings from

cross-national statistical research showing that ethnic and religious

characteristics fail to explain which countries were at risk for civil war between

1945 and 1999 (2003). They also did not find more ethnically or religiously

diverse countries to at greater risk of significant civil violence *after controlling for*

per capita income. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) arrive at the opposite

conclusion, but only because they fail to control for *per capita* income.

Despite ethno-nationalist violence's evident relation to perceptual factors, such

as patterns of cultural discrimination, problematic histories between groups and

the cultural construction of fear, "it is difficult to know whether, when, where, to

what extent, and in what manner the posited beliefs and fears were actually held"

(Brubaker & Laitin 1998). Violence cannot be reduced to a simple extension of

intergroup bias (Fearon & Laitin 2000): "Cultural contextualizations of ethno-

nationalist violence, however vivid, are not themselves explanations of it. They

constructing more antagonistic identities which encourages more violence (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956; Levy 1989; Laitin 1995b).

cannot explain why violence occurs only at particular times and places, and why, even at such times and places, only some persons participate in it" (Laitin & Brubaker 1998:443). It is easy to explain an internal war *ex post facto* by asserting that people feared one another, were prejudiced and so forth. These feelings or beliefs are always present and they say little about why internal wars take place.

2.3. Grievance explanations of ethno-nationalist violence

The emphasis cultural-distance explanations of ethno-nationalist violence place on the intrinsic value of culture contrast with supply-side explanations that attribute ethno-nationalist violence to grievance. They may be characterized broadly as accounts of ethnic mobilization among groups with incompatible goals that are competing for scarce economic and political resources such as power, wealth, and/or territory. Competition over objective gains as a source of violence is a phenomenon known as ethnic outbidding (Shepsle & Rabushka 1972:chs 1-3; Rothschild 1981; Horowitz 1985:chapter 8).[4]

Grievance can explain ethnic outbidding in different ways. One option is to construe grievance as relative deprivation, where deprivation may take the form of either matieral deprivation or deprivation of status. The other option is to invoke ethno-nationalist violence as a form of collective action in response to perceived economic or political threats. Taxonomically, intrinsic to research on

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[4] Since ethnic outbidding conjures up mutual distrust (Walter 2002), violent conflicts become intractable: The parties to a conflict lose confidence in the other side's willingness or ability to adhere to a political settlement. Ethnic relations are thus said to suffer from an asymmetry of

ethnic "riots" is the "irrationality" of mob violence implied by the relative-deprivation hypothesis. Contrariwise, the term "pogrom" designates the orchestrated and organized nature of collective violence.

The best-known exponent of the material-deprivation hypothesis is Ted Gurr. Using inductive analyses of ethno-nationalist violence that take the group as their unit of analysis, Ted Gurr compares large sets of data statistically to explain variegated manifestations of ethno-nationalist violence in terms of frustration that is engendered by material deprivation (Gurr 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Harff & Gurr 1989; Gurr & Harff 1994).

Don Horowitz's classic study of violent ethnic conflict in postcolonial Africa and Asia (1985) and Roger Petersen's work on Eastern Europe (2001, 2002) are exemplary of the status-deprivation hypothesis. They link a group's status with institutional design, and resentment and individual emotion. Kolsto and Melberg (2002) test the social-psychological and cognitive underpinnings of ethno-nationalist violence by comparing attitudes in Estonia and Moldova. They find that feelings offer a parsimonious explanation for ethic violence in the latter, but not in the former, country because the differences in attitudinal data between the two countries are statistically insignificant.

Susan Olzak, by contrast, views the collective violence of economically underprivileged ethnic groups in urban America occasioned by material deprivation as a deliberate and rational choice (1992; Olzak & Tsutsui 1998). In other words, ethno-nationalist violence amounts to a collective-action problem.

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information (Fearon & Laitin 1996) which thwarts the "evolution of cooperation" (Axelrod 1984:chapters 1, 2 & 4).

The deprivation hypothesis, by contrast, reduces ethno-nationalist violence to an unintended consequence. In an effort to avoid this kind of reductionism, game theory proves particularly useful. It helps identify general mechanisms that account for particular aspects of the problem of ethno-nationalist violence such as credible commitments, asymmetric information, and intra-group dynamics.

Analyses of ethno-nationalist violence in Sri Lanka (Rogers 1987), Southern India (Vincentnathan 1996) and Mauritius (2000) suggest that ethno-nationalist violence may be a collective reaction to the discontent conjured up among individuals and groups when expectations with regard to primary goals, such as economic advancement and social respect, are not met. Such institutional failure may be a deliberate strategy employed by ethnic entrepreneurs. But is may also just be an unintended consequence of institutional weakness. Crawford (1998) and Oberschall (2000) identify institutional weakness, that is, the inability of the institutions of state to respond adequately and timely to collective political and economic grievances, as a source of the politicization of identity in ex-Yugoslavia. Violence is thus thought to emerge not from pre-existing hatreds but from sudden political uncertainties and shifting social conditions, particularly the declining capacity of authorities to enforce agreements or police existing boundaries (Tilly 2003).[5] Don Horowitz has found ethnic riots to be most probable during times of political uncertainty (2001). Similarly, Susan Woodward attributes the violent ethno-nationalist conflict in the Balkans not to ancient hatreds and military aggression, but the

political grievances arising out of the disintegration of government authority and a breakdown of political and civil order (1995).

Similarly, realists have applied game theory to international relations. They hold that conditions of anarchy give rise to a "security dilemma" in which even non-aggressive moves to enhance one's security are perceived by others as threatening and trigger countermoves that ultimately reduce one's own security (Jervis 1978). Just as the logic of anarchy leads states to protect themselves in ways that may inadvertently lead to interstate warfare, so, too, internal threats lead groups within states to take measures to defend themselves in ways that may lead to internal warfare, regardless of whether that was their original intention (Posen 1993:103-111; Kaufmann 1996:147-151).

This sort of dilemma can be precipitated by the collapse of central authority in multiethnic empires. A collapse of central authority creates windows of opportunity that facilitate a pre-emptive attack (Posen 1993). This assertion is validated by Mark Beissinger's statistical analysis of violence in the disintegrating Soviet Union and its incipient successor states which show that incidences of ethno-nationalist violence in the context of a larger cycle of nationalist contention are highly clustered (1998, 2002). Nationalist struggles turned increasingly violent late in the mobilizational cycle, in connection with the contestation of borders, and at a moment when authority was passing from the collapsing center to the incipient successor states. Beissinger's conclusions resonate in the literature.

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[5] Secession thus becomes an attractive option for a minority because that is its only assurance that its demands will be addressed adequately (Fearon 1998; Lake & Rothchild 1998; Horowitz

His finding on the level of violence associated with the contestation of borders of an incipient state is echoed by Jim Ron's examination of the way a state's definition of the boundary separates its favoured population from a different people authorizes, channels, or inhibits the use of force (2003). His approach to state-sponsored violence in Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Israel, and Palestine is institutional. Ron is interested in the way the state's monopoly on power was used in each of these cases to serve the political and economic interests of a particular ethnic group. Deng's analysis of the violent conflict between the Sudan's Arab-Islamic mold of the North and the indigenous African race of the South encapsulates the way identity has been used to assert political, economic, social and cultural interests. Gérard Prunier applies a variant of this approach to explain the Rwandan genocide (1995). Dispelling notions of ancient tribal hatred among the Hutu and Tutsi as the primary reason for the madness, Prunier believes that this antipathy was exploited by Europeans for political and economic reasons, and that this laid the groundwork for the hatred to explode into genocidal rage.

While Ron's and Prunier's institutional approach focuses on a the state as a executor of the political and economic interests, Michael Hechter (1995, 2001, 2002) regards collective violent action an unintended consequence galvanized by the political grievances that arise when political institutions are used to impose direct rule in heterogeneous societies. Since the dispositions underlying violence are clustered systematically, they are decisive at the aggregate level; therefore, a reduction in the resources of local elites galvanizes political grievances to the

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1985:chapter 6).

point where violent collective action becomes a perfectly rational response. Ron Suny (2001) has employed this approach to explain ethno-nationalist violence in the former USSR.

Beissinger's finding on the level of violence associated with a change in effective political authority is equally significant. Saideman (1998) identifies this as the prime source of domestic disintegration and a precipitant of secessionism and Carment et al. (1997) explore the possibility of third-party intervention in such circumstances. The Serb provocation of ethnic war with Croats is examplary. In the Serb-Croat case, however, ethnic outbidding was used to consolidate power after shifts in the structure of political and economic power caused endangered elites to fend off *co-ethnic domestic* challengers who sought to mobilize the population against the status quo (Gagnon 1994/95). When a low-probability event with drastic consequences has a high expected disutility, co-ethnics who are told by their leaders that they are targets for extermination understandably take up arms even if their leaders are probably wrong (Weingast 1998; Weingast & Figueiredo 1999).

If the leadership of a newly independent state dominated by one ethnic group but containing at least one powerful minority is either unable or unwilling to make a credible commitment to protect the lives and political and economics interests of subordinate groups, democratizing regimes might be expected to prove especially prone to political grievances that engender violence. Following the "illiberal democracy" thesis (Zakaria 2003), Jack Snyder has argued that ethnic conflict is most likely to break the early stages of democratic transitions

(1998, 2000). During those early stages, elites are likely to stage, instigate, provoke, dramatize, or intensifie democratic deliberations to preserve their political power. This is the way in which Perera explains ethno-nationlist violence in Sri Lanka (1998). Snyder, however, blames "mass electoral politics," not elites, for the violence that ensues.

To test the impact of democratization and political institutions on ethnic violence, Saideman et al. (2002) have conducted large-N statistical research. They find that the impact of democratization, federalism, and presidentialism may not be as problematic as some argue. In fact, postulating ethno-nationalist violence in terms of an absence of credible commitments is problematic because many states do not pretend to make such commitments in the first place (Rothchild 1991). That raises the question of the degree to which international-relations theory is applicable to ethno-nationlist violence. Since ethnic groups and their territorial boundaries are not neatly delimited the way states are (Barth 1967; Young 1965; Ra'anan 1990), inter- and intra-national conflicts are fundamentally different phenomena (Fearon & Laitin 2000).

Relative material-deprivation arguments fare no better. The mere existence of relative deprivation, inequality, or even a deterioration or spread of such circumstances, are insufficient causes of political and ethno-nationalist violence (Gurr 1980; Goldstone 1998, 2003). Why would material deprivation necessarily cause an ethnic group to band together against the core? Could such exploitation not just as easily cause the proletariat of the dominant and the minority ethnic groups to band together against the bourgeoisie? The impact that

economic factors exert upon ethno-national conflict is greatly exaggerated

(Esman 1977; Connor 2001). Are Catalans, Malays, Croats and Slovenes not in

a privileged position (Connor 1984:4)? Neither class nor ethnicity is reducible to

the other (Rothschild 1981). "Ranked societies" -- where ethnic and socio-

structural cleavages coincide – are no more prone to ethno-nationalist violence

than "unranked societies" -- where cleavages cut across ethnic and social divides

(Waldmann 1989:chapter 5).[6] Although social mobility has been associated with

ethnic war (Bonneuil & Auriat 2001; Rogers 1987), there is no indication that

internal conflict subsides as economic disparities between groups diminish

(Connor 1984; Smith 1986:7). If longevity is indicative of economic well-being,

then improvements in life expectancy should reduce the incidence of political

violence. This hypothesis, however, is empirically unsupported (Muller and

Weede 1990). Fearon and Laitin's statistical work suggests that that relative

deprivation *may* be a necessary but hardly a sufficient cause of violence (2003).

In the end, *political* grievance is a more probable cause of ethno-nationalist

violence than absence of economic opportunity (Sambanis 2001).

It is also uncertain how materialism explains why the timing of ethno-

nationalist violence. Despite a long history of significant economic disparities

between Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir, and Hindu dominance of most political

and economic institutions, tensions did not escalate until 1989 (Ganguly 1996).

What is now Northern Ireland has seen violence on and off for four centuries

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[6] Although cross-cutting cleavages allegedly impede conflict and reinforce social cohesion (Sperlich 1971), that theory has been discredited. Still, it remains a popular justification for redistributive solutions to ethnic conflict.

(Budge and O'Leary 1973). Explanations for ethno-nationalist violence stand or fall on their ability to explain this sort or irregularity.

2.4. Conclusion

A theory fails to explain the phenomenon of violence in conflictual situations unless it questions and explains the fluctuations in violence across time and space (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Only a handful of explanations apply non-material explanations of ethno-nationalist violence that control for temporal or geographical variance.

In terms of longitudinal analysis, one may cite, inter alia, Suny's analysis of violent conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis (2001) and Prunier's analysis of Rwanda (1995), or Lemarchand's analysis of Burundi (1996). Despite the narrative wealth, the problem with such longitudinal studies of a single case, however, is that they fail to test one definitive hypothesis. Rather, they arrive at a vague conclusion about the way ethnic entrepreneurs use political institutions for the purposes of economic and political discrimination against another ethnic group.

In terms of geographic variation, one could cite Tambiah's comparison of Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan (1997) and Kapferer's comparison of Sri Lanka and Australia (1988), but their findings as to the preconditions for violence are rather vague. Other controlled comparisons, however, have arrived at more definitive conclusions. Laitin investigates juxtaposes cyclical violence in the Basque country and in Georgia with the peaceful developments in Catalonia and the

Ukraine. An explanation of violence in these cases can not reply on symbolic repertoires because these are similar across the cases. Instead, Laitin focuses on linguistic tipping phenomena and the differential availability of recruits for guerrilla activity from rural social groups governed by norms of honor (1995b). Díez compares the social bases of the nationalist movements in the Basque country and Catalonia which he ascribes to the differential development of the capitalist economy and the state in each region (1995). Waldmann compares ethno-nationalist violence in the Basque region and Northern Ireland to the (largely) non-violent conflicts in Catalonia and Quebec, and explains the transition from non-violent nationalist protest to violent conflict in the former cases in terms of the middle-class losing control over the movement (1985, 1989). Ashutosh Varshney explains strikingly divergent outcomes of communal violence in three Indian cities with similar proportions of Muslim and Hindu inhabitants and that share other background variables regarding the way they are structured in terms of the nature and presence of civil society (1997, 2002). The concern with the collapse and transfer of power in nascent democracies (Beissinger 1998, 2002; Bonneuil & Auriat 2001) and the associated concerns about the probability of violence during times of political uncertaintiy (Horowitz 1985, 2001) remains controversial due to Saideman et al.'s (2002) contradictory findings. Beissinger's finding on the salience of republican borders, however, seems to stand.

In terms of combined longitudinal-geographical analyses, Tilly's (2003) and Horowitz's (2001) comparative work on 150 deadly ethnic riots in 40

postcolonial countries since 1965 raises the spectre of political and economic instability as a source of ethno-nationalist violence. Yet, Sambanis' dataset of 161 countries over 40 years suggests that it is important to distinguish between civil and ethno-nationalist violence because the latter is predominantly associated with political grievances (2002). The salience of political rather than economic factors is confirmed by Fearon and Laitin's study of 127 violent civil conflicts between 1945 and 1999 (2003), and Gurr's findings that discrimination consistently plays a key role in ethno-nationalist violence. More specifically, Bonneuil and Auriat's study of the sequencing of conflict observed among 163 ethnic groups finds that insurgency correlates strongly with discrimination against social customs. Sambanis also finds that a bad neighbourhood, that is, undemocratic neighbours or ones experiencing violence, increases the probability of violence.

In the end, the evidence against economic grievance and for political grievance as explanations for ethno-nationalist violence is convincing. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that recruitment, and the age of the state, but not its level of democratization, appear to play a role in ethno-nationalist violence. In other words, there is good evidence to suggest that demagogues, political institutions, and state policies are significant factors in determining the probability of ethno-nationalist violence. Yet, the disproportionately small number of ethno-nationlist conflicts that turn violent posits that political grievance can be neither the sole nor the determining cause of ethno-nationalist violence. Not all divorced Protestant males who are unemployed commit suicide, as Aron

(1961:202) famously pointed out concerning the argument in Durkheim's celebrated study on suicide in modern society (1897). To show that unemployment preconditions suicide – or that political grievance preconditions ethno-nationalist violence -- is one thing, attributing suicide to unemployment is quite another. Precipitants are not to be confused with preconditions (Eckstein 1965). Are the micro-causal mechanisms of ethno-nationalist violence knowable or is the research on ethno-nationalist violence limited to putative relationships? Perhaps political grievances need a soil in which to flourish? That soil would have to provide insights into the temporal and geographic variations of ethnic violence and it would have to exhibit some predictive capacity.

This conclusion keeps with those that follow from a seminal review of explanations for the ethno-national conflict in Northern Ireland conducted by McGarry (1995) and his collaborator O'Leary (1995). Their review leads them to conclude that the literature exaggerates the importance of the self (culture) and of class-interest (grievance) to the detriment of ethno-national bonds.[7] If grievance and cultural distance are inadequate explanations for ethno-nationalist violence, then they may not be of much help in explaining the shift from ethno-nationalist conflict to ethno-nationalist violence. This does not invalidate grievance and cultural-distance explanations of ethno-nationalist violence. Ethno-nationalist violence is not

> a homogeneous substance varying only in magnitude. [...] Paradigmatic instances of ethnic and nationalist violence are large events, extended in space and time. [...] There is no reason to believe that these heterogeneous components of large-scale ethno-nationalist violence can be understood or explained through a single theoretical lens. Rather than aspire to construct a theory of ethnic and nationalist violence—a theory that would be vitiated by its

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[7] The same frustration already motivated Benedict Anderson's work (1983:65).

lack of a meaningful explanandum—we should seek to identify, analyze, and explain the heterogeneous processes and mechanisms involved in generating the varied instances of what we all too casually lump together—given our prevailing ethnicizing interpretive frames—as "ethno-nationalist violence." This can be accomplished only through a research strategy firmly committed to disaggregation in both data collection and theory building (1998:446-47).

To this end, alternative methods need to be brought to bear on ethno-nationalist violence; alternative ways of conceptualizing the phenomenon and of situating it in the context of wider theoretical debates, must be considered (Brubaker and Laitin 1998:427).

When they crowd into the seats in the assembly, or law courts or theatre,
or get together in camp or any other popular meeting places and,
with a great deal of noise and a great lack of moderation,
shout and clap their approval or disapproval of whatever is proposed or done,
till the rocks and the whole place re-echo,
and re-double the noise of their boos and applause.
Can a young man be unmoved by all this?
He gets carried away and soon finds himself behaving like the crowd and becoming one of them.
(Plato, *Republic*:492)

Chapter 3: The political demography of ethno-nationalist violence

The link between demographics and conflict is not new. However, many of the

conventional theories of political demography are not particularly helpful because

they misidentify the role that demographics play in ethno-nationalist violence.

The reason is that demographic explanations habitually focus on aggregate data

between and within states. While aggregate data are a salient dimension of this

investigation, a review of the existing literature on ethno-nationalist violence

suggests that much is presumed but little is actually known about the relationship

between demographics and ethno-nationalist violence.

Demography is a recent science. Belgian botanist and statistician Jean-

Claude-Achille Guillard coined the term demography in 1855 to denote the

scientific study of human populations in relation to the interplay brought about by

changes in births, deaths and migration. It began with English mathematician

John Graunt's observation of the underlying quantitative regularities in vital

events. His observations laid the foundation for the science subsequently styled

"political arithmetick" by his friend Sir William Petty (1682). Yet, the

preoccupation with the political implications of a population's size dates back to

the ancient Chinese, Greek and Arab civilizations (Dupâquier 1985; Spengler

1980, 1998).

As defined by Myron Weiner,

> Political demography is the study of the *size, composition*, and *distribution* of
> population in relation to both government and politics. It is concerned with the
> political consequences of population change, especially the effects of population
> change on the demands made upon governments, on the performance of
> governments, and on the distribution of political power. It also considers the
> political determinants of population change, especially the political causes of the
> movement of people, the relationship of various population configurations to the
> structures and functions of government, and the public policy directed at affecting
> the size, composition, and distribution of populations. Finally, in the study of
> political demography it is not enough to know the facts and figures of populations
> – that is fertility, mortality, and migration rates; it is also necessary to consider the
> knowledge and attitudes that people have toward population issues (Weiner
> 1971:567, emphasis added).

Political demography has a long history of misuse. Traditional theories about

how "demography is destiny" are either ill supported or they are unhelpful for the

purpose of explaining ethno-nationalist violence. Still, they warrant being

discussed because they convey important lessons. Three popular but misguided

examples of political demography will be examined critically in turn: the

postulated links between pressures of natural increase and conflict, youth and

conflict, and international differentials in natural increase and conflict. After

rejecting these overly broad claims, the chapter will examine the state of the

literature on the impact demographic differentials within states have on ethno-

nationalist violence.

3.1. The population-pressure hypothesis

One argument linking demography to conflict holds that the pressure exerted by

natural increase generates violence. Demographic pressure is thought to

occasion aggression, war, and revolution (Ross 1927; Thompson 1930;

Devaldés 1933; Bouthoul 1953; Sax 1955; Lorenz 1966; Ardrey 1966;

Hutchinson 1967).[8] This claim is commonly associated with Malthus when its

roots actually date back to William Petty, Thomas Hobbes, Sir Walter Raleigh, Sir

Edmund Spenser, and Sir Francis Walsingham (Spengler 1998). Malthusian

constraints emerge when the supply of labour incessantly outstrips demand and

the technological advancement capable of sustaining economic growth and

nourishing the population is sporadic (Coale & Hoover 1958; Meadows 1972):

> The greatest test for human society as it confronts the twenty-first century is how
> to find effective global solutions in order to free the poorer three-quarters of
> humankind from the growing Malthusian trap of malnutrition, starvation, resource
> depletion, unrest, enforced migration, and armed conflict (Kennedy 1993: 13).

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[8] One of the founding fathers of the United States of America, Thomas Jefferson, had already
expressed concern about the relation between demographic density and civic life (1801; Smith
1999). The preoccupation with the sterile notion of a population optimum, however, dates back to
Confucius and Plato. Confucius and his disciples posited the population (Goy-Sterboul 1974) and
its capacity to manage population growth (Huan-Chang 1911; Weber 1920) as its locus of power.
Given the ideal relationship between the number of inhabitants and the arable land, they believed
that there was an optimum (Chi Chao 1930; Lee 1921).

Plato's preoccupation with the topic of population in the Republic (Bks. II, IV, V) and in
the Laws (Bk. V) is similar. Plato worried about growth-induced depletion of soil, minerals and
forests (Moreau 1949; Spengler 1980:200-201). Socrates notes in the Republic:

> The number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the
> rulers, whose aim will be to preserve the average of population. There are many
> other things which they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and
> diseases and any similar agencies, in order as far as this is possible to prevent
> the State from becoming either too large or too small (Book V).

The ideal size of the city is 5040 (out of a total population of about 60,000) which is the number of
citizens "most likely to be useful to all cities [...] I have my reasons for choosing that number,"
affirms the Athenian. It has "59 divisors, 10 of them consecutive, starting with the unity, which
facilitates enormous possibility of different categorization." It will "furnish numbers for war and
peace, and for all contracts and dealings, including taxes and divisions of the land."

This claim is rooted in Ricardo's Iron Law of Wages: Attempts to improve the real income of workers are futile because they "naturally" tend towards a minimum level corresponding to the workers' needs of subsistence (1817:31, 50-58).[9]

The case of Italy is a good example. Between 1876 and 1915, 7.5 million Italians left Europe and a further 6.5 million left for other parts of Europe (Armengaud 1973:69). Between unification and the First World War, the average annual rate of increase remained elevated at 0.8 per cent. With the outbreak of war, migration was prohibited. As a result, migration dropped to 28,000 by 1918, a mere fraction of the 900,000 that had left only five years earlier. In addition, large numbers of Italians returned to their homeland. Italy had become a net importer of people. One of the most distinguished sociologists of the time found this development disconcerting, an omen of things to come:

> The sudden repatriation of so many people who had emigrated in the previous years put the government in a very embarrassing position. Italian emigration is of vital importance to Italy both economically and socially in that it constitutes the exodus of a true population excess, an excess which it is impossible to feed at home given the shortage of industrial resources and the density of the rural population. The return of this population excess, lacking the means of subsistence, brought with it the dangerous spread of unemployment. Indeed, at a time when the Italian economy was on the verge of stagnation as a consequence of the European war, the terms repatriate and unemployed had become synonymous. As a result, there arose a serious discontent among the masses. Those very repatriates, in the larger cities, constituted groups of the underfed who demanded work in tones not flattering to the state. There spread among the masses a spirit which can be summed up in the French revolutionary motto of '48: *Vive en travaillant ou mourir en combattant...* To many at the time the only way out of this dangerous situation seemed to be mobilization and war against Austria (Michels 1917:20).

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[9] A discussion of Ricardo in the context of population dynamics lies close at hand since the law of diminishing returns was as fundamental to his thought as to Malthus' (1967): "Although, then, it is probable that, under the most favourable circumstances, the power of production is still greater than that of population, it will not longer continue so; for the land being limited in quantity, and differing in quality, with every increased portion of capital employed on it there will be a decreased rate of production, whilst the power of population continues always the same" (Ricardo 1964:56). In other words, if supply of land or capital is presumed to be fixed, natural increase will precipitate a *per capita* decline of production.

Others have also connected demographic pressures in Italy at the time with its

incipient revolution (Ciuffoletti 1978:487-489; Delg'Innocenti 1978:1) and to

suggest emigration as the remedy (Bollettino, iii-iv, 1917:105-108; Coletti

1923:178, 193; Sulpizi 1923:45-150, 228-357). Although post-bellum emigration

peaked at 614,611 in 1920, in 1919, 1921 and 1922 it averaged between

200,000 and 300,000 people (ISTAT 1975:246-279 cited in Martellone 1984).

Immigration subsequently declined in absolute and in relative terms. Between

1911 and 1921, however, the number of adult males in Italy had swelled by one

million, an increase of 25 per cent over a decade (Ipsen 1990:166):

> By arresting emigration and encourageing repatriation the First World War [...]
> had an unique effect on Italian demography causing the working-age population
> to increase in spite of war casualties and disease. This phenomenon was
> identified by some [...] as a potential source of population pressure and, with
> demobilization, of social unrest, a situation made still worse by the closing off of
> the traditional safety valve of immigration to the United States. While the
> suggestion that Italian population pressure somehow led to Fascism is untenable
> -- why, for example a Fascist rather than a Socialist revolution? -- it is clear that
> the demographic element was perceived as relevant to the political climate of the
> day. Naturally, the demographic situation in Italy only partially explains the tense
> socio-economic climate prior to the Fascist revolution. [...] But [...] a complete
> picture must include the demographic context (Ipsen 1990: 168).

Increases in the cost of living, which stabilized in 1921 – at a time when wages

started to decline -- exacerbated demographic pressures: Inflation caused

stagnation which kept wages low. Unemployment continued to rise. When the

liberal governments of Giovanni Giolitti, Ivanoe Bonomi, and Luigi Facta failed to

stop the spread of anarchy, Benito Mussolini was invited by King Victor

Emmanuel III to form a government in October 1922.

Although Marxists and Neo-Classical economists theorize the relationship between natural increase and economic growth differently,[10] they arrive at the same conclusion: A population's growth is problematic when it exceeds economic growth and technological advancement (Keyfitz 1965). The Malthusian view has been summarized succinctly by Goldstone: "Substantially increased risks of violent political conflict are found when imbalances arise between population changes and the absorptive capacity of societies" (2001:52). This view can be formulated as an empirically testable hypothesis:

H_m: *The probability of political conflict is a function of a population's growth minus its society's carrying capacity.*

This hypothesis, however, is empirically suspect (Füredi 1997; Teitelbaum & Winter 1998: 198; Goldstone 2002). For instance, Tad Homer-Dixon's (1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999; Homer-Dixon, Boutwell & Rathjens 1993; Percival & Homer-Dixon 1996, 1998; Homer-Dixon & Blitt 1998) thesis on civil and international conflict ensuing from the long-term environmental degradation

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[10] Marxists assume that surplus value varies in proportion to changes in population. If population increases at the same rate as variable capital, surplus value and constant capital must also be increasing at the same rate; consequently, the various ratios which these variables define, the rate of surplus values, the wage rate, and the rate of profit, must all be constant. If population increases at a slower rate than variable capital, the effect is a rise in the wage rate. Correspondingly, the rate of profit and the rate of surplus value both decline due to the rates of increase in constant and variable capital being greater than the rate of increase in surplus value. If, however, population increases at a faster rate than variable capital, the wage rate declines. Since the rate of surplus value exceeds the rate of increase in constant and variable capital, the rate of surplus value and the rate of profit must both rise (Wilgert 1974).

Ceteris paribus, neo-Classical economic theory posits shifts in the marginal productivity curves for both labour and capital. When the population increases faster than the rate of increase in variable capital (Neo-Classicists equate any increase in capital with an increase in the demand for labour), the marginal productivity would rise. This is explicable in terms of the changing proportionality in which the two factors are combined. As the marginal productivity of labour curve shifts downward, the wage rate drops, and as the marginal productivity of capital shifts upward, the rate of profit rises (Coontz 1968: 108). This single-sector growth model, however, accounts neither for the substitution of labour by capital nor for the increase in labour supply due to women entering the workforce.

arising from development has little empirical support (Deudney 1990; Levy 1995;

Gleditsch 1998; Hauge & Ellingsen 1998; Baecheler 1998; Esty et al. 1995,

1998; Diehl 1998). Similarly, the State Failure Task Force found no significant

effects for size, density, increase or youth-cohort size as a cause of violent

conflict (Esty et al. 1998). These findings, save size, are echoed by Fearon and

Laitin (2003). They found size to correlate with the likelihood of insurgency.

Although more populous countries are more prone to civil war in general, they

are no more prone to ethnic war in particular. Simultaneously, the hypothesis

that increase and density lead to conflict is unsupported empirically (Tir & Diehl

1998; Goldstone 2001):

> There is no clear empirical evidence to support the widely held view that low-
> income, high-population-growth, high-density countries are more violent [...] than
> countries with higher *per capita* incomes, lower increase rates, and lower
> population densities, or any combination of these variables (Weiner and
> Teitelbaum 2001:52).

If the evidence does not support the materialist claim that natural increase

correlates with political violence, then it is improbable that natural increase would

correlate with ethno-nationalist violence.

3.2 The Youth-Bulge Hypothesis

The youth-bulge hypothesis is a more targeted variant of the population-pressure

hypothesis. This label encompasses four distinct hypotheses that are widely

confounded. First, it may refer to the cohort's absolute size. Second, it may refer

to the cohort's proportion relative to the rest of the population in general. Third, it

may refer to the cohort's proportion relative to the adult population. Technically,

finally, it refers to the phenomenon that results when a boom in population

growth goes bust and then "echoes" (Foot 2001). Even though fertility may be decreasing overall, the base of the population is of sufficient size that a slight resurgence in fertility will "echo" in the form of a bulge. All of them enjoy limited empirical support (Urdal 2001).[11]

"Youth" has been posited as "a force in the modern world" (Moller 1968). Politically volatile times often coincide with the presence of a disproportionate number of youth among a population (Esler 1974; Moller 1974; Fuller 1990; Goldstone 2001:95): "The Protestant Reformation is an example of one of the outstanding youth movements in history" (Huntington 1996:117). Demographic growth played a major component of the Eurasian revolutions of the mid-seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries (Goldstone 1991:24-39). The "Age of the Democratic Revolution" in the latter half of the eighteenth century coincided with a notable increase of the number of young people in those countries. That growth continued to fuel tumult across Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century (Feuer 1972). The rise of fascism has also been attributed to a rise in the numbers of young people (Ipsen 1990). In the 1960s, the baby boomers wreaked havoc the world over. The relationship between cohorts of youth, movements of protest against all forms of authority, and attempts to bring down governments is apparent: Paris in 1968, Dacca in 1971, Tehran in 1979, Manila in 1986, Seoul in 1988, Tiananmen Square in 1989, Jakarta in 1998 (Weiner and Russell 2001:7; Fuller 1990). Movements of religious fundamentalism such as Wahibism in Saudi Arabia, its Taliban variant in

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[11] Although this conclusion follows from Urdal's research, his research fails to recognize that he is actually dealing with four discreet phenomena.

Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in the Occupied Territories thrive

in areas with some of the greatest concentrations of youth in the world.

Consider Hamas' most fervent supporter, the country where the idea of

the Islamic revolution materialized: Iran. In 1966, youth constituted 15 per cent

of the population. The proportion exceeded 20 per cent by 1979 when the

Islamic revolution overthrew the Shah (Afhajanian 1990:239). Is the peak in the

proportion of youth in Iran around the time of the Revolution incidental? In

neighbouring Iraq, the return of political stability subsequent to the volatility it

experienced throughout the 1960s coincides with a decline in the proportion of

youth.

Figure 1 Figure 3.1: Youth as Percentage of Total Population of Iran and Iraq, 1950 - 2000

(Source: UN Population Projection, 2000 revision)

Figure 2Figure 3.2: Ratio of Youth to Adult Populations of Iran and Iraq (in Percent)

(Source: UN Population Projection, 2000 revision)

Today, half of Iraq's population is under 15 and two-thirds of Iran's population is under 30. Their population pyramids contrast starkly:

Figure 3 Figure 3.3: Population Pyramid for Iran, 2000

The concentration of teenagers among Iran's population suggests that the potential for political instability in the country remains elevated. The base of Iran's population, however, is shrinking. By contrast, the base of Iraq's population, and concomitantly the concentration of youth among the population, continues to expand.

Figure 4 Figure 3.4: Population Pyramid for Iraq, 2000

Iraq: 2000

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base.

Psychological and psychiatric research has long posited rebellion as a natural and universal characteristic of youth (Hall 1905). The theory on the culture of violence (Felson, Liska, Sourth, & McNulty, 1994), psychopathology theory (Lewis, Shanock, Pincus, & Glasser, 1979), social-cognition theory (Markus & Zajonc, 1985), drive theory (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), instinct theory (Freud, 1950; Lorenz, 1966; McDougall, 1908; Trotter, 1916), social-learning theory (Bandura & Walters, 1959), conflict theory (Dahrendorf, 1968), and impression-management theory (Felson, 1981, 1982; Mason, 1998) have attempted to explain the mechanisms that form the foundational basis for the relationship between youth and conflict.

Two distinct but related explanations emerge. One explanation holds that violence is a collective enterprise entered into as a response to the problems of growing up in a fundamentally unequal society. The other explanation holds that diminished prospects of finding gainful employment during times of economic decline lead to greater dis-satisfaction and that the frustration unleashed by "urban pauperism" increases the propensity for violence (Choucri 1974:73).

The outbreak of domestic armed conflict is more likely when young people are excluded from political and economic participation, particularly when they are well educated and urbanized and with few prospects of finding gainful employment (Goldstone 2001:40). On the one hand, education is thought to make youth risk averse by raising opportunity cost (Collier 2000). On the other hand, the ambitions of the "intellectual proletariat" may be frustrated by insufficient economic opportunities to match their level of education (Feierabend and Feierabend 1966; Gurr 1969; O'Boyle 1970; Doyle 1984; Remington 1990): "A rapid increase in educated youth aspiring to elite positions [increases] the risk of violent internal political and ethnic conflicts" (Goldstone 2001:87). These conditions foster "a climate of radicalism particularly among unattached youth who have the least to lose" in a struggle; consequently, countries where the population is growing more rapidly than the economy and whose undiversified economy is highly susceptible to market fluctuations, have an enlarged reservoir of "latent rebellion" (Braungart 1984:16).

A tight labour market may, therefore, be the best antidote to youth violence (Collier & Hoeffler 2001:6). Similarly, adequate and reasonably stable revenues, manageable debt, low and constant inflation, and a sound and reliable monetary and banking system appear to obviate conflict (Goldstone 1996:33).

Once again, Goldstone summarizes the essence of the argument: "When social and political conditions are such that a majority of the population is at least thinking about rebellion, the dynamics of revolution may be greatly affected by

the age-distribution of the population" (1999:6-7). Stated in the form of an

hypothesis that can be tested empirically, this view can be formulated as:

H_y: The probability of political conflict is a function of the proportion of youth
minus their society's carrying capacity.

That is what one would expect to find if quality of life is a function of a

population's structure (Easterlin 1980). The outlook for a large younger

generation is generally bleak. The economic fortunes of young workers, that

includes earnings, unemployment experience, and rate of advance up the career

ladder, will be adversely affected. The economic environment during the critical

family-forming years is also likely to be unfavourable – characterized by

"stagflation," it is a combination of high unemployment and accelerating inflation.

Young families will be pressured to postpone having children. During times of

economic decline, often preceding conflict, the crude birth rate tends to drop:

People are less likely to get married during difficult times or are less likely to have

children (Lee 1990). Psychological stress among young adults will be

comparatively severe, and suicide, crime, and feelings of alienation unusually

high. Life for a small generation of young people is disproportionately good. The

severity of the conditions that have been identified as symptomatic of a general

deterioration in the economy and society, such as stagflation, rising crime and

suicide rates, accelerating divorce and illegitimacy, will abate as the pressure of

numbers diminishes.

When the population grows faster than the economy, unemployment

becomes a formative experience for the younger generation. From a

functionalist perspective, weak integration leads to inter-generational conflict

(Parsons 1942; Eisenstadt 1956). A common social experience and common location may cause shared consciousness of *being* a generation to congeal. They then become unified as a political actor. The sociology of knowledge (Mannheim 1926) as well as the anthropology of age-class systems (Stewart 1977; Bernardi 1985) argues that certain ideas are tied to specific classes and social forces. How do cultural generations become political generations that create social dynamics (Mentré 1920; Ortega y Gasset 1923, 1933; Mannheim 1928; Thibaudet 1936: 525; Bengtson 1975; Attias-Donfut 1988: part 3)? Politics, economics or geography may fragment generations into "generational units" of people with common grievances (Braungart 1984). Generational consciousness arises out of formative experiences such as military victory or defeat, bullish or bearish economic times, or even a change in the size of a cohort (Goldstone 1999:4-5). The generation is thus bound together by shared hopes and disappointments. Common disillusionment defines a sense of opposition (Feuer 1969: 25).

Since crowds are largely composed of young people, a generation of young people can be equated with a crowd. But a crowd is not a crowd until the "discharge" happens, until the "burdens of distance," difference of rank, status and property, are lost (Canetti 1978:15). Egalitarian misfortunes of this sort engender opposition that manifests itself in an "ethical compulsion" which induces generational struggle (Feuer 1969:32).

Young people are more readily attracted to new ideas and religions. Thereby they challenge traditional forms of authority (Goldstone 2001:95; Nevitte

1996). The older generation, by contrast, is more conservative, deferential and reluctant to embrace radical change. Yet, there is no strict causal relationship between age and political attitudes (Eberstadt 1998a:38). Still, age has been shown to have a moderate albeit subordinate impact on political attitudes (Gini 1930; Tews 1987; Bürklin 1987). With fewer responsibilities, young people "are free, to a unique degree, of the constraints that tend to make activism too time-consuming or risky for other groups to engage" (Goldstone 1999:3). Lower opportunity cost makes them more predisposed to risk (Wright 1964:164; Collier 2000:94).

Based on *prime facie* evidence, Huntington argues that the proportion of youth correlates with levels of political violence (1996:259-261). Moreover, episodes of political violence are often preceded by a rise in the number of educated youth (Goldstone 2001:95; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1990:196-197). Periods of improvement, followed by periods of decline, increase domestic volatility because expectations that had previously been raised can no longer be met (Davis 1962, 1969). Economic viability is identified as the predominant explanation for rebellion (Collier & Hoeffler 2001) and, more recently, terrorism (Ehrlich & Liu 2002). The State Failure Task Force found that the risk of crises doubles in countries with above-average levels of urbanization but below-average levels of GDP/capita (Esty et al. 1998:15). Yet, national economic performance has been shown to have only marginal effects on *ethnic* conflict (Esman 1990). The old addage that idle hands let the devil toil is just too simplistic.

Still, there is good reason for conjecturing a link between youth and ethno-nationalist violence. Youth have the least to lose when it comes to rectifying material deprivation. Conversely, they stand to gain the most from taking collective action because they still have many years to live. They are also engaged in an inter-generational struggle, one that may be directed at the older generation of the competing ethnic group if that group can be held responsible for the first group's plight. Empirically, however, the link between youth and ethno-nationalist violence remains unsubstantiated. The State Failure Task Force found a population's youthfulness to amount to a necessary *precondition* for ethnic *conflict* (Esty et al. 1995). But youthfulness does not explain why a latent conflict turns violent, why the conflict transpires along an ethnic divide, and why an ethnic conflict gives way to ethno-nationalist violence.

In fact, the relationship between rapid population growth and ethno-nationalist violence has only received sustained attention in a single case: Sri Lanka (Pfaffenberger 1990; Braungart 1984; Fuller 1984).[12] Sri Lanka's worst episode of political violence, the Sinhalese nationalist JVP rebellion in 1971, coincided with a "youth bulge" (Braungart 1984:14-15; Pfaffenberger 1990:253). The Sinhalese nationalist insurgency in 1970 and the Tamil reaction in 1980 occurred during the same years as a bulge in the 15 to 24 cohort. The Sinhalese insurgents were reportedly all under 24. The Tamil Tigers were even younger, partially due to a concerted effort by the Liberation Tigers to prevent young male Tamils from leaving the Jaffna peninsula (Pfaffenberger 1995).

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[12] Pfaffenberger's analysis, however, is the least interesting of the three because it treats youth as an epiphenomenon to unemployment.

Figure 5Figure 3.5: Distribution of Population in Sri Lanka, age 15-24

Distribution of Population in Sri Lanka, age 15 - 24, 1950 - 2000

(Sources: Fuller 1984:153, New York Times, 15 October 1994:3; Economist, 5 August 1995:32; Huntington 1996:259-261; UN Population projections 2000)

A decline in the crude birth rate since 1985 has been paralleled by diminishing tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils. Now that the boom in natural increase has given way to a bust, hostilities have ceased and both sides are working towards reconciliation and coexistence. In other words, the Sri Lankan case study validates the State Failure Task Force's findings. Yet, ethnic conflicts are as punctuated by high birth rates as they are by political grievance.

The claim ethno-nationalist violence is the result of women bareing too many children, therefore, is untenable. In other words, youth may be a necessary but hardly a sufficient condition for ethno-nationalist violence: The proportion of youth among the population as a whole explains neither the *ethnic* nor the *violent* nature of a conflict.

3.3. The international-differential hypothesis

Recent scholarship has raised the spectre of an international clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996) precipitated by a bifurcation in fertility rates (Teitelbaum & Winter 1985). Although population trends have never been a reliable indicator of the countries that will be economic powerhouses of the future (Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001:6), demographic competitors allegedly benefit from "future workers and soldiers" (Huntington 1996:86). Conventional wisdom holds that, "the larger the nation, the more soldiers it could mobilize for its armies; the more densely populated the land, the better it could resist the incursions of its neighbors; the more rapid the growth of population, the more easily could men be spared to found colonies, engage in international trade, and carry abroad the national language and culture" (McIntosh 1983:28).

Countries with low fertility are suspicious of countries with high fertility (Enloe 1993:16) for eugenical and realist reasons. The eugenical concern is that the least talented and least provisioned with resources tend to proliferate most rapidly. A growing and increasingly mobile global underclass may precipitate the incipient political, economic, cultural and military decline of the West (Castles &

Miller 1998: 104). That conclusion is reminiscent of Malthus' anxiety about the

bifurcation in natural increase between Ireland and the remainder of Europe.[13]

While the popularized version of Malthusian thought has been sanitized of his

Puritan moralism, Malthus' real concern was not overpopulation per se but a

disproportionate rise in the size of the underclass which he represents as more

numerous, less industrious, and less moral. He believed that they threatened the

ruling elites of the social order (1807). In effect, the first edition of Malthus'

"Essay on the Principle of Population" in 1798 was a *polemical* riposte to

Godwin's (1793:Book 8, chapter 7) and Condorcet's (1795:187-192; Spengler

1942:259-263; Stangeland 1904: 228, 273, 283, 344; Griffith 1926:chapter IV;

Tomaselli 1988) utopian proposals which he feared would increase the number

of paupers.[14] The phobia proved especially popular with nationalists such as the

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[13] The bifurcation persists to this day.

[14] The polemical points of the Essay are too readily misinterpreted if one fails to contextualize Malthus, Godwin and Condorcet in the utopian tradition. The moralizing Puritanism inherent in Malthus' apprehension about the apparent proliferation of immorality and pauperism in urbanizing eighteenth-century England is reinforced by the fact that his own evidence does not support his point. Malthus was the first professor of political economy in England (Keynes 1972: 91). Yet, the science that motivates his claims is suspect. France may be the cradle of anti-populationism (Voltaire 1771; Schumpter 1954: 252; Burguière 1995). Paradoxically, however, anti-populationism matured in industrializing and expansionist England (Smith 1951), despite the fact that, in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, the ratio of economic growth to natural increase exceeded that of France (Weir 1991):

> The most interesting thing to observe is the complete lack of imagination which [the] vision [of Malthus, Mill, and Ricardo] reveals. Those writers lived at the threshold of the most spectacular economic developments ever witnessed. Vast possibilities matured into realities under their very eyes. Nevertheless, they saw nothing but cramped economies, struggling with ever-decreasing success for their daily bread. They were convinced that technological improvement and increase in capital would in the end fail to counteract the fateful law of decreasing returns. James Mill, in his Elements, even offered a "proof" for this. In other words, they were all stagnationists. Or to use their own term, they all expected, for the future, the advent of a stationary state (Schumpeter 1954: 571).

Ergo, the explanation for Malthus' conclusions must be sought in his moral and political mission (Behar 1987). Although Malthus never reversed his conclusion entirely, he bridled his pessimism in subsequent editions of the Essay.

German historian Treitschke (1897-1898:106-108), the French novelist Zola (1899), the fascist dictator Mussolini (1928), and the Nazi chief statistician Burgdörfer (1932, 1934). The perspective was ethnocentricized by Mesnard (1937) and racialized by Stoddard (1920).

Not long ago, American political journalist Wattenberg prophesied that the West's "slow-motion demographic suicide would precipitate the ascendancy of the "industrial Communist world" over the West by 2085 (1987). Differential fertility breeds resentment towards those "who reproduce at a much faster pace. This animosity is rooted in the belief that the faster-growing species will encroach upon, and eventually overwhelm, a population with static or declining numbers" (Kennedy 1994: 40). This dystopian perspective was popularized by Spengler (1918-1922) and Toynbee (1949) but also counts among its adherents Kuczynski (1928) and Vogt (1948), and has recently been popularized by Connelly and Kennedy (1994) and Raspail (1995). Differences in natural increase of national populations are also thought to engender environmental degradation, health risks, and economic collapse (Kennedy 1993: 32). This global-chaos theory, however, is no longer premised chiefly on quantitative differential:

> Quantitatively, Westerners [...] constitute a steadily decreasing minority of the world's population. Qualitatively, the balance between the West and other populations is also changing. Non-Western peoples are becoming healthier, more urban, more literate, and better educated (Huntington 1996:84-85).

Giovanni Botero's (1589) equation between population and power has inspired realists (Organski 1961a, 1961b; Morgenthau 1967:106-158; Waltz 1979; Knorr 1956; German 1960; Bremer 1980:60; Wallerstein 1991). Stated in the form of an hypothesis that can be tested empirically, this view can be formulated as:

H$_i$: Differentials in inter-national fertility make international conflict more probable.

The emphasis on differential size, however, has been found to be misplaced: "Far more important is the size of the effective population, which contributes actively to overall national productivity and which can in fact be mobilized in any military confrontation" (Choucri 1974:200; Wright 1964:285). In the age of Louis XIV and after, there were debates as to what proportion of the total population might be removed from economic production without adverse effect. A century earlier Jean Bodin observed: "One should never fear there being too many subjects or too many citizens seeing that there is neither wealth nor strength but in men" (cited in Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001:24). Yet, neither a population's demographic dynamics nor its demographic composition translates into military power and effectiveness (Angell 1913; Levy & Krebs 2001:66; Weiner & Teitelbaum 2001:23-44). One need only think of Israel's disproportionate military power compared to the size and structure of its population.

The classic variant of this hypothesis posits an uneven increase in population in different countries as a cause of war (de Bliokh 1898; Balas 1936, Wright 1964:294-295): "Differential rates of population change are often a critical consideration in a conflict situation" because they shape attitudes towards acceptable casualties and relative power (Choucri 1974:202). A newer alternative hypothesizes that aggression results from a population's growth because war takes on the sociological function of "demographic relaxation" (Aron 1962:236). Yet neither density nor overpopulation has been found to cause war

(Bremer, Singer and Luterbacher 1973; Choucri 1974; Keyfitz 1980b). In fact, countries perceived as overpopulated are notoriously weak and thus far more likely to be the victim than the aggressor (Organski 1961b:239). In the end, the materialist claim that links population growth, economic development, national power (as measured in terms of economic growth) and international conflict is tenuous. The relationship between population growth and international conflict is indeterminate, outside of specific societal and institutional contexts (Levy & Krebs 2001:69-81; Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001; Füredi 1997).

Although the hypothesis on the impact of *international* differentials is not supported empirically, it introduces a comparative perspective. The focus on differentials emerges as a vital component of a demographic assessment of ethno-nationalist violence from the review of the literature on ethno-nationalist violence that follows.

3.4. Demographics and ethno-nationalist violence

These domestic differentials have not been well-studied. The remainder of this investigation endeavours to show that this is a serious gap in the literature which, in light of the explanatory and predictive potential of differential demographic trends, merits further consideration. Issues of the differential growth and asymmetric age structure of ethnic groups prove to be salient in understanding the dynamic of ethno-nationalist violence; so, it is surprising that more work has not been done on these topics. Although not studied systematically, a few studies have touched on related issues. Demographic differentials tend to come

up in two contexts. First, the idea of a threshold a critical mass comes up time and again. It is commonly thought that 20 per cent is the point at which point a subordinate group's size and growth start to have a detrimental impact on political stability. Second, the rate of differential growth between groups that are already close in size is also thought to have a detrimental impact on political stability. Neither of these ideas narrows in on violence. Instead, their preoccupation is of a broader nature, namely with political instability in general. Yet, the studies that explore the political implications of demographic differentials between ethnic groups are worth mentioning because they provide a trajectory of sorts of the research being conducted in this investigation.

First, then, is the idea of a threshold or critical mass for minorities. In Israel-Palestine, this notion has guided policy made by successive Israeli governments, as applied to both the size of the Palestinian minority as a proportion of the total Israeli population and the size of the Palestinian population in so-called mixed cities. The threshold has been upheld with regard to Jerusalem, and motivated the gerrymandering of the borders of Jerusalem after the unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967 to secure a Jewish majority in metropolitan Jerusalem. In the early 1990s, immigration from the former Soviet Union brought one million immigrants to Israel. One-third of them is technically not Jewish but with the aid of social construction, the government counts them with the Jewish population in order to offset any possibility that the count might increase the size of the Arab population so as to cross the 20-per cent threshold. Thus far, however, the evidence cited in support of this figure

has been impressionistic. Impressionistic evidence, however, runs the risk of tautological motivations.

Second, the differential-increase hypothesis has been advanced to explain ethnic tensions in Belgium, Nigeria and South Africa. Its most eloquent formulation is found in Monica Duffy Toft's investigation of differential population trends in Israel: "The more rapid the rate of differential growth between groups, and the closer in magnitude the growing group is to other groups, the more likely a democratic state is to be destabilized by differential demographic growth" (2002:158). Note, however, that Toft's hypothesis pertains to political instability in a democratic state. It does not hone in on violence per se. While political instability and violence are obviously related, no inference can be drawn from political instability to violence because the former neither implies nor necessitates the latter.

Aside from Judah's work on Kosovo and some peripheral work on demographic differentials in Northern Ireland and Israel which will be taken up in a later chapter, only Courbage and Fargues (1987) have explicitly applied the hypothesis in their attempt to explain the Lebanese civil war. Due to Lebanon's bifurcated fertility, it was only a matter of time before Muslims were to outnumber Christians. By the 1970s, despite Christian immigration from Syria, Egypt and Iraq, Christians found themselves the minority (42.9 per cent) in a country where less than 20 years earlier they had been the majority (Courbage & Fargues 1997:198). Moreover, in 1970, 42.17 per cent of the inhabitants of Beirut were under 15 (Boudjikanian 1994:265). The majority of them were Muslims because,

despite being surrounded by population groups with record fertility rates, Lebanese Christians were the first Arab population to achieve a demographic transition by the mid-1980s (Courbage & Fargues 1997:185). Three decades of constitutional order collapsed. A decade and a half of civil war followed. As a result of a deceleration in natural increase during the early 1980s, the proportion of people under the age of 15 in Beirut had fallen to 32 per cent by 1991. Hostilities ceased.

These isolated studies are suggestive. Before embarking on a more general framework for examining the impact of differential differential demographics on ethno-nationalist violence in subsequent chapters, however, sceptics deserve a hearing. Notably, Krebs and Levy dispute the putative relationship between differential demographics and ethnic *conflict* on two grounds (2001:82).

First, they claim that the hypothesis that differential demographic trends within states occasion conflict fails to recognize that identity is variable:

> A particular identification, whether along gender, class, ethnic, or religious lines,
> is neither constant nor exclusive, and thus a full explanation of the dynamics of
> ethnic conflict must explain why a particular ethnic identity comes to dominate all
> other possible identities and why violence conflict follows (2001:82).

The premise that identity is fluid and variable is well documented (Horowitz 1975:113; Brass 1991, Wieviorka 2001). Yet, Krebs and Levy do not consider the possibility differential demographic growth itself causes ethnic identity to congeal. As will be shown below, empirical evidence exists substantiating the synthesis of consciousness of youth and ethnicity into what is known as

"youthnicity" (Malewska 1986; Fornäs 1992; Vinsonneau 1996),[15] a phenomenon that has been observed among Muslim youth in Xinjiang (Smith 2000).

Second, Krebs and Levy point out that differential fertility between ethnic groups does not determine conflict in heterogeneous societies. Ethno-nationalist violence in Kenya, for example, has been less frequent than one might expect even though the dominant Luo are very concerned about the rate of increase among the Kikuyu. Differentials exist among many of the former Russian satellites, especially throughout Central Asia, in the absence of ethno-nationalist violence (Anderson & Silver 1995). In short, the existing literature contains some suggestive ideas as well as some scepticism abou the link between demographics and ethno-nationalist violence.

At this point, it is impossible to tell whether there is anything to the idea of a critical mass or not. The proposition has yet to be investigated systematically and, as a later chapter will explain, there are good methodological reasons for this dearth. The same reasons explain why the demographic-differential hypothesis has not received more systematic attention. The literature thus intimates that there is a demographic story to be told about ethno-nationalist violence. Yet, the variables and data currently being deployed have thus far failed to capture it.

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[15] The evidence also suggests that this consciousness may be gendered (Malewska-Peyre and Zaleska 1980; Malewska 1981; Zaleska 1982; Yildirim 1997) but that point remains controversial (Phinney 1990).

3.5 Conclusion

One problem that emerges from the review of the literature is that the research that attempts to broach the relationship between demographics and political instability in general, and the research on demographics and ethnic conflict and ethno-nationlist violence in particular, tends to be carried out rather unsystematically. That is, there is no overarching theoretical framework from which the hypotheses that are being tested are being deduced. Instead, the research either proceeds in an impressionistic *ad hoc* fashion, almost testing possible hypotheses at random, or it proceeds inductively, analyzing a particular case from which non-generalizible conclusions are then drawn. The problem partially stems from the fact that almost all these investigations are carried out by individuals who understand a great deal about sociology or politics, but who do not have an expertise in demography.

One way of proceeding more systematically is to construct a theoretical edifice exploring the plausible relationship between demographics and ethno-nationalist violence. Since demography has three basic variables, it makes intuitive sense to start with those: Fertility, mortality, and migration. In a closed system, population growth is determined by fertility and mortality; so, it makes intuitive sense to treat the two in tandem. Migration factors into the equation on population growth once the system is opened. Intuitively, therefore, it makes sense to explore the plausible relationship between migration and ethno-violence separately from fertility and mortality.

Chapter 4: Fertility, Mortality and Ethno-nationalist Violence – the independent variables

This chapter demonstrates the intuitive plausibility of a relationship between fertility, mortality, and ethno-nationalist violence. It does not investigate causal mechanisms. Initially, the chapter will treat fertility and mortality as distinct variables. Its objective is to show that they are connected through the phenomena of natural increase and population structure and that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that their relationship with ethno-nationalist violence is worth testing. It then posits this relationship in the form of two hypotheses.

Demography has two dimensions: Difference and change. Demographic *difference* refers to a population's *composition*. Demographic change refers to the *dynamics* that give rise to composition. Demographic change is a function of a *population structure*. Population structure is determined by three basic demographic variables: Fertility, mortality and migration. Instead of treating demographics exogenous, the dissertation takes *fertility*, *mortality* and *migration* as its points of departure. Since internal violence involves interethnic dynamics, the dissertation will theorize a political demography of ethno-nationalist violence by dis-aggregating these variables.

4.1. Age structure and the demographic transition

A population's potential for natural increase is a function of the synthetic measures of reproduction and survival: the average number of children produced

by a generation of women during the course of their reproductive lives[16] and, in the hypothetical absence of mortality, the average number of years lived for a generation of newborns[17]. The former has biological and social determinants: the frequency of births during a woman's fecund period and the portion of the fecund period – between puberty and menopause – used for reproduction.[18]

The condition associated with the change of a population from high fertility and mortality to low fertility and mortality is known as the demographic transition. In the pre-transitional period, the crude birth rate (CBR) and the crude death rate (CDR) cancel each other out. Improvements in health care and sanitation then cause the CDR to fall while the CBR remains constant. As the opportunity cost of having children rises, the CBR starts to fall as well. Eventually, the two will once again be in a stable equilibrium where they cancel each other out. This is the post-transitional phrase. That equilibrium is short-lived because the CDR ends up exceeding the CBR. This phase has been dubbed the second demographic transition.

Figure 6Figure 4.1: The demographic transition

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[16] The average number of children per woman, or total fertility rate (TFR), is the sum of age-specific mortality rate for women between the minimum and maximum ages of reproduction, $f_x=B_x/P_x$ where B_x is the number of births per woman age x and P_x is the female population age x.
[17] It is determined by the force of mortality at various ages, which in turn is determined by the species' biological characteristics and relationship with the surrounding environment
[18] Pursuant to the Bongaarts-Menken model (1983), the number of children is obtained by dividing the length of the reproductive period (age at birth of the last child minus the average age at marriage) by the interval of birth.

Figure 7Figure 4.2: Population structure

During the pre-transitional phase (stage I), the population size remains stable.

Once the CBR exceeds the CDR (stage II), however, the population starts to

grow. At the beginning of this stage, growth is rapid (first graph below) but slows

steadily (see second population pyramid below). When the CBR once again

equals the CDR (stage III), natural increase approaches zero (see third

population pyramid below). Beyond that equilibrium, growth becomes negative

as the CDR outpaces the CBR (fourth graph below). The population pyramids

below plot along the x-axis the range of ages of each cohort, starting at the

bottom with the youngest. A cohort is a given group of people who will

experience all of the various stages of life at about the same time by virtue of

having been born in the same period. The absolute size of each cohort is plotted

along the y-axis. The longer the bar, the larger is the cohort.

Figure 7Figure 4.2: Population structure

Stage 2a	Stage 2b	Stages 1&3	Stage 4

male female	male female	male female	male female
Rapid growth	Slow growth	Zero growth	Negative growth

This progression is both the cause and the effect of the way a population is structured. In the pre-transitional phase, CBR and CDR more or less cancel each other out. As a result, the population's structure is relatively young and the population pyramid relatively stable. As the CDR declines, the base of the population pyramid expands (first population above), not because of more births per se but because more children survive. As life expectancy increases, the population pyramid becomes more stretched out towards the top (second population pyramid above). The population's structure remains young. A young population can produce large cohorts which can later precipitate bulges (of the sort evidenced by the last graph where the absolute size of the cohort of young adults exceeds that of children). As the CBR starts to decline, however, the age structure becomes older because fewer children are born and people grow older (third population pyramid above). In theory, the process of ageing should stabilize a population's structure once CDR and CBR reach equilibrium again. Due to an ongoing gradual improvement in life expectancy, the population continues to age. This process of ageing accelerates once the CDR surpasses the CBR.

4.2. Fertility and ethno-nationalist violence

Since the thesis links differential demographic trends of ethnic populations within states with ethno-nationalist violence, fertility is integral to its argument. Fertility is the main determinant of population structure; consequently, it is a determinant of the numerical balance between groups. A decline in fertility of one group is not usually due to a rise in fertility of the other group. It is quite rare, although not unheard of, for fertility to rise substantially. Instead, infant mortality drops before fertility starts to decline (rather than the reverse). In the case of differentials in the CBR, one group's CBR declines more rapidly than the other's. The result is a relatively older age structure among the group whose fertility rate is declining more rapidly. The following typology about the relationship between fertility and conflict presents itself:

1. The majority may either have a higher fertility rate, which means the minority must have a lower fertility rate; or

2. The majority may have a lower fertility rate, in which case the minority must have the higher fertility rate.

Attempts at formulating a grand theory about fertility have thus far proven unsuccessful. In other words, the causes of fertility decline remain indeterminate (Easterlin and Crimmins 1985; Becker 1991:chapter 5). Instead, decline in fertility varies according to economic conditions, changing opportunities for women, tax policies, public policies toward childcare, housing costs, inflation rates, and changing cultural norms (Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001:7). Since these dynamics vary from the transnational, to the national and to the sub-national level, fertility rates differ not just among but also within states. Since

fertility is variable within states and since fertility is a determinant of natural

increase and population structure, it follows that fertility is likely to vary by ethnic

group as well. Ergo, the preliminary discussion of fertility supports the case for

an intuitively plausible relationship between fertility and ethno-nationalist

violence.

4.3. Mortality and ethno-nationalist violence

There is also a case to be made for a similarly plausible link between mortality,

grievance and cultural distance. Just as fertility differs between groups, so does

mortality. Natural increase is thus as much a function of a decline in infant

mortality as it is of a decline in adult mortality. The former, however, tends to

determine the latter. Societies with high infant mortality also tend to be societies

with a disproportionately young population.

Morbility is chiefly a function of war and disease. If minorities are

disproportionately predisposed to the effects of both, then minorities may be

predisposed to higher mortality rates than majorities. Internal wars have made

up over 80 per cent of war casualties since the end of the Second World War.

They now account for virtually all casualties (Sivard 1996:18-19). War's

contribution to mortality, however, tends to be indirect (Sorokin 1967). Of the 1.7

million deaths in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo in the

years 1999 and 2000, only 200,000 were the result of violence (Roberts et al.

2001). Although crude mortality rates can be up to 30 times higher compared to

base mortality lines during acute emergencies (Reed & Keely 2001; Murray and

Lopez 1996), war mainly contributes to rising mortality by undermining the infrastructure necessary to fend off disease. The World Health Organization, for instance, estimates that the deaths of as many as one-third of the one million Africans who succumb to malaria every year would be preventable, were it not for civil conflict. Malaria often kills more people in the aftermath of a conflict, war or natural disaster than died during the emergency.

Although the impact of war on demographic developments is more marginal than one might think (Urlanis 1971), violent conflict can have large and long-lasting effects that make it more likely for conflict to flare up again (Fearon & Laitin 2003). It thus precipitates shifts in the composition of age and gender, marriage and fertility rates, and population distribution. These effects increase exponentially in countries that are densely populated and whose population is growing rapidly. Density, therefore, may not be a determinant of violence, but it does account for high mortality rates precipitated by violence. Violent conflict invariably leads to a rise in mortality rates (especially among children) and large outflows of refugees and internally displaced persons (Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001:52). The unhygenic conditions under which displaced people tend to live, coupled with the destruction of health infrastructure and poor medical services, manifest themselves in a disproportionate rise in infant mortality.

Infants are highly susceptible to disease. If infant mortality is a function of disease, if high infant mortality is indicative of a younger population, and if minorities tend to have higher mortality rates because they are more predisposed to disease, then it is not surprising that infant mortality has been found to be one

of the strongest predictors of impending armed domestic conflict (Sen 1998; Esty

et al. 1998). Although infant mortality does not *cause* conflict, it does differ by

ethnic groups. Ergo, there exists a plausible link between mortality and ethno-

nationalist violence.

4.4. Population growth and ethno-nationalist violence

Having established plausible links between fertility and ethno-nationalist violence

and mortality and ethno-nationalist violence, this section explores the plausibility

of a link between population growth and ethno-nationalist. By wiping out large

parts of a population, epidemics can cause abrupt shifts in population structure

(McNeill 1990). Decreased life expectancy due to epidemics can reverse a

population's process of ageing. Life expectancy in Botswana used to be among

the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. It has plummeted to 35 years of age.

Epidemics such as AIDS have a disproportionate impact on younger cohorts.

Half of all students at the university in Gaberone are infected.[19] Women who are

infected by HIV still live through a good portion of their reproductive period. As a

result, there is no marked decline in fertility, at least not due to the epidemic

(although child mortality may rise as babies are born with AIDS). The process of

ageing may thus arrest or even reverse.

In South Africa, the incidence of AIDS ballooned from 0.7 per cent of the

population in 1990 to 24.8 per cent ten years later. Across the border in

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[19] The evidence from sub-Saharan Africa shows that, contrary to popular belief, the middle class is most prone to infection. Since young members of the middle class are mobile, often studying in the city and returning home on weekends, they spread the virus rapidly, far more rapidly than the poor whose immobility confines them to a relatively closely defined area.

Botswana, one-third of the population is infected. India today has the same rate of incidence South Africa had in 1990. At this point, it is spreading in India at a rate akin to that documented for South Africa. In India as in Africa, AIDS has an ethnic dimension. The prevalence of AIDS among Hindus is much higher than among Muslims. Together with its twin city Secunderabad, the mostly Muslim city of Hyderabad has a disproportionately low incidence of AIDS. One possible explanation is predicated on an objective cultural difference between Hindus and Muslims: The latter are circumcised. Medical research has shown that circumcision decreases the probability of contracting sexually transmitted diseases; hence, one might expect Muslims to be less likely to contract AIDS. This hypothesis withstands empirical scrutiny. If AIDS is partially a function of culture, its spread will affect demographic differentials between Muslims and non-Muslims (Jawahar 2003). About four-fifth of India's population is now Hindu. The Hindu proportion of the total population, however, has been in decline. This issue has been politicized by the main Hindu political mouthpiece, the ruling BJP.

Until now, the biggest concern has been the fertility rate of Muslims. Between 1981 and 1991, India's total population grew by 23.8 per cent. Over the same period, however, its Muslim population grew by 32.8 per cent. The alleged differential in fertility between the two groups is a chimera. The actual differences in the total fertility *rate* are marginal. Muslim women only appear to be bearing more children than Hindu women because the base of the Muslim population is younger. Hindus are left with the perception that Muslims are out-producing Hindus (DeVotta 2002). Perception is a powerful weapon (Horowitz

1985:175-184). In fact, natural increase among Muslims is a function of an expansion in the base of the Muslim population. Still, the population of Indian Muslims is actually in transition. Religion, then, is hardly the cause of differential increase between the two groups. However, it remains to be seen whether the reverse might be true: Does differential increase contribute to an upswing in religious fundamentalism?

Without factoring AIDS into the projection, Muslims may outnumber Hindus in India by the middle of the twenty-first century. Should AIDS spread in India at a rate comparable to South Africa's, it will hasten the demographic decline of Hindus – and the disproportionate demographic rise of Muslims in India. While India's Muslim population is currently structured younger than the Hindu population, the aforementioned experience in Botswana shows that AIDS has the potential of reversing a population's ageing trend. Were AIDS to spread rapidly among Hindus, it may cause the Hindu population to become younger. A young Muslim population would thus be confronted with a rejuvenating Hindu population.

Since HIV is most prevalent among the middle class, Hindu human capital is also being undermined. The likely result will be a redistribution of wealth between ethnic groups with the group able to retain a greater proportion of its human capital becoming more prosperous. AIDS is thus bound to narrow the demographic and economic gaps between Muslims and Hindus. The dictum *cuius regio eius religio* has been turned on its head (Bookman 1997:113). In a curious twist, religion now controls territory.

Unlike other epidemics, the spread of AIDS is reasonably predictable. It has been established how it spreads and who is most vulnerable. Preventative intervention, therefore, is possible. That, however, may only exacerbate tensions. As the benefits of the investment of scarce resources in preventative measures will accrue mainly to India's Hindu majority, ethnic tensions are bound to become further politicized. The potential effect of the AIDS epidemic on ethnic relations thus exemplifies a plausible link between population growth and ethno-nationalist violence.

4.5. The demographic "security dilemma"

This section uses a demographic derivative of the "security dilemma" to argue that the link between grievance, cultural distance and demographics is not accidental. Differential demographic trends affect a group's sense of security. The political decision to allocate resources unequally between ethnic groups in order to reinforce security and control has the unintended consequence of exacerbating the sort of differential demographic trends that lead to heightened insecurity: Disadvantaged ethnic populations tend to be younger because of earlier mortality and higher fertility (Kyriakos & Mindel 1987:chapter 3). Heightened insecurity is in large part the result of a widening age-structure gap between the two groups.

The health status of Israelis, for instance, is much higher than that of Palestinians. On average, people in Gaza people can expect to live 70.8 years. In the West Bank they can expect to live 72.1 years. In Israel, by contrast,

people can expect to live 78.6 years. In 2001, mortality rates in the Occupied Territories and in Israel were comparable: five deaths per 1,000 population and six deaths per 1,000 population, respectively. This is due to the radically different age structures resulting from the different levels of fertility. While 28 per cent of Israel's population is under 15 years of age, almost half of the Palestinian population is under 15. Palestinian infant mortality rates, however, are almost five times higher than in Israel, at 26 deaths per 1,000 live births, versus 5.3 deaths per 1,000 births, respectively. Within Israel itself, Arabs are an increasing proportion of the population. The Arab population has grown from just under half a million in 1980 to 0.9 million in 1998—an 80 per cent increase in 18 years. The Jewish population has grown from under 2.8 million to 4.8 million, a 74 per cent increase due primarily to Jewish immigration, that is, unlike Arab increase, not due to natural increase.

The explanation for this phenomenon hinges on longevity being a function of disease and war. Increased life expectancy due to improvements in sanitation and health care has two effects (Vovelle 1983:371; Chaunu 1995:557): infant mortality drops and people live longer.

At the outset, a decline in infant mortality leads to a younger age structure because initially there are relatively few people around to grow old but many more children who survive. Over time, however, the opportunity cost of having children rises. As a result, people have fewer children. In the meantime, high fertility has caused the base of the population pyramid to expand. The onset of a

demographic transition, therefore, will initially cause a younger age structure but, as longevity increases, will subsequently cause a population to age.

Asymmetric demographic transitions between ethnic groups will have differential effects on age structure. While the causes of decline in fertility remain indeterminate, mortality is essentially a function of disease; consequently differential mortality rates between groups are, for all intents and purposes, the result of political decisions. These decisions have the *unintended* consequence of exacerbating the demographic differential between ethnic groups, thus aggravating tensions.

Resources are scarce, their allotment political (Bowen 1996; Beck 1992). Yet, power and the distribution of scarce resources are a function of size (van den Berghe 1975:72; Hoetnik 1975:9; Olzak and Nagel 1986; Olzak 1992). In a biological system, the group that can secure access to a greater proportion of resources is also the one more likely to survive. Under circumstances of unequal distribution of resources, it follows that mortality rates differ. Ostensibly, members of the group that is able to secure better access to food, water, healthcare, housing, and so on should enjoy lower infant mortality and expect to live longer.

Since members of the group controlling a greater share of resources enjoy lower infant mortality and higher life expectancy, their overall TFR is bound to fall because the incentive for raising a large family has been undermined. Presently, the opportunity cost of raising a large family exceeds that of raising a small one.

At the same time, insecurity among the ethnic group with fewer resources heightens. Infant mortality may drop as well, but will remain high compared to the drop enjoyed by the ethnic group with greater resources. The same holds true for life expectancy; consequently, the incentive for the group commanding fewer resources to have fewer children is far less than that for the group commanding more resources. Among one group, infant mortality drops sharply; life expectancy improves. Among the other group, infant mortality decreases far more gradually. Improvements in life expectancy are equally gradual. This has the unintended consequence of widening the gap in infant mortality and life expectancy between the groups.

The result is two-fold. First, psychological misgivings about exploitation and mistreatment by the group with a greater share of resources are reinforced. Second, the group with fewer resources is now even less secure than it was before. If reproductive behaviour among ethnic groups is framed in biological parameters (van den Berghe 1978, 1981; Salter 2002), then a species under threat can increase its chances of survival if it starts reproducing faster. If greater insecurity causes that group's TFR to rise, the situation is now such that one group's TFR is dropping while the other's is rising. A demographic "security dilemma" ensues. In short, efforts by the dominant ethnic group to enhance its security by reducing mortality and improving life expectancy worsen security overall because the oppressed group may adjust its levels of fertility upward in response to unjust treatment that stimulates an instinctive drive for collective

survival. The demographic "security dilemma" thus serves to show that the link between demographics, grievance and cultural distance is not accidental.

4.6. Conclusion

The demographic "security dilemma" makes the strongest case yet for an intuitively plausible relationship between demographics and ethno-nationalist violence. This stage calls for the some hypotheses to be formulated that might allow for the plausible relationship between demographics and ethno-nationalist violence to be tested empirically while being able to control for grievance and for cultural distance. In other words, the hypotheses will be positing demographics, not grievance or cultural distance, as the independent variable. Two demographic variables warranting closer examination emerged from the discussion of the literature in the third chapter: youth and difference. Formulating an intuitively plausible relationship between fertility, mortality, and ethno-nationalist violence as an hypothesis, one thus might say that ethno-nationalist violence is improbable unless.

H1: Ethnic populations are young; and

H2: Ethnic populations are structured asymmetrically.

H1 accounts for the fact that fertility and mortality are determinants of age structure and that a younger age structure may be more problematic in terms of ethno-nationalist violence than an older one. H2 accounts for the effect of differentials in fertility and mortality between groups on age structure, that is, it accounts for the fact that some ethnic populations may be younger (or older)

than others. How are the two hypotheses related? Does one of them have greater explanatory and predictive power than the other? Do they provide a more accurate explanation and prediction of ethno-nationalist violence when taken together than as a stand-alone explanation or prediction? Only empirical testing can answer those questions.

Chapter 5: Migration and ethno-nationalist violence – the intervening variable

Now that the effect of natural increase has been hypothesized, migration remains as the third demographic variable to have an intuitively plausible impact on ethno-nationalist violence. Like the previous chapter, this chapter does not investigate causal mechanisms either. It is predicated on the idea that migration acts as a demographic "wild card" which has subsidiary effects on population structure and natural increase. The effect of migration on ethno-nationalist violence is posited as subsidiary because unlike birth or death, migration is not a discrete natural event. Nonetheless, it has the ability to distort a population's age structure. If ethno-nationalist violence is a function of differential demographic trends, then the way migration distorts age structure may either mitigate or exacerbate the potential for ethno-nationalist violence.

Research on migration tends to ask some combination of three questions. Who lives here *now*? Where did they live *then*? Who else lived *here* then? Migrants come in one of two basic varieties: economic and political. The former are usually thought of as immigrants, the latter are thought of as refugees or asylum-seekers. Political emigration is largely involuntary. Economic migrants, by contrast, make a conscious decision to relocate. This distinction matters because the age composition of the two groups differs. Involuntary migration usually involves entire populations, young and old.

5.1. Migration, demographic difference and ethno-nationalist violence

Violent conflicts generate migratory pressure (Teitelbaum 1992). Although the Thirty Years' War and the Napoleonic Wars displaced entire populations, their effect was minuscule compared to the migratory currents precipitated by the First and Second World Wars (Kulischer 1948). According the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2002), between 1992 and 2001 the top ten countries of origin for EU refugee claimants were Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, Iran, Somalia, and the Republic of Congo. Over the same period of time, the top three countries of origin of refugee claimants in Canada were Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sri Lanka and Somalia. Every one of the countries of origin wrestled with ethnic tensions during that time period. Hence the theory that the main cause of refugee movements in less-developed areas is not relative deprivation and underdevelopment but generalized and persistent violence (Zolberg, Suhrke & Aguao 1989:227-257). When conflict erupted after Bosnia declared its independence in 1991, half its population -- two million, mostly Muslims -- was displaced.

Involuntary migration can tilt precarious ethnic balances. An influx of refugees shoulders a country with economic and social burdens that readily lend themselves to nativist exploitation for the purpose of shoring up ethnic group sentiment (Swain 1996:969-970; Saunders 1991:2). A surge of illegal Bengali migrants from Bangladesh into the northeast Indian state of Assam, for instance, triggered fears of being "swamped," unsettled fragile land and electoral distributions and eventually culminated in internal violence (Weiner 1982;

Anderson 1990). Or take the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina where the results

of the 1990 census were a direct precipitant of war. The graph illustrates why:

Figure 8Figure 5.1: Ethnic Composition of Bosnia, 1961-1991

Ethnic Composition of Bosnian Population (1961 - 1991)

(Source: Judah 1997:155)

The graph shows that Croats and Serbs have passed through the demographic

transition while Muslims are only now embarking on it. The effect of differential

rates of growth was exacerbated by an exodus of Serbian youth to urban areas

in Serbia proper.

Neighbouring Kosovo used to be the most densely populated area in

Yugoslavia, in large part due to the fact that Albanian Muslims have the highest

birth rate in Europe. Between 1948 and 1981, the fact that the number of

Albanians in Kosovo doubled had a clear impact on their proportion of the

population:

Figure 9Figure 5.2: Ethnic Composition of Kosovo, 1948-1991

Ethnic Composition of Kosovo, 1948 - 1981

(Source: Judah 1997:155)

By the 1980s, almost half of the Albanian population in Kosovo was under 25 (Woodward 1995:32-35; Magas 1993:6, 19; Judah 1997:152). Serb emigration left behind a rump which, by 1991, made up less than 10 per cent of the population.

During the conflict in Kosovo, an estimated 250,000 Albanians streamed into the neighbouring Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mere provision of services for that large a population is a feat in itself and a huge strain on a small country such as Macedonia (about 25,000 square kilometres) that counts barely 2 million citizens. Prior to the influx of Albanians, Macedonia already harboured a sizeable Albanian minority. Relations between Macedonians and the Albanian minority had been lukewarm. In proportional

terms, Macedonia's Albanian minority is among the larger ones of any country in Europe.[20] Numbers bolster claims for recognition. Furthermore, Albanians are concentrated in the northeastern part of the country. Albanians are Muslims. Their TFR and CBR exceeds that of Orthodox Macedonians. The effect of differential fertility is exacerbated by the fact that the native Macedonian fertility rate is insufficient to sustain Macedonian growth. In effect, the ethnic Macedonian population is shrinking. Albanian growth is thus doubly potent. First, the Albanian population is growing while the Macedonian population is shrinking. Second, the influx of 250,000 Albanians from across the border in Kosovo doubled the number of Albanians in Macedonia. Were the refugees to stay, Albanians may soon become the plurality in Macedonia.

Similarly, of the 20 to 25 million Kurds in the world, half reside in Turkey where they make up about a quarter of the country's population, the same proportion they make up across the border in Iraq (Gurr & Harf 1994: 30-32). Kurdish hopes for an independent state were disappointed in the wake of the First World War. They have since been fighting for greater autonomy. By 1987, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) controlled much of northern Iraq. To reassert control, Baghdad used poison gas and bombed civilians indiscriminately. Millions of Iraqi Kurds sought shelter in Turkey and Iran. That influx reinvigorated the Kurdish rebellion already under way in Turkey. When similar prospects loomed after Kurdish defeats in northern Iraq in 1991, Turkey

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[20] Macedonia's Albanian minority exemplifies dubious data. Officially the Macedonian government pegs the Albanian minority at 22 per cent. In fact, the figure is substantially higher. According to anecdotal evidence, Macedonian officials for some time refused to issue birth certificates to Albanians. They excused this move by claiming that they were "out of paper."

was determined to buttress its national security by preventing mass inflows of the sort seen in 1987. Turkey's inhospitable stance notwithstanding, it still experienced an influx of an additional 1.5 million Kurds, boosting the number of Kurds in Turkey to almost 13 million. That means the *proportion* of Kurds among the Turkish population has more than doubled since 1965. Turkey's *total* population more than doubled over those three decades; consequently, the number of Kurds in Turkey over that period quadrupled. Such are the effects when natural increase due to high fertility is compounded by immigration. The situation is further complicated by Turkish migration from eastern and southeastern Anatolia towards urban centres in Western Turkey which transplants the conflict (Mutlu 1996). Those who migrate tend to be young. The potential for urban political violence has risen accordingly (Aksit, Mutlu et al. 1996).

Increased heterogeneity in urban centres due to rural-urban migration has been linked to violence elsewhere. Weiner (1978) documented this development in the Indian context. Varshney (2002) has studied the effects of such migration on ethno-nationalist violence in three cities which have borne the brunt of communal rioting in India: Ahmedabad, Baroda and Godhra. All are located in the state of Gujarat. This is significant because it underscores the fact that Hindu-Muslim riots are localized, not national, events. Between 1950 and 1995, rural India accounted for a mere four per cent of all deaths in communal violence. Within urban India, Hindu-Muslim riots are locally concentrated. Eight cities account for about 45 per cent of all deaths in Hindu-Muslim violence. Together,

however, these eight cities account for a mere 18 per cent of India's urban population and for only five per cent of the country's total population.

Historically, migration determines ethnic power. Russians in Kiev, Italians in the Julian Region after 1918, and Jews in Jerusalem in 1948 illustrate that the demographic presence of a dominant ethnic group is a pivotal factor in the incorporation or retention of regions in metropolitan states. Swedes lost demographic control over Helsinki, Germans over Prague, Budapest, and most other cities of east-central Europe during the rapid urbanization that occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century (Hepburn 1994:88-91). At the turn of the century, Vilna was a Polish and Jewish city, by 1940, it had become Lithuanian. Prior to 1948, Jaffa used to be Arab, Salonika used to be Turkish and Jewish, Izmir used to be Greek, Urumchi used to be Uighur (a city we will encounter again in a later chapter on China), Gdansk (Danzig) and Kaliningrad (Königsberg) used to be German, Lvov used to be Polish, while Sarajevo was a culturally heterogeneous rather than a Bosnian Muslim city.

The plausible link between involuntary migration and the potential for ethno-nationalist violence is thus two-fold. A surge of immigrants can "swamp" another ethnic group. Immigration may thus call another ethnic group's demographic predominance into question. At the very least, it consolidates the minority's demographic foothold in an area. The dominant group that enjoys a numerical majority at the national level may also be in the majority on the level of the area subject to immigration by kin of an ethnic minority already residing in that area. Alternatively, the dominant group may be in a minority in that area.

Immigration thus consolidates the subservient majority's numbers. Although this sort of immigration is rare on a large scale and necessarily limited to countries or areas that are already adjacent to one another, whether the dominant or the subservient group is in the majority or in the minority in that particular area may affect the transition from latent conflict to manifest violence.

5.2. The effect of migration on demographic difference and demographic change

In terms of a case for the plausible relationship between migration and ethno-nationalist violence, the impact of migration on demographic difference is only half the story. The other half is about the impact migration has on demographic change.

Migration is less costly for the single, unskilled, young adult than for the population at large. A family decreases mobility. Foreign languages become more difficult to acquire with age. The risk of leaving a job becomes greater as the chances of finding a new one decrease with age. In addition, young people are in better physical health than the very young or the old.

Since migrants tend to be young they have a significant impact on population structure. An influx of young people slows the ageing process of the population as a whole. It also affects fertility. Recent immigrants often adhere to values of reproduction different from those in the West; consequently, they often have a higher rate of natural increase. A high CBR will turn into a large cohort of youth. Inter-marriage tends to be the exception rather than the norm. For these

reasons, populations of recent immigrants tend to be younger and more homogeneous than more established populations.

Although "foreigners" accounted for less than nine per cent of Germany's total population, a quarter of Germany's "foreign" denizens in 1995 were below age 18. Most of these youths were born in Germany, renowned for having one of the lowest levels of fertility in the world.

Similarly, in the United States, Hispanics have surpassed Blacks as the country's largest ethnic minority. Hispanics in the United States also have a higher fertility rate than Blacks. Between 1995 and 2050, fertility and immigration is projected to cause the percentage of Hispanics to double, rising from 12 to 24 per cent of the population. Over the same timeframe, the proportion of blacks among the American population will rise marginally from 12 to 14 per cent.

The key to internal violence, however, is that these sorts of differentials do not play themselves out evenly across a country. As illustrated in the case of India, internal violence tends to be localized. A likely reason for this observation is the fact that rural-urban migration is almost solely responsible for urban increase (Keyfitz 1980a, Keyfitz & Philipov 1980). It follows that there is no shortage in young people in urban areas. And since migrants tend to gravitate towards centres where a diaspora of their ethnie is already established, the city's dominant ethnic group finds itself confronted with a new ethnic minority consisting of a rapidly growing group of young newcomers.

On the one hand, immigration may increase in the demographic proportion of a subservient ethnic minority, resulting in greater heterogeneity and thus a

decline in the demographic proportion of the dominant majority. On the other hand, immigration may precipitate a disproportionate increase in the cohort of youth among that minority. There is thus a plausible case to be made that the combined impact of migration on demographic difference and demographic change strains interethnic relations.

If immigration by a subservient minority raises the spectre of ethno-nationalist violence by leading to greater heterogeneity and a younger population among the minority, might emigration lower the spectre of ethno-nationalist violence? Out-migration, as recognized by Voltaire and Rousseau (1771; 1762:Book II, chapter 10), can function as a pressure-release, a "safety valve" (Myrdal 1944:chapter 7). Not only does an exodus have the potential to decrease heterogeneity by decreasing the proportion of the subservient minority among the population as a whole, but it also has the potential to relax a young demographic structure.

On the one hand, slower economic growth will suffice to keep up with high rates of natural increase that are moderated by out-migration. On the other hand, out-migration will slow future demographic growth by reducing the number of women of childbearing age. Past demographic events have an indirect influence on present emigration through the supply of labour: "Relatively high additions to the labour market would be expected, other things remaining equal, to result in labour market slack (comparatively slower growth in wages, less secure employment, etc.) and to lead to relatively higher emigration" (Easterlin 1961:332). Lenin argued that, by cultivating international markets, advanced

capitalist countries could export relative deprivation, thereby temporarily

alleviating the domestic contradictions between labour and capital. Citing Cecil

Rhodes, Lenin argued that imperialist states allow nations to export their

redundant population to dependent nations:

> I was in the East End of London yesterday and attended a meeting of the
> unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for "bread,"
> "bread!" and on my way home I pondered over the scene and became more than
> ever convinced of the importance of imperialism [...] My cherished idea is a
> solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of
> the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire
> new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods
> produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a
> bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become
> imperialists (1917:93-94).

The possibility for Europe's many young people to emigrate to the United States,

especially during the second half of the nineteenth century, offers a germane

explanation for the notable absence of youth-generated political violence in

Europe during that period (Moller 1968:242). Fifty-five million people left Europe

between 1850 and 1914 (Gonnard 1928; Ferenczi and Willcox 1929, Sorre

1955). Rates exceeding 50 per thousand were common for Britain, Ireland,

Norway, Italy, Portugal, Spain and at times also Sweden and Finland (Kosinski

1970:57).

5.3. Conclusion

So, the case for the relationship between migration and ethno-nationalist

violence is defensible, both because of migration's impact on demographic

difference and because of its impact on demographic change. Compared to the

influence of natural increase, however, migration is a subsidiary variable because

it does not deal with discreet natural events. Despite immigration's impact on

demographic change, its contribution to natural increase is minor (Weiner and

Teitelbaum 2001:8). If the putative relationship between migration and ethno-

nationalist violence is not on the same level as natural increase, then it should

not be postulated in the form of hypotheses. The relationship between migration

and ethno-nationalist violence might more aptly be described in the form of

conditions. In terms of conditions that might qualify H1 and H2, one might say

that ethno-nationalist violence is implausible unless there is

C1: large-scale emigration, or

C2: a surge in immigration.

A surge of refugees poses a serious demographic threat because it alters the

balance of demographic composition between two ethnic groups. Yet, surges

are transient. They only pose a demographic challenge when refugees fail to

return home. Provided that the group subjected to the surge is in the majority

and has a younger population, the surge may not be perceived as too great a

threat because demographically it still commands a comparative advantage.

Conversely, when the dominant group is in the minority and immigration serves

to consolidate the minority by increasing its proportionality and adding to the

number of youth among its ranks, ethno-nationalist violence becomes more

probable. On the one hand, youth are intrinsically more predisposed to violence

for reasons mentioned in the third chapter. On the other hand, they increase the

base of the minority's population that is of reproductive age, thus raising the

prospects of consolidating the minority's demographic foothold further and of the

subservient minority calling into question the dominant group's majority, or even its plurality.

Should C1 and C2, and H1 and H2, for that matter, turn out to describe accurately the relationship between demographics and ethno-nationalist violence, it would be interesting to know whether certain rates, levels or thresholds are particularly problematic. That, in turn, raises questions about the method to be employed to test these hypotheses and conditions as well as possible limitations that may be inherent in the method. That is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 6: Method and design of the research

Having identified the hypotheses and conditions on which the thesis is predicated, the question is how best to test them. The most obvious approach would be cross-national statistical correlations using multiple regressions. That would involve tabulating correlations based on a list of violent ethnic conflicts, the proportion of youth among each ethnic group over time, rates of natural increase, as well as figures for immigration and emigration for the parties to the conflict. But data are a problem. The chapter argues that a paucity of reliable data and inconsistencies in data collection necessitate foregoing multiple regressions in favour of controlled comparisons using crucial case studies. Controlled comparisons limit overgeneralizations by focusing on specific processes under differing conditions.

Data admit of quantitative expression; hence, they lend themselves to projection. Demographic data, however, have political implications which make them highly controversial, especially when they contain information about ethnicity. Statistical cross-national correlations can thus be difficult to operationalize. The chapter explains why crucial demographic data, dis-aggregated by ethnic group, are often absent or unreliable. It then argues that inconsistencies in data collection complicate the problem of large-n statistical cross-national correlations. These difficulties are illustrated by referring to the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database which contains data on demographic

difference, but not on demographic change. In other words, the most renowned

database on factors governing ethnic relations does not allow for the sort of

multiple tabulations necessary to test the dissertation's hypotheses. Ergo, the

comparative approach is the best alternative.

6.1. Multiple regressions of aggregate cross-national demographic statistics

The complexity of the modern world nullifies monocausal or deterministic

explanations. One cannot even begin to take all possible factors, angles, cases,

counter-factual cases and exceptions into account. No single variable, factor,

theme, hypothesis or theory can ever explain reality perfectly. These

methodological problems are not new. They caused Karl Popper to advocate a

critical approach: Rational science is not about the inductive generalization of

isolated behavioural data in order to arrive at theoretical knowledge. Instead, he

argued, one makes an attempt at formulating daring hypotheses and subjects

them to the harshest of criticisms in order to learn from the possible mistakes, in

the process drawing nearer to the truth (1934).

In the natural sciences, this does not present much of a problem because

nature functions according to laws: Water is always made up of one oxygen atom

attached to two hydrogen atoms. Adding another atom of hydrogen changes its

property to a different type – heavy water. Unlike the natural sciences, the social

sciences, and politics especially, deal with people. Human behaviour is

unpredictable. Most people might have the same reaction to a given

phenomenon but a few might respond differently. This creates a problem

because no matter how often one might reformulate a hypothesis in the behavioural sciences there is always an exception to it. This has frustrated efforts at formulating grand theories. Most have been discredited, demonstrating they are prone to exceptions and omissions.

One response to this phenomenon is to accept the situation. Yet, ambitious efforts at formulating a more comprehensive theory need not be abandoned. Arguably the most cogent response to this conundrum comes from the social science that aspires to emulate the natural sciences most closely: economics. The advent of econometrics particularly has facilitated an explanatory revolution of sorts. Instead of arguing in deterministic terms, econometrics reasons in terms of probability. Using econometrics, Collier (2000) has found that dependence on the export of primary commodity, low average incomes, slow growth, and large diaspora, make civil conflict more probable. Countries that rely on extractive mineral exports, for instance, are 20 per cent more likely to experience civil war than countries with more diversified economies.

The probabilistic approach is applicable to causal explanations and is ideally suited for any social-scientific project. Therefore, using probability makes more sense for examining an environment in which it is impossible to account for every conceivable variable, case and nuance.

In principle, demographic data should allow for aggregate statistical analysis. But they do not readily lend themselves to aggregation. It is important

to understand that demographic categories are what Max Weber calls a

Wertbegriff. Insofar as they are value-laden,

> the mathematization of the social sciences consists of extracting from objects
> their quantitative aspect in order to measure it with a maximum of precision. To
> abstract the purely quantitative aspects of the phenomenon of population,
> demographers are obliged to impoverish them (Lévi-Stauss 1954).

Structuralists presume that forms of social organization can be objectified (Mauss

1953-1954; 1969; Gellner 1983). For constructivists, by contrast, such reification

amounts to an "objectification" that presumes a "class or ethnic group to

represent a primary reality" (Brass 1985:11). To meet this ambiguity, Weber

suggested that any definition must be based on empirical qualities common to all

potential members of a group (1968:675, 677). Such is the challenge facing

ethnic demography: Data may be non-existent or outdated; data may have been

manipulated for political purposes or political circumstances which may render

them unpublishable; data may be affected by changes to the categories used in a

census; sets of data comprising a large number of 0/1 observations are

methodologically controversial. Even the definition of the term minority is

controversial.

6.2. The politics of numbers

The largest part of demographic data consists in census and vital registrations.

In addition, there is limited information concerning population movements across

frontiers. As national governments have a virtual monopoly on the collection of

these data, they control the process of collection. They decide how to count,

when to count, whether to count, who gets counted, which results to release and

when. It raises a question: What could possibly be so political about fertility, mortality and migration?

A nation amounts to a demographic artefact. Its creation is inherently political (Anderson 1991). Who counts and who does not is a political decision: "Who counts depends on how you count" (Guyot 1975). When to count is a political decision. Accuracy, the method of collection and questions asked in gathering the data are political decisions (Keyfitz 1979). What data are analyzed and how they are aggregated is a political decision. Their interpretation is a political decision. Which data are released and which held back or destroyed is a political decision. Demographics, then, is a political science; consequently, one continually needs to be aware of the data's limitations: "Numbers are an indicator of whose country it is [...] A census needs to be 'won.' So the election is a census and the census is an election" (Horowitz 1985:194, 196).

Politics becomes a game of numbers (Alonso and Starr 1987):

> The close association between the desire for group hegemony and the democratic ethos of universal suffrage and majority rule are the stimulators of the 'ethnic numbers game' by which groups in competition seek to adjust their numerical ratios for sectional hegemonic interests (Olugbemi 1983: 266).

The questions that formed William Petty's concern for charting the likelihood of holding on to Catholic Ireland are illustrative: How many are there of "us"? How many of "them"? What does the forecast say about "our" numbers versus "their" numbers? The national census is the crux of this identity-fixing process (Arel and Kerzer 2001; Anderson & Fienberg 1999): "Projected population trends may be thought to foretell changes in the political fortunes of competing ethnic groups. [...] Accordingly, demographic changes may loom large in the minds of

competing political leaders of groups fearful of losing their positions" (Wriggins & Guyot 1973).

6.3. Paucity of reliable data

One way to check the veracity of data is to tally annual registered births with the returns from the country's census. In many countries, however, that is not possible. Throughout the Arab world, data on fertility and ethnic composition are routinely withheld. Only in Kuwait, Tunesia, Algerian and Egypt are the registries of births and deaths accessible for purposes other than "official use" (Courbage 1999:354). Data on ethnic composition are even more political.

Until 1991, political apportionment in the Lebanese parliament was predicated on the most recent "official" data available -- collected in 1932! The erosion of Maronite fertility, and asymmetrical national development to the detriment of shi'i[21] Muslims in the south due to mis-apportioned political power, are largely responsible for Lebanon's civil war.

In Nigeria, at the time of independence, seats in the country's House of Representatives were apportioned on the basis of population. Thus, the constitutionally mandated decennial census had important political implications. The Northern Region's political influence was based mainly on the results of the 1952-53 census, which identified 54 per cent of the country's population in that area. Yet, this census has been regarded as having undercounted the number of

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[21] In Arabic, Sunni denotes the mainstream of Islam and could be translated "followers of the sunna", the sunna being the traditions of the proper practices of the prophet Mohammed. Shi'i, by contrast, means "partisan". The apostrophe stands for an Arabic letter (ayin) that cannot be

people. This turned on a number of reasons: apprehension that the census was related to tax collection; political tension at the time in eastern Nigeria; logistical difficulties in reaching many remote areas; and inadequate training of enumerators in some areas.

Subsequent attempts to conduct a reliable post-independence census have been mired in controversy, and only one has been officially accepted. The first attempt, in mid-1962, was cancelled after much disagreement and allegations of over-counting in many areas. Southern hopes for a favourable reapportionment of legislative seats were buoyed by preliminary results, giving the south a clear majority. A supplementary count was immediately taken in the Northern Region that turned up an additional 9 million persons reportedly missed in the first count. Charges of falsification were voiced on all sides. This led to an agreement among federal and regional governments to nullify the count and to conduct a new census.

A second attempt in 1963, which was officially accepted, also was encumbered with charges of inaccuracy and manipulation for regional and local political purposes. Indeed, the official figure of 55.6 million as the national population was inconsistent with the census of a decade earlier. It indicated an impossible rate of annual growth of 5.8 per cent. In addition, significant intra-regional anomalies emerge from a close comparison of the figures from 1953 and 1963. In portions of the Southeast, for example, the two sets of data show that some rural local government areas (LGAs) had increased at a rate of almost

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pronounced in English. It is used as an adjective for one, a collective for all, and an adjective for the belief/sect. Shi'a and shi'ite are colloquial anglicisms.

13 per cent per year, compared to half a per cent in neighbouring areas. Despite the controversy, the results of the 1963 census were eventually accepted. The nation-wide census reported a population of 60.5 million, which census officials considered impossibly high. A scaled-down figure of 55.6 million, including 29.8 million in the Northern Region was, finally, submitted and adopted by the federal government. Legislative apportionment remained virtually unchanged. Until the 2000 census, most official estimates of Nigeria's population have been based on projections from the 1963 census. Nevertheless, demographers rejected the results of the 1963 census as inflated, arguing that the actual figure was as much as 10 million lower. Controversy over the census remained a lively political issue. The Northern Region's government was publicly charged with fraud, a claim that was denied by the regional prime minister.

After the civil war of 1967-70, an attempt was made to hold a census in 1973. The results were thrown out and the census forms burned. Improvements to transportation and accessibility of most areas, advances in technological capability, and better education throughout the country, as well as broad acceptance of national coherence and legitimacy all favoured the success of a census in 1991. It was to be conducted in about 250,000 areas of enumeration by the National Population Commission, with offices in each of the country's LGAs. To reduce possible controversy, religious and ethnic identification would be excluded from the census forms, and results would be verified by supervisors from outside each state. The government was forced to abandon the census

because controversy over the possible results threatened the country with political turmoil.

Many countries have attempted to deal with the controversy over ethnic demographics by dropping ethnicity from the census altogether. This complicates any demographic study of ethnic relations because the researcher has to estimate plausible numbers. Depending on the experience, ideological orientation and qualifications of the person designing the model, these projections can be suspect.

6.4. Inconsistencies in data collection and their political implication
The census has played an important role in defining group membership, national identities, and majority/minority configurations. Still, census categories are often quite arbitrarily created and loosely defined (Cohn 1987; Raphael 1989; Anderson 1991; Edmonston, Goldstein & Lott 1996). Methods vary, categories are inconsistent, and subjective choices are made.

In the Austro-Hungarian double monarchy, ethnicity was determined by a person's vernacular. For a multi-lingual society, that is a highly subjective criterion. In Trieste, for instance, the dominant ethos and language was Italian, while the administration spoke German. Slovenes who migrated to Trieste during the second half of the nineteenth century adopted Italian as their vernacular. As a result, the census count of Slovenes underestimated their actual number (Hepburn 1996:220). In Nigeria, the 1952 census was based on

information provided by the head of the household. Other countries count every person.

Ethnic categories on the census change. Such changes can have important normative and methodological implications. The introduction of the category of language in Canada's 1901 census was a deliberate effort to alter the prevailing construction of the social hierarchy:

> The linear thinking underlying documents such as the census strove to differentiate individuals in two ways: it put them into singular and exclusive categories (one and only one answer for each question), and it explicitly or implicitly ranked those categories hierarchically and connected them in one-directional ways. Behind each census question was the anticipation of singular responses that were more or less close to an "ideal." In that sense, the census enumeration was not benignly counting and classifying social "realities" but was, in fact, constructing hierarchies in which individuals were singularly lined up from best to worst (Gaffield 2000: 255).

As late as the 1960s, people could not self-identify as Canadian on the census. The United States, since its census in 2000, has allowed people to self-identify as being of one or more distinct races. Significantly, the addition, deletion or alteration of categories has a direct bearing on the results. According to raw census data, between 1980 and 1990 the number of Mongols in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region grew at rates surpassing their physical ability to reproduce. In the census conducted in 1990, individuals were identified as Mongols who had hitherto been classified as Han Chinese (Banister 2001:280). During the same period, the number of self-identified Aborigines in Australia increased at a rate far greater than is explicable in terms of natural increases. The addition of a new category means people who now identify with that category previously identified with another category. Their ethnicity has thus mutated. Deletions and alterations of categories have a similar effect. Moreover,

the meaning and interpretation of categories may change. Such inconsistencies skew the results and make it difficult to plot accurate ethnic demographic trends.

Countries may use identical categories but their meanings may differ. With the exception of recent immigrants, African-Canadians tend to self-identify as Canadian. In the United States, by contrast, ethnic identification among blacks as African-American is prevalent. As a result, categories that may appear comparable are not so. This difference, for instance, skews the data for endogamous marriages in the two countries, with Americans appearing to have a lower rate of mixed marriages. When the difference in racial identification is controlled for in Canada and the United States, the apparent discrepancy in endogamous marriages disappears (Harles 2001).

An equally serious problem is that of non-respondents who may boycott an entire census (as Catholics did *en masse* in Northern Ireland in 1981). Another problem may be the reluctance to answer specific questions, such as that of religious affiliation asked in the census conducted in Northern Ireland in 1971. While methods exist to control for non-respondents, such adjustments increase the degree of uncertainty inherent in the data. Using adjusted and raw data threatens the reliability of the results.

6.5. The 0/1 controversy

Aggregate data in research on political violence are of limited explanatory value (Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Snyder 1978; Williams 1994; Horowitz 2001). The unrepresentative number of ethnic conflicts hampers indiscriminate statistical

work (Fearon and Laitin 1996). The number of cases does not endorse statistically significant conclusions.

Using complex and varied models to explore various sets of demographic causes is methodologically problematic (Beck, King & Zeng 2000). The analysis of sets of data containing large numbers of 0/1 (peace/violence) observations from many countries and groups over many years requires the data to be corrected for auto-correlation. This is necessary because the observations of violence (1) are few relative to the observations of peace (0). The method also has to compensate for simultaneous problems of spatial auto-correlation, temporal auto-correlation and rare-event bias (Beck 2001; King & Zeng 2001; Katz & Tucker 1998). Since different approaches give different estimates of the significance of particular variables, the method that produces the best estimates for the effects of population in such data remains an open question (Gleditsch & Ward 2000; Green et al. 2001). The relationships of demographic factors to violence may not even fit the traditional notion of necessary and sufficient conditions as the basis for causal relationships (Ragin 2000). Cohort size, for instance, may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ethno-nationalist violence to occur.

6.6. Evidence from the Minorities at Risk database

Given these difficulties in acquiring and analyzing statistical data on demographics, the use of cross-national statistical analysis is limited. One ambitious attempt to analyze ethno-nationalist violence is the MAR database.

The Minorities at Risk project tracks 285 ethnic groups throughout the world from 1945 to the present. Using a dataset of 470 variables, it identifies where they are, what they do, and what happens to them. Data on size are available for all groups. Data on fertility, migration and youth are unavailable. The MAR database facilitates work on absolute difference in population *size* between groups but not on population change. The latter requires comprehensive, reliable, and consistent data on fertility, mortality and migration. Although the UN maintains such data for every country in the world, it does not break figures down by ethnic group. And, in Shakespeare's words, "there's the rub:" Even if all the requisite data on fertility, mortality and migration were complete, available, and contained in the database for each country as a whole, part of the story would still be missing, namely the essential data for each ethnic group within the country.

The point here is not to disparage a beneficial database that has facilitated germane research on minorities that would have been impossible to realize otherwise. Moreover, those responsible for the MAR project are aware of the concerns raised about the availability of reliable data and change in categories, and have endeavoured to correct for inconsistencies. But it is uncertain how the designers confront the 0/1 controversy. In connecting population change with population size, they recognize that fertility and migration, even differential increase, are important. Yet, mortality rates have not been considered.

Given the database's purpose, this is an egregious oversight. Infant mortality is presumed to be a reliable indicator of impending armed domestic

conflict (Esty et al. 1998; Sen 1998). Similarly, wealthier people tend to live longer. It follows that mortality is indicative of broader trends. Thus it is useful for examining social, political and economic aspects that may be more difficult to ascertain. As evidenced in the fourth chapter, aggregate measures of mortality at the national level may conceal discrepancies regarding how long members of competing ethnic groups can expect to live. Infant mortality may correlate with political instability at the national level. Yet, mortality among Arab infants in Israel has long exceeded that among Jewish infants.

The converse holds true for longevity. In terms of aggregate numbers for the country as a whole, infant mortality may not deviate substantially from the norm. Broken down by ethnic group, however, data for one group may exceed the norm, while data for another may fall below it (a difference distorted further in the aggregate by the fact that minorities are by definition less numerous than the majority). If infant mortality is a relevant predictor of political instability of countries as a whole, data on infant mortality would provide important information. One would, therefore, expect to find countries where mortality differs significantly between two ethnic groups to be more unstable than countries whose ethnic groups have the same mortality rate. The fact that Israeli Arabs die more frequently and earlier than Jews must be rooted in social, political, and economic constraints that differ between the two groups; consequently, the MAR project's failure to include data on mortality is a major shortcoming.

Since it does not contain comprehensive data on fertility, mortality and migration, the MAR database cannot be used to chart demographic change. It does allow the researcher to track demographic difference, i.e., the change in the size of a group and its proportion of the total population. But even the demographic data contained in the database are limited, as they go back only a couple of decades. This is insufficient to establish any sort of trend. For demographic purposes, the MAR database is useful insofar as it lends itself to correlating data on demographic difference with other non-demographic data contained in the database.

There are other databases but either they lack meaningful demographic variables or they do not separate the variables beyond the aggregate at the national level. Foreign Policy Indicators are being tracked at Carleton University but the data are aggregate for countries as a whole and provide no meaningful data on fertility, mortality and migration. The Population Division at the United Nations in New York regularly revises its Population Projection but it, too, only contains aggregate data for countries. The same criticism applies to data collected by the International Monetary Fund.

Ergo, there is no hope in the foreseeable future for testing H1 and H2 through cross-national statistical correlations. Having ruled out the obvious method for testing hypotheses, the alternative is the comparative study of cases.

6.7. Controlled case studies

This study will select eight crucial case studies from which it hopes to derive some general deductions (Eckstein 1975). The method is comparative. Comparison is always inherent in a scientific approach, whether in the formation of concepts or the interpretation of empirical findings (Nohlen 1985). For the purposes of this dissertation, however, comparison is understood as a specific method with specific points of departure (Mill 1948; Prezeworski/Teune 1970, Smelser 1968:62-75; Lijphart 1971:682-693; Dogan & Pelassy 1984). Comparison is particularly useful when investigating a small number of complex cases, particularly cases that involve numerous variables. Unlike the statistical method, the comparative approach with a small number of cases limits the range of possible conclusions that may result. As a result, *the comparative method supports the formation of hypotheses rather than their verification*. Contrary to the natural sciences, hypotheses in the social sciences reflect trends, not laws. A single exception to the rule, therefore, is insufficient to disprove a theory in the social sciences (Lijphart 1971:686). The thorough investigation of a few cases facilitates the discovery of background variables, of multi-level relationships between many variables, and of functional equivalents.

Controlled comparisons focus systematically on specific processes under differing conditions, thus limiting the validity of the findings that emerge. The second chapter, however, demonstrated that controlled comparisons of ethno-nationalist violence (as a protracted phenomenon distinct from an ethnic riot) are few: Waldmann (1985, 1989), Laitin (1995), Díez Medrano (1995), Varshney (1997, 2002), Friedland and Hecht (2000), Fearon and Laitin (2003). For findings

to have any more general validity, the comparative method depends on an informed choice of cases. Biased choices have been shown to skew results by distorting measurements and analyses (Weede 1985; Muller 1986). A cursory survey of the existing literature reveals three such biases.

6.8. Biased selection of cases I: Occidental parochialism

In the literature on ethno-nationalist violence, there is an overwhelming preference for studying conflicts in industrialized countries, particularly in Western Europe. Using Western Europe as a basis for studying ethno-nationalist violence, however, is misleading for three reasons. First, ethnic relations the industrialized world are not generally violent. Most ethno-nationalist violence takes place in Asian and African countries. Second, although the strife and suffering in Israel and Northern Ireland may be at the forefront of the international media, these conflicts are relatively benign compared to many of the other conflicts that do not make headlines in the West. Despite a death toll that exceeding that of Northern Ireland and Israel, how much television coverage did ethno-nationalist violence in Rwanda receive prior to, or even after, the genocide? Third, much of the literature is devoted to ethno-nationalist violence in advanced democracies. Even the ethnocratic situation in Israel is far more democratic than the context in which internal violence commonly transpires. In other words, the conflicts selected are the exception. Unfortunately, the literature conveys the opposite impression. This ethnocentric bias inherent in the selection of cases makes it difficult to generalize more broadly from findings that follow.

6.9. Biased selection of cases II: Linguistic parochialism

Research gravitates towards conflicts readily accessible to Anglophones. Eighty per cent of the literature on political science is published in English. This is indicative of two trends. First, the discipline is dominated by Anglophones. A common native tongue makes Northern Ireland the obvious conflict to study for unilingual Anglophones. This parochialism is self-perpetuating. With so much of the literature published in English, the incentive to acquire another language is small. Linguistic constraints are thus a powerful filter. Second, when researchers do acquire another language, it tends to fall within the same family as their native tongue. Thus, Anglophones tend to learn languages with Germanic or Romantic roots. Conversely, the Basque language does not have Indogermanic roots. As a result, Basque is more difficult to learn than Catalan or Spanish. Many Catalans tend to be bilingual, however, allowing a researcher to get by in Spanish -- or even in English, given the growing literature on Catalonia in English.

6.10. Biased selection of cases III: Geostrategic parochialism

Research in the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, Spain, and even Israel, has definite advantages. On the whole, these countries are relatively safe. This is not true for most countries that are rife with ethno-nationalist violence. Moreover, legal and geographical constraints prevent access to many of the countries and regions where ethno-nationalist violence is rageing. The absence of an

infrastructure in a country is another problem for advanced research. A story told by the H.F. Guggenheim Foundation illustrates the point. It once rejected a research proposal that was based on a mail survey in Mali. Mali does not have the infrastructure to keep track of its citizenry, such as the names of streets, and the numbers on houses. A similar difficulty occurs with the Basques, who, for a long time, had no institution of higher learning. The records that exist were preserved by clergy. Given these shortcomings, the comparative method may be the best method to use to arrive at any meaningful results.

6.11. Selecting the cases

A number of criteria for selecting cases for a comparative study on the political demography of ethno-nationalist violence emerge. First, sufficient reliable demographic data for that case must be available. Second, cases must not sample according to the dependent variable. The selection must include violent and non-violent cases alike. "Hard" cases where violence was expected but failed to materialize pose a formidable counter-factual challenge and should thus be sought out actively rather than ignored. Third, for the findings to have general validity, the cases selected should avoid ethnocentric idiosyncracies in favour of cases that are geographically and linguistically diverse.

With this in mind, the dissertation narrowed the pool of cases to eight binaries: Northern Ireland and Israel, Estonia and Transylvania, the Xinjiang and Tibet autonomous regions of China, and Mauritius and Fiji. One of the drawbacks to the comparative method is an intrinsically unavoidable semblance

of arbitrariness. Ideally, the choice in cases should be contrasted with all the other possible options in order to show why the choices being defended are indeed the best choices available. Unfortunately, given that there are some 5,000 ethnic groups in the world of which even the MAR database tracks only 285, that type of comprehensive defence is beyond the scope of this dissertation. A few words on each of the eight cases selected will thus have to suffice to dispel any notion of injudiciousness.

Northern Ireland and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are an obvious choice because they are the two cases where the demographic dimension of the conflict has attracted the most academic attention. In that sense, they are an "easy" choice because the data from the primary sources have already been processed. That has three advantages. First, it saves time because one need not seek out the data for oneself. Second, it puts at the investigator's disposal more complex research on historical data and cross-tabulations that require time (which is of the essence) and expertise (which can take a long time and a lot of experience to acquire). Third, the data have already been processed; consequently, there are some controversies and debates in the literature that can be engaged. For example, the inverse relationship of ethno-nationalist violence in the two cases is particularly puzzling: The situation in Northern Ireland is becoming more peaceful at the same time that ethno-nationalist violence in Israel has been escalating. Can political demography make sense of this dialectic?

Estonia and Transylvania are counter-factual examples. Ethnic tensions in Estonia have long been deemed precarious by a wide variety of international

organizations. After its independence, Estonia curtailed many of the rights Russians had enjoyed while Estonia was a Soviet satellite. Still, ethno-nationalist violence never materialized. The situation of the Hungarian minority in the Romanian region of Transylvania has been similarly delicate. The difference between the Transylvanian and Estonian situation is that the former has existed for well over a century while the latter emerged virtually overnight when the country gained independence. Yet, neither case turned violent. The populations of Estonia and Transylvania are structured similarly to most of the populations in the region. Therefore, does political demography explains the notable absence of protracted ethno-nationalist violence in those two cases in particular and throughout the region more generally?

Xinjiang and Tibet are interesting because one can control for the impact of migration on ethno-nationalist violence. From a demographic perspective, Xinjiang and Tibet are a paradoxical choice. More has likely been written on the topic of population for China than for any other country in the world. Yet, research on the political demography of minorities in China is scarce. Nevertheless, there is enough literature to present an interesting argument as to why patterns of Han Chinese migration have precipitated conflict in Xinjiang but not in Tibet. The chapter intends to demonstrate that for cases where primary sources can be hard to come by and secondary sources are scarce, there may still be enough material to construct a political demography of ethno-nationalist violence. Admittedly, the paucity of an array of consistent and precise figures undermines the empirical precision of the sort that underpins the political

demography of ethno-nationalist violence for Northern Ireland and Israel. Still, Tibet and Xinjiang are similar cases (in the sense that they are both autonomous regions of China). They promise to yield some interesting results regarding the relationship between migration and ethno-nationalist violence.

Finally, Mauritius and Fiji are marked by an absence of secondary literature about political demography of ethno-nationalist violence. The chapter on Mauritius and Fiji illustrates that there are cases whose politico-demographic dimension has been ignored despite the existence of sufficient reliable data. The chapter demonstrates that the data demanded by a political demography of ethno-nationalist violence may be documented in primary sources. Mauritius and Fiji lend themselves well to comparison because of the similarity in the size of their populations, the nature of their economy and geography and their inter-ethnic dynamics. A failure in the literature makes them especially challenging to study. While forecasting dim prospects for ethnic relations in Mauritius, the literature had always been buoyant about Fiji. Yet, discard around anyway. Ethnic relations in Mauritius have turned out quite harmonious while, in recent years, the situation in Fiji has deteriorated. Can political demography offer a tenable explanation for this irony?

The studies span the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Oceania. There are, of course, other possible options. Reliable data that would allow for the examination of a political demography of ethnic relations exist for the Baltics, Eastern, Central and Southern Europe. This is also true of some Asian countries, such as Sri Lanka, Indian, Taiwan, and Japan. It is not true of many

African countries where the collection of reliable data has rarely been a priority. Ghana is an obvious exception. Another problem is that many conflicts in Asia and Africa countries involve multiple ethnic cleavages. Mathematically, the addition of a third variable renders any equation infinitely complex. To simplify the task, the cases to be compared in part B are all binary. That may limit any generalizations that may emerge, but debates about the applicability of a political demography of ethno-nationalist violence to cases involving more than two groups are beyond the scope of the dissertation.

The examples chosen illustrate a number of points. They show that it is possible to go beyond the standard array of cases that recur in the literature. Nonetheless, they show that well-established cases can provide as much insight as ones that have been marginalized. They show that sampling according to geographic and linguistic diversity is easy. They show that even distant countries that impose severe constraints on research should not be ignored without careful consideration. They show that similar pairs like Mauritius and Fiji as well as Xinjiang and Tibet can provide as much insight as comparatively dissimilar pairs like Northern Ireland and Israel as well as Estonia and Transylvania. And they show that a judicious selection of cases will facilitate the testing of the aforementioned hypotheses while confronting some interesting puzzles at the same time.

6.12. Conclusion

Limitations are inherent in any method. The comparative method is well suited to discerning patterns about the relationship between youth, demographic differentials, immigration and emigration, and ethno-nationalist violence. It does not, however, lend itself to answering many of the more precise empirical questions with any reasonable degree of certainty. The figure of 20 per cent is widely cited as a problematic threshold for a youth cohort (Fuller & Pitts 1990; Huntington 1996; Urdal 2001). Thus far, however, the evidence cited in support of this figure has been impressionistic. Impressionistic evidence sometimes looks more like a hunt for evidence in support of a foregone conclusion rather than a conclusion drawn from a systematic assessment of the evidence. The way the claim about a threshold of youth is currently construed is also problematic because it is rarely clear to what exactly this claim refers. Is it the proportion of youth among the population as a whole? Is it the proportion of youth among the adult population? Or might a better prediction of ethno-nationalist violence hinge not the proportion of youth per se but rather on the rate at which the cohort of youth is growing?

Cross-national statistical correlations using multiple regressions could potentially answer these sorts of questions. The comparative method cannot offer, nor does it aspire to offer, a reassuring response to any of them. No definitive findings about rates, levels, and thresholds follow from a comparison of a select number of cases. They only point towards patterns. Part B of this dissertation is devoted to identifying such patterns.

Part B: Case studies in the political demography of ethno-nationalist violence

Thus far, the dissertation has defended a political demography of ethno-nationalist violence based on differential demographic trends as an alternative to explanations premised on grievance or cultural distance. Two hypotheses and two conditions have emerged from this discussion. Ethno-nationalist violence is improbable unless

H1: Ethnic populations are young; and

H2: Ethnic populations are structured asymmetrically.

To these hypotheses were added two subsidiary conditions. Ethno-nationalist violence is improbable unless

C1: There is large-scale emigration by one ethnic group; or

C2: An ethnic group is swamped by another ethnic group.

The four chapters remaining are devoted to applying the hypotheses to eight cases.

The question as to why sectarian violence in Northern Ireland subsided just when ethno-nationalist violence started to escalate in Israel brings out an interesting contrast in the way H1 and H2 apply to the two conflicts. First, the number of youth in Northern Ireland has been in decline; therefore, H1 applies. Second, the Catholic population of Northern Ireland is younger than the Protestants population; therefore, H2 applies. Northern Ireland has also witnessed Catholic emigration; therefore, C1 applies. It has also seen Protestant immigration; therefore, C2 applies. Similarly, in Israel, the youth cohort among

Palestinians is large; therefore, C1 applies. Palestinians also have a younger population than Jews; therefore, C2 applies. In 1948, the base of the Palestinian population was undermined by a combined expulsion and exodus of fear; more recently there has been some Jewish immigration; therefore, C1 applies. Subsequently, Jewish immigration kept the ratio of Palestinians to Jews constant; therefore, C2 applies. Both hypotheses are thus shown to play a significant role in increasing and decreasing the probability of ethno-nationalist violence.

H1 and H2 play out in roughly identical fashion in Estonia and Transylvania. There is no youth cohort to speak of and there is almost no difference in age structure between the Estonian and Transylvanian populations. That may explain why ethno-nationalist violence has not materialized in either case despite the fears of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. Still, there has been migration. Transylvania has seen some emigration by members of the subservient Hungarian minority and Estonia saw emigration by its subservient Estonian majority during Soviet times; therefore, C1 applies. By contrast, members of the dominant Russian minority immigrated to Estonia during Soviet times and members of the dominant majority of Romanians immigrated to Transylvania; therefore C2 applies. The notable absence of ethno-nationalist violence may thus be explicable in the sense that C1 and C2 are preconditioned by H1 and perhaps H2; that is, when there are few youths and populations are old, migration does not have an impact on ethno-nationalist violence.

In China's Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and its Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), there are large youth cohorts; therefore, H1 applies. The local populations are also much younger than the Han population; therefore, H2 applies. Although H1 and H2 are comparable for the XUAR and the TAR, the former is plagued by ethno-nationalist violence whereas the latter is not. The attention thus falls on migration as a possible demographic culprit. Early on, many Tibetans and Uighurs emigrated; the TAR has since seen an outflow of Han migrants; therefore, C1 applies. There has been Han immigration to both autonomous regions; therefore, C2 applies. As a result, this case is able to control for C2.

Finally, the demographic dynamics on Mauritius and Fiji provide a contrast of H1 and H2 similar to that witnessed in the comparison of Northern Ireland and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Youth cohorts on Fiji are large; therefore, H1 applies. The ethnic contenders on Mauritius have roughly similarly age structures whereas the ethnic contenders on Fiji have quite different age structures. Might that explain why the ethno-nationalist violence predicted for Mauritius failed to materialize and why the literature failed to predict the ethno-nationalist violence that erupted in Fiji? There are also complex migratory trends to consider. Over recent years, the out-migration of Indians from Mauritius has been small whereas the out-migration of Indians from Fiji has been large; therefore, C1 applies. While Fiji was originally subject to immigration by a dominant Indian minority, Mauritius initially saw immigration by a subservient Indian *minority* but as the number of Indians on the island swelled, that became

immigration by a subservient *majority* of Indians. By the time Indians started emigrating again, they had become a dominant *majority*.

Each chapter will examine what sort of outcome in terms of ethno-nationalist violence one would anticipate based on the different hypotheses that apply to each case. It will contrast the results that ensue with popular explanations for ethno-nationalist violence in terms of grievance and cultural distance in order to ascertain whether demographics are indeed able to make sense of fundamentally different cases. The conclusion synthesizes the findings and discusses their application and implication.

The character of the state is conditioned
in the first place by its demographic composition.
(Abba Eban, Israeli minister of foreign affairs, 1966-1974)

Chapter 7: Northern Ireland & Israel: a demographic paradox?

Modern nationalism has any number of unifying factors: language, religion,

ethnicity, region, to name but a few. It has recently been postulated that a

decline in secular nationalism premised on linguistic difference coincides with a

rise in religious activism (Juergensmeyer 1993; Hobsbawm 1992). It has even

been argued that religion may not complement nationalism but rather that the two

may actually be mutually exclusive. This hypothesis claims that religion is

displacing nationalism throughout large parts of the modern world (Kepel 1991;

Gellner 1995). Both these hypotheses raise a question: How is one to explain

the resurgence of religion as a source of conflict? Is violence part of the "nature"

of Islam, a religion whose adherents are allegedly prepared to "fight" (Kaplan

1994)? Have not all other major world religions been belligerent at some point or

another? If Islam is indeed a source of religious radicalism, how is one to explain

the many Muslims who live in harmony with their neighbours? If religion is a

source of conflict, why did sectarian violence in Northern Ireland subside at the

same time that violence in Israel escalated? This is the puzzle at the heart of this

chapter. The claim in this chapter is that popular explanation of ethno-nationalist

violence premised on grievance and cultural distance may have difficulty making

sense of this puzzle. Political demography is posited as an alternative

explanation.

A review of the slate of explanations for the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland has been undertaken elsewhere (McGarry & O'Leary 1995a). In any event, the literature on Northern Ireland and on the Israel-Palestinian conflict is so voluminous that a cursory review of some examples of explanations formulated in terms of grievance and cultural distance will have to suffice. Since the dissertation's frame of reference is the popular variants of these explanations, this review serves to illustrate only that these paradigms have also had a considerable influence on the academic literature.

Waldmann (1985, 1989) explains the transition from latent protest to violent to manifest violence in terms of the loss of middle-class control over the nationalist movement. His contention is that the middle class plays a key role in the orchestration of violence. It stands to gain because the majority has been shut out from material wealth and political power. His argument, however, is premised on the idea that there must be large numbers of recruits from the lower middle class and upper lower class available to perpetrate the violence. In the case of Northern Ireland, these recruits were able to wrestle control over the nationalist movement from the middle class. The movement radicalized in the process. But how is one to explain violence originating not with Catholics but with Protestants? They are better off and, as this chapter will show, have a smaller proportion of youth than Catholics. Yet, are they any less radical than the Catholic movement? The other problem with Waldmann's work is that his categories contain a hint of Malthusianism in that they are premised on a qualified equation between socio-economic standing and a person's

predisposition toward internal violence. As may be the case, the evidence cited in the second chapter cautions that the equation between socio-economic standing and ethno-nationalist violence does not add up. Still, Waldmann's paradigm could probably be applied successfully to explain ethno-nationalist violence in Israel. But could it explain why ethno-nationalist violence in subsiding in Northern Ireland while it is intensifying in Israel-Palestine?

Islamic fundamentalism has been explained in terms of Islam's general popularity among the lower middle class (petty bourgeoisie) (Fuller 1991). If Waldmann's attribution of ethnic radicalism to the lower middle class and the upper lower class is correct, that might explain ethnic radicalism among Muslim Palestinians – had the Israeli return not undermine the Palestinian middle class.

Economic grievance has similar difficulties accounting for ethno-nationalist violence in Northern Ireland. In Belfast, the urban concentration of ethnic members in segregated residential neighbourhoods and in shared occupational niches, coupled with modern facilities of communication, are thought to provide the requisite organizational resources for ethnic collective action (Wolpe 1974; Stinchcombe 1975; Kasfir 1979; Bonacich & Modell 1980; Jenkins 1988). But does segregation necessitate ethno-nationalist violence? Dynamics of this sort are neither unique to the subservient ethnic minority in Northern Ireland, nor do they necessarily precipitate ethno-nationalist violence elsewhere.

Landau (1993) has argued along similar lines that a shortage in the provision of services to Arabs coupled with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is partially responsible for their radicalization. Although Arabs account for 19 per

cent of the population, they make up only 5.9 per cent of students in Israeli institutions of higher learning. These numbers are structurally determined: Hebrew in university, lower rates of achievement in Arab schools, limited opportunities, and constraints in housing contribute to the educational marginalization of Arabs. After the 1967 war, Israel devised a strategy aimed at integrating the newly occupied territories into the Israeli economy (Aronson 1990). During the early 1990s, however, Israel rescinded that policy. In this light, "other-directed" ethno-nationalist violence can be posited as a strategic choice (Lustick 1990). A switch from "solipsistic" to "other-directed" rationales may offer an interesting explanation for the intensification of conflict in terms of a shift from economic to political grievance, but fails to explain the timing of violence.

Adherents of the cultural-distance paradigm have explained the radicalization of ethnicity in Israel-Palestine as a reaction to Westernization and atheism, the trend towards Muslim secularization of the 1950s and 1960s. In its most fundamentalist incarnation, this is part of a wider return to religion that was inaugurated by the Iranian Revolution. It offered a "home-made" nation-building alternative to the Western ideological strategies of capitalism or socialism (Ghayasuddin 1986). A study on Islamic fundamentalism identified the role of Islam as a native cultural vehicle for dissent (Fuller 1991). Fundamentalism of this sort plays itself out in terms of a violent struggle over sacred places in Jerusalem (Friedland & Hecht 2000). But cultural distance alone cannot explain

why Islamic fundamentalism turns violent among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories?

The relationship between religious fundamentalism and ethno-nationalist violence contrasts curiously with the observation that Northern Ireland may be the first religious war being fought by atheists. In this light, cultural distance defined in terms of religion does not hold much sway as an explanation for ethno-nationalist violence in Northern Ireland. Burton (1979) documented that Catholics and Protestants actually have a lot more in common with one another than with the rest of Britain. Yet, they are feuding with *each another.* The second part of the first chapter showed that similarity rather than difference may be a more probable source of ethnic tension. So, which is it? Does violence arise because people are culturally similar or because they are distant? If ethno-nationalist violence is a function of cultural distance, then why is there any violence in Northern Ireland at all? Conversely, if ethno-nationalist violence is inversely related to cultural distance, then why is Israel plagued by ethno-nationalist violence?

Cultural distance and grievances over resources, power, territory may be invoked to account for ethnic *mobilization,* but can they explain the presence or absence of ethno-nationalist violence? Political demography claims to be able to explain why sectarian violence is subsiding in Northern Ireland at the same time that it is escalating in Israel. For the popular explanations of ethno-nationalist violence that invoke grievance or cultural distance, that is a tough nut to crack.

7.1. Northern Ireland

Compared to most other regions in Europe, the population of Northern Ireland has a disproportionately young age structure; therefore, H1 applies. Northern Ireland's Protestant majority entered the demographic transition earlier than the Catholic minority, resulting in a younger Catholic population with a greater proportion of youth than among the Protestant population; therefore H2 applies. In light of H1 and H2, one would anticipate a high probability of ethno-nationalist violence in Northern Ireland. Although the Catholic population remains younger than the Protestant population, that likelihood may in turn be tempered by structural ageing among the Catholic population. Catholic emigration (C1) and Protestant immigration (C2) also factor into the equation.

It would be foolhardy to write about ethno-nationalist violence without making some reference to the voluminous literature on Northern Ireland. Arguably, no other violent ethnic conflict has received more attention in the academic literature. In the case of this dissertation, the amount of literature on Northern Ireland underscores a claim that is central to this dissertation: How little attention that has been paid to demographics. Among the countless academics who have written on Northern Ireland, only a handful have picked up on the underlying demographic dimensions and treated them as a phenomenon instead of relegating them to the margins: Jones (1960), Compton (1976, 1982, 1991) and Shuttleworth (1992). Boal's interest in the demographic dynamics within Belfast warrants special consideration (1971, 1976, 1981, 1995). With the exception of Poole (1983), they all discuss demographics only in the broader context of ethnic conflict, not in specific relation to ethno-nationalist violence.

Northern Ireland underscores the claim that density and increase are not a probable cause of conflict in and of themselves since the counties which today make up Northern Ireland were more densely populated 170 years ago than they are today. The population peaked around 1840. Famine and the associated emigration caused it to decline. It only started to rise again during the twentieth century. The proportion of Catholics in Northern Ireland has been increasing ever since the Second World War.

Figure 10Figure 7.1: Estimated Catholic Population of Northern Ireland, 1861-2000

Estimated Catholic Population of Northern Ireland, 1861-2001

(Source: Census of Ireland, 1861-1911; Census of Northern Ireland, 1925-2001)

Violent sectarian "troubles," however, started as early as 1922. Relative to the total population of the United Kingdom, the proportion of the Irish population dropped from one-third at the beginning of the nineteenth century to one-seventh by the end, only to gain momentum again during the twentieth century (due to receding emigration). That made all the difference in the way the United Kingdom coped with demands for Irish independence. An alliance between the

Irish and the French and later between the Germans and the Irish were of genuine concern to the English.

The "troubles" turned violent again as of the late 1960s. Other factors aside, the dimension that persisted throughout is the Catholics' younger age structure. In 1971, between 38 and 47 per cent[22] of the Catholic population was under the age of sixteen whereas only 28 per cent of Protestants fell into that category. Conversely, 13 per cent of Protestants were over 65, compared with nine per cent of Catholics. Ergo, Catholics have a higher rate of natural increase than Protestants, only that its effects happened to be tempered considerably by emigration: In 1971, the 20-24 cohort was a full 25 per cent smaller than the 15-19 cohort. The comfortable 2:1 majority Protestants had enjoyed thus far had proven unsustainable. The broader Catholic base ensured that the proportion of Catholics reached 38.5 per cent in 1981 with a steady increase of 2 per cent per decade.

Crude Protestant birth rates were healthy compared to the European standard: 19.3 per 1000 in 1961; 18.0 per 1000 in 1971. Catholics were gaining ground nonetheless because they had a comparative advantage in fertility: 28.1 in 1961; 25.4 in 1971 (Compton 1982:86-89). A decline in fertility among Northern-Irish Catholics set in only in the 1960s, 60 to 80 years after rates had started to come down in the rest of the United Kingdom:

> It is only in the last 10 years that Roman Catholic fertility has begun to fall from
> the high levels associated with the pre-transition period. Thus while in 1961 their

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[22] Due to an estimated nine per cent of (probably mainly Catholic respondents) who failed to identify their religious identification (which is different from identifying with no religion at all), estimates of the Catholic cohort for the 1971 census vary (Compton 1982:98-100).

fertility indices were very similar to those found in Europe in the third quarter of the nineteenth century [...], by 1971 they were more akin to those found in England and Wales in 1911 (Compton 1976:441).

Catholic entered the demographic transition only in the 1960s. Until then, Catholics fertility had been about 50 per cent higher than that of other denominations (Jones 1960:155). The transition may be explicable in terms of birth control but, given that its effectiveness in lowering fertility has been shown to be questionable in other parts of the world, the more definitive cause is that fewer Catholics now marry and that women's median age at marriage has been rising. Catholics maintain a comparative advantage relative to Protestants in fertility and median age at marriage. As a result, Catholics continue to benefit from higher fertility (3.2 to 2.3) and larger families (3.1 to 2.4 children) (Compton 1991). The comparative advantage precipitated not only a rise in the ratio of Catholics, it also reinforced the younger Catholic age structure.

Without emigration, Catholics would have caught up with Protestants some time ago. It follows repression which precipitates emigration by the political subservient ethnic group reduces violence. The proportion of emigrants is almost inversely proportional to their respective proportion among Northern Ireland's population: Although they made up only one-third of the population, Catholics made up almost 60 per cent of all emigrants (Lyons 1971:745; Compton 1982:91). Emigration undermined natural increase among Catholic because those who emigrated generally fell between the ages of 15 and 40. Since the 1960s, however, the number of emigrants has declined steadily. The secular decline in the rate of emigration from its immediate post-famine peak is owing to the impressive rise in wages and standards of living (Hatton &

Williamson 1998:92). Perversely, therefore, violence is not just the problem – it has also been deployed successfully as part of the "solution".

This has affected the structure of Northern Ireland's population. When the Catholic population is divided into three categories, those under 18, those 18-65 and those over 65, emigration would manifest itself in a younger Catholic age structure, i.e., one where seniors are disproportionately few. The notable discrepancy of seniors documented by the 1991 census substantiates that claim:

Table 1 Table 7.1: Catholic-Protestant age structure in Northern Ireland, 1991

	Catholic	Protestant
under 18	52%	48%
18-65	41%	59%
65+	30%	70%

(Source: Census of Northern Ireland, 1991)

These numbers are indicative of the impact of migration on bifurcated natural increase between ethnic groups.

Since increase is a function of age structure, some models showed Catholics becoming a plurality early in the twenty-first century and comprising the majority of the electorate less than two decades later. That was generally seen as the end of the Ulster state. But even Protestants unfamiliar with these estimates had reason to fret. As a result of natural increase and mounting segregation, Catholics comprised a majority in 11 of 26 districts in 1990 (Compton 1991:29). That approximates their proportion of the total population. On the one hand, this snapshot suggests that the balance of political power is in line with the demographic balance. On the other hand, if that equivalency were to keep pace, it may be only a matter of time before the balance of political power will favour Catholics over Protestants. Irrespective of reunification, Protestants

will probably become a minority in Northern Ireland. But even without reunification, due to a higher TFR, natural increase among Catholics has long had the potential to undermine the Protestants' majority (Hepburn 1996:116). In 2000, Catholics became in the majority among the cohort of people under twenty years of age (Guiffan 2001:256). By 2025 Catholics are projected to constitute a majority of the population and by 2036 a majority of the population of voting age will be Catholic (Compton 1991).

Still, ethno-nationalist violence has abated in recent years. As the Catholic population entered the demographic transition in the 1960s, it started to age. While natural increase remains substantial, the claim that the population is ageing is substantiated by a slowing rate of natural increase. But since fertility among Protestants has now dropped below levels of replacement, the effect of a persistent natural increase among Catholics is being multiplied by a shrinking population base among Protestants.

The impetus for peace in Northern Ireland coincides with two demographic phenomena: a diminishing margin in the proportion of Catholics relative to Protestants as well as declining fertility. Demographic trends may not favour Protestants but the populations of both sectarian groups are ageing, albeit Catholics more slowly than Protestants. As a result, the proportion of young people among the population is diminishing.

While the proportion of Catholics has been rising steadily, the rate of increase among Catholics is slowing. As the Catholic population ages and the relative size of its cohort of youth continues to shrink, violence will likely wane

further. Ethno-nationalist violence was mitigated by Protestant immigration at the turn of the century and by Catholic emigration throughout most of the first half of the twentieth century. The evidence from Northern Ireland thus supports H1 and H2.

A leading authority on ethno-nationalist violence recently arrived at a comparable conclusion, arguing that impending demographic marginalization of the Protestant minority in Northern Ireland has encouraged the peaceful resolution of sectarian tensions (Horowitz 2002:199, 201-2, 204). That reasoning may apply to Northern Ireland but it certainly does not have general validity. Why does marginalization appear to be precipitating peace in Northern Ireland but not in Israel? Comparative evidence suggests that the demographic locus of the difference between peace in Northern Ireland and the Intifada in Israel is the minority's population structure and, to a lesser degree, migration, not a feeling of marginalization. Horowitz's intuition about the role that demographics played in galvanizing peace or conflict is right but his reasoning appears to be flawed.

7.2. Israel-Palestine

While the ethnic populations of Northern Ireland are ageing, that is only true of the Jewish, not of the Palestinian population in Israel and even then, only for secular, not for orthodox Jews; therefore, H1 applies. In Israel, the subservient Palestinian minority has a younger population structure than the dominant Jewish majority; therefore, H2 applies. According to hypotheses H1 and H2, the probability of ethno-nationalist violence should thus be high. This probability is

conditioned by the expulsion of Palestinians combined with an exodus of fear in the aftermath of the declaration of the Israeli state in 1948 and more recent emigration by young Jews; therefore, C1 applies. It is also conditioned by massive Jewish immigration between 1948 and the early 1990s; therefore, C2 applies.

Relative to the bulging literature on the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, the literature on the contribution that demographics have made to ethnic tensions between Israelis and Palestinians is minuscule. Yet, the contribution made by demographics has likely been explored to a greater extent for this conflict than for any others. The pioneering work by Goldscheider (1983, 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996, 2002), by his collaborator Friedlander (1979, 1984), and by Eberstadt and Breindel (1978) stand out in this regard, as do contributions by Peretz (1993), Courbage (1995), Gilbar (1997) and Landau (1993). Of interest are also the demographic analyses of intra-Jewish dynamics by Eisenbach (1992) and by Schmeltz, DellaPergola and Avner (1990) as well as the particular attention paid to demographic dimensions of ethnic relations in Jerusalem by Efrat (2000), Dellapergola (2001), Gonen (2002) and between secular and orthodox Jews by Toft (2002).

Demography has long been identified as a key fault-line between Jews and Palestinians (Eberstadt & Breindel 1978; Friedlander & Goldscheider 1979; Goldscheider 1991, 1992b). About 15 per cent of the Israeli population identifies as Muslim, most of Sunni confession. The remainder of Arabs (as a fraction of the Israeli population) consists of Christians (1.7 per cent), Druze (1.6 per cent)

and a handful of people of other religions. They amount to "double minorities" –

within Israel and among Palestinians. The effect of the "double minority" is

exacerbated by a disproportionate increase in the number of Muslims. At Israel's

founding, Muslims accounted for 7.8 per cent of the population and 69.1 per cent

of the non-Jewish population. These proportions are now 15 and 67 per cent

(Israeli Census, 2001).

Figure 11Figure 7.2: Total Fertility Rate of Israeli Arabs, 1965-1989

(Source: Census of Israel, 1965-1989)

The pattern in the Occupied Territories is comparable: Muslims there now make

up 95 per cent of the population.

The issue of the relative number and rate of growth of Israeli Jewish and

Arab populations and the implied demographic threat of Israeli Arab rates of

increase to the political control of the Jewish majority is ideologically contested

for Israel proper, i.e., pre-1967 (Goldscheider 1996: 63). In absolute terms, Arab

increase was sizeable: from 156,000 in 1948 -- all of whom were granted Israeli

citizenship -- to 875,000 by January 1991. Five reasons account for this increase

(Landau 1993: 6):

1. High fertility: Initially Palestinian Arabs registered a four per cent birth rate -- one of the highest in the world and three times that of Jews. In recent years it has receded to 3.3 -- twice that registered by Jews. At 5.5 per cent, some Arab villages have the highest birth rates in the world: Kisra, Jisrr al-Zarqa, Bu'ayna and Najdat. While a transition in fertility has been under way among the Arab population in pre-1967 frontiers for over two decades, that transition has yet to set in among Palestinians in areas bordering on that territory. Due to the emigration of 300,000 Palestinians (mainly to Gulf States), however, natural increase in the Occupied Territories has been more modest than one might think. Between 1967 and 1993, the population doubled from 1 to 2 million. The resulting mean annual rate of growth of 26 per 1,000 is moderate in an area of the world where values frequently exceed 35 to 40 per 1,000 (Courbage 1995:213-214). As for Northern Ireland, it follows that repression stifles violence if it precipitates emigration by the subservient ethnic group.

2. Decline in disease and mortality: Health services, preventative medicine, prenatal counselling and postnatal care, giving birth in a hospital;

3. Officially sanctioned family reunions: 40,000 have been allowed to return to Israel since 1950;

4. Unilateral annexation: East Jerusalem in 1967 and the Golan Heights in 1981;

5. Low emigration among Arabs: Christians and students stay abroad after concluding their post-secondary education.

Despite some minor fluctuations, the proportion of Arabs among the population of

Israel proper has essentially remained constant at 19 per cent since the inception

of the State of Israel in 1948. In 1948, 872,700 people lived in Israel, four-fifths

of whom identified as Jewish. Of the 6.5 million people who lived in Israel proper

in 2001, a historic nadir of 77 per cent identified as Jewish (and a historic peak of

4 percent identified as neither Jewish nor Arab). That number includes Israeli

settlers in the Occupied Territories but it also includes half a million Israeli

citizens in the United States. If they are factored out, the proportion of the

Jewish population of Israel is closer to 70 percent. The ratio between Jewish and

Arab residents is shifting in favour of the latter.[23]

In 1990, the total number of Palestinians in the Middle East was

estimated at 5.25-5.7 million. At 3 per cent per annum, Palestinian refugees

have one of the highest rates of natural increase in the world. Fertility projections

suggest that by 2010 there will be 9 million Palestinians in the area – an eight-

fold increase over six decades.

Even though the Palestinian population is projected to double about every

decade, Arab-Israeli demographics pose no immediate threat to the Jewish

majority -- unless non-Israeli Arabs were incorporated or non-Arab Israelis were

to emigrate *en masse*.

Figure 12Figure 7.3: Arab and Jewish populations west of the Jordan River, 1948-2048

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[23] Ratio technically to residents, not citizens: About 20% of Arabs, including Arabs in East
Jerusalem and Golan Heights, have not been denied Israeli citizenship.

Arab and Jewish Population of Israel Proper, 1948-2048

(Source: Census of Israel, 1948-2001; 2001 population projection)

On the one hand, current emigration is almost exclusively Jewish at an annual average rate of about 3.3 per 1,000 residents. The rate of return is only about 1.1 per 1,000 residents. The rates of departure (but correspondingly the rates of return are as well) are greatest among the 20-34 cohort, that is, among childbearing Israelis. On the other hand, from the Jewish perspective, non-Israeli Arabs are perceived as a real threat. The Palestinian minority in "smaller" Israel now numbers in excess of 1.2 million, a majority of whom are Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel. That is still far off from catching up to the 5 million Israeli Jews (or Israel's 4.5 million Jewish residents). Add 1.7 million Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and another million Palestinian Arabs in Gaza. In effect, that means half the Palestinians in the region live in Israel or territory controlled by Israel. The demographic facts of life preclude the eventuality of annexation or incorporation of Gaza and the West Bank into the State of Israel. In effect, Jews may return to their historical pre-1948 minority status in "greater" Israel sometime between 2007 and 2013.

The CBR among Palestinians reached its nadir in 1942 at 45 per thousand

(McCarthy 1990). The TFR among Palestinian women peaked at eight children

in 1991 and has only been declining slowly. With emigration from Gaza (but not

from the West Bank or Israel) having virtually ceased, there is only a limited

"safety valve" to release the impending demographic pressure.

Figure 13Figure 7.4: Crude Birth Rate of Muslims and Jews, 1925 – 1980

(Source: Census of Israel, 1948-1980)

The Palestinian excess of crude births coincides with the first Intifada. Similarly,

the second Intifada coincides with a *rise* in Palestinian fertility in the West Bank

and Gaza:

Figure 14Figure 7.5: Total Fertility Rate of Palestinians, 1925-1985

(Source: Census of Israel, 1948-1985)

Palestinians have not only maintained a higher rate of fertility, but also a younger age structure.

Once the Palestinian diaspora of 3.3 to 4.5 million is taken into account, three-quarters of which resides in countries bordering Israel, majority-minority tables are turned. That explains why Israel could never possibly allow them to return. In the words of an Israeli diplomat: "The Palestinians have never made a secret of their intention to try to bring down the Jewish state by flooding it with hundreds of thousands of Arabs from abroad" (Shoval quoted in The New York Times 1994).

There is no consensus on the number of Arabs exiled from Israeli land. Still, the Palestinian diaspora bordering the State of Israel is a whole lot larger than the State's total Jewish. Ergo, any right of return would inexorably have detrimental consequences for the balance of power in Israel.

Of 1.5 million Palestinians in Jordan – half of Jordan's population -- 1 million, that is, one-third of Jordan's population, are refugees. The proportion of refugees among the Palestinian population in Lebanon is 85-90 per cent (332,000), 90 per cent in Syria (302,000), 40 per cent in the West Bank and two-thirds in Gaza. The average number of children per women among Palestinians is 3.7, among Palestinians in Jordan it is 5.6, among Palestinians in Gaza it is ten.[24] In other words, the proportion of refugees among the population and the rate of fertility appear to correlate positively. The average age of a refugee is but

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[24] Incidentally, note the curious correlation with the number of Palestinian refugees living in camps: 55 per cent in Gaza versus 23 per cent in Jordan.

28 years of age. On average, one-third of the Palestinian population in the areas

is 15 or younger but in Gaza well over half the population is below 15.

Historically, the primary source of Jewish population growth has been

immigration, not natural increase. The early 1950s saw three waves of Jewish

immigration. Immigration continued thereafter on a more modest scale.

Figure 15Figure 7.6: Immigration to Israel, 1948 – 2001

(Source: Census of Israel, 1948-2001)

Figure 16Figure 7.7: Components of Growth among the Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1967-1989

(Source: Census of Israel, 1967-1989)

During the late 1960s, high mortality and emigration among Palestinians

compounded to cancel out any demographic gains from natural increase.

Twenty years hence, the available avenues of emigration had been closed and fertility cut in half. For all intents and purposes, total growth now equalled natural increase. In the meantime, the inverse had impeded Jewish growth, already hampered by low fertility:

Figure 17Figure 7.8: Components of growth among the Jewish Population in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 1967-1989

(Source: Census of Israel, 1967-1989)

Figure 18Figure 7.9: Jewish Immigration, 1980 – 1989

(Source: Census of Israel, 1980-89)

Although the sources of Jewish immigration to the State of Israel are slowly being exhausted, the proportion of the population which identifies as neither Jewish nor Arab continues to rise due to Israel's promotion of non-Arab immigration. Fewer migrants have caused the proportion of Israeli-born Jews to rise. These patterns call the Israeli nation-building strategy of demographic dominance of the Jewish population into question because Israeli Arabs have the edge. Israel's first prime minister, David Ben Gurion (1948-1963), cautioned:

> Without high, constantly growing, Jewish immigration to Israel, without a significant increase in the rate of Jewish births in the country, we are condemned to become a minority, even if the threats of the Arab dictators to exterminate Israel are thwarted by our national army. To ignore this danger is tantamount to say *après moi le déluge* (cited in Courbage & Fargues 1997:153).

But if the objective was to use immigration to alter the country's ethnic structure, then that objective has failed. Jewish increase has been largely by immigration whereas Arab increase has been exclusively by natural increase (Friedlander & Goldscheider 1984; Goldscheider 1995:140, Table 6.3). In 1982, the median age for Israeli Jews was 25.1, the median age for Israeli Arabs was 16.9. The gap has since widened. By 2001, the median age of Israel's Jewish population was 30. The average age of the Arab population was 19.6. Half of Israel's Palestinian population is under 20 years of age. Half the Arabs in Israel are below 15 years of age, compared to about one-third of Jews. That works out to an average of three in ten Israelis under the age of 15. The relative youth of the Arab minority in Israel is largely the result of large families and efficient public health services. Yet, they can expect to live almost as long as Jews (Landau 1993:6).

Having endured for five decades, the ratio between Jews and Arabs is beginning to change. Had there been no immigration in the 1970s, for instance, the proportion of the Jewish population in Israel would have been only 65 instead of the actual 85 per cent (Friedland & Goldscheider 1979:Table 7.6). In order to keep the proportion of Muslims at bay, Israel now welcomes virtually any and every non-Arab immigrant. Over the past decade, Israel has accepted over 400,000 non-Jewish immigrants -- not a single Arab among them. Incidentally, there are now 240 million Arabs in the Middle East. By 2025, there will be almost twice that many.

7.3. A tale of two cities

Since Israel's unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, the combined population of Arabs in all of Israel's other cities has never matched that of Jerusalem. In Haifa their proportion is less than ten per cent, in Tel Aviv-Jaffa it is negligible. With the notable exception of Acre, Arabs are in the minority in all mixed cities, albeit a sizeable one in Jerusalem. Arabs will outnumber Jews in Northern-Israeli towns, such as Nazareth, before they will outnumber them in the actual City of Jerusalem. There they already make up 36 per cent of the population (Dellapergola 2001): Arabs who do not live in Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel Aviv, Acre, Lydda and Ramleh live in the relatively homogenous Little Triangle.

When East Jerusalem came under Israeli control after the Six-Day War in June 1967, expediency prevailed over logic as the boundaries of the new city were drawn. Two objectives prevailed: Military security and a desire to maximize

the amount of territory while minimizing the size of the Arab population (Efrat 2000:138). The new boundaries incorporated between 60,000 and 70,000 Arabs in the enlarged Jerusalem. Some 35 years later, the number of Arabs in the enlarged Jerusalem exceeds 200,000. Jerusalem's territory is now 2.8 times that of the exclusively Jewish pre-1967 portion controlled by Israel. It stretched from the western fringe of the Judean Desert in the east to the airfield of Qalandiya in the north and to Bethlehem in the south. Israel proceeded to confiscate a quarter of East Jerusalem in order to construct seven new Jewish neighbourhoods. They were supposed to balance East Jerusalem's Arab population: French Hill, Pisgat Ze'ev, Neve Ya'cov and Ramot in the northn, and Talpiot Mizrah and Gilo in the south (Hilterman 1991: 76-77). Israel, however, has been unable to populate East Jerusalem at the pace at which Arabs grow.

Demand due to construction caused Arab labour to flood into the city from outside Jerusalem. Along with their families, they settled in the Old City while its original Jewish residents moved to the suburbs. The compound effect of Arab immigration and a rate of natural increase that is about twice that of Jews more than doubled Jerusalem's Arab population to 160,000 by 1995 (of a total population of 552,000). Despite massive Jewish immigration, the Arab proportion of the city thus increased from 26.7 per cent in 1967 to 28 per cent in 1995. The difference is, however, that due to massive Soviet immigration and settlement during the early 1990s, the population balance in East Jerusalem has now been tilted in favour of the Jewish population. A third of Jerusalem's Jewish population now lives in East Jerusalem, an area uninhabited by Jews until 1967.

The irony in all this is that while upsetting the equilibrium in East

Jerusalem, the proportion of Jews in the District of Jerusalem is shrinking.

Among the three-quarters-of-a-million people who reside in metropolitan

Jerusalem, which stretches from Ramallah in the north to Bethlehem in the south

and Malleh Edummim in the east, Jews have been in a slight minority for some

years (Mazor & Cohen 1994). Of the 1.125 million denizens in the "zone of

influence," which stretches from Ramallah in the north to Hebron in the south and

Bet Shemesh in the west, 55 per cent are Jewish. If, however, the population of

Jerusalem per se, which constitutes 47 per cent of the "zone of influence's"

territory, is factored out, 90 per cent of the inhabitants in the zone, minus

Jerusalem, are Arab. The proportion of the Arab population in Jerusalem proper,

not counting el-Quds, currently 29 per cent, is projected to reach 31 per cent by

2010 and to swell to 38 per cent by 2020. The following sequence of pyramids

comparing the structure of the Jewish and non-Jewish populations of Jerusalem

explains why.

Figure 19Figure 7.10: Jewish Age Structure in Jerusalem, 1972
(Source: Hyman, Kimhi & Savitzky, 1985:11)

Figure 20Figure 7.11: Jewish Age Structure in Jerusalem, 1983

Jewish Age Structure in the City of Jerusalem, 1983

(Source: Hyman, Kimhi & Savitzky, 1985:11)

Figure 21Figure 7.12: Non-Jewish Age Structure in Jerusalem, 1972

Non-Jewish Age Structure in the City of Jerusalem, 1972

(Source: Hyman, Kimhi & Savitzky, 1985:11)

Figure 22Figure 7.13: Non-Jewish Age Structure in Jerusalem, 1983

(Hyman, Kimhi & Savitzky, 1985:11)

The Jewish population is ageing far more rapidly than the non-Jewish population of Jerusalem. The phenomenon in Belfast is comparable. The difference, however, is that Belfast's total population is older and has been ageing more rapidly than Jerusalem's. Belfast's Protestant population is ageing more rapidly than Belfast's Catholic population. Indeed, the structure of its population is comparable to that of Jerusalem's Jewish population. But even Belfast's Catholic population is still older and ageing more rapidly than Jerusalem's non-Jewish population.

Figure 23Figure 7.14: Belfast Core City Population, 1971

(Source: Boal 1995:31)

Figure 24Figure 7.15: Belfast Core City Population, 1991

Belfast Core City Population 1991

(Source: Boal 1995:31)

Figure 25Figure 7.16: Belfast Core City Protestant Population, 1991

Belfast Core City Protestant Population 1991

(Source: Boal 1995:31)

Figure 26Figure 7.17: Belfast Core City Catholic Population, 1991

(Source: Boal 1995:31)

Belfast Core City Catholic Population 1991

The compound effect of the asymmetric structure of Belfast's Protestant and

Catholic populations and of slowing emigration manifests itself in terms of the

changing proportion of each sectarian group's contribution to Belfast's

population:

Figure 27Figure 7.18: Belfast Core City, Catholics and all others as a percent of the Total Population, 1757 – 1991

**Belfast Core City 1757-1991 Catholics and All
Others as a percent of the Total Population**

(Source: Budge & O'Leary 1973:32; Hepburn 1996:4; Boal 1995:13; Census of Ireland, 1821-1911; Census of Northern Ireland, 1926-61)

Until 1780 Catholics made up little more than five per cent of Belfast's population. By 1861, however, the proportion of Catholics had swollen to one third. Due to a boom in overseas migration, Catholics were reduced to one quarter of the population by 1911 (Hepburn 1994:91). Concomitantly though, the gap between the Catholic rate of growth and the Protestant rate of growth, a gap that had consistently favoured Protestants throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, had virtually disappeared by 1911 (Hepburn 1979:90). A lower proportion of Catholics is indicative of massive Protestant immigration. The closing gap is indicative of Catholic urbanization but, more importantly, of a disequilibrium in fertility to the detriment of Protestants. Ergo, the fate of Protestants had been sealed by the turn of the century. The situation is thus comparable to Jerusalem's. Barring sustained levels of massive Protestant immigration to Northern Ireland, the marginalization of Protestants in Belfast was foreseeable. The Catholicization of Belfast continues apace. The cause is a

petering out of overseas migration in the wake of the Second World War coupled

with Protestants moving out of the city into the neighbouring districts of the

Belfast Urban Area: Newtonabbey, Carrickfergus, Castlereagh, and Lisburn

(Kennedy 1990:146). In recent years, the rate of out-migration from the south

and west of Northern Ireland to urban areas has lessened (Shuttleworth

1992:87). The compound effect of high fertility and urbanization that propelled

the Catholic presence in Belfast has thus been mitigated by a decline in fertility

and urbanization among Catholics. With lower fertility and migration, the cohort

of youth among Catholics in Belfast is necessarily in decline, which, following the

logic of H1 and H2, should make ethno-nationalist violence less probable.

These trends manifest themselves in the form of a young urbanizing

Catholic population with a higher rate of natural increase confronting an ageing

Protestant population. If ethno-nationalist violence is a function of a minority's

youthfulness, and the extent to which it has passed through the demographic

transition, it should not come as a surprise that in Belfast (as in Jerusalem), the

rate of fatal incidents per 1,000 people that flow directly from ethno-nationalist

violence is much higher in urban than in rural areas (Poole 1990:67).

Nichiporuk's hypothesis that the epicentre of ethno-nationalist violence is

shifting from the countryside into cities is thus confirmed (2000). His causation,

however, is flawed because it is premised on aggregate natural increase and

urbanization. The actual reason for this geographic shift in the locus of ethno-

nationalist violence is the result of the way the populations of competing ethnic

groups are structured and the way migration attenuates or intensifies the impact

a population's structure has on ethnic relations. This claim is narrowly defined. Thus, it offers a more parsimonious model for ethno-nationalist violence than the impressionistic assertion that the "risk" – not even the empirical probability -- of "political instability" increases when population growth in urban areas exceeds economic growth (Brennan 1999).

As Catholics are bound to become a majority of Belfast's population, so Palestinian Arabs are bound to become a majority of Jerusalem's population. In the case of Jerusalem, however, partition remains an option that is buttressed by the differentials in population structure between Belfast and Jerusalem. The younger structure of non-Jews in Jerusalem relative to the older structure of the Catholic population suggests that this transition is likely to be more violent in Jerusalem than in Belfast. Initial empirical evidence about rising levels of ethno-nationalist violence in Jerusalem and subsiding sectarian violence in Belfast confirms this claim.

7.4. Conclusion

The political demography of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict thus supports H1 and H2. The population, or at least part of the population, is young. The Jewish population entered the demographic transition long before the Palestinian population. A comparison of the graph below charting mortality among Palestinians and Jews in Israel proper with the graph earlier charting fertility among different Palestinian groups, however, suggests that the Palestinian

population in Israel proper entered the demographic transition earlier than the

Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories.

Figure 28Figure 7.19: Mortality Rate of Muslims and Jews, 1925 - 1980

Death Rate of Muslims and Jews, 1925-1980

Deaths per thousand

40
30
20
10
0

■ Death Rate of Muslims

■ Death Rate of Jews

1925 1935 1945 1955 1967 1980

Years

(Source: Census of Israel, 1948-1980)

Arab fertility in pre-1967 Israeli territory has been in transition since the early

1980s. Still, it exceeds Jewish fertility on the same territory. The proportion of

the Arab population on pre-1967 territory, therefore, continues to increase,

although not as rapidly as in the Occupied Territories. This observation is

pertinent in the sense that almost all suicide bombers originate, not in Israel

proper but in the Occupied Territories, that is, among the *younger* of the

Palestinian sub-groups. Demographic differentials thus exist between as well as

within ethnic groups. Their internal asymmetry appears to affect the way the

conflict transpires.

Further evidence for this claim emerges from the correlation between

fundamentalism and fertility. The correlation holds for Jews as well as Arabs

(Goldstone 1996:213). Despite a remarkable asymmetry in fertility between secular and religious Jews, the former group is larger in size but its fertility is below average while the latter group is smaller in absolute terms but gaining in relative terms due to higher fertility. At six children per woman, the fertility among orthodox Jews (about 20 per cent of Israel's 5 million Jews and about a quarter of its electorate) exceeds that of the Palestinian population as a whole.

"Fundamentalists" are gaining demographic ground on both sides (Toft 2002), thus precipitating a clash of cultures between competing orthodox and progressivist moral visions (cf. Hunter 1991). The orthodox moral camp roots its moral vision in an external, transcendental authority, while the progressivist camp finds it authority in reconstructions of historical faiths or philosophical traditions. The orthodox demographic "victory," therefore, is likely to undermine Israel's secular and democratic character – even though Jewish increase is stagnant overall.

The demographic analysis of internecine violence in Israel-Palestine thus suggests that it may be insufficient to apply a model such as the demographic transition to an ethnic group as a whole because each ethnic group has internal demographic differentials. That observation, however, only reinforces the claim that differential demographic trends have ramifications for the absence and presence of ethno-nationalist violence.

In addition to H1 and H2, the empirical evidence also supports C1 and C2. Israel's politics of control ensured relative internal calm in the aftermath of the mass exodus of Palestinians from Israel in 1948. The level of ethno-nationalist

violence appears to have been much lower while there was Jewish immigration. Conversely, the Intifadas coincide with a reversal of migratory fortunes for Israel's Jewish population.

The political demography of ethno-nationalist violence in Northern Ireland, however, revealed that although Catholics have been closing in on Protestants, sectarian violence has declined. The implication is that the closing demographic gap between two groups may not be the cause of ethno-nationalist violence. This finding suggests that the mere fact that Palestinians are rapidly catching up to Israelis is likely not a sufficient demographic cause for ethno-nationalist violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That claim is confirmed by the different structures of the Palestinian populations residing in Israel proper and those residing in the Occupied Territories.

Comparing ethno-nationalist violence perpetrated by Catholics to that perpetrated by Palestinians, H1 and H2 predict that the level of ethno-nationalist violence should be lower in Northern Ireland than in Israel-Palestine. Since Catholics entered the demographic transition earlier than Palestinians, the Catholic population in Northern Ireland is older than the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories. Political demography thus offers a possible explanation for the chapter's opening puzzle: Why is sectarian violence in Northern Ireland subsiding at the same time as it is taking off in Israel-Palestine?

Sectarian violence in Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine may have more to do with demographics than with grievance or cultural distance. In any event, political demography can readily explain a puzzle that grievance and

cultural distance can not. Ethno-nationalist violence in Northern Ireland started to subside when it intensified in Israel-Palestine because of *differentials* in the demographic dynamics that determined each ethnic group's population. The evidence from Northern Ireland and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict thus corroborates the dis-aggregation of demographic data by ethnic group.

The sort of demographic analysis of ethno-nationalist violence presented in this chapter also raises a question about the motivation for taking recourse to violence. Presumably, if ethno-nationalist violence is attributed to demographic trends, then there would have to be some general level of consciousness about these trends among the populace which in turn can be harnessed for purposes or orchestrating violence. What might an analysis of discourse reveal? Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland are equally conscious of interethnic demographic patterns (Compton & Boal 1970:475-476). Although the demographic perception may differ from the demographic reality, it is in both sides' interest to overstate the trends. The overstated perception of an impending demographic shift between the two sectarian factions brings hope to the Catholic minority and congeals fear among the Protestant majority (Rose 1971:364; Cameron 1969:55, 65). An analysis of discourse, therefore, is unlikely to provide any greater insight into the relationship between demographics and ethno-nationalist violence other than to confirm that it is in both sides' interest to embellish the trends in the same way. The differentials between Belfast and Jerusalem intimate, however, that demographics may moderate transterritorial or partitionist discourse.

Chapter 8: Estonia and Transylvania

There are different types of minorities in the post-Soviet space. The main

distinction is between titular groups, national minorities and ethnic minorities.

Titular groups reside on a territory to which they stake a claim as their "native"

land. In order to qualify as a titular group, it need not necessarily form a plurality

on that territory nor are they necessarily the politically dominant group, but

usually they are both. National minorities are groups that ended up within the

boundaries of a sovereign state when it was founded. They need not constitute a

plurality on part of that state's territory. Usually, they are politically subservient.

Similar to national minorities, ethnic minorities do not enjoy a plurality. Unlike

national minorities, they arrived on a state's territory *after* it was founded. They

tend to be politically subservient. Most conflicts in the post-Soviet space

transpire between a politically dominant titular group and one (or more) politically

subservient national minorities.[25]

While research on the comparative sociology of values has found

nationalist sentiment to be in decline throughout the West, nationalist sentiment

is on the rise in the East (Dogan 2000; Anderson 2001). These observations

have reinforced concern about a cauldron ripe with ethnic strife left in the wake of

the Soviet Union's collapse.

Yet, with the exception of the Balkans and some parts of the Caucasuses,

the region has not been consumed by widespread ethno-nationalist violence.

Despite becoming minorities in new countries from the Baltics right across to

Central Asia, insurgencies by newly marginalized Russians have not

materialized. National minorities which had been present on a shared territory

throughout recent history turned out to be a greater source of political instability

than the Russian minorities. But even those insurgencies, such as those in

South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Moldova, remain the

exception.

This chapter postulates that Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the

Baltic states, have been spared ethno-nationalist violence because of their

ageing populations. This chapter explores this correlation by comparing Estonia

to Transylvania. The fragmentation of the Soviet empire left in its wake two

different types of conflicts between a titular group and a national minority. The

creation of independent successor states, such as Estonia, turned former

majorities into minorities overnight. In contradistinction, minorities such as the

Hungarians of Romanian Transylvania had long been coexisting with another

group that is a majority.

Estonia is a small country of about one million people located on the Baltic

Sea between Finland, Russia and Latvia. Before it was annexed by the USSR

during the Second World War, it was an independent country. Even before

annexation, however, it had already been home to a Russian minority. Its

numbers were bolstered after annexation by an influx of skilled Slav labour and

administrators, mostly of Russian origin. When Estonia regained its

independence in 1991, the Slav immigrants who had previously constituted a

---

[25] Yet, as refugees from Asia and Africa are prevented from entering the Western European
countries that are signatories to the Schengen agreement, ethnic minorities have started to

majority within the former USSR became a minority in a newly independent

Estonia. Since the majority of Slavs in Estonia are of Russian descent, the main

ethnic fault-line runs between Estonians and Russians.

Transylvania is a mineral-rich region located in the northwestern quarter of

Romania. Its political ties, however, have historically been with Hungary.

Although Magyar tribes first entered the region in the 5th century, Romanians

settled there as early as 1222. After the First World War, the convention at Alba

Iulia proclaimed Transylvania's union with Romania. In 1920, it was formally

ceded by Hungary in the Treaty of Trianon. Since then, the Romanian majority

and the Hungarian minority have led an uneasy coexistence in Transylvania.

8.1. Grievance and cultural distance

National minorities which had been present on a shared territory throughout

recent history turned out to be a greater source of political instability than more

recent Russian settlers. That observation negates any pedestrian explanation of

ethnic in terms of cultural distance. Presumably, cultural distance between the

Russian minority in Estonia and Estonians is comparable to cultural distance

between the Russian minority in Moldova and its Romanian majority. If that

assumption is correct, then cultural distance is a troubling explanation for ethno-

nationalist violence.

The cultural distance between Russians and a titular group is no greater

than cultural distance between Azeris and Armenians in the enclave of Nagorno-

---

appear on the political radar screen throughout Central Europe.

Karabakh. One might even speculate that the cultural distance between Armenians and Azeris is akin to that between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, namely, that they have more in common with one another than they do with adjoining ethnic groups. Yet, ethno-nationalist violence brought into conflict neither the Russian minority in Azerbaijan with the titular group, nor the Russian minority in Armenia with the titular group, but Azeris and the Armenian enclave. A popular explanation for ethno-nationalist violence premised on cultural distance has great difficult accounting for this fact.

A study by Melvin (2000) attributed differences in ethnic harmony to varying degrees of intercultural contact. In Estonia, Russians are concentrated in urban enclaves. In neighbouring Latvia, Russians had a much higher rate of intermarriage prior to independence and Russophones were dispersed widely among the indigenous population of Latvia's urban areas. Melvin concludes that perception of a Russian "threat" has been comparably greater in Estonia than in Latvia. Yet, the degree in ethnic (dis)harmony between the two countries is not much different. For one thing, neither country has seen ethno-nationalist violence. As a matter of fact, the whole "contact hypothesis" (Deutsch 1953) is suspect (Amir 1969; Forbes 1997). Intercultural contact appears to reduce antipathy only at the level of relationships between individuals, not between groups.

The paradigm invoking grievance is equally problematic. Metton and Williams (1998) ascribe the absence of ethnic radicalism in Estonia to the cultural division of labour in the former Soviet republic of Estonia. Russian migrants were

educated and belonged to the middle class or the managerial or political elite. As

a result, there should be a distinct shortage of possible recruits from the upper

lower class or the lower middle class. Recruits from these socio-economic

strata allegedly form the basis for ethnic radicalism (Waldmann 1985, 1989).

Russians were in a position to fend off subjugation because the new Estonian

society could not have made do without their expertise. Metton and Williams

argue that the Russian elite has an interest in collaborating with the Estonian

elite to maintain the system because, in economic terms at least, it stands to

benefit from the status quo. On average, however, the economic situation of

individuals who belong to minorities is worse than that of Estonians. In effect,

government policy furthers Russian unemployment (Varennes 1999). How is the

system of elite accommodation sustainable when the economic grievances of

Estonia's Russian minority, let alone its social and political grievances in a

country that has moved to abolish all but primary education in Russian, are being

strengthened? As the standard of living among Russians in Estonia declines, is

the number of potential recruits for radical movements from the upper lower class

and the lower middle class not growing?

Metton and William's explanation is undermined further by another

explanation using grievance, only this one focusing on politics. Pettai and Hallik

(2002) attribute the conflict in Estonia to the degree of control the Estonia-

speaking community has been able to institute over the Estonia's Russian

minority. This does not sound like an explanation that would endorse Metton and

William's elite-accommodation model. An even more innovative variant holds

that the absence of ethno-nationalist violence is conditioned by the fact that economic and political grievances do *not* coincide in Estonia (Hallik 1996; Vetik 2002).

Poppe's (1999, 2001) explanation of the conflict in Transylvania also invokes grievance. He observes that national stereotypes in Transylvania reflect more or less realistic differences. Ethnic groups do not blindly favour their group over all others on competence or morality. Poppe finds that the stereotypes attributed to ethnies are not completely biased effects of underlying psychological needs, but constrained by socio-economic reality. In Transylvania, Magyars are scapegoats. They are blamed for the deterioration of economic circumstances by dissatisfied Romanian youth, especially when their parents share their economic frustration. On average, the Hungarian minority in Transylvania may be better off than the Romanian majority but, on average, the Russian minority in Estonia is worse off than the Estonian majority. Can Poppe's socio-psychological model explain why neither scenario has turned violent?

Similarly, Petersen (2002) argues that resentment, linking an individual's emotion with a group's status, offers the best explanation for ethno-nationalist violence in a broad range of East-European cases. Yet, given the relative infrequency of ethno-nationalist violence in Eastern Europe, this is a curious generalization for it is based on observations drawn from a single country that never experienced any ethno-nationalist violence. Moreover, the claim may not withstand empirical scrutiny. Kolsto and Melberg (2002) set out to test the sort of claim advanced by Petersen by conducting a survey in Estonia and Moldova.

Ethno-nationalist violence had erupted in Moldova in 1992. Since ethnic

relations in Estonia have been reasonably harmonious, one would expect

attitudes between the titular groups of the two societies to differ. Yet, Kolsto and

Melberg found no statistically significant variations between titular groups in

Estonia and Moldova. This result suggests that psychological feelings may not

be a particularly parsimonious explanation for ethno-nationalist violence.

This is not a comprehensive review of the literature. After all, the

dissertation is predicated on the popular, not the academic, explanations for

ethno-nationalist violence as a function of grievance and cultural distance. This

section only means to show that these paradigms have been applied to Estonia

and Transylvania, that they are problematic, and that they have difficulty making

sense of the notable absence of ethno-nationalist violence throughout the region.

8.2. The former USSR and Estonia

The overriding objective of this chapter is to show that once a population has

passed through the demographic transition, the conditions on migration no longer

apply. Estonia's population is ageing rapidly:

Figure 29Figure 8.1: Population Pyramid for Estonia, 2000

It has passed through the demographic transition; therefore, H1 does *not* apply.

Since the Estonian and Russian populations are similarly old, their age structure

is comparable; therefore, H2 does not apply either. There was significant out-

migration by Estonians during the Soviet era; therefore, C1 applies. There was

also significant Russian immigration during Soviet times; therefore, C2 applies.

The subservient Estonian majority was being undercut by out-migration and

swamped by Russian immigration. Still, ethno-nationalist violence did not

materialize.

Work on the specific demographic situation in Estonia is elusive.

Anderson and Silver (1990, 1995), however, as well as Kingkade (1992) have

written on the broader demographic situation of titular majorities and national

minorities in the former Soviet Union.

Between 1949 and 1970, the Slav population of the Soviet Union,

consisting of Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians, increased naturally by 13,

14 and 9 per cent, respectively. Between 1970 and 1979 the natural increase

among these Slav groups dropped to 7, 5, and 4 per cent, respectively.

Concomitantly, Soviet Union's Muslim groups multiplifed. Kazakhs and

Azerbaijanis mushroomed by 46 and 49 per cent, and 24 and 25 per cent,

Kyrghyz and Turkmens by 52 per cent, then by 31 and 33 per cent, Uzbeks and

Tajiks by 53 per cent, then by 35 and 36 per cent. As a result, the percentage of

Russians in the Soviet Union has shrunk from 54.6 per cent in 1949 to 53.4 per

cent in 1970 and 52.4 per cent in 1979. For the Russian republic, the numbers

are 83.3, 82.8 and 82.6 per cent. Over the last thirty years, Muslim ethnies

doubled and tripled in size. Slavs increased by a mere 10 per cent (Breton

1981:29).

This difference is mainly explicable in terms of asymmetrically structured

populations. Between 1959 and 1989, the doubling time of the Russian

population increased from 62 to 128 years. Over the same period, by contrast,

the doubling time of Russia's Muslim population increased only marginally from

22 to 29 years. By 1989, Muslims contributed 75 per cent of the net increment of

Russia's labour force (Anderson & Silver 1990) and accounted for almost half of

Russia's natural increase -- even though they made up less than 20 per cent of

Russia's total population: "50 million Soviet Muslims currently produce as many

babies per year as the 145 million Russians" (Brzezinski 1989-1990). Between

1988 and 1994, the birth rate among Russian women dropped by 35 per cent

from 2.2 to 1.4 children per woman.

Figure 30Figure 8.2: Distribution of Population by Nationality Category, 1926 - 1989

(Source: Kingkade 1992:252)

At that rate, Russians were estimated to have ceased to be the majority of the

Soviet population by 1994, Muslims were expected to outnumber Russians by

2042, and Slavs by 2059. They were destined to become the majority of the

Soviet population by 2066 (Anderson & Silver 1995).

When the numbers are broken down into the 15 union republics, the

differences are even more glaring. In 1989, the percentage of a republic's titular

majority ranged from a low of 40 per cent for Kazakhs in Kazakhstan to a high of

93 per cent for Armenians in Armenia. The two following tables compare the

share of the titular nationalities among the populations of the various republics of

the Union to the share of the Russian population in the same republics.

Table 2Table 8.1: Proportion of titular nationalities in Union republics, 1926-1989

	1926	1959	1970	1979	1989
RSFSR	78.03	83.26	82.83	82.62	81.53
Ukraine	80.08	76.81	74.87	73.55	72.76
Lithuania		79.34	80.13	79.95	79.58
Latvia		62.02	56.76	53.7	52.04
Estonia		74.6	68.22	64.71	61.53
Georgia	67.63	64.32	66.81	68.76	70.13
Azerbaydzhan	63.35	67.44	73.81	78.13	82.68
Armenia	84.6	88.03	88.62	89.73	93.31
Uzbek SSR	75.44	62.15	65.74	68.68	71.39
Kirgiz SSR	66.79	40.51	43.81	47.89	52.37
Tadzhik SSR	74.84	53.08	56.21	58.78	62.29
Turkmen SSR	73.78	60.95	65.62	68.43	72.01
Kazakh SSR	57.12	30.08	32.55	36.02	39.69
Belorrusia	80.63	81.09	80.97	79.4	77.86
Moldavia		65.43	64.56	63.95	64.46

(Source: Kingkade 1992:256)

Table 3Table 8.2: Proportion of Russians in Union republics, 1926-1989

	1926	1959	1970	1979	1989
RSFSR	78.03	83.26	82.83	82.62	81.53
Ukraine	9.23	16.94	19.37	21.11	22.07
Lithuania		8.52	8.57	8.93	9.37
Latvia		26.56	29.8	32.8	33.96
Estonia		20.05	24.68	27.92	30.33
Georgia	3.63	10.09	8.46	7.45	6.32
Azerbaydzhan	9.72	13.55	9.97	7.88	5.59
Armenia	2.22	3.18	2.65	2.3	1.56

Uzbek SSR	5.42	13.46	12.49	10.83	8.35
Kirgiz SSR	11.76	30.2	29.18	25.89	21.53
Tadzhik SSR	0.68	13.28	11.87	10.38	7.63
Turkmen SSR	7.72	17.35	14.5	12.62	9.48
Kazakh SSR	19.69	42.96	42.45	40.8	37.82
Belorrusia	7.7	8.18	10.42	11.9	13.22

(Source: Kingkade 1992:256)

In the Baltics, the proportion of the titular majority relative to the Russian minority shrank during the Soviet reign, largely due to Russian immigration. By contrast, despite Russian immigration, the proportion of the titular group in the Central Asian republics continued to climb. By the time the USSR collapsed, Russians constituted less than half the country's population. The proportion of the USSR's population living in the five Asian republics grew from 14 to 23 per cent (Breton 1981: 29). While the titular majorities in European Russia were becoming increasingly Russified, the titular majorities in Asian Russia were becoming more indigenized. The table below shows the discrepancies in TFR among the former Union's republics.

Table 4Table 8.3: Fertility rate of Soviet nationalities, 1959-1989

	1958-59	1969-70	1978-79	1988-89
Russian	2.44	1.82	1.8	1.93
Ukrainian	2.36	2.13	2.02	2.05
Belorussian	2.92	2.37	2.09	2.11
Uzbek	6.08	7.48	6.22	4.67
Kazakh	7.02	5.79	4.68	3.6
Georgian	2.41	2.56	2.28	1.9
Azeri	6.4	5.6	3.93	3
Lithuanian	2.72	2.42	2.1	2.03
Moldavian	4.14	2.86	2.63	2.69
Latvian	1.89	1.99	1.97	2.25
Kirgiz	6.05	7.76	6.67	4.76

Tadzhik	5.3	7.51	5.71	5.34
Armenian	4.8	3.05	2.36	2.4
Turkmen	6.59	7.69	6.55	4.86
Estonian	1.95	2.25	2.14	2.35

(Source: Darskiy and Andreyev 1991)

The subsequent "indigenization" of the titular majorities throughout the Central Asian republics has been propelled by natural increase and Russian emigration. Conversely, Russian immigration and the Soviet Cultural Revolution, which had effectively turned some majorities into minorities, had reinforced the Russifican syncretism of the Baltics until Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian independence in 1991.

When the USSR dissolved, 65 million ex-Soviet citizens were living outside of their "own" ethnic polity. Twenty-five million Russians found themselves residing in non-Russian republics (Brubaker 1993: 49; Kingkade 1992: 258, 265). Since Russians were heavily urbanized (Kolstoe, 1995), by 1989, indigenous groups made up less than half the population in the capital of six union republics: Alma Ata (Kazakhstan 22.3 per cent), Riga (Latvia 36.3 per cent), Dushabe (Tajikistan 38 per cent), Tashkent (Uzbekistan), Tallinn (Estonia) and Kishinev (Moldova) between 43.8 and 48.8 per cent. Throughout Central Asia, the urban proportion of ethnic Russians exceeded the urban proportion of the largest indigenous group.

Table 5Table 8.4: Urban Proportion of Russian Minority vs. Titular Group, 1991

	Russians (urban) % population	Titular group (urban) % population
Kazakhstan	77.5	38.4
Uzbekistan	94.8	30.5
Tajikistan	93.0	26.4
Kyrgystan	69.9	21.8
Turkmenistan	96.9	33.8

Moldova	86.1	33.5

(Source: Anderson & Silver 1995)

In Armenia and the Baltics, by contrast, titular groups were 60 to 70 per cent urban (Prazauskas 1993:28).

Concomitantly, the share of ethnic Russians decreased throughout most of Central Asia between 1959 and 1989: From 13.5 to 8.3 per cent in Uzbekistan, from 30.2 to 21.5 per cent in Kyrgyzstan, from 13.3 to 7.6 per cent in Tajikistan, and from 17.3 to 9.5 per cent in Turkmenistan. Despite Russians' strong urban presence, the diminishing proportion of Russians on the territory of Central-Asian states prevented the minority complex that emerged among Latvians, Estonians and Moldovans.

As early as the end of the nineteenth century, Estonians were in the plurality, but not in the majority, in Tallinn and Tartu. In 1913, however, Russians surpassed Germans as the largest minority. In 1922, 969,976 Estonians (87.7%) shared the territory with 91,109 Russians. Throughout the 50 years preceding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939), the Estonian proportion of the population hovered between 88 and 91 per cent. Danes and Swedes emigrated; Jews were exterminated. In Estonian territories in the country's northeast, already containing Russians, such as Narva, ceded to the USSR, the proportion of Estonians reached 95 per cent during the Second World War. In 1940, the Estonian proportion of the population in the northeast of the country, which borders Russia between the Baltic Sea's Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipsi, was 79 per cent. Five decades hence Russian immigration and Estonian immigration

had caused the proportion of Estonians in the same part of the country to drop to 18.5 per cent (Melvin 2000).

In 1940, Estonians made up 97 per cent of the entire territory's population. By 1994, the compound effect of Estonian emigration and Russian immigration had reduced the former's proportion of the population to 61.5 per cent. The decline was relative and absolute. In 1994, there were 962,000 Estonians. That is fewer than the 992,000 Estonians who resided on the country's territory immediately before World War II. That decline is largely attributable to the death and emigration of some 200,000 Estonians during the war. Between 1945 and 1989, Estonians multiplied by 22 per cent. That contrasts with a 26-fold increase in the number of non-Estonians over the same period. This dichotomous development is explicable in terms of slow natural increase due to the diminished number of Estonians left on the territory after the war and the immigration of 551,000 Russians. The number of Russians swelled from 20,000 in 1945 to 474,800 in 1989. Compounded by immigration from other Slavic-language peoples, especially Ukrainians and Belorussians, the number of non-Estonians, who had accounted for only three per cent of the population in 1940, made up 35 per cent of the population by the time Estonia declared itself independent in 1991. (Krieken 1999:107).

The marginalization of Estonians is exacerbated by the fact that the rural population is heavily Estonian and stable over time. Russians, by contrast, are concentrated in the aforementioned northwestern part of the country, along today's border with Russia, in the strategic industrial towns of Narva, Kohtla-

Järve, and Sillamäe. As late as 1934 Estonians held a two-thirds majority in these towns. By 1994, they had been reduced to less than ten per cent of the local population. In 1934, Tallinn, Estonia's capital, was 85.8 per cent Estonian and only 5.8 per cent Russian. By 1994, Russians lagged only 1.7 percentage points behind the Estonian plurality of 49.1 per cent.

So, despite patterns of migration that worked to the detriment of the subservient Estonian majority, ethno-nationalist violence did not occur. The claim that the conditions on migration only apply when H1 and H2 apply, is thus supported empirically.

8.3. Transylvania

Transylvania provides further empirical support for the claim that migration acts as an intervening variable only when H1 and H2 apply. Romania's population is ageing as rapidly as Estonia's:

Figure 31Figure 8.3: Population Pyramid for Romania, 2000

The dominant Romanian majority's and subservient Transylvania's Hungarian minority's populations are comparably old. Estonia and Transylvania differ, however, in terms of emigration by the subservient Hungarian *minority* and

immigration by the dominant Romanian *majority*; therefore, C1 and C2 apply. Although net migration thus worked to the detriment of the Magyar minority, ethno-nationalist violence did not materialize.

The relationship between demographic trends and ethnic relations in Transylvania has already attracted attention. Works by Illyés (1982), Trebici (1991) and Edroiu and Puscas (1995) manifest an interest in the demographics of Magyar Romanians. The Research Centre for Inter-Ethnic Relations In Transylvania (CCRIT) at Babes-Bolyai University's Department of Sociology in Cluj also conducts research on the evolution of ethno-demographical structures of settlements throughout Transylvania.

In 1880, Magyars accounted for 27.1 per cent of Transylvania's population. By 1890 that proportion had risen to 31.3 per cent. In 1910, the Magyar proportion of Transylvania's population peaked at 36.1 per cent. Between 1910 and 1930, the proportion of Romanians in Transylvania rose from 53.7 to 57.8 per cent. Over the same period, the proportion of Hungarians declined from 31.6 to 24.4 per cent. Between 1941 and 1966, Hungarian migration and a disproportionately slower Romanian fertility decline caused the proportion of Hungarians in Transylvania to drop from its apex of 48 to 26.8 per cent (Illyés 1982:140).

The number of Magyars in Romania as a whole, by contrast, has remained relatively stable – 1,423,459 in 1930, 1,620,199 in 1992 -- even though over the same period the total Romanian population rose from 14,280,729 to 22,760,489. That observation, however, belies the fact that the proportion of

Romania's Magyar population has been in decline since 1977 when it peaked at 9.99 per cent. The events of December 1989 have reinforced this decline by unleashing an exodus of Romanian Magyars. As a result, the proportion of Magyars hit a nadir of 7.11per cent in 1992 (Illyés 1982:140).

Transylvania's Hungarians have traditionally been more urbanized than Romanians. In 1880, 53.9 per cent of Hungarians lived in urban areas, 22.8 per cent in rural ones whereas only 19.8 per cent of Romanians lived in cities, 61.2 per cent on the land. The gap widened. In 1910, 62 per cent of Transylvanian Hungarians lived in cities -- compared to 19.7 per cent of Romanians and 15.8 per cent of Germans -- even though their total proportion of the population was only 31.6 per cent. By 1930, however, 35 per cent of Transylvanian cities were inhabited by Rumanians. Still, the Hungarians hung on to a relative majority -- 37.9 per cent. Germans accounted for 13.2 per cent of the population. The atrocities committed by Horthyites between 1940 and 1944 reversed that trend as many urban Romanians took flight. Over the next two decades, however, a rural exodus and high fertility caused the proportion of urban Romanians to double from 33.8 per cent in 1941 to 64.7 per cent in 1966. Subsequent to rural flight of native Romanians, the Hungarian proportion of urban dwellers dropped accordingly to 26.8 per cent, not primarily because there were many fewer Hungarians but because the proportion of Romanians in cities was simply that much greater (Illyés 1982:140). According to the 1992 census, Hungarians now constitute 21.2 per cent of the urban population in Transylvania (Edroiu and Puscas 1995:24-25, 27).

Due to low fertility and emigration, the Magyar minority in Transylvania

appears to be losing in terms of demographic difference and demographic

change. Yet, ethno-nationalist violence has not materialized.

8.4. Conclusion

This chapter argued that old populations whose ethnic groups have comparable

age structures are not predisposed to ethno-nationalist violence, notwithstanding

migration. In Estonia, emigration undercut the base of the subservient majority

and immigration consolidated the dominant minority's numerical position. The

opposite holds in Transylvania. Emigration undercut the base of the subservient

minority while the dominant majority's numerical position was bolstered by the

immigration and urbanization of Romanians. That nuance, however, appears to

have had no effect on ethno-nationalist violence. Since all groups involved have

passed through the demographic transition, neither group's age structure

threatens the other group, nor are there enough youth to perpetrate violence on a

large and protracted scale.

Estonia and Transylvania are exemplary of most of Eastern and Central

Europe and the Baltic states. Low fertility and out-migration have resulted in old

populations. Low fertility among ethnies in Estonia and Transylvania has been

compounded by emigration. The proportion of Russians dropped by over one

percentage point to 29 per cent between 1989 and 1994 because 63,000

Russians left Estonia (Martynova 1999:88). The transition of Central European,

Eastern European and Baltic societies has been accompanied by significant

changes in demographic behaviour: rising divorce, declining nuptuality, declining fertility, and increased mortality (Kuddo 1997). In addition, fertility in Eastern and Central Europe and in the Baltics plunged between 9 and 36 per cent and 20 and 40 per cent, respectively, between 1989/1990 and 1993/1994 (Grasland 1998:98-99). Like other advanced industrial countries, the countries in the Baltics and Eastern and Central Europe have averaged around 1.7 children per woman – the precise figure for Russian Estonians today -- well below the rate of replacement of 2.1 for low-mortality settings (Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001:3). Without natural increase, populations througout the Baltics, Eastern and Central Europe are effectively shrinking. Post-Soviet demographic changes have thus given a small nation such as Estonia, which had seemed destined to be turned into a minority on its own territory, a new lease on life.

The findings thus suggest that the propensity for ethno-nationalist violence may be inversely proportional to the structure of a group's population. On average, if predominantly Muslim groups are factored out, European ethnic groups have the oldest ethnic populations in the world. Political demography thus offers a possible explanation for the low incidence of ethno-nationalist violence throughout the European continent but especially throughout the Baltics, Eastern and Central Europe where the ageing of populations is accelerated artificially by emigration. Political demography thus predicts the risk of ethno-nationalist violence throughout Europe to remain low or decline even lower than it is now. Muslim ethnies in the Balkans and the Caucasuses are the exception. They are bucking the overall demographic trend on the continent.

That being said, political demography cannot explain violence between Serbs and Croats. From the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina cited in the fifth chapter, it is obvious that Serbs and Croats had long entered the demographic transition when war broke. Both sides had relatively old populations. Arguably, however, their war was intended to re-engineer the demographic map of their territories (Bookman 1997). The war precipitated large flows of migration, which, in turn, increased the intensity of ethno-nationalist violence (through retributions, for instance).

This raises an interesting question. Is there perhaps a certain rate, level or threshold beyond which emigration or immigration could become problematic even among old populations without asymmetric age structures? McGarry has argued the opposite, namely, that demographic engineering can be used to de-escalate a conflict (1998). Are there indeed levels of immigration or emigration that reduce the probability of ethno-nationalist violence? Is there a threshold in terms of age structure beyond which the probability of ethno-nationalist violence drops sharply? Or is there instead a direct correlation between population ageing and the probability of violence? These are the more specific questions to which this chapter gives rise and which only cross-national statistical correlations using multiple regressions can answer definitively. Due to a paucity of data, that method is not available. Most Eastern and Central European countries, however, have some demographic records detailing the ethnic breakdown and structure of their populations. In theory, therefore, it may be possible to realize some multiple regressions on a regional scale using data from Eastern and Central European

countries. In practice, a concerted effort could assemble them. This would be a worthwhile undertaking because accurate figures for Western European countries are more easily – although not centrally – accessible. Were both sets of data collected, one might be able to ascertain some interesting parallels or contrasts between Western European countries, and Eastern, Central European and Baltic states.

Demographic patterns across European countries are relatively uniform. Compared to countries on other continents, notably Asian and African societies, the demographic patterns across European countries also constitute an aberration. Sampling according to demographic dynamics as the independent variable thus suggests that germane insights may be gleaned from demographic patterns in non-European countries. When demographic circumstances are too similar, any conclusions that may appear to follow from inductive research, of the sort which limits itself to one or more European countries or ethnic groups, may not lend themselves to generalization. By sampling according to the dependent variable, a dissertation on the political demography of ethno-nationalist violence that investigated European cases may inadvertently miss the point. In this light, the next chapter is devoted to China.

The Greek genius is better understood
by opposing one Greek statue to an Egyptian or Asian statue
than by getting to know a hundred Greek statues.
(André Malraux,
adventurer, French minister of culture and author of La Condition humaine)

Chapter 9: Xinjiang/Tibet

Far from being monochromatic, the political, economic and demographic

powerhouse of Asia includes Tibetans, Mongols, Manchus, and Turki and other

Muslims. Official Chinese policy divides the population into 'nationalities'

(minzu). Of China's 1,130,510,638 people counted in the 1990 census,

1,039,187,548 (91.92 per cent) were Han, 90,567,245 (8.01 per cent) were

minority nationalities (shaoshu minzu), and the remainder (752,347 – 0.07 per

cent) was classified as unidentified people. Among the minorities, 18 exceeded

the 1 million mark while 15 fell between 100,000 and 1 million. Ten of 55

officially recognized minorities identify as Muslim. Most reside in the Northwest:

Hui (8,612,001), Dongziang, Baonan, Salars, Uygurs (7,207,024), Kazaks

(1,110,758), Tartars, Uzbeks, Kirgiz, Tajiks. Their total population amounts to

17,599,268, about 1.5 per cent of China's total population.

In 1949, Han Chinese constituted 94 per cent of mainland China's

population. Prior to the PRC's founding, most minority populations were

decreasing. Between 1953 and 1964, the annual growth rate of minority

populations was 1.11 per cent versus 1.59 per cent for Han (Mackerras 1994:

240).[26] Between 1964 and 1982, however, the trend reversed, with 2.94 per cent annual growth among minorities versus 2.04 among Han Chinese. Between 1982 and 1990, the gap widened to 4.44 versus 1.35 per cent (Mackerras 1994: 241).

The number of people identifying as a minority in the PRC has increased – not just because of high fertility -- due to minorities being exempt from the one-child rule -- but also due to

1. Special permissiveness in regards to religious ritual;

2. Regional autonomy;

3. Extensive economic subsidies

4. Ethnoregional festivals;

5. Preferential education policies such as larger budgets, lenient admission standards, and tuition waivers; and

6. Selective use of minority languages as vehicles of instruction.

There are preferential policies (*youhui zhengce*) in family planning, school admissions, hiring and promotion, financing and taxation of social equality. Although the education gap between Han and minorities is substantial, the number of university students who identified with an ethnic minority more than doubled between 1980 and 1995 to 16 million. Still, the number of educated members of ethnic minorities is insufficient to fill cadre and state leadership positions. Concomitantly, minorities are vastly underrepresented in the military. In 1990, the Chinese army was 3,199,100 strong. Han composed 98.6 per cent

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[26] For the 1953, 1964 and 1982 Chinese census see Zhang (1987: 438). For the 1990 census see Beijing Review (1990: 18).

of the forces. Minorities made up 1.4 per cent -- even though nationally they account for 8.04 per cent of the population.

According to the State Statistical Bureau of China (1997), the titular group is in the majority in only two of the five autonomous regions: the Tibet[27] Autonomous Regions (TAR) with 2.3 million Tibetans or other minorities (97.3 per cent) and Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) with 10.5 million (61.9 per cent); the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (GZAR) had 17.5 million (38.5 per cent), the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (ZHAR) 1.8 million (34.3 per cent), and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) 4.4 million (19.6 per cent). The XUAR, the IMAR, and the TAR are punctuated with resistance against the Chinese government, opposition to Han Chinese cultural dominance, and religious resurgence. Economic and political control of the XUAR has been premised on permanent mass migration. By contrast, there has been only limited migration to the IMAR and almost none to the TAR. The puzzle that motivates this chapter is the presence of ethno-nationalist violence in China's XUAR and its absence in the TAR.

A small but growing number of Westerners are studying minorities in China. Gladney is the noted Western expert on minorities the China (1999). He is cognizant of the demographic imperatives governing Beijing's policies towards

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[27] All references are to the territory which today encompasses the TAR, not to "greater Tibet" claimed by the Tibetan government in exile which is about three times the size of the TAR. This is a germane nuance because it partially explains the discrepancy in figures for the Tibetan and Han populations cited by Beijing and the Tibetan government in exile. The former's figures refer to the TAR, the latter's to the population of "greater Tibet." Yet, it is advantageous for the Tibetan government in exile to quote figures for "greater Tibet" because that way, the proportion of Han mushrooms from 5 per cent in the TAR to about 50 per cent in "greater Tibet." This is just one more piece of evidence in support of the argument in the sixth chapter that working with

the XUAR. Mackerras (1994) is also aware of the way demographics and

identity politics in China are intertwined. Significant contributions to the topic

have also been made by Sautman (1998), Longworth and Williamson (1993), He

and Pooler (2002), and Banister (2001). Demographic data for China are

reasonably easy to obtain because China's population dynamics have long

fascinated Western research. In the case of minorities in China, therefore, data

per se are not the main obstacle. The challenge, rather, is to apply an analytic

paradigm and to interpret them.

9.1. Grievance and cultural distance

Several studies have applied one variant or another of Hechter's (1975) theory

on internal colonialism (Gladney 1998; Dillan 1995; Chung 2002; Bovingdon

2002). The premise is that the Han are exploiting Xinjiang and its local

inhabitants for the region's natural resources, which are vital to China's economy.

Throughout the XUAR as elsewhere in China, unemployment has become a

serious problem as the labour force has been growing much more rapidly than

the economy. Many of the most desirable and best-paid jobs are with the

regional administration; but those jobs are mostly inaccessible to non-Han. In

other words, economic grievances abound.

Yet, there is good reason to be sceptical about the pertinence of the

internal-colonialism paradigm in the context of Xinjiang (Sautman 2000). Muslim

minorites in Xinjiang are not being exploited to any greater an extent than

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demographic figures can be tricky because the numbers change depending on the point of reference.

Tibetans. Relative to the small proportion they represent among the population as a whole, Han in Tibet are vastly over-represented in cadre and professional positions (Liu 1989:294). Among professionals in Tibet, 32.9 per cent are Han, 66.1 per cent native Tibetans. By contrast, only 26.5 per cent of workers are Han as compared to 72.6 per cent of Tibetans (Mackerras 1994:255).[28] The economic grievances in the two autonomous regions are similar. How, then, can internal colonialism explain ethno-nationalist violence in Xinjiang relative to its absence in Tibet?

Similarly, ethno-nationalist violence in Xinjiang is often blamed on religious difference (eg. Gaborieau & Popovic 2001). Most of the local minorities in the XUAR are Muslims. Yet, that cultural-distance explanation is untenable. China has another major Muslim minority, the Hui who live in central China. Yet, the Hui coexist peacefully with the Han majority. This difference, however, might be explained away if ethnicity is assumed to trump culture. Then one could argue that the Hui and the Han get along because they share a common culture. This is not the case between Han and the Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. But why would ethnicity trump religion? That claim goes against the grain in the current literature (Juergensmeyer 1993; Hobsbawm 1992). If anything, religion has been argued to be experiencing a renaissance as a marker of identity (Kepler 1991; Gellner 1995).

This survey of explanations premised on grievance and cultural distance is meant only for purposes of illustration. Ultimately, the dissertation is premised on

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[28] If Mackerras' data are accurate, then the Chinese government is low-balling the number of Han in Tibet: If the proportion of Han professionals and workers among the Tibet's workforce is

the juxtaposition of the popular variants of these explanations, not the academic variant. This cursory review is merely meant to show that these paradigms have indeed been applied to the case under investigation. Not only are they problematic, they also have difficulty explaining the puzzle at the heart of this chapter: Why is there ethno-nationalist violence in Xinjiang but not in Tibet?

9.2. Xinjiang

The titular population of Xinjiang is young; therefore, H1 applies. The contrast in age structure between the dominant Han minority and the subservient Muslim majority is stark;[29] therefore, H2 applies. There was some out-migration by Uighurs just after the region came under Chinese control; therefore, C1 applies. There has been consistent immigration by Han to the XUAR over the past 50 years; therefore, C2 applies. These trends converge on a high probability of ethno-nationalist violence.

Two-thirds of the PRC's territory are minority regions with great natural wealth. Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is in China's Northwest. It is located north of Tibet and west of Mongolia. Also called "Chinese Turkestan" by explorers such as Sir Aurel Stein and Sven Hedin, at 640,000 square miles it is the largest administrative unit in China. It borders eight countries and accounts for one-sixth of China's territory. Urumqi, the capital, is 1,500 miles from Beijing. In 1996, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) counted 16.9 million inhabitants (curiously unchanged since the 1990 census). The minority

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correct, then it would be improbable that only five percent of Tibet's residents are Han.

population consists of seven Muslim nationalities: Uighur, Kazak, Uzbek,

Taranchi, Tatar, Tajik, Kirghiz. During the 1940s, they constituted 92 per cent of

the region's total population. The 1945 census shows that of a total population of

4,015,350 total, only 222,401 were Han. All seven Muslim nationalities have had

Han Chinese as their common enemy (Benson 1990:30). In 1949, 4.33 million

people lived in the XUAR. By 1989, while minorities had merely doubled, the

XUAR's total population had almost quadrupled to 14.54 million.

The increase is partially due to minor Uighur out-migration (Roberts 1999)

but largely due to Han immigration. The reaction of Xinjiang's Muslim and Tibet's

Buddhists has hardly been jovial. Beijing has not been amenable to calls for

greater autonomy and has clamped down on "militants." Still, there is a marked

difference between the way this has played out in Xinjiang and Tibet. Xinjiang

has been plagued by increasingly belligerent political violence from which Tibet

has largely been spared.

Political demography posits a possible explanation. In 1949, Han Chinese

made up 7 per cent (300,000) of Xinjiang's population. Uighurs constituted 76

per cent and Kazaks 10 per cent. By 1962, Han made up 30 per cent of the

region's population. The Han proportion of the population peaked at 42 per cent

in 1978. That translates into a six-fold increase over less than three decades.

Demographic marginalization stirred up ethnic tensions between migrant Hans

and local minorities. Beijing initially responded by decreasing the rate of Han

migration to Xinjiang. That policy changed in 1990. At the time, Xinjiang counted

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[29] Due to the diversity represented among Xinjiang's minorities, considerable reification is required to speak of a Muslim majority.

about 5.7 million Han, a figure that climbed to 6.5 million – 39 per cent of the population – by 1995.[30]

The Chinese leadership seems to be aware of the impact perceived demographic shifts have on ethnic tensions; hence, minorities in China's five autonomous regions have always been exempt from the one-child policy and have at times been allowed to have as many as five legal children. Since 1973 Han have been permitted to have two children only. As a result, Han fertility was cut in half. Minorities, however, were exempt from this policy. Only since the 1980s has the one-child policy and family planning been promoted among minorities. Effectively that works out to two children per family in cities and three to four in the countryside. Minorities of less then 50,000 may have three children. While minorities were officially allowed to have two children with exceptions for a third, even a fourth and a fifth child, in 1992 urban Han were allowed only one child (Sautman, 1998:89).

Minorities have the right to marry two years earlier than Han (age 20 for males and age 18 for women) and even younger in some remote areas of Xinjiang. In 1984, the average age of marriage of Uighur women was 17. Overall, women belonging to ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang marry earlier than Han. In 1981, one-third of the former aged 15-19 had given birth to a child while 2.5 of Xinjiang Han had done so (Sautman 1998:87-88, 90).

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[30] In reality, however, almost half the region's population is now of Han origin. If the approximately one million Han "blind floaters," who are not officially registered, are factored into the equation, then the Han population has long surpassed its previous peak of 42 per cent in 1978 (Xinjiang Yearbook 1995:872-3; Xinjiang statistical yearbook 1996:47).

That explains differentials in fertility between Han and Uighurs. In 1994, the natural birth rate in China was 17.1 per 1000, 18.98 in Inner Mongolia, 18.84 in Guangxi, 25.64 in Tibet, 19.67 in Ningxia, and 20.82 in Xinjiang. That precipitated natural rates of increase of 11.21, 12.48, 12.24, 16.93, 13.65, and 13.39 respectively (Wang 1999:176). The average of four children in 1981 had dropped to 2.71 by 1989. Only 40 per cent of Uighurs had just one or two children compared to 82 per cent of Han. Among Uighurs, 15.5 per cent had three children, 12.5 per cent four and 30 per cent five or more. The total fertility rate among rural Uighurs was 4.77 and 4.38 among rural Kazaks. That contrasts with a total fertility rate for Xinjiang Han of 1.4, which is slightly below the national average of 1.5 (Sautman 1998:90). Uighurs average 4.3 children per woman, Han 1.5 (Anderson and Silver 1995:215; Toops 1999:6). In other words, Xinjiang is growing rapidly. In 1995, it had 9 per cent of the PRC's minority population of 110 million, a rise of 20 million from five years prior. Forty million more are expected by 2010.

The situation in the IMAR is somewhat different because Han there have consistently outnumbered Mongols by more than five to one. Unlike Xinjiang, that ratio has changed little over the past half a century even though the total number of Han in the IMAR jumped to 17.3 million in 1990 from 5.2 million in 1949 (CPIRC 1991). Of the 5.617 million people and 44 nationalities living in Inner Mongolia in 1947, 83.6 per cent were Han, and 14.81 per cent Mongols. By 1985, the population had risen to 2.75 million with a further rise to 4.4 million by 1996 (Wang 1999:169). By 1990, despite immigration and the detrimental

demographic effects of the Cultural Revolution, the proportion of Han among the

21,456,798 inhabitants had declined to 80.62 per cent (Mackerras 1994:251). By

1989 there were 3.07 million Mongols (14.7 per cent of the population). Other

minorities accounted for 3.1 per cent of the population (600,000 people)

(Longworth and Williamson 1993:77).

9.3. Tibet

The titular population of Tibet is even younger than Xinjiang's; therefore, H1

applies. The contrast in age structure between the dominant Han minority and

the subservient Tibetan majority is as stark as in Xinjiang; therefore, H2 applies.

Many Tibetans left after the Chinese crackdown; therefore, C1 applies. Yet,

there has also been a constant stream of Han out-migration from Tibet. That out-

migration is moderated by consistent Han immigration; therefore, C2 applies. In

theory, these trends point towards ethno-nationalist violence. In practice, there

has been no violence.

Between 1952 and 1959, Tibet's population rose from 1.15 million to 1.228

million (Mackerras 1994:241). Whereas, Tibet's Han population increased by

6.76 per cent between 1953 and 1964, increase among native Tibetans was

slightly lower at 6.06 per cent. Under normal conditions, increase among native

Tibetans would have exceeded the increase among Han, had it not been for

emigration accompanying the flight of the Dalai Lama. That outflow of Tibetans

undermined the base of the Tibetan population. As a result, the ratio of growth

remained tilted slightly in favour of the Han from 1964 to 1982: 6.06:6.7 per cent

(Wang 1999:173). The 3,649,371 people who called Tibet home in 1994 included 2.36 million Tibetans. Mortality decreased during the 1950s across China. By the 1980s the Chinese could expect to live 66 to 68.92 years. That average is almost double what it had been some three decades earlier. As a result, 77 per cent of Tibetan women are now of childbearing age (Wang 1999:174). In the 1953 census, 36.27 per cent of the population was under 15. The proportion of under 15s peaked at 40.41 per cent in 1964 and has been declining ever since. In 1982 -- immediately prior to a Chinese crack-down on secessionists -- it was 33.59 per cent. By 1987 it had declined further to 28.76 per cent.

Immigration to the TAR has been low and its overall impact mitigated by a low fertility among Han. The number of Han in Tibet decreased by 6.6 per cent from 122,356 in 1980, to 70,932 in 1985, followed by an increase of 3.6 per cent to 79,871 in 1989 and an increase of 3.7 per cent to 81,217 in 1990 (Liu 1989:140-141; SBT 1989:140-141; Wang 1999:174). According to the official numbers, almost all Han reside in the prefecture of Lhasa where they account for 30 per cent of the population. The TAR's other five prefectures are, for all intents and purposes, homogeneous. Of 72 counties, 40 were less than one per cent Han (Mackerras 1994:252, 254). Tibet's high elevation, scarcity of arable land and poor infrastructure, especially the absence of an immigrant network outside of the capital, make it inhospitable and difficult to reach. Tibet is not a particularly attractive destination for potential Han migrants. As a result, Han immigration

has been moderate. Most Han immigrants to Tibet remain only for a few years, arriving in their 20s and departing in their 30s.

By contrast, disproportionately high birth rates among minorities in Xinjiang coupled with aggressive Han immigration have led to demographic frictions. Beijing's migration policy shifted in the 1980s and the Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities was adopted in 1984. Since 1980, the national leadership under Mao Zedong's successor Deng Xiaoping has broken with the policies of "coercive assimilation" dating back to the Cultural Revolution and started to endorse greater regional autonomy and recognize minority rights (Mackerras 1994:153-155). Han migration policy was pursued less vigorously. The result was a brief aberration in the mid-1980s when the rate of Han immigration to Xinjiang declined. A resurgence has since caused Han immigration to Xinjiang to rise steadily (He & Pooler 2002:157, 163, 174). The spontaneous rural-rural Han migration of the 1950s and 1960s (Ma 1987; Ji Ping 1990) has made way for deliberate migration to geostrategic urban centres. Instead of regional domination, cities and areas of political and/or economic import are now Beijing's priority, especially administrative capitals, areas of economic interest, and the border (Banister 2001:290-291). As a matter of fact, since the 1980s Xinjiang has been among the top three provincial destinations for inter-provincial Han migrants (He and Poorer 2002:166, 173). As a result, more Han have been concentrated in fewer areas where Han immigration is confronted with disproportionately high fertility among ethnic minorities.

China already has one of the world's highest rates of annual increase in its urban population, 5 per cent in the 1980s, and 4 per cent in the 1990s (Ebanks & Cheng 1990:31). Urumqi, Xinjiang's capital, grew at an above-average rate of 5.67 per cent per annum between 1953 and 1982 (1990:47), a rate which shows no sign of letting up because of continued increase and urban migration in the XUAR. The pace of Han immigration to Urumqi must have been substantial for they are now the majority. Over the same period, by contrast, Inner Mongolia's capital, Huhehot, grew at less than one per cent per annum. The incessant arrival of young newcomers has reinforced the (un)popular perception that Beijing is trying to flood Xinjiang. Since Han fertility is below levels of replacement, the proportion of Han Chinese in Xinjiang would decline steadily without positive net Han migration (Banister 2001:288).

9.4. Conclusion

Why has Han immigration been a source of violent conflict in the XUAR but not in the TAR? While the local population(s) technically remain in the majority in both autonomous regions as a whole, Han have been a strong urban presence, especially throughout Xinjiang. Tibetans, by contrast, only have to contend with temporary Han immigration to Lhasa. Han migration to Xinjiang has been far more widespread, substantial and permanent than in Tibet. These populations are much younger than the Han population because they have yet to pass through the demographic transition. In this case, however, H1 and H2 fail to explain how a population's youthfulness might precipitate violence. Although the

subservient majorities in both autonomous regions are younger, only Xinjiang has had to contend with protracted ethno-nationalist violence. These cases thus provide empirical support for the salience of migration as a relevant predictor of ethno-nationalist violence.

While Han immigration to both autonomous regions has persisted, it has played out differently in the two regions. Han immigrants to Tibet rarely settle for good, whereas that is the case in Xinjiang; therefore, growth among the Han population in Xinjiang is by migration as well as by natural increase. Growth among the Han in Tibet is essentially by migration only. Due to its effect on population structure, migration may affect the probability of ethno-nationalist violence. Despite its high fertility, the subservient Muslim majority in Xinjiang is being marginalized. By contrast, immigration does not appear to have a marginalizing effect on the subservient Tibetan majority.

Emigration by Tibetans in the wake of the flight of the Dalai Lama undermined the base of the Tibetan population. Still, Tibetans have always been more numerous than Han (with the possible exception of Lhasa) and the combination of flows of Han migration with high fertility among Tibetans have never called the demographic superiority of Tibetans into question. The dissertation stresses that the paradigm of political demography is not to be mistaken as a deterministic explanation. Ostensibly, any impact emigration dating back almost half a century might have is limited and, therefore, does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the persistent absence of ethno-nationalist violence. Still, migration provides an answer to the puzzle presented by the

absence of ethno-nationalist violence in Tibet and its presence in Xinjiang. The demographic trends in Tibet and Xinjiang differ. Han immigration to Tibet has been tempered by Han emigration.

Once again though, the question about more precise figures rears its head. Do the rates of immigration and emigration fall below or exceed the average rates that increase or decrease the probability of ethno-nationalist violence? Once again, cross-national statistical correlations using multiple regressions can provide answers to questions to which the comparative method cannot respond with definitive findings.

The inevitable never happens. It is the unexpected always.
John Maynard Keynes

Chapter 10: Mauritius and Fiji

The state of Mauritius consists of a pair of islands located about half way

between Sri Lanka and Madagascar. Fiji consists of an isolated group of islands

located in the south Pacific, west of Hawaii and north of Australia. In fact,

Mauritius and Fiji are located along the same latitude – but half a world apart.

Both countries are former British colonies. Today, Mauritius and Fiji are

renowned for their beaches. Initially, however, their economies were built on

sugarcane. Whereas the Fijian economy still relies on sugarcane as a cash-

crop, the Mauritian economy has undergone a remarkable transformation and

diversification – so remarkable, in fact, that the International Monetary Fund

frequently uses it as a poster-child to show that it is possible for a former

heterogeneous colony to build a vibrant economy, live in ethnic harmony, and

enjoy political stability. This observation is even more remarkable when one

considers that the territory of Fiji is ten times the size of Mauritius.

Yet, their populations are of comparable size. About 850,000 people live

in Fiji; Mauritius is home to about 1.2 million people. Mauritius thus ranks among

the most densely populated countries on the planet. Mauritius is also a very

heterogeneous society. Fifteen linguistic groups are represented on Mauritius,

as are four world religions. Although the main ethnic cleavage is between the

dominant Creole minority and the subservient Indian majority, the high degree of

diversity within Mauritian society problematizes the reification of ethnic

categories.[31] In Mauritius, 68 per cent of the population is of Indian descent – the highest concentration of Indians worldwide in any country outside of India -- while 27 per cent is Creole. The principal ethnic cleavage in Fiji is similar. About half the population is of Indian descent while the other half is native Melanesian with a Polynesian admixture. Mauritius was first a Dutch, then a French, and finally a British colony, the only country in the world that can lay stake to this claim. One significant difference is that Fiji's Melanesians lay claim to the islands as their native land. Mauritius, by contrast, does not have any native inhabitants. All its inhabitants trace their migration to relatively recent history. Its earliest colonization dates back to the seventeenth century when the island counted 200 Dutch people and about 1,000 slaves.

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[31] By definition, Creole refers to a mixture. In the context of Mauritius, Creoles are colored people who trace their origins to Madagascar and East Africa, especially Mozambique; therefore, their ethnic background is diverse.

   While that fragmentation is manifest among the Indian community, religious divisions appear to trump linguistic ones. Although 65 per cent of the population in Mauritius is of Indian ancestry, for instance, its Muslim contingent (17 per cent), its Dravidian contingent (6 per cent Tamil and 3 per cent Telugus), and its Marathis contingent (2 per cent) have rarely aligned themselves politically with the North Indian Biharis (42 per cent). What communal cohesion is concerned, however, that categorization is somewhat misleading. Hindus are commonly understood as a religious group whereas Tamils and Telegus are commonly understood as a cultural and, to a lesser degree, linguistic group. But on Mauritius, Hindu does not have as much of a religious as a cultural connotation. That has the effect of reinforcing ethnic cohesion among Indians (Alber 1994). Many Indo-Mauritians still communicate in Bhojpuri (a Hindi dialect) although Hindi and Urdu are also common. Similarly, one might expect Hindus to be divided along caste lines. For Indo-Mauritians, however, castes do not represent strict endogamous units. Marriage and kinship cut across caste lines. The ethnic division of labour on the island further reinforces group cohesion: Hindus and Muslims tend to work in rural agriculture, especially the sugar industry (Eriksen 1997). Inter-ethnic marriages are rare and in the fewer than 1 in 10 cases where they do occur, the evidence suggests they have consolidated, not undermined, ethnic consciousness (1989: 148-154; 1997; 1998: 121-130; Oodiah 1992: 59; Nave 2000). On closer examination, then, Indo-Mauritians constitute more cohesive a group than an initial glance might suggest.

10.1. Grievance and cultural distance

This dissertation's target are popular explanations for ethno-nationalist violence that focus on simplistic models of grievance and cultural distance to which is seeks to posit political demography as an alternative. Yet, these paradigms also dominate the academic literature.

If density, natural increase and ethnic heterogeneity were the sole determinants of internecine violence, then Mauritius definitely beat the odds. James Meade, Nobel laureate in economics, a British commission, and an independent analysis all arrived at the same pessimistic outlook about the prospects for ethnic harmony on Mauritius (Meade 1961; Titmuss and Abel-Smith 1968; Naipaul 1973). The way Meade invokes economic grievance is exemplary. Natural increase was outstripping economic growth. Since political power resided with the white and Creole minority, the material deprivation of Indians would worsen as the scarce resources would accrue mainly to the dominant minority. For all intents and purposes, demographic developments and materialist circumstances had thus preordained ethno-nationalist violence.

Did Meade get it wrong because he did not know Mauritius well? Not long ago one of the authorities on ethnic relations in Mauritius seems just as pessimistic about the prospects for ethnic harmony (Eriksen 1989). His argument, however, is premised on the apparent difficulty of the current political arrangements on Mauritius experience in coping adequately with cultural distance. Premdas (1993) makes a comparable observation about Fiji. Ironically, Mukonoweshuro's argument (1991) is diametrically opposed to Eriksen's: There is no need for concern about ethnic harmony on Mauritius

because the political system contains the safeguards necessary to compel opposing parties to negotiate economic, political and social grievances by institutional, rather than violent, means. Institutional arrangements, however, do not offer a tenable explanation for the absence of violence. Neither the Mauritian nor the Fijian electoral system has ever really produced genuine interethnic collaboration. That makes it difficult for an account based on grievance to explain the ethno-nationalist violence on Fiji and its absence on Mauritius.

Grievance is also at the heart of Carroll & Carroll's (2000) explanation for interethnic rioting on Mauritius in 1999. This study is exemplary of the difficulties such explanations face in making sense of violence. They argue that economic inequalities had worsened on Mauritius in the years preceding the rioting. But why did rioting break out when it did? And why did rioting break out in the first place? Even more troubling about this explanation is the fact that it cannot explain why this riot remained an isolated event that did not become protracted. Economic disparities have not narrowed since. Why, then, would ethno-nationalist violence not persist?

An earlier comparative study by Carroll (1994) successfully explained political *conflict* – but not political violence -- on Fiji and its absence on Mauritius in terms of grievances over land. He examined the arrangements for the tenure of land in both countries and finds that Mauritius realized more than a century ago that, given the demographic reality on the island, the control over, and redistribution of, land would be essential to preserving political stability.[32] By

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[32] Melanesian land ownership has been constitutionally sanctioned since the Deed of Cession of 1874. Melanesian chiefs were effectively given a veto over constitutional change. That explains

contrast, Indians have been constitutionally barred from owning land on Fiji even though they are the dominant economic force in the country. Melanesians make up about half the population but own 97 per cent of the land.

Grievance is also widely invoked to explain episodic violence on Mauritius. Two major periods – as opposed to incidents such as the riot in 1999 – of political violence stand out in Mauritius. One is between 1937 and 1943, the other during the mid-1960s. The obvious explanation for the instability during the late 1930s and early 1940s is materialist deprivation because Mauritius had fallen upon hard economic times. Yet, there is evidence to suggest that the root cause was not material deprivation but ethnicity. Before the end of the decade, Indians had been awarded the franchise. As for the 1960s, Mauritius was ravaged by so-called "race riots," instigated by Hindu gangs. During their attacks in 1964, 1965 and 1968, however, they desecrated mosques and churches. In other words, Hindus attacked symbols of religion rather than ethnicity. Since most of the Muslims on Mauritius are also of Indian descent, this violence was really inter-Indian, not interethnic. This is not to say that the violence had

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why Melanesians still control 97 per cent of the land in Fiji and all arable land (Lea 1997). By contrast, the potentially explosive issue of land reform has long been defused in Mauritius. It is interesting that this process was initiated just after it had become clear that Indians would be an absolute numerical majority for the foreseeable future. In the *grand morcellement* that occurred from the 1870s until about 1920, the government parcelled out large estates. That enabled many Indians to change their status from wage-earning labourers (coolies) living in estate camps, to independent smallholders living in villages. By 1921, 93 per cent of the island's planters were Indians, and Indians owned approximately 35 per cent of the land under cultivation (Allen 1988:182-184). Land acquisition by Hindus and Muslims was an important means of social mobility. Reforming land tenure early on removed not only an important structural impediment to future economic growth, but it also contributed to harmonizing ethnic relations on the island by facilitating social mobility for Indo-Mauritians. Equality of opportunity is a mitigating factor in ethnic tensions. If young people see real chance for social advancement and see that possibility confirmed in their ethnic peers, they are less likely to get frustrated. Less frustration diminishes possible feelings of deprivation and thus the urge to revolt against a system that might otherwise be perceived as ethnically unjust and discriminatory.

religious overtones cannot coincide with ethnic overtones. Genuinely interethno-nationalist violence, however, would have seen Indians attacking Creoles, their main ethnic contender – not other Indians.

Similarly, the violence that gripped Fiji in 1959 is widely interpreted as a labour dispute. Yet, a recent re-examination of the circumstances found that the unrest in 1959 may have been more ethnically motivated than is commonly acknowledged (Heartfield 2002).

Grievance can account for the politicization of ethnic identity in Mauritius and Fiji. Yet, it has difficulty explaining why these particular circumstances culminated in violence and comparable ones on both islands at other times did not. The two other episodes that warrant careful consideration in the case of Fiji are the protracted ethnic stand-offs in 1987 and 2000. Fiji had certainly fallen upon hard economic times. But is grievance and cultural distance all there is to the story?

10.2. Mauritius

During the 1960s, Mauritius underwent one of the most rapid transitions in fertility in the world; therefore, H1 applies historically but not currently. The case of Mauritius is particularly interesting because it allows us to control for H2. For the first part of Mauritian history, Indians had a younger age structure than the General Population. Since some Indians have been leaving the island, C1 applies and since the island has no native population, all of today's inhabitants are descendants of immigrants; therefore, C2 applies. Since H1 and H2 no

longer apply, one would expect to see some episodes of ethno-nationalist violence in Mauritius history, but not in recent years.

Until 1834, Mauritius had been colonized by Europeans, coloreds and slaves. Mauritius was rapidly becoming a leading exporter of sugarcane in the British Empire (Alladin 1987). Since labour was in short supply, landowners had the British bring in indentured Indian labourers (Bissoondoyal and Servansing 1986). As a result, the island's population effectively tripled to 310,000 by 1860. Indians have been in the majority ever since (Lutz 1994 & Wils:76-78). By 1871, they made up 67 per cent of the island's population.

The proportion of Indians to the General Population has remained stable over time. Initially, natural increase among the Indian population was hampered by the unsanitary conditions to which Indians were subjected (Parahoo 1986; Ly-tio-Fane Pineo 1984) and by an unequal ratio in the distribution of gender (Lutz & Wils 1994:87). Of the 451,796 Indians who arrived on Mauritius between 1834-1940, 346,036 were males.

Figure 32Figure 10.1: Mauritius: Gender Balance, 1851 - 1921

(Source: Census of Mauritius and its Dependencies 1944: Table VII)

Further, natural increase among the Indian population was hampered by the *return* of 157,539 Indians (128,761 males and 22,778 females) to their country of origin prior to 1910 (Kuczynski 1949:797). The Indian multitudes and their youthfulness notwithstanding, these three mitigating factors – unsanitary conditions, an unbalanced ratio in the distribution of gender, and emigration – ensured that its rate of natural increase approximated that of the General Population:

Figure 33Figure 10.2: Mauritius: Real Average Annual Population Growth, 1881 - 1952

Mauritius: Real average annual population growth (1881-1952)

(Census of Mauritius and its Dependencies 1851-1952)[33]

Due to the large base of their population, however, Indians were able to maintain their absolute edge.

Only once in Indo-Mauritian demographic history did it appear as if Indians might stand to lose that edge: From the 1930s until the mid-1940s. That period coincides with internal violence.

[33] All subsequent graphs in this section draw on the same census data.

Figure 34Figure 10.3: Mauritius: Population Proportion of Ethnic Group 1840 - 1989

(Source: Census of Mauritius and its Dependencies, 1861-1973; estimates 1982-2001)[34]

Until 1921, the rate of natural increase for both ethnic groups had been about the same. At that point, the Creole population entered the demographic transition. Improvements in health care provided to Creoles led to greater rates of natural increase. Initially, the subservient Indian majority did not benefit from improvements in health care; so, their rate of natural increase remained unchanged. With a higher rate of natural increase, Creoles now had a comparative advantage.

Due to their numbers, Indians implicitly held some political power. By the 1930s, however, Indians were starting to lose the game of numbers to the Creoles. Not only might those demographic trends consolidate political power among the already privileged Creoles, but it might also mean waning political influence for the Indians. Were these demographic trends to persist, the best

option open to Indians would be to buttress their political influence by means of concessions extracted from the dominant minority. Indians pressed for the vote. A decade after the first major incident of ethno-nationalist violence in 1937, the number of enfranchised Mauritians had grown from 11,437 to 71,230 (or about 40 per cent of the adult population) (Tinker 1976:335). Indians benefitted disproportionately from the expansion of the franchise.

Indian political violence in 1937 and in 1943, as well as the general strike in 1938, were allegedly triggered by the grievances of Indian labourers and small planters. Differential increase, however, postulates that these grievances may have been more ethnically than economically motivated. Whereas the rate of natural increase among Creoles rose, the rate of natural increase among Indians remained constant. The gap between the two ethnic populations narrowed accordingly. Only after Indians were able to bolster their political influence did they, too, benefit from improved health care. At that point, the rate of natural increase among Indians picks up sharply – and ethno-nationalist violence subsides.

The low rates of natural increase throughout the late nineteenth century were due to epidemics of cholera, smallpox, the Bubonic plague in 1899, hurricanes and an outbreak of the Spanish flu in 1919. The rise in natural increase among all populations on Mauritius recorded at the end of the Second World War is largely the result of DDT spraying in 1948/49 that eliminated malaria as a mass killer. Yet, DDT spraying in and of itself cannot explain the

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[34] Data after 1973 are based on estimates because collection of data by ethnic group was halted beginning with the census in 1983.

disproportionate rise in the CBR among Indians, especially given that their CBR

picked up before spraying was initiated. The spraying of DDT, however,

bolstered the rate of natural increase among Indians at a time when Indians just

started to enter the demographic transition.

The demographic transition offers one possible explanation for the sudden

rise in the Indian CBR. A lower fertility rate among women but a greater number

of woman overall can cause the CBR to rise. Indeed, a rise in the rate of natural

increase among Indians indicates that Indians were only starting to enter the

demographic transition (Xenos, 1977). Being more recent and sizeable than

Creole immigration, Indian immigration ensured that even decades after Indian

immigration had ceased, the Indian population was younger than the Creole

population. The census conducted in 1944 illustrates the point:

Figure 35Figure 10.4: Age Structure in Mauritius by five-year Cohorts, 1944

Age structure on Mauritius by 5 year cohorts (1944)

(Source: Census of Mauritius and its Dependencies, 1944)

By simple virtue of being younger and more numerous, Indians were able to produce a greater number of children than Creoles. Since Indians comprised two-thirds of the population as a whole, the young structure of the Indian population manifests itself in the form of large cohorts of youth on the island throughout the first half of the twentieth century:

Figure 36Figure 10.5: Mauritus: Proportion of Youth, 1851 - 1944

Mauritius: Proportion of Youth (1851-1944)

(Source: Census of Mauritius and its Dependencies, 1944)

The graph illustrates how the immigration of Indians coincides with a rise in the proportion of youth. Since the number of Creoles remained largely unchanged until the end of the nineteenth century, this trend is indicative of a disproportionately younger population among Indians.

During the 1960s, Mauritius witnessed a decline in fertility of such dramatic proportions that it may be unprecedented. This has had two effects. Presently, natural increase among all ethnic groups has slowed considerably to the point where Mauritius' population may start to shrink. Indians still have a slightly higher rate of fertility than Creoles but that is compensated for by moderate Indian emigration. As a result, the proportion of the Creole to the Indian population has remained constant. Second, slow natural increase among

a population that has almost passed through the demographic transition translates into rapid ageing. As a result, youth make up a diminishing proportion of the population. Fertility and out-migration have thus been a force of political stability on Mauritius. The *proportion* of Creoles to Indians has remained unchanged since independence and the steep decline in fertility from the 1960s onwards has almost brought natural increase to a standstill. Their age structures, however, differed considerably prior to independence, with Indians having a younger population. As those hypotheses would suggest, ethno-nationalist violence was indeed more probable prior to independence than after independence.

10.3. Fiji

Fijian society remains young; therefore, H1 applies. The demographic differential between the two populations has been growing; therefore, H2 applies. There has been substantial emigration by Indians; therefore, C1 applies. Intially, there was Indian immigration to Fiji; therefore, C2 applies. Given the current applicability of H1, H2 and C1, one would expect the probability of ethno-nationalist violence on Fiji to be elevated.

Unlike Mauritius, Fiji has a native population that lays claim to the territory. The immigration of about 60,000 indentured Indian labourers – girmitiyas – to Fiji occurred later than in Mauritius, between 1879 and 1916. Its impact was compounded by a subsequent wave of Indian immigration to Fiji during the inter-bellum period.

The number of migrants to Fiji was smaller than in Mauritius, both in absolute terms and relative to the population already established there. As a result, the absolute gap between Indians and Melanesians has always been much closer than the gap between Indians and Creoles in Mauritius.

Figure 37Figure 10.6 Fiji: Proportion of Ethnic Group, 1881-1996

(Source: Fiji Islands Statistics Bureau 2002)

Since the migration of Indians to Fiji postdates their migration to Mauritius by several decades, it follows that the Indian population on Fiji remained young longer into the twentieth century than the Indian population on Mauritius. That largely explains the rise in the rate of natural increase among Indians on Fiji during the first half of the twentieth century.

Figure 38Figure 10.7 Fiji: Average Annual Population Growth by Ethnic Group, 1901 – 1996

Fiji: Average annual population growth by ethnic group (1901-1996)

Average percentage annual increase

(Source: Fiji Islands Statistics Bureau 2002)

Due to the compound effect of natural increase and immigration, Fiji's Indian

population quadrupled between 1921 and 1966. Despite an average annual rate

of increase of five per cent between 1911 and 1921, increase of the proportions

seen over that 45-year period exceeded even the most optimistic prognosis of

the 1921 census (Fiji 1925:22). Only a disproportionately young population can

sustain abnormally high rates of natural increase of four to five per cent over

decades.

Indians outnumbered native Melanesians by the end of the Second World

War. By the late 1950s, Indian plurality was about to turn into an absolute

majority (Meller and Anthony 1968:28-29; Milne 1981:61). The impending

absolute Indian majority comes with a large cohort of Indian youth. Demographic developments in Fiji thus intimate an ethnic dimension to the violence of 1959.

Those demographic dynamics contrast with the ones associated with the period of violence and instability spanning from 1987 to 2000, with attempted *coup d'État* at either end. Indians passed through the demographic transition more rapidly than native Melanesians; consequently, the Indian fertilty rate and of natural increase dropped below the Melanesians' rates. The decline in Melanesian fertility has been more gradual. In the early 1980s, Indians and Melanesians traded "fecund advantage." For the first time in decades, Melanesians now had the edge in terms of TFR. As a result, natural increase among Melanesians now exceeded that among Indians. Melanesians were poised to challenge Indian plurality.

Melanesians also had migration on their side. Despite a decline, Melanesian fertility still exceeds levels of replacement. Yet, the Indian population is in decline. The explanation for this paradox is out-migration. The graph plotting the proportion of ethnic groups in Fiji shows that the 1987 coup attempt comes at a time when Indians had lost their majority and the compound effect of a decline in fertility and emigration was about to cost them their plurality. The subsequent coup attempt in 2000 coincides with Melanesians regaining the demographic majority they had relinquished during the 1930s. Since the late 1980s, Fiji's Indian population has been shrinking at the rate of half a per cent a year. The Indian population has contracted by a quarter over the last decade.

Over 50,000 have left. The rate of emigration has had a visible impact on

average annual rate of population growth:

Figure 39Figure 10.8: Mauritius and Fiji: average Annual Population Growth Rate, 1950-2050

Mauritius and Fiji Average Annual Population Growth Rate (percentage)

(Source: UN Population Projection, 2000 revision)

Providing that these trends persist, the number of Indians in Fiji will keep

diminishing.

A lower rate of fertility coupled with out-migration has caused an absolute

decline in Fiji's Indian population. The fifth chapter explained the impact

emigration has on the base of a population: The part of the population that is

most likely to emigrate includes the women of childbearing age and the part of

the population most likely already to have children. Emigration further

decelerates natural increase. First, the part of the population that could reproduce is the one most prone to leave. Second, the potential for future increase is undermined by children who are leaving with the parents.

Natural increase among Melanesians, by contrast, held steady. With no emigration and a slower decline in fertility, the Melanesian CBR has been exceeding the Indian CBR since the 1980s. Now that increase was clearly favouring the impending but subservient Melanesian *majority*, is it any surprise that Melanesians did not react well to the results of the 1987 election which produced another Indian majority?

The situation on Mauritius in the late 1930s and early 1940s was reversed. Creoles were gaining on Indo-Mauritians. In absolute terms, however, Indo-Mauritians still had the edge due to a higher CBR. Indo-Mauritians may have lagged in terms of relative increase but they were still far more numerous.

10.4. Conclusion

Fiji's population is still in the process of passing through the demographic transition. Unlike Mauritius, behavioural change in Fiji has been gradual and fertility remains higher than in Mauritius. Fiji's population continues to grow at 1.41 per cent – as opposed to 0.88 per cent per annum on Mauritius -- it is ageing far more slowly (33 per cent of its population is under the age of 15 as opposed to 25 per cent in Mauritius) and on average women still give birth to almost three children, which is well above the level of replacement. On

Mauritius, the TFR is 2.01 children (Prinz 1991) which is below the level of replacement of about 2.1.

Figure 40Figure 10.9: Mauritius and Fiji: Total Fertility Rate, 1950-2050

Mauritius and Fiji Total Fertitly Rate (Children per Woman)

(Source: UN Population Projection, 2000 revision)

This trend is partially a function of the average age at which women get married. Women on Fiji marry earlier (22.5 years of age) than women in Mauritius (23.8) (UN 2000). As a result, the proportion of youth among the population has diminished more gradually:

Figure 41Figure 10.10: Mauritius and Fiji: Youth as percentage of Total Population, 1950 – 2050

Youth as Percentage of Total Population (1950 - 2050)

(Source: UN Population Projection, 2000 revision)

When the 0-15 cohort is factored out, the dimensions are even more striking:

Figure 42Figure 10.11: Mauritius and Fiji: Youth as a Percentage of Adult Population, 1950-2050

Youth as Percentage of Adult Population (1950 - 2050)

(Source: UN Population Projection, 2000 revision)

In 1996, one-third of the population in Fiji was between the ages of 10 and 24.

That means that the base of the Melanesian population is young and broad;

consequently, any decline in the rate of natural increase among Melanesians is

bound to be gradual:

Figure 43Figure 10.12: Mauritius and Fiji: Rate of natural increase (per 1,000 population), 1950-2050

Rate or natural increase (per 1,000 population)

(Source: UN Population Projection, 2000 revision)

The gap between the two ethnic groups on Fiji has always been narrower than

that between Creoles and Indo-Mauritians. An Indian plurality has, therefore,

never been a foregone conclusion in Fiji. On a territory claimed by Melanesians, that is of great import. It means that native Melanesians never had to relinquish the hope of regaining control over "their" land. Out-migration and a decline in the TFR among Indians has allowed Melanesians to regain the plurality:

Figure 44Figure 10.13: Mauritius vs. Fiji: Net Migration Rate, 1950 – 2050,

Mauritius vs. Fiji Net Migration Rate (1950-2050) per thousand

(Source: UN Population Projection, 2000 revision)

Formerly a dominant majority, Indians on Fiji now find themselves in the position

of a subservient minority. As a result, the question is no longer one of a just

political deal for Melanesians as a national minority. The concern is now the

protection of Indians as a political minority. Issues of this sort tend to be difficult

enough to resolve in countries that have already passed through the

demographic transition. A satisfactory solution is likely to be complicated by

demographic trends that favour the new majority and a majority whose claims are

bolstered by a large cohort of youths who, in as many years, has twice taken up

the Melanesian cause.

Yet, it would be interesting to know more about how the cohorts of

Melanesian youth on Fiji compare to the average size and proportion of ethnic

youth that get involved in violence. As in other cases, it would also be interesting

to know more about how the flow of migration and its correlation with ethno-

nationalist violence compares to figures from cross-national statistical

correlations using multiple regressions. These issues make painfully obvious the

limitations inherent in the comparative approach necessitated by the absence of

data.

Still, the patterns that emerge provide empirical support for the

explanatory and predictive potential of a political demography of ethno-nationalist

violence. An application of the hypotheses suggested correctly that the

probability of ethno-nationalist violence is low on Mauritius and high on Fiji. The

Mauritian population entered the demographic transition earlier than the Fijian

population; therefore, it is older. Yet, both cases show evidence of significant

differentials in age structure. Nowadays, the ethnic populations on Mauritius are structured similarly to one another. Their proportion has remained constant, and it has not been affected by migration. On Fiji, by contrast, the formerly subservient minority's population is younger than the formerly dominant majority's population, whose demographic position has been undermined further by emigration. As a result, the minority has been in a position to challenge the majority's plurality. In the end, demography does appear to offer a viable explanation for episodic ethno-nationalist violence on Mauritius and Fiji. The case of Mauritius is particularly interesting because it allows us to control for H2, with the result that H2 appears to affect the probability of ethno-nationalist violence. This is a significant finding because it establishes a compound effect between H1 and H2. The conclusion will comment further on this effect and its implications for the explanatory and predictive power of demographics as they pertain to ethno-nationalist violence.

The future is not for you to foresee, but to allow.
(Antoine de Saint-Exupéry)

Part C: Conclusion

This investigation posited demographics as the soil in which political grievances can flourish to the extent where an ethno-nationlist conflict takes a violent turn. Demographic trends thus offer a better explanation of ethno-nationlist violence than cultural-distance or grievence. Cultural-distance and grievances are ubiquitous; therefore, it is hard to invoke them as precipitants of ethno-nationalist violence. Explanations premised on cultural-distance and relative material deprivation are empirically suspect anyway. Political grievances, however, contribute significantly to ethno-nationalist violence. In other words, politics offers a more probable explanation for ethno-nationalist violence than economics. Still, demagogues, outmoded political institutions, and the abuse of state apparati to advance the interests of one ethnic group over those of another are endemic.

Political grievances remain a point of contention in each of the cases under investigation. Yet, ethno-nationalist violence remains the exception. While it can be taken for granted that political grievances continue to propel the violent conflicts under investigation, especially in Israel and Xinjiang, it is noteworthy that political grievances in the other cases are just as prevalent. In Northern Ireland, the single-transferrable-vote system now in place has not silenced the Reverend Ian Paisley. In Estonia, Russians today continue to have fewer rights than they

had at Estonian independence. In 1991, they had the right to conduct their entire

education up to and including secondary school in Russian. Now, they can only

be educated in Russian up to grade 6 and there are substantial obstacles

Russians have to overcome to participate in the country's political life. Yet,

Romania cotinues to subject its Hungarian minority to forms of discrimination to

which only it, and no other minority group in the country, is subject. The plight of

Tibetans under Chinese occupation has been internationalized. Yet, there is no

evidence to suggest that the Muslim minorities in Xinjiang are being treated any

worse by Beijing than Tibetans. Moreover, minorities in both autonomous

regions are culturally equidistant. Still, there is no violence in Tibet. Black

Mauritians have long felt discriminated against economically and politically by the

state. Yet, they have refrained from violence. In Fiji, the peace between natives

and Indians is very uneasy. While the new Constitution has remedied some of

the major concerns with the previously revamped Constitution, political

grievances abound, especially as they relate to the electoral system. It is clear

that the skewed results produced by the electoral system under Fiji's revamped

constitution in 1987 are responsible for the coup that followed. Similarly, it is

clear that Spreight's coup in 2000 was an unnecessary ethnic confrontation

motivated largely by demagogical self-interest on his part. This investigation

does not call these observations into question. States, institutions, policies and

ethnic entrepreneurs play a pivotal role in ethnic conflicts. But there are simply

too many cases where political grievances of all sorts are present, but violent is

not. In other words, there is more to ethno-nationalist violence than political

grievance. It appears that political grievances only turn violent under specific

conditions. This investigation argued that demographics offer a plausible

condition.

It observed that ethnic relations are unlikely to turn violent unless

(i)   the ethnic groups involved are young, and

(ii)   the population of one group is younger than the population of the other

        group.

Migration was posited as an intervening variable in that violence was unlikely as

long as

(i)   one of the ethnic groups involved is not being depleted by the emigration

        of co-ethnics or

(ii)   one group experiences a surge in co-ethnic immigration.

However, the investigation does not purport to make a claim about the directional

causality regarding the impact of immigration on ethno-nationalist violence. That

would be an investigation by itself. All this dissertation hopes to have shown is

that migration matters as an intervening variable due to its subsidiary effect on

population size and growth.

1. Fertility, mortality and the probability of ethno-nationalist violence

*H1: Ethno-nationalist violence is improbable unless the ethnic populations
involved are young.*

The comparisons in this dissertation provide strong empirical support for this

hypothesis. Ethno-nationalist violence in Israel-Palestine, the XUAR and Fiji is

explicable in terms of young ethnic populations. Diminished violence in Northern

Ireland is explicable in terms of a decline in the number of young people. The

absence of ethno-nationalist violence in Estonia, Transylvania and on Mauritius

is explicable in terms of ageing populations. Northern Ireland and Mauritius are

particularly insightful examples because they intimate that a decline in youth may

lower the probability of ethno-nationalist violence. However, the hypothesis does

not accurately describe the situation in the TAR.

Classifying ethnic populations according to whether they are young,

ageing or old is indicative of the point at which it entered the demographic

transition. Almost no populations remain that have yet to enter the demographic

transition. Young populations are produced by a decline in the CDR while the

CBR remains high. Palestinians, orthodox Jews in Israel, Uighurs and the

Tibetans are in this situation.

Figure 45Figure C.1: Natural increase in less and more developed countries

(Source: Population Reference Bureau)

Populations begin to age as the CDR and CBR start to converge. Catholics in Northern Ireland and native Fijians are in this situation. Once they converge, populations are deemed old. Protestants in Northern Ireland, Magyars and Romanians in Transylvania, Estonians and Russians in Estonia, whites, creoles and Indians on Mauritius, Fijian Indians and the secular Jewish population in Israel are in this situation.

The correlation between youth and ethno-nationalist violence postulated by H1 thus appears to hold. The evidence suggests that young populations are more predisposed towards ethno-nationalist violence than older ones.

H2: Ethno-nationalist violence is unlikely unless they the groups involved have differential age structures.

This hypothesis suggests that the probability of ethno-nationalist violence is greater when populations confronting each other are structured asymmetrically than when they are structured symmetrically. In other words, it posits differentials in age structure – as opposed to age structure per se -- as the independent variable. The ethnic populations in Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, the XUAR and the TAR, and Fiji have different age structures. By contrast, the ethnic populations in Transylvania, Estonia and Mauritius have the same age structure. The former conflicts have violent overtones, the latter do not. The hypothesis is thus supported empirically. Yet, the support is not unequivocal. The differential between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland may have shrunk, but the gap remains sizeable. Still, even a decline in the gap may suffice to reduce the probability of ethno-nationalist violence. In

terms of probability, however, it does not appear to matter whether the minority –
Catholics in Northern Ireland, native Fijians prior to the 1990s and Palestinians --
or in the majority -- native Fijians after the 1990s and Uighurs -- is younger.

2. The compound effect

If H1 and H2 are not present, as in Transylvania, Estonia, and Mauritius, ethno-
nationalist violence appears to be improbable. Conversely, does the compound
effect of H1 and H2 aggravate ethno-nationalist violence? The most intense and
protracted cases of ethno-nationalist violence discussed in this dissertation are
Israel-Palestine, the XUAR and, historically, Northern Ireland. These cases have
– or, in the case of Northern Ireland, had – young populations *and* the ethnic
groups involved have asymmetrically structured populations. Fiji, however,
appears to be the exception. Still, one could argue that the demographic
situation in Fiji is akin to the one seen in Northern Ireland only a few years ago.
Fiji, then, is an interesting litmus test for the predictive power of H1 and H2.
Should the situation stabilize, the way it has in Northern Ireland – or in Sri Lanka,
to cite a comparable example – then that provides further confirmation for H1 and
H2.

But is a situation where only H1 or only H2 might apply even conceivable
or do they always go in tandem anyway? With the notable exception of
Christians in Lebanon and Egypt, and Jews in Israel, most ethnic groups
throughout the Middle East, for example, have largely undifferentiated age
structures. Their populations are comparably young; consequently, the youth

cohort among each group is disproportionately large. Yet, ethno-nationalist violence remains the exception. The demographic situation in Northern Ireland is reversed. Whereas Catholics and Protestants have differential age structures, the proportion of youth has been in decline. That decline has been paralleled by a lower level of internecine violence. Ergo, the evidence intimates that the predictive power of H1 and H2 is greatly enhanced when they are considered in tandem.

Yet, neither H1 nor H2 offers definitive insight into the ramifications of demographics for the presence and absence of ethno-nationalist violence in every conceivable instance. Exceptions not discussed in detail in this dissertation include the ethnic wars between Serbs and Croatians during the 1990s and between Moldovans and Moldova's subservient Russian minority in 1992. Yet, the dissertation did not claim that demographics are capable of explaining all incidents of ethno-nationalist violence. It did, however, claim that it is capable of explaining incidents that are inexplicable in terms of grievance or cultural distance.

In terms of case studies discussed in this dissertation, the TAR is the notable exception. Since the structure of the Tibetan population is much younger than that of the Han Chinese, the hypothesis predicts ethno-nationalist violence. The prediction, however, does not pan out. Yet, political demography *does* offer a possible explanation for the absence of ethno-nationalist violence in Tibet: The immigration of Han Chinese is moderated by their emigration.

3. Migration and the probability of ethno-nationalist violence

The dissertation posited migration as a subsidiary variable that is conditional upon the applicability of H1 and H2. What merit do these conditions have?

C1: Emigration by members of one ethnic group increases the probability of violence.

Catholics left Northern Ireland, Palestinians left Israel, Jews are leaving Israel, Estonians left Estonia, Hungarians left Transylvania, Uighurs left Xinjiang, Tibetans left Tibet, Han are leaving Tibet, a few Indians are leaving Mauritius and many Indians are leaving Fiji. In cases of Northern Ireland, the combined Palestinian expulsion and exodus of fear from Israel, Estonia, Transylvania, Xinjiang, Tibet (Tibetans as well as Han), and Mauritius, emigration appears to have mitigated violence whereas the recent emigration of Jews from Israel and the emigration of Indians from Fiji appear to have exacerbated it. The former group consists of emigrating minorities while the latter group consists of an emigrating Jewish majority, Tibetans, Uighurs, and the former Indian majority in the case of Fiji. Estonia and Mauritius are aberrations. Yet, the dissertation suggested that the constraints introduced by migration apply only insofar as H1 and H2 apply. In this light, emigration by a minority appears to have a mitigating effect on ethno-nationalist violence; emigration by a majority appears to reinforce it, irrespective of whether a minority has a subservient or a dominant role. Although Tibetans and Uighurs are technically an exception to the rule, their migration was momentary. Catholics, Palestinians (whose migration was also momentary), (and Hungarians, if they are counted in despite the fact that H1 and H2 do not apply) are in a subservient position; Han are in a dominant position. In

effect, *emigration* by an ethnic *majority* may *increase* the *probability* of ethno-nationalist violence – but emigration by members of a *minority* may actually *decrease* it.

When emigration starts to undermine a population's base to the point where natural increase allows the contending minority to make disproportionate demographic gains, ethno-nationalist violence appears to become more probable. Emigration acts as a pressure valve by undermining the demographic basis necessary to sustain substantial natural increase by a minority over a long period of time. By decelerating natural increase, emigration distorts the potential impact of natural increase on the demographic difference between groups.

C2. A surge in immigration by members of one ethnic group increases the probability of violence.

Protestants immigrated to Northern Ireland, Jews immigrated to Israel, Russians immigrated to Estonia, Romanians immigrated to Transylvania, Han immigrated to Tibet and Xinjiang, and Indians immigrated to Mauritius and Fiji. Protestants in Northern Ireland, Jews in Israel, Romanians in Transylvania, and Indians on Fiji *were* dominant majorities: Under the Soviet regime, Russians were a dominant minority, as are Han in Tibet and Xinjiang; Indians on Mauritius are a subservient majority; Indians on Fiji *are* a subservient minority. Only immigration by the dominant Han minority to Xinjiang appears to have contributed directly to ethno-nationalist violence, although Indian immigration to Mauritius as well as Fiji may have had an indirect effect on ethno-nationalist violence.

In all three cases, immigrants settled on so permanent a basis as to have an impact on demographic change by contributing to natural increase. The point

of contention that may contribute to a heightened probability of ethno-nationalist violence thus does not appear to be immigration per se but its long-term effects on demographic dynamics and thus on demographic difference. Immigration may raise ethnic consciousness and politicize interethnic relations, but it does not appear to act as a precipitant of ethno-nationalist violence.

4. Prospects for ethno-nationalist violence

The correlation between fertility, mortality, migration and ethno-nationalist violence has explanatory as well as predictive power. When current demographic trends and projections are evaluated in light of H1, H2, C1, and C2 a clear pattern emerges. The countries that are confronting the youngest populations, the greatest potential for internally differentiated demographic trends, and the highest migratory flows all happen to be located on the same two continents.

Most populations in European and North American countries have passed through the demographic transition. Populations in Latin American countries are passing through the demographic transition, as are many populations in Asian countries. In Middle Eastern countries, populations are still in the early stages of the demographic transition. The same holds true for most African countries.

Figure 46Figure C.2: Distribution of the Global Population, 1800 - 2050

(Source: United Nations Population Division, 1998 Revision of World Population Prospects)

For all intents and purposes, countries on three continents will produce all of the world's natural increase during the twenty-first century: Asia (which is already home to half the world's population), Africa and Latin America. The graphic also visualizes, however, that with the exception of African countries, natural increase will slow considerably during the first part of the twenty-first century. What the graphic fails to show is the sharp divide between Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries relative to the rest of Asia. Most of the natural increase in Asia will originate in the former group of countries. The world's seventeen nations whose populations are projected to shrink between 1996 and 2025 are all located in Europe: Russia, Italy, Ukraine, Spain, Romania, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria,

Belarus, Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Portugal, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. By contrast, of the 20 nations with the highest fertility rates in the world, 16 are in sub-Saharan Africa: Niger, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Burundi, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Togo, Nigeria, and Rwanda. Another six developing countries will account for half the increase in the developing world: India, China, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. In other words, the greatest proportion of natural increase during the twenty-first century will emanate from countries on the two most populous continents that also count the greatest number of ethnic groups, Asia and Africa, and from countries that are predominantly Muslim. Muslim countries currently account for about 20 per cent of the world's population. By 2025, they are expected to account for 30 per cent of the world's population – a proportional increase of 50 per cent over a quarter of a century. The most populous Muslim country in the world is also the one with the highest rate of increase outside of the Middle East: 1.54 per cent; Indonesia's 206 million people are composed of more than 300 ethnic and language groups.

H1 thus has analytical value not only in the sense that it facilitates an explanation of instances of ethno-nationalist violence at particular points in time, since demographic trends can be projected with reasonable accuracy over the short- and medium term, but also in that it facilitates forecasting of possible hot-spots on which to focus future research on ethno-nationalist violence. From H1 it follows that ethno-nationalist violence in the twenty-first century will be most probable in countries located in the Middle East, North- and sub-Saharan Africa

and Central Asia. Due to the momentum generated by a broad population base,

natural increase in those countries is still two generations removed from

stabilizing:

Figure 47Figure C.3: Stabilization Ratio: Africa, Asia and South and Central America, 1950 – 2050

Stabilization Ratio
(births/deaths)
(1 = no population growth)

■■■■AFRICA
▒▒▒▒ ASIA
▒▒▒▒ SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
▬▬▬▬DEVELOPED
■■■■DEVELOPING

If ethno-nationalist violence is a function of youthfulness, then the propensity for

ethno-nationalist violence may be diminishing. The global rate of natural

increase has been declining since the 1950s. The proportion of youth in the

world relative to the world's population has been declining accordingly. The

proportion of the population below age 15 is projected to decline by about a

quarter over the next half a century: from 20 per cent in 1995 to 15 per cent in

2050. The decline will be most dramatic in developing countries where the

percentage of young people is projected to drop from 34 to 20 per cent.

The onset of a decline in the TFR two to three decades ago is now causing a relative decline in the proportion of youth. As mentioned in the second chapter, the Muslim population of India is clearly in transition. For Muslims socialized in industrialized countries, fertility is not a function of religion per se but, as for other religious groups, a function of the degree of fundamentalism of the particular brand of religion to which a believer adheres. Ergo, the influence of Islam on fertility should not be overstated. There is no "natural" reason to expect high fertility among Muslims to persist indefinitely. As a matter of fact, the populations of many Muslim countries are already well beyond their peak in terms of the proportion of youth: Bosnia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt, Kazakhstan; Syria, Albania, Yemen, Turkey, Tunisia, Pakistan, Malaysia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan. In Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Bangladesh and Indonesia it peaked during the 1990s. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Sudan are peaking at this time and Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Oman, Libya and Afghanistan are about to peak. In each case, the peak exceeds 20 per cent of the total population.

Relatively, the rates of natural increase are greatest in African countries. Absolute gains are greatest in Asian countries. Countries facing challenging population structure include Bangladesh, India, the Philippines, Viet Nam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan. By contrast, Thailand, China, Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore are in the midst of the fertility transition.

Asian and African countries have the youngest populations. By virtue of their heterogeneity, due to their high degree of internal diversity, they are also the more likely than countries on any other continent to experience differential demographic trends among ethnic groups. As much as Africa, with its 740 million people and 2,200 ethnic groups has disoriented researchers, Asia is just as disconcerting. More minorities and native people live here than on any other continent. Asia outnumbers Africa on ethnic groups, languages, religious multiplicity and national heterogeneity. Although there exists no apparent correlation between diversity and conflict to speak of, by virtue of their disproportionately high degree of internal diversity, they have the greatest potential to have internally differentiated demographic trends among their ethnic groups.

Their predisposition towards differential demographic trends is magnified by the prevalence of the conditions necessary to beget a demographic "security dilemma." In contrast to Africa, Asia does not even go through the motions of constitutional mimesis and has several dominant ethnic groups. Laws tend to reflect the demographic reality of the country. The demographic explosion in Asia is aggravated by growing economic disparity, environmental degradation (mostly due to deforestation), pollution, a shortage of space, asymmetrical development, regional constraints, savage colonization, rural-urban splits, ethnic border disputes, dissipated state territories, authoritarian regimes, ruthless exploitation of natural resources, a renunciation of individualism, new forms of contrarian culture based on religion and tradition, wide-spread poverty, and huge

discrepancies in the provision of basic services, such as education and health-care. With some exceptions, the politics of national integration have failed and economic development has produced a small cleptocracy which feeds off the masses. Most adversely affected are ethnic minorities, natives, and tribes.

Migration further compounds the impact of natural increase and the predisposition towards internal demographic differentials. Since little is known about the effect of the movement of populations on conflict, these tentative findings may be more significant than they appear. We do know that most international migration transpires within the developing world, between countries with similarly high fertility rates and youthful age structures. The world's most important haven for refugees, for instance, is Iran with 2.2 million refugees, followed by Pakistan with 1.1 million. Africa has one-quarter of the world's landmass and one-tenth of the world's population. Yet, its has more refugees than any other continent. Together, African countries counted 6.8 million refugees in 1995, followed by Asian countries with 5 million. By contrast, Europe, North America and Oceania together housed a total of 2.6 million. Migration's main impact, then, is at the regional, national, and sub-national level - - *not* at the international level. Ergo, migration's potential to increase – or decrease – the potential for ethno-nationalist violence, is greatest in African and Asian countries.

The incidents and levels of ethno-nationalist violence in Asian and African countries over the coming decades are thus the litmus test for H1, H2, C1, and C2. Their populations are young, they are most at risk of facing internally

differentiated demographic trends, and they have the highest migratory flows. H1, H2, C1 and C2 thus converge on two continents. That coincidence underscores their predictive potential.

5. Future Research

Demographics may be indicative of the probability of ethno-nationalist violence. Yet, they certainly do not *determine* it. Notwithstanding the caveat that mechanistic causality may be impossible to discern, it is clear from the dissertation that there are instances, such as the Serbo-Croatian war or ethno-nationalist violence in Moldova, that political demography cannot explain. But that is not the claim being defended in the dissertation anyway. It endeavoured to posit political demography as an alternative to grievance and cultural distance.

The more interesting counter-factual exceptions are not those that political demography cannot explain but the ones that were able to buck the demographic trends. Mauritius is the case in point. The question is whether that was deliberate or whether Mauritius just got lucky. Mauritius is renowned not only because of its unprecedented decline in fertility during the 1960s, but also for the fact that this decline was not accompanied by economic development. This observation is significant because economic development is widely posited as a precondition for a decline in fertility. In effect, the *general* causes of the onset the demographic transition and the decline in fertility remain elusive. In Mauritius, birth control was highly effective. Elsewhere, development may be more important.

Even though the proper instruments and sequencing may be controversial, Mauritius illustrates the fact that something can be done about destabilizing demographic trends. Similarly, the demographic "security dilemma" underscores the point that demographics are not deterministic, but they are political. They do not determine violence, but they certainly have an influence on the distribution of economic, political and social risks. The demographic trends throughout Asia and Africa should be cause for concern. The concern, however, ought to be directed not at the trends themselves but rather on their subliminal impact on political decision-making. Demographics are as much about facts as they are about norms.

Insofar as demographics are political, they raise a conundrum. Within a liberal-democratic framework it is uncertain what a country may be able to do about destabilizing demographic trends without being illiberal. A state with a changing demographic composition facing the sort of preconditions that will increase the likelihood of ethno-nationalist violence has a range of preventative options at its disposal. The dilemma is that many of the options that are effective are also illiberal and that many of those that conform to liberal-democratic principles are ineffective. To what extent might the ends justify the means? Dire circumstances could very well justify more severe means. These are hard ethical questions.

Ethno-nationalist violence may be more probable under conditions of differential demographic developments between groups because difference lends itself to nativist exploitation by ethnic entrepreneurs. The theory of agency that

approximates this scenario is that of collective action. It posits ethno-nationalist violence as a strategic choice made with the aim of improving the group's lot by capitalizing on the strength or weakness afforded by the way a population is structured. Either side has an incentive for taking concerted action: The minority with the younger population may capitalize on its relative advantage, the majority with the older population may want to try to keep the minority at bay. The dissertation is agnostic on whether relative demographic advantage, of the sort enjoyed by the ethnic group with a younger population, or relative demographic disadvantage, of the sort enjoyed by an ethnic group with the older population, is ultimately *responsible* for the violence.

Still, if political discourse is partially responsible for raising the level of consciousness about demographic trends among the general population, it would be helpful to know more about that *modus operandi*. With both parties to a conflict standing to benefit from embellishing demographic trends -- the overstated perception of an impending demographic shift between the ethnic groups brings hope to the minority and congeals fear among the majority – there would not be much point in trying to analyze discourse in order to determine who is at fault for instigating violence. This sort of analysis may, however, uncover the processes by which demographic data is distorted. A better understanding of that process may help to counteract such distortion.

A discourse analysis of the demographic dimensions of ethno-nationalist violence may also provide relevant insights into the demographic conditions under which the probability of distortion through political discourses rises. Are

there specific rates, levels or thresholds beyond which demographic trends become more prone to politicization in public discourse? Similarly, does an ethnic group's receptiveness to political discourse that invokes demographics vary depending on, say, the size of the youth cohort?

Neither is there a clear threshold, nor is it clear to what exactly this claim refers. Is it the proportion of youth among the population as a whole? Is it the proportion of youth among the adult population? Or might a better prediction of ethno-nationalist violence hinge not on the proportion of youth per se but rather on the rate at which the cohort of youth is growing?

It would be interesting to know whether there is a threshold that is of statistical significance and what that threshold is. Similarly elusive is the question about a threshold for minorities. Subservient minorities that are very small are not usually perceived as a threat by the dominant majority; consequently, the dominant majority tends to accede to their demands quite readily and the two parties usually get along quite amicably. Relations only appear to become problematic once the minority surpasses a certain demographic threshold. But what is the threshold beyond which interethnic relations become problematic? Similarly, are there thresholds for the rates of immigration, or emigration for that matter, beyond which ethnic relations take a hostile turn?

These questions bring to light the limitations of findings that from a comparative approach. Only cross-national statistical correlations using multiple regressions can answer these questions definitively. The demographic data

necessary to run these regressions, however, are not currently available – at least not in a format or a database that is easily accessible.

This deficiency, however, can be overcome. For select cases, some of the requisite demographic data have already been gathered, estimated and processed in the secondary literature. For many other cases there are enough fragments of demographic data available that facilitate a longitudinal reconstruction. This was done for Nigeria when, despite the paucity of data from a census, the government sought to fill the void in vital statistics needed for the purposes of long-term planning. When Nigeria finally held a census, it turned out that the demographics modelled for Nigeria had been surprisingly accurate.

This sort of exercise has never been undertaken on a large historical scale for any ethnic sub-group within a state. The Nigerian example, however, suggests that with enough demographic fragments, it is possible to reconstruct an entire demographic table. Ergo, the same should, in theory, be possible for ethnic sub-groups.

Models of this sort, however, are methodologically controversial. Often they are driven more by politics than by science. The overriding purpose of some models is to lend "empirical" support to a specific political agenda. Other models are never realized because the results would be too political. The challenge of modelling ethnic demographics is complicated by the fact that not all variables have the same effect on the uncertainty inherent in a demographic model. The degree of uncertainty is primarily a function of life expectancy and a population's size. If those two variables are unknown, even relatively reliable

knowledge about fertility (including the average number of children per women and the average age of marriage), mortality and migration will still produce a model with a disproportionately high degree of uncertainty. Reliable results thus depend on expertise, care, experience, and political independence.

Due to the investigative work involved in tracking down data, an attempt to produce a reasonably accurate model for all 285 ethnic groups being tracked by the MAR project would be a laborious undertaking. A division of labour might expedite the process. Some investigators could focus on gathering available data. That would allow experts in demography to devote their time to the task of modelling. In the process, they would direct the search for data. They would be in a position to ascertain the data on which to concentrate the search in order to minimize uncertainty. First, there is a case to be made for orchestrating the attempted demographic modelling of all 285 ethnic groups under the same umbrella in order to avoid inconsistencies in the way data are gathered, and compared and in the way models are devised and their uncertainties assessed. Second, this project should probably be realized under the auspices of MAR in order to ensure that the way the data can readily be integrated into MAR's current database in order to facilitate correlation with the other variables contained in the database. Demographic data would make an important addition to MAR's database because they are not just historical but can also be projected into the future; consequently, the addition of demographic data to MAR's database would enhance not just the capacity for explaining ethno-nationalist

violence in correlation to other data but also the capacity for more accurate forecasting of probable flashpoints for ethno-nationalist violence.

More accurate figures may thus contribute to preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy is not just an ethical imperative in that it is designed to prevent large-scale violence before it erupts. It is also an instrumental imperative. Since domestic conflict rarely spills over into other countries, the instrumental concern is not really about the contribution preventative diplomacy can make to international stability per se. Yet, domestic conflict does give rise to streams of refugees that may, as the fifth chapter explained, have an impact on political stability in neighbouring states. Moreover, it is an instrumental imperative because it saves money. The cost of the Rwandan genocide to the international community, for instance, has been pegged at $4.5 billion. By contrast, an effective peacekeeping force capable of preventing the genocide would have cost only $2 billion.

The theoretical and empirical questions are related. Better data and more precise answers to questions on rates, levels and threshold may allow ethnic relations to be managed in a more effective *and* liberal-democratic manner. The empirical and theoretical challenge facing the political demography of ethno-nationalist violence is to turn this relationship into a positive-sum game. Dominant ethnic groups need to have a better idea which sort of demographic policies to pursue without having these policies become counter-productive, that is, without a policy designed to enhance the dominant majority's security deteriorating into a demographic "security dilemma." Are there effective

measures of "demographic engineering" are also commensurate with liberal-

democratic values?

Predictions are difficult, especially when they involve the future.
(Yogi Berra)

Epilogue: The demographic anatomy of democracy

Democracy is widely believed to have made a critical contribution to the peaceful resolution of ethnic disputes throughout the West. But might ethno-nationalist violence attenuate democractization? Countries whose ethnic populations are entering, or are in the process of passing through, the demographic transition are more prone to ethno-nationalist violence than countries whose ethnic populations have passed through the demographic transition. Similarly, countries with young populations are more likely to be governed by authoritarian regimes without any semblance of functioning democratic institutions. Conversely, countries whose populations have passed through the demographic transition also tend to be either advanced democracies or democratizing countries

Western countries lean on their democratic laurels. Yet, it may be premature to ascribe political stability in the West solely to an allegedly superior form of governance. The advent of political stability and democracy may just as well have been an unintended consequence of favourable demographic trends. Methodologically, there are no variables to control for Western countries' success at curbing ethno-nationalist violence by liberal-democratic means. The requisite political arrangements developed under unprecedented demographic conditions. Democracy is not a virtue; patience is. How will changing demographic trends affect the evolution of institutions of governance in developing countries?

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