

**University of Alberta**

From Anglo-Conformity to Multiculturalism:  
The Role of Scottish, Ukrainian, and Japanese Ethnicity in the  
Transformation of Canadian Identity, 1919-1971

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

Department of History and Classics

Edmonton, Alberta

Spring 2007



Library and  
Archives Canada

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395 Wellington Street  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
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395, rue Wellington  
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*Your file* *Votre référence*  
*ISBN: 978-0-494-29674-5*  
*Our file* *Notre référence*  
*ISBN: 978-0-494-29674-5*

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## **Abstract**

This study examines the transformation of Canadian identity from Anglo-conformity to multiculturalism between 1919 and 1971, recognizing the role that Scottish, Ukrainian, and Japanese elites played in the shift, and focusing on both official negotiations and unofficial myth making. It argues that the interwar Anglo-conformity that categorized Ukrainians and Japanese according to a British-Canadian ethnic hierarchy was gradually replaced by an all-inclusive Canadian pluralism, particularly after World War II. Both Ukrainians and Japanese played a large part in the transition, focusing on democracy and citizenship rights within Canada while maintaining loyalty to their homelands overseas. Using a comparative approach, the study also highlights the differences in the ways these three groups interacted with mainstream society, arguing that nationalist Ukrainians had more motivating factors in the pursuit of ethnic pluralism as a politicized phenomenon than either the marginalized Japanese or mainstream Scots. They included statelessness in Europe, the absence of formal homeland representatives, large numbers, and concentration on the prairies. Japanese, in contrast, were marginalized during much of the five decades because of race and the relatively small size of their group. The first gap between the two appeared during the interwar period, when Ukrainians but not the Japanese had the franchise and were accepted as components of the emerging Canadian mosaic. The second critical moment was World War II in which Ukrainians participated and from which Japanese were excluded as enemy aliens. Finally the 1960s witnessed the divergence between the two groups, as Ukrainians led the lobby for multiculturalism

while the Japanese, because of their long history of suffering from discrimination, sought the protection of individual human rights rather than collective rights. Scots differed from both ethnic groups, as they were influential culturally, politically, and economically. Yet the fact that they still chose to stress symbolic ethnicity regionally and nationally suggests that ethnicity was always a major factor in the defining of Canada.



## Acknowledgements

Many people have assisted me during my Ph.D program. My sincere appreciation goes to Professor Frances Swyripa, who gave me invaluable intellectual guidance, generously sharing her knowledge with me. Her devotion to and talent in training of students provided me with valuable learning experience at every stage of my program. This dissertation would never have been completed, had it not been for her assistance, although I am responsible for any flaws in it. I would also like to thank my other committee members, Professors Gerhard Ens, Ryan Dunch, Robert Irwin, Tracey Derwing, and Royden Loewen for helpful comments. I express my gratitude to Professor Christopher Mackay, graduate chair, and Lydia Dugbazah, graduate secretary, for dealing with the complicated process of thesis submission.

My appreciation also goes to Professor David Marples, who read some of my first drafts and gave me many suggestions. At difficult times during my program, he always told me not to give up and lose sight, sharing with me stories from his early years in Canada and his own challenges as a historian of a foreign nation. With his exceptional productivity and passion for history, he showed me that hard work would pay off.

I must also thank Professor Kazuo Kimura at the University of Tsukuba in Japan and Professor Brook M. Taylor at Mount Saint Vincent University, who taught me in the past and always encouraged me through numerous emails. Professor Kimura, as one of the “pioneers” in Canadian history in Japan, led me to this field, motivated me to learn something new, and encouraged me to study at the University of Alberta. Had it not been for his prompting, I would not have been here.

Many thanks to my friends at the history department, Tolly Bradford and Per Rudling, for reading part of my first draft, and Matt Eisler, Febe Pamonang, and Allan Rowe for keeping me intellectually alive through discussion in offices and over coffee. Mykola Soroka was a great help in improving my Ukrainian translation. I also send my thanks to Serhiy Fenyuk and Monty Ross for their consistent moral support and trust in me.

Helpful staff members at the Public Archives of Nova Scotia, the Library and Archives Canada, the Beaton Institute at the University College of Cape Breton, the Acadia University Archives, and the University of British Columbia Archives made my research easier. I must especially note Myron Momyrk at the Library and Archives Canada for his help with some materials.

I also express my gratitude to the Department of History and Classics for financial assistance for many years in the form of teaching assistantship, travel grants, and scholarships. I also thank the Killam Trust and the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for the Izaak Walton Killam Memorial Scholarship and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies for Darcovich Memorial Doctoral Fellowship.

Finally, my parents, though they may have regretted having a daughter living in a different country, always provided me with greatest moral support and made me feel very at home whenever I was back in Japan. For this I am very grateful.

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## **Introduction**

This thesis examines the transformation of Canadian identity between 1919 and 1971 from unofficial Anglo-conformity to official multiculturalism. It emphasizes the significant roles that ethnic elites played in negotiating this intellectual shift, using the Scots, Ukrainians, and Japanese as examples. Canada's evolution from a British colony to an ethnically pluralistic society during these five decades posed its leaders a challenge to create a uniform national identity or unity that accommodated not only the English and French but also immigrants and their descendants from Europe, Asia, and other parts of the world. The path to "imagining" Canada as a multicultural nation was neither straightforward nor simple. It entailed a complex interplay of various factors, such as Canada's increasing distance from Britain, the rise of French-Canadian nationalism, the decline of discrimination against ethnic minorities within and outside Canada, and the gradual integration of ethnic elites into Canada's political and economic structures. Taking into account these changes, this study examines one aspect of the larger picture, focusing on the interaction of ethnic elites with mainstream politics and leaders and the constant manipulation of political discourses and historical myths on part of both groups in the search for a satisfactory national identity. The major goal is to argue that Scottish, Ukrainian, and Japanese elites all contributed in some crucial way to the transformation of Canadian identity over the five decades under discussion, acknowledging and analyzing their input into this construct from the perspective of three contrasting ethnic elites.

At the official level, and particularly after the Second World War, both Ukrainian and Japanese elites pressured the federal and various provincial governments for full recognition. Internal competition—between nationalists and communists among Ukrainians and between *issei* (the first generation) and *nisei* (the second generation) among Japanese—created four camps, each of which sought to build a better relationship with mainstream elites, proving that they were “real” and “fit” representatives of their ethnic communities who shared democratic and liberal ideals with other Canadians. At the same time, all four camps tried to insert their own political ideals and agendas into Canadian politics. Specifically, nationalist Ukrainians campaigned for the independence of Ukraine in Europe, while communist Ukrainians tried to build socialist democratic principles in Canada. The *issei* Japanese campaigned for a better relationship between Japan and Canada, an end to discrimination, and the franchise, especially for veterans, while *nisei* Japanese lobbied for the enfranchisement of Japanese Canadians as their birthright. Ultimately, Ukrainian nationalists and Japanese *nisei*, advocating democracy and freedom which were closest to the mainstream Canadians’ definition of the two concepts, won the competition with their respective rivals and became important factors in shaping Canada’s multiculturalism. At the unofficial level, the integration of ethnicity into Canadian identity, or the fusion between “mainstream” and “ethnic” identities, began during the interwar period and accelerated after World War II. As part of this process, Ukrainian and Japanese elites both injected Canadian elements into their traditional homeland myths, symbols, and collective memories and constructed new, distinctively “Canadian” ones that reflected life in the adopted homeland. The Scots focused on making Canada Scottish, which was

always part of mainstream Canadian identity. Myth, symbol, and collective memory represented areas where “mainstream” and “ethnic” boundaries became indiscernible more quickly than in official Canadian identity.

A study of this kind requires a clarification of its use of terms as they contain different meanings and nuances to different people. First, although the term “Anglo” could be defined narrowly as English or broadly as English-speaking, this thesis often uses it to refer to all British peoples. For example, in Canada phrases like “Anglo-conformity” and “Anglo-Saxon” values often embraced a sense of superiority tied to imperialism among the British, including the Scots. This thesis thus does not always add “Celtic” to these terms, unless Scottish ethnicity is in question. Second, terms like “mainstream” and “ethnic” need to be explained, as both terms are understood as generic concepts, dynamic and evolutionary, with their meaning changing according to time and situation. For example, while “mainstream” meant the British and less so the French during the interwar period, what constituted the “mainstream” became more complex and fluid after World War II. Not only did members of “ethnic” groups become increasingly integrated, both politically and socioeconomically, but ethnic community leaders also began to participate in high-level decision making as elected officials, and, more rarely, as appointees to the Senate or government commissions. Their activism on behalf of “ethnic” pluralism as Canada’s official identity, in particular, challenged a dichotomy between “mainstream” and “ethnicity.” In contrast, whether the Scots—who have historically been fundamental to “mainstream” Canadian identity, leaving a huge imprint in every field of endeavour—are “ethnic” as it defines an unequal power relationship or minority status

is debatable. This study, while recognizing that the terms are evolutionary, basically refers to the Ukrainian and Japanese as “ethnic” and the British, including the Scots, as “mainstream.”

Certain tendencies in the study of Canadian identity have hindered the investigation of the mainstream-ethnic boundary as flexible and dynamic. First, while a number of studies have made a great contribution to the understanding of how Canada adopted “ethnic” pluralism as the official “mainstream” identity, they ignored the existence and impact of “ethnic” perspectives. Examples of this approach include Howard Palmer’s now dated *Immigration and the Rise of Multiculturalism* (1975) and José E. Igartua’s recent *The Other Quiet Revolution* (2006). Igartua’s excellent account of the evolution of Canadian identity reveals that since the end of World War II, mainstream politicians, presses, and commentators broadened Canadian identity, moving from an emphasis on British “common ancestry” to “universalistic moral values of equality.”<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps understandable that in an analysis of “mainstream” Canadian views, how ethnic elites—except for French-Canadian nationalists—saw Canada is overlooked. Yet the rise of “equality” in Canada’s political discourse would never have been possible without the long-term interaction between mainstream and ethnic perspectives. Igartua regards “the emergence of civic representations of Canadian identity as the foundation of Canadian political discourse” as “sudden.”<sup>2</sup> What he fails to understand is that ethnic elites in Canada had been promoting the idea of a liberal, equal, democratic, and all-inclusive Canada already between the wars, and thus were agents in shaping its modern identity. Some studies have, however, successfully demonstrated the impact that ethnic activism has had on the evolution of

human rights in Canada. Ross Lambertson's *Repression and Resistance* (2005), for example, shows how Japanese and Jewish elites independently nurtured a clear notion of human rights. Their activism, he argues, became the driving force behind the passage of the Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960.<sup>3</sup>

The second influence hindering the examination of the mainstream-ethnic boundary was the way in which ethnic historiography evolved. Ethnic histories, which proliferated right after the introduction of multiculturalism in 1971, were the first attempt to shed light on the internal complexity of ethnic groups. Yet because the very purpose of these studies was to produce ethnic histories, they often deliberately disassociated ethnicity from mainstream Canadian identity. Assuming ethnicity to be always unchanging, these monographs adopted it as their predetermined conceptual framework, and, by implication, conceived of it as common descent rather than a political construct emerging out of ethnic elites' interaction with mainstream society. An illuminating example is the Generations Series, which, funded by the Multiculturalism Program of the Department of the Secretary State of Canada, produced a number of monographs, in most cases, one ethnic group per book in the 1970s and the 1980s. Most of these books use the same formulaic framework organizing their chapters around themes of immigration, settlement, politics, religion, secular community life, and socioeconomic issues. The series, aiming to recognize and commission ethnic history officially, tends to define ethnic boundaries artificially. The volume on the Scots, for example, completely detaches Scottish-Canadian history from a mainstream one to which the Scots belonged, and contains things Scottish without any context.<sup>4</sup> As Roberto Perin points out, the "static" and "dry" nature of the monographs in the series



was not the authors' fault, given the guidelines they received,<sup>5</sup> but it had a great impact on the direction which ethnic history took in subsequent years.

It was not until the 1990s that ethnic historians and others began situating ethnic communities in the larger Canadian context, while the traditional single-group approach to ethnic history produced marked distinctions among groups. Of the three groups concerned here, Ukrainian-Canadian historiography is the most advanced, not only in the incorporation of the larger Canadian context into ethnic history but also in the attention to both the impact of a community elite and mainstream-Ukrainian negotiations, which went beyond the notion of "cohesive community."<sup>6</sup> *Canada's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity* (1991) a collection of essays edited by Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk, Lubomyr Luciuk's *Searching For Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory* (2000), and Bohdan S. Kordan's *Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945* (2001) all provide great insights into how Ukrainian elites responded to and shaped the federal government's wartime external or internal policies.<sup>7</sup> Studies which pay more attention to the constructed nature of ethnicity, and examine the role of elites in promoting ethnic identity, are Orest Martynowych's *Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Years, 1891-1924* (1991) and Frances Swyripa's *Wedded to the Cause: Ukrainian-Canadian Women and Ethnic Identity, 1891-1991* (1993). Martynowych's monograph, which demonstrates how Ukrainian individuals, motivated by ambition, clashing ideologies, and competition for power, rose as self-appointed intermediaries between their immigrant people and the mainstream society, illustrates their centrality to creating and defining a Ukrainian community.<sup>8</sup> Swyripa's study, which explains how an

ideologically divided Ukrainian elite manipulated ethnic myths, symbols, and collective memory to mobilize women on behalf of community agenda, incorporates gender, class, ethnicity, and region into her analysis.<sup>9</sup>

Yet approaches which tackle the complexity of ethnic identity are still rare, if not absent, in both Scottish- and Japanese-Canadian historiographies, neither of which developed into analytically or theoretically sophisticated fields. The writing of Scottish-Canadian history has, from the beginning, tended to be a celebration of Scottishness in which the Scots distinguish themselves from other British settler peoples through their symbols and cultural traditions. Multiculturalism only encouraged this tendency to further cement the link between writing Scottish-Canadian history and creating Scottish identity. For the Japanese Canadians, the situation was the opposite; long marginalized, they only established a historical tradition around the collective memory of “struggle” associated with internment during World War II. The impact of this event was so strong that other facets of their past often received little attention until very recently. The scarceness of studies that examine political interaction between a Japanese elite and mainstream Canadian society is, to some extent, comprehensible, because the factors that shaped Japanese-Canadian history were segregation and discrimination.

Scottish-Canadian history has been regarded as an integral part of mainstream history, and thus any attempt to write a separate history for Scots inevitably highlights distinctively Scottish elements and impoverishes the common narrative. Publications on the Scots in Canada outside mainstream Canadian historiography from the early twentieth century mostly simply celebrate things Scottish—historical figures, cultural

traditions, education, and folk arts, for example—without any attempt at analysis.<sup>10</sup> A number of books appearing after the introduction of multiculturalism reinforced this emphasis on the maintenance of symbolic ethnicity among the Scots. Jenni Calder's *Scots in Canada* (2003), for example, writes: "Wherever there were Scots, it seems, there was music. . . . It is often said that Scottish Canadians cherish the culture of the Gael more enthusiastically than do the Scots in Scotland."<sup>11</sup> Others, such as D. Campbell and R. A. Maclean in their *Beyond the Atlantic Roar* (1974), which examines the Scots in Nova Scotia, adopt conventional themes such as settlement, literature, education, and politics, the formula set by the Generations Series. *Beyond the Atlantic* illustrates the dilemma in treating Nova Scotia Scots as an ethnically identifiable group, arguing that Scottishness remained "in the realm of attitudes" while Scots themselves were politically and culturally assimilated by 1940.<sup>12</sup>

Japanese-Canadian historiography, as opposed to its Scottish counterpart which was shaped by positive myths, evolved around recollections of the negative past mainly by those who witnessed or experienced the wartime evacuation from British Columbia. Often written as first-hand accounts, the books on internment are valuable personal records but their focus on the narrative of the event is disinterested in indepth analysis of ethnicity. Illuminating examples include Barry Broadfoot's *Years of Sorrow, Years of Shame* (1977), Keibo Oiwa's *Stone Voices: Wartime Writings of Japanese Canadian Isseis* (1991), and Takeo Nakano's *Within the Barbed Wire Fence* (1980).<sup>13</sup> The triumph in 1988 of the redress movement seeking compensation for the wartime losses also produced a series of books that extended the collective memory of the evacuation beyond World War II. Maryka Omatsu's *Bittersweet Passage* (1992), for

example, provides a first-hand account of experiences in the evacuation and in the redress movement, tying the two events as a long history of “struggle.”<sup>14</sup>

Despite this general tendency, a few studies on Scots and Japanese in Canada exhibit sophistication, analyzing rather than celebrating or lamenting the collective memories. Three monographs on the Japanese, Ken Adachi’s *The Enemy That Never Was* (1974), Ann Sunahara’s *The Politics of Racism* (1981), and Roy Miki’s *Redress* (2004), for example, clearly go beyond simple recollections of the wartime evacuation, even though they stress the injustice of the event.<sup>15</sup> By incorporating both mainstream and Japanese perspectives, and by providing insights into negotiations between Canadian and Japanese elites, they situate ethnicity in a larger political context. They all also pay more attention to ideological and generational divisions and their impact on claims to speak for the group before mainstream society, if not analyze ethnic identity. With respect to the Scots, some scholars have indeed addressed the often blurred boundary between “mainstream” and “Scottish” identities and examined how Scottishness became an integral part of Canadian identity. Ian McKay, for example, has insightfully demonstrated the artificial and constructed nature of Scottish ethnicity in Nova Scotia, arguing that Scottishness, imbued with antiquity and exoticism, was promoted between 1933 and 1954 in particular by “anti-modernist” premier Angus L. Macdonald.<sup>16</sup> According to McKay, Scottishness was designed by Macdonald to ethnicize the province, where Scots were not the numerically dominant group at any time, for both economic and promotional reasons, incorporating Scottish symbols such as the tartan, Gaelic songs, Highland games, and bagpipes into the province’s identity. The two collections of essays *Transatlantic Scots* (2005) and *A Kingdom of the Mind*:

*How the Scots Helped Make Canada* (2006), inquire into the complexity of Scottish ethnicity as a symbolic phenomenon that often exists in the mind. Celeste Ray's article in the first collection, for example, theorizes "Scottish Americans" or "hyphenated Scots" as "imagined" and historically rooted.<sup>17</sup> Significantly, both books recognize the strong influence of the Scots in every sphere of life in Canada, thereby underscoring the fact that their strong power as nation builders rarely hurt their desire to remain Scottish.<sup>18</sup>

This study places a special focus on the constant interplay between "mainstream" and "ethnic" communities, and on "mainstream" and "ethnic" as categories of analysis, rather than separate the two. For this purpose, it builds on theories which understand ethnicity as a dynamic political phenomenon. First, as Fredrick Barth argued back in 1969, the study of ethnicity needs to shift its focus "from the internal constitution and history of separate groups to ethnic boundaries and boundary maintenance."<sup>19</sup> Writing in an era when the primordial definition of ethnicity via such factors as common blood, traits, traditions, and languages was still dominant,<sup>20</sup> he argued that ethnic boundaries existed independently, and were never defined by such biological and cultural elements but rather drawn by social interactions that distinguished the members of one ethnic community from another. Once ethnic boundaries were built, they could survive despite the decline in cultural distinctiveness, and people could move across the boundaries.<sup>21</sup> While Barth's theory tends to focus more on the persistence than the fluidity of ethnic boundaries, it is useful in the present context, as both Ukrainian and Japanese boundaries could not be drawn without interaction with mainstream society. Second, theorizing the role that ethnic elites played

in the formation and maintenance of ethnic community is central to this thesis, because without the rise of prominent ethnic individuals, there would have been no such communities in Canada. The mechanism by which ethnic elites became representatives of their peoples has been theorized by scholars like Orlando Patterson and Michael Hechter.<sup>22</sup> The most common theory attributes the rise of ethnic elites to intensive political competition within and outside the ethnic group. For ambitious ethnic individuals, the acquisition of political power in Canadian society was a major goal, but as influential positions in mainstream society were limited, they had to use their ethnic background and fellow ethnics as strength. Yet in order to do so, they first needed to become representatives of their own ethnic community by winning over or defeating rivals for the position. Then, by mobilizing and promoting their people's interests and ethnic consciousness, they could compete in mainstream society as legitimate voices of the ethnic community.<sup>23</sup> A common basis of this theory is the conviction that ethnicity, to a greater or lesser degree, is constructed by choice and that, in Patterson's words, the ethnic allegiance of individuals is "in their own best social and economic interests."<sup>24</sup> This instrumentalism has been used by sociologist Wsevolod W. Isajiw and political scientist Bohdan S. Kordan to explain the emergence and behaviour of the Ukrainian-Canadian community as a political phenomenon. Isajiw, for example, pointed out the particular tendency of the third or later generation of Ukrainians, who usually had little association with anything Ukrainian, to rely on their ethnicity to gain access to and participate in higher strata of Canadian society.<sup>25</sup> Instrumentalism is thus particularly useful to explain why influential Scots did not rely on their ethnicity to

attain individual and collective recognition and power in Canada, while both Ukrainians and Japanese regarded it as a significant tool.

This instrumentalist theory, which focuses only on the ambitions of ethnic elites, has been reinforced by other theories of ethnicity which tie the ethnic elite to its community, bringing Benedict Anderson's imagined communities and Anthony D. Smith's ethno-symbolism into the analysis. While a primary goal of both concepts is to answer a much larger question—whether or not the nation is a phenomenon constructed as a result of modern technological and economic developments—their understanding of *étnie* or ethnic community has implications for Canada. Anderson's modernist theory, which asserts that “all communities,” including ethnic ones, “are imagined” by their members mainly through the rise of “print capitalism,”<sup>26</sup> stresses the impact of modernity on the formation of ethnic groups. Thus, this theory provides great insights into how both Ukrainian and Japanese Canadians promoted their ethnic consciousnesses, largely constructed after immigration, through their own presses that eliminated the need for face-to-face encounters in a vast land. For ethnic elites, who initiated and controlled these presses, the role that “imagination” played was of great significance.

Smith sets out to refute the overwhelming importance which was placed on modern changes in technology and capitalism. Although he admits that nation and ethnicity are modern phenomena, he stresses an essential historical continuity between premodern cultural groups and modern ethnicity and the modern nation. For him, the profound attachment that ethnic groups have to their traditions and culture is due to the myths, symbols, and shared memories that the group members have nurtured for a long

period of time.<sup>27</sup> “Myths of common descent,” in particular, constitute a crucial part of ethnic consciousness, as they provide a sense of security and meaning for a group and its members. Specifically, “myths of common descent” include myths of temporal origins, location and migration, ancestry, the heroic age, and regeneration.<sup>28</sup> This ethno-symbolist theory explains well why both Ukrainian and Japanese elites constantly produced or reproduced their own homeland and Canadian myths and collective memories that provided them with what Smith has called a sense of distinctiveness as “chosen peoples.”<sup>29</sup> This theory also explains why the Scots, who defined much of the Canadian mainstream, sometimes needed to emphasize their Scottishness: for them, their ethnicity was strongly tied to a sense of mission and pride as a superior people who designed much of the modern world. In this sense, “symbolic ethnicity”—whereby the ethnic group focuses on ethnic traditions, foods, music, and arts as its members become integrated into the mainstream society<sup>30</sup>—always contains a political message.

Within the above analytical framework, this thesis asserts that ethnic elites nurtured their own vision of a multiethnic Canada long before mainstream society accepted it with the implementation of a federal policy of multiculturalism in 1971. It shows that the strategies and discourses on which Ukrainian and Japanese ethnic leaders relied in an attempt to participate and promote their peoples’ interests were quite similar. For them, ethnic pluralism was always the only way to achieve and legitimize the desired dual identity that drew on both the homeland and Canada.

Chapter 1 outlines the formation of Ukrainian, Japanese, and Scottish ethnic communities in Canada and describes their changing profiles. Significantly, although both Ukrainian and Japanese communities displayed inconsistency in membership in



organized activities, widespread integration at elite and grassroots levels, and the geographical migration of members, the transformation rarely pointed to the decline of ethnicity. Chapter 2 examines the consolidation and factionalization of the three ethnic communities between the wars, when elite mobilization of the masses produced a number of self-serving ethnic myths and first introduced the concept of ethnic pluralism into Canadian discourses. Chapter 3 focuses on World War II, when the mainstream-ethnic boundary was most visible and rigid because of suspicion and discrimination against suspect ethnic groups. While both Ukrainians and Japanese faced a test of loyalty, marginalization of the Japanese took official form after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and became belligerent. While Ukrainians were expected to participate in Canada's war effort, they, too, were affected by international developments, especially events in Ukraine. Chapter 4 argues that the mainstream-ethnic boundary became more flexible after 1945 for two main reasons. First, wartime atrocities and Hitler's "Final Solution" in particular dramatically changed attitudes towards ethnic minorities across the globe—reflected, for example, in the Citizenship Act of Canada in 1947 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Second, both Ukrainian and Japanese elites accelerated their campaign for full recognition as well as the very specific goals of the admission of Ukrainian refugees and limited compensation for Japanese losses during the war. Increasing appreciation of democracy provided both groups with the best opportunity in Canadian history to lobby the federal government on behalf of their group goals. Chapter 5 posits a merger between ethnic and mainstream identities. As participants in this process, both Ukrainian and Japanese elites attached new "democratic" meanings to their homeland symbols and myths, thereby Canadianizing

them. At the same time, they produced their Canadian symbols and myths, ethnicizing specific places, events, and historic figures. Chapter 6 focuses on the period when lobbying for multiculturalism gained momentum, triggered by the rise of French-Canadian nationalism and the appointment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism by the federal government in 1963. Yet it was also during this period that a divergence between Ukrainians and Japanese became obvious in terms of ethnic activism. While Ukrainians were in the vanguard of the multiculturalism movement, the Japanese lost much of their organized power.

As an examination of the evolution of Canadian identity over five decades, the present study has its limitations. First, it focuses on Scots, Ukrainians, and Japanese, and arguments it makes in relation to them cannot necessarily be applied to all ethnic groups in Canada. At the same time, the fact that common patterns emerge in terms of elites' strategies in ethnic community building and maintenance and in the construction of a multicultural Canada, despite fundamental differences among the three groups, provides useful clues as to how other ethnic groups in Canada constructed and maintained their ethnicity. The three groups chosen as case studies were selected to represent a range of racial and cultural backgrounds and value systems, distance from mainstream society, and regional distribution. These factors determined each group's relative power in Canadian society with the Scots at the top, the Ukrainians in the middle, and the Japanese at the bottom of Canada's ethnic hierarchy.

Obviously, the Scots belonged to mainstream Canada, not only sharing a sense of superiority with the "Anglo-Saxons" as the world's dominant race, but also belonging to a primarily Protestant culture. Although Ukrainians were not part of Anglo

Protestant or Western civilization, the fact that they were Christian and white gave them an edge over the Japanese in terms of accessing mainstream society. The Japanese, in contrast, believed mainly in Buddhism or Shintoism except for a few converts to Christianity, were racially visible, and came from the “Orient.” They thus were seen as inassimilable, even if properly enlightened. The political implications of such differences were enormous, particularly with respect to equal partnership in Canadian society. The Scots were part of and helped define mainstream Canada, having a huge impact on its political, educational, and economic development and philosophical underpinnings as members of the dominant British group. Yet they are significant from a comparative point of view, as they still highlighted their ethnicity at times. For both reasons, this study treats the Scots differently from the other two groups, which are central to the analysis. The Ukrainians, whose old-world political ideologies and involvement were never accepted by mainstream Canadians before World War II, were more or less acknowledged for their economic contribution as prairie farmers and allowed naturalization and the franchise. Their European origins and white background also made them culturally and racially assimilatory. The dividing line with mainstream Canada was the most persistent in the case of the Japanese because of race and their non-Christian culture and traditions. The Japanese came under the “official” protection of the consulates of Japan until World War II, and were denied naturalization and the franchise until 1948.

Regional differences also affected how these three groups perceived themselves and their significance in Canadian nation building. The fact that until 1942 the great majority of Canada’s Japanese population was concentrated in “marginal”

British Columbia reinforced their sense of otherness. The Ukrainians, in contrast, cultivated and exploited the notion that they were a founding people of the economically significant prairie provinces. For the Scots, who settled across Canada, regional boundaries often did not matter, weakening ethnic cohesiveness. Yet, as with the other two groups, Scottish identity was fortified where their population was concentrated and somewhat marginalized, as in Nova Scotia. Patterns of geographical concentration among all these groups became less distinctive after World War II, yet myths and memories around the “ethnic” regions survived and even flourished.

The second limitation of this study is its focus on how ethnic elites perceived and defined the role that “their” people should play, rather than on how the masses responded to these elites or thought independently. Given that the primary interest of the study is more a comparison among ethnic groups in their negotiations with Canada than an in-depth examination of a single ethnic group, this approach is more fruitful. Most significantly, a mosaic identity or ethnic consciousness was, if not invented, at least crystallized and articulated by community elites, who generally had a better knowledge of and familiarity with Canadian mainstream and homeland politics through education and interest. Most scholars of nationalism, including Anthony D. Smith and Eric Hobsbawm, agree that the initiative of elites is necessary in the formation of ethnicity or the nation.<sup>31</sup> Often members of a rising and ambitious middle class, living in urban centres and acquiring influential positions as newspaper editors, businessmen, and teachers, these leaders are quite anxious to better political, cultural, and economic conditions both for themselves and for the group. As such, they play an important role as self-appointed mediators between mainstream society and the ethnic community,

seeking upward mobility, and defining ethnic boundaries by mobilizing “their” people behind their group goals.

Finally, some chapters focus on the Ukrainians and Japanese and make only occasional references to the Scots, as the nature of Scottish ethnicity differed. While Scottish ethnicity, to some extent, was politically motivated and influential, the Scots did not need to take advantage of or exploit their ethnicity in order to participate in mainstream society, so that they are often irrelevant to discussions of political inequality and/or marginalization that the Ukrainians and the Japanese confronted for most of the concerned period. Yet the Scots’ ethnicity provides a valuable conceptual perspective when used to highlight the differences with the Ukrainians and Japanese. In a sense, the Scots demonstrated an extreme case where ethnicity defines Canadian identity without any difficulty—a state that the Ukrainians and Japanese reached only in 1971 when Canada introduced multiculturalism.

Despite these limits, this study offers an alternate ethnic’s view of Canada, in an effort to stress the significance of Ukrainian and Japanese activism for democratic and liberal principles and to pinpoint when and how ethnicity began defining Canadian identity. Rejecting the single interpretation of the evolution of Canadian identity from Anglo-conformity to liberal-democratic ethnic pluralism defined by mainstream Canadians, it recognizes multiculturalism as a principle that both ethnic elites possessed before World War II and began challenging mainstream with Canadians after the war. In the process, mainstream Canadians recognized ethnicity as a significant component of Canadian identity, while ethnic elites accepted, broadened, and redefined narrowly defined Canadian identity and democracy.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> José E. Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006), 226.
- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 227.
- <sup>3</sup> Ross Lambertson, *Repression and Resistance: Canadian Human Rights Activists, 1930-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005). For the human rights movement after World War II, see also Carmela Patrias and Ruth A. Frager, "'This Is Our Country, These Are Our Rights': Minorities and the Origins of Ontario's Human Rights Campaign," *Canadian Historical Review* 82: 1 (March 2001): 1-35; and James W. Walker, "Human Rights in a Multicultural Framework: Defining Canadian Citizenship, 1945-1970," *Canadian Issues* (February 2002): 32-4.
- <sup>4</sup> See W. Stanford Reid, *The Scottish Tradition in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976).
- <sup>5</sup> Roberto Perin, "Writing about Ethnicity," in *Writing about Canada: A Handbook for Modern Canadian History*, ed. John Schultz (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1990), 207.
- <sup>6</sup> Franca Iacovetta, "Manly Militants, Cohesive Communities, and Defiant Domestics: Writing about Immigrants in Canadian Historical Scholarship," *Labour/Le Travail* 36 (Fall 1995): 236-42.
- <sup>7</sup> See Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk, eds., *Canada's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); and Bohdan S. Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991).
- <sup>8</sup> Orest Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Years, 1891-1924* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1991).
- <sup>9</sup> Frances Swyripa, *Wedded to the Cause: Ukrainian-Canadian Women and Ethnic Identity, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
- <sup>10</sup> For example, see Wilfred Campbell, *The Scotsman in Canada* (London: S. Low Marston, 1911); John M. Gibbon, *Scots in Canada: A History of the Settlement of the Dominion from the Earliest Days to the Present Time* (Toronto: Musson, 1911); James H. Walker, *A Scotsman in Canada* (London: J Cape, 1935); Neil MacNeil, *Highland Heart of Nova Scotia* (New York: Scribner, 1948); and Charles W. Dunn, *Highland Settler: A Portrait of the Scottish Gael in Nova Scotia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953).
- <sup>11</sup> Jenni Calder, *Scots in Canada* (Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2003), 137.
- <sup>12</sup> D. Campbell and R. A. MacLean, *Beyond the Atlantic Roar: A Study of the Nova Scotian Scots* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), 281.
- <sup>13</sup> Barry Broadfoot, *Years of Sorrow, Years of Shame: The Stories of Japanese Canadians in World War II* (Don Mills: Paperjacks, 1977); Keibo Oiwa, ed., *Stone Voices: Wartime Writings of Japanese Canadian Isseis* (Montreal: Véhicule Press, 1991); and Takeo Ujo Nakano and Leatrice Nakano, *Within the Barbed Wire Fence: A Japanese Man's Account of His Internment in Canada* (Halifax: Goodread Biographies, 1980).
- <sup>14</sup> Maryka Omatsu, *Bittersweet Passage: Redress and the Japanese Canadian Experience* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1992).

- <sup>15</sup> Ann Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of the Japanese Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto: J Lorimer, 1981); Ken Adachi, *The Enemy that Never Was: An Account of the Deplorable Treatment Inflicted on Japanese Canadians during World War Two* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976); and Roy Miki, *Redress: Inside the Japanese Canadian Call for Justice* (Vancouver: Raincoast Books, 2004).
- <sup>16</sup> Ian McKay, "Tartanism Triumphant: The Construction of Scottishness in Nova Scotia, 1933-1954," *Acadiensis* 21: 2 (Spring 1992): 16.
- <sup>17</sup> Celeste Ray, "Transatlantic Scots and Ethnicity," in *Transatlantic Scots*, ed. Celeste Ray (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 31.
- <sup>18</sup> Celeste Ray, *ibid.*; and Peter E. Rider and Heather McNabb, eds., *A Kingdom of the Mind: How the Scots Helped Make Canada* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006). For the strong influence that Scottish writers had on Canadian literature, see Elizabeth Waterston, *Rapt in Plaid: Canadian Literature and Scottish Tradition* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
- <sup>19</sup> Fredrik Barth, introduction to *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*, ed. Fredrik Barth (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 10.
- <sup>20</sup> On the primordialist theory of ethnicity, see Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz* (New York: Basic Books, 1973); and Max Weber, "Ethnic Groups," in *Theories of Ethnicity: A Classical Reader*, ed. Werner Sollors (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 52-66.
- <sup>21</sup> Barth, introduction, 22-4.
- <sup>22</sup> Orlando Patterson, "Context and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance: A Theoretical Framework and Caribbean Case Study," in *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, ed. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 305-49; and Michael Hechter, "A Rational Choice Approach to Race and Ethnic Relations," in *Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations*, ed. D. Mason and J. Rex (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 268-77.
- <sup>23</sup> This theory of the relation between upward mobility and the mobilization of the masses is well articulated by Paul R. Brass, for whom ethnicity is nothing but a by-product of political competition among elites. Using the controversy of cow protection and slaughter between Hindu and Muslim elites in South Asia as an example, he demonstrates how they manipulated cultural or religious symbols to win political and economic clout, consequently defining ethnic boundaries. See his "Ethnic Groups, Symbol Manipulation, and Ethnic Identity Among the Muslims of South Asia," in *Political Identity in South Asia*, ed. David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (London and Dublin: Curzon Press, 1979), 35-77.
- <sup>24</sup> Patterson, "Context and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance," 312.
- <sup>25</sup> Wsevolod W. Isajiw, "Multiculturalism and the Integration of the Canadian Community," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 15: 2 (1983): 110. See also Bohdan S. Kordan, "The Intelligentsia and the Development of Ukrainian Ethnic Consciousness in Canada: A Prolegomenon to Research," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 17: 1 (1985): 22-33.
- <sup>26</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).
- <sup>27</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

<sup>28</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 68.

<sup>29</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

<sup>30</sup> Herbert J. Gans, "Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America," in *On the Making of Americans: Essays in Honor of David Riesman*, ed. Herbert J. Gans (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), 193-220. See also his "Symbolic Ethnicity and Symbolic Religiosity: Towards a Comparison of Ethnic and Religious Acculturation," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17: 4 (October 1994): 577-92.

<sup>31</sup> Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*; and Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).



## **Chapter 1**

### **Scots, Ukrainians, and Japanese: Changing Profiles**

While ethnic communities in Canada have often been seen as static and inflexible entities defined largely by their internal dynamics, their boundaries have always been active and fluid. Although pre-existing ethnic, religious, and racial backgrounds determined primarily how mainstream Canadian society perceived the character of each ethnic group, interaction between mainstream and ethnic elites determined much of a group's character, including its position in the country's ethno-racial hierarchy that favoured those of British origin. Ethnic elites constantly sought to define the nature of their ethnic community, responding to the transforming political and economic conditions of the new land. This chapter, then, focuses on change and continuity within Ukrainian, Japanese, and Scottish ethnic communities over approximately a century, investigating two contradictory forces: segregation and integration. The first and longer section deals with the era throughout the interwar years in which discrimination dominated public attitudes, and ethnic communities, to a large extent, existed separately from the mainstream society. The second section looks at the postwar period, when prewar ethnic community boundaries collapsed or shifted considerably and ethnic elites, to a lesser or greater extent, became integrated into mainstream politics. Comparison of Scots, Ukrainians, and Japanese leads this chapter to argue that the distance of each from mainstream society was the key factor in determining the nature of their respective ethnic communities. Undoubtedly, the Scots created close-knit circles among themselves, yet their nation-wide "imagined" Scottish community was not as consistent and cohesive as those of the Ukrainians and the

Japanese, and often overlapped with that of Canada. Although in different ways and at different paces, both Ukrainian and Japanese “imagined” communities dramatically transformed their outlooks over the years, becoming increasingly open and minimizing the distance from mainstream society.

### **The Era of Segregation and Alienation**

The great surge of immigration to Canada in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was crucial to ethnic community building. While pre-existing racial, religious, and ethnic biases determined the hierarchy that emerged, it was reinforced by other factors, such as the scale of immigration and the place and size of settlement. In addition, these biases and factors not only greatly influenced the priorities and agenda of ethnic elites in Canada but also had a persistent impact on negotiations between ethnic groups and mainstream society.

The first and most significant factor that put the Scots above the Ukrainians and the Japanese was racism. A concept that categorized humans by skin colour and physical features into “Caucasian, Mongoloid, and Negroid,” it believed in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon, Celtic, and other northern European races.<sup>1</sup> Racism emerged as a scientific doctrine mainly from the increasing contact between Europeans and others as a result of colonialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it dominated public discourses in North America into the early twentieth century.<sup>2</sup> Mainstream Canadian politicians, philosophers, and commentators believed that people’s racial or physical characteristics determined their nature in other respects. They thought that Canada should remain an Anglo-Celtic or at least a “white” nation because it meant both physical and moral strengths. James S. Woodsworth, the social gospeller and

Methodist minister who later helped found the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation published a monograph in 1909 that classified immigrants into ethno-racial categories and tried to define the character of each group. Although he perceived both Ukrainians and Japanese as inferior to the British, there was a clear difference in his attitudes towards the two groups. For example, he portrayed Galicians [Ukrainians] as “quarrelsome and dangerous,” but nevertheless also “patient,” “industrious,” and “eager to become Canadianized.”<sup>3</sup> The Japanese and other Asians, in contrast, tended to maintain “their own virtues and vices” and “constitute an entirely distinct class or caste,” and they could not “be assimilated.”<sup>4</sup>

A second factor that merits attention is the role that the homelands of the three groups—Scotland, Ukraine, and Japan—played on the world stage, as they predetermined how their people would be perceived in Canada. Politically united with England since 1707, Scotland wielded considerable influence in the world. Not only did the Scots expand geographically around the globe as part of the British Empire, but they also contributed fundamentally to modern sciences and technology and to the British-based legal, political, and educational systems like those in Canada. Scotland thus became a symbol of modernity and hegemony, both in Scotland and for Scottish immigrants overseas.<sup>5</sup> Neither Ukraine nor Japan could make such a claim on behalf of Western civilization. The contemporary territory of Ukraine, which had known periods of statehood in medieval Kievan Rus’ and under the Cossacks was divided among neighbouring powers and subject to foreign rule.<sup>6</sup> The provinces of Galicia and Bukovina in Western Ukraine, where most Ukrainians in Canada originated, were part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, then interwar Poland and Romania, and then the Soviet

Union, except for the period between 1917 and 1920. Statelessness and national oppression both disadvantaged Ukrainian immigrants and their descendants as a sign of cultural and political weakness and galvanized them to help the homeland. Statelessness also led to confusion, so that when Ukrainians first came to Canada they were identified by various names as Austrians, Ruthenians, Galicians, and Bukovinians. Japan had existed as an isolated realm since ancient times, and developed as a strong modern nation state after 1868. But in light of its seclusion from the world for a long time and localism in the Far East, it was regarded in Europe and North America as backward economically, politically, and culturally. Ukrainians and Japanese, then, were placed below Scots in the world's hierarchy of power, even before they immigrated to Canada.

Third, the sheer scale and timing of the Scottish immigration—both much larger and earlier than the Ukrainian and Japanese immigrations—meant that the Scots not only constituted a dominant group numerically in Canada but also were initial builders of the new colony following the British conquest of New France. For them, British North America was a most logical place for emigration and an extension of their homeland. During the eighteenth century, Scots in Canada included often transient fur traders, soldiers, merchants, and adventurers as well as more permanent settlers of Loyalist stock. Large-scale immigration and settlement occurred after 1815, nearly a century before Ukrainians and the Japanese began arriving in Canada *en masse*, thereby consolidating the Scottish imprint on British North America. Between 1815 and 1870, approximately 170,000 Scots immigrated to Canada; another 326,000 arrived between 1870 and 1918.<sup>7</sup> Although the reasons for this movement were often associated with

economic conditions in Scotland, such as overpopulation and the lack of land, they also represented imperial expansionism politically, culturally, and economically.

British Canada's deeply-rooted ethno-racial biases allowed more Ukrainians than Japanese to immigrate, thereby securing for the former greater numbers and political influence. Even though Ukrainians would later promote themselves as co-builders of Western Canada, when they first arrived, British immigrants had already established Canada's political and cultural norms. Yet, as experienced farmers, Ukrainians were economically if not ethnically desirable and actively recruited to settle prairie homesteads after Clifford Sifton became Minister of the Interior in 1896. Approximately 170,000 Ukrainian peasants came to Canada between 1896 and 1914, attracted by one hundred sixty acres of "free land" in the West. Another 68,000 Ukrainians arrived in Canada between 1925 and 1930 under the Railways Agreement, most again for destined for the rural prairies.<sup>8</sup> The experience of Japanese immigrants was different in that they were neither racially desirable nor needed from an economic standpoint, being regarded as cheap labourers who would compete for jobs with white working-class Canadians. Besides, compared to Ukrainians, the proportion of urban dwellers was much higher: nearly forty-seven per cent of the entire Japanese population lived in urban areas in 1931.<sup>9</sup> The Gentleman's Agreement between Japan and Canada in 1908 limited new arrivals to four hundred annually so that Japanese immigration, which reached 11,500 between 1905 and 1908, began to decline. Although the annual quota was reduced again in 1928, another 12,000 Japanese immigrants came during the interwar period.<sup>10</sup> Finally, if Ukrainian numbers were small compared to the Scots, the Japanese population was

much smaller than its Ukrainian counterpart, guaranteeing more limited collective power in the years to come.

	1921	1931	1941
Scots	1,125,153	1,346,350	1,403,974
Ukrainians	105,175	225,113	305,929
Japanese	15,984	23,342	23,249

Table 1. Scottish, Ukrainian, and Japanese population in Canada, 1921-1941  
Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada.

A fourth factor reinforcing the pre-existing ethnic or racial hierarchy was the regional dispersal of the three groups and the significance attached to the region where each group settled or was concentrated. While approximately forty per cent of all Scots lived in Ontario in 1921, they were found in all parts of Canada, thereby making Scottish influence nation-wide.<sup>11</sup> Both the Ukrainian and Japanese, in contrast, showed regional concentration—the former on the prairies and the latter on the West Coast in British Columbia. That the Ukrainians settled and cultivated a “central” part of Canada provided them with a sense of significance as nation builders, while the Japanese, having settled on the western edge of the country, were marginalized geographically as well as in other respects. The first wave of Ukrainian immigrants established bloc settlements in the aspen parkland belt of the three prairie provinces.<sup>12</sup> The largest bloc was at Edna-Star in east-central Alberta; others formed at Stuartburn, Whitemouth, Interlake, Shoal Lake, and

Dauphin in Manitoba, and at Yorkton, Battleford, Prince Albert, and Fish Creek in Saskatchewan. In 1921, the three prairie provinces had approximately ninety percent of all Ukrainians in Canada. That same year ninety-five per cent of the entire Japanese population in Canada was to be found on the West Coast in British Columbia.<sup>13</sup> While the Japanese had first come to Canada as seasonal sojourners in the late nineteenth century, they began to settle permanently at the beginning of the twentieth century. Substantial urban Japanese clusters appeared in the city of Vancouver, which attracted most Japanese, but others settled in the fishing village of Steveston along the Fraser River as well as on farm land in the Fraser and Okanagan valleys.

	1931	1951	1971
British Columbia	22,205	7,169	13,585
Alberta	652	3,336	4,460
Saskatchewan	114	225	315
Manitoba	51	1,161	1,335
Ontario	220	8,581	15,600
Quebec	43	1,137	1,745
Atlantic	4	19	140

Table 2: Japanese population in Canada, 1931-1971

Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada.

	1931	1951	1971
British Columbia	2,583	22,613	60,150
Alberta	55,872	86,957	135,510
Saskatchewan	63,400	78,399	85,920
Manitoba	73,606	98,753	114,410
Ontario	24,426	93,595	159,880
Quebec	4340	12,921	203,25
Atlantic	883	1,431	3,215

Table 3: Ukrainian population in Canada, 1931-1971

Source: William Darcovich and Paul Yuzyk, eds., *A Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891-1976* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980).

	1931	1951	1971
British Columbia	135,038	202,158	263,910
Alberta	110,702	124,045	165,942
Saskatchewan	121,485	94,539	79,940
Manitoba	112,326	109,251	97,980
Ontario	549,648	658,594	773,080
Quebec	87,300	89,620	108,085
Atlantic	521,474	261,431	231,435

Table 4: Scottish population in Canada, 1931-1971

Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada.

Both discrimination and internal group dynamics (often old world in origin or character) determined the cohesiveness and the nature of ethnic communities and their associations in Canada, with the Ukrainians and Japanese establishing much more close-knit institutions than the Scots. As new immigrants, all three groups had created local and regional organizations for the purpose of mutual support, which marked a significant first step in the formation of identifiable ethnic communities outside the common society. The first Scottish association, the North British Society of Halifax, was established in 1768, and several St. Andrew's societies appeared in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in cities like Saint John, Montreal, and Ottawa.<sup>14</sup> But because the Scots experienced little discrimination because of background, their associations tended to focus on recreational activities, often combined with charity and/or the promotion of ethnic identity, such as celebrating St. Andrew's Day or Robert Burns Day and hosting Highland Games. Some attempts were made to recreate the Scottish clan system which represented kinship and geographical links in the old country, yet it was often done for symbolic purposes, including the celebration of more localized roots. Among Ukrainians and Japanese, pioneer secular institutions were more than



opportunities for socializing. Facing prejudice because of their ethnic or racial origin and difficulties in communicating in English, both Ukrainians and Japanese regarded their countrymen, friends, and neighbours as crucial sources of assistance. By the end of the 1920s, a number of Japanese and Ukrainian secular institutions, which followed homeland models, emerged at the local level. Ukrainians formed *chytalni* (reading clubs) and *narodni domy* (community halls) for mutual support, enlightenment, and the preservation of Ukrainian culture while the Japanese established *kenjinkai* (countrymen's clubs), similar to the Scottish clan yet more practical in promoting co-operation among fellow immigrants from the same region. The first Ukrainian reading club was organized in Winnipeg in 1899, and dozens of others or related institutions had appeared in both prairie cities and the rural Ukrainian blocs by the 1930s.<sup>15</sup> The Japanese *kenjinkai* existed mainly in Vancouver and southern Alberta; the first to be formed was the Hiroshima *kenjinkai* in 1902, followed by the Shiga *kenjinkai* in 1905, both in British Columbia.<sup>16</sup>

Religion also functioned as a natural focal point of ethnic identity as well as spiritual faith and practical collaboration. Yet religion was also subjected to Canada's pre-existing ethno-religious hierarchy, which placed Christianity, and Protestantism in particular, at the top, thus reinforcing the marginalization of Greek Catholics and Orthodox Ukrainians, but especially Buddhist/Shinto Japanese. The Protestant Scots, who were mostly Presbyterian, played a significant role in the consolidation of Protestant traditions and values in Canada. Presbyterianism had its roots in the Scottish Reformation led by John Knox in the sixteenth century and was strongly tied to Scottish identity. The Presbyterian Church was established in Canada in 1875 and merged with

the Congregational and Methodist churches to form the United Church of Canada in 1925. Catholic Scots, who came mostly from the Highlands, maintained their ethno-religious identity particularly in Cape Breton, eastern Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island.

Establishing and securing their religious institutions in Canada was more complicated for Ukrainians and Japanese, whose respective faiths were regarded as foreign and inferior. Protestant missionaries, inspired in part by a sense of British superiority, worked among both peoples, hoping to proselytize them, while the Roman Catholic Church, tied to French linguistic and cultural survival, tried to win Ukrainian converts in particular to consolidate their influence in the West.<sup>17</sup> For example, the French Latin-rite Catholic archbishop of St. Boniface, Adélarde Langevin, opposed the establishment of an independent Greek Catholic Church under Byzantine-rite bishop for Ukrainians until 1912, trying to keep Roman Catholic order in Canada. Similarly, the construction of Japanese Buddhist or Shinto institutions in British Columbia was not welcomed by white Canadians. In fact, Protestant missionaries worked intensively among Japanese immigrants, trying to enlighten them by instilling Christian morality and values. The first Japanese church in Canada. The most successful denomination was Methodists who built eight Japanese churches in British Columbia by 1921.<sup>18</sup>

The Ukrainians and Japanese, however, never abandoned the desire to worship in their own faiths and eventually succeeded in building their own independent religious institutions. Moreover their leadership elites saw religion, with its familiar ritual and language, as a tool to reach out the masses. The Ukrainian pioneer nationalist intelligentsia, for example, opposed the appointment of foreign priests and the Latin-rite

influences because of the important connection they made between ethnicity and religion.<sup>19</sup> They established the independent Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church in 1918, overtly tying religion to their secular nationalistic agenda, especially the retention of Ukrainian identity. During the 1920s and 1930s both the Greek Catholic and Ukrainian Greek Orthodox churches successfully promoted Ukrainian ethno-religious consciousness and enjoyed the support of most Ukrainian Canadians. In 1931, fifty-eight per cent of all Ukrainians were the Greek Catholic, while approximately twenty-four per cent were Ukrainian Greek Orthodox.<sup>20</sup> For the Japanese elite, who came from the non-Christian world, religion created a much clearer split within their community. While the majority of the Japanese kept Shintoism and Buddhism (*jōdoshinshū*), some converted to Christianity, which became a symbol of Canadianization. Shintoism, originated as a folk faith which possessed neither a founder nor scriptures, was closely intertwined with people's internal being and lives, while Buddhism was more organized institutionally. The Buddhist elite built their first temple in the city of Vancouver in 1905 under Sasaki Senju, a temporary priest from Japan, hoping to block further expansion of Christianity among their people. The largest temple, the Hōmpa Canada Buddhist Temple, was established in 1910, also in Vancouver. Buddhism was further promoted by associations which targeted specific age and gender groups, such as the Buddhist Women's Organization (1913) and the Buddhist Youth Association (1915). By the 1930s Buddhism had five missions and six branches served by Japanese priests, and twenty-eight associations organized by secular priests.<sup>21</sup> Japanese Christians focused around the Methodists did exert some pressure on the Buddhist churches, however. For

them, Christianity was a way to interact with mainstream society whose acceptance provided them with a special status in the Japanese community.

These ethnic and/or religious societies at the local level were established mainly by the initiative of individuals who, in many cases, were more highly educated or economically better off than other immigrants and demonstrated leader qualities. They provided assistance and guidance to the members of local communities in the early stages of settlement, and were admired as leaders if not recognized officially. While these men played a significant role in the formation of identifiable ethnic communities, the concept of creating nation-wide network and “imagined” communities emerged from a rising middle class of often younger people. While the Scots, whose leaders became Canada’s leading politicians and even prime ministers, did not create a distinctive pan-Scottish community in Canada, a pan-Ukrainian and a pan-Japanese consciousness gradually crystallized. The new elites, upwardly mobile and often politically ambitious, were educated either in the homeland or in Canada, and moved into influential occupations such as newspaper editors, businessmen, and teachers. They also founded their own bases for activity in Winnipeg (Ukrainians) and Vancouver (Japanese). Because they were familiar with conditions in both Canada and the homeland, they tried to educate and guide their peoples as their self-appointed representatives. The emergence of such a leadership core of Ukrainians and Japanese soon or later led to sharp competition as they all sought power and respect within both mainstream and ethnic communities.

How and when these conflicts emerged was affected by the political situation surrounding and energizing the large group. Polarization occurred much more quickly among Ukrainians, organizing around competing solutions to the unresolved Ukrainian

question in Europe, and thus accelerated the mobilization of the Ukrainian masses behind community building. Before World War I, a rivalry had gradually emerged between nationalists and socialists; the former defending Ukrainian independence and cultural and linguistic survival, and the latter seeking workers' rights and the construction of an international proletarian world.<sup>22</sup> They laid the foundation of two large conflicting nation-wide camps in the interwar period, pulling Ukrainians together beyond the local community, for example, around nationalist bilingual teachers and the Federation of Ukrainian Social Democrats, and publishing their own presses.<sup>23</sup> The Japanese also experienced minor internal rivalries before the war, especially ones that were regional and clan based, but they did not import such clear ideological conflict from Japan. Yet the prewar urban and rural associations and their presses, which appeared both in British Columbia and Alberta and initiated anti-racist activities, facilitated Japanese elites to broaden their influence on their people in the interwar period. For example, Canadian Japanese Association (CJA, est. 1897) was established in Vancouver, followed by the Calgary CJA in 1909 and the Raymond CJA in 1914 in Alberta. The rural Japanese, who were mainly farmers and fishermen, established farmer and fisher cooperatives all over British Columbia, such as the Fraser River Japanese Fishermen's Co-operative established in 1900.

From the 1920s through the mid 1940s, internal conflict and power struggles among Ukrainians and the Japanese went through a number of stages. After the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the failure of Ukraine to become independent, the earlier Ukrainian rivalry between nationalists and socialists intensified, pitting those who sought statehood for a non-communist Ukraine against communist sympathizers who

worshipped the Soviet Union, which included the bulk of Ukrainian territory. Among the Japanese, the *issei* or immigrant generation increasingly found its views at odds with the *nisei* or Canadian-born generation. In general, nationalist Ukrainians and *nisei* Japanese, both strong advocates of democracy at any time, found it easier to adapt their principles to Canada's values and goals. Although Ukrainian nationalists were split into pan-Canadian homeland-oriented and Canadian-oriented factions—the monarchist United Hetman Organization (UHO, est. 1924), the Canadian-oriented Ukrainian Self-Reliance League (USRL, est. 1927), and the right-wing émigré Ukrainian National Federation (UNF, est. 1932)—they all saw their search for freedom and democracy as overlapping with British and thus Canadian political ideals. Japanese *nisei* also stressed their loyalty to Canada and claimed their natural rights as Canadian citizens, establishing the Japanese Canadian Citizens League (JCCL, est. 1936) to further their goals. In comparison, communist Ukrainians and *issei* Japanese experienced more difficulty in fitting into Canadian society, even if they had a great impact on their respective communities. Their ideologies—Ukrainian communism and Japanese nationalism tied to colonialism—were often regarded as being incompatible with Canadian values or even dangerous. While the nation-wide communist Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA, est. 1918 as the Ukrainian Labour Temple Association) was active in the rural Ukrainian blocs, the cities, and resource towns in support of the Soviet Union and the promotion of workers' rights, its activities were viewed as suspicious and often inspected by the Canadian police. The *issei* Japanese carried the memory of official and unofficial discrimination, including the Vancouver riot of 1907 in which Canadian anti-Asian organizations attacked the Chinese and Japanese quarters in Vancouver. Thus,

during the interwar period, Japanese *issei* continued fighting overt discrimination against the Japanese at the same time as trying to promote Japanese consciousness among the *nisei*.

A final factor affecting the behaviour and agenda of Ukrainian and Japanese elites as community leaders was their relationship with the Canadian mainstream. Ukrainians, as voting citizens, had a better chance to negotiate with Canadian political leaders, developing, for example, a system of “party agents” already in the period of initial immigration. These agents, affiliated with the mainstream Conservatives or Liberals, campaigned in the Ukrainian blocs in the prairie provinces on behalf of their parties, playing an intermediary role that promoted their status both in their own community and in mainstream political circles.<sup>24</sup> Without the ballot, the Japanese elite had limited methods by which to form bridges between their community and mainstream society.<sup>25</sup> One of them was through formal representatives from their homeland; Japan opened its first consulate in Vancouver in 1889, followed by one Montreal in 1902. Another possible way for the Japanese elite to build a better relationship with the Canadian government was to exploit a formal relationship between Japan and Britain. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, a military agreement between Japan and Britain against Russian expansion, for example, provided them with a strong backbone.

During World War II, nationalist Ukrainians and *nisei* Japanese focused on building stronger negotiating bodies with mainstream society for different reasons. The former were united for the first time under the government-sponsored Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC, est. 1940), in order to facilitate their cooperation with the mainstream Canadian war effort. The latter, facing internment, sought a better deal with

the Canadian government, forming new organizations such as the *nisei* Japanese Canadian Citizens Council (JCCC, est. 1942), the Nisei Mass Evacuation Group (NMEG, est. 1942), based in Vancouver, and the Toronto-based Japanese Canadian Committee for Democracy (JCCD, est. 1943).

### **The Era of Assimilation and Integration**

While the origins of the Scottish, Ukrainian, and Japanese ethnic communities determined their fundamental roles and positions in Canadian society, their appearance changed over the years. Quite naturally, as members became more integrated into Canadian political and economic structures, the size and number of ethnic associations tended to shrink, and geographical concentration became less obvious. In addition, old ideological tensions did not always function in the same way as they had in the past. Recognizing such changes is significant, when ethnicity as a political phenomenon is under investigation. First, the integration of ethnic elites into the higher levels of Canadian society requires attention, as they increasingly gained opportunities to define what “mainstream” Canada meant. Second, decline in the membership of ethnic associations did not necessarily correspond to a decline in ethnicity or ethnic consciousness, and continued to shape Canadian identity after World War II. Finally, the diffusion of ethnic populations did not necessarily affect the impact of ethnicity on Canadian identity either. After World War II, people increasingly moved out of traditional ethnic clusters, a voluntary process quite separate from the coercive diffusion policy imposed on the Japanese in the interment camps. This section touches upon these issues, focusing on differences and similarities between the Ukrainian and Japanese communities after World War II, and drawing in the Scots where relevant.



The integration of ethnic elites into influential positions in Canadian society did not always lead to the demise of ethnic activism in politics. Traditionally, historians, social theorists, and others argued that such upward mobility resulted in loss of political motivation and an emphasis on the symbolic aspects of ethnicity, such as cultural traditions, ethnic foods, and folk arts. Although this argument can be applied to the Scots, it does not explain the Ukrainians or Japanese. Even though prominent Ukrainian individuals emerged as Members of Parliament, cabinet ministers, and senators, they never lost their commitment to ethnic causes. For example, Anthony Hlynka, elected to the House of Commons for Social Credit in the Vegreville constituency in 1940, keenly worked for the acceptance of Ukrainian displaced persons after the war,<sup>26</sup> while Paul Yuzyk, appointed to the Senate in 1963, frequently spoke up for Ukraine in Europe and Ukrainian rights in Canada. Not surprisingly, Japanese participation in Canadian politics was very slow; nevertheless, after the mid 1960s, individuals emerged locally as mayors, magistrates, or judges who also chose to work for the betterment of their people in Canada. Lucien Kurata, who was appointed a deputy magistrate in 1966, for example, identified the promotion of “human rights” as his top priority.<sup>27</sup> For Ukrainian and Japanese elites, whose chances to climb to the top were not as great as those of the Scots, ethnic agendas and their peoples’ support served as significant means to gain and retain power. Their integration, in turn, thus played a significant role in defining the Canadian “mainstream” as multicultural.

Decline in ethnic organizational membership after World War II was particularly true for the *issei* Japanese and communist Ukrainians, whose falling fortunes changed the tone of ethnic activism within their respective communities, as the

competition among ethnic leaders for group loyalties became less intense. In the Japanese community, the shift in leadership and power from the *issei* to the *nisei* was inevitable, as between 1957 and 1961 the proportion of *issei* in the Japanese-Canadian population dropped from twenty-nine per cent to approximately twenty-one per cent.<sup>28</sup> After the end of World War II, the *issei* did not establish any new large-scale independent associations and were, in fact, incorporated to the *nisei* oriented nation-wide body, the National Japanese Canadian Citizenship Association (NJCCA, est. 1947). By the 1960s, the old *issei-nisei* rivalry had virtually died out, and nobody challenged the *nisei* any longer. After 1962, when most racial discriminatory policies were removed from Canada's immigration policy, Japanese immigrants to Canada gradually increased, yet they were neither ideologically oriented nor closely united. The NJCCA's struggle for survival, which became the largest community issue during the 1960s, largely reflected the lack of appealing agendas, competition among leaders, and enthusiastic mobilization of the masses. After 1945, the communist Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC, est. 1945) peaked quickly and then lost both members and branches, affected by the growing antagonism to communism during the Cold War. Between 1954 and 1970, approximately ninety-one AUUC branches closed.<sup>29</sup> Yet while the communists posed no serious treat to the far more popular nationalists, the fact that the USSR continued to control Ukraine kept animosities high. Reinforcing these tensions, as well as national consciousness among Ukrainians already in Canada, was the postwar displaced person immigration, anti-communist refugees from former Nazi camps.

Finally, physical concentration was not a prerequisite for the existence of ethnic communities, especially when means of communication through the ethnic press

and other media were available. Despite the flourishing of Ukrainian myths that focused on rural communities on the prairies in the postwar period, the reality was that many Ukrainians lived neither on the prairies nor in rural areas. In 1941 approximately eighty per cent of all Ukrainians lived in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, but this figure dropped to fifty-eight percent by 1971. By 1951, approximately half of the Ukrainian population was urban.<sup>30</sup> For the Japanese, the evacuation from the West Coast of British Columbia in 1942, and the postwar policy to resettle them east of the Rockies, destroyed their political base in British Columbia completely. In 1941, ninety-five per cent of all Japanese lived in British Columbia, while in 1951 only fifteen per cent could be found in the province. The Japanese population in British Columbia recovered to some degree and reached thirty-five per cent in 1961, but the Japanese dispersal across the country was obvious: another forty per cent lived in Ontario, and about thirteen per cent in Alberta in that year.<sup>31</sup>

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The position of Scots, Ukrainians, and Japanese in Canada was determined by their race, religion, ranking in the country's ethno-racial hierarchy, their place of settlement, and the size and timing of their immigration. Together these factors made the Ukrainians and the Japanese second-class citizens, while favouring the Scots who were entrenched in the "mainstream." Both Ukrainian and Japanese elites focused on improving their status inside and outside their groups and on gaining negotiating power with mainstream society, expanding their ethnic communities nation-wide throughout the interwar period. Major changes after World War II in the geographical distribution,

ideological rivalries, and elitist political integration of Ukrainians and Japanese could have meant the demise of ethnicity. Yet the reality was that Ukrainian and Japanese elites, to a greater or lesser degree, maintained their ethnic identity as a means to obtain greater power, lobbying the federal and provincial governments for their specific agendas and producing various collective memories and myths. Integration, in fact, increased such opportunities for both elites, leaving more ethnic impact on mainstream politics and culture. The following chapters thus demonstrate that ethnicity, despite the changes that occurred throughout the fifty years, continued to shape Canadian identity.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Leo Driedger, *Race and Ethnicity: Finding Identities and Equalities* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 216.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> J.S. Woodsworth, *Strangers Within Our Gates or Coming Canadians* (1909; reprint with an introduction by Marilyn Barber, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 112 (page citations are to the reprint edition.)

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 154-5.

<sup>5</sup> Arthur Herman, *How the Scots Invented the Modern World* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2001), 345-85.

<sup>6</sup> Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 2.

<sup>7</sup> J. M. Bumsted, *The Scots in Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1982), 10.

<sup>8</sup>On the first immigration, see David J. Hall, "Clifford Sifton: Immigration and Settlement Policy, 1896-1905," in *The Settlement of the West*, ed. Howard Palmer (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1977), 60-85; Orest Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Years, 1891-1924* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1991), 3-70; and John C. Lehr, "Peopling the Prairies with Ukrainians," in *Canada's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity*, ed. Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 30-51. On the second immigration, see, for example, Myron Gulka-Tiechko, "Ukrainian Immigration to Canada under the Railways Agreement, 1925-30," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 16: 1-2 (1991): 29-60; and Brian Osborne, "'Non-Preferred' People: Interwar Ukrainian Immigration to Canada," in Luciuk and Hryniuk, *Canada's Ukrainians*, 81-102.

<sup>9</sup> Dominion of Bureau Statistics, *Census of Canada* (Ottawa, 1931).

<sup>10</sup> Masako Iino, *Nikkei Kanadajin No Rekishi* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1997), 6-7. The numbers of immigrants included those who did not stay in Canada.

<sup>11</sup> Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Canada* (Ottawa, 1921).

<sup>12</sup> Lehr, "Peopling the Prairies with Ukrainians," 30-51.

<sup>13</sup> William Darcovich and Paul Yuzyk, eds., *A Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891-1976* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980), Series 20.60.

<sup>14</sup> J. M. Bumsted, "Scots," in *Encyclopedia of Canada's Peoples*, ed. Robert R. Magocsi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1139.

<sup>15</sup>See, for example, Andrij Makuch, "Narodni Domy in East Central Alberta," in *Continuity and Change: The Cultural Life of Alberta's First Ukrainians*, ed. Manoly R. Lupul (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1988), 202-10.

<sup>16</sup>Iino, *Nikkei Kanadajin No Rekishi*, 15.

<sup>17</sup> Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada*, 155. See also Andrii Krawchuk, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Francophone Missionaries among Ukrainian Catholics," in Luciuk and Hryniuk, *Canada's Ukrainians*, 206-17. On Anglican missions in Western Canada, see, for example, Barry Ferguson, ed., *The Anglican Church and the World of Western Canada, 1820-1970* (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, University of Regina, 1991). On United Church activities, see Dennis L. Butcher, ed., *Prairie Spirit: Perspectives on the Heritage of the United Church of Canada in the West* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1985).

<sup>18</sup> For the activities of Methodist among the Japanese, see, for example, Ken Adachi, *The Enemy that Never Was: An Account of the Deplorable Treatment Inflicted on Japanese Canadians during World War Two* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1976), 111-3; and Bob Stewart, "The United Church of Canada in British Columbia," in *Circle of Voices: A History of the Religious Communities of British Columbia*, ed. Charles P. Anderson, Tirthankar Bose, and Joseph I. Richardson (Lantzville: oolichan books, 1983), 201.

<sup>19</sup> Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada*, 186, 197.

<sup>20</sup> Paul Yuzyk, "Religious Life," in *A Heritage in Transition: Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada*, ed. Manoly R. Lupul (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 166. For Ukrainian religion in Canada, see also David J. Goa, ed., *The Ukrainian Religious Experience: Tradition and the Canadian Cultural Context* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1989).

<sup>21</sup> Jinjiro Nakayama, *Nikkeimin Shiryoshu*, vol. 10, *Zaibei Nihonjinshi* (1922; reprint, Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Senta, 1994), 1285-1288. See also Yasuo Izumi, "Buddhists in British Columbia," in *Circle of Voices*, 27-33; and Terry Watada, *Bukkyo Tozen: A History of Jodo Shinshu Buddhism in Canada* (Toronto: HPF Press and Toronto Buddhist Church, 1996). For Buddhism during World War II, see Akira Ichikawa, "A Test of Religious Tolerance: Canadian Government and Jodo Shinshu Buddhism During the Pacific War, 1941-1945," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 26: 2 (1994): 46-69.

<sup>22</sup> For a detailed discussion of mobilizing the Ukrainian grassroots, see Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada*, 155-308; and Frances Swyripa, *Wedded to the Cause: Ukrainian-Canadian Women and Ethnic Identity, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 143-82.

<sup>23</sup> The socialist movement started around 1907 and local associations emerged in urban centres in Manitoba and British Columbia, all of which were united in 1909 under the nation-wide Federation of Ukrainian Social Democrats in affiliation with the Socialist Party of Canada. Nationalist activities in the early twentieth century focused around some organized local associations which included the government-funded Ruthenian Training School for bilingual teachers and the Ukrainian National Home in Winnipeg. For more details, see Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada*, 252-3.

<sup>24</sup> Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada*, 237-44.

<sup>25</sup> The British Columbia government disenfranchised the Japanese, both naturalized and Canadian born, in 1895. In 1902, the Japanese were denied the vote in every election in British Columbia: federal, provincial, municipal, school board; World War I veterans gained the vote in 1931. Yoko Urata Nakahara, "Ethnic Identity Among Japanese Canadians in Edmonton: The Case of Pre-World War II Immigrants And Their Descendants" (Ph.D. diss., University of Alberta, 1991), 11.

<sup>26</sup> See Oleh W. Gerus and Denis Hlynka, eds., *The Honourable Member for Vegreville: The Memoirs and Diary of Anthony Hlynka, MP* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005).

<sup>27</sup> “Kurata Becomes 1st J. C. Appointed Magistrate,” *New Canadian*, 16 March 1966, 1. See also “Jo Ann Miyagawa Believed First JC Women Called to the Bar,” *New Canadian*, 1 April 1969, 1; and “Nisei Potato ‘King’ Becomes First JC Mayor in Alberta,” *New Canadian*, 8 December 1970, 1.

<sup>28</sup> Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Canada* (Ottawa, 1951 and 1961).

<sup>29</sup> Orest T. Martynowych, introduction to *Prophets and Proletarians: History of the Rise and Decline of Ukrainian Communism in Canada*, ed. John Kolosky (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1990), xxvi.

<sup>30</sup> Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Canada* (Ottawa, 1951 and 1971).

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 1941, 1951, and 1961.

## **Chapter 2**

### **The Interwar Era:**

### **The Consolidation of Ethnic Boundaries and the Rise of the Mosaic**

The 1920s and 1930s witnessed a consolidation of ethnic boundaries because of the intensive activities of ethnic elites and the rise of the mosaic as the basis of Canadian identity. During this time, the majority of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century immigrants, who were usually apolitical and lived in close-knit circles of fellow countrymen, increasingly became incorporated into larger ethnic communities beyond locality. This crystallization of ethnic communities is particularly significant because as powerful categories of identity, they determined how political leaders and scholars conceptualized Canadian identity in the past and present. In other words, the roots of ethnic pluralism, which preserves ethnic boundaries, lay in this period. This chapter examines the nature of consolidating ethnic boundaries in light of the roles which factors such as homeland and host society politics, ideological competition within an ethnic group, region, and ethnic myths and symbols played in ethnic community building, and questions how the mosaic became the dominant view of Canada among ethnic elites. In fact, it was the dramatic interplay among these factors that defined ethnic boundaries.

Through a comparison of Ukrainians, Scots, and Japanese, some points can be made. First, this chapter argues that while Ukrainian, Japanese, and Scottish elites, to a greater or lesser degree, all found instrumental advantages in ethnicity, Ukrainians had the prerequisites to organize a more politically distinctive community than the other two because of both their political oppression in Ukraine and “middle” status in Canada between “mainstream” Scots and “marginalized” Japanese. Their “middle” status, in particular, allowed the Ukrainian elite to consider active political negotiation with



mainstream society. Second, this chapter asserts that the prototype of ethnic pluralism as understood in Canada can be found in the ideals of the Ukrainians and, to a lesser degree, the Japanese during the interwar period, as it permitted dual loyalty and the simultaneous belonging to ethnic and Canadian communities. In this sense, the notion of multiculturalism or ethnic pluralism, which not only preserves the cultural heritages of ethnic groups but also respects ethnic individuals' right to keep their inner being, is by no means a postwar concept. Ukrainian nationalists and Japanese *issei*, in particular, regarded Canada as neither a British country nor a Canadian melting-pot at any time. Third, the chapter argues that ethnic and mainstream visions of Canada never met during the 1920s and 1930s and the mainstream-ethnic boundary remained in force. While a few British-Canadian scholars and writers—including Kate A. Foster and John Murray Gibbon<sup>1</sup>—did suggest that a cultural mosaic could distinguish Canada's identity, they tended to confine their discussions to cultural and philosophical matters, and never incorporated homeland politics, racial and/or ethnic equality, and the political recognition of ethnic groups into their idea of the mosaic.

### **Ethnic Elites and the Crystallization of Ethnic Communities**

The roles of ethnic elites in Canadian society and in individual ethnic communities were key factors in determining the nature of ethnic boundaries. In interwar Canada, the Scots, the Ukrainians, and the Japanese were all represented by self-appointed ethnic leaders. Yet various factors left nationalist Ukrainians in a better position to gain influence among their people as representatives than either their rival communists or the other two groups. Of fundamental importance was the distance of the Ukrainians and the Japanese from the British-Canadian mainstream, and the Scots'

closeness to it, that made a difference in the effectiveness of the elites in the mobilization of their people.

Unlike Ukrainians and Japanese, who were regarded as second-class citizens, Scots occupied politically, economically, and culturally influential positions in Canada, and their elite included in many cases national leaders. Thus, they rarely regarded their ethnicity as a means to upward mobility, and lacked strong motivation and incentive to become “ethnic” representatives. In this context, the few individuals were rarely seen as voices for Scottish people in Canada. They included, for example, Gaelic scholars like J. G. MacKinnon, A. M. Sinclair, and James MacNeil to politicians like Angus L. Macdonald, premier of Nova Scotia, who began a Gaelic and/or Scottish revival movement particularly in Nova Scotia during the 1920s and 1930s.<sup>2</sup> Gaelic or Scottish scholars were more academics than political activists, and their focus on the promotion of Scottish culture and folklore was motivated by their scholarly interests in culture and language. They thus were rarely active in the mobilization of the masses. A politician like Macdonald was more politically motivated and active than they, but he represented all people in Nova Scotia, not just Scots.

Prominent Ukrainian and Japanese individuals, in contrast, regarded ethnicity as significant as a means to gain full participation in Canadian political and economic structures. Ukrainians, however, possessed the franchise, constituted a majority in some prairie ridings, and did not have to deal with any official non-Soviet representatives from their homeland<sup>3</sup> who could overshadow or contradict them. These factors made it easier for them than for the Japanese to climb the ladder as influential group spokespersons. The turning point for Ukrainians came when they recognized the need for their own

elected representatives instead of imposed ones. They increasingly began “to take their destiny into their own hands” in order to further their ethno-religious goals, rejecting the Anglo-Protestant assimilationist agenda,<sup>4</sup> and advanced their own candidates in federal and provincial elections, particularly in the prairie provinces with their sizeable Ukrainian population. The emergence of a “formal” political elite had two consequences. It not only helped to mobilize the grassroots but also facilitated the Ukrainian elite in bringing their ethnic agenda to the attention of mainstream provincial and national governments. The Edmonton-based newspaper *Zakhidni visty*, for example, repeatedly stressed that the economic and political interests of the Ukrainians, and “equal rights” in particular, would be fought for only by Ukrainian candidates, and argued that “solidarity and unity among the Ukrainians” were crucial for the success of a Ukrainian candidate.<sup>5</sup> It was imperative, therefore, to remind Ukrainian people of their right to vote at every election and to urge immigrants to take out naturalization papers and be eligible.<sup>6</sup> Obviously, such priorities subordinated general political ideals and party affiliations to ethnicity and ethnic agenda.

Japanese leaders, on the other hand, were disenfranchised in every federal, provincial, and municipal election in British Columbia throughout the interwar period,<sup>7</sup> and could neither mobilize their people as voters nor have themselves elected to any body. Therefore, they had no choice but to rely on Japanese delegates in the Consulate of Japan and, after 1929, in the Legation as their only “official” representatives who possessed some influence with Canadian governments, even if they rarely had the same political agenda as the Japanese Canadians.<sup>8</sup> One consul, Tatsuo Kawai, in particular, was a controversial figure. His understanding that “all Japanese in Canada were under his

control,” and the Canadian Japanese Association’s (CJA) compliant attitude towards him, divided the Japanese community in 1926 when sixteen executive members left the association in anger.<sup>9</sup> Kawai’s attempts to directly govern the CJA and its Japanese language school,<sup>10</sup> plus other issues, caused dissent between CJA members who believed in their “autonomy” and those who supported the consul.<sup>11</sup> The frustrated sixteen members contended that “the CJA only existed for the consul’s satisfaction and personal interest in power,” and that the consul’s notion that the CJA belonged to Imperial Japan fuelled pre-existing anti-Japanese sentiment among white British Columbians.<sup>12</sup> Their memoranda, which outlined Kawai’s lack of effort to bridge Japanese and mainstream communities, were in fact distributed to the Japanese masses with the assistance of the Vancouver-based *issei* newspaper, *Tairiku nippo*. A striking characteristic of the Japanese in Canada in the 1920s, then, was the absence of powerful individuals who acquired unanimous respect beyond their local communities as well as an organized voice more generally. On special occasions such as New Year’s Day, for example, messages from the Japanese consul, government ministers, and scholars, who spoke only for Imperial Japan, always covered the front page of *Tairiku nippo*. A small self-appointed Japanese elite—among them the Christian Yasutarô Yamaga in Port Haney—did emerge and devoted themselves to the acquisition of the franchise and building better relations between the Japanese and other Canadians through local farmers’ or fishermen’s unions.<sup>13</sup> But their impact on mainstream politics was limited without collective power through the franchise, and thus unity among the Japanese masses was weak. The elite could only express their resentment of racial discrimination and criticize anti-Japanese politicians indirectly through media such as the Japanese ethnic press. It was only natural,

then, that the emerging *nisei* saw an “organized lobby for the franchise” as the prime means by which to enhance their status in both the Japanese community and Canada.<sup>14</sup>

The consolidation of ethnic elites often coincided with ideological splits within an ethnic group, which also had a significant impact on the promotion of ethnic consciousness among the masses. Each faction’s efforts to represent its ethnic group and to build a solid sphere of power and influence inevitably involved the intensive production of propaganda in the ethnic press and in cultural and educational activities that formed the basis of an “imagined community” and distinguished the group from its competitors. One goal of such competition was to acquire greater influence in Canadian society as the representative voice of a particular ethnic group. Logically, then, the fact that the Scots did not need to rely on ethnicity for social and economic upward mobility helps to explain their lack of internal ideological competition. Furthermore, the lack of internal rivalry, which often involved intensive mobilization of the masses around a certain ideology, explains the relative weakness of this group’s ethnic consciousness. In fact, in the 1920s and 1930s, Scots rarely reflected the conflict between Highland Catholics and Lowland Presbyterians, which they had carried from their homeland.<sup>15</sup> For example, the minutes of two Catholic associations—the Scottish Catholic Society in Cape Breton Island and St. Andrew’s Society of Ottawa—never even mentioned homeland politics, let alone hostility towards the Presbyterian community. Their interests rarely went beyond the preservation of Highland symbols, sports, and events like Robert Burns Day.<sup>16</sup> At the same time, these associations and were locally oriented rather than nation-wide and seldom claimed to represent all Scots in Canada.

Conversely, Ukrainians and Japanese were both severely divided along internal lines—the former between nationalists and communists, and the latter between *issei* and *nisei*. Yet differences between the two in the nature of the intra-group rivalry made the Ukrainians more politically competitive than the Japanese during the interwar period. The first difference simply concerned the origin and timing of the conflicts. In terms of origin, while the Ukrainian rivalry was led from Europe with the rise of the Bolsheviks and the failed Ukrainian People's Republic, and was imported to Canada, Japanese rivalry began with the emergence of Canadian-born Japanese who did not know Japan and possessed little understanding of loyalty to the Emperor, and later developed ideological characteristics. As a result, Ukrainian nationalists and communists had to fight intensively to gain their people's support, while the Japanese were categorized into *issei* or *nisei* by birth. The *issei-nisei* rivalry thus did not involve recruitment to their camps, which was crucial to the Ukrainian competition.

In terms of timing, it was not until the mid-1930s that the *nisei* reached adulthood, started organized political activities, and challenged the *issei*, yet the conflict among the Ukrainians had been intense since the end of World War I and the creation of the Soviet Union. The rivalry gained momentum with the establishment of nation-wide organizations: the communist Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA) and the nationalist United Hetman Organization (UHO), Ukrainian Self-Reliance League (USRL), Ukrainian National Federation (UNF), and Ukrainian Catholic Brotherhood (UCB). Their ideological organs such as the nationalist *Ukrainskyi holos* of the USRL and *Novyi shliakh* of the UNF and the communist *Ukrainski robotnychi visty*, together with sometimes dozens of local branches, were significant tools in mobilizing the

grassroots.<sup>17</sup> In comparison, the Japanese elite was neither politically competitive nor ideologically divided throughout the 1920s. Their activities—such as the fight for workers' rights and opposition to the anti-Japanese propaganda of mainstream politicians—focused on pre-World War I cooperatives such as the Fraser River Japanese Fishermen's Co-operative and local *issei* groups such as the CJA in Vancouver. The individuals identified with such associations did not face any challenge until the late 1930s when the *nisei* produced its own politically conscious elite, at which point the *issei-nisei* rivalry over representation became intense. While some early *nisei* favoured the idea of a *nisei* organization and launched short-lived newsletters like the *New Age*, more organized activities started with the establishment of the Japanese Canadian Citizens League (JCCL) in 1936 and its organ, the *New Canadian*, in late 1938 in pursuit of the franchise and Japanese participation in Canadian political and social life. The real competition between *issei* and *nisei* thus postdated Ukrainian ideological activities and competition, which began several years earlier.

The second difference between Ukrainians and Japanese in terms of internal competitiveness stemmed from relations between the two camps within each group. Ukrainians were divided by incompatible ideologies, while the Japanese rivalry was primarily generational. Consequently, the two Ukrainian camps sought mutually exclusive goals while the Japanese rivals were interdependent. Ukrainian nationalists were well aware that communist ideology was at odds with British democratic principles and that its presence among Ukrainians would never benefit them in their pursuit of full participation in Canadian life. Yet the Japanese *issei* needed the *nisei*, who were born in Canada and thus had a natural right to Canadian citizenship, to reinforce their organized

activities to resist mounting anti-Japanese sentiment in British Columbia and be accepted in Canadian society.<sup>18</sup> For the young *nisei*, too, the *issei* were important for guidance and deserved respect, as they had built the foundation of Japanese life in Canada. While the Japanese *issei* regarded the *nisei* as a significant part of their ethnic community and vice versa, Ukrainian nationalists tried to alienate the rival communists from the Ukrainian ethnic community. The intensity of the Ukrainian rivalry is evident from the nationalists' constant criticism of the communists, describing their work as "evil," "dividing our Ukrainian brothers to an extent that no foreigner could,"<sup>19</sup> and "demoralizing" to the people.<sup>20</sup> For them, Bolshevism was a foreign ideology to which "Ukrainians are by nature and instinct opposed."<sup>21</sup> The Japanese *issei*, on the contrary, saw the *nisei* as a symbol of "hope" and of the "evolution" of the Japanese as "Canadian citizens," and themselves as the *nisei*'s collective parents and guides, claiming the CJA to be a province-wide organization in British Columbia where the majority of the Japanese population resided.<sup>22</sup> In fact, the *issei* elite debated endlessly over how to educate the *nisei* as Japanese Canadians in terms of the balance of their Japanese and Canadian identities.<sup>23</sup> The *issei-nisei* rivalry thus rarely developed into hostile name-calling, which was quite common between nationalist and communist Ukrainians.

The nature of the ideological ideals and propaganda that Scots, Ukrainians, and Japanese adopted to engage their peoples' emotions was another factor that created a gap among the three. While not all ethnic leaders chose to evoke nationalistic and/or imperialistic aspirations (for example, communist Ukrainians), when they successfully did, they could unite their ethnic communities behind a strong sense of pride in being a special group. Yet the political implications and nuances that imperialism or nationalism



exhibited varied among Scots, Ukrainians, and Japanese. Ukrainians were by far the most effective in the use of such ideologies for various reasons.

First, the situation in Europe provided nationalist Ukrainians with a better basis for constructing the negative collective memories of oppression on which nationalism was best founded. They also possessed a much more pronounced sense of persecution than the Scots, whose history had some parallels. But while Scottish nationalism, to some degree, had been constructed in comparison with that of the dominant “Anglo-Saxon,” Scots regarded the Union of 1707 that had brought the Scottish and English kingdoms together as based on democratic decision making or “semi-independence.”<sup>24</sup> Thus Scottish nationalism rarely became a widespread ideology in Scotland or Canada. Furthermore, as the Scots were part of the powerful British Empire, their nationalism often overlapped with British imperialism, and could be described as “Scottish imperial localism”<sup>25</sup> rather than as standing in opposition to imperial conquest. In Canada, as Carl Berger pointed out, Scottish imperialism was an integral part of Canadian nationalism.<sup>26</sup> Ukrainian nationalism, on the contrary, historically existed in opposition to Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Polish imperialism. Its expression in interwar Canada promoted the cause of freedom for Ukraine from four foreign rulers (Poland, the Soviet Union, Romania, and Czechoslovakia) around which nationalists organized the grassroots.

In a similar vein, Ukrainian nationalism differed from Japanese nationalism in terms of both goals and appearance, to the benefit of the Ukrainian nationalist leadership. During the 1920s the Ukrainian nationalists exhibited their national consciousness much more explicitly than the Japanese *issei*. Because of Ukrainians’ long history of

statelessness and the recent failure of the Ukrainian People's Republic to maintain itself, they possessed a cause directly tied to Ukraine's liberation which encouraged strong emotional identification with the homeland. Ukrainian nationalists remained very active on behalf of Ukraine throughout the interwar period; they appealed to Ukrainian Canadians for financial and moral support for their major place of origin, Galicia, in particular, then under the control of Poland.<sup>27</sup> For Ukrainian nationalists, it was an "obligation" to support the native land and emigration did not free people from such duties.<sup>28</sup> The Japanese *issei*, in contrast, originated from a full-fledged nation state with territory and autonomy, took national identity for granted,<sup>29</sup> believed in the perpetuity of both Japan and its national identity, and did not regard the promotion of "national" consciousness as their task, particularly in the 1920s. Therefore, they drew a clear line between their duty and that of the Legation and Consulates, which represented the Japanese nation. They stressed that the CJA should be "a volunteer organization established under Canadian law,"<sup>30</sup> and tried not to be officially involved in Japanese "national" ambitions or policies even if the power of consuls over the Japanese-Canadian community could not be avoided.

Yet Japanese Canadians' involvement in homeland politics shifted more dramatically than that of Ukrainians in the interwar period, affected as it was by the international situation. A turning point was Japan's invasion of China—the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the establishment of Manchuko, an official colony of Japan, in 1932—when the attitudes of the Japanese *issei*, and to some extent, the *nisei*, towards Japan obviously changed. Both *issei* and *nisei* could no longer avoid or try to suppress escalating anti-Japanese feelings in British Columbia, as they were now viewed as part of

an expanding Japanese Empire. As avoiding mention of or keeping a distance from Imperial Japan would not change public attitudes against the Japanese, they chose to manipulate the situation by invoking a sense of pride among the Japanese and strengthening Japanese unity to fight anti-Japanese sentiment in Canada.<sup>31</sup> Whether or not these leaders actually supported Japan's imperialist activities, their support for Japan's cause was more a means to an end. While Japan's aggression increased throughout the 1930s, the Japanese-Canadian elite rarely changed its attitudes towards the homeland. Immediately after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the CJA announced its support for Japan's action and collected donations for its soldiers.<sup>32</sup> Japanese Canadians' enthusiasm for their homeland was obvious when a Japanese official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed his "gratitude" for their financial support, but stressed as well that their patriotism should be demonstrated not only by giving money but also by "promoting better relations between the Japanese and Canadians."<sup>33</sup>

In turn, Canada's international politics affected whether or not Ukrainian nationalist and Japanese *issei* elites carried homeland causes into the public sphere. The former, who portrayed Ukrainians as a nation oppressed by the Soviets or the Poles, in particular, found it easier to support Ukrainian nationalism than the Japanese, whose homeland was regarded as the oppressor, did Japanese imperialism. Ukrainians' activities anticipated both British and Canadian involvement in their homeland's affairs. During Ukraine's bid for independence in the wake of World War I, for example, the crystallizing nationalist elite made a number of appeals to the British and Canadian governments. J. W. Arsenych, one of the founders of *Ukrainskyi holos* and the first

Ukrainian lawyer in Canada, for example, wrote to British Prime Minister Lloyd George on behalf of the rival Ukrainian Canadian Citizen's League, demanding that the Ukrainian nation be liberated from Russian and Polish rule at the Paris Peace Conference.<sup>34</sup> In 1922 delegates from the trial Ukrainian Central Committee of Canada urged Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King to support their effort "to promote and accelerate the settlement of the political status of Eastern Galicia as an independent state."<sup>35</sup> In this way, Ukrainian nationalists quickly learned how to insert their homeland issues and nationalism into Canadian politics, albeit unsuccessfully. The Japanese, in contrast, were much more careful in bringing Japanese issues to the official attention of the Canadian or British government, especially after Japan's colonialism reached its peak in the 1930s. Despite the fact that Japanese *issei* leaders showed their support for Japan in front of their people, confronting such issues formally was something different. Being aware that Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 caused friction between Britain and Japan, they never tried to discuss Canadian-Japanese foreign relations directly with the Canadian government of the day to gain its sympathies for Japan's imperial pursuits. It was more than obvious that such efforts would be in vain, if not promote further anti-Japanese feeling in Canada.

Both Ukrainian nationalist and Japanese elites were indeed concerned about mainstream reaction to their respective homeland politics, as it often affected British Canadians' perception of who was loyal and disloyal to Canada. Both elites also believed that in so far as Canada and their respective homelands valued the same goals and political principles, their dual loyalty would never be in conflict. They thus stressed the similarities between British and their own values. Ukrainian nationalists did not see their

nationalist movement as incompatible with Canadian politics because they believed that it adhered to the British ideals of democracy and freedom. Ukrainians, they said, were “by nature freedom-loving”<sup>36</sup> and “one of the most democratic peoples in the world,” among them Western European and North American nations.<sup>37</sup> Likewise, they also maintained, “the English love freedom. All English history is a history of the struggle for freedom, a history of developing freedom to a higher and higher degree. Ukrainian history is also a history of the struggle for freedom, but the struggle has not always been rewarded with success.”<sup>38</sup> The Japanese needed to try much harder to justify Japan’s colonial expansion. Japan’s advance into China, which the CJA elite called a “holy war,” was undertaken “to establish eternal peace and a new order in Asia” and “to liberate the Asian people” from other oppressive regimes. They continued: “The goal remains distant, but we believe in our victory.”<sup>39</sup> This view was actually an echo of the propaganda of homeland leaders; influential military officers and government ministers kept sending messages to the Japanese in North America, maintaining that Japan was “shedding the sacred blood of many imperial soldiers over the Chinese continent for peace and justice.”<sup>40</sup> Some *nisei*, who questioned whether or not Japan was an aggressor, also ended up defending Japan’s cause. An illuminating example was Yasuji Kadoguchi, a *nisei* leader who published a series of articles on the question of the *nisei* and Japan’s war against China. He argued:

Japan’s aggression against China does not simply intend to conquer China. Its purposes are to built a strong coalition between Japan and China and to contribute to the promotion of world peace and human welfare through establishing peace and stability in the East. To many foreign nations, it simply appears to be an invasion.<sup>41</sup>

Kadogushi's comments, while they did not make any direct connection between Japan's action and British democracy, show his attempt to rescue the image of Japan from which the *nisei*, mainly because of their race and parents, could never be detached, especially in the eyes of the mainstream Canadian public. The *nisei*'s duty, then, as Edward C. Banno, Provincial Secretary of the JCCL argued, was to provide "a correct appraisal of the Far Eastern situation, and then to bring this knowledge to our Canadian friends."<sup>42</sup> Both Japanese and Ukrainian nationalist elites thus used "democracy," explicitly or implicitly, to bridge their and mainstream Canadian communities. Yet the Japanese "democratic" appeal was never accepted by Canadian leaders, as illustrated by the fact that anti-Japanese sentiment in British Columbia often resulted from the growing power of Japan.

Indeed, mainstream British-Canadian leaders, including those of Scottish origin, in general perceived Ukrainian and Japanese homeland politics as something either irrelevant or dangerous for Canada, thereby helping to perpetuate the mainstream-ethnic boundary. Yet there was a difference in the degree of alienation. The Ukrainian nationalists' appeal for support for Ukrainian independence received little sympathy from mainstream Canadians as the issue was regarded as outside Canadian jurisdiction, if not an immediate menace to the Canadian public. Ukrainian communist ideology and Japanese imperial pursuits, however, were viewed more cautiously. Communist Ukrainians were labeled "a positive danger" that possessed "the firm determination of eventually turning this country [Canada] inside out and upside down."<sup>43</sup> This fear was based partly on the ULFTA's close ties with the Communist Party of Canada and cooperation with related movements in the country, which might expand

their influence over other ethnic groups.<sup>44</sup> Japan's growing power also alarmed Canadians, and the concentration of the Japanese population in British Columbia was associated with concerns that Canadian natural resources would be exploited to assist Japan's imperialist expansion.<sup>45</sup> Such brief was based on the idea that Japanese were sojourners or even if they settled, they were supporting relatives and family in Japan financially, talking advantage of the rich natural resources. As Peter Ward put it: "Once fixed in the west coast mind, the image of an aggressive, militaristic Japan was not to be dislodged."<sup>46</sup> Such anxiety about Japan's expansion, together with racism, was well reflected in Hilda Glynn-Ward's biased 1921 novel, written long before Japan expanded its territory as an imperial power. Her fictional event in which the Japanese, who had kept strong ties with the homeland, conquered British Columbia implied that the fear of Japanese expansionism did not just begin in the 1930s. The final chapter, entitled "The Future," contained the following:

Within the self-same hour, the Japs, who swarmed like bees in a hive along the west coast of Vancouver Island, overcame by sheer force of numbers the operators in the cable and wireless stations at Alberni, Banfield, Pachena Point and Victoria, and sent their own messages to the outside world—pleasant little messages in which was no sort of mention of Japs and the cataclysmal disturbances in 'Columbia.' Aeroplanes dropped bombs in Victoria and Nanaimo at the same minute that they were dropped in Vancouver.<sup>47</sup>

Such sensitivity and caution towards Ukrainian and Japanese homeland politics was the most decisive factor in maintaining interwar ethnic boundaries, which situated both groups outside the Canadian community.

The British-Canadian elite's power of definition was so great that it determined the prevailing ethno-racial hierarchy, which placed the Ukrainians over the Japanese. Mainstream Canadians, to some extent, attached importance to Ukrainians on several

grounds. First, as the following paragraph indicates, Canada initially assessed the value of non-British immigration in economic terms, and judged each ethnic group by its suitability to agriculture, thus favouring mostly peasant Ukrainians over Japanese. Second, assimilability to British values and standards also benefited Ukrainians who were regarded as much closer to them because of their European origin. Third, the fact that Ukrainians settled on the prairie provinces, which needed settlers at the turn of the century, gave them an advantage over the Japanese who lived on the West Coast of British Columbia. These factors gave Ukrainians a significance and a basis for negotiation with mainstream society for full rights in Canada. In other words, they helped them situate themselves in Canadian society as an “ethnic minority,” unlike the marginalized position of the Japanese that had no foundation for negotiation.

Most Ukrainians were much wanted farmers, and considered to “have a creditable record” as pioneers.<sup>48</sup> The Japanese, on the other hand, were largely unwanted and engaged in a variety of occupations in proximity to Chinese clusters in Vancouver, in fishing villages on the West Coast, and in interior mining camps. While many did farm, the concentration of the Asian population in Little Tokyo and Chinatown in Vancouver tended to catch greater attention from mainstream British Columbians who did not always distinguish the two peoples. These two districts reinforced a stereotype that the Japanese were mainly urban dwellers who would take white men’s occupations. Besides, the Japanese could not be racially assimilated and transformed into white Canadians, while the Ukrainians—even if less “desirable” than Western or Northern Europeans and without the “possibility of complete assimilation”<sup>49</sup>—were compatible in terms of skin colour. The Ukrainians, then, were regarded as potential Canadians, given proper



education and guidance, and their economic contribution to prairie agriculture and development was recognized.<sup>50</sup> This hierarchy in economic demand and racism was well described by mainstream officials and scholars. The *Canada Year Book* for 1927-8, for example, pointed out that “settlers from southern and eastern Europe” were “desirable from the purely economic point of view,” though “less readily assimilated” than Western Europeans. “Less assimilable still,” it continued, were “those who come to Canada from the Orient.”<sup>51</sup> Finally, Ukrainians resided in blocs in the three prairie provinces, which were regarded as “central” to Canadian nation building and economic development, and with which the West Coast of marginalized British Columbia in which the Japanese concentrated compared poorly. They thus were always identified as the province’s problem, if not a national one. As W. A. Carrothers, a professor of economics at the University of British Columbia stated: “The problem of Asiatic immigration is a vital one for the Province of British Columbia. The admission of any race that cannot blend satisfactorily is a menace.”<sup>52</sup> The double marginality of the Japanese, both racially and geographically, plus Japan’s imperial expansion and Japanese economic competition with other British Columbians, helped white British Columbia develop a picture of overwhelmingly evil people. They were economically unnecessary, but “despite restrictive legislation, still swarm over British Columbia’s fishing grounds.”<sup>53</sup>

The primary concern of the mainstream Canadian elite was the building of an economically strong and culturally uniform Canada, making the assimilation of ethnic groups to Canadian ways urgent. Educators and missionaries, particularly British Protestants, were some of the first agents to work for the enlightenment of non-British peoples and to act as guides to Canadian standards and laws. In the interwar period,

committed to building a better Canada, scholars and scientific experts joined the effort. Their publications exhibited somewhat contradictory but intertwined tendencies that included ethnic groups in or excluded them from Canada. On the one hand, they tried to erase the mainstream-ethnic boundary and incorporate non-British peoples into the grand national scheme. Through careful observation of ethnic clusters and standards of living, they pinpointed what should be done in the interests of “progress” and assimilation. In the process, they expanded the country’s knowledge of its ethnic communities and overcame many of the overt prejudices and/or xenophobia that dominated public discourse at this time.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand, they always drew a clear line between themselves and ethnic groups, acted from a sense of superiority, and were still largely biased. Illuminating examples include William G. Smith’s *Building the Nation: The Churches’ Relation to the Immigrant* (1922), Robert England’s *The Central European Immigrant in Canada* (1929) and *The Colonization of Western Canada: A Study of Contemporary Land Settlement* (1936), and Charles H. Young’s *The Ukrainian Canadians: A Study of Assimilation* (1931) and *The Japanese Canadians* (1938).<sup>55</sup>

National projects that investigated the assimilation of ethnic groups into Canada’s nation building were officially funded and encouraged, suggesting the importance of such issues during the interwar period. Smith’s study of immigrants in Canada’s development, funded by the Methodist, Presbyterian, and Congregationalist churches, presented a standard British Protestant perspective. These denominations assigned to themselves a great responsibility in nation building, and thus saw the Canadianization of all immigrants as their most pressing duty.<sup>56</sup> “The task is now quite evident,” Smith said, “and to it all genuine Canadians, young and old, are required to

give energy.”<sup>57</sup> This comment implied that anybody who was British in origin possessed a mission to convert ethnic peoples into Canadians. Awarded a scholarship from the War Memorial Scholarship Fund from the Masonic Order of Saskatchewan to teach in an ethnic community in Saskatchewan in 1922 and 1923, England published his monograph on central European immigrants in Canada based on his experiences and the reports of other scholarship teachers and “experienced nation-builders.”<sup>58</sup> These teachers were devoted to the education of ethnic peoples and prepared a number of detailed observations on the positive and negative aspects of the districts in which they lived. Based on these reports, England pointed out low standards of living, lack of cleanness in houses, and intellectual ignorance in Slavic districts, but admitted that Slavs could be “desirable” citizens should they be provided “with the means of raising the standard of their economic and social life.”<sup>59</sup> His 1936 study launched the intriguing notion that ethnic consciousness could be effective in agricultural progress in settlements, promoting cooperation and motivation for development, despite the general belief that ethnic bloc settlements were “subversive of national unity and unprogressive in agriculture.”<sup>60</sup>

Young’s *The Ukrainian Canadians* and *The Japanese Canadians* (written with W. A. Carrothers and H. A. Innis) were both published under the direction of Helen R. Y. Reid, Chairman of the Division on Immigration for the Canadian National Committee for Mental Hygiene. Reid stressed the significance of the committee’s interest in immigrants’ welfare, contending that “Canada cannot have a strong and healthy nation unless its people are mentally as well as physically sound.”<sup>61</sup> For her, the mental and physical fitness for nation building was to be achieved by improving the standard of living among immigrants materially and culturally. Thus, living, economic, and health conditions in

Ukrainian districts were monitored very carefully and compared with the national standards, highlighting problems. For example, although bloc settlement promoted “successful colonization,” and thus contributing to nation building, Young believed that large concentrations of Ukrainians “permeated with the atmosphere of the old world” were “inimical to the assimilation of these people.”<sup>62</sup> Ukrainian districts were labeled as “notoriously lacking in amenities which might mitigate the incidence of poverty, disease and general hardship.”<sup>63</sup> Yet such comments implicitly suggested his conviction that improvements in these fields could make Ukrainians suitable nation builders. Young presented an opposite view with regard to the Japanese, recognizing their high standards in fields like health, living conditions, and culture, yet arguing that such good qualities meant nothing in eyes of mainstream British Columbians because of their racial inassimilability.<sup>64</sup> Smith, in referring to Asian clusters in British Columbia, also saw the assimilation of Asians as problematic. “The problem of the Oriental,” he argued, “is intensified by the fact that it is concentrated rather than diffused, British Columbia having to carry the heavy end of the burden.”<sup>65</sup> In this way, the goal of nation building—an economically and culturally sound Canada—preoccupied these commentators.

At the same time, both England and Young pointed to persistent ethnic boundaries between mainstream and ethnic communities, and produced a static and monolithic image of a single ethnic community. Their views represented how contemporary British Canadians conceptualized Canadian identity, distinguishing themselves from ethnic peoples. England and his teachers were clearly affected by the popular ethnic hierarchy of the era, especially the dichotomy between civilized and

uncivilized. For example, one teacher wrote with respect to the local “Ruthenian” settlement that “we cannot get away from that fact that this ‘vast amount’ [of ignorance among the non-English] constitutes a serious menace to our own civilization.”<sup>66</sup> England himself categorized the Mennonites, French, Hungarians, and Germans as “progressive” communities. The Slavic settlements in which Ukrainians predominated, in contrast, were “not progressive” due to “a great deal of economic and social backwardness” caused by a “lack of education” and primitive “hygiene and sanitation”—the products of bloc settlement that segregated the settlers from outside influences.<sup>67</sup> Ukrainian rural settlements were thus typically portrayed as lagging “a century behind.”<sup>68</sup> Young’s account of the Japanese presented a more modernized image of the group, contending that the Japanese maintained the average standard of living in both villages and cities. However, he also felt that their family lifestyle, religion, social cohesiveness, and economic competitiveness created a great gap between them and white Canadians.<sup>69</sup> This dichotomy between the mainstream and ethnic groups suggests that close encounters with “peculiar” ethnic customs and habits helped to reassert mainstream Canadians’ pre-existing sense of superiority. In some ways, although their primary goal was to promote the assimilation of ethnic groups, commentators like England, Smith, and Young reinforced ethnic categories and stereotypes of the Japanese and Ukrainians by defining them.

Both Ukrainian nationalist and Japanese *issei* elites supported the idea of progress and enlightenment, but they differed significantly from mainstream Canadians in that they did not simply regard the adoption of Britishness as “progress.” They rather adroitly identified elements to be abandoned from their group’s characteristics, and

others to be adopted from the British values system, in order to be recognized as citizens equal to mainstream British Canadians. In this regard, they were never passive agents who arbitrarily accepted cultural enlightenment or guidance from mainstream dictates; rather, they played an active role in the construction of what it meant to be good Canadians, providing their own definitions of “progress.” In this way, they rejected the equation of Canadianization with Anglo-conformity, seeking to maintain their ethnic identity and elevating it to something positive which would help their political upward mobility in Canadian society.<sup>70</sup>

Both ethnic elites also took very similar approaches. Quite logically, the removal of their negative images and the education of the masses were top priorities. Customs, attitudes, and behaviour which might retard cultural and/or economic mobility had to be eliminated quickly, and the lists of such traits were endless. The Ukrainians, for example, pointed to the many “unenlightened” people among them whose children “were running about on their farms without necessary clothing and shoes”<sup>71</sup> or who focused only on “physical strength and endurance” but lacked cultural sophistication.<sup>72</sup> A Japanese Christian, Yasutarô Yamaga argued that the Japanese masses lived in “unsanitary” places or worked on Sundays “when the whites dressed up and went to church.”<sup>73</sup> Intellectual, economic, and political development, both groups believed, could be achieved through better education, self-awakening, and an orderly life—all elements equated with British success. *Ukrainskyi holos*, for example, often targeted the farmers who constituted the majority of Ukrainians and encouraged “the study of modern farming”<sup>74</sup> for their material well-being. In comparison with the English, the newspaper said,

the lack of education is our largest obstacle to life in Canada. Because of the lack of schooling, we can be distinguished neither in all the free professions (doctors, lawyers, politicians) nor in business or industry, nor even in farming. To become successful farmers at present, it is necessary to learn and read about practice, and pursue the market economy, and to study it constantly. The Canadian agricultural department constantly issues extraordinarily valuable research and information for farmers, and the English are making good use of such information, because they receive suitable school training, and take advantage of official publications. They thus can avoid economic misfortune. And our farmers? They revert to their familiar shovels and are twenty or thirty years behind.<sup>75</sup>

Learning from British Canadians was particularly encouraged:

Ukrainians have many deficits: Ukrainians lack an intelligentsia, wealthy people, skilled labourers, accountants, and merchants. . . . And where do Ukrainians learn politics and gain political experience, if not from the people who have the best political experience among all nations in the world? The English are the nation with the longest and best political experience in the world. Living among the English and not learning politics from them is the same as going to school but not learning how to read.<sup>76</sup>

The Japanese *issei* Yasutarô Yamaga attributed Japanese agricultural instability to “selfish” motives. Individual farmers saturated the market with cheaper crops, thereby lowering prices; this practice, he warned, would only lead to the farmers’ “self-destruction” and to “anti-Japanese sentiments.”<sup>77</sup> Yamaga therefore recommended that farmers and other workers participate in mainstream cooperatives for “the permanent stability and progress of the Yamato race.”<sup>78</sup> The Japanese consul, Isago Gomei, also entered such debates, emphasizing the necessity of orderliness:

Harmony or assimilation does not simply mean personal or domestic customs such as speaking English, dressing up in Western clothing, and living in Western houses. It means to be equal with Canadians in social life. The Anglo-Saxon race, namely the English and Americans, is proud of its “orderly civilization,” which is to build a cohesive social unity that protects individual rights and promotes well-being, thereby preventing disorganized and lawless social life.<sup>79</sup>

Thus, for the Ukrainian nationalists and Japanese *issei*, “progress” often meant extracting admired qualities from the British-Canadian tradition without losing the best

and distinctive elements of their own ethnic culture. Such selectivity undoubtedly created certain dilemmas in terms of how far they should assimilate into mainstream norms. Significantly, race affected this dilemma and process of selection, determining how Japanese and Ukrainian elites envisioned their “ethnic” communities and making the former more docile towards the idea of assimilation than the latter. The Ukrainian nationalists believed that a common culture and language were the main distinguishing characteristics that defined their ethnicity, and as such had to be preserved through people’s conscious will and active participation. The Japanese *issei*, on the contrary, always conscious of being racially visible, did not regard these traits as the only elements of their distinctive identity. Such differences in the two groups’ understanding of ethnicity were well reflected in their attitudes towards and debate over cultural and linguistic preservation beyond the first generation.

A native language and culture tied to the specific political goals of the ethnic group, preoccupied nationalist Ukrainian and *issei* Japanese elites—both as the core of their identity and as means to educate and enlighten their peoples—to slightly different degrees. Ukrainians remained strong supporters of the Ukrainian language and culture, regarding them as inseparable components of ethno-national identity, arguing that

culture involves the education of people in their mother tongue. Without learning in the mother tongue and without any organization that teaches people in their mother tongue, a nation must perish and blend into other nations. Such educational institutions [that promote the language] can be established with the help of the press, books, schools, and associations. The most powerful cultural organization supports a state. Similarly, nothing can help even the best newspapers, books, schools, and associations when the nation does not have its own independent state.<sup>80</sup>

Notably for Ukrainian nationalists, language and culture rather than biological traits determined their ethno-national identity, leading to concerns that the growing number of



Canadian born might decelerate the spread of national consciousness. Writing in 1935, Ukrainian teacher F. T. Hawryliuk explained:

Besides, they [the older generation] were sure that their children would have Ukrainian blood and a Ukrainian soul, and that this strong inheritance would be the same as in their fathers. But it is not so. Physical inheritance alone does not include culture. Moreover, culture itself is based not on “blood and bones,” but on the mind, emotional feeling, custom and habit, a way of thinking and doing, all of which people gain in the process of education. . . . A sudden change or loss of culture means not only spiritual death but also physical demise.<sup>81</sup>

Cultural and linguistic survival in Canada thus was perceived as crucial in the constant “fight” to maintain Ukrainian ethnicity.

In this context, the Ukrainian and Gaelic languages played a similar role because of the repression of the former and the rareness of the latter, providing an illuminating example of how language was preserved for symbolic purposes as a means to protect and express ethnic distinctiveness. During the 1920s a sporadic movement for the preservation of Gaelic emerged among some Scottish politicians and scholars, resulting in short-lived Gaelic journals such as *Mosgladh* launched by the Scottish Catholic Society of Canada in 1922, and *The Gaelic Herald* sponsored by Gaelic scholar James MacNeil in 1925. The movement’s supporters saw Gaelic as particularly appealing for its antiquity and rareness, as this comment indicates:

One does not speak Gaelic, one “has” it. “Bheil Galig Agaibh?” (Have you the Gaelic?) one is asked. And one goes through Cape Breton Island in bitter regret that one has not, for it is the key to the Highland heart. It is one of the oldest known tongues and excepting only Russian is said to be the most flexible of European languages. It has the wealth of Sanscrit and Greek in native roots and shades of meaning impossible to convey in the less pliant English.<sup>82</sup>

Gaelic’s difference from English was the key, as it was seen not only as a language but also as an old symbol that expressed the entire nature of the Highland Scots—“a language of feeling and of sentiment, of ideals and inspiration of a great, free, patriotic

and liberty-loving people.”<sup>83</sup> The distinctiveness of the language and its significance in the survival of the ethnic group was also stressed by Ukrainians. Ukrainian nationalists, for whom linguistic survival was a constant concern, stressed the originality of their language and its importance in preserving a distinctive culture. One commentator wrote, quoting a linguist:

Professor Hayes defines nationality as “a people who speak the same language, or closely related dialects, cherish common tradition, and constitute, or think they constitute, a distinct cultural society.” . . . The world has been convinced that Ukrainian is distinct from any other Slavic language. . . . If the Ukrainian language had been similar to Russian, the Ukase of Ems (1876) would not have been signed by Alexander II, “prohibiting: first, the import to Russia from abroad of books published in the ‘Little Russian’ language; second, the publishing in Russia of any books in the Little Russian language except historical documents and belles-lettres; third, the use of Ukrainian language on the stage.” Russia and Poland have made repeated attempts to destroy our language, knowing well that they could thus win half their battle for Russification or Polonization.<sup>84</sup>

This quotation not only supports Ukrainians’ claim to be an independent linguistic group but also stresses the significant role of language in their national survival. At the same time, Ukrainians took a position similar to the Gaelic supporters, distinguishing their language from the dominant one. The article went on to say how the Ukrainian language had a “richness” and “superiority” over Russian because “the Ukrainian language contains a great many Slavic words which cannot even be found in the present Russian language.”<sup>85</sup>

For the racially visible Japanese, the loss of their culture and language did not mean the automatic decline of their ethnicity, so that they tended to restrain group markers which might hinder the *nisei*’s full participation in Canadian society. The *issei* intensively debated throughout the 1930s whether the *nisei* really needed education in their own language—a necessity Ukrainian nationalists never doubted. The *nisei*, now

seen as a symbol of Japanese Canadians' new era, had to become "Canadians" first. Controversy increasingly focused on the role played by the CJA's Japanese language school in Vancouver in the education of the *nisei*. The *issei* understood the benefits of teaching their children Japanese, which included "emotional harmony between parents and children" and "understanding of the situation in and nature of the homeland." Yet they also insisted that "our research has proved that the disadvantages overwhelm the benefits."<sup>86</sup> The *issei* believed that "the adjustment to Canadian society at the earliest stage of childhood" and "primary education as Canadian citizens" should be the *nisei*'s top priority, and Japanese-language education should not be permitted to cause confusion among the younger generation.<sup>87</sup> This criticism was also directed at the *issei*'s own CJA, which was said to "contribute to the isolation of the Japanese community from white society spiritually, geographically, economically, educationally, and religiously" by creating its own societies and institutions, including the Japanese school.<sup>88</sup> Japanese Canadians' future, the *issei* argued, lay in the *nisei*'s JCCL, which would "overthrow *issei* isolationism" and "make the acquisition of Canadian citizenship the primary goal."<sup>89</sup> However, this thinking does not mean that the Japanese *issei* regarded "Japaneseness" as something insignificant. Rather, it was based on the belief that the *nisei*'s acquisition of English skills and the loss of the Japanese language alone would never free them from either ethno-racial identification or an obligation to the Japanese-Canadian community and Japan. In other words, the *issei* did not regard the acquisition or promotion of language and culture as the primary duty of community members. More significantly, the presence of English speakers among Japanese

Canadians was a great demonstration to mainstream society of Canadianization, and made it easier for the *issei* themselves to remain Japanese.

Ethnic elites and their interaction with mainstream society were most instrumental in the crystallization of Ukrainian and Japanese communities during the interwar period. The emergence of clear internal divisions, changing homeland politics, regional concentration, and an externally imposed ethno-racial hierarchy caused them constantly to redefine their ethnic boundaries. Within this context, Scottish ethnicity was expressed inconsistently and often considered unnecessary. Ukrainian nationalists, who had more advantages and opportunities to engage with mainstream society, were better equipped to consolidate their ethnic community than the marginalized Japanese. Such advantages included the fact that they were farmers, had settled in the prairie provinces, possessed the franchise, and belonged to the white race. All these factors gave Ukrainian nationalists bargaining tools, which the Japanese elite rarely possessed.

### **Dual Loyalty and Embryonic Multiculturalism**

The Japanese *issei* and Ukrainian nationalist elites both maintained a fundamental desire to be full-fledged Canadians and simultaneously retain their own ethnic identities. The similarities here between the two groups were striking, indicating that the weight that ethnic elites placed on a distinctive identity was never totally ruled by race, national origin, or the existence (or lack) of a state to which they belonged. This idea of dual loyalty was twofold: it focused first on the promotion of personal pride and a sense of being special among ethnic peoples, and second on the progress of Canadian identity. It also became the major vehicle for launching, as the basis of Canadian identity, the notion of multiculturalism over Anglo-conformity, which justified only the dual

loyalty of British Canadians to Canada and their homeland, Britain. This idea was innovative for its era in that it attempted to minimize the binary opposition between “mainstream” and “ethnic” identities.

That the idea of dual loyalty primarily concerned a person’s inner being or soul was particularly significant, because it provided ethnic elites with a solution to the lingering dilemma between their ethnic and Canadian identities and the inferiority complex that stemmed from their ethnic and/or racial backgrounds. Dual loyalty also provide for a concrete definition of what ideal “Canadians” should be. Both Ukrainian and Japanese elites, in their attempt to elevate ethnicity to something valuable, argued that two loyalties not only were compatible but also strengthened each other. The Ukrainians stressed the compatibility between their two identities, arguing:

The better Canadian the Ukrainian is, the better Ukrainian he is. Only a conscious, honest, and well-defined person can be good a Ukrainian. Only a conscious, honest, and well-defined person can be a good Canadian. Those who do not have such a nature can be neither good Ukrainians nor good Canadians.<sup>90</sup>

This comment reflected Ukrainian nationalists’ rejection of the concept that only Anglo-conformity could create “better” quality Canadians. The Japanese *issei*, always concerned about the racial complex that Canadian-born *nisei* felt, focused more on overcoming a sense of inferiority and emphasized the advantages of keeping both Japanese and Canadian identities:

Teaching Japanese merits and skills lets [the *nisei*] realize in a natural manner that the Japanese can never be inferior to other races, and promotes their racial pride. Some critics argue that instilling pride as Japanese hinders them from being Canadian citizens. Yet it is certain that citizens with a firm racial pride and consciousness to fight against discrimination are much better than those who believe in their inferiority because of racism. Therefore, maintaining racial pride and strengths would never prevent them from being good Canadian citizens.<sup>91</sup>

Obviously, dual loyalty was deemed beneficial to the *nisei*. For the first time, at least in their own logic, the Japanese found a way to be as proud as other Canadians. The fact that both Ukrainians and Japanese thought the same was perhaps only natural; it allowed members of each group to belong simultaneously to international ethnic and national communities as long as their priorities—Canada first and homeland second—were kept in mind. Both Ukrainian and Japanese elites launched a new model of Canadianness, composed of two complementary parts and harnessed it to the promotion of confidence and pride in being Canadians of particular ethnic origins.

The second dimension of dual loyalty involved the crystallization of Canadian national identity. It aimed to provide a solution to Canada's dilemma of being a country of immigrants yet adopting Anglo-conformity as its essence, and was a first step in the evolution towards ethnic pluralism. Ukrainian nationalist and Japanese elites alike emphasized the possibility that Canada could benefit from their peoples' aspirations towards their homelands. For the Canadian-oriented USRL and its organ *Ukrainskyi holos* among Ukrainian nationalists, the consistency between loyalty to Canada and to Ukraine was particularly emphasized, as Ukrainian national survival and political and cultural contributions to Canada were inseparable goals. In contrast to the Ukraine-oriented UNF, the USRL elite argued that individuals who kept their distance from Canadian politics "because of their attachment to the Ukrainian nation, are not only making mistakes, but also doing damage to their nation [Canada],"<sup>92</sup> as the two loyalties had to be maintained side by side. Such support for dual loyalty was extended to culture, when *Ukrainskyi holos* wrote that "in order to facilitate the evolution of very multinational and rich Canadian cultures, we, Ukrainians, must maintain, develop, and

create our culture.”<sup>93</sup> The Japanese *issei* presented a similar view, asserting that “having the *nisei* study and be proud of their ancestors’ land does not contradict the Canadian spirit; rather, it would be a factor that imbues Canadian culture with our merits and virtues.”<sup>94</sup> The *nisei* themselves embarked on a mission—to “build a link between Japanese and Canadian civilizations,” because “there are many points in eastern civilization which are superior to those in Western civilization, and these the Canadian-born Japanese should retain.”<sup>95</sup> In this way, they argued that they could contribute to both nations, promoting a mutual understanding between the Japanese and other Canadians and building “international brotherhood.”<sup>96</sup>

Specifically, the Ukrainian and Japanese goal was to initiate a politicized ethnic pluralism or mosaic which celebrated the sum of the dual loyalties of all ethnic groups. However, the Ukrainian nationalists were more apt to envision Canada as an ethnically diverse nation than were the Japanese because of three major factors: the difference in the ethnic composition of British Columbia and the prairie provinces, race, and the franchise. As Ukrainians were concentrated in the three prairie provinces, where, in 1931, only about fifty per cent of the population was British in origin and some twenty per cent East European,<sup>97</sup> they could conceptualize themselves as part of a multiethnic society in which they mattered. The size of the Ukrainian population on the prairies compared to other groups was particularly significant for Ukrainian nationalists, as group numbers and geographical concentration were always seen as bequeathing both the right to and possibility of political power. *Ukrainskyi holos* for example, stressed the need for Ukrainian candidates in Canadian elections, particularly in those ridings in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba where Ukrainians constituted a majority. Pointing out the

lack of interested candidates and voters, it stated, “Canada is a new country populated by people of diverse origins, enough to exercise a power to decide from which nationality politicians can be chosen. Ukrainians have as much right to be chosen as the English, the French, the Jews, or the Germans.”<sup>98</sup> Contributors to *Ukrainskyi holos* also offered their own vision of what the future Canadian identity should be. “People in Canada consist of two main cultural groups, Anglo-Saxon and French,” wrote F. T. Havryliuk in 1936:

In addition, there are many other national groups, the more important among them being the Scandinavians, Germans, and Ukrainians. A commonly accepted thought is that in the distant future, all these cultural elements, having one common goal—the creation of a Canadian nation or Canadian race, which does not exist yet—will blend into a whole. This unity will come not through the triumph of one culture over others, as one often sees in European states, but through the mutual appropriation and development of all cultures, selecting what is best, most valuable, and durable from each of these nations. This would be a multi-coloured mosaic of Canadian culture and life. . . . Any cultural group works for its own benefit and obtains such recognition and respect as it deserves.<sup>99</sup>

For the Ukrainian nationalists, Canada had to become a nation characterized by the equal representation and recognition of all groups.

The Japanese, overwhelmingly residing in British Columbia where some seventy-five per cent of the population was still British,<sup>100</sup> were much more limited in terms of imagining Canada as a multiethnic nation. Besides, exclusion from the franchise and racism in British Columbia made the Japanese feel psychologically distant from the mainstream society, which delayed the evolution of the notion of the mosaic among them. As anti-Japanese sentiment escalated and became common in public discourse in British Columbia in the 1930s, discussion of the problem continued to dominate the Japanese press. *Tairiku nippo*, for example, referring to the prohibition of fishing by the Japanese in many fishing villages in the province, advocated uniting all Japanese into a collective



force: “The franchise has not been a big deal for the fishers till very recently. Yet now we need to secure the right to fish in any BC fishing villages to make our living. For this purpose, unity for the lobby for the franchise is imperative.”<sup>101</sup> Such a comment indicates that the Japanese believed in their own collective power, but their imagination rarely went beyond their own group. They usually did not have a clear sense of the distinction between white immigrants who were also treated as inferior and the dominant British. Even when the Japanese recognized the diversity that existed within “white” society, they tended to believe that the European immigrants rarely faced discrimination. The CJA president entertained a homogeneous image of white Canada when he said: “In the case of European groups, by the time they reach the second generation, all problems with respect to politics, occupation, and ethnicity will disappear naturally and completely.”<sup>102</sup> Obviously, he did not see Canada as a country in which all ethnic groups, including those sharing the same privileged skin colour, could and would maintain their identities.

Despite these differences, dual loyalty was also advocated and encouraged by Ukrainians and Japanese outside Canada, providing the Canadian diaspora with a greater mission than simply the establishment of ethnic pluralism in Canada. The emergence of the mosaic in Canada thus also needs to be conceptualized within its international context. Ukrainian nationalists all over Eastern Europe regarded their Canadian counterparts as part of international émigré circles devoted to the cause of Ukrainian independence, while Japan’s leaders saw their people in Canada as an outpost of the country’s international expansion. Great emphasis thus was attached to the roles that overseas Ukrainians and Japanese could play in Canadian politics. O. I Bochkovsky, a Ukrainian

scholar from Czechoslovakia who specialized in the Ukrainian question and visited Canada at the invitation of the USRL in 1936, provides a good example. His series of articles on Ukrainian Canadians that appeared in *Ukrainskyi holos* preached how a strong sense of loyalty to Canada strengthened the Ukrainian nation:

Ukrainian Canadians regard themselves not as visitors but as co-hosts of Canada. They have the potential to become a “third nation” of Canada and to create a variation of the Ukrainian nation—the overseas type. This is not only their selfish interest. It is also in the interest of the Ukrainian nation in general, especially when Ukraine is oppressed, because in Canada our countrymen have the opportunity and the rights to be a factor in the state. They do not demand the secession of their nation. On the contrary, as Canadian Governor-General Tweedsmuir evidently noted: “. . . you will all be better Canadians for being also good Ukrainians.”<sup>103</sup>

That the notion that Ukrainians in Canada be a “third nation” came from outside the country suggests that their recognition was considered beneficial to the world-wide Ukrainian community. They were expected to create an outpost to the pressure for Ukrainian independence, as Ukrainians in the homeland, oppressed by foreign powers, were quite limited in such an endeavour. Likewise, the role which the Japanese *nisei* could play was assigned, to some degree, by their homeland elites. Inazô Nitobe, a specialist in agriculture and law who served as under secretary general of the League of Nations between 1919 and 1926 and lectured around North America to promote understanding of the Japanese, stressed the *nisei*'s strength at a meeting of the CJA in 1933:

*Nisei* can be both Canadians and Japanese. How lucky they are. . . . They are able to take advantage of these dual characteristics, by getting acquainted with other Canadians, inspiring in them the Japanese spirit, and building good-will between Japan and Canada. This is a privilege unique to the *nisei*. . . . I hope that all of you will keep your affection both to your parents' country, Japan, and to your native land, Canada, and contribute to the promotion of friendship between the two countries.<sup>104</sup>

Nitobe's speech not only aimed to eradicate a sense of inferiority in the *nisei* but also reflected his conviction that the *nisei* could bridge the growing gap between Western nations and Japan, especially after the Manchu Incident in 1931. Kenzô Ikago, who worked for the Department of Agriculture in Japan and served as a delegate for Japan's new colony in China, Manchuko, also sent a message to the gathering. In it he argued that "the *nisei*'s greatest duty as Canadian citizens" was to introduce to Canadians the Japanese spirit and qualities and to contribute to the development of the Canadian nation.<sup>105</sup> In such ways, Ukrainian nationalists and the Japanese in Canada were always regarded as part of international ethnic communities, and assigned great responsibilities by both overseas elites and themselves, playing a role in the construction of ethnic pluralism in Canada.

Ethnic pluralism thus became the major political principle among Ukrainian nationalists, and to a lesser degree, among the Japanese. For the Scots, in contrast, whose dual loyalty had coincided with legitimate Canadian identity for a long time and thus was not divided, ethnic pluralism as a theory to bridge the conflicting loyalties, seemed unnecessary. Canada was always an integral part of the world-wide British Empire so that Scottishness never contradicted Canadian identity. Through ethnic pluralism Ukrainian nationalists and the Japanese found a vehicle to enhance their personal and ethnic pride as Canadians, just as the Scots had always seen their special role in their dual loyalty. In this process, the ties with their homelands provided new missions for the two groups. Yet Ukrainian nationalists were the strongest advocates of ethnic pluralism, because such factors as the size, the franchise, and their pursuit of democracy allowed them to establish a foundation for political negotiation to gain a better position in Canada.

Ethnic pluralism or a mosaic never became a dominant idea in Canada until the late 1960s yet it was the major vision of what Canada should be among ethnic groups as far apart as Ukrainians and Japanese.

### **Homeland Myths and Symbols and the Canadian Mosaic**

While ethnic elites relied on propaganda and ideological concepts such as ethnic pluralism and democracy to promote ethnic consciousness in Canada, historical myths and symbolic figures and cultural traditions—much more flexible and easily manipulated for political purposes—constituted other components that shaped their identity. Interwar Canada witnessed three kinds of myths and symbols, sometimes coexisting in harmony and sometimes competing with each other. First, there were British myths, symbols, and cultural traditions, including Scottish ones, that had dominated Canadian identity since the colonial era. Second, there were ethnic myths, symbols, and cultural traditions, invented in and transplanted from the homeland, that played a significant role in the promotion of ethnic consciousness in Canada. All three elites—Scottish, Ukrainian, and Japanese—valued them for the emotional appeal that they had to their peoples. Finally, there were Canadian-made ethnic myths, symbols, and cultural traditions that were limited in effect but began to emerge in specific regions or localities. All three categories of myth- or symbol-making existed independently, and ethnic elites manipulated them for recognition of their ethnicity in Canada.

Ukrainians and the Japanese, and most certainly the Scots, all saw the British monarch as the most powerful and all-encompassing Canadian icon during this period. The visit of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to Canada in 1939 provided the best platform for Ukrainians and Japanese as outsiders to show their allegiance to the British

monarch. As such, the occasion symbolically served as an opportunity for ethnic groups to demonstrate that they could be loyal to Britain without losing their ethnic identity. For example, both the Ukrainians and the Japanese welcomed the King and Queen with great enthusiasm, hoisting Union Jack flags and assembling floats that featured such ethnic symbols as Mt. Fuji for the Japanese and Cossacks for the Ukrainian nationalists.<sup>106</sup> Yet the two groups saw different political implications in the monarchy as the universal Canadian symbol. For the Ukrainians, the King and Queen were symbols of the “freedom,” “justice,” and “equality” that had created “the tolerance shown to the heterogeneous people of this country” and provided land for “the oppressed and suffering people” of Ukraine.<sup>107</sup> The royal couple were thus viewed as a symbol of the cosmopolitan British Empire where many ethnic groups coexisted. For the Japanese, George VI and his wife represented the “good-will between the British and Japanese Empires,” which, by the late 1930s, had become crucial to the Japanese Canadians who were facing an anti-Japanese movement because of the rise of their homeland as a colonial power. The royal couple were also used to justify loyalty to Imperial Japan, when an *issei* Japanese maintained that “to be loyal to the king of Canada where we reside, just as being loyal to Japan’s royal family, is our pride.”<sup>108</sup> In this way, Ukrainian and Japanese elites politicized and attached different messages to the British monarchy which British Canadians, including the Scots, did not necessarily think were relevant.

Despite support for the British monarch as a uniting figure, all three groups possessed their own symbols and historical myths rooted in their respective homelands. The Scots provide a good example here because of the symbolic character of their ethnicity and parallels with Ukrainians due to somewhat similar situations in Europe.

First, both groups sought to protect their distinctiveness against neighbouring dominant peoples in their homelands. The Scots traditionally distinguished themselves from the English to gain “a sense of the country’s worthiness to be a partner in a Union.”<sup>109</sup> In a similar manner, the Ukrainians demonstrated their difference particularly from the Russians with whom they tended to be identified. For this goal, their respective ancestors, whether Highland Scots or medieval Kievan Rus’ and the Cossack state under Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1595-1657),<sup>110</sup> were used to show their distinctive ethnic origins. Ukrainians claimed to be “the closest descendants of the inhabitants of Rus’” whom the Russians also claimed as their ancestors,<sup>111</sup> while the Scots emphasized their Highland as opposed to their Lowland roots for the former’s peculiar language, religion, and distance from England. Second, influenced by late eighteenth-century Romanticism in literature, both groups chose poets as their national heroes. Robert Burns (1759-96) and Taras Shevchenko (1814-61) were intertwined with the national consciousness of their respective peoples. The Japanese behaved somewhat differently because of little influence from other cultures, the lack of a survival mentality, and the absence of nationally enshrined figures in literature. The Emperor, the most powerful national symbol of modern Japan, served as the foremost icon. Invented as a descendent of the ancient sun goddess who gave birth to the Japanese in the Shinto tradition, and the eternal head of the Yamato race whose ancestry could be traced back to ancient times,<sup>112</sup> he stood at the core of the Japanese “myth of common descent.” Imported to Canada, all these historic myths and symbolic figures enhanced a sense of being special among the three groups in Canada. The fact that even the politically influential Scots valued them supports the theory of Anthony D. Smith that attributes ethnicity to a sense of a

distinguished race or “chosen people,”<sup>113</sup> and emphasizes the role of the homeland as a “sacred” place that invokes past memories in ethnic community formation.<sup>114</sup>

While both Scottish and Ukrainian elites used homeland myths and symbols to bolster their political ambitions in Canada, the Scots Canadianized the symbols more enthusiastically. Paradoxically, their claim that they were “chosen peoples” who built Canada made the boundary between Canadian and Scottish myths and symbols indiscernible. For example, Burns, bagpipes, and the Highland Regiment constituted Canadian identity. The overlap of Canadianness and Scottishness proved their superiority over others, highlighting the Scots’ impact on the creation of universal cultural traditions and democratic principles that Canada inherited and enjoyed. In this context, as a symbol of democracy and liberty, Burns could become a “Canadian” hero, whose work “brought to modern political conceptions those accepted tenets which are the very fabric of the systems of self-government by which our race holds dominion and authority from sea to sea.”<sup>115</sup> Ukrainian nationalists also saw Shevchenko as a symbol of democracy and freedom, and thus he, too, embodied Canadian values. Yet it was even more critical for them to keep him as a “Ukrainian” hero and “as the greatest son of Ukraine” who brought “light and justice” to all Ukrainians,<sup>116</sup> as their state-building goals remained unachieved. Ukrainians thus maintained ethnic boundaries in defining their hero, while the Scots tried to make Burns as universally Canadian as possible. The two men reflected different messages; Ukrainians were safeguarding ethnic distinctiveness and the Scots were defining Canada.

The Japanese elite took a completely different approach to homeland myths and symbols, rarely preaching the “myth of common descent” in their press or in public prior

to the 1930s, both because Japanese identity was self-evident due to their racial visibility and because they were aware that the promotion of their symbols would give other Canadians the wrong impression that they were disloyal to Canada. Yet a sense of pride rooted in membership in the Yamato race and loyalty to the Emperor were intertwined with messages from the *issei* and homeland leaders and displayed in public on special occasions. An illuminating example is the celebration of Crown Prince Akihito's birth in 1933, when the Consulate organized a ceremony involving most of the Japanese associations in British Columbia, including the CJA, the Japanese language school, and the commercial and fishermen's cooperatives. It was a unique event that showcased Japanese allegiance to the Emperor, opening and closing with Japan's national anthem and drinking a toast to the royal family. *Tairiku nippo* proposed that "participants in the ceremony could be in casual outfits yet should not appear disloyal to the Emperor," and that "all Japanese hoist both British and Japanese national flags to pay their respects."<sup>117</sup> On other occasions, the Emperor's messages were manipulated by the Consul in the interests of his influence over the Japanese Canadians. "When I was appointed as Consul," he said in a speech to the CJA's Japanese language school board, "I was told by the Emperor to promote the goodwill between Japan and Canada, and for the Japanese in Canada." He added that King George VI had signed his appointment as Consul for the Canadian side, implying that he had been chosen by the will of the two monarchs,<sup>118</sup> which would give him double authority and legitimacy as both a Japanese and a Canadian delegate. The Emperor, as a source of Japanese moral teachings, was also incorporated into the education of the *nisei*. Emphasizing the need to instill a "Japanese spirit" in the *nisei*, Kenzô Ikago, the Japanese agricultural minister, quoted the Meiji



Emperor and argued that such things as loyalty, trust, and compassion could be found in “the teachings of the ancestral Emperors.”<sup>119</sup>

The supremacy of the Emperor as a symbol gained more influence in the late 1930s as Japan’s imperial activities accelerated in Asia, making it critical for the Japanese in Canada to unite against escalating anti-Japanese sentiment in British Columbia. At this point, rhetoric about the Emperor and the Yamato race came to dominate public discourse. Consul Hirokichi Nemichi, celebrating the anniversary of the start of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, noted how a “glorious tradition, kept for two thousand six hundred years, had built the distinctive moral values that Imperial Japan, as the best moral state in the world, maintained under successive Emperors, without defiling anyone or being defiled by anyone.”<sup>120</sup> This type of “national” pride was supported by the CJA, when president Eikichi Kagetsu stated:

Needless to say, our country is a nation-state, formed around the Emperor, that possesses a profound sense of nationhood. We must be united, abandon selfishness, be economical, respect God’s achievements and contribute to the advancement of the imperial power with a spirit of perseverance. . . . Since the Manchurian Incident, anti-Japanese sentiment intensified. We, however, patiently resisted this sentiment against humanity, showing the real value of the Yamato race, by enlightening the white race, working hard, and never breaking the Canadian law. It has been a very difficult two years for the Japanese in Canada, overcoming all hardships.<sup>121</sup>

The fact that this *issei* leader shared the homeland’s enthusiasm for Japan’s imperial ventures is quite suggestive: his kind saw the Yamato race and the Emperor as key factors in the promotion of a sense of community and solidarity after Japan’s invasion of China. Such a concept of the Japanese as a family with a long history helped to boost the sense of pride among Japanese Canadians who were more marginalized in Canada than ever.

Despite ethnic elites' constant manipulation of their own myths and symbols, Canada's British-dominated ethnic hierarchy affected how influential these homeland traditions could be to the formation of a Canadian identity. In the 1930s a few individuals put forward the idea of a mosaic as Canada's potential national identity, in which cultural elements such as literature, music, and handicrafts—but neither loyalty to the homeland nor homeland politics—could be preserved. This notion was best defined in the works of men like Watson Kirkconnell, John Murray Gibbon, and Robert England. Kirkconnell, as a literary critic and translator of several European languages, including Ukrainian, had a special interest in ethnic poetry and fiction. Gibbon was a publicist for the Canadian Pacific Railway who organized folk festivals, like the New Canadian Festival in Winnipeg in 1930, that were planned to celebrate immigrants' cultural traditions in Canada as part of the promotion of immigration to the West.<sup>122</sup> England, through his association with ethnic settlements on the prairies, became fascinated by old exotic cultures and traditions as he grew more familiar with them, contending that Canada should not “destroy those indigenous natural colours that enrich the national character” in the process of Canadianization.<sup>123</sup>

Scottish symbols and heroes, including Robert Burns, were obviously most cherished by these mainstream commentators and politicians, themselves often Scottish in origin, and understood to be part of Canadian identity. On official and unofficial occasions, Scottish bagpipes, dances, and Highland tartans were an integral component of public events, creating an antecedent for the Canadian mosaic. However, the Ukrainian hero, Taras Shevchenko, was viewed with ambivalence—accepted as a poet who fought for freedom and democracy in general but neglected as a symbol of the fight

for Ukraine's liberation. Gibbon, in his book *Canadian Mosaic*, appreciated the broad impact of both Ukrainian poetry and Shevchenko as its greatest creator:

The Ukrainians have been described by Professor Seignobos, of the Sorbonne, as "a race of poets, musicians, artists, who have fixed for all time their national history in the songs of the people which no centuries of oppression could silence—the Ukrainians became the first singers of Europe; the celebrated Russian music is the music of the Ukraine, and it is a Ukrainian, Gogol, who has opened the way to the Russian romancers of genius." Their greatest poet, Taras Shevchenko, wrote the songs they love best to sing.<sup>124</sup>

Shevchenko and his songs were detached from the concrete campaign for Ukraine's independence but valued as a symbol of the survival of the oppressed. Gibbon believed in the quality of Ukrainian literature, and placed it highly in his cultural hierarchy. He quoted the praise of Stephen Rudnitzky, former professor and director of the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Geography and Cartography, that "the worth of Ukrainian culture appears, in its most beautiful and its highest form, in the unwritten literature of the people. . . . But the national genius of the Ukrainians has risen to the greatest height in their popular poetry."<sup>125</sup> Gibbon then contemplated this literature's potential for his Canadian mosaic, concluding that "those new flowers . . . will surely add a richness and colour to the present somewhat monotonous Canadian literary garden."<sup>126</sup> He also drew a comparison with the Scots, equating Robert Burns' Day to "the annual celebration held in March in honour of the memory of Taras Shevchenko."<sup>127</sup> Watson Kirkconnell also emphasized the necessity of paying attention to Ukrainian cultural works and creativity, stating in his collection of Canadian poetry that "unheeded by the Anglo-Canadian, they [Ukrainians] have tenaciously cultivated their handicrafts, music, ballet, drama, fiction, and poetry."<sup>128</sup> Such comments indicated that the Ukrainians were granted participation in the building of Canada's new identity as far as culture was concerned.

The Japanese symbol of the Emperor, in contrast, was regarded as both politically dangerous as the reigning head of Imperial Japan and culturally irrelevant to the Canadian mosaic. In fact, both Gibbon and Kirkconnell excluded the Japanese from their list of “cultural” groups—the “cosmopolitan” West usually did not include non-Europeans. Intriguingly, Charles Young’s *Japanese Canadians* did not even mention the groups’ traditional culture and literature. For these commentators, non Europeans did not possess the world-class literature and traditional cultures that could contribute to the enrichment of the Canadian mosaic.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian, Japanese, and Scottish elites began inventing their own new historical myths based on specific regions and localities in Canada—Nova Scotia for the Scots, the prairies for the Ukrainians, and small British Columbia fishing villages like Steveston and Powell Street in Vancouver for the Japanese. The emergence of such new myths points to a growing sense of attachment to a particular place for the Ukrainians and the Japanese, while the Scots found a more practical use of region. Such myths showed similarities in their emphasis on “first” arrivals and pioneering and in the development of a collective memory around settlement, the significance of the land, and their imprint on it. The production of these Canadian-made myths associated with a place also suggests that geographical boundaries reinforced ethnic communities.<sup>129</sup> Despite these similarities, however, differences existed.

First, the Scots’ attempt to promote Scottishness in Nova Scotia was more deliberate and official than the Japanese identification with British Columbia or the Ukrainian identification with Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. The artificiality of the Scottish geopolitical boundary is obvious, when historically they were not always

numerically predominant in the province's population,<sup>130</sup> and when only seventeen per cent of all Scots lived in the Maritimes in 1931.<sup>131</sup> At the same time, the Scots constituted the first case in which ethnicity officially became a provincial identity—something which the Ukrainians and the Japanese never achieved. Ian McKay rightly attributes this interwar Scottish movement in Nova Scotia to Angus L. Macdonald, who became premier of the province in 1933. Because of Macdonald's enthusiasm for the Scottish tradition and conviction of its effectiveness as a tourist attraction, McKay argues, he promoted "Scottishness" as the "brand-name of the province." The project was large-scale and went beyond his own entertainment or recreational search for his roots.<sup>132</sup> The premier's obsession with the Scottish past and traditions was a key factor in making collective Scottish identity more predominant and powerful in the province. His commemoration of the *Hector*, a ship which brought a large group of Highland immigrants to Pictou in 1773, provides an illuminating example of his project. The *Hector* had already gained symbolic status when Nova Scotia commemorated its hundred and fiftieth anniversary widely in 1923,<sup>133</sup> but Macdonald promoted its relevance to the province further. He depicted it as the ship that brought important founding fathers of Canada, writing, "The arrival of the *Hector* is one of the outstanding days in Nova Scotian history," and "the history of this Province and this Dominion would have to be written differently if there had been no *Hector* and no Pictou County."<sup>134</sup> In reality, these immigrants were not the first Scots who came to Canada, yet as the Scottish Catholic Society of Canada pointed out, they left a great impact in that they spearheaded large-scale Highland Scottish immigration to Nova Scotia's small community.<sup>135</sup> Such

comments stressed not only the crucial role that the Scots played in province building but also the significance of Nova Scotia to Canada.

Ukrainians also nurtured a sense of region, associating their ethnic boundary with the three prairie provinces. Unofficially, the fusion between Ukrainianness and the prairie region was documented both by Ukrainians themselves and mainstream Canadians. Ukrainians' attachment to the prairies was obvious when a newspaper like *Zakhidni visty* stressed the hard work of Ukrainian farmers on the prairies that made "the Ukrainian name deserve distinction and respect."<sup>136</sup> The claim that Ukrainians built the West appeared in the 1930s in *Ukrainskyi holos*, which promoted a sense of possessiveness of the region. Bochkovsky, for example, wrote: "Our people in Canada were not only able to gain land, but also maintained it. . . . I was convinced of this, driving through the vast prairie in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. . . along 'our' land."<sup>137</sup> Mainstream Canadians did not always agree that Ukrainians were builders of the West, yet admitted their success in colonizing the prairie land.<sup>138</sup> In contrast, the Japanese rarely saw British Columbia as "their" province, both because their population was very small and because they tended to reside on the province's western edge. Mainstream Canadians identified British Columbia with Japanese only in negative terms, concerning their high birthrate, competitiveness in the labour market, and strong ties with Japan, while all problems were created or dramatized by white Canadians in British Columbia.<sup>139</sup>

The second difference among the three groups concerned the relationship between these Canadian-based ethnic myths and Canadian nation building. While the Japanese and Ukrainians exaggerated their hardships and sacrifices and contributions to their specific regions in the context of Canadian nation building, the Scottish myths were

predominantly launched from Nova Scotia but more pan-Canadian in content.<sup>140</sup> For the Scots, their founding myth in Nova Scotia overlapped with that of Canada. The greatness and contribution of the “Celtic race” was emphasized specifically in James MacNeil’s Sydney-based newsletter, the *Gaelic Herald*:

These moral and inspiring ideals [of the Celt] gave grandeur and beauty to the life and work of the Celt since he first set foot on Canadian soil. The life work of the early Gael or Celt immortalizes the pioneers of this great dominion who courageously braved the wilds of Canada under intolerable hardships, privation and sacrifice, felled the majestic forests, cleared the land, tilled the soil, built its grand system of highways, railways and canals; established its numerous educational and cultural institutions, evolved its government system based on equality, freedom, and justice.<sup>141</sup>

The sense of being a select people, tied to the myth of Canadian nation building, echoed Scots’ strong influence in the British Empire more widely. The same article continued:

Canadians may well be proud of the role they [the Scots] have played in the building of a happy and prosperous country. Let us rejoice in the magnificence and splendor of their great achievements and the glorious harvest they have garnered for future generations in this great Dominion and far-flung British Empire.<sup>142</sup>

The same rhetoric of “pioneer saga” and participation in nation building put forward by the Ukrainians was more regionally confined and did not exhibit the sense of supremacy that the Scots had.<sup>143</sup> The following represents the typical myth that the Ukrainians developed during the interwar period:

Ukrainian immigrants settled down some 40 to 80 miles from the railway. They cleared the land of forests, drained swampy land, and cleared the land of rocks. Ukrainian immigrants did not come to Canada with great resources, but they established themselves on homesteads, and needed to seek work outside the place where they lived, in order to keep the family together and make money for the purchase of ploughs, wagons, oxen, and horses. Immigrants could not choose jobs, as there were not many of them; the construction of new railways and the maintenance of old lines were the main source of work. For long years, Ukrainians nearly monopolized the jobs on the railways in Western Canada. We can say boldly that every mile of railway in Western Canada was bedewed with the sweat and blood of Ukrainian labourers. The strength of Ukrainians

constructed a fine railway network. . . . When the Canadian people acquire a sense of justice and gratitude in the future, they will build monuments to the Ukrainian pioneers in Canada just as Eastern Canada erects monuments of their Cartier, Champlain, and Frontenac....Ukrainians, to a large degree, built Western Canada. They endured the hardest of pioneer lives, and helped open up Western Canada. May gratitude and respect be offered to them by the residents of Western Canada, if not from the entire country.<sup>144</sup>

This passage clearly shows how Ukrainians combined struggle and inappreciation with their desire to be recognized as nation builders and full-fledged Canadian citizens. The fact that they contributed to Western Canada's economy through homesteading, railway construction, and farming—which could be achieved only by the physical strength of a “peasant race”—gave them a sense of pride and significance.<sup>145</sup> The Ukrainians depicted themselves as “Sons of the Land,” who could easily cultivate and become attached to the land and argued that they naturally possessed “the qualities of colonizers” who opened up the prairies.<sup>146</sup>

The Japanese-Canadian myth was also regionally focused, concentrating on urban and rural communities on the West Coast. Yet the Japanese rarely tied their pioneer myths to Canadian nation building, perhaps because they developed around the fishing village of Steveston and Powell Street in Vancouver—whose inhabitants were not farmers. The sense of struggle was expressed through fishing stories and the prejudice that the Japanese encountered in the new land. In 1935, on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Fraser River Japanese Fishermen's Co-operative, *Tairiku nippo* stated:

In the turbid waters of the Fraser River, in the wind blowing through the Georgia Valley, and in the sultan on their faces, the power that only fishermen possess pulsates silently like an artery. Two thousand Japanese Canadians! This number exceeds that of Vancouver. Why and how could this wonderful progress be made? Who is responsible for the flourishing of the Japanese community in Steveston today? Every Japanese who lived in Steveston is. . . .



Yet on this foreign land of Canada, until the Japanese achieved this success, there were numerous hardships and instances of prejudice; it was a life of endurance. . . . Imagine the brave people in the past who fished for salmon, sailing boats on the turbid waters of the Fraser River!<sup>147</sup>

This romantic portrayal of the Japanese pioneers clearly embraces their pride as an island race as well as their roots on the Fraser River. At the commemoration ceremony, the Japanese Consul stressed that the Canadian Japanese “should stop remittance back home, and build an economic base with firm roots on this land.”<sup>148</sup> He did not, however, claim a Japanese contribution to Canada’s “national” economic development. The fiftieth anniversary of the City of Vancouver in 1936, which received unprecedented enthusiasm from the Japanese community, best illustrated this limited sense of their Japanese community. While the Japanese attached special meaning to this year, indicating their growing sense of being part of Vancouver, the festival was generally limited to Powell Street. Featuring everything Japanese—including kimono parades, folk dances, Japanese drums and *koto* (a musical instrument)—the occasion was named the Japanese Festival by the local Japanese. Primarily it was a gala that demonstrated Japanese commercial development on Powell Street, both to the group itself and to mainstream Canadians.<sup>149</sup> To mark the occasion, *Tairiku nippon* gathered five early immigrants for a roundtable discussion to talk about the hardships and experiences of the past. They portrayed life on Powell Street as that of a self-contained Japanese society, focusing on pioneer economic, social, and political activities, and never politicized or expanded them in a nation-building context.<sup>150</sup>

That Ukrainians, more than the Japanese, envisioned Canada as a diverse but united “imagined community” was reflected on special occasions. The Diamond Jubilee of Canadian Confederation in 1927 provides an illuminating example of how the two

ethnic elites showcased their dual loyalties, vision of Canada, and regional identity all at once through their myths and cultural symbols. Both the Ukrainian- and Japanese-language presses published a history of Canada distributed from Ottawa, which covered mainstream landmark events from Jacques Cartier's arrival on the St. Lawrence in 1534 to the passing of the British North America Act in 1867 and the subsequent birth of the various provinces.<sup>151</sup> While both groups were kept from this official version of "Canadian" collective memory, Ukrainians perhaps exhibited a slightly better sense of participation in it. *Ukrainskyi holos* stressed a sense of loyalty to Canada, stating:

Today, being a Canadian citizen is an honour, and those who deem it an honour owe gratitude to all those people who contributed to the building of Canada, as it is. Ukrainians in Canada belong to the youngest of its citizens, but exactly for that reason, we can sense the great significance of the work of the Fathers of Confederation, who created Canada, and their successors who continued and perfected their work. Therefore, while Ukrainians participate in the anniversary holiday of Canada, they do this not superficially, through moral obligation, but with a sincere heart, as peoples who, with complete integrity, appreciate the good will of Canada.<sup>152</sup>

For them, the anniversary was an occasion on which all diverse ethnic groups demonstrated their sense of appreciation to Canada, exhibiting the mosaic character of the country. Looking at Winnipeg specifically, the Ukrainian newspaper praised the participation of "patriotic clubs and separate national groups" representing the French, Icelanders, Italians, Poles, and others who entered floats in the city, and lamented the absence of a Ukrainian one.<sup>153</sup> Yet Ukrainians still "distinguished" themselves with Ukrainian choirs, singers, and dancers in Ukrainian costume,<sup>154</sup> publicly displaying their heritage as part of the landmark event. The Japanese also showcased their culture in Vancouver, with a float from one of the labour associations, folk dances, and fire works, although they did not make any official remarks on the anniversary.<sup>155</sup> Unlike

Ukrainians who were always conscious of celebrating Canada's birthday, the Japanese tended to focus on an "ethnic festival" rather than situating their events in the larger Canadian vision.

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Interwar Canada was characterized by the crystallization of distinct Ukrainian and Japanese communities which had first emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the revival of Scottish ethnicity, both instrumentally and symbolically. Political causes in both the homeland and Canada as well as homeland myths and symbols played a significant role in the reinforcement of ethnic boundaries. Mainstream and ethnic identities rarely merged, except for the Scots, whose "ethnic" boundaries were fluid and often needed to be artificially redefined. Ukrainian nationalists and Japanese *issei*, in particular, sought full recognition in Canadian society without having to abandon their ethnic identity and loyalty to their respective homelands. Such a desire to maintain a dual loyalty became a major force in the rise of the idea of the Canadian mosaic. Overall, Ukrainian nationalists, with all their prerequisites—the franchise, intensive ideological rivalry, lack of an official and overriding voice from their homeland, and statelessness—strengthened their boundaries. They also did so more than "mainstream" Scots, who to a great degree defined Canada, and "marginalized" Japanese, who had few means of participation, given their race, Japanese imperialism, and concentration in British Columbia. The Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, envisioned Canada as "multiethnic" more enthusiastically and earlier than others.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See Kate A. Foster, *Our Canadian Mosaic* (Toronto: Dominion Council, YWCA, 1926); and John Murray Gibbon, *Canadian Mosaic: The Making of a Northern Nation* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1938).

<sup>2</sup> Many of the issues regarding the promotion of Scottish identity as a provincial identity of Nova Scotia by Angus L. Macdonald are discussed in Ian McKay, "Tartanism Triumphant: The Construction of Scottishness in Nova Scotia, 1933-1954," *Acadiensis* 21: 2 (Spring 1992): 5-47.

<sup>3</sup> Canada officially recognized the Soviet Union in 1924. The first Soviet ambassador to Canada, Georgi Nikolayevitch Zarubin, was appointed in 1944. In 1941, the proposal that Canada should establish full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was vigorously opposed by nationalist Ukrainians. See Bohdan S. Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 65-74.

<sup>4</sup> Orest Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Years, 1891-1924* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1991), 224.

<sup>5</sup> "My dlia partii—chy partiia dlia nas?" *Zakhidni visty*, 20 June 1930, 4. See also "Korin pomylok," *Zakhidni visty*, 15 August 1930, 4; and "Vorohy i pryiateli," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 21 October 1925, 4.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, "Pravo holosovnia i listy holosuiuchykh," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 5 October 1921, 4; "Dominiialni vybory i my," *Zakhidni visty*, 18 April 1930, 4; and "Ukrainski kandydaty v Manitobi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 8 June 1927, 4.

<sup>7</sup> There were some exceptions, which included World War I veterans who gained the franchise in 1931, and the Japanese who lived in Alberta who had the provincial and municipal franchise, but they constituted less than 2% of all Japanese in Canada. See Yoko Urata Nakahara, "Ethnic Identity Among Japanese Canadians in Edmonton: The Case of Pre-World War II Immigrants And Their Descendants" (Ph.D. diss., University of Alberta, 1991). For the interwar franchise movement for Japanese veterans, see Hiroko Takamura, "The Tangled Identity of Issei Japanese in Their Fight for Franchise, 1900-1931," in *Changing Japanese Identities in Multicultural Canada*, ed. Hiroko Noro, Midge M. Ayukawa, and Helen Landowne (Victoria: University of Victoria Press, 2003), 233-40.

<sup>8</sup> On the role of the Legation, see Klaus H. Pringsheim, *Neighbours across the Pacific: Canadian-Japanese Relations, 1870-1982* (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1983), 31-65.

<sup>9</sup> "Zaika dôhō no ankoku jidai, 10," *Tairiku nippo*, 24 December 1926, 1.

<sup>10</sup> Japanese language schools were often organized by interested groups of parents and local secular or Buddhist organizations. The first one opened in Vancouver in 1906, and by 1935, there were approximately forty schools in British Columbia. See Ken Adachi, *The Enemy that Never Was: An Account of the Deplorable Treatment Inflicted on Japanese Canadians during World War Two* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 127.

<sup>11</sup> A number of criticisms of the Consul were expressed in *Tairiku nippo* in 1926; see, for example, "Zaika dôhō no ankoku jidai, 6," *Tairiku nippo*, 20 December 1926, 1.

<sup>12</sup> "Dôhō shakai wa kiki ni aru to nikkai o satta hito ga shinchōnaru kōryo o kibō," *Tairiku nippo*, 20 March 1926, 5.

- <sup>13</sup> Yasutarô Yamaga regularly contributed to *Tairiku nippo*. As a Christian, he built a good relationship with British Canadians, and was always critical of forming Japanese clusters in Canada. See, for example, his series of articles, “Dôhō nôsha no haiseki mondai,” *Tairiku nippo*, 1 June 1926, 1, and 3 June 1926, 1.
- <sup>14</sup> See, for example, “Zaika dôhō seikatsu ni shidôseishin no teishô,” *Tairiku nippo*, 11 October 1934, 3. The JCCL’s activities focused on the franchise and it was always on the agenda. See University of British Columbia Archives, Japanese Canadian Research Collection (hereafter JCRC), Box 7, file 4, Vancouver Chapter of the Japanese Canadian Citizens League, minutes, 1936-41.
- <sup>15</sup> J. M. Bumsted, “Scots,” in *Encyclopedia of Canada’s Peoples*, ed. Robert R. Magocsi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1139.
- <sup>16</sup> Library and Archives Canada (hereafter, LAC), MG 28 V2, vol. 6, St Andrew’s Society of Ottawa, minutes, 1868-1929; Beaton Institute, University College of Cape Breton (hereafter, Beaton Institute), MG 6-26 C 8, Scottish Catholic Society Collection, 1920-46, the Scottish Catholic Society, minutes.
- <sup>17</sup> For ideological divisions and mobilization of the masses, see Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada*, 486-510.
- <sup>18</sup> While the *issei*, with a few exceptions, did not speak out for the franchise as actively as the *nisei*, they always confronted attempts by “white” British Columbians to strip all rights from the Japanese, which included restrictions on land ownership and fishing licenses in the early twentieth century.
- <sup>19</sup> “Naibilshе lykho v hromadskim zhyttiu,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 30 December 1925, 4.
- <sup>20</sup> “Shoho ne treba zabivaty!” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 11 February 1920, 4. See also “Ukrainska kultura i chervoni ianychary,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 7 March 1923, 4; “Praktychna propozyziia,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 22 April 1925; and “Ugrupuvannia kanadiiskykh ukrainsiv,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 9 May 1928, 4.
- <sup>21</sup> D. M. Elcheshen, “Bolshevik Imperialism,” *Ukrainian Review*, 4 January 1937, 8.
- <sup>22</sup> “Nikkei shiminkyôkai no hôshin ni tsuite,” *Tairiku nippo*, 28 March 1932, 8.
- <sup>23</sup> Kenô Ikago sent his articles on the education of the *nisei* to *Tairiku nippo* throughout the 1930s. Numerous public seminars were also held to discuss how to educate the *nisei*. See, for example, a series of articles on the educational workshop in Vancouver, starting on 8 June 1935 in *Tairiku nippo*.
- <sup>24</sup> Christopher Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707 to the Present*, 3rd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 13.
- <sup>25</sup> Murray G. H. Pittock, *Scottish Nationality* (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave, 2001), 82.
- <sup>26</sup> Carl Berger, *Sense of Power: Studies in the Idea of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 259.
- <sup>27</sup> See, for example, “Poslidovnist,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 1 April 1921, 4; “Pozychka dlia Halychyny,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 13 July 1921, 4; “Na pomich ridnyi zemli!” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 21 December 1921, 4; “Na shcho e halytska pozychka svobody,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 10 August 1921, 4; and “Velykyi zymovyi oboviazok,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 19 January 1921, 4.

<sup>28</sup> “Do ukrainskoho hromadianstva v Amerytsi y Kanadi!” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 4 October 1922, 5; “Narodna sprava,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 13 December 1922, 4; and “Robota dlia ukrainskoi spravy,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 8 July 1925, 4.

<sup>29</sup> The construction of the modern Japanese nation state started in 1868 when the Meiji government took over Tokugawa bakufu (polity) and introduced modernization policies in education, the military, and government systems. Yet scholars identified the emergence of national consciousness or nationhood before the Meiji restoration, especially among local samurai who tried to restore the Emperor’s power which had been under the shogun’s control. See, for example, Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 94-8.

<sup>30</sup> “Dôhō shakai ha kiki ni aruto nikkai o satta hitobito ga shinchōnaru koryo o kibō,” *Tairiku nippo*, 20 March 1926, 5.

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, “Dôhōshoshi ni kangaete itadakitai koto,” *Tairiku nippo*, 31 August 1939, 2; and Noboru Inamoto, “Dainisei no watashi ga hunki no tokikuru,” *Tairiku nippo*, 16 February 1939, 2.

<sup>32</sup> “Zairyū dôhō no seishin sōdōin,” *Tairiku nippo*, 23 January 1939, 4.

<sup>33</sup> “Kaigai zairyūmin ha dôhōshakai o wasureruna,” *Tairiku nippo*, 9 August 1938, 5.

<sup>34</sup> “Telegrama v ukrainskii spravi,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 28 January 1920, 5.

<sup>35</sup> “Memorial do premiera Kinga,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 12 July 1922, 3.

<sup>36</sup> “Ukrainets liubyt voliu,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 5 May 1937, 4.

<sup>37</sup> “Ukraina domahaesia povnoi svobody,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 1 January 1919, 1. For discussion on democracy, see also “Voroh demokratii,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 12 July 1933, 4; “Syla i slabict demokratii,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 19 July 1933, 4; and “Poshana zakoniv,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 25 July 1937, 4.

<sup>38</sup> “Pislannytstvo kanadiiskykh ukraintsiv,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 29 June 1938, 4.

<sup>39</sup> “Zairyū dôhō no seishinsōdōin,” *Tairiku nippo*, 23 January 1939, 4. See also “Nentō ni Atari dôhōshoshi ni tsugu,” *Tairiku nippo*, 1 January 1939, 1; “Dainisei no watashi ga huntō no toki itaru,” *Tairiku nippo*, 16 February 1939, 2; Eikichi Kagetsu, “Jiko no seishin o saikentōseyo,” *Tairiku nippo*, 7 July 1939, 3; and “Dôhōshoshi ni kangaete itadakitai koto,” *Tairiku nippo*, 31 August 1939, 2.

<sup>40</sup> “Zaibei dôhō ni tsugu!” *Tairiku nippo*, 5 November 1938, 4.

<sup>41</sup> Yasuharu Kadoguchi, “Jihen to dai nisei,” *Tairiku nippo*, 10 November 1937, 2.

<sup>42</sup> See also Edward C. Banno, “The Sino-Japanese Affair and the Second Generation Japanese,” *Tairiku nippo*, 1 January 1938, 2.

<sup>43</sup> “Immigrants Who Are Not an Asset,” *Saturday Night* 40 (14 March 1925): 1.

<sup>44</sup> Ninety-five per cent of the CPC members came from by the Finns, the Jews, and the Ukrainians. Orest T. Martynowych, introduction to *Prophets and Proletarians: Documents on the History of the Rise and Decline of Ukrainian Communism in Canada*, ed. John Kolasky (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1990), xxiii.

<sup>45</sup> Charles Lugin Shaw, “Japan’s Finger in Canada,” *Maclean’s* (15 October 1937): 11, 53.

- <sup>46</sup> W. Peter Ward, *White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes And Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978), 100.
- <sup>47</sup> Hilda Glynn-Ward, *The Writing on the Wall* (1921; reprint, with an introduction by Patricia E. Roy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 143.
- <sup>48</sup> F. W. Baumgartner, "Central European Immigration," *Queen's Quarterly* 37: 4 (Winter 1930): 190.
- <sup>49</sup> A. L. Horton, "A Protest from Vegreville," *Macleans* (15 August 1930): 48.
- <sup>50</sup> This sort of belief is well expressed by Griffin Frederick, "Catching up with Canada," *Star Weekly*, 1 December 1928, 3.
- <sup>51</sup> *Canada Year Book* (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1927-8), 191.
- <sup>52</sup> W. A. Carrothers, "The Immigration Problem in Canada," *Queen's Quarterly* 34: 2 (Summer 1929): 521.
- <sup>53</sup> Charles Lugin Shaw, "The Oriental Wants to Vote," *Macleans* (1 April 1937): 24.
- <sup>54</sup> For a discussion of the liberal tendencies of Canadian scholars who moved away from narrow racism to ethnic pluralism, see Susan Bellay, "Pluralism and Race/ethnic Relations in Canadian Social Science, 1880-1939" (Ph.D. diss., University of Manitoba, 2001).
- <sup>55</sup> For studies of assimilation of ethnic groups published during this period, see also James T. M. Anderson, *The Education of the New Canadian: A Treatise on Canada's Greatest Education Problem* (London and Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1918); and C. A. Dawson, *Group Settlement: Ethnic Communities in Western Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada 1936).
- <sup>56</sup> W. G. Smith, *Building the Nation: A Study of Some Problems Concerning the Churches' Relation to the Immigrants* (Toronto: Canadian Council of the Missionary Education Movement, 1922), xiv.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 170.
- <sup>58</sup> George M. Weir, introduction to *The Central European Immigrant in Canada*, by Robert England (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1929), x.
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.
- <sup>60</sup> Robert England, *The Colonization of Western Canada: A Study of Contemporary Land Settlement* (London: P.S. King, 1936), 167.
- <sup>61</sup> Helen R. Y. Reid, foreword to *The Ukrainian Canadians: A Study in Assimilation*, by Charles H. Young, and Helen R. Y. Reid (Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1931), v.
- <sup>62</sup> Young, *Ibid.*, 76-7.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 77.
- <sup>64</sup> Charles H. Young, Helen R. Y. Reid, and W. A. Carrothers, *The Japanese Canadians*, ed. H. A. Innis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1938), 171-4.
- <sup>65</sup> Smith, *Building the Nation*, 129.
- <sup>66</sup> England, *The Central European Immigration in Canada*, 85.
- <sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 73, 83, 88, 96-7.

- <sup>68</sup> See also Denzel G. Ridout, "European Sources of Non-Anglo-Saxons in Canada," *Canadian Geographical Journal* 2 (March 1931): 204.
- <sup>69</sup> Young, *The Japanese Canadians*, 78-81, 85-118.
- <sup>70</sup> Focusing on the images of Ukrainian women, Frances Swyripa argues that both nationalist and communist elites invented enlightened and emancipated images of women to promote Ukrainian Canadian Community goals and help integrate Ukrainian into Canadian society. See her *Wedded to the Cause: Ukrainian-Canadian Women and Ethnic Identity, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 63-142.
- <sup>71</sup> A. Hniazdovska, "Nehozhadani imigranty," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 20 June 1928, 11.
- <sup>72</sup> "Naivazhniima sprava," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 23 July 1924, 4; see also "Na uvahu farmeram i farmerskyii molodizhy," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 20 October 1920, 4; and "Postupaemo chy padaemo?" *Ukrainskyi holos*, 22 February 1922, 4.
- <sup>73</sup> Yasutarô Yamaga, "dôhō no haiseki mondai," *Tairiku nippo*, 1 June 1926, 1.
- <sup>74</sup> See, for example, "Na uvahu farmeram i farmerskyii molodizhu," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 20 October, 4.
- <sup>75</sup> "Naivazhniima sprava," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 23 July 1924, 4.
- <sup>76</sup> "Dobri ukraintsi i dobri kanadiitsi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 6 November 1929, 4.
- <sup>77</sup> Yasutarô Yamaga, "Yamato minzoku hatten no kagi, 3," *Tairiku nippo*, 1 November 1934, 3.
- <sup>78</sup> *Ibid.* See also his "Yamato minzoku hatten no kagi, 1," *Tairiku nippo*, 30 October 1934; and "Yamato minzoku hatten no kagi, 2," *Tairiku nippo*, 31 October 1934, 3.
- <sup>79</sup> "Zairyû dôhō ni taisuru kibō," *Tairiku nippo*, 27 August 1923, 1.
- <sup>80</sup> "Ukrainska kultura i chervoni ianychary," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 7 March 1923, 4.
- <sup>81</sup> F. T. Havryliuk, "Nash kulturnyi rozvii v Kanadi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 5 February 1936, 12.
- <sup>82</sup> Beaton Institute, University College of Cape Breton, MG 6-20 3, Joseph J. MacInnis Collection, 1924-1939, Catherine MacKenzie, "Creating A New Scotland in Canada," 4, n.d.
- <sup>83</sup> "The Gael or Celt in Canada," *Gaelic Herald* 4: 9 (1932): 9. For Angus L. Macdonald's obsession with Gaelic, see McKay, "Tartanism Triumphant," 35-9.
- <sup>84</sup> Joseph D. Stetkewicz, "The Ukrainian Language," *Ukrainian Review*, 20 April 1937, 10.
- <sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>86</sup> "Nihongo gakko mondai," *Tairiku nippo*, 8 October 1932, 3.
- <sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>88</sup> "Kanada zairyu dôhō no kakuriteki seikatsu," *Tairiku nippo*, 4 November 1932, 3.
- <sup>89</sup> "Dai nisei mondai to dôhōshakai no genjōtoppa," *Tairiku nippo*, 28 April 1932, 4.
- <sup>90</sup> "Dobri ukraintsi i dobri kanadiitsi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 6 November 1929, 4.
- <sup>91</sup> "Dainisei shidō seishin no kakuritsu ga hitsuyō da," *Tairiku nippo*, 2 April 1934, 2.
- <sup>92</sup> "Dobri ukraintsi i dobri kanadiitsi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 6 November 1929, 4.
- <sup>93</sup> V. Sarchuk, "Harmonizatsiia dvokh kultur," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 21 September 1938, 11.



- <sup>94</sup> “Kanada no nihongo gakkô: kyôikukai no sôkai,” *Tairiku nippo*, 17 April 1933, 8.
- <sup>95</sup> Hisae Hirano, “Ideals of a Canadian-born Japanese,” *Tairiku nippo*, 12 November 1932, 7.
- <sup>96</sup> Eiko Henmi, “Ideals of a Canadian-born Japanese,” *Tairiku nippo*, 24 September 1932, 7.
- <sup>97</sup> William Darcovich and Paul Yuzyk, eds., *A Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891-1976* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980), Series 20.1-11.
- <sup>98</sup> “Za svoe pravo,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 13 June 1934, 5.
- <sup>99</sup> F. T. Havryliuk, “Nash kulturnyi rozvii v Kanadi,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 12 February 1936, 12.
- <sup>100</sup> Darcovich and Yuzyk, *A Statistical Compendium*, Series 20.24-7.
- <sup>101</sup> “Nikkei dainisei no gyosha danketsu no yô o sakebu,” *Tairiku nippo*, 9 May 1935, 2.
- <sup>102</sup> “Dai nisei shidôseishin no kakuritsu ga hitsuyô da,” *Tairiku nippo*, 31 March 1934, 3.
- <sup>103</sup> O. I. Bochkovsky, “Ukrainci v Kanadi,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 21 August 1937, 4.
- <sup>104</sup> “Nisei no Tenshoku,” *Tairiku nippo*, 21 January 1933, 4.
- <sup>105</sup> Kenzô Ikago, “Zaika dainisei no kyôiku mondai ni tsuki,” *Tairiku nippo*, 8 March 1935, 3.
- <sup>106</sup> “Shinsaiin no nihonjin, shugasai ni dashi,” *Tairiku nippo*, 11 May 1937, 5; and “Ukrainian Contribution to Welcome Week Parade,” *Ukrainian Review*, May 1939, 1.
- <sup>107</sup> “Hail, Their Majesties!” *Ukrainian Review*, May 1939, 4.
- <sup>108</sup> “Bankuba o iyasu kehu no kangai,” *Tairiku nippo*, 29 May 1939, 1.
- <sup>109</sup> Pittock, *Scottish Nationality*, 82. Hugh Trevor-Roper well explains how Highland cultures were invented. See his “The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland,” in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 15-41.
- <sup>110</sup> “Syn i batko narodu,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 10 March 1926, 4. See Swyrypa, *Wedded to the Cause*, 104, 120-4, 215-16, 238, 255, for a discussion of the role of Cossack mythology in Ukrainian-Canadian Women’s organizations.
- <sup>111</sup> Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3.
- <sup>112</sup> Kiyoharu Kitô, “Kokumin kokka o sakanoboru,” in *Kokumin Kokka o Tou*, ed. Rekishigaku Kenkyukai (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1994), 228-9.
- <sup>113</sup> The theory that ethnicity was deeply rooted in a sense of being “chosen peoples” was best explored by Anthony D. Smith. See his *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). How the Scots in Canada viewed themselves as a “chosen people” is discussed thoroughly by Ian McKay in “Tartanism Triumphant,” 16-9.
- <sup>114</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 149-50.
- <sup>115</sup> F. A. Morrison, *Toast to the Immortal Memory, Address before the Burn's Club*, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada on the anniversary of the birthday of Robert Burns, Edmonton, *Report*, 1925, 8.

- <sup>116</sup> “Sviato Shevchenka,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 10 March 1926, 5. See also “Pamiaty Shevchenka,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 9 March 1921, 4; “Shevchenka Sviata,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 23 March 1921, 4; “Ne pliuimo sobi v lytsie,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 19 March 1924, 4; “Mistsie Shevchenka,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 9 March 1932, 4; “9-ho bereznia – sviato Shevchenka,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 4 March 1936, 4; “Taras Shevchenko,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 3 March 1937, 4; and “Pamiati velykoho spivtsia Ukrainy,” *Ukrainski visty*, 14 March 1934, 4.
- <sup>117</sup> “Zairyûmin hôshukukai,” *Tairiku nippo*, 28 December 1933, 5.
- <sup>118</sup> “Ishiiryôji no kôwa,” *Tairiku nippo*, 24 April 1935, 3.
- <sup>119</sup> “Zaika nisei shokun no kyôiku mondai ni tsuki,” *Tairiku nippo*, 23 February 1935, 3.
- <sup>120</sup> Hirokichi Nemichi, “Nihon no kokuryoku iyo kanpeki,” *Tairiku nippo*, 7 July 1939, 3.
- <sup>121</sup> Eikichi Kagetsu, “Jiko no seishin o saikentô seyo,” *Tairiku nippo*, 7 July 1939, 3. See also “Nihonjin no tachiba,” *Tairiku nippo*, 27 February 1939, 4.
- <sup>122</sup> For Gibbon’s role in creating national unity through folk arts, see Ian McKay, *The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), 57-8. See also Stuart Henderson, “‘While There is Still Time...’: J. Murray Gibbon and the Spectacle of Difference in Three CPR Folk Festivals, 1928-1931,” *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 39: 1 (Winter 2005): 139-74.
- <sup>123</sup> Robert England, “Glimpse of Europe in Western Canada,” *Canadian Geographical Journal* 5: 1 (July 1932): 15.
- <sup>124</sup> Gibbon, *Canadian Mosaic*, 299.
- <sup>125</sup> John Murray Gibbon, “European Seeds in the Canadian Garden,” *Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* 17: 2 (May 1923): 123-4.
- <sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 129.
- <sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 303.
- <sup>128</sup> Watson Kirkconnell, *Canadian Overtones* (Winnipeg: The Columbia Press, 1935), 76.
- <sup>129</sup> The best exploration of the relationship between people and geographical territory in the rise of nationalism is by Anthony D. Smith. See his *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, 150.
- <sup>130</sup> McKay, “Tartanism Triumphant,” 6. See also Steve Murdoch, “Cape Breton, Canada’s ‘Highland Island’?” *Northern Scotland* 18 (1998): 31-42.
- <sup>131</sup> Darcovich and Yuzyk, *A Statistical Compendium*, Series 20.49.
- <sup>132</sup> McKay, “Tartanism Triumphant 9, 19. For myth-making and the promotion of Scottishness, see also Norman Macdonald, “Putting on the Kilt: The Scottish Stereotype and Ethnic Community Survival in Cape Breton,” *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 20: 3 (1988): 132-46.
- <sup>133</sup> Michael Vance, “Powerful Pathos: The Triumph of Scottishness in Nova Scotia,” in *Transatlantic Scots*, ed. Celeste Ray (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 158. For Macdonald’s fascination with the *Hector*, see “Tartanism Triumphant,” 14. On romanticized histories of the *Hector* immigrants, see Lucille H. Campey, *After the Hector: The Scottish Pioneers of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, 1773-1852* (Toronto: Natural Heritage, 2004); and Donald MacKay, *Scotland Farewell: The People of the Hector* (Toronto: Natural Heritage, 1996). Campey’s book includes a list of passengers, their age, occupation, and other information.

- <sup>134</sup>Public Archives of Nova Scotia (hereafter, PANS), MG 2 vol. 1507, file 436-1, Angus L. Macdonald, address to the St. Andrew's Society of New Glasgow, 1924, p.5A.
- <sup>135</sup> Beaton Institute, MG 6-26, C 10, "New Scotland," n.d.
- <sup>136</sup> "Chy spravdi ukrainsi 'nebazhanyi' element v Kanadi?" *Zakhidni visty*, 16 January 1931, 4.
- <sup>137</sup> "Epopoia ukrainskykh pioniriv u Kanadi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 20 July 1939, 3. See also "Novi kanadiitsi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 26 July 1939, 10.
- <sup>138</sup> For example, see Baumgartner, "Central European Immigration," 183-92.
- <sup>139</sup> Ward, *White Canada Forever*, 117.
- <sup>140</sup> McKay, "Tartanism Triumphant," 19.
- <sup>141</sup> "The Gael or Celt in Canada," *Gaelic Herald* 4: 9 (1932): 9.
- <sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.
- <sup>143</sup> See, for example, "V stolittia kanadiiskoi zalisnytsi," *Ukrainski visty*, 22 July 1936, 4.
- <sup>144</sup> "Nepryznani sasluhy," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 5 August 1925, 4. See also M. Luchkovich, "Ukrainian and Canadian Citizenship," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 6 July 1921, 2.
- <sup>145</sup> Frances Swyripa argues that this sort of manipulation of "peasant pioneer myths" became commonplace by the 1960s among the Ukrainians. See her *Wedded to the Cause*, 221.
- <sup>146</sup> "Epopoia ukrainskykh pioniriv u Kanadi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 20 July 1939, 3.
- <sup>147</sup> "Gyodan to Stebusuton," *Tairiku nippo*, 14 December 1935, 5.
- <sup>148</sup> "Suson gyosha jizen dantai sôritsu sanjûgonen no shukugakai," *Tairiku nippo*, 17 December 1935, 4.
- <sup>149</sup> "Pauerugai ha hito no nami," *Tairiku nippo*, 13 August 1936, 5. See also "Sakuya no nihon odori," *Tairiku nippo*, 14 August 1936, 4. "Nihonshu, omatsuri," *Tairiku nippo*, 27 August 1936, 3. It was argued that the Powell Street could be one of the major tourist sites of Vancouver, and the construction of a better "Japanese town" was emphasized. See Yoriki Iwasaki, "Nihonjingai hattensaku shian," *Tairiku nippo*, 13 August 1936, supplement.
- <sup>150</sup> "Kusawakejidai o kataru," *Tairiku nippo*, 1 January 1936, 1.
- <sup>151</sup> See "Shistdesiatylittia Kanady," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 29 July 1927, 9-10; and "Shistdesiat lit postupu vid konfederatsii," 25 May 1927, 4. *Tairiku nippo* featured a series of articles, "Kenkoku rokujûnen no shukusai," 10 June 1927, 2, 16 June 1927, 2, 20 June 1927, 2, 21 June 1927, 2, 22 June 1927, 2, 23 June 1927, 2, 25 June 1927, 2, and 28 June 1927, 2.
- <sup>152</sup> "Iuvylei Kanady," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 29 June 1927, 4.
- <sup>153</sup> "Obkhid iuvyleiu Kanady v Vinnipegu," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 6 July 1927, 1.
- <sup>154</sup> "Sviatkovannia iuvyleiu Kanady," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 29 June 1927, 1.
- <sup>155</sup> "Bankuba no daishukuga," *Tairiku nippo*, 28 June 1927, 5; and "Daishukuga no nigiwai," *Tairiku nippo*, 2 July 1927, 5.

### **Chapter 3**

## **World War II: Increasing Tensions and the Wartime Mosaic**

The outbreak of World War II posed dilemmas for both mainstream Canadians and ethnic elites in terms of how they envisioned Canada and dealt with ethnic groups' homeland issues. On the one hand, mainstream British-Canadian politicians and academics faced difficulties in balancing democratic principles with deep-rooted suspicions and prejudices against certain ethnic groups. They reconfirmed the supremacy of the political, legal, and cultural traditions—particularly democracy and liberalism—that Canada inherited from Britain. Paradoxically, however, the ideals for which they were fighting overseas raised questions about how to deal with ethnic minorities in Canada. On the one hand, Canada had to denounce racism, which was now identified with Nazi Germany, at every opportunity; at the same time, the presence of “enemy aliens”—particularly the Japanese—within its territory was seen unfavourably. On the other hand, Ukrainian and Japanese elites faced their own dilemma of conflicting loyalties between Canada and their homelands, now more acute than ever. Both communities pledged their allegiance to Canada and Britain, yet they rarely abandoned homeland politics even if they conflicted with Canada's war effort.

The war era was thus a period filled with contradictions and political maneuvering. This chapter argues that, at one level, the war reinforced the existing ethnic and racial hierarchy to the point of broadening the gap between suspect ethnic groups and their acceptance as participants in Canadian nation building. In this process, the Scots were ethnically invisible as part of the wartime leadership; Ukrainians were increasingly incorporated into or expected to contribute to Canada's war effort; and the Japanese were

excluded. Yet at another level, the escalating tensions between potentially problematic ethnic groups and Canada urged the Canadian public to contemplate the roles that ethnic groups could play in the country and how they should be treated. Both Ukrainians and Japanese seized the opportunity that this rethinking presented. Ukrainian nationalists demanded equal rights and the broad acceptance of ethnic pluralism in Canada, while the Japanese *nisei* denounced racism and internment, and renewed the call for the franchise in the name of democracy. In this sense, both ethnic groups took a critical step in the pursuit of full partnership in Canadian society.

### **Reinforcing the Ethnic Hierarchy: Mainstream Canada**

During World War II, the situation among the Ukrainians and the Japanese in Canada was always affected by international events compounded by political considerations of the Canadian government, while the Scots were integral to wartime policy making. The decision of Parliament under Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King, himself of Scottish origin, to join Britain in the war against Nazi Germany in September 1939, following Adolf Hitler's advance into Poland, made Germany and its allied Axis countries Canada's enemies. On the home front, Canadians were categorized into loyal and disloyal groups, based on alleged formal or informal ties with such foreign powers—Germany after 1939, Italy after 1940, the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941, and Japan after 1941.<sup>1</sup>

Ukrainians' loyalty was assessed according to the ideological line between nationalists and communists, and as the international situation affecting the two groups shifted, so did their status in Canadian society. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, as well as general suspicion of communism, automatically made communist

Ukrainians disloyal, and challenged the Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA) leadership. Their organized activities and newspaper, *Narodna hazeta* (renamed from *Ukrainski robotnychi visti* in 1937), were banned in 1940; several leaders were interned between 1940 and 1942; and their community halls were confiscated and sold to other Ukrainian associations.<sup>2</sup> The position of communist Ukrainians improved after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, which made Canada the latter's ally and upset nationalist Ukrainians. Before the war, the leaders of the right-wing Ukrainian National Federation (UNF) had hoped that Hitler would help redraw national territories in Europe and give Ukrainians sovereignty. They were thus particularly vulnerable after the outbreak of hostilities to accusations of being pro-German and often came under suspicion.

The loyalty of the Japanese was viewed collectively and monolithically in that no distinction was made between Japanese-born *issei* and Canadian-born *nisei*. The Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan signed in 1936 and Japan's participation in the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1940 were initial factors in labeling the Japanese unreliable. The start of the Pacific War in December 1941 officially made them enemy aliens and intensified these sentiments. The following year when the federal government announced the evacuation of 22,000 Japanese residents from the West Coast of British Columbia, their relocation to camps (such as Tashme, Greenwood, Kaslo, New Denver, and Slocan) in the interior, and the confiscation of their property.<sup>3</sup> The evacuation was undertaken gradually rather than all at once, starting with males so that the separation of family members and the removal of community leaders became a major problem. Also in 1942 the Canadian Japanese Association (CJA) was dissolved; the

*issei's* organ, *Tairiku nippo*, was banned; and both the Consulate in Vancouver and the Legation in Ottawa were closed, leaving the Japanese with neither the organized *issei's* voice nor official representatives from Japan.

While mainstream Canadian policy makers, which included ethnic Scots, thus viewed both the Ukrainians and the Japanese with caution and suspicion, other pre-existing factors made them treat the former with greater flexibility and openness. First, there was the critical fact that Ukrainian nationalists lacked a sovereign homeland and did not identify with Soviet Ukraine, whereas the Japanese in Canada were regarded as part of a now dangerous imperial power. Second, over the previous two decades Ukrainians had acquired increasingly political as well as economic importance in Canada, unlike the Japanese, and a certain trust developed between them and a handful of well-placed mainstream Canadians. Third, the concentration of the Japanese population in British Columbia, which was within reach of Japan, intensified anti-Japanese sentiment, while Ukrainians, residing mainly in remote central provinces, rarely raised such fears.

These differences were evident in the attitudes of not only mainstream politicians but also academics whose significance lay in their close association with governments at both the provincial and federal levels. These individuals played a critical role in the mobilization of public opinion regarding Ukrainians and Japanese. Watson Kirkconnell, then a professor of English at McMaster University, and George W. Simpson, a professor of history at the University of Saskatchewan, were two of the influential figures who provided background information on the Ukrainians both to the public and to the Department of National War Services established in 1940. An advocate

of the Canadian mosaic since the 1930s, Kirkconnell had written extensively and favorably about Ukrainians. Yet as the war progressed, his focus moved to questions about the loyalty of nationalist Ukrainians in Canada, which was a key theme in each of his *Canada, Europe, and Hitler* (1939), *The Ukrainian Canadians and the War* (1940), and *Our Ukrainian Loyalists* (1943). Simpson had a close relationship with the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League (USRL), and played a central role in the establishment of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) in 1940 to facilitate Ukrainians' war effort.<sup>4</sup> Having strong personal connections with nationalist Ukrainian organizations such as the UNF, Kirkconnell, in particular, tried to justify alleged strong ties with Nazi Germany. He argued that Ukrainians were only trying to take advantage of Nazi Germany's eastern expansionist goals that might destroy the Soviet Union and help the establishment of a sovereign Ukraine. The UNF, according to Kirkconnell, did not support "the Nazi régime and its political ideals" but saw it just as a means to an end.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, after investigating the issue, Simpson concluded that "it is a conjunction or coincidence in international affairs which at the present time links Hitler's ambition for power with Ukrainian aspirations for national independence. Such a situation is by no means unusual or novel."<sup>6</sup>

Nor were the Japanese without sympathizers. In fact, prior to Pearl Harbor, Mackenzie King took a very sympathetic approach to the Japanese, stating:

The decision of the Japanese government to ally itself with Germany and Italy, under certain conditions, has undoubtedly greatly increased tension in the whole Pacific area. . . . Partly, perhaps, as a result of growing tension in the far east, we recently witnessed an unfortunate recrudescence of anti-oriental feeling in British Columbia. This campaign was characterized by wholly unsubstantiated and irresponsible charges and accusations against our fellow nationals and other residents of British Columbia who are of Japanese racial origin.<sup>7</sup>



As this remark suggests, the Japanese problem was initially identified only with British Columbia and not yet perceived as a national one. Other individuals, such as Henry F. Angus, a professor of economics at the University of British Columbia,<sup>8</sup> and members of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) also advocated tolerance towards the Japanese, particularly the Canadian born. Yet their moderate voices were overwhelmed by anti-Asian politicians from British Columbia, including MPs like Ian A. Mackenzie and Thomas Reid, both Liberals, and Independent MP, A. W. Neil.<sup>9</sup> Mackenzie, who happened to be an expert in Gaelic and Scottish literature, served first as Minister of National Defence and then as Minister of Pensions and National Health, and spearheaded the anti-Japanese movement in Parliament. Through his influential position in the government in Ottawa and in British Columbia, he exercised power and was involved in the creation of anti-Japanese policies during the war, including internment.<sup>10</sup>

One of the striking differences in activities and rhetoric among these diverse individuals was their characterization of the Ukrainian and Japanese groups. The mainstream elite rarely treated all Ukrainians in the same way, recognizing the internal diversity among them, yet it categorized all Japanese in Canada as a single dangerous ethnic community. Kirkconnell, for example, devoted a series of publications to stressing the difference between Ukrainian nationalists and communists. For him, the former represented genuine Ukrainians and loyal Canadians, who “were so organized, not primarily as Ukrainians but as Canadian citizens in support of the war effort,” and whose “support has been loyally and generously given.”<sup>11</sup> Conversely, he attributed all signs of suspicious activities to the latter and their “rural constituencies,” which were “closely identified with the Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association, a small but vigorously

organized Communist group, which is far from representative of the Ukrainians as a whole.”<sup>12</sup> The ULFTA, he said, was “not even Ukrainian,” as “authentic Ukrainians are apparently an actual minority within the alleged total of 20,000 members.”<sup>13</sup> Clearly, ideology rather than common ethnic descent based on blood played a great role in the assessment of Ukrainian loyalty. This kind of distinction was rarely made for the Japanese, even if the mainstream elite was aware of the growing number of *nisei* and naturalized *issei* among them. In fact, A. W. Neil did recognize these differences, explaining, in a lengthy address to the House of Commons in 1942 on his work to restrict Japanese rights, that:

there are three classes of Japanese we must deal with. There are the Japanese nationals, those born in Japan and never naturalized in Canada; they are Japanese nationals. Then there is the man born in Japan and naturalized in Canada. He is called a naturalized Japanese or a Canadian. Then there is the Japanese who was born in Canada, who can call himself a Japanese-Canadian if he likes. The government orders with regard to seizing the boats and the sale of gas and explosives applied to all three classes. That was all right.<sup>14</sup>

Clearly, this remark represented both racism and the strong conviction that Japanese loyalty to the homeland would remain, no matter what an individual’s legal status. In this way, the mainstream elite played a role in redrawing Ukrainian and Japanese boundaries, determining who made up the membership of the two ethnic communities, regardless of how Ukrainians and Japanese themselves perceived their identity.

Another Japanese/Ukrainian difference concerned mainstream Canadians’ expectations regarding participation in the war effort. The fact that they anticipated Ukrainians’ full support for the war, while denying the Japanese such opportunities particularly served to increase the distance between the two groups. In many ways, the federal government often evaluated loyalty and participation in Canada’s war effort

according to the ethnic group rather than the individual, thereby reinforcing ethnic boundaries. The high expectations of the federal government for Ukrainians collectively to participate in the war effort was well illustrated by its involvement in the establishment of the UCC, which brought nationalist Ukrainians together and encouraged closer supervision of the masses. For example, Tracy Philipps, the government's own advisor in European affairs, worked behind the scene on behalf of the Department of National War Services and the Department of External Affairs to create the UCC as a unified, umbrella organization that would shift Ukrainian Canadians' focus from Ukraine to Canada.<sup>15</sup> Canadians' obsession with good "group" performance became obvious when they criticized the Ukrainian bloc settlements, especially the Vegreville colony in Alberta, for failing to cast majority votes for conscription in the national plebiscite of 1942.<sup>16</sup> In contrast, the Japanese were collectively denied participation in the war. Mackenzie and other MPs from British Columbia promoted anti-Japanese sentiment in Parliament, insisting the Japanese not have the right to enlist in the Canadian military. While Mackenzie King initially took a moderate approach to the Japanese, he announced his decision to exempt them from enlistment in January 1941, before Pearl Harbor, to show that the opinion of mainstream British Columbians weighed more than that of the Japanese. Such measures, together with the internment after Pearl Harbor that segregated the Japanese community from the rest of Canada, were undertaken, to some extent, to unite the rest of the country behind the war effort.

### **Conflicting Loyalties: Between Homelands and Canada**

World War II highlighted the tensions in the dual loyalty that Ukrainian and Japanese elites—the nationalists and the *issei* in particular—had cultivated since the

interwar period. The Scots were the only group among the three whose dual loyalty was never in conflict, and the war served to strengthen it by reminding them of the value of British ideals and the need to pursue them. Yet Ukrainian nationalists and the *issei* Japanese faced a test of loyalty. Both groups pledged their first loyalty to Canada and Britain, expressing full support for the Allies. Yet Ukrainian nationalists within as well as outside Canada regarded the wartime turmoil as a great opportunity to liberate Ukrainian territories from foreign rule and establish a unified independent Ukrainian state. The expectation in certain circles of the role that Nazi Germany might play in this quest was obviously incompatible with Canada's war aims. The Japanese *issei* were also torn between their support for Japan's campaign to become a world power and participation in Canada's war effort. Nonetheless, there were also major differences that helped to consolidate a sense of community among Ukrainian nationalists that was missing among the Japanese.

First, as ethnic communities are often built on causes closely tied to their homelands psychologically and physically, the absence of such a cause can weaken community bonds. Homeland remained a core of Ukrainian nationalist propaganda and a unifying force throughout the war regardless of the difficulties it presented, while to the Japanese it was no longer perceived as politically advantageous. In this light, Ukrainian nationalists renewed their sense of community in pursuit of independence for Ukraine, but the Japanese elite, especially once they became enemy aliens, could no longer use Japan's imperial messages to mobilize their people. The need for Ukrainians to grab the chance created by the war to fulfill their goal of nationhood was stressed, for example, in *Ukrainskyi holos* in an article entitled "All Ukrainians—Together!" It implied that such a

chance was rare and would not last long, arguing: “Here we need to act quickly. Ukrainians have to be independent, free, and self-reliant. This has been our long-term goal.”<sup>17</sup> Such a message might conflict with Canada’s interests, especially given the Allies’ guarantees to Poland and cooperation with the Soviet Union after 1941, but such political contradictions were relatively easy to be hidden in the name of a united war effort for Canada. For the Japanese, the conflict in their dual loyalty was much more obvious. Between September 1939 and December 1941, prior to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese elite also emphasized homeland issues to unite their people. The *issei*, in particular, had never lost their loyalty to Imperial Japan and publicly expressed it until right before Pearl Harbor. Such sentiments were expressed well by Eikichi Kagetsu, president of the CJA in 1940:

Now, our Imperial Japan has advanced above the world’s powers and stands in a superior position. Today, we, residing abroad, are able to look upon the gallant figure of Japan, thanks to its imperial virtues and the nation’s consistent efforts to pressure the traditional Japanese spirit. . . . The road to progress for our race is still far. The mission that the young generation carries on its shoulders on this road is of great significance. Yet behind our efforts, there is a great motherland and the world’s best national spirit.<sup>18</sup>

Understandably, this sort of open celebration for Japan rarely surfaced in public after December 1941 as the Japanese deliberately hid any emotional attachment to Japan. At a regular meeting organized by the *issei* who looked after Japanese internees in the Slocan camp, for example, the discussion went as follows: “They [the British Columbia Security Commission (BCSC)] complained about some people waving the Rising Sun when a group of internees set out. It would be better to conceal the Rising Sun in our mind.”<sup>19</sup> Both because Japanese symbols became increasingly “dangerous,” and because the *issei* lost their organized voice, the homeland was rarely incorporated into Japanese

propaganda. The *nisei* often took a very ambivalent and low-key approach to the war between Japan and Canada. The *New Canadian*, for example, wrote: “If we are honest, we shall never say that we hate the Japanese or that we hate Japan. And if we stand for Canada, we need not be ashamed of being a ‘Jap.’”<sup>20</sup> Clearly, Japan no longer served to promote a sense of pride and unity among the Japanese and became, instead, a source of tension.

The second difference between the Ukrainians and the Japanese concerned the role of organizational activities and the press, crucial to incorporating all Ukrainians and all Japanese in Canada into “imagined communities.” The Ukrainian nationalists, supported and spurred by mainstream Canadian leaders, began to overcome internal rivalries and increasingly unite, at least at an organizational level. This unity was considered particularly significant as it strengthened the power of the Ukrainian nationalist elite as the voice of the grassroots.<sup>21</sup> The great achievement was the establishment of the UCC in 1940, bringing together the USRL, the UNF, the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics of Canada, the United Hetman Organization, and the League of Ukrainian Labour Organizations. Its first national congress in 1943 served as a demonstration of Ukrainian unity behind two goals: Allied victory and Ukrainian independence. The publicity the congress attracted and such a grand gesture in support of Canada’s war effort were very effective in helping the UCC leadership promote the role that Ukrainians should play in the war.

The Japanese *issei*, on the contrary, lost such a means to mobilize their people, as *Tairiku nippo* was banned and organized activities were restricted. They published some articles in the *nisei* organ, the *New Canadian*, which became bilingual and ran

throughout the war, but censorship limited its contents to official information the *issei* needed to know. Japanese associations were often under the close scrutiny of government agencies, such as the BCSC which carried out the evacuation. In fact, the Japanese came into the crisis with limited organization and few competent leaders who could unite them in the emergency situation. For example, when the evacuation began, the BCSC appointed *issei* Etsuji Morii, who had experience in working with the RCMP, to carry out its orders. He was considered notorious among his people who did not regard him as their representative, and in his new position of authority was completely opposed by other Japanese leaders.<sup>22</sup> As a result, the Japanese were divided into three organizations: the *issei*'s Naturalized Japanese Canadian Association, the *nisei*'s Japanese Canadian Citizens Council (JCCC), and an independent group of *nisei* who resisted the government orders for evacuation.<sup>23</sup> None of these organizations could take effective leadership in the camps, however.<sup>24</sup> In fact, as their leaders went to different camps, organizational activities became increasingly difficult. For example, the JCCC saw its own demise:

We may take the stand that we have been taking up till now, that is, to co-operate with the Commission even against great opposition from many quarters and do what we can do to help the Japanese community carry out the evacuation as safely and as comfortably as possible. It probably will mean the slow starvation or strangulation of the Council because sooner or later the male Council members at least will be picked off one by one. The other way of settling this question is to hand in our permits [to leave for the camps] in a wholesale manner and break up the Council at once.<sup>25</sup>

Outside British Columbia, some Japanese *nisei* organized in Toronto in 1943 as the Japanese Canadian Committee for Democracy (JCCD). The war thus created a critical difference between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Japanese at an organizational level, uniting the former around a centralized umbrella association and leading to a division of power among the latter.

Finally, the intensity of internal competition within each of the Ukrainian and the Japanese ethnic groups during the war determined how much they became united. As the war progressed, the nationalist-communist rivalry intensified among the Ukrainians over both homeland issues and the representation of Ukrainians in Canada, providing momentum to each faction's activities on behalf of the mobilization of the masses. The *issei-nisei* relationship among the Japanese, in contrast, became much more interdependent than it had been during the interwar period, as *issei* and *nisei* alike faced the evacuation and camp life.

Among Ukrainians, the conflict between the UNF and the UFLTA was particularly severe, as the latter attacked the former for fascist propaganda and Nazi connections, and the former criticized the Soviet Union and communism.<sup>26</sup> The two groups exchanged shots in their respective organs, the UNF's *Novyi shliakh* and the communists' *Ukrainske zhyttia* and *Ukrainske slovo*.<sup>27</sup> The first UCC congress, which publicly proclaimed nationalists' loyalty to Canada, also demonstrated to the communist Ukrainians the size of the nationalist community and its good relations with mainstream Canada. This sense of community and its size were exaggerated in the congress's official proceedings: "The hearts, the feelings, and the thoughts of those present transcended the external manifestations of the Congress—they embraced the many thousands of Ukrainians in Canada."<sup>28</sup>

Similarly, among the Japanese the war increased the antagonism between the *issei* and the *nisei*, which surfaced over a number of issues such as loyalty to Japan, representation of the evacuees, and the preferred response to the evacuation orders. One illuminating example involved how to demonstrate Japanese loyalty to Canada. The *nisei*,



who regarded the purchase of the government's Victory Bonds as the most visible and recognizable way to show their dedication to the war effort, criticized an *issei* group for making direct donations to Canadian soldiers, as the *New Canadian* stated: "Differences in training and heritage have unfortunately left the average *issei* quite unable to grasp Canadian psychology. And viewed from the standpoint of a Canadian, the attitude of many of the first generation, though undoubtedly sincere and well-intentioned, is incredibly naïve and unrealistic."<sup>29</sup> Clearly, the *nisei* were more aware of the fact that the federal government tended to judge loyalty in terms of the ethnic group rather than individuals. Yet these differences were not as far reaching and profound as those dividing their Ukrainian counterparts. In fact, to a certain degree, the lack of an organized voice among the *issei* after 1942 gave the *nisei* the power and opportunity to speak for the community, particularly at the beginning of the evacuation.<sup>30</sup> As both the *issei* and the *nisei* were facing the crisis that threatened their community life, and the *issei* lost effective leadership, intense competition seemed counterproductive. The JCCC often worked with the CJA to carry out the BCSC's orders of confiscation and evacuation, held joint meetings, and eventually took over the CJA's responsibilities.<sup>31</sup> While effective leadership of the *nisei* rarely lasted in the camps or later on the farms to which many Japanese were moved, some voices anticipated the *nisei* era that followed. For example, a letter from an *issei* Japanese, sent to the *New Canadian* from a sugar beet farm in Manitoba, noted how a *nisei* had already been acting as a local representative, adding, "Everything belongs to the *nisei*'s era. We should only follow them."<sup>32</sup> Another letter from an *issei* in Ontario foresaw the *nisei*'s success as sugar beet farmers, building a good relationship with white society and winning its trust because of their fluent

English.<sup>33</sup> These comments suggest that a shift of power from the *issei* to the *nisei* was obvious at the new places, if all at once on a national scale.

While Ukrainian and Japanese elites both strove to maintain ethnic identity, they also wanted to demonstrate loyalty to Canada, using propaganda and rhetoric that targeted mainstream Canadians as well as their own people. USRL circles and the *nisei* Japanese, both Canadian oriented and adherents of liberal democracy to distinguish themselves from their rivals, exhibited a similar attitudes towards the war. As soon as the war broke out, both the USRL and the JCCL officially declared their full support for Canada. The USRL announced that the association “at no time wavered in its loyalty and devotion to the British Crown or to Canada.”<sup>34</sup> Similarly, the JCCL maintained that “since Canada is at war, and we call ourselves Canadians, we are anxious to do our share to help Canada; and there should be no doubt in our minds as to this issue.”<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, both the USRL and the Japanese *nisei* contended that their ethnic backgrounds would never affect their Canadianism. This position is evident from the USRL’s message to its members:

As we live in Canada, try to be good Canadian citizens. As Canadian citizens, you should not place the interests of a second state higher than those of Canada, and you should not have an obligation to those other countries higher than to Canada. . . . Even if the Ukrainian state should become independent, the obligations of Ukrainian Canadians towards Canada must be placed first. . . . And because an independent Ukrainian state does not exist, there is no difficulty for Ukrainians in Canada to sustain their loyalty to Canada over other loyalties.<sup>36</sup>

*Ukrainskyi holos* frequently expressed a sense of belonging to Canada, in statements like the following: “As Canadian citizens, we want Canada to have fewer guests and more real citizens. As Canadians of Ukrainian descent, we want Canada to have fewer guests of Ukrainian origin. We want Ukrainians in Canada to be the best of citizens.”<sup>37</sup> The

*nisei* Japanese, although well aware of their dilemma, expressed similar thoughts, as when one of them said: “He [a *nisei*] realizes that his destiny lies primarily in Canada, the land of his birth and education.”<sup>38</sup> The war was viewed as a great chance for the Japanese to prove their loyalty and destroy any suspicions about where they stood. “Indeed,” the *New Canadian* wrote after the attack on Pearl Harbor, “the war has not lessened our contribution as a group to the Canadian nation; it has imposed upon us a greater task for the future.”<sup>39</sup>

Both the Japanese and the Ukrainians also demonstrated their loyalty by enlisting and/or participating in Victory Loan Drives and Red Cross collections. Yet establishing Ukrainian support for the war effort was much easier, especially after Pearl Harbor when Japanese participation was greatly restricted. The war thus broadened the gap between the two groups in terms of their distance from mainstream society. At the UCC’s first congress in 1943, Vice President W. Kossar provided concrete evidence of the Ukrainian contribution. He estimated that 35,000 Ukrainians had enlisted to date, representing about fourteen per cent of the entire Canadian armed forces; and he claimed that Ukrainians were taking a major role in the Victory Loan drives in Alberta, for example, where 71,863 Ukrainians had purchased Victory Bonds.<sup>40</sup> George E. Dragan, who was the first Ukrainian to sit in the Saskatchewan Legislature, also stressed the good record in collecting money among his people in Saskatchewan.<sup>41</sup> The call to contribute to the Red Cross and Victory Loans also appeared frequently in *Ukrainskyi holos*, which urged the readers to participate in these collective endeavours to support Canada.<sup>42</sup>

The Japanese also tried to emphasize their role in the war and throughout 1941 devoted much energy to the Victory Loan campaign, to some extent reading the

international situation and anticipating a war between Canada and Japan. Contributions to the war effort, particularly from the *issei*, were frequently announced in the *New Canadian* to prove the immigrant generation's loyalty to Canada. For example, Bunjiro Uyeda, who owned Yamato Silks Limited on Granville Street in Vancouver, gained fame for his large donations to the National Defence Fund.<sup>43</sup> Besides the amount of money collected, the Victory Loan Drives were regarded as important as a showcase of the *issei*'s stance in event of war between Canada and Japan. The *New Canadian* depicted the Japanese headquarters of the Victory Loan campaign, writing: "Decked in Union Jack bunting and gay in red, white and blue, this sign [of the Victory Loan] above the offices of the Canadian Japanese Association in Vancouver tells its own story."<sup>44</sup> After the internment and the confiscation of the Japanese property, participating in such campaigns was neither expected nor easy, yet the Japanese tried as it was the only possible way left to prove their loyalty to Canada. Financially contributing to the war effort might make some sympathizers, if not overturn anti-Japanese wartime policies. The *New Canadian* implied that demonstrating that the Japanese were doing what they could was more important than the amount of money raised, admitting that "recent drastic economic changes" hurt potential donations.<sup>45</sup> The propagandistic value of such collective efforts was well illustrated by the president of the CJA when he reminded the BCSC that since Canada's entry into the war with Germany his association had tried "its best to aid in the defense of Canada."<sup>46</sup>

Although Scots had no need to highlight their loyalty during the war, some of them nonetheless highlighted the particularly "Scottish" contributions to the conflict. In part, such manifestations reflected resistance to the weakening ties between Canada and

Scotland, which increasingly made Scots just mainstream Canadians. For some people, especially in Nova Scotia, Scottish origin still provided a sense of pride and distinctiveness, and the war offered an opportunity for Canada and Scotland to bond against a common enemy in Nazism and Fascism. An illuminating example of the ethnicization of the war effort emerged from the reaction of Scottish associations in the province to the appeal for donations made by the Association of Highland Societies in Edinburgh to supply Highland Regiments with comfort kits.<sup>47</sup> Angus L. Macdonald, who served as minister of defence for naval services between 1940 and 1945, stressed supporting the Scottish cause, saying: “I realize quite fully, of course, that there are many appeals to the charity in these times. But I think, nevertheless, that this appeal from the country of our origin stands in a position somewhat different from other general appeals.”<sup>48</sup> At his behest organizations from the North British Society in Halifax to the Antigonish Highland Society and the St. Andrew’s Society of New Glasgow raised funds for this cause.<sup>49</sup> It was presented as the obligation of “persons of Scottish blood,” assigned a special mission in preserving the long-treasured “Scottish” ideals of democracy and liberalism.<sup>50</sup>

### **Bridging the Gap: Democracy and Ethnic Rights**

The Ukrainian and Japanese elites, aware of the tensions in their dual loyalty to Canada and their respective homelands, regarded democratic ideals as the best bond to overcome such contradictions. The Allies framed the war as a struggle for democracy against Nazism and Fascism, and defined democracy broadly as standing in opposition to totalitarian regimes. The Atlantic Charter signed in 1941 by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill became the model for democratic principles, which included the

sovereignty of nations, the ban of the use of force, and the abolition of territorial expansionism. While mainstream Canadians tended to view democracy narrowly, following those principles, Ukrainian nationalists and the Japanese *nisei* expected Canada to be consistent in upholding the ideals for which both groups had given their support through concrete activities like enlistment or buying Victory Bonds. They exaggerated mainstream wartime propaganda, and incorporated their own political agendas into the mainstream vision. For Ukrainian nationalists, democracy meant being able to participate fully in Canadian politics and life generally and to liberate Ukraine. For the Japanese *issei* and *nisei*, it meant an end to long-term racism as well as the difficulties they faced as enemy aliens during the war. Ironically, the entire wartime treatment of the Japanese placed them at the centre of mainstream politicians' attention, and thus provided them with a chance to be heard.

In this process, nationalist Ukrainians and the Japanese *nisei* led a campaign for a new Canada that was strongly tied to democracy and ethnic pluralism. Not surprisingly, both of them had much broader definitions of democracy than mainstream Canadians, who identified it with the British parliamentary and legal system or the provisions of the Atlantic Charter at best. Yet the question of whether homeland politics could realistically be incorporated into Canadian "democracy" separated Ukrainian nationalists and the Japanese *nisei*. Ukrainian nationalists regarded the liberation of Ukraine as an integral part of the war for democracy and as part of Canadian ethnic politics, whereas the Japanese *nisei* withdrew comments on Imperial Japan and focused on their rights in Canada. The outbreak of the Pacific War had made Japan's foreign policy actions no longer justifiable as a movement toward "democracy" in Asia, while

the war in Europe provided Ukrainian nationalists with ideal grounds for their support of Ukrainian independence. The fact that this goal was in line with the Allies' principle of democracy, at least in theory, made Ukrainians more active on behalf of their homeland.

The war thus accelerated the Ukrainian nationalists' lobby for a sovereign state that had begun during the interwar years, putting the two facets of their dual loyalty in greater harmony than ever. They expected the Allies to assist Ukrainians in their campaign for independence in Europe on the grounds that the liberation of Ukraine would limit the size of the territory under communist rule and eventually contribute to the expansion of the "democratic" world. At the same time, the struggle for the liberation of Ukraine coincided with Canada's wartime propaganda on behalf of "democracy," and thus had to be assisted by Canadian policy makers. Democracy as defined by *Ukrainskyi holos* was a principle "best described as a national right, and in terms in which people govern or have a decisive voice in the state."<sup>51</sup> Ukrainian nationalist leaders tried to pressure the Canadian government on behalf of their agenda, but once the Soviet Union became an ally, security concerns and diplomatic issues ensured they would be unsuccessful.<sup>52</sup> For example, Anthony Hlynka brought the issue of Ukrainian independence to the House of Commons in 1942 and explained why it mattered to Canada and the world:

In view of this increasingly dangerous threat [communism], the allies should, therefore, take it upon themselves to become the guardians of sovereign ideals and sovereign nations. . . . Above all, a Ukrainian independent state in Eastern Europe would be important to the British Commonwealth of nations and the United States as a balance of power. I venture to suggest that in the not distant future the British people and the principles for which they stand will be more closely associated with the Ukrainians than they have ever been before.<sup>53</sup>

Meanwhile, developments in Europe alarmed Ukrainian nationalists in Canada for seeming to increase communist power. A series of events occurred in 1943 which expanded the power of the Soviet Union. The German armies suffered the first serious defeat by the Soviet Union in Stalingrad. The Soviet Union also cut off the ties with the Polish government in exile, which reopened the question of the borders of future Poland and the autonomy of Ukraine. The UCC presented a memorandum to Mackenzie King in 1943, asking for Allied support for the redrawing boundaries of autonomous Ukrainian territory after the war. Nevertheless, conscious that the Soviet Union remained Canada's ally, the UCC simply interpreted democracy as the self-determination of nations, arguing: "The Atlantic Charter clearly and unmistakably lays down as a principle the right of a people to determine their political destiny," which was "the basis of their [the Allies'] present war objective." Making such an appeal, according to the memorandum, was "a duty which they [Ukrainian Canadians] owe to Canada," as democracy needed to receive "the greatest support from all Canadian citizens."<sup>54</sup>

The Japanese *nisei*, in contrast, abandoned their interwar justification that Japan's imperial aims were to liberate Asia. Yet the war and internment gave them a different cause, fueling their demand to be treated as equal Canadian citizens, and already nurturing the ideal of human rights. They stressed the definition of "democracy" as a principle that guaranteed the basic rights of citizens, which, in their view, should be based on "the preservation of an unwritten code of British justice, irrespective of race, color or creed."<sup>55</sup> Such a definition was stretched to include enemy aliens, particularly the *nisei*, who were supposed to possess the birthright to be Canadian. The JCCL, for example, contested the government's policy to ban the Japanese from enlisting on behalf



of their understanding of democracy, which guaranteed “the duty and privilege of every citizen of a democratic country to defend the land of his birth.”<sup>56</sup> For the *nisei*, a comparison between Nazi racism and the treatment that they received in Canada appeared to be the best ammunition in their fight for recognition. In June 1941, six months before Pearl Harbor, the *New Canadian* foresaw war between Canada and Japan and argued:

As a Japanese racial minority in British Columbia we recognize the shortcomings of our Canadian democracy. But for the same reason we recognize just what Hitler and his doctrine of racial persecution would mean to us were it to gain even temporary ascendancy. If we have not always enjoyed the full benefits of democratic freedom and equality in our native and adopted land, we have not come to believe thereby that these are only empty phrases.<sup>57</sup>

Clearly, such an argument was never taken into account at the start of the Pacific War.

Although the majority of the Japanese *nisei*, except for a few militant individuals, obeyed the evacuation order as a gesture to prove their loyalty, they never accepted internment and property confiscation, and kept criticizing such policies as racist and undemocratic. That they never portrayed themselves as passive victims is clear from their demand that the BCSC protect their fundamental rights and dignity, securing, in turn, the physical and psychological well being of evacuees and evacuation as family units. As the war moved towards the end, the *New Canadian* anticipated changes in public opinion:

Notwithstanding the almost fanatical prejudice of some of the members [of parliament] from British Columbia, we cannot yet believe that the Canadian people think their ‘good interests’ are to be served best by the adoption of the same tactics of racial persecution so significant in the ideology of the enemy with whom we are at war. On the contrary, we have seen and experienced so many instances of genuine democratic belief among the Canadian people that we still look forward to the future with confidence.<sup>58</sup>

The *nisei* elite, concerned with the disillusionment felt by Japanese Canadians over establishing a better life and pursuing of their rights in Canada, looked ahead and encouraged their people to retain their confidence in democracy.<sup>59</sup> The Japanese campaign had just started, and as it unfolded, the *nisei* would leave an impact on the development of Canadian democracy itself.

Despite their different agendas, the Ukrainians and the Japanese contributed to a similar pan-ethnic definition of democracy that both guaranteed everybody full rights and equal privileges as citizens and accommodated ethnic pluralism which was interpreted to include non-British and non-French peoples. The war prompted both the Ukrainian nationalists and the Japanese *nisei* to contemplate interethnic cooperation, and the role they could play as a part of a united force. The messages that they sent to their respective peoples were strikingly similar in terms of the marriage of the notions of democracy, citizenship, and ethnic rights, and the strategies which they used to make their appeal. For example, a Ukrainian delegate to the first UCC congress anticipated postwar Canada to be completely different from the interwar notion of Anglo-conformity:

In my humble estimation, the root of this problem [discrimination] lies in the fact that we still have in our midst that first school of thought, which believes in building the Canadian nation on the pattern of British traditions only. If the French would have seen their cultural stripe woven into the Canadian way of life, if all other ethnical groups would have seen their finer qualities forming part of the Canadian culture, they would have felt that this culture to which they have contributed and which is now their own is being challenged and they would have raised their voices in a unanimity that would have been commendable to our great nation. . . . In building a strong, united nation, we should place on the shoulders of each and every individual the responsibilities and the obligations of a citizen of a democratic country.<sup>60</sup>

The Japanese *nisei* developed a very similar concept just after Canada entered the war with Germany, yet they added a racial dimension to Ukrainian's ethnic pluralism. Equal partnership with the British, which they thought the French already enjoyed, was stressed as the most significant element in the building of Canada. The war years marked the first time that the Japanese *nisei* clearly claimed that Asians could also be part of Canada, as the *New Canadian* noted just before Pearl Harbor in 1941:

Fully as vital to Canada today and in the future, must be the establishment of unity between races; and dominating Anglo-French Canadian relations in the east have their counterpart in Occidental-Oriental relations in the west. If we, Canadians of Oriental origin can play our part in the welding of national unity in British Columbia, we shall have made a contribution to this nation equal to in principle if not in degree to the work of French Canadian leaders, headed by the Hon. Ernest Lapointe, whose stand on the question of military conscription last year is said to have saved Confederation in Canada.<sup>61</sup>

Such an optimistic vision of Canada was, of course, toned down after the evacuation, but it recovered towards the end of the war, when the *nisei* and their organ anticipated drastic changes in postwar Canada. The *New Canadian* discussed what both Canada and the Japanese Canadians had learned in terms of the evils of racism, and how the lessons could be used to build a new Canadian citizenship in which "no exceptions" could be made because of "race or national origin."<sup>62</sup> "Despite all the things that have been said and done since Pearl Harbor," said a Dominion Day editorial in 1944,

and despite all the things which becloud the horizon, this Dominion Day serves as an appropriate time to re-affirm here the fundamental purpose for the existence of this newspaper. That purpose, simply, is to lift a voice and fight to establish the right and privilege of every citizen of the Dominion, irrespective of his racial origin to walk with equal dignity, freedom, and service among his fellow Canadians. Over five years ago *The New Canadian* dedicated itself to a particular phase of that purpose. It was to seek the fulfillment of the democratic aspirations of a particular Japanese Canadian minority, which formed a small, but important part in Canada's all important problem of establishing a nationhood and citizenship of enduring value. . . . We point, today, to the substantial evidence of a large and powerful reservoir of genuine goodwill and

democratic conviction in Canada, which is opposed to the emotional prejudice and blind bigotry of some Canadians.<sup>63</sup>

In the circumstances, Dominion Day was seized upon as an appropriate occasion to proclaim a new Canadianism. Clearly, the wartime evacuation and the rise of democratic discourses urged the Japanese to demand equal partnership in Canadian nation building.

### **The Wartime Mosaic**

The embryonic interwar notion of Canada as a mosaic and its component ethnic myths and symbols proved to be significant to both mainstream and ethnic elites during the war, even though they conceptualized and manipulated the idea very differently. Major interwar mainstream advocates of a mosaic kept developing the concept during the war, moving beyond simply celebrating ethnic groups' cultural traditions such as music, folk art, artifacts, and dance as potential components of a Canadian identity. They now placed more emphasis on the rhetoric of unity in diversity, in recognition of the need to mobilize the country's diverse population behind war effort. Their wartime mosaic also exercised more control over ethnic groups, investigating and censoring their newspapers and cultural activities. In a sense, it became a vehicle to understand ethnic groups' ideology and test their loyalty in order to reduce tensions between them and mainstream society. For Ukrainian nationalist and Japanese elites, the mosaic had the same meaning as it had before the war, providing the logic to remain loyal to both Canada and the homeland. Yet at the same time, they saw cultural events as particularly useful during the war to build a better relationship with mainstream Canadians, and helping to integrate ethnic groups into the war effort more directly. Meanwhile, Ukrainian nationalist and Scottish elites used their homeland cultures and

myths to promote a sense of unity among their peoples, tying them to the goal of Ukrainian independence for the one, and renewed pride as a dominant race for the other.

The rhetoric of unity became commonplace among mainstream advocates of the prewar mosaic. For example, John Murray Gibbon noted how “in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and in munition plants, Canadians of many racial origins are beginning to understand each other better through working together.”<sup>64</sup> In Kirkconnell’s words, “we are all minorities but all Canadians, entering each with his own capacities, into the richness of the national amalgam.”<sup>65</sup> Such an idealistic vision of wartime Canada also became intertwined with a Scottish sense of superiority, as this address to the Highland Society of Antigonish in 1940 illustrated:

Perhaps when this terrible struggle is over, the distracted people of war-torn Europe will seek, in millions a heaven amongst us to start life anew. To blend these diverse peoples into a Canadian Nation will be Canada’s task for the future. And for us of Highland blood what part shall we play? To pour into that leaven that will be Canada, the idealism, the loyalty, the courage, the manly independence of the Highland Scot, that, I believe is the high destiny of the Celtic race.<sup>66</sup>

While comments like the above completely ignored the tensions between mainstream Canadians and ethnic groups, especially enemy aliens, they were considered effective in terms of promoting national consciousness.

At the same time, ethnic groups’ cultural activities were brought under scrutiny and official and unofficial censorship, which politicized them and contributed to tensions. Kirkconnell, for example, used his language skills to study a number of ethnic newspapers and literary works to determine whether the group was politically dangerous and should be watched carefully.<sup>67</sup> Among Ukrainians, he greatly preferred nationalists to communists, whose cultural activities he viewed as being dangerous to Canada.<sup>68</sup> The

politics behind their concerts and dances “were the icing on the educational cake, but the cake itself was filled with political arsenic” that sought to launch revolutionary activities by the working class and “destroy both Christianity” and the “British form of government.”<sup>69</sup> Yet scrutinizing ethnic cultures went too far at times and caused unexpected tensions. Scots’ sense of ethnic pride and confidence was challenged when Gaelic was banned in telegraph communications and on the CBC, following general guidelines for the treatment of foreign language exchanges. An angry Scottish Catholic Society in Cape Breton wrote to Angus L. Macdonald:

The fact that this innocent Scottish Custom was ruthlessly interrupted for no sensible reason at all, hurt every true Cape Breton Scot deeply, for his language is one of his greatest pride [sic], and that this language should be treated as a foreign language implied that he was a foreigner. He, whose ancestors were pioneers in the formation of a glorious new nation based on democratic ideals.<sup>70</sup>

The censorship issue even reached the prime minister, when Rev. A. W. R. Mackenzie, a founder of the Gaelic College in Cape Breton, reminded him that “Highland Scottish Gaelic has now a high ranking position with the other two main languages of Canada; namely English and French, in that it has a College at St. Ann’s, Cape Breton” which focused on the preservation of Gaelic.<sup>71</sup>

For Ukrainian nationalists and the Japanese, the public presentation of their artifacts, dances, and costumes appeared a valuable method of showing to mainstream society the politically innocuous side of ethnicity. The war made celebratory occasions like folk art and music festivals something very special as homeland politics, ideologies, and loyalty issues had been always highlighted since the outbreak of the war. Referring to Gibbon’s recommendation to the Royal Society of Canada to publish a collection of

ethnic literature, Ukrainian nationalists repeated the point that Ukrainian cultural works could appeal to mainstream Canadians at this critical time, arguing:

We have often appeared before our Anglo-Saxon friends with our beautiful folk songs, our spirited dances, and our colorful national costumes. With the exception of our songs, it is highly improbable that any of our artistic attainments will be accepted by our English compatriots. Through our music and songs, however, we have practically unlimited possibilities for the enrichment of Canadian culture.<sup>72</sup>

The Japanese *nisei*, aware of the deteriorating relationship between Japan and the Allies, focused on the potential of their folk culture to create bridges with mainstream Canadians. While occasions on which they could display their heritage declined after Pearl Harbor, the *nisei* kept participating in folk culture festivals in British Columbia until they received their evacuation orders. In 1940, they clearly placed a strong emphasis on such events. The *New Canadian* appreciated the Vancouver Folk Festival Society for organizing the annual event despite the war, “to bring to public attention something of the beauty and charm of the cultural sources.”<sup>73</sup> Thus, folk cultures, as opposed to the discrimination and suspicion the Japanese increasingly faced, symbolized peace. The significance of this kind of festival as a meeting place, particularly during the war, was well illustrated by the *New Canadian*, which reported on the Drama Festival in Vancouver in 1942:

In the face of the grim realities of abnormal war conditions, the participation of two *Nisei* drama groups in the annual Greater Vancouver Young People’s Drama Festival augurs well for the future. On the one hand, the Festival officials have raised no barriers against the entry of the *Nisei* groups, but have given them every encouragement, furnishing for us all but another example of the fair mindedness and tolerance of the goodly portion of our fellow citizens. On the other hand, the *Nisei* themselves must receive credit for the fine spirit they have shown in their willingness to keep up and not abandon the splendid record and reputation they have so deservedly earned in past years, and for their faith in the fairness of both the Festival officials and their audiences. In these days and times we cannot stress too much the need for continued contacts

and co-operation by the *Nisei* with our fellow Canadians. For it is true, now as never before, that we must work among and with the great body of Canadian citizens in order to disprove the charges of disloyalty and disaffection that are often times laid against our door, and to secure their willing admission to our claim to an honourable place in Canadian society.<sup>74</sup>

This passage indicates that the festive occasion was politicized. The emphasis that the *nisei* attached to holding the Folk Festival during the war suggests that opportunities for mingling were declining considerably, and that the distance between Japanese and mainstream society was broadening. The *New Canadian* thus urged the *nisei* to “take advantage of this opportunity” by participating in the event and proving their loyalty and cooperation to mainstream Canadians.<sup>75</sup>

Not surprisingly, the Ukrainian nationalist and Japanese *nisei* elites identified with the mainstream wartime mosaic, claiming it marked the recognition of ethnic groups. That both elites cited the same interpretation, despite the fact that such a concept was supported by only a handful of individuals, points to how appealing their interwar and wartime mosaic was for them and how much impact it had on their thinking. They frequently quoted interwar advocates of the Canadian mosaic like Kirkconnell and Gibbon to stir up patriotism for Canada, and thus enthusiasm for the war, among their peoples as well as to urge mainstream leaders to include ethnic groups in the war effort. Such a tendency was particularly evident among Ukrainian nationalists. C. H. Andrusyshen, secretary of the UCC and later a professor in the Slavic Department at the University of Saskatchewan, pointed out at the first UCC congress that “Dr. Gibbon thinks, and rightly so, that the successful completion of such an anthology [of literature] will assist the Canadians in understanding each other thoroughly, and so will help to consolidate their varied cultural attainments into a single Canadian mosaic.”<sup>76</sup> Another



speaker repeated Watson Kirkconnell's comments: "A Canadian of Ukrainian extraction is a better Canadian if he realizes that the stock from which he comes has a fine past, incorporated in literature, music, handicraft and religious faith."<sup>77</sup> Anthony Hlynka quoted Lord Tweedsmuir on two separate occasions in the House of Commons. In 1940, he urged the government to trust and recognize Ukrainians during the war, reading Tweedsmuir's entire 1936 speech, which stressed the value of Ukrainian handicrafts and folksongs as components of Canadian identity and argued that "the strongest nations are those that are made up of different racial elements." Hlynka expanded on this concept in the wartime context, arguing that all ethnic peoples could work together to make a strong Canada, united by such principles as "liberty" and "justice," and thus their participation was essential.<sup>78</sup> In 1943, Hlynka again quoted Tweedsmuir, this time to envision what postwar Canada should be. Now that Ukrainians had proved their loyalty, joining the country's armed forces, he argued, Canada had to produce a citizenship that brought the various ethnic groups "into our one common Canadian mosaic."<sup>79</sup>

The Japanese *nisei* belatedly picked up the concept of the mosaic in the late 1930s, and with the outbreak of the war, began engaging with the idea so that their people would realize that they could become part of Canadian unity. Despite the fact that Kirkconnell's *Canadians All* only devoted one paragraph to "the Asiatic Canadians," briefly mentioning the *nisei*'s participation in the annual Vancouver drama festival, the *New Canadian* praised the book as an example of how mainstream society valued wartime unity among various ethnic groups. It stressed Kirkconnell's expectation that the cooperation of all ethnic groups would make a stronger Canada, implying that the

tensions within the country would result in the opposite.<sup>80</sup> For the Japanese, Kirkconnell was highly respected as he stood for a rare voice that expected them to join Canada.

Meanwhile, ethnic groups' myths and symbols, which were components of the mosaic, were modified in the wartime context to strengthen a sense of ethnic community. Ukrainian nationalists and the Scots, in particular, related their homeland myths and heroes to Canada's war effort, thereby encouraging their people to simultaneously do their part and be proud of the heritage that was part of their identity. Only the Japanese did not cultivate wartime symbols, at least publicly, as the Emperor and the Yamato race around which Imperial Japan promoted wartime ultranationalism, represented totalitarianism in the eyes of Canadians. The absence of such historical myths among the Japanese led the *nisei* to seriously question who they were.

Both Ukrainian nationalists and the Scots regarded the democracy for which Canada was fighting as something inherent in their peoples and history. This concept attached high value to their characterization as "free-loving" peoples with a great mission in the contemporary war. Historically well trained in and inspired by democratic principles, both groups believed, they could guide Canadians in the creation of a better world. The Cossacks, who were the founders of a Ukrainian state in 1648, for example, became forerunners of "democracy." As *Ukrainskyi holos* argued:

The Ukrainian nation has been democratic from time immemorial. It was democratically governed already from the very beginning of its history, when the "viche" was a key part of their way of life, and not only enacted the law, but also called in and discharged the prince. Democracy was the foundation for the Cossacks, who did not allow any power of heredity, if appointed at the top, and selected every official in the same way, that is only at the time that official was needed. In the name of democracy, in the name of sovereignty, the entire real struggle for the liberation of the Ukrainian nation was carried out. The same right which the Ukrainian people heard from them is the right to govern themselves; the right of democracy. Therefore, their entire struggle is the

struggle for democracy. The Ukrainian people strove for democracy between the first and second world wars and fought against Poland and Russia.<sup>81</sup>

Clearly, this passage contains a number of political messages. It implies that Ukrainians were fighting for democracy long before it became a principle of the Allies, and thus were most effective in Canada's war effort.<sup>82</sup> It also looked towards the future, implying that it was high time for Ukrainians to achieve the goal and return their nation to democracy. Speaking of postwar reconstruction as president of the UCC, Basil Kushnir contended that "the senseless cries about the supremacy of race and nation will die, too, and in their stead will appear appeals for Christian democracy voiced by people of good faith, respect, virtue and justice."<sup>83</sup>

The Scots also saw the war as their fight for democracy, which represented the traditional Scottish political system that had dominated the world with the expansion of the British Empire.<sup>84</sup> Robert Burns became "one of the foremost of democrats,"<sup>85</sup> whose legacy Angus L. Macdonald explained in an address to the Ottawa Gaelic Society in 1944:

"We shall drain our dearest veins, but they shall be free," said Burns, and no people have had a fiercer passion for freedom and democracy than the people of Scotland. That passion has its roots in the sturdy independence of Scottish character, and in the clan system of Scotland, which was in itself a great democracy. . . . The Clansmen did not preach democracy. What they did was to practice Government of the people by the people. When you say that "A man's a man for a' that," you imply that he has an essential dignity; that he has certain rights, foremost of which is the right to independence. It has been the ceaseless struggle of Scotsmen to maintain the rights of the common men. That being so, need we wonder that today, when these rights are threatened by the most ruthless of tyrants, Scotsmen are fighting with all their traditional courage and gallantry.<sup>86</sup>

Clearly, much like Ukrainian nationalists, the message is that that the Scots' historical roots as "democratic" people gave them a special responsibility to lead Canada's war and

build a peaceful world. In 1942, Macdonald underlined why it was necessary to celebrate and listen to Scottish history and songs during the war at the Gaelic Mod in Cape Breton, maintaining that it helped to “renew the tie with Scotland” and “strengthen and rekindle the fires of our patriotism.”<sup>87</sup> The impact of the Scots on Canada was also noted by T. C. Davis, High Commissioner for Canada in Australia, in anticipating the great role that Canada could play in the postwar world: “People have marveled at Canada’s contribution to this war. Thanks largely to the influence of the Scots, a young vigorous nation is emerging with an ultimate destination of a world power.”<sup>88</sup>

The war also made both Scots and Ukrainian nationalists highlight the hardships in their histories. The endurance of their peoples gained particular significance both because it proved their readiness for the challenges of the war and because it promoted ethnic consciousnesses based on memories of persecution. The landmark fights for their great causes in the past overlapped with the ideals of the contemporary war. Scots praised the Jacobite Uprising of 1745, in which Scottish Highland chieftains tried to make Charles Edward Stuart the legitimate successor to the British throne. For example it was depicted as “the world’s last outburst of chivalry,” which showed clansmen’s “loyalty,” “devotion,” and “idealism.”<sup>89</sup> They believed that such Scottish qualities were both inherited and exercised by Canadians, enabling them to distinguish themselves in the war effort.<sup>90</sup> Among Ukrainian nationalists, Bohdan Khmelnytsky—who had “created on the basis of Ukrainian tradition a free and independent Cossack state”<sup>91</sup>—represented their ability to fight for sovereignty. “The history of the Ukrainian Cossacks,” *Ukrainskyi holos* wrote, “is a history of the several-hundred-year pursuit of the Ukrainian people for liberty, and a history of their

struggle for liberty.”<sup>92</sup> Their long struggle in the past proved that they could overcome the “extreme tragedy of slavery and death” brought by the Soviet regime.<sup>93</sup> For each group, the failure of independence or uprising was compensated for by spiritual strength and revival. Burns and Shevchenko, once again, functioned as icons of the national spirit which had survived. Scottish culture, once “in danger of extinction” after the failure of the 1745 Uprising, was rescued by Burns, “with his true Scottish patriotism,” while Ukraine’s “greatest” disaster in national survival in 1917 was saved by Shevchenko who promoted the “national and political consciousness of the Ukrainian people.”<sup>94</sup>

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World War II imposed a test of loyalty on the Ukrainian and the Japanese elites. While both groups had to face the same dilemma of balancing between Canada and their respective homelands, the war created clear gaps between the two groups that made for a stronger sense of ethnic community among the Ukrainians. First, Ukrainian nationalists, to a greater or lesser degree, were incorporated into Canada’s war effort, and thus consolidated their position in defining the ethnic group, as opposed to the enemy-alien status imposed on the Japanese, which dismantled their organized activities and way of life. Second, Ukrainian nationalists could renew their ethnic consciousness around their long-term goal of Ukrainian independence, as Axis expansion in Europe and the ideals of the Allies gave some hope for their cause. The Japanese, on the contrary, could no longer support Imperial Japan after the outbreak of the Pacific War. Third, while Ukrainian nationalists maintained homeland myths and symbols, the Japanese had to abandon them at least in the public sphere. In this regard, the Scots, as participants in the war who helped shape wartime policies and public opinion, belonged to a different category. They

certainly kept their pride as “chosen people,” yet their ethnicity was defined always by choice and was thus fluid. But although the war reinforced the existing ethnic hierarchy in Canada, “democracy” bridged the gap. All three groups made an effort to define a new identity for Canada, based on the democratic principles for which the Allies and Canada fought the war.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> On government internment policies in general, see John Stanton, "Government Internment Policy, 1939-1945," *Labour/Le Travail* 31 (Spring 1993): 203-41.
- <sup>2</sup> See Orest T. Martynowych, introduction to *Prophets and Proletarians: Documents on the History of the Rise and Decline of Ukrainian Communism in Canada*, edited by John Kolasky (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1990), xxv-xxvi. The action that the government took against the ULFTA was attacked by mainstream MPs like Dorise Nielsen of the CCF from Saskatchewan; see House of Commons, *Debates*, 15 July 1943, 4845-51.
- <sup>3</sup> For life in the camps, see, for example, Mary Taylor, *A Black Mark: The Japanese-Canadians in World War II* (Ottawa: Oberon Press, 2004); Keibo Oiwa, *Stone Voices: Wartime Writings of Japanese Canadian Isseis* (Montreal: Véhicule Press, 1991); Tom Sando, *Wild Daisies in the Sand: Life in a Canadian Internment Camp* (Edmonton: NeWest Press, 2002); and Shizue Takashima, *A Child in Prison Camp* (1971; reprint, Toronto: Tundra Books, 1998).
- <sup>4</sup> The establishment of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee was not without conflicts among the various organizations. The roles that non-Ukrainian interveners played in this process are examined, for example, in N. Fred Dreisziger, "Tracy Philipps and the Achievement of Ukrainian Canadian Unity," in *Canada's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity*, ed. Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 326-41.
- <sup>5</sup> Watson Kirkconnell, *The Ukrainian Canadians and the War* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1940), 24.
- <sup>6</sup> G. W. Simpson, "The Ukrainian Problem," in *The Ukrainian Cause on Radio Waves* (Saskatoon: Ukrainian National Federation of Canada, 1939), 5.
- <sup>7</sup> W. L. Mackenzie King, House of Commons, *Debates*, 17 February 1941, 815.
- <sup>8</sup> As a scholar, Henry F. Angus tried to present an objective image of the Japanese Canadians, and his work in general was sympathetic. See his "The Effect of the War on Oriental Minorities in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 7: 4 (November 1941): 506-16. For similar observations in the same journal, see Forrest E. LaViolette, "Social Psychological Characteristics of Evacuated Japanese," (11: 3 [August 1945]: 420-31).
- <sup>9</sup> Ann Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1981), 7.
- <sup>10</sup> For a detailed description of Ian A. Mackenzie and his anti-Japanese stance, see *ibid.*, 11-15.
- <sup>11</sup> Watson Kirkconnell, *Our Ukrainian Loyalists* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1943), 4. He had a great interest in Ukrainian history and the origins of the ideological conflict in Europe. His monograph describes the general background of Ukrainian nationalism and the communist revolution. See also his *Canada, Europe, and Hitler* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1939), 74-90.
- <sup>12</sup> Kirkconnell, *The Ukrainian Canadians and the War*, 7.
- <sup>13</sup> Kirkconnell, *Our Ukrainian Loyalists*, 20.
- <sup>14</sup> A. W. Neil, House of Commons, *Debates*, 19 February 1942, 715.
- <sup>15</sup> Bohdan S. Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 37-40.

- <sup>16</sup> Thomas M. Prymak, *Maple Leaf and Trident: The Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1988), 69-81.
- <sup>17</sup> I. Havryliuk, "Vsi ukrainsi—razim!" *Ukrainskyi holos*, 8 May 1940, 4. For the necessity of Ukrainian unity, see also "Do porozuminnia," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 17 January 1940, 4; "V chim i na chim iednaemosia," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 29 May 1940, 4; and "Potreba iednosty," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 27 May 1942, 4.
- <sup>18</sup> Eikichi Kagetsu, "Nisei shokun ni teisu," *New Canadian*, 1 July 1940, 29. For an appeal to support Japan's cause, see also "Kaigai dôhôshoshi ni tsugu," *Tairiku nippo*, 9 January 1941, 1.
- <sup>19</sup> JCRC, Box 17, file 6, Slocan Standing Meeting Committee, 17 June 1942.
- <sup>20</sup> "The Conflict of Loyalty and Affection," *New Canadian*, 25 December 1941, 4. See also "Nisei Reaffirm Loyalty to Canada," *Tairiku nippo*, 16 January 1941, 4; and "Zairyû no nihonjin ha kanadajin tare," *Tairiku nippo*, 1 April 1941, 4.
- <sup>21</sup> On the unity of Ukrainian nationalists, see, for example, "V chim i na chim iednaemosia," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 29 May 1940, 4, and "Potreba iednosty," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 27 May 1942, 4.
- <sup>22</sup> Ken Adachi, *The Enemy that Never Was: An Account of the Deplorable Treatment Inflicted on Japanese Canadians during World War Two* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 237. See also Roy Miki, *Redress: Inside the Japanese Canadian Call for Justice* (Vancouver: Raincoast Books, 2004), 44-6, 63.
- <sup>23</sup> The group resisted the order of mass evacuation which might mean the separation of family members. Their views conflicted with those of the *New Canadian*. On this point, see Patricia E. Roy, J. L. Granatstein, Masako Ino, and Hiroko Takamura, *Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese during the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 115; and Robert K. Okazaki, *The Nisei Mass Evacuation Group and P.O.W. Camp 101*, trans. Jean M. Okazaki and Curtis T. Okazaki (Scarborough: Markham, 1996).
- <sup>24</sup> Adachi, *The Enemy that Never Was*, 269.
- <sup>25</sup> LAC, MG 28 V 7, Japanese Canadian Citizens Council, minutes, 12 May 1942, 1-3.
- <sup>26</sup> Prymak, *Maple Leaf and Trident*, 51. Mainstream Canadians also played a major part in this conflict. While Watson Kirkconnell, G. W. Simpson, and Tracy Philipps supported nationalists, communists such as R. A. Davies criticized them for "favouring anti-allied, pro-fascist, and even outright fascist groups particularly the Ukrainian National Federation and the Ukrainian Hetman Organizations." See R. A. Davies, *This is Our Land: Ukrainian Canadians Against Hitler* (Toronto: Progress Books, 1943), 85.
- <sup>27</sup> Prymak, *Maple Leaf and Trident*, 58-9.
- <sup>28</sup> Ukrainian Canadian Committee, preface to *First All-Canadian Congress of Ukrainians in Canada* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1943), 4.
- <sup>29</sup> "Those Comfort Kits," *New Canadian*, 25 April 1941, 2.
- <sup>30</sup> Roy, et. al., *Mutual Hostages*, 130-1.
- <sup>31</sup> LAC, MG 28 V 7, Japanese Canadian Citizen's Council, minutes, 17 May 1942, 1-3.
- <sup>32</sup> Takejirô Mitani, "Mohaya subete ha nisei no shakai," *New Canadian*, 2 May 1942, 3.
- <sup>33</sup> "Eigo o jiyûni hanasu nisei kyûsoku ni rikaisare shin'yôsarû," *New Canadian*, 6 June 1942, 3.



- <sup>34</sup> “For Canada and British Empire,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 6 September 1939, 1. See also “Na dvokh koniakh,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 5 June 1940, 4; “Treba peresterihaty,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 6 November 1940, 4; “Dobra pryznaka,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 20 May 1942, 4; and “100-protsentova loialnist,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 23 September 1942, 4.
- <sup>35</sup> “Nisei Canadianism,” *New Canadian*, 22 November 1940, 2. See also “A Re-dedication,” *New Canadian*, 2 February 1940, 4.
- <sup>36</sup> “My ne imigranty,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 31 January 1940, 4.
- <sup>37</sup> “Hromadiany, chy hosti?” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 27 January 1943, 4.
- <sup>38</sup> “A Higher Education for Nisei—Hopeless?” *New Canadian*, 5 January 1940, 2.
- <sup>39</sup> “A Greater Task,” *New Canadian*, 12 December 1941, 1.
- <sup>40</sup> W. Kossar, “Ukrainian Canadians in Canada’s War Effort,” in *First All-Canadian Congress of Ukrainians in Canada*, 42, 44.
- <sup>41</sup> G. E. Dragan, “Victory Loan,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 25 June 1941, 6.
- <sup>42</sup> See, for example, “Zhertviimo na Chervonyi Khrest,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 11 September 1940, 4.
- <sup>43</sup> “\$1000 Donated To War Effort,” *New Canadian*, 21 February 1941, 1.
- <sup>44</sup> “Victory Loan 1941,” *New Canadian*, 5 June 1941, 1. See also “Japanese Canadians Give Freely to Red Cross and National Defense,” *New Canadian*, 9 February 1940, 1; “First Japanese Canadian Red Cross Unit to be Organized,” *New Canadian*, 23 February 1940, 1; and “A Past Record of Loyalty the Japanese Canadians Will Uphold,” *New Canadian*, 12 December 1941, 3.
- <sup>45</sup> “Community Plans Victory Loan Drive,” *New Canadian*, 6 February 1942, 1. See also “Committee to Draft Final Plans for Victory Loan Drive,” *New Canadian*, 11 February 1942, 1.
- <sup>46</sup> LAC, MG 28 V 7, vol. 1, file 3, B. Hisaoka, letter to Major Austin C. Taylor, Chairman of the BC Security Commission, n.d.
- <sup>47</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1506, file 419-20, George Farquhar, letter to Angus L. Macdonald, 26 January 1940.
- <sup>48</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1506, file 419-21, Angus L. Macdonald, letter to George Farquhar, 23 January 1940.
- <sup>49</sup> See PANS, MG 2, vol. 1506, file 419-22, 23, 27, George Farquhar, letter to Angus L. Macdonald, 5 March 1940; Angus L. Macdonald, letter to Martin L. Fraser, 2 February 1940; and Angus L. Macdonald, letter to George Farquhar, 6 March 1940.
- <sup>50</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1506, file 419-22, Angus L. Macdonald, letter to George Farquhar, 6 March 1940.
- <sup>51</sup> “Nedostatky demokratii,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 4 September 1940, 4. Democracy became one of the most popular concepts among Ukrainian nationalists. See, for example, “Teperishnia viina i oboviazok ukrainskoho zhinotstva v Kanadi,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 14 February 1940, 11; “Peresuvannia narodiv,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 8 October 1941, 4; “Demokratiiu treba boronyty,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 10 June 1942, 4; “Dlia sebe,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 3 March 1943, 4; and “Volia,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 23 February 1944, 4.
- <sup>52</sup> Kordan, *Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945*, 7-10.

- <sup>53</sup> Anthony Hlynka, House of Commons, *Debates*, 2 February 1942, 231.
- <sup>54</sup> Acadia University Archives and Special Collections, Watson Kirkconnell Collection, vol. 45, file 9, memorandum of Ukrainian Canadian Committee to the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs Canada, 1943.
- <sup>55</sup> "Protection for Japanese Canadians," *New Canadian*, 14 February 1941, 2.
- <sup>56</sup> LAC, MG 28 V 7, vol. 1, file 1, Japanese Canadian Citizens League, resolution to the sixth national Japanese Canadian Citizenship League council, n.d.
- <sup>57</sup> "It's Up to Us!" *New Canadian*, 5 June 1941, 2. The comparison between Japanese internment and Nazi racial persecution was also made by a few mainstream Canadians who wanted to protect Canada's image as a democratic nation. An editor of the *Marpole-Richmond Review*, for example, wrote: "What is this, anyway—Hitler's country or a democracy?" *B.C. Teachers*, an organ of the B.C. Teachers' Federation, also referred to the Japanese in Canada as "Canadians." All these minority voices were publicized in the *New Canadian*. See "A Country Editor Views Evacuation," 17 March 1942, 2; "A National Problem," 6 April 1942, 2; Rev. W. R. McWilliams, "Problems of the Canadian-Born," 26 August 1942, 2; Audrey Alexandra Brown, "Need to Clear Away Our Prejudices," 22 May 1943, 3; "Christian Church Upholds Justice for Racial Groups," 17 June 1944, 1; "Let's Not become as Nazis—Ottawa Journal Scores Racism," 1 July 1944, 1; Rev. A. Drand, "No Reason for Persecution," 28 April 1945, 7; and Edith Fowke and F. G. Watson, "Democracy and the Japanese Canadian," 14 July 1945, 7. For other pro-Japanese articles, see the following in *Saturday Night*: Norman F. Black, "The Problem of Japanese Canadians and Solutions," 5 February 1943, 12; "Japanese Canadians," 24 June 1944, 3; Atkinson, L. "The Japanese Controversy is Revising Liberalism," 15 July 1944, 6; and "The Japanese Canadians," 21 July 1945, 3.
- <sup>58</sup> "We Welcome A Statement," *New Canadian*, 13 May 1944, 1.
- <sup>59</sup> "Safeguarding Democratic Principles," *New Canadian*, 28 January 1942, 4.
- <sup>60</sup> J. R. Solomon, "Some Problems of Canadian Nationhood," in *First All-Canadian Congress of Ukrainians in Canada*, 91.
- <sup>61</sup> "The Nisei—Today and Tomorrow. . ." *New Canadian*, 31 January 1941, 4. See also "National Unity," *New Canadian*, 29 March 1940, 2.
- <sup>62</sup> George T. Tamaki, "Notes on Nationality and Citizenship," *New Canadian*, 6 January 1945, 7.
- <sup>63</sup> "Re-affirming a Purpose," *New Canadian*, 1 July 1944, 2.
- <sup>64</sup> J. Murray Gibbon, "A Secular Bible for A New Canada," *Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* 36: 2 (1942): 94.
- <sup>65</sup> Watson Kirkconnell, *Canadians All: A Primer of Canadian National Unity* (Ottawa: The Director of Public Information, 1941), 7.
- <sup>66</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 436-12, Donald Lewis MacDonald, address to the Highland Society of Antigonish, 30 November 1940, 5.
- <sup>67</sup> Watson Kirkconnell, *Twilight of Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941).
- <sup>68</sup> Watson Kirkconnell, "The European-Canadians in Their Press," *Canadian Historical Association Report* (1940): 88. See also "Our Communists and the New Canadians," *An Address Delivered before a Meeting of the Canadian Club at Toronto, Canada, on Monday, February 1, 1943* (Toronto: Southam Press Toronto, 1943).

- <sup>69</sup> Kirkconnell, *Our Ukrainian Loyalists*, 20.
- <sup>70</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1518, file 745-12, J. N. Wallis and J. J. MacInnis, letter to Angus L. Macdonald, 16 December 1940.
- <sup>71</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1506, file 419-16, A. W. R. Mackenzie, letter to W. L. Mackenzie King, 2 May 1940.
- <sup>72</sup> C.H. Andrusyshen, "The Contributions of the Ukrainian Canadians to Canadian Culture," in *First All-Canadian Congress of Ukrainians in Canada*, 107.
- <sup>73</sup> "Folk Festival," *New Canadian*, 18 September 1940, 2. For folk festivals, see also other articles in the *New Canadian* such as "Nisei of the Week," 14 February 1941, 2; "Community Contributes to Folk Festival Programs," 26 September 1941, 1; "Canadian Folk Society To Forge New Bonds of Common Interest and Unity," 28 November 1941, 1; "Kanada o ikuseisuru shominzoku," 30 September 1942, 3; and "Japanese Joined in Folk Festival," 13 November 1943, 8.
- <sup>74</sup> "Our Contacts with Canadian Society," *New Canadian*, 26 January 1942, 4.
- <sup>75</sup> "Our Festival of Peoples," *New Canadian*, 10 October 1941, 2.
- <sup>76</sup> Andrusyshen, "The Contributions of the Ukrainian Canadians to Canadian Culture," 108.
- <sup>77</sup> W. J. Sarchuk, "Ukrainian Contribution to Canadian Culture," in *ibid.*, 109.
- <sup>78</sup> Anthony Hlynka, House of Commons, *Debates*, 25 November, 1940, 381.
- <sup>79</sup> Anthony Hlynka, House of Commons, *Debates*, 18 February, 1943, 521-2.
- <sup>80</sup> "Canadians All: Nisei Support Canada says Gov't Book," *New Canadian*, 25 July 1941, 1. See also "Mosaic of Loyalty in Canada," *New Canadian*, 19 January 1940, 2, and on the drama festival and the mosaic, "Nisei in Canadian Society," *New Canadian*, 9 February 1940, 4; and "Our Responsibility," *New Canadian*, 16 February 1940, 4.
- <sup>81</sup> "Peresuvannia narodiv," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 8 October 1941, 4.
- <sup>82</sup> As the Cossacks and Bohdan Khmelnytsky were regarded as their symbols, nationalist Ukrainians opposed the use of them by communists. See "Shcho chorne, to ne bile," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 5 April 1944, 4.
- <sup>83</sup> Basil Kushnir, "Post-War Reconstruction of the World," in *First All-Canadian Congress of Ukrainians in Canada*, 119.
- <sup>84</sup> The connection between democracy and the clan system made by Angus L. Macdonald during World War II is discussed by Ian McKay in "Tartanism Triumphant: The Construction of Scottishness in Nova Scotia," *Acadiensis* 21: 2 (Spring 1992): 41-2.
- <sup>85</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 436-18, Angus L. Macdonald, address to the Ottawa Gaelic Society, 29 February 1944, 1.
- <sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.
- <sup>87</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 437-2, "Gaelic Mod—Cape Breton," Angus L. Macdonald, address, n.p., August 1942, 2.
- <sup>88</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1518, file 746-47, T. C. Davis, address to the St. Andrew's Society of Melbourne, 30 November 1944, 13.

<sup>89</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 436-12, Donald Lewis MacDonald, address to the Highland Society of Antigonish, 30 November 1940, 3.

<sup>90</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 436-18, Angus L. Macdonald, Address to Ottawa Gaelic Society, 29 February 1944, 1.

<sup>91</sup> Anthony Hlynka, House of Commons, *Debates*, 2 February 1942, 233.

<sup>92</sup> “Demokratiia,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 3 June 1942, 4.

<sup>93</sup> Anthony Hlynka, House of Commons, *Debates*, 2 February 1942, 232.

<sup>94</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 436-18, Angus L. Macdonald, address to the Ottawa Gaelic Society, 29 February 1944, 2; and O. Terletskyi, “Iak buduvav i iak ruinuvav ukrainskyi narod,” *Kaliendar “Ukrainskyi holos”* (1941): 38; see also O. Ivakh, “Shevchenko—prorok ukrainy,” *Kaliendar “Ukrainskyi holos”* (1942): 35-9.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Postwar Era: For Democratic and Multicultural Citizenship**

The postwar period was a turning point in the evolution of Canadian and ethnic identities. Major changes in the attitudes of Canadian political leaders towards ethnic groups occurred in conjunction with international events such as the end of World War II (1945), the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the start of Cold War (1946) as well as domestic developments like the Canadian Citizenship Act (1947) and the removal of various discriminatory laws at national and provincial levels. Within this context, Canada tried to redefine its identity around the notions of democracy and freedom, particularly as part of the world reaction to the terrible consequences of racism in Nazi Germany and the growing power of Soviet-led communism. Ukrainian and Japanese elites were both actively involved in the consolidation of Canadian democracy and citizenship during in this period, both in their pride for having contributed to Canada's victory and in their expectations for growing signs of tolerance in postwar Canada. For the first time, Ukrainians and Japanese were officially recognized as Canadians, and mainstream and ethnic visions of Canada overlapped in the name of "democracy."

This chapter analyzes how Canadian identity was reconstructed around the new postwar political discourses of human rights, democracy, and freedom in the first decade after 1945, focusing on the interplay between ethnic and mainstream boundaries. First, it argues that Ukrainians and Japanese were driving forces in the creation and expansion of pan-Canadian identity, bridging the gap between mainstream and ethnic visions of Canadian democracy. They adroitly adopted evolving "mainstream" principles of human

rights, democracy, and freedom in their efforts to pressure the federal government to act on behalf of their specific political agendas. For Ukrainian nationalists, the goal was the reclaiming of Ukrainian territory from Soviet communist control in the homeland and the protection of Ukrainian cultural and linguistic rights in Canada. For Ukrainian communists, it was the establishment of world peace alongside the protection of proletarian rights and the promotion of ethnic equality. Both Japanese *issei* and *nisei* sought compensation for wartime property losses and, especially important to the *nisei*, basic citizenship rights. Second, a closer look at the interplay between mainstream and ethnic visions of Canada reveals that despite the changes in mainstream attitudes towards and policies for ethnic groups, conflict persisted. High-level government leaders and policy makers still possessed a limited vision of “democracy,” designed to protect Canada’s interests and international reputation, and thus took a cautious approach to ethnic issues considered beyond Canada’s duties or contrary to its policies. Finally, the 1950s witnessed a general decline in ethnic activism, although differences could be seen among the above three groups in terms of how they maintained a sense of ethnic community. Nationalist Ukrainians, who had a continuing cause in the liberation of their homeland from foreign and communist rule, remained most active, while Japanese and communist Ukrainians began losing momentum for organized activity. Nationalist Ukrainians were thus the best equipped to push their interpretation of ethnic pluralism and claim group rights, regarding ethnicity as a crucial category with which to identify themselves. Throughout these years both Ukrainians and Japanese still possessed political agendas which were incompatible with the accepted vision of Canada.

## **Towards a New Canada: Canadian Democracy and Citizenship**

After World War II, “democracy” and “freedom” became main principles in Canada for both mainstream and ethnic elites. For mainstream leaders, democracy and Canada’s new status as an autonomous nation had to be promoted side by side so that the country would not lose a self-image that appealed to both Canadians and people abroad. Internationally, democracy was the means by which Canada would express its opposition to communism and confirm its role in the construction of a peaceful postwar order and in the new United Nations. Domestically, democracy was to provide a sense of pride and unity among the people of Canada, erasing the ethnic tensions that had characterized much of the war on the home front. Within this context, Ukrainian and Japanese elites welcomed Canada’s growing power in the world, and celebrated the introduction of citizenship. The first development provided great grounds for maintaining their loyalty to their respective homelands as world citizens, while the second marked a step forward towards their full recognition as Canadians, which they thought that they certainly deserved after their participation in Canada’s war effort. At the same time, in redefining Canadian identity and redrawing the boundary of the national community, ideological conflicts within the Ukrainian and Japanese groups over the meaning and desirability of Canadian citizenship resumed.

From an international perspective, democratic discourse gained momentum in Canada after the war for two purposes: to promote people’s pride as citizens of a peaceful and free nation in the noncommunist West, and to demonstrate that Canada was a full-fledged world power.<sup>1</sup> As the comments of the Secretary of State, Paul Martin near

the end of 1954 illustrate, mainstream Canadian leaders were primarily interested in Canada's new role as peacekeeper and its attendant international responsibilities:

The nations which, between the wars, had pinned their hopes on the League of Nations had done so without being willing to use collective force to deter aggression. This led to the Second World War from which we learned that peace was the responsibility of all and that strength was needed to deter and, if need be, to resist aggression. Canada's growing strength, which had been shown during the war in the effort of the fighting services and in our increased productive capacity, was also reflected in the development and strengthening of the external affairs service, both at home and abroad. Thus, at the end of hostilities, Canada stood prepared to participate in the challenging task of international co-operation.<sup>2</sup>

The Canadian Citizenship Council (renamed from the Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship), which was established in 1940 as a non-profit federation of more than fifteen national and provincial educational groups with a particular focus on citizenship,<sup>3</sup> also provides a great example of how postwar Canada perceived its role in the world. To promote awareness, the Council published several pamphlets, including *The Democratic Way* (which appeared as a series), *Canada as a Democracy*, and *Freedom of Association*, as well as their periodical, *Canadian Items*. In outlining what Canada could do in the world, an article in the last publication argued: "The responsibilities of Canadian Citizenship do not stop at our boundaries. As a people who are a participating member of the United Nations Organizations, we have obligations as United Nations Citizens."<sup>4</sup> This role, strongly tied to citizenship and Canada's new status as a full-fledged nation, was obviously a response in part to the spreading communist ideology and its menace to Canada. The Council elsewhere made it clear that Canada would never be willing to tolerate anyone communist, referring to "a man, misguided or otherwise, who scorns the 'untidiness of democracy' and subscribes to and works for a totalitarian regime, often giving first and devoted allegiance to a foreign power."<sup>5</sup>



The Ukrainian and Japanese elites, whatever their ideological stance, welcomed Canada's new muscle as an independent power and anticipated the major role that the country could play in the reconstruction of world peace. Underlying this attitude was the expectation of better relations between Canada and their homelands; for the Japanese and Ukrainian communists especially, Canada's peaceful ties with Japan and the Soviet Union, respectively, had to be maintained. The Japanese, because of the persecution that they had experienced during the war, stressed the necessity of their active work for the cause of internationalism. Canadian *nisei*, wrote the *New Canadian* in 1950,

are gradually becoming aware of the great need to promote, and one day achieve, a kind of citizenship which knows no national boundaries. In their JCCA organization, they are finding the opportunity to contribute in some measure by their active interest in the promotion of the important principles contained in the United Nations Charter and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For peace in the world must come through learning to live at peace with each other in the neighbourhoods of the world.<sup>6</sup>

Similar support for world peace was expressed by communist Ukrainians, who reorganized as the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC) in 1945, as they faced a new challenge created by the ideological polarization in the world. They celebrated the end of the war, declaring, "Together with all good Canadians, we rejoice that the dread nightmare of atomic war is receding from the world."<sup>7</sup> They also encouraged both Canada and the AUUC to take a leading role in the construction of a better place to live, in light of the "new hopes arising for the possibility of completely eliminating the danger of war and for peaceful co-existence and fraternity among the nations in the world."<sup>8</sup> Obviously, communist Ukrainians tried to minimize the political gap between Canada and the Soviet Union.

Nationalist Ukrainians valued Canada's increasing profile and responsibility in world affairs for a slightly different reason, namely, for the common enemy they shared with other noncommunist Canadians. In essence, they expected Western countries to unite in putting pressure on the Soviet Union, and ultimately bringing about its downfall. Addressing the fifth national congress of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) in 1956, former Alberta MP John Decore explained the Canadian role:

After the war, two worlds were created. The other world caused so much menace to the Western world that Canada had spent half its budget on security to watch the Soviet Union very closely. In such situations, one nation cannot pursue an independent cause. Although Canada does not belong to the great powers in terms of population, it can play a distinguished role in international politics.<sup>9</sup>

Canada's new role in international politics thus was greeted with high expectations from the Ukrainian and Japanese ethnic groups.

With the position that Canada should take in the world confirmed, both mainstream and ethnic leaders turned to the creation of a strong basis for citizenship and democracy domestically.<sup>10</sup> Mainstream leaders emphasized Canadians' democratic roots and a sense of mission, associating democracy and freedom with their vision of a new Canada, yet they simultaneously reinforced the legal and political traditions that were the legacy of old Canada. For example, although it certainly did not exhibit any of the prewar discrimination and hostility aimed at ethnic groups, the Canadian Citizenship Council valued the British parliamentary and legal systems and underlying philosophy that Canada had inherited as the best. Democracy and freedom were also often identified with Britain and its history. In 1949, *Citizenship Items* noted how the British Bill of Rights passed in 1689 ensured "many of the basic freedoms" that contemporary society accepted.<sup>11</sup> The first pamphlet in the series, *The Democratic Way*, emphasized the

fairness of the British legal tradition, compared to justice in a “totalitarian system,” stating: “British democracy over many hundreds of years has worked out a system by which no man may be arrested without evidence and without knowing the charge brought against him.”<sup>12</sup> Focusing on freedom of conscience, the third book in the series maintained that “modern democratic Britain, like nineteenth-century Britain which was in process of becoming democratic, is a community where free associations flourish.”<sup>13</sup> Britain also symbolized freedom of faith, as reflected in “the Church of Scotland Act passed by the British Parliament in 1921. This act recognizes the church’s right to alter its confession of faith and to unite with another church without losing its identity, and at the same time guards against any inference from the act prejudicial to any other church in Scotland.”<sup>14</sup> That the roots of democracy and freedom were always associated with Britain reconfirmed the deeply felt belief that the British political system nurtured and promoted fundamental values that had made Canada a better place in the past and would do the in the future.

Yet mainstream leaders also believed that Canadians, as a nation, should move on from Britain. With the implementation of the Citizenship Act of 1947, people in Canada were no longer British subjects, pushing a new emphasis on cultivating their pride as a distinctive and strong people, which inevitably focused on the promotion of a sense of togetherness beyond the ethnic group. Attitudes towards ethnic minorities were thus dramatically transformed from the interwar period. Moreover, not only did the war make racism taboo but the Cold War also led to unprecedented recognition of some ethnic groups. Anticommunist Ukrainian nationalists, in particular, were increasingly portrayed as representatives of a loyal ethnic group that participated in Canada’s growth

as a nation and had contributed to its war effort. At the fourth congress of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) in 1953, for example, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent acknowledged the Ukrainian war effort, stating that the commitment that the UCC had made “towards winning the war, is a splendid example of the steady growth in unity that is being achieved throughout our nation.”<sup>15</sup> The issue of unity seemed imperative as Canada received new postwar immigrants. Presenting the citizenship bill to the House of Commons in 1945, Paul Martin stressed its necessity as a means to national unity:

Our “new Canadians” bring to this country much that is rich and good, and in Canada they find a new way of life and new hope for the future. They should all be made to feel that they, like the rest of us, are Canadians, citizens of a great country, guardians of proud traditions and trustees of all that is best in life for generations of Canadians yet to be. For the national unity of Canada and for the future and greatness of this country it is felt to be of the utmost importance that all of us, new Canadians or old, have a consciousness of a common purpose and common interests as Canadians: that all of us be able to say with pride and say with meaning: ‘I am a Canadian citizen.’<sup>16</sup>

Established mainly for the education of new citizens, the Canadian Citizenship Council provides an illuminating example of its goal to “stimulate in the minds of all Canadians a greater appreciation of the meaning and implications of democracy as a way of life” and “to strengthen and revitalize throughout Canada the ideals of democratic citizenship.”<sup>17</sup> From the Council’s perspective, the Citizenship Act of 1947 symbolized the rise of a new Canadianism and an effort to mobilize both new and old citizens, together with postwar immigrants, to become one nation. As a result, it was

increasingly important to awaken in Canadians, and prospective Canadians, a pride in the development, institutions and life in our country, an understanding of the nature, privileges and obligations of citizenship, an appreciation of the positive and dynamic implications and possibilities of democracy, and the threat of other ideologies to our free, democratic way of life.<sup>18</sup>

Yet this comment failed to suggest that the Council had a concrete or definite vision as to what Canada should be and on what model its peoples should be educated. This elusiveness and ambiguity with respect to Canadian identity often surfaced when the Council attempted to justify and seek a niche for itself in practical terms. Executive director, J. P. Kidd, in response to the general concern raised in a Council executive meeting as to the Council's lack of vision and ineffectiveness in guiding Canadians, tried to avoid dealing with the fundamental issue of Canadian identity and focused on the roles and directions the Council should take:

I feel that we should give a great deal more attention to the structure of the Council, not only from the standpoint of a constitution, but also in order to make it a live and useful organism. We need to work out, improve working relationships and affiliations with other organizations; we need to find ways of getting more effective national representation; and we need to develop a number of technical and working sub-committees to deal with various aspects of the Council's work.<sup>19</sup>

The roles and responsibilities of Canadian citizens also remained undefined. For example, the Council contended that it should "mould Canadian public sentiment and opinion in such a way as to increase the consciousness on the part of every Canadian of being Canadian,"<sup>20</sup> without providing any concrete idea of what that meant or entailed. Undoubtedly, integration was its key concept, although statements like "the integration of the various organized ethnic groups into the group-life of our Canadian communities" never clarified to what extent postwar integration differed from prewar assimilationism.<sup>21</sup>

Ukrainian and Japanese elites played active roles in the consolidation of the pan-Canadian identity as a "democratic" and "free" nation. The introduction of citizenship was widely celebrated, as they saw it as recognition of their people as full-fledged citizens who possessed equal rights and duties with other Canadians, a status

earned through their long-term contribution to Canada's nation building and recent performance in its war effort. Paul Yuzyk, a former president of the Ukrainian National Youth Federation and in the early 1950s a professor at the University of Manitoba, explained how special Canadian citizenship was to Ukrainian Canadians in a report to the Ukrainian section of the international service of the CBC. "Each year," he said, "May 15 is designated as Citizenship Day to bring to the minds of Canadian citizens and those to be admitted to citizenship the importance of their inheritance of freedom and democratic rights as well as responsibilities." Those Canadians and prospective Canadians included "a considerable number of Ukrainians, who had escaped from under the Soviet tyranny and who now were happy to live in a country of freedom."<sup>22</sup> Ukrainians in Canada, Yuzyk stressed in another CBC report, thus had an extra motivation to assume the rights and responsibilities that they enjoyed as citizens under the Canadian "democratic" system, particularly through participating in federal and provincial elections.<sup>23</sup> Although regarding Canadian citizenship as key to seeking support for Ukrainian causes, the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League (USRL) encouraged its members to fulfill their duty as Canadian citizens first:

It can be argued that the access of the USRL and its members and associates to Canadian and Ukrainian affairs in Canada and in Europe always lies in and builds on the basis of Canadian citizenship. The USRL argues that it is the only real approach which Canadians of Ukrainian origin have to every matter of our life. Maintaining such a stance, Ukrainians would not end up in an unfavourable result, going beyond Canada's sphere [of interests]. Any sensible person who comes to Canada must consider becoming a host and citizen here.<sup>24</sup>

While Ukrainian nationalists had always embraced and defended the idea of their dual loyalty to Ukraine and Canada, the establishment of Canadian citizenship, and the

rhetoric surrounding it, facilitated and legitimized a renewed sense of duty to both countries.

A similar hope for what Canadian citizenship could do for ethnic equality and rights can also be seen in the case of the Japanese. For a community and individuals who had long been marginalized, becoming Canadian citizens was of utmost significance. The *New Canadian*, for example, expressed the *nisei*'s sense of appreciation, regarding the achievement as something for which they had worked diligently:

Those of us who were born in Canada or have been granted naturalization papers are now qualified to call ourselves Canadian citizens; we are also British subjects. . . . The experience of the war years have taught us much about citizenship rights and fundamental liberties, because these things were endangered and at times denied especially where Japanese Canadians were concerned. But those of us who did not lose faith in Canada—in our belief that the Canadian way of life is fundamentally sound—are finding our faith vindicated.<sup>25</sup>

For the Japanese, the Citizenship Act symbolized the end of an era, as it was followed by the long-awaited federal franchise in June 1948, the provincial franchise in British Columbia in March 1949, and the end to the ban on Japanese migration back to the West Coast in April 1949. The *New Canadian* called 1949 “the best year,” stating: “No other period from the latter part of the last century when Japanese immigrants first entered Canada is prominent with as much progress in the attainment of equal opportunities and full citizenship as 1949.”<sup>26</sup>

In redefining Canada's national boundaries around democracy, freedom, and citizenship, ethnic elites were once again divided internally—between nationalists and communists among Ukrainians and, to a lesser degree, between *issei* and *nisei* among the Japanese. Each faction sought status and recognition as the representative of its ethnic group and greater influence in Canadian politics, whether for sidelined Ukrainian

communists in the Cold War or for Ukrainian nationalists and Japanese after the doubts concerning their loyalty that they faced during World War II. The lingering internal cleavages and competition among rival elites, in fact, were crucial factors in how Ukrainians and Japanese defined Canadian democracy, as they debated who was the better Canadians and labelled their opponents antidemocratic.

Not surprisingly, the rivalry among Ukrainians crystallized around the conflicting ideologies of communism and nationalism. Each camp maintained that it was the real defender of democracy and thus that its sympathizers would make more loyal Canadians. Representing the nationalist perspective, *Ukrainskyi holos* made a link among the Ukrainian national character, the Ukrainian thirst for independence, and democracy, arguing:

The Ukrainian people are well-known for their democratic way of thinking. Ukrainian democracy is not a fake. It is a particular democracy—the democracy of a freedom-loving nation. When Ukrainians fight for independence, they fight for freedom ‘for all and for themselves’ . . . and do not deliberately seize foreign countries. . . . Ukrainian democracy—this is an idea of a great nation. The Ukrainian democratic idea can stand for the salvation of the entire world.<sup>27</sup>

Communism was the negation of these values and resulting Ukrainian mission, as well as harmful to Canadian democracy. The USRL confirmed its stance against communism at its national congress in 1946, stating:

This congress condemns the activities of the Communist Party of Canada, activities hostile to the interests of this country and its democratic institutions. It especially struggles against the activities of this party among our people as harmful and hostile to our cultural interests in Canada, and calls for our citizens to stay away from involvement in them by all means.<sup>28</sup>

Ukrainian communists also cited the need to preserve “democracy,” but on their own terms, which rejected narrow and/or excessive nationalism in favour of the



communist vision of equality among people. Referring to the often intensely anticommunist Ukrainian refugees who had entered Canada after the war in particular, the AUUC argued “that this type of ‘selective immigration’ is contrary to Canada’s democratic traditions and in so far as it serves as a mask to cover the bringing over to Canada of the pro-Nazi remnants in Europe it is subversive and fraught with dangers to Canadian democracy and security.”<sup>29</sup> Ukrainian communists held that they, together with all like-thinking Slavs, were the best citizens of Canada who also kept pride in their homelands, and imported from them “strong traditions of democracy” and “a militant defense of their rights and mutual aid.”<sup>30</sup> The Cold War, which intensified competition among nationalist and communist Ukrainians in Canada, helped define membership in the Canadian nation.

Competition between the Japanese *issei* and *nisei* was less intense, even though the *nisei* tried to distinguish themselves from the undemocratic or imperial image that was often attached to the past society of the *issei*. The *nisei* organ, the *New Canadian*, developed a new way of interpreting prewar and wartime anti-Japanese sentiment, attributing it to the lack of democracy within Japanese ranks rather than to racial or economic factors. In short, “the Japanese Canadians were treated as dangerous people, and had to face ‘internment, control, and confiscation of property’” because of the *issei*’s unwillingness to adopt “Canadian democracy.”<sup>31</sup> The adoption of “democracy” was therefore urgent “for the further development of the Japanese race in Canada.”<sup>32</sup> In promoting these arguments, the *nisei* were speaking in particular about their own community, specifically the power that the *issei* had been exercising over the *nisei* and the lack of openness of the Japanese community towards the outside society. In this way,

democracy became a symbol of the *nisei* who gained power in the Japanese-Canadian community that formed after the war.

### **Tying Ethnic Causes to Canadian Democracy and Citizenship**

While democracy defined pan-Canadian identity, mainstream and ethnic elites differed considerably over what Canadian democratic principles and citizenship rights should include. On the one hand, mainstream Canadianism rarely embraced the specific interests of either Ukrainian or Japanese elites. Their agendas were taken into consideration only when directly related to or affecting Canada's image as an international power, its economic interests, or national unity. Ukrainian and Japanese elites, on the other hand, strove to add their peculiar interests and perspectives to the definition of Canadian democracy and citizens' rights. Defining the principle in their own terms left, in turn, a positive imprint on Canada's identity.

Well aware of the rhetoric that mainstream Canadians were using, Ukrainians and Japanese strove to bridge the disparity, thus revealing the extent to which ethnic agendas helped shape Canadian democratic identity. There was, of course, the continuation of long-term missions such as the liberation of Ukraine for Ukrainian nationalists and the gaining of the franchise for the Japanese. Yet the end of the war also produced new agendas, which imposed their own unity of purpose. For Ukrainian nationalists, Canada's acceptance of Ukrainian refugees from Nazi camps all over Europe was imperative, an initiative opposed by their rival communists who focused on the peace movement instead. The Japanese *issei* and *nisei* both shared common goals, and expected the most dramatic changes, concentrating on compensation for wartime property losses, the removal of restrictive laws, and cancellation of the deportation of

those who had been forced to agree on repatriation to Japan at the end of the war. The propaganda that Ukrainians and Japanese launched to appeal to the public affected both the formation of a new Canadian identity and the renewal of their ethnic consciousness. That not only Ukrainian nationalists and communists but also the Japanese *issei* and *nisei* adopted the same strategy, language, and logic in these negotiations indicates how all elites searched for and quickly selected the most useful political discourses to mobilize their people behind their ethnic causes and to challenge mainstream politics.

The years immediately after the war can be characterized as the most active period for both Ukrainian and Japanese elites, because the end of the war left them with high expectations. For the Japanese *issei* and *nisei*, it was the right time to be compensated for discriminatory wartime policies. A volunteer *nisei* organization, the Japanese Citizenship Committee for Democracy (JCCD), and a joint mainstream-Japanese association, the Cooperative Committee of Japanese Canadians (CCJC), established in Toronto in 1943, undertook nation-wide research on Japanese wartime losses and the resettlement orders issued by the federal government. The immediate issue for them was to stop the deportation. Following the repatriation survey administered by T. B. Pickersgill, Commissioner of Japanese Placement, which had asked Japanese whether they preferred to live east of the Rockies or return to Japan, forty-three per cent, voluntarily or not, agreed to repatriation by August 1945.<sup>33</sup> In 1947 the JCCD evolved into a nation-wide *nisei* association, the National Japanese Canadian Citizens Association (NJCCA), and worked in close cooperation with the CCJC. Besides these large-scale associations, some Japanese evacuees, often frustrated with their representatives, organized into local groups such as the Toronto Claimants Committee,

which took a more militant approach towards the federal government.<sup>34</sup> The postwar era was also a significant one for Ukrainian nationalists, as it appeared to be the last chance for redrawing Ukrainian boundaries in Europe and securing an independent Ukrainian state. Moreover, the issue of Ukrainian refugees in camps in Germany and Austria, who refused to go back to their Soviet-controlled homeland, became the UCC's primary focus, both for the refugees' own salvation and to strengthen the existing Ukrainian community in Canada both physically and psychologically. The end of the war thus galvanized ethnic elites into political action, thereby promoting a sense of unity and purpose among their peoples.

In pursuing their goals, ethnic elites adopted various strategies. Both Ukrainian nationalist and Japanese elites challenged Canadian politicians, pointing out contradictions between Canada's stated democratic principles and actual policies. Their lobby was directed not only at promoting public awareness of such contradictions but also simultaneously at expanding the definition of democracy and citizenship rights. Both elites thought that citizenship should guarantee all citizens' demands, insofar as they did not do any harm to Canada's interests. In their minds, the geographical and political boundaries of Canada did not necessarily determine the boundaries or priorities of citizens.

For Ukrainian nationalists, the fact that World War II, which was repeatedly referred to as a war for democracy, brought more power to the Soviet Union constituted a major contradiction and needed to be challenged. *Ukrainskyi holos*, for example, stressed that the fight was far from over, arguing:

Democracy did not win in the Second World War; rather, it lost. The end of the war left much less democracy in the world than before the war. And where

democracy remains, it is threatened very much, just as it was before the war. In many countries in the world, it remains only an empty phrase and seems like a betrayal to democracy, or leans towards the politics of the greatest enemy of democracy, the Communist party, which was a prototype of a totalitarian party, an anti-democratic organization.<sup>35</sup>

Criticizing the lack of support from Western nations, including Canada, for the liberation of Ukraine, another article in the same newspaper reminded its readers that “no country can claim a better reason than Canada or the United States that they entered the war for the liberation of oppressed nations.” Therefore, it continued, “democratic countries can and must stress, based on moral principles, that they recognize the right of oppressed nations for autonomous life and that their sympathy is definitely on the side of those who desire freedom.”<sup>36</sup> Speaking about the Ukrainian question, the Ukrainian Catholic priest and president of the UCC, Basil Kushnir encouraged Ukrainians in Canada, as “freedom-loving” Canadians, to fight against “the menace of Communism. . . . Our Canadian faith in democracy and people’s rights cannot be indifferent. We must cultivate it with our personal and collective efforts for the benefit of us all.”<sup>37</sup> The UCC always spearheaded the lobby for Ukraine’s independence, submitting various memoranda to Canadian authorities. Its report on Canada’s foreign policy submitted to the federal government in 1956, for example, urged Canada’s active involvement, as a democratic country, in world affairs.<sup>38</sup>

The opening of Canada’s doors to Ukrainian refugees in Europe just after the war was also discussed in terms of democracy and humanitarianism.<sup>39</sup> “In the name of humanity,” the UCC said in a brief presented to Mackenzie King, “we appeal to the Government of Canada to do whatever may be possible to prevent such deportations [of Ukrainian refugees] to the Soviet territories.”<sup>40</sup> Anthony Hlynka also urged the Canadian

government to act against the “forceful repatriation of displaced persons” from refugee camps to Soviet territory, citing Winston Churchill’s speech in the British House of Commons on 16 August 1945: “Yes, democracy is on trial. No atheistic philosophy of force, torture and extermination shall ever restore the God-given democratic right to humanity unless the surviving democracies write a new chapter of history founded on Christian principles.”<sup>41</sup> Hlynka, who was somewhat frustrated by the government’s slow response to the Ukrainian refugee issue, repeatedly challenged immigration policies in Canada. For him, if Canada was to be democratic and humanitarian, the federal government should “give first consideration to stateless or displaced persons,” both because they were “unfortunate” and because they were “democratic-minded people who had to move on into Western Europe when totalitarianism was advancing.”<sup>42</sup> He further nuanced his high expectations for postwar Canada to distinguish itself in the area of humanitarianism, contending “that Canada was not the first nation to make that move” and offer refuge.<sup>43</sup> In his memoirs Hlynka stressed the significance of his initiatives, including the establishment of the Resettlement Fund to support the displaced persons, thirteen speeches in the House of Commons on the Ukrainian refugee issue between 1945 and 1949, and visits to the refugee camps in Europe.<sup>44</sup>

This sort of frustration was also expressed by the Japanese, who were protesting deportation from Canada. Now that the war was over, the federal government was urged to adopt a “democratic” solution. “The forcible deportation without clear justification,” the *New Canadian* argued, was “something that should not be allowed in a country professing to be a democracy, and for attempting such a plan, the government lays itself open to serious criticism.”<sup>45</sup> The *New Canadian*’s tone was more determined

than ever, seizing this great opportunity to pressure the federal government: “We must continue the fight [against deportation] because we believe in the justice of our cause, and because we firmly believe that there is in Canada a thing called democracy.”<sup>46</sup> The government’s treatment of the Japanese in Canada was implicitly identified with the methods used by the Nazi regime. For example, the CCJC claimed that “the war was fought to destroy the hateful doctrine of racialism which is the basis of the Nazi system everywhere.” Therefore, it continued, “it is of vital importance to Canadian democracy at home and our reputation abroad that we deal justly with the Japanese-Canadians in our land.”<sup>47</sup>

The Japanese soon picked up one of Mackenzie King’s statements in the House of Commons in 1944—“It is a fact that no person of Japanese race born in Canada has been charged with any act of sabotage or disloyalty during the years of war”<sup>48</sup>—and frequently repeated it as if it were official evidence of Japanese loyalty. Now that Japanese loyalty had been “officially” recognized, they claimed, lingering discrimination against the Japanese must be a sign of persistent racism. The *New Canadian* repeatedly quoted a phrase from the Nuremberg Trials, namely, that the “deportation of civilian populations on racial grounds” was “one of the crimes against humanity.”<sup>49</sup> In a similar vein, a CCJC pamphlet cited the United Nations Charter, which vowed to “encourage and promote respect for human rights and for the fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”<sup>50</sup> When she addressed the National Council of Women in 1948, Muriel Kitagawa, a writer and activist, informed her audience that “23,000 Japanese Canadians [who] were displaced persons within our country” represented “an unfortunate page in Canadian history.”<sup>51</sup> The CCJC also

emphasized Canada's responsibility towards the Japanese, arguing: "On humanitarian grounds the exile [of the Japanese] cannot be permitted if Canada is to be worthy of a place in the United Nations and if Canadian Citizenship is to have any meaning whatsoever."<sup>52</sup>

Clearly, such references and comparisons were carefully chosen, in effect asking Canada to honour the principles it professed to uphold. The *New Canadian* also pointed out the implicit contradiction in the concept of Canadian citizenship, as it appeared to value more the concerns of British Columbians and other Canadians who wanted to keep the Japanese out of the province or elsewhere than those of the Japanese:

When the government introduced the Canadian Citizenship bill last year, it also had up its sleeves orders-in-council which were contrary to the spirit of that bill and which would have denied normal citizenship privileges to one racial group of Canadians. This situation led to much heated discussion in the House of Commons. A similar situation seems to be building up in the current session. As indicated in the throne speech, the government intends to give special attention to the study of individual rights in Canada. Yet at the same time it proposes to continue its control over the movement of Japanese Canadians and to determine for them where they may and may not live.<sup>53</sup>

During the 1950s, frustrations were also expressed regarding Canada's immigration policy, which still restricted the entry of the Japanese, including the deported *nisei*, into Canada. Jack Pickersgill, who had administered the repatriation survey and served as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration from 1954 to 1957, was regarded as a major voice in the racially discriminatory immigration policies and became a focus of criticism among the Japanese. The *New Canadian*, for example, criticized his comment that no racial restrictions would be removed from Canada's immigration policies.<sup>54</sup> *Tairiku jiho*, which replaced the prewar *Tairiku nippon* in 1951, pointed out that despite the fact that "racial equality" was "commonsense in the world" and "declared in the well-known



Atlantic Charter,” Canada’s immigration policy and Pickersgill’s comments “tended to be retrogressive.”<sup>55</sup> Canada as a democratic nation in the postwar free world, the Japanese elite believed, could not contradict or ignore its principles.

The second strategy both the Ukrainian and the Japanese elites adopted was to assign themselves specific missions that would not only see their own goals achieved but also help both Canada and the rest of the world to establish a more complete or genuine democracy. An illuminating example can be found in the memorandum that the UCC sent to the Paris Peace Conference of 1946 (which guaranteed nations such as Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland sovereignty) opposing the Soviet delegation from Ukraine as well as Soviet control over Ukrainian territory. The denunciation of Soviet power, the document stated, “contributes its utmost to the cause of freedom, democracy and peace in the world.”<sup>56</sup> Given the growing threat of the Soviet Union and its military power, nationalist Ukrainians believed that their role was to constantly warn the West of the dangers. At the fifth congress of the UCC in 1956, for example, S. W. Sawchuk, its first vice-president (representing the USRL), noted that communists survived in Canada under the guise of “Ukrainian ethno-national activities and public manifestations of Ukrainian national culture,” and “without publicizing the existence and menace of communism in the English-speaking world.” He continued: “Communism is detrimental and threatening not only to us but also to the entire world.”<sup>57</sup> For nationalist Ukrainians, it was essential to remind both their own people and other Canadians that Canada could benefit from assisting in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Canadians were thus encouraged to “be informed about the Ukrainian question not just for sentimental purposes.”<sup>58</sup> In contrast, communist Ukrainians tried to bridge the ideological gap

between Canada and the Soviet Union. For example, their support for Slavic unity and the flourishing of the Soviet Union was “in concert with the loftiest ideals of the democratic and peace-loving people in Canada,” and they constituted “an additional force to the struggle for the peace, national independence and democratic progress of Canada.”<sup>59</sup> Emphasizing the benefits of Canadian-Soviet friendship, communists criticized the overwhelming power of the United States over the world in the postwar era as “chauvinist savagery.” They also praised Slavic solidarity or the USSR, in contrast, for its “peace and respect for the independence and equality of all the nations on the earth.”<sup>60</sup>

The Japanese also equated their community agenda with the evolution of Canadian democracy. Immediately upon the conclusion of the war, the CCJC stressed how the Japanese cause and actions would make a better Canada, arguing:

For over a period of three years the people of Japanese origin in Canada had been deprived of and removed from all the natural benefits belonging to trusted citizens of this country. As in the process of assimilation of any group, linguistic and cultural differences, lack of citizenship rights and the fact that they were of oriental origin, all contributed to a certain sense of insecurity and fear of the white population and of government action, even before evacuation took place. . . . In their struggle to defend their rights they have furthered the cause of democracy in our land.<sup>61</sup>

In this context, Japanese individual compensation claims and the establishment of a royal commission to investigate their property losses in July 1947<sup>62</sup> were regarded as a landmark “contribution to the principles of democracy, for it will reveal starkly that Canada is not free from the germs of racial intolerance, and that there is a constant need for vigilance against this evil.”<sup>63</sup> The Japanese sense of accomplishment is well illustrated by the booklet, *They Made Democracy Work*, published by the CCJC and the NJCCA. It attributed the success of some claimants for property compensation, though

very limited, to the work of the CCJC members, including non-Japanese Canadians, emphasizing the bottom-up forces:

Thus, after eight years, the issues which led to the forming of the Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians have been settled. The committee was not solely responsible for this settlement, but it did play a leading part. It was the instrument by which thousands of Canadians who wanted to see justice done were able to influence government policy. . . . The particular crisis that called the Co-operative Committee into being has now passed, but there will always be fronts on which our civil liberties are threatened. Perhaps this story of what one group was able to do will encourage other groups working on these other fronts. Here is one clear-cut example of how individual citizens, by banding together, managed to change the course of events in a very significant way. They made democracy work because they cared enough about it to make it work. What they did can be repeated.<sup>64</sup>

Clearly for the Japanese, Canadian democracy was not defined solely by mainstream leaders but constantly reconstructed and redefined with crucial input from the specific Japanese experience. The royal commission and compensation were the first real recognition of the Japanese recently treated as enemy aliens and traditionally outside the mainstream community.

Mainstream leaders, however, did not necessarily take into account the demands or arguments and agendas of ethnic groups, imposing instead their own criteria to select what deserved attention. Not surprisingly, they were never concerned about anything that was not directly related to their definition of Canadian interests or that was beyond their control, choosing to focus on Canada's image in the world and foreign relations, particularly with the Soviet Union, and unity among Canadian citizens. In this sense, traditional mainstream-ethnic boundaries persisted. Yet some changes could be seen in the priorities of the mainstream elite in Canada's policy making. Factors such as race and ethnic representation in provincial legislatures and the House of Commons,

which had shaped Canadian policies regarding ethnic affairs for a long time, became subordinated to other immediate Canadian concerns.

First, the presence of Ukrainians in the federal and some provincial governments, as well as their more general “participation” in the mainstream political structure, did not always determine whether or not Canada took the Ukrainian agenda into account. The Japanese demand for property compensation, for example, received more attention from mainstream Canadian leaders than Ukrainian nationalists’ call for Ukraine’s independence, despite the fact that the Japanese did not have their own representatives in any provincial legislature or Ottawa. Ukrainians, in contrast, had MPs such as Anthony Hlynka, who brought up the independence of Ukraine and the opening of Canada’s doors to the refugees in the House of Commons both during and after the war. Yet despite Hlynka’s numerous speeches on the refugees, the Canadian government saw the issue as something beyond national politics.<sup>65</sup> For Mackenzie King, peaceful relations between Canada and the Soviet Union were more important than the demands of Ukrainian activists or how they viewed his government.<sup>66</sup> Given the great military power of the Soviet Union, and the threat that it posed to all Canadians, Ukrainian criticism of government inaction mattered less. In addition, Ukrainian independence, which would have entailed the violent dismantling of the Soviet empire, did not affect the Canadian masses, and for this reason as well as the Cold War concerns, the Canadian government made no effective intervention on behalf of Ukrainian sovereignty.<sup>67</sup>

Compensation for Japanese property, which had been sold to other Canadians at under-market value during the war, in contrast, was treated as an issue which required action in response to the compensation movement that the Japanese spearheaded. The

government response gained momentum, as Ann Sunahara points out, partly because the “virtually friendless” Japanese of 1942-43 had “some determined friends” in 1945, particularly members of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), who, before the outbreak of the war, had frequently expressed pro-Japanese sentiments.<sup>68</sup> Some sympathetic organizations in and outside British Columbia, which had obviously overcome wartime racism, also appeared in support of the Japanese. This support from the general voting public undoubtedly affected the attitudes of Canadian officials. Moreover, while such voices helped the Japanese cause, the fact that Japanese property losses occurred in Canada’s jurisdiction as a result of Canadian policy distinguished the Japanese case from that of the Ukrainians and prompted the federal government to act. The establishment of the 1947 royal commission reflected changing government priorities and attitudes towards the Japanese. It also marked a shift in the nature of Japanese ethnicity from something negative and marginalized to something more positive and influential.

Second, race or national origin, which had been a major factor in determining public opinion on ethnic groups before and during the war, could no longer be used as a legitimate reason for discriminatory policies. Of course, racism did not completely disappear from Canada’s policy-making process, as the fact that race remained as a category of selection in Canada’s immigration act until February 1962 illustrated. Yet the growing tendency to place priority on Canadian citizenship rather than on colour can be seen in the federal government’s attitudes towards the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees and the contemporary deportation of the Japanese. While the Canadian government acted very slowly and somewhat reluctantly in both cases, it saw a clear difference between the

two cases. Canada would be completely responsible for producing Japanese “refugees,” including the *nisei*, who deserved Canadian citizenship, while it would not be blamed for Ukrainian refugees. Mackenzie King’s statement in 1944 that the Japanese problem should be treated not as a British Columbia but as a national problem illustrated how central this issue became to Canada.<sup>69</sup> As Japanese associations and their mainstream sympathizers enthusiastically championed Japanese rights to remain in Canada, the deportation of the Japanese attracted more official and public attention. The CCJC led the publicity campaign, publishing pamphlets such as *A Challenge to Patriotism and Statesmanship* and *From Citizens to Refugees—It’s Happening Here!*<sup>70</sup> Despite attempts by anti-Japanese politicians like Ian Mackenzie and the Minister of Labour, Humphrey Mitchell, to prove the legality of the deportation Orders-in-Council, by the end of 1946 Ottawa had abandoned the enforcement of deportation mainly “on humanitarian grounds.”<sup>71</sup>

Ukrainian displaced persons, initially moved to work in German agriculture or war industry and now living in refugee camps had nothing to do with the Canadian government.<sup>72</sup> The desire to avoid a conflict of interest with the Soviet Union, which regarded the refugees as its “citizens” who should return to Soviet territory, and concern about the potential danger of an influx of Nazi collaborators, made the Canadian government “indifferent” to this issue.<sup>73</sup> Responding to Hlynka’s request in the House of Commons to speak on the Ukrainian refugee issue, King stated somewhat obscurely:

The subject to which the hon. member has referred is one which relates to Europe. I am not in a position to say whether the representations made are wholly correct. I would suppose in that respect that my hon. friend is in the same position as I am. I can assure him however that the government has watched this whole Ukrainian situation most carefully and, so far as it is within

our power to control matters, we have sought to see that the course taken would be such as would protect their interests.<sup>74</sup>

Two years later, King was more specific. “Canada is not obliged,” he said, “as a result of membership in the United Nations or under the constitution of the international refugee organization, to accept any specific number of refugees or displaced persons”—although, he added, it would have “a moral obligation” to do so.<sup>75</sup> While Canada eventually took 34,000 Ukrainian refugees after 1947, the decision was based on the nation’s labour requirements rather than humanitarian or democratic ideals.<sup>76</sup>

That the federal government prioritized its reputation and the goal of a united nation over humanitarian concerns was well reflected by the royal commission on the Japanese property issue as its establishment was due more to pressure from both Japanese elites and mainstream human rights supporters than to government initiative. The commission, as such, served more as an official demonstration of dealing with the Japanese problem fairly. As a result, a fundamental barrier surfaced between Japanese and mainstream political circles as to the commission’s purpose. One gap in understanding appeared over the issue of limited eligibility for compensation and general procedures for assessing property losses. The commission set up regulations as narrowly as possible in terms of who qualified for compensation, limiting eligibility to cases in which the Custodian of Enemy and Evacuee Property did not take care of the property in a satisfactory manner and it was sold at below value. In addition, these facts had to be legally proven in order for the owner to be compensated.<sup>77</sup> The CCJC, led by mainstream legal consultants Andrew Brewin and J. R. Cartwright, and the JCCA agreed to the regulation in order not to jeopardize relations with the government and to secure any possible compensation.<sup>78</sup> But such an approach frustrated some claimants who

organized the independent Toronto Claimants' Committee, which rejected any settlement unless their properties were fairly assessed and compensated. Its declaration that they represented the Japanese evacuees' voice and would continue to fight for full compensation well illustrated that the Japanese elite rarely saw the federal government's investigation as meeting their demands.<sup>79</sup>

The distance between mainstream and ethnic elites was also obvious in the activities of the Canadian Citizenship Council, which claimed to be "non-denominational" and "non-party."<sup>80</sup> It took either a very cautious approach or no decisive action with respect to ethnic issues. This hesitancy is explained by the fact that the persistence of mainstream-ethnic boundaries was not limited to the political level, which required detailed and official procedures to alter existing laws to accommodate ethnic groups. The Council undoubtedly had an interest in Canada's acceptance of postwar refugees from Europe, but it showed more concern for the assimilation of the immigrants to Canadian norms than for amending immigration policy. In 1955 it summarized its postwar priorities and activities as follows:

For the first time in thirty-five years, Canada was embarking on what approached mass immigration. Genuine sympathy for the Displaced Persons, a desire that they be helped to fit into life in Canada quickly, and some anxiety about the possibility of the communists getting to them first sparked an interest and concern on the part of organizations and individuals all across the country. Some national focus, some advice and assistance, and educational and other materials were needed, as was a further awakening of citizens to the coming of these new people.<sup>81</sup>

The fact that the Council's interests were confined to Canada's boundaries is understandable. Yet despite its lofty ideals "to provide the setting, the machinery and the opportunity" for ethnic and other organizations "to work together,"<sup>82</sup> its minutes suggest very limited cooperation on refugee issues with ethnic associations such as the UCC,



although there were sporadic references to education of the Jews.<sup>83</sup> In a similar vein, the Council rarely supported anything which served specifically “Japanese” causes. For example, when its executive committee was approached by the CJCC about the publication of a monograph on the Japanese compensation movement, members “felt that it was a controversial subject” that demanded “careful thought and careful perusal of the manuscript . . . before a decision was reached.”<sup>84</sup> In other words, ethnically specific concerns and activism did not figure in the Council’s immediate agenda or, perhaps more precisely, were treated with extreme caution.

### **Towards Multiculturalism**

Ukrainian and Japanese elites regarded Canadian democracy and citizenship as a step towards ethnic pluralism. Yet the fact that the integration of Ukrainian nationalists into Canadian politics was well under way by the late 1950s and that they were long-term supporters of the survival of anything Ukrainian distinguished them from their rival communists and the Japanese in terms of how they perceived Canada’s multiethnic nature. In other words, Ukrainian nationalists had already reached the stage where they regarded democracy and citizenship as something that embraced and guaranteed their collective rights to preserve their ethnic identity in Canada. Although communist Ukrainians also valued ethnic diversity as part of Canada’s identity, they preferred to attach symbolic values to culture and language in order to attract more people to their ideological point of view and organization. For their part, the Japanese paid more attention to group members’ individual rights and to be integrated into Canadian society without discrimination and without losing their ethnic identity. In this sense, then, nationalist Ukrainians were better equipped and programmed to launch a form of

multiculturalism that would not only guarantee their individual rights to sustain who they were but also secure their ethnicity at an official level.

Consequently, nationalist Ukrainians concentrated on the preservation of language and culture as the foundation of a multicultural Canadian identity, always focusing on their own language and culture as the key to their own national survival. Nationalists thus urged Canadian federal and provincial governments to recognize them as a group equal to the British and the French, and propagandized among both Ukrainians and the Canadian public. For example, it was important to encourage their people, and the younger generation in particular, to take pride in things Ukrainian.

*Ukrainskyi holos* stressed that Ukrainians were no different from the French, arguing:

There is no need to be ashamed of your mother tongue. One's mother tongue should be used proudly by all those who honour their national group. The Ukrainian mother tongue is among all of us, a testimony to a nation's culture. . . . The French in Canada everywhere use their own language among their own people. Let us speak Ukrainian among ourselves: on the street, in the streetcar, in the theatre, on the train, in the restaurant.<sup>85</sup>

The Ukrainian language and culture also deserved a special status in Canada, according to the national convention of the USRL in 1946: "Ukrainians as a cultural nation in a free autonomous country have full rights to look to the future with hope for the expansion of our unique culture, with hope that it will be reflected in the new Canadian culture."<sup>86</sup>

The speaker then continued:

The philosophy of moral obligation is just under construction. Canada is building Canadian identity, made up of nations with diverse cultures, including, among others, the Ukrainian nation. . . . It depends only on the strength of one's national culture, whether it possesses something worth contributing. Canada is only different from other states in that it has more sovereignty of the people, more freedom, and more peoples for the diffusion of an ideal culture.<sup>87</sup>

Although the culturally diverse nature of Canada was not a new theme by the late 1940s, Ukrainian nationalists were promoting the idea as the essence of a unique Canadian identity tied to serving their goal of linguistic and cultural survival. State support of the Ukrainian language was also frequently discussed by the UCC and *Ukrainskyi holos*, including its reintroduction into state schools after some four decades as a sign of recognition of Ukrainians' importance. When the Alberta government announced the introduction of teaching of Ukrainian language at the high school level in 1959, *Ukrainskyi holos* called it "comforting news" for the Ukrainian "institutions and individuals which made every effort to ensure that the instruction of Ukrainian language was territorially broadened."<sup>88</sup> Michael Luchkovich, an educator and the first Ukrainian MP, applauded "a fine gesture towards the Ukrainians because of their heroic struggle for freedom, and being a nation that the world forgot."<sup>89</sup> Full recognition of the Ukrainian language, however, remained for the future. Meanwhile, following the Alberta triumph, *Ukrainskyi holos* called for the expansion of Ukrainian linguistic rights in Manitoba schools:

The resolutions about instruction in languages other than English, Ukrainian in particular, do not meet the expectations of the Ukrainian community. The [Manitoba Royal] Commission recommends the introduction of French or German in the first grade in the schools provided that there are qualified teachers for them. The report further states: when there are qualified teachers, it is possible to teach another language, including Ukrainian, but this has to be in addition to French or German. . . . Such a solution to this question relegates Ukrainian language to secondary place, and no one could agree with this. Ukrainian citizens in Manitoba now must endeavour to ensure that in Manitoba regions populated by considerable numbers of Ukrainians, the Ukrainian language has the same status as French and German.<sup>90</sup>

Obviously, for Ukrainian nationalists, linguistic and cultural equality was an integral part of democracy and multiculturalism. They were the first group of people after the French to claim their collective rights in Canada.

Communist Ukrainians also championed ethnic pluralism by this time, but for more practical reasons than their nationalist rivals. They were guided by the principle of national communism, which adopted a nation's traditional way of life, cultures, and language, to facilitate the expansion of communism among the grassroots in the Soviet territories.<sup>91</sup> They thus stressed the significance of Ukrainian culture and language among the younger generation. Juxtaposing Canada's multiculturalism against the American "melting-pot," seen as a symbol of chauvinism, the *Ukrainian Canadian* criticized American imperialism and the menace that it posed to Canada:

Canadian culture, under attack by United States imperialist cosmopolitanism and obscurantism, which seeks to deny and destroy it, feels the onslaught in this field as well, in the so-called 'melting-pot' steamroller policy—the other side of the coin of racism and discrimination—which is applied in the U.S. and prescribed by Wall Street for Canada too.<sup>92</sup>

Such comments intended to warn Ukrainian Canadians that their traditional culture would be eventually absorbed into the dominant North American culture, defined by an expansionist United States. For postwar communist Ukrainians, Canadian multiculturalism represented "mutual aid" and "peace" among different peoples, which communist discipline, they believed, offered to the masses. They also attached their proletarian message to multiculturalism, arguing that it secured every ethnic group the right to maintain its traditional culture, which the working class could enjoy,<sup>93</sup> as opposed to the materialism that defined "American bourgeois culture."<sup>94</sup> Within this context, communist Ukrainians advertised the greatness of the Soviet Union, which,

according to them, had been practicing the system that “guaranteed full equality and free, independent development of all nations and nationalities” ever since it had ended “the tsarist policy of force and oppression.”<sup>95</sup> Multiculturalism, tied to communist ideals, was particularly significant to communist Ukrainians in Canada, who felt their influence threatened in the West, and thus wanted a vehicle besides the conventional appeal to proletarian rights and world peace to attract more followers.

The postwar Japanese elite, preoccupied with restitution for wartime discrimination, understood ethnic pluralism more as something that would secure individual rights for the Japanese as Canadian citizens.<sup>96</sup> As during the interwar period, they focused more on integration than on the preservation of collective distinctiveness, evidence that they still saw their group boundaries as a stigma and an obstacle. They were also well aware that the purpose of the federal government’s policy to disperse the Japanese population throughout Canada was to facilitate the assimilation of the Japanese. Thus, while Japanese community leaders envisioned Canada as a multiethnic nation, they believed that the contribution of diverse peoples came from the individual’s commitment and effort to be Canadian. The *New Canadian* expressed this sentiment well, stating:

Canada is the Frenchman, the Englishman, the Irish, the Chinese, the Finnish, the Jew, the German, the Ukrainian, and the Japanese. It is the Roman Catholic, the Presbyterian, the Methodist, the Baptist, the Four Square, the Confucianism [sic], the Buddhist. . . . True, Niseis [sic] differ in many aspects from other groups: the difference can also be their contribution to the Canadian life. In the final analysis, a true Canadian is one who firmly believes in democratic ideals, recognizes the rights, accepts the obligations and discharges the duties of Canadian Citizenship.<sup>97</sup>

The fact that this statement treated Japanese more as an individual is quite suggestive, implying that the Japanese group boundaries were an externally imposed impediment that one day would have to be overcome. A 1947 article made the connection explicit:

“Now they [the Japanese masses] are ready to take further positive strides towards reaching the true maturity of citizenship that comes when they can see themselves, not as a group apart, but simply as Canadians sharing the rights and duties and a common destiny with twelve and a half million fellow Canadians.”<sup>98</sup> The fact that the Japanese Canadians had always been situated outside Canadian society because of their racial background forced them to act more individually than collectively, always prioritizing their duties and interests as Canadians.

### **Searching For a Cause**

After accelerated activity in the last half of the 1940s in pursuit of postwar settlements peculiar to each ethnic group, Ukrainian and Japanese ethnic groups, to a greater or lesser degree, lost some momentum during the 1950s. This shift reflected both the growing number of Canadian-born generations and the setback experienced in the great expectations held at the end of the war. Ukrainian nationalists, who had maintained the same political goals since the interwar period, kept their sense of community alive and relatively active. The influx of new nationalist immigrants also regenerated the national consciousness of the existing Ukrainian-Canadian community. Even so, with the admission of Ukrainian refugees to Canada and the consolidation of Soviet power across Ukraine, making independence appear remote, their activities calmed down for a while. Yet their communist rivals and the Japanese elites tended to lose more influence as ethnic community leaders.

The start of the Cold War made Canadians more skeptical than ever of the Soviet Union, while the postwar economic boom rendered the Communist movement less popular in Canada. Both factors brought a rapid decline in AUUC membership,<sup>99</sup>

causing Ukrainian communists to rethink their agendas, focusing on mass campaigns for world peace and a ban on the atomic bomb.

As for the Japanese, the fall of Imperial Japan, their long-term source of ethnic pride and Japan's negative postwar reputation, led to growing indifference towards the homeland. Domestically, as they had been officially marginalized for a long time, the creation of citizenship and acquisition of the federal franchise provided a great sense of satisfaction. These developments, plus the gradual removal of other restrictions, provincial enfranchisement in British Columbia in 1949, and an initial settlement over compensation made them less inclined towards organized activities. In 1953, the CCJC, which had worked for the removal of the wartime discriminatory measures against the Japanese, was officially disbanded. The NJCCA, whose budget depended on membership, faced financial problems. At the same time, the weakening of a sense of ethnic community beyond the local sphere and the necessity to maintain organized ethnic activities at the national level especially were often discussed. For example, despite the contention that the NJCCA was "necessary to safeguard Japanese Canadian interests,"<sup>100</sup> its lack of an agenda and the decentralization of power around local groups were obvious. In the late 1950s, the NJCCA frequently looked at its past achievements, such as the acquisition of compensation and citizenship, while expressing a certain pessimism for the future:

[N]JCCA has meant many things to many people. It has been a symbol of our ideals; it has been a means through which we were able to maintain our self-respect; it has taught us the ethics and machinery of organization; it has been our tool to handle with the best of our skill; it has been our unifying force for good intent; it has been a taskmaster and our teacher. Yet it is now reaching the point where it may easily become a thing of historical moment.<sup>101</sup>

Such comments suggest how important were common goals and agendas to the maintenance of ethnic groups, especially as organized and focused communities. In this sense, Ukrainian nationalists were rare in that they possessed a long-term agenda because of their statelessness and as such maintained their ethnic boundaries collectively more than some other groups.

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The post-World War II period can be characterized by the rise of pan-Canadian identity around democracy and citizenship. Both mainstream and ethnic elites supported and anticipated the great impact that Canada could make on the world as a democratic country. Domestically, the Citizenship Act, in particular, promoted people's sense of belonging to Canada. Mainstream Canadians saw the construction of a strong sense of national community as an important task. The war made them long for peace, and changed how they perceived ethnic minorities in Canada. The Ukrainians and the Japanese regarded the Citizenship Act as long overdue recognition as full-fledged citizens, and had great expectations of dramatic changes. At one level, mainstream and ethnic boundaries merged in the name of freedom, democracy, and citizenship. Yet at another level, the interests of mainstream leaders remained remote from those of ethnic elites. Mainstream policy makers' Canadianism placed issues directly related to Canada as their top priority, taking into account specific ethnic agendas only affected Canada's image or national strength. Japanese issues—such as wartime property losses, the lack of the franchise, and deportation—were thus discussed widely as symbols of racism as they were unjustifiable in democratic nations. Issues outside Canada's jurisdiction, like Ukrainian nationalists' lobby for an independent Ukrainian state free of Soviet control,



were neglected. In pursuit of their respective goals, both ethnic elites challenged the federal government, thereby redefining and expanding the definitions of Canadian democracy and citizenship on their terms, tying them to ethnic pluralism. Yet certain factors made Ukrainian nationalists best equipped to promote the idea of multiculturalism and group rights. Ukrainian statelessness in Europe and fear of cultural assimilation in Canadian society convinced them to strive for cultural and linguistic survival. Ukrainian nationalists thus actively maintained ethnic consciousness and activism, while both communist Ukrainians and the Japanese increasingly lost momentum for organized action.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> On the Cold War, anticommunism, and new immigration that shaped postwar Canadian citizenship, see Franca Iacovetta, *Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2006), 62. See Franca Iacovetta, *Gatekeepers: Reshaping Immigrant Lives in Cold War Canada* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2006).
- <sup>2</sup> Paul Martin, "Canada and the United Nations," *Dalhousie Review* 33: 4 (Winter 1954): 212.
- <sup>3</sup> This organization was established after a Conference on Education held on 20 November 20 1940 through the initiative of C. H. Blakeny, Minister of Education in New Brunswick and D. McArthur, Minister of Education in Ontario. See LAC, MG 28 I 85, vol. 31, file: Annual Meeting – Report 1941. Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, annual report, 31 December 1941, On the Canadian Citizenship Council and its ideals, see also Iacovetta, *Gatekeepers*, 62.
- <sup>4</sup> "United Nations Day," *Citizenship Items* 1: 2 (October 1948): 1.
- <sup>5</sup> Committee of the Canadian Teachers' Federation, *The Democratic Way: The Air We Breathe*, no. 1 (Ottawa: Canadian Citizenship Council; Toronto: The Canadian Association for Adult Education 1951), 1.
- <sup>6</sup> "Secretary's Desk," *New Canadian*, 23 December 1950, 15. For Japanese-Canadian internationalism, see also "Rule of War," *New Canadian*, 10 August 1949, 2; and "For a Better Canada, We Must Each Do Our Part," *New Canadian*, 28 October 1950, 1, 8.
- <sup>7</sup> "Unite as Ukrainians and as Canadians!" *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 February 1956, 9.
- <sup>8</sup> "For Victory in AUUC Drive," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 April 1956, 5.
- <sup>9</sup> John Decore, *Piatyi i shostyi kongres ukrainsiv Kanady*, ed. Ukrainian Canadian Committee (Winnipeg: National Publishers, 1956), 86.
- <sup>10</sup> How citizenship was imagined in an historical context is discussed in a collection of essays, Robert Adamoskyi, Dorothy D. Chunn, and Robert Menzie, eds., *Contesting Canadian Citizenship: Historical Readings* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002).
- <sup>11</sup> "The Human Rights Charter," *Citizenship Items* 2: 1 (January 1949): 1.
- <sup>12</sup> Committee of the Canadian Teachers' Federation, *The Democratic Way: The Air We Breathe*, 6.
- <sup>13</sup> Committee of the Canadian Teachers' Federation, *The Democratic Way: I'm Free to Choose*, no. 2 (Ottawa: Canadian Citizenship Council; Toronto: The Canadian Association for Adult Education 1951), 5.
- <sup>14</sup> Committee of the Canadian Teachers' Federation, *The Democratic Way: Freedom of Conscience*, no. 4 (Ottawa: Canadian Citizenship Council; Toronto: The Canadian Association for Adult Education, 1951), 5.
- <sup>15</sup> Louis St. Laurent, in *Chetvertyi vce-kanadiiskyi kongres ukrainsiv Kanady* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian National Publisher, 1953), 23.
- <sup>16</sup> Paul Martin, House of Commons, *Debates*, 22 October 1945, 1337.
- <sup>17</sup> LAC, MG 28 I 85, vol. 31, file: Annual Meeting – Report 1941, Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, annual report, 31 December 1941.

- <sup>18</sup> LAC, MG 28 I 85, vol. 45, file: Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, Minute Book, 1944-1950. H. D. G. Crerar, Chairman, Executive Committee, Canadian Citizenship Council, memorandum on Training for Canadian Citizenship to Departments of Government and Organizations whose delegates attended the Conference on Citizenship Problems of Immigrants and Other Interested Bodies, 1948.
- <sup>19</sup> LAC, MG 28 I 85, vol. 31, file: Annual Meetings—Minutes and Financial Statements 1945-1955, Canadian Citizenship Council, minutes of annual meeting, 23 May 1950.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>21</sup> LAC, MG 28 I 85, vol. 31, file: Annual Meetings—Minutes and Financial Statements 1945-1955, Canadian citizenship Council, annual report, 30 April 1954.
- <sup>22</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 15, file 30, Paul Yuzyk, "Citizenship Day in Winnipeg, report to Ukrainian Section, IS-CBC," 20 May 1953.
- <sup>23</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 15, file 30, Paul Yuzyk, "Civic and Municipal Elections in Manitoba, news report to the Ukrainian Section, IS-CBC," 1 November 1953.
- <sup>24</sup> "Vlasnymy sylamy," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 14 January 1948, 4. See also "Politychne a, b, v," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 6 February 1946, 4; and "V chim syla hromadianstva," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 25 December 1946, 4.
- <sup>25</sup> "We are Canadian Citizens," *New Canadian*, 4 January 1947, 2. See also "New Years Day Marks Enforcement of New Canadian Citizenship Act," *New Canadian*, 4 January 1947, 1; Mas Sunada, "Citizenship Discussed at Alberta Youth Conference," *New Canadian*, 11 January 1947, 1; "Weakness in Citizenship Act Draws Many Criticisms," *New Canadian*, 18 January 1947, 1; "Mature Citizenship," *New Canadian*, 18 January 1947, 2; "Kanada shimin to natta hi no shinjô," *New Canadian*, 10 January 1948, 5; "Canada Recognizes Citizenship of Niseis, Naturalized Persons," *New Canadian*, 6 December 1947, 1; and "Canadian Citizenship," *New Canadian*, 21 May 1952, 2.
- <sup>26</sup> "1949—The Best Year for Japanese Canadians," *New Canadian*, 24 December 1949, 1. See also "A Day to Remember," *New Canadian*, 6 April 1949, 2; "Japanese Canadians Win Franchise: Measure Passed Without Protest," *New Canadian*, 23 June 1948, 1; "A Pleasant Surprise," *New Canadian*, 26 January 1949, 2; "BC Japanese Canadians Win Franchise," *New Canadian*, 12 March 1949, 1; and "Credit Where Credit Is Due," *New Canadian*, 16 March 1949, 2.
- <sup>27</sup> "Zvidusiudy," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 16 January 1946, 2. For their attack on the communist definition of democracy practice in the Soviet Union, see, for example, "Shchyra mova," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 13 February 1946, 4; and "Ekonomichna demokratiia," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 20 November 1946, 4.
- <sup>28</sup> "Soiuz ukraintsiv samostiinykiv proty komunistychnoi roboty," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 9 January 1946, 1.
- <sup>29</sup> LAC, MG 30 D 403, vol. 24, file 31, William M. Teresio, President, Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, brief submitted to the Senate Committee on Immigration on behalf of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, the Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association, the Workers' Benevolent Association and the newspaper "Ukrainian Life," Ottawa, 5 June 1947.
- <sup>30</sup> "Slavic Canadians! Let Our Voice Be Heard!" *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 May 1955, 7. See also "USSR – Cornerstone of Slav Unity," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 January 1953, 7-8; and "The Address of John Boyd to the Congress," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 July 1955, 57.

- <sup>31</sup> Yasutarô Yamaga, "Hitotsu no hansei," *New Canadian*, 12 October 1946, 5.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* See also "Dai nisei no jidai to iukoto," *New Canadian*, 22 December 1956, 1.
- <sup>33</sup> Ann Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1981), 109.
- <sup>34</sup> Ken Adachi, *The Enemy that Never Was: An Account of the Deplorable Treatment Inflicted on Japanese Canadians during World War Two* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1976), 333.
- <sup>35</sup> "Velyke pravo," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 26 January 1946, 4.
- <sup>36</sup> "Ukrainske pytannia v Ottavi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 14 April 1954, 4. On the issue of nations that remained oppressed after World War II, see, for example, "Zabrekhanyi svit," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 16 January 1946, 4.
- <sup>37</sup> Basil Kushnir, "Ukrainska vyzvolna sprava na tri mizhnarodnoho polozhennia v sviti," in *Tretii vse-kanadiiskyi kongres ukrainsiv Kanady*, ed. Ukrainian Canadian Committee (Winnipeg: Ukrainian National Publishers, 1950), 58-9.
- <sup>38</sup> W. S. Kochan, "Politychi problemy," in *Piatyi i shostyi kongres ukrainsiv Kanady*, 144-5.
- <sup>39</sup> Many of the issues regarding the negotiations between the Canadian government and the Ukrainian-Canadian community and the role of Anthony Hlynka are discussed by in Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).
- <sup>40</sup> Acadia University Special Collection, Watson Kirkconnell Collection, vol. 45, file 10, Ukrainian Canadian Committee, memorandum to W. L. Mackenzie King on Ukrainian Refugees, 23 May 1945. The UCC also presented a memorandum to the United Nations which can be found in *Ukrainskyi holos*, 13 November 1946, 4. On the refugee issue, see also, for example, "Obhovoriuetsia sprava imigratsii do Kanady," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 15 January 1947, 1; "Sprava imigratsii do Kanady," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 29 January 1947, 1; "Sprava imigratsii do Kanady," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 2 July 1947; and "V spravi ukrainskoi imigratsii, Ukrainska delegatsiia v Ottavi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 18 June 1947, 1.
- <sup>41</sup> Anthony Hlynka, House of Commons, *Debates*, 24 September 1945, 386-7.
- <sup>42</sup> Anthony Hlynka, House of Commons, *Debates*, 14 December 1945, 3528-9.
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 2529.
- <sup>44</sup> Oleh W. Gerus and Denis Hlynka, *The Honourable Member for Vegreville: The Memoirs and Diary of Anthony Hlynka, MP* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), 139-42.
- <sup>45</sup> "Japanese Problem Can be Solved," *New Canadian*, 30 March 1946, 2.
- <sup>46</sup> "We Must Continue the Fight," *New Canadian*, 23 February 1946, 2.
- <sup>47</sup> Norman Black, *From Citizens to Refugees—It's Happening Here!* (Toronto: The Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians, 1945), 1. On the Japanese lobby for the end of prewar and wartime restrictions, see, for example, "End Restrictions, JCCA Brief Urges," *New Canadian*, 13 March 1948, 1-3; and "Seek Vote for Japanese Canadians: Niseis Lobby for Elections Act Revision, Removal of Ban from Crown Timber Lands," *New Canadian*, 10 April 1948, 1.
- <sup>48</sup> See, for example, Edith Fowke, *They Made Democracy Work: The Story of the Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians* (Toronto: The Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians and Japanese Canadian Citizens Association, 1951), 9.

- <sup>49</sup> “Orders-in-Council Challenged,” *New Canadian*, 12 January 1946, 2.
- <sup>50</sup> Black, *From Citizens to Refugees—It’s Happening Here!*, 1.
- <sup>51</sup> LAC, MG 31 E 26, vol. 1, Muriel Kitagawa, manuscript of speech to the National Council of Women, March 1948.
- <sup>52</sup> LAC, MG 28 V 1, vol. 1, file 1-2, Hugh MacMillan, letter to Edith Fowke, the Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians, 19 May 1946. On deportation and racism, see also “The Bill vs. Deportation Orders,” *New Canadian*, 11 May 1946; 2 “Expulsion?” *Nisei Affairs*, 20 July 1945, 2; “V-J Day,” *Nisei Affairs*, 28 August 1945, 2; “Will Race Bigotry Triumph?” *Nisei Affairs*, 29 September 1945, 2; George T. Takami, “Deportation by Order-in-Council,” *Nisei Affairs*, 31 October 1945, 1; and “Deportation Should be Abandoned,” *Nisei Affairs*, 19 January 1946, 1.
- <sup>53</sup> “Time to Protest,” *New Canadian*, 19 July 1947, 2.
- <sup>54</sup> “How Can You Justify Racial Discrimination in Immigration, While Deploring it at Home?” *New Canadian*, 18 August 1956, 2.
- <sup>55</sup> *Tairiku jiho*, 3 December 1954, 4.
- <sup>56</sup> “Memorandum by Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Representing Canadian Citizens of Ukrainian Origin to Paris Peace Conference, September 1946,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 16 October 1946, 6.
- <sup>57</sup> S. W. Sawchuk, “Persha sesiiia,” in *Piatyi i shostyi kongres ukraintsiv Kanady*, 18-9.
- <sup>58</sup> John Decore, in *ibid*, 87.
- <sup>59</sup> John Weir, “USSR—Cornerstone of Slav Unity,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 January 1953, 7.
- <sup>60</sup> John Kolasky, “Slavic Solidarity—A Ukrainian Tradition,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 January 1952, 5; and “USSR—Cornerstone of Slav Unity,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 January 1953, 7.
- <sup>61</sup> LAC, MG 28 V 1, vol. 1, file 3, Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians, brief to W. L. Mackenzie King, on repatriation of Japanese Canadians, 25 July 1945.
- <sup>62</sup> Its official title was the Royal Commission to Investigate Complaints of Canadian Citizens of Japanese Origin who Resided in British Columbia in 1941, That Their Real and Personal Property had been Disposed of by the Custodian of Enemy Property at Prices Less than the Fair Market Value.
- <sup>63</sup> “Wanted, A Report on Evacuation,” *New Canadian*, 28 June 1946, 2.
- <sup>64</sup> Fowke, *They Made Democracy Work*, 32.
- <sup>65</sup> Harold Troper, “The Canadian Government and DPs, 1945-8,” in *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons After World War II*, ed. Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1992), 403.
- <sup>66</sup> Luciuk, *Searching for Place*, 79-81. The gap between the ideals of the Canadian government and the Ukrainian elite during World War II is best explored by Bohdan S. Kordan. He argues that Canadian government, while launching democratic principles and national sovereign as its policy, rarely supported Ukrainian nationalist causes, partly because of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. See his *Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945*, 4-5.
- <sup>67</sup> According to Luciuk, neither the British nor the American government showed sympathy to the independence of Ukraine. See Luciuk, *Searching for Place*, 111-4.

- <sup>68</sup> Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism*, 117. Patricia E. Roy also argues that civil liberty and church groups also took a pro-Japanese stance by this time in pursuit of democracy and human rights. See her "Lessons in Citizenship, 1945-1949: The Delayed Return of the Japanese to Canada's Pacific Coast," in *Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans & Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Louis Fiset and Gail M. Nomura (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2000), 269.
- <sup>69</sup> W. L. Mackenzie King, House of Commons, *Debates*, 4 August 1944, 5915.
- <sup>70</sup> Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism*, 119-20.
- <sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 128. Ross Lambertson provides a detailed account of the negotiation between the CCJC and the federal government over the Japanese deportation, recognizing the significance of the issue in the development in the human rights in Canada. See his *Repression and Resistance: Canadian Human Rights Activists, 1930-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 106-42.
- <sup>72</sup> On the attitudes of Canadian government, see Myron Momryk, "Ukrainian DP Immigration and Government Policy in Canada, 1946-52," in *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons After World War II*, ed. Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1992), 413-33; and Troper, "The Canadian Government and DPs, 1945-8," 402-12.
- <sup>73</sup> Luciuk, *Searching for Place*, 82-3. Communist Ukrainians in Canada also expressed their resentment of Canada's acceptance of DPs; see, for example, "Deport Nazi DP Criminals!" *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 January 1950, 1.
- <sup>74</sup> Anthony Hlynka, House of Commons, *Debates*, 18 December 1945, 3718.
- <sup>75</sup> W. L. Mackenzie King, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1 May 1947, 2645.
- <sup>76</sup> Troper, "The Canadian Government and DPs, 1945-8," 408; and Myron Momryk, "Ukrainian DP Immigration and Government Policy in Canada, 1946-52," in *The Refugee Experience*, 420.
- <sup>77</sup> Adachi, *The Enemy that Never Was*, 325-6. For the Japanese attack on the narrow definition of losses set by the royal commission, see "Terms of Reference are Too Restricted," *New Canadian*, 18 August 1946, 2; "Indemnification for Losses," *New Canadian*, 1 February 1947, 2; "Basis for Compensation," *New Canadian*, 10 May 1947, 2; "A Satisfactory Proposal," *New Canadian*, 2 August 1947, 1; "A Request to the Commissioner," *New Canadian*, 8 November 1947, 2; and "The Claims Question," *New Canadian*, 21 June 1950, 8.
- <sup>78</sup> LAC, MG 28 V 1, vol. 1, file 1, Co-operative Committee on the Japanese Canadians, minutes, 24 February 1950.
- <sup>79</sup> LAC, MG 28 V 1, vol. 1, file 1, S. Takashima, Toronto Claimants' Committee, letter to Margaret K. Boos, Secretary, Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians, n.d.
- <sup>80</sup> LAC, MG 28 I 85, vol. 31, file: Annual Meeting – Report 1941, Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, first annual report, 31 December 1941.
- <sup>81</sup> LAC, MG 28 I 85, vol. 54, file: Canadian Citizenship Council Memorandum re: Its History and Activities, 1941-1955, Canadian Citizenship Council, memorandum, October 1955,
- <sup>82</sup> LAC, MG 28 I 85, vol. 45, file: Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, Minute Book, 1944-1950, "Some Thoughts in Connection with Organization Pattern of the Canadian Citizenship Council," n.d.

<sup>83</sup> The Council was involved with the Jewish community in education and conferences. See, for example, LAC, MG 28 I 85, vol. 45, file: Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, Minute Book, 1944-1950. Canadian Council of Education For Citizenship, minutes, 8 October 1949.

<sup>84</sup> LAC, MG 28 I 85, vol. 45, file: Canadian Council of Education for Citizenship, Minute Book, 1944-1950. Canadian Citizenship Council, minutes of executive meeting, 5-6 November 1948.

<sup>85</sup> "Ukrainska kultura," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 9 January 1946, 11. See also "Kulturna syla v nashomu zhyttiu," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 15 January 1947, 4; "Syla kultury v zhyttiu narodu," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 30 April 1947, 4; and "Chom ukraintsi v Kanadi svoimy spravamy interesuiutsia," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 18 June 1947, 4.

<sup>86</sup> "Zahalnyi narodnyi zizd Soiuzu ukraintsiiv samostiinykiv ta yoho soiuznik organizatsii v Vynypeg, Man.," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 30 January 1946, 7.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> "Ukrainska mova v Alberti," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 3 September 1958, 4.

<sup>89</sup> Michael Luchkovich, "V oboroni ukrainskoi movy," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 15 October 1958, 4. For bilingual education and school questions on the prairies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Bill Maciejko, "Ukrainians and Prairie School Reform, 1896-1921: Ethnic and Domestic Ideologies in Modern State Formation," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 22: 2 (1990): 19-40. For the historical development of Ukrainian education in Canada, see Manoly R. Lupul, "Ukrainian-Language Education in Canada's Public Schools," in *A Heritage in Transition: Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada*, ed. Manoly R. Lupul (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart), 215-43.

<sup>90</sup> "Korolivska komisiia i ukrainska mova v Manitobi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 2 December 1959, 4.

<sup>91</sup> On national communism, see Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 93-116.

<sup>92</sup> John Weir, "National Groups and the Canadian Character," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 May 1955, 9.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> Hannah Polowy, "Ukrainians Have Role in Democratic Culture," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 May 1955, 11.

<sup>95</sup> Peter Krawchuk, "October Revolution Gave Ukrainians Freedom," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 November 1955, 7.

<sup>96</sup> For the call for a bill on fundamental human rights, see, for example, "Canada Needs a Bill of Rights," *New Canadian*, 15 March 1947, 2; "Canadians Ask for Rights Bill," *New Canadian*, 23 June 1948, 2; "Vancouver Minority and Labour Groups in Joint Action for Bill of Rights," *New Canadian*, 8 March 1950, 1; "National JCCA to Urge Bill of Rights before Senate Committee at Ottawa," *New Canadian*, 29 April 1950, 1; "JCCA Brief Heard by Senate Committee, Urges Rights Bill," *New Canadian*, 13 May 1950, 1; and "To Confer with Prime Minister about Canadian Bill of Rights," *New Canadian*, 28 April 1951, 1.

<sup>97</sup> S. W., "The Question of Assimilation," *New Canadian*, 24 August 1946, 2.

<sup>98</sup> "Mature Citizenship," *New Canadian*, 18 January 1947, 18.

<sup>99</sup> Orest T. Martynowych, introduction to *Prophets and Proletarians: Documents on the History of the Rise and Decline of Ukrainian Communism in Canada*, ed. John Kolasky (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1990), xxvi. See also “Some Problems Facing AUUC,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 January 1952, 6.

<sup>100</sup> “JCCA Necessary to Safeguard Japanese Canadian Interests,” *New Canadian*, 26 October 1949, 1. On the NJCCA survival, see also “George Tanaka said: ‘JCCA Important As Means of Fostering Democracy,’” *New Canadian*, 24 June 1953, 1; Ed Ide, “What ‘JCCA’ Means to Me,” *New Canadian*, 22 December 1954, 4; “Whither JCCA?” *New Canadian*, 26 January 1955, 2; “National JCCA: a Backward Step?” *New Canadian*, 2 July 1955, 2; “Urge February Confab in Winnipeg to Decide Future of National JCCA,” *New Canadian*, 10 November 1956, 1; “Nisei No Longer Dependent on Ethnic Community,” *New Canadian*, 19 January 1957, 1; “What Do You Think about the National Confab?” *New Canadian*, 26 January 1957, 1; “JCCA: The Membership,” *New Canadian*, 2 February 1957, 3; “Where Do We Go From Here?” *New Canadian*, 24 December, 1958; “Problems of JCCA in Vancouver,” *Tairiku jiho*, 10 April 1959, 1 (English section); and “The JCCA—Reorganized or Disband?” *Tairiku jiho*, 28 April 1959, 1, (English section).

<sup>101</sup> George Tanaka, “What is JCCA?” *New Canadian*, 25 January 1958, 8.



## **Chapter 5**

### **Postwar Era: The Canadianization and Ethnicization of Myths, Collective Memories, and Symbols**

After the end of World War II, not only the Ukrainian and Japanese elites but also the Scots enthusiastically incorporated new political discourses around democracy and citizenship into their collective memories and group myths, thereby modifying them to be relevant in the contemporary Canadian context. At the same time, they ethnicized past events in Canada and consolidated their ethnic boundaries. Through both processes, these elites contributed to the construction of a more encompassing Canadian identity defined by ethnicity and characterized by the merger of Canadian and ethnic identities. First, Canadian citizenship had a great impact on the acceleration of such a merger. During this period, the myths and collective memories that the Scots, Ukrainians, and Japanese produced were positive, reflecting appreciation for their new status as Canadian citizens and the optimism they had for a postwar reborn Canada. Second, the continuity of myths and collective memories from the interwar period, as a factor in helping maintain ethnic identity, varied among the three groups. Ukrainians kept their homeland symbols such as Taras Shevchenko and the Cossacks and their Canadian pioneer myths on the prairies, around which they built a sense of community. The Japanese, in contrast, saw their homeland symbols such as the Emperor and their Canadian myth in British Columbia interrupted by the war and thus had to reconstruct new symbols and myths. The Scottish interest in their myths, symbols, and collective memories was more sporadic, based on such movements as the promotion of Gaelic and Scottish traditions in Nova Scotia. Finally, as in the regional boundaries of the interwar period, both physical and imagined, constituted a crucial factor in shaping communities. Here again, Ukrainian

nationalists provided the best example of intertwined ethnic and regional identities, which focused on and identified with the prairies. For both the Japanese and the Scots, neither British Columbia nor Nova Scotia necessarily reflected their demographical concentrations, and were rather more imagined. This chapter examines the above points through three types of myths and symbols—homeland, Canadian, and regional.

### **Homeland Myths and Symbols**

Myths and symbolic figures imported from the homeland remained effective for the maintenance of ethnic identity in postwar Canada. Yet as pride in being Canadian was boosted by the implementation of Canadian citizenship, these myths and memories were Canadianized, reflecting postwar optimism and victory in the war. Despite common tendencies, how the three ethnic elites preserved and used these myths and symbols after the war varied significantly, having different implications for and impacts on their respective ethnic communities and identities. The Ukrainian nationalist elite was the most effective in using homeland myths and symbols to retain a strong ethnic consciousness among their people. Unlike Scots, who promoted their myths, symbols, and collective memories for Canadian or provincial purposes, Ukrainians kept their myths and symbols ethnically distinctive, for their unchanging cause of Ukrainian independence.

The first difference among the three groups concerned the consistency of myths and symbolic figures. The maintenance of ethnicity, as a dynamic political phenomenon defined by identity not common blood, required ethnic elites' efforts to keep homeland myths and symbols alive and to stimulate their ethnic pride constantly, even though obstacles often hindered such efforts. Among the three groups, and in comparison with

their rival communists, Ukrainian nationalists preserved heroes such as Taras Shevchenko and Bohdan Khmelnytsky most continuously, both because these figures did not meet with any obvious objections from mainstream Canadians who did not always see or ignored them as symbols of loyalty for Ukraine and because they were intertwined with Ukrainian independence. While Ukrainian communists also saw historical homeland heroes as very useful, their emphasis was more on the promotion of the class consciousness of the international proletariat than ethnicity at least until the late 1940s, when they began focusing on the ethnic significance of such heroes. While the Japanese always valued their homeland heroes and myths, World War II did not allow them to promote interwar ones, particularly the Emperor, resulting in a period of discontinuity. Japan's defeat in the war neither ended Hirohito's throne nor reduced his significance to the Japanese nation, but it did terminate the myths which tied him with imperialism and ultranationalism. The Scots were another peculiar case; their homeland collective memories and symbolic figures were always present, but they frequently became more broadly "Canadian" rather than distinctively "Scottish." For example, Burns's birthday on 25 January was celebrated and often featured in a mainstream newspaper like the *Globe and Mail*.<sup>1</sup> Also, the "Scottish movement" that had thrived in Nova Scotia lost momentum after the death of the greatest promoter of Scottish culture and premier of the province, Angus L. Macdonald, in 1954.<sup>2</sup>

The second difference among the three groups was seen in the political agenda attached to these myths and symbols. While at a fundamental level the "myth of common descent" was always closely tied to ethnic groups' respective pasts, roots, and collective memories in their homelands, the political messages attached to them depended on ethnic

elites' contemporary political interests. Such interests did not necessarily involve nationalistic aspirations for or independence of the homeland, but when they did, they provided the ethnic group with a strong motivation for unity and a sense of community.

In this vein, Ukrainian nationalists kept making the most effective use of national heroes and the myths of Ukraine's "golden age" to strengthen ethnic consciousness, tying them to the renewed lobby for Ukraine's independence. The fact that Ukrainians remained an "oppressed" nation after World War II, despite their desire to become independent, increased the significance of these homeland myths and symbols, which, they believed, would justify the claim of Ukraine as a separate state historically. In order to raise support for the independence movement, Ukrainian nationalists cited Ukraine's history, emphasizing the fact that Ukrainians had once been an autonomous nation and therefore had to continue fighting for "freedom" to recover their state. For example, they highlighted the golden age of Ukraine in the "great and powerful Ukrainian state" under Volodymyr the Great,<sup>3</sup> and celebrated Khmelnytsky as a fighter who physically led the Cossacks in pursuit of Ukrainian nationhood.<sup>4</sup> Above all, Shevchenko continued to be enshrined as an all-around leader in every aspect of Ukrainian national life and democracy, as is clear from the following:

They [Ukrainians] have great kings, hetmen, religious leaders, cultural and educational leaders, novelists, poets, and composers. But among all the heroes in its history, the figure of Shevchenko appears above the horizon of people's life. Beyond God's gift, he showed the depth of his intellect and the heart and soul of language by his alluring poems, and became a nationalist prophet, leader, historian, teacher, and people's defender against the authoritarianism and slavery of tsarist Russia. He was the voice of the nation, who could not put his words into practice in his defense in the political and economic situation. Yet Shevchenko was not only in his defense, but he also set a clear goal for liberation, realizing that only in one's home were rights, strength, and freedom.<sup>5</sup>

Shevchenko thus was elevated to a sacred figure who could lead God's "chosen people" to their freedom, and was celebrated as a figure "that God sent to us [Ukrainians] in order that he [Shevchenko] could guide the Ukrainian nation to live."<sup>6</sup> This sort of fusion between Shevchenko and God's will made the Ukrainian nation eternal, at least in the minds of Ukrainian nationalists. Even at critical times when "the Poles and Muscovy tried to destroy Ukrainian life," *Ukrainskyi holos* argued, "they could not destroy the Ukrainian soul."<sup>7</sup> Such comments, implicitly tying the Ukrainian situation in the past to the contemporary one, sent the Ukrainian masses a clear message that the failure to make Ukrainians independent after World War II should never undermine Ukrainian national consciousness.

Scots, too, stressed their glorious past, but they differed from Ukrainian nationalists in that their interests lay in Scottish superiority in Canada rather than in Scotland's politics. At the same time, Scottish Canadians' celebration of anything Scottish was by no means politics-free, as Scots manipulated their myths, symbols, and collective memories in order to claim to be a "chosen people" who had come to Canada with the democratic mission to build a new British colony.<sup>8</sup> As the Citizenship Act promoted the notion of "all Canadians" and the memories of the old world and the British Empire began to fade, Scots stressed their distinctiveness as the founders of the free West and a democratic and free Canada as opposed to growing communist powers. In this context, Robert Burns became a symbol of the world-wide Commonwealth and democratic West as Angus L. Macdonald reminded his audience on Burns night in 1951:

On this very night, in a thousand cities and towns in every part of the English-speaking world, in old Scotland herself, in England, in Ireland, in Wales, in the United States and in Canada, in far off Australia and New Zealand, in many a ship on distant seas, and in many a camp under strange

skies, the thoughts of thousands of men and women will turn to Burns for inspiration and courage, for pleasure and for hope.<sup>9</sup>

After quoting a couple of Burns's poems, he stressed the relevance of Burns to the postwar international scene:

Burns dignified the common man and the common pursuits of life, and in a time when democracy and the rights of common man are threatened by ruthless and tyrannous foes, it is well that we should recall this aspect of Burn's poetry—message of Burns to our time.<sup>10</sup>

Canada's new fight for equality, democracy, and freedom in the Cold War was also encouraged in the context of the Scottish past. Justice J. Keiller Mackay of the Supreme Court of Ontario, for example, stressed the benefits of freedom and human rights, tying them to how Scots survived as a strong and influential nation, when he responded to the toast to Scotland at the North British Society meeting in Halifax on the feast of St. Andrew in 1950. "Empires rise and fall, kings, tyrants and conquerors come and go, but Scotland has contrived throughout the centuries to preserve her ancient love of freedom and her passionate avowal of the dignity and nobility of our common humanity."<sup>11</sup> More specifically, the event was often dramatized as a rebellion for Scottish independence and freedom. Angus L. Macdonald, for example, called it the "final stand for an independent Scotland."<sup>12</sup> Flora Macdonald, a Scottish heroine who helped Charles Edward Stuart lead the Highland clans in the Uprising was enshrined in Canada as well.<sup>13</sup> The fact that she helped Charles Edward Stuart to escape from British forces after his defeat at the Battle of Culloden in 1746 demonstrated her "loyalty" and "self-sacrifice"<sup>14</sup>—qualities admired and needed by Canadians who had just experienced the war and faced a new challenge in the Cold War. Scots thus were defined as a special people possessing democratic principles and loyalty, but the racism accompanied the

same Scottish sense of superiority for much of the first half of the twentieth century, particularly during World War II, was largely forgotten.<sup>15</sup>

Postwar Japanese leaders reinstated the Emperor and his family as symbols of their loyalty to Japan, yet quite naturally they were no longer identified with Japan's nationalism or imperialism. This decline of nationalist discourse around the Emperor was a factor which made the Japanese homeland symbol different from that of Ukrainian nationalists. The royal family was now viewed as a central national symbol that would lead Japan's postwar reconstruction of the nation and its relationship with other countries—particularly with Canada. The memories of the war and Imperial Japan, which postwar Japanese Canadians always identified with property losses and internment, had to be separated from the royal family. The new role that was assigned to Japan's throne became apparent when Prince Akihito visited Canada in 1953 on behalf of his politically controversial father, who was often seen as responsible for the Pacific War. The Japanese throughout Canada, both *issei* and *nisei*, widely celebrated the occasion, although the *New Canadian* insisted that the celebration be done in a very “modest” and “democratic way,”<sup>16</sup> as opposed to a nationalistic way, reflecting concern about the reaction of mainstream society. The visit signified a resumed relationship between Japan and Canada and the end of lingering suspicion against Japan. The purpose of the royal visit, like the speech that the prince gave in Victoria said, was “to contribute to the further development of friendship between Canada and Japan.”<sup>17</sup> The *New Canadian* endorsed this goal, arguing:

Prince Akihito could have been regarded merely as another visitor from a foreign land but our role as Canadian citizens does not mean that we should be completely invisible citizens detached from a land which has given us cultural heritage of its customs, aesthetics, philosophy, art, and moral code that we can

help impart to Canadian life. The visit of Prince Akihito, we hope, will bolster friendly relations between Canada and Japan, and if we, as Canadian citizens, have helped in making his visit a successful one, then the effort will have been worthwhile.<sup>18</sup>

*Tairiku nippo*'s successor, *Tariku jiho*, expanded on the significance of the visit, maintaining that the improved relationship should not only complete the normalization of the diplomatic relationship but also end the continued ban of Japanese immigration to Canada.<sup>19</sup> Akihito's visit to Canada was indeed received with exhilaration and "tears in the eyes."<sup>20</sup> If Hirohito represented the bitter memory of the war, Akihito brought great expectations for a new Japan and the future. As the *New Canadian* stated, "Japan's moderns hope that he will return with ideas of becoming an important force in the country and a modern monarch, less tied up with religious ritual and more concerned with current trends of Japanese history."<sup>21</sup> Such a comment manifested resistance to conventional practices and rituals that the *issei* Japanese had maintained. *Tairiku jiho* no longer identified Akihito with the "golden age" of Japanese nationalism, and reported on his tour with enthusiasm as a "honourable" and "memorable" event that would lead "Japan's postwar policies in the right direction," and guide "Japan to join democratic Western nations."<sup>22</sup> For the Japanese, Akihito's visit removed the contradictions in Japanese Canadians' dual loyalty.

The third difference among the three groups concerned the impact of homeland myths and symbols on internal divisions within each. When competing elites share the same myths and symbols, rivalry between two factions often intensifies over the representation of the ethnic group and the mobilization of its members. This phenomenon, which Paul R. Brass describes as "the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group's culture, attach new value and meaning to them,



and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interests and to compete with other groups,”<sup>23</sup> was most obvious among Ukrainians. Fueled by the Cold War, competition between Ukrainian nationalists and communists over Ukrainian historic figures such as Taras Shevchenko intensified. They competed over symbols and myths more vigorously than Scottish and Japanese elites who were rarely divided ideologically by the use of ethnic symbols during this period. Obviously for Scots, who did not need to rely on ethnicity to gain greater power in Canadian society or politics, homeland myths and symbols were highlighted only by a circle of interested politicians, scholars, and others and were rarely sources of conflict. The difference between Ukrainians and the Japanese, therefore, is the focus here.

Ukrainian nationalists and communists both adroitly manipulated the myths around Kievan Rus’ and Shevchenko for their own purposes so that they could win the political competition to represent the Ukrainian ethnic community. For nationalist Ukrainians, Shevchenko, in addition to his traditional role as a national prophet, played a part as a symbol of resistance against neighbouring foreign powers in Europe. A spirit of struggle against communism, which gained significance as the Cold War escalated, was derived from Shevchenko’s poetry and acquired contemporary political connotations, as the following quotation shows:

Not only Ukrainians but also foreigners know who Shevchenko was, for what he fought and perished. Shevchenko fought not only for the social and economic liberation of Ukrainian people. He fought not only for the political liberation of Ukraine about which he often wrote in his poems. Most precisely, the ingenious work of Shevchenko turned against the Russian tsar who subjugated the Ukrainian people and their state. He rebelled against this hostile authority, which was in Ukraine in his time. Clearly, he was not able to stand against communists, such as Lenin and Stalin and all contemporary soldiers in Ukraine, because he was no longer alive. But nobody doubted that if Shevchenko were to live today, and had the freedom to write as he had from

the tsar, he, without any contradiction, would have cursed the contemporary Communist red Muscovite tsars and called on the Ukrainian people to rise and break their chains.<sup>24</sup>

Clearly, such comments, which equated the Russian tsars with the communists, portrayed Shevchenko as a fighter against their authoritarian power. Among communist Ukrainians, the Russian tsars were depicted as “Russian militarist-feudal-capitalist oppressors.”<sup>25</sup> In this context, Shevchenko was a hero who represented the exploited class of “serfs” and worked “for the overthrow of feudalism and the democratic unification of the Slavic peoples.”<sup>26</sup> Both factions also competed over the interpretation of historical memory and myth. Their ideal of Slav unity and insistence on the legitimacy of the Soviet Union made communists refute the nationalist notion of Kievan Rus’ as a distinctively “Ukrainian” state, and argue that it was a Slavic empire that “embraced all the Rus people.”<sup>27</sup> This communist interpretation of Kievan Rus’ was a message to Ukrainians in Canada that they should not lobby for Ukrainian independence. According to the communists, Khmelnytsky did not fight for Ukrainian independences, as nationalists argued, but “brought to fruition the age-old dream of the Ukrainian people—their unification with the Russians, the people of the same blood and religion,” to return to “the ancient glory of the Rus’.”<sup>28</sup>

Such competition over symbols surfaced most clearly when the communists erected a monument of Taras Shevchenko on 1 July 1951 in North Oakville, Ontario, on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada.<sup>29</sup> The communists, quite naturally, celebrated the success of the project and the appeal that the monument had to the public, calling it “a great triumph” and stating:

While there were a couple of thousand visitors from other parts of Canada and even from the United States, and while there were undoubtedly several

thousand non-Ukrainians present, there could not have been 45,000 people at the celebration if the great majority of the Ukrainian people in this district had not turned out. Despite the false and insidious propaganda of the “nationalist” leaders,” the Ukrainian Canadian people joined hands to mark the 60th anniversary and together greeted the Shevchenko monument.<sup>30</sup>

Obviously, this was an opportunity to showcase the work of communists and its innocuous nature, and to defeat negative views about the Soviet Union. It was also a public gesture to show their possession of the Ukrainian hero. The nationalist elite, which was never pleased with the attention that the communists received from the public, criticized their patriotism as superficial, arguing:

Having realized that Ukrainians feel very sentimental toward Shevchenko and have profound love for him and his achievements, the communists attached to a monument of Shevchenko brutally and carelessly, manipulating this honest sentiment of Ukrainians for their evil goal, spreading hostile propaganda, collecting donations from Ukrainians, and using them for their weak cause. . . . Moscow in the era of Shevchenko and at present, has only one goal: to conquer all Slavic and other nations with their despotic power and government. Shevchenko vigorously rebelled against Moscow, the worst prison house of people, and led his people in the correct direction: the liberation of the Ukrainian people from Moscow. On this road, Ukrainian leaders and the entire people stand today.<sup>31</sup>

For the nationalists, then, the statue was an evil manipulation of the Ukrainian spiritual symbol, and thus, was not legitimate. Their statue was erected in 1961 in Manitoba on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada and the centennial of the poet’s death. The nationalists demonstrated the legitimacy of their statue, inviting the prime minister and other government officials to the ceremony; John G. Diefenbaker unveiled the statue, while Dufferin Roblin, Premier of Manitoba gave an address. Inviting mainstream politicians was nationalists’ statement that they were Ukrainians’ representatives in Canada, and that they shared interests with other

Canadians. Yuzyk, for example, stressed the “universal” nature of Shevchenko, describing the day of the ceremony:

This man of lowly birth, who used his rare talents of poetry and painting to fight Russian tsarist tyranny for the rights and dignity of the common man and for freedom of his and other subjugated nations and who suffered a martyr’s fate in exile, is to-day the most revered man among Ukrainians throughout the world.<sup>32</sup>

The Japanese differed considerably from Ukrainians in terms of competition over myths and symbols within their community, as they lacked an intense rivalry between the *issei* and *nisei* over the interpretation of the Japanese past and the role of the Emperor. Both groups agreed, if not completely, on the role that the Emperor could play. Such agreement was due to changes in the *issei*’s attitudes towards Japan and the royal family, caused by the demise of Imperial Japan. While the *issei* had always seen the Emperor as a symbol of imperialism and the head of the superior Yamato race, they now accepted the new role of the Emperor as the representative of a normalized relationship between Canada and Japan. Rather than imposing their loyalty to Japan on the *nisei*, they only hoped that Akihito’s visit would promote pride in being Japanese among the *nisei*, who had grown up believing that maintaining distance from Japan was politically appropriate in Canada. “The biggest product” of Akihito’s visit to Canada, *Tairiku jiho* reported, was “to impress the *nisei* who tended to underestimate Japan.” As Canada “invited him as an official guest,” it continued, “the *nisei* must have realized the special status that Canada assigned to Japan.”<sup>33</sup> Now that their adopted homeland, Canada, recognized Japan, the *issei* thought, the visit of Akihito could also help the *nisei* appreciate Japan as a democratic country and take pride in their ethnic background. In addition, the royal tour was officially laid out by the Canadian and the Japanese

governments, and thus, unlike the construction of monuments, not a demonstration of the possession of the Japanese symbolic figure by any group.

### **Crystallization of Canadian Ethnic Myths, Symbols, and Histories**

Postwar Canada saw two opposite tendencies in the development of myths and collective memories. On the one hand, the fusion between ethnic and Canadian myths and collective memories advanced, while on the other hand, ethnic groups tried to establish their own history, which could be detached from Canada's past. In many ways, the coexistence of the two tendencies suggests that ethnic groups always tried to be both ethnic and Canadian. The postwar expansion of specifically Canadian myths and symbols, already found in the interwar period, reflected a sense of roots in and attachment to Canada and Canadian citizenship on the part of both ethnic groups and their elites. The emphasis on Canadian experiences by ethnic elites made ethnicity integral to Canadian identity and Canada to ethnic identity. For late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ukrainian and Japanese immigrants, who had resided in Canada for many years, and for their Canadian-born descendants, Canada became a more familiar land. For the Ukrainian and Japanese elites, one of the most notable and common ways of demonstrating Canadian ethnic myths and symbols was the celebration of their anniversaries in Canada and the enshrinement of the first immigrants to Canada. The 1951 diamond jubilee of the settlement of Ukrainians in Canada was the most organized manifestation of the maturity of community life in comparison with other groups. The Japanese had not yet established a precise date for their first settlement, but they still commemorated fifty years of their experiences in Canada during this period. The case of Scots, as builders of the Empire and Canada, showed a different tendency in creating

Canadian myths and requires a separate category of analysis, because the boundary between Scottish and mainstream myths and anniversaries was less clearcut. Yet at the same time, all groups tried to establish their own history, which celebrated their own ethnic heroes and events, thereby redefining their boundaries.

“Canadian” stories and collective memories, which stressed ethnic groups’ contribution to Canada’s nation building and cultural, economic, and political achievements in Canada, had their origin in the interwar period. Yet this movement had some postwar dimensions. The first was the integration of the notion of Canadian citizenship that could be seen in the public discourses of rival factions—Ukrainian nationalists and communists, Japanese *issei* and *nisei*.<sup>34</sup> Ukrainian and Japanese leaders wished to show that their groups, had deep roots in the country, and therefore deserved equal status and rights as citizens. Yet the Ukrainian elite had a better opportunity than the Japanese to make an explicit connection between their pioneer symbols and citizenship, as their hero, Wasyl Eleniak, was among the first people to gain Canadian citizenship, together with the prime minister and the mother of a Polish soldier. The ceremony in Ottawa was a sign that the Ukrainian pioneer had gained an equal status with these individuals, and *Ukrainskyi holos* reported on it with great enthusiasm, writing:

Respectfully and firmly for his age, he [Eleniak] walked into the court. And when he received the certificate, the applause never stopped. The next person after him was Mrs. Mynarska from Winnipeg. Her son, a pilot, perished heroically in the war, and achieved a great distinction: the Victoria Cross. And Mrs. Mynarska equally received a lot of sincere applause. Then another person followed and in total there were twelve people.<sup>35</sup>

The fact that Eleniak became one of the first Canadian citizens was valued by Ukrainians, not simply because his contribution as a Ukrainian pioneer was recognized

by mainstream leaders but also because he was selected to participate in the citizenship ceremony, representing Ukrainians who built roots in Canada. This sense of uniqueness was well illustrated by Vera Lysenko, when she put it, “Eleniak symbolizes today, as perhaps does no other man of any ethnic groups in Canada, the entire period of their settlement for the Ukrainian Canadians.”<sup>36</sup>

The Japanese, in contrast, had no such perfect symbol as Eleniak. The alleged first Japanese immigrant to Canada, Manzô Nagano, who landed in British Columbia in 1877, was not always based in the province, moving back and forth among Canada, Japan, and the United States. Neither did he live long enough to receive Canadian citizenship, as he died at his home in Nagasaki in 1923. Yet the Japanese elite also considered contributions to citizenship and the franchise when they selected their heroes. In 1950, the *New Canadian* “officially” elevated thirty-six people as “the Japanese Canadians of the Half-Century,”<sup>37</sup> based on nominations and votes by its subscribers. Besides Manzô Nagano, they included individuals such as Etsu Suzuki, a newspaper editor and leader of the Japanese-Canadian labourers’ rights movement; Tomekichi Honma, who led the Japanese campaign for the vote and equal rights as citizens; and Yasutarô Yamaga, who built a foundation for better Japanese-(white) Canadian relations in the interwar years so that the future generation could become full-fledged citizens of Canada.<sup>38</sup> Suzuki gained the largest number of votes in the competition, reflecting the fact that the labourers’ movement was one of the few concrete ways at that time to unite Japanese and other Canadians in local communities and combat racism. The *New Canadian* noted the impact that his work had on the field of citizenship as follows: “We are indeed putting into practice what he had advocated twenty some years ago. It was to

build our lives in Canada permanently and establish our lives in Eastern Canada. In short, it was a plea that we become Canadians.”<sup>39</sup> While Suzuki did not represent the entire span of Japanese settlement, he symbolized much of the Japanese fight for equal rights in Canada.

The postwar features of Canadian ethnic myths also included emphasis on ethnic groups’ accomplishments and the reflection of expectations rather than the negative sides of their pasts. As the introduction of Canadian citizenship and the end of World War II were critical steps for ethnic groups towards full recognition in Canada, both the Ukrainian and Japanese elites developed myths and collective memories that made a transition from the “difficult” past to the “better” present in terms of both material conditions and social acceptance. In this way, they could conceptualize their histories as a linear progression that overlapped with the experiences of Canada. As a part of the initial batch of stories, pioneers were honoured for the hardships they encountered in the new land, and celebrated for building the foundations of ethnic communities. On the sixtieth anniversary of Ukrainian settlement, tributes to the pioneers were the main focus. At a concert held by the nationalists in Winnipeg on 8 September 1951, the organizers stressed the contrast between past and present in very congratulatory tones:

The foreign land and language, the foreign customs and habits, the wild forest and the prairies—all laid down difficulties in your mind at the very doorstep of the promised land. Quite often immigration officers left you with spouses and children on the foreign, unfriendly prairies, in the bleak isolated forest, far away from cities and people, without a roof over your head, without any money and livelihood, without anything. Though without anything, you had your precious treasures, talismans which at times transformed endless forests and grassy prairies into a sea of golden grain. . . . With your courage, endurance, and hard work, you enriched not only yourself, but also your children and grandchildren.<sup>40</sup>



This sort of collective memory reflected the idea that the evolution of the Ukrainian Canadians and the Canadian community occurred side by side, and distinctively Ukrainian qualities were great assets to Canada. Communist Ukrainians, while placing more emphasis on labourers' struggles in the pioneer era, also exhibited a bright picture of their present and future and a sense of contribution to Canada. The *Ukrainian Canadian* celebrated Ukrainians and Canada on Dominion Day in 1956, stating: "The Ukrainian Canadians have already contributed greatly in labour, in helping to build up the country, in bringing the traditions of their people into the common store house of Canadian culture."<sup>41</sup>

The Japanese, settled mainly on the West Coast before World War II, did not possess a sense of being a major force in Canada's nation building, but nonetheless saw their participation as a great achievement:

Fifty years ago, our pioneers came to Canada without anything. All they had was a spirit of endurance, persistence, and unlimited ability of development. Despite the fact that they faced discrimination and intolerance, they built strong roots on the Canadian land—created a seed of real Canadianism. This seed has now grown, and the dreams and hopes of the pioneers came true in Canada. Canada is now one of the international powers. Today, the Japanese Canadians are no longer politically and socially marginalized or isolated.<sup>42</sup>

Such a depiction of the difficult past was written in retrospect to contrast with the better postwar period and thus showed how much Japanese felt part of Canada by this time. The striking similarity between Ukrainian and Japanese emphases on the hardships that immigrants had confronted in terms of both racism and economic conditions in the pioneer era reflected their perceptions that their situations had improved greatly in the postwar era.

The final postwar feature of Canadian myths and collective memories was the fact that they began taking shape as more sophisticated ethnic histories, predecessors of the scholarly works that started appearing in the 1960s and became common in the 1970s. This tendency reflected ethnic elites' determination to preserve "their" past, which was distinguishable from Canadian experiences, and thus to produce their own history, making all ethnic groups' experiences independent of each other and mainstream history. In other words, the production of ethnic groups' own histories was a claim that they were participants in Canada's growth as a nation state, but as distinctive groups of people who made a positive contribution to Canada. Their monographs thus differed considerably from the interwar studies produced by mainstream assimilationist scholars in terms of ethnic groups' self-assertion.

Illuminating examples of such ethnic histories for the Ukrainians are Vera Lysenko's *Men in Sheepskin Coats*, published in 1947, and Paul Yuzyk's *The Ukrainians in Manitoba*, published in 1953. While both authors had different ideological orientations—the former was funded by the AUUC and the latter was a nationalist—and interpreted Ukrainian-Canadian history from their own political perspectives, they were similar in their belief that their history could be written independently of mainstream landmark events and great individuals. Their works, in fact, were some of the earliest studies to use the format that later became the norm in writing ethnic history, dividing their chapters into such themes as settlement, organizational life, the press, culture, and assimilation. Written in a journalistic style, Lysenko's book outlined Ukrainian life in Canada from the arrival of Ivan Pylypiw and Wasyl Eleniak to the development of a community—particularly around the Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association

(ULFTA)—and assimilation. Yet her history also went back to the old world, particularly to the time of the Cossacks under Bohdan Khmelnytsky, thereby providing Ukrainian-Canadian history with primordial roots as a nation.<sup>43</sup> Reflecting the priorities and censorship of the communist sponsor of *Men in Sheepskin Coats*, the AUUC, Lysenko focused on Ukrainian songs, poems, and other cultural works, which the AUUC used to attract people to communism and increase its membership.<sup>44</sup> Yuzyk's monograph was based on much more thorough research, yet followed a similar line of events, from the Cossack era in Europe to immigration to Canada, and the economic and cultural activities of the Ukrainian community. It was provincial not national in scope, understanding Manitoba as the focal point of Ukrainian-Canadian identity, and in that context enumerating, for example, events, names, cultural activities, presses, and secular organizations in the province.<sup>45</sup> Both monographs thus perceived the ethnic group from a similar primordial perspective, as a community of people bonded by common roots and cultural traits, which became the major way of conceptualizing Ukrainian history in Canada.

For the Japanese elite, the establishment of Japanese-Canadian history became particularly imperative in the 1950s because they were searching for a new cause. As most wartime restrictions on the Japanese had been lifted by then and the franchise achieved, they needed a project to replace such political campaigns. In a way, their institutionalization of ethnic history was more obvious and intentional than that of the Ukrainians. The newly formed Japanese Canadian Citizens Association (JCCA) officially called for the production of Japanese-Canadian history in the late 1950s. A sense of

possession of Japanese-Canadians' past and the will to make their ethnic boundary something permanent was well illustrated when the *New Canadian* wrote:

A History of the Japanese in Canada will be Our Story. . . . This history is a necessity of the annals of Canada and to future generations of Japanese Canadians, showing the record of progress of one minority group which under unique circumstances rose from the pall of racial discrimination to make contributions to almost every field of Canadian life.<sup>46</sup>

This project should not be regarded merely as an effort to record the past; it was also the claim that the NJCCA had the authority to carry out the plan, determining who could be the author and what should be written. The emphasis on political correctness and control was evident when the association justified its choice of Ken Adachi, then a journalist, as project leader, on the grounds that it had found “no major faults with Adachi’s work, which we assigned to him” in previous years.<sup>47</sup> The history committee added that “the history” should be “written by a Japanese Canadian able to feel and extract the true meaning and picture experienced by our pioneers.”<sup>48</sup> While the committee acknowledged that mainstream studies of Japanese Canadians—including Charles Young and Helen Reid’s *The Japanese Canadians* (1938) and F. E. LaViolette’s *The Canadian Japanese and World War II* (1948)—shed light on the Japanese-Canadian community, it rejected them as the official historical interpretation of Japanese-Canadian life. These studies, according to the committee, focused more on statistics and failed to incorporate a “clear-sighted view into the hearts and minds of the people they are about.”<sup>49</sup> LaViolette’s study, in particular, was censored because of the federal government’s wartime policy.<sup>50</sup> Implicitly, the NJCCA was denying mainstream practices and power to define the Japanese community since the interwar period. It was also criticizing the lack of celebration of Japanese-Canadian history in those books, indicating that

Japanese-Canadian history had entered a new phase, which claimed self-definition of the past and the uniqueness of the community. More specifically, the NJCCA's project rejected a "straightforward, chronological marshalling of events," and focused more on "an interpretative study of the struggle, upheaval, and achievement of the Japanese Canadians."<sup>51</sup> Adachi, in his article "History of Japanese Canadians in B.C., 1877-1958," which was a prelude to the history project, argued: "The story of the Japanese in British Columbia, of all the groups in the province, is easily the most dramatic, and disturbing in its ramifications."<sup>52</sup> More precisely, he placed special emphasis on various types of long-term discrimination and internment during World War II, thereby determining the future foci around which Japanese-Canadian history would evolve.

As part of the mainstream British group, the Scots fit into a different category from Ukrainians and the Japanese in terms of writing ethnic history. Most notably, they did not try to construct a dichotomy between their and Canada's pasts as clearly as the Ukrainians and Japanese did, yet like them they highlighted the Scottish experience and contribution to nation building.<sup>53</sup> Such a tendency was well illustrated by Angus L. Macdonald, who, in referring to Scottish contributions to Canadian education, maintained that "these [educational institutions, including universities] owe their beginnings to men of Scottish birth or Scottish descent. So that the Scot in Canada, as elsewhere, has established a goodly record in the educational world."<sup>54</sup> The Scottish system of education was celebrated not only as a Scottish achievement but also as the foundation of mainstream Canada. A similar tendency of ethnicizing Canadian achievements can be seen in Charles W. Dunn's *Highland Settler* (1953), which

attempted to highlight the Scots' contribution to Nova Scotia. Following a linear development from emigration to the cultural and economic developments of the Highland Scots in the province, this study used the same format of Ukrainian- and Japanese-Canadian histories. It, however, differed slightly from Ukrainian and Japanese efforts to create their histories in terms of who wrote them. Dunn was a Harvard-trained Scottish scholar of literature, who was born and grew up in Scotland, and thus was rather an "outsider" to Nova Scotia. His book was more a celebration of Gaelic cultural heritages, which were well preserved in Nova Scotia, than a politically motivated representation of the Scottish voice. Undoubtedly, he gave the Highland Scots a special "ethnic" status, not as imperial colonists but as people brought to Canada after their clan system was destroyed in 1746.<sup>55</sup> Yet his main interest was the retention of a rare language away from Highland Scotland. Devoting a large part of his book to Gaelic literature, poems, and presses, he stressed their survival: "The quantity of Gaelic pamphlets, papers, and books published in North America is considerable and somewhat astonishing."<sup>56</sup> In this case, then, Gaelic identity was promoted also by homeland scholars whose works helped identify Nova Scotia with Highland characteristics.

### **Region and Identity**

Ethnic myths and collective memories were often closely tied with imagined region. Anthony D. Smith provides a very useful concept of "ethnoscape" to describe ethnic identity in which "the idea of an historic and poetic landscape" becomes imbued with "the culture and history of a group."<sup>57</sup> The nature of the relationship between region and ethnicity is that regional identity helped to consolidate ethnic identity rather than to overwhelm it. In other words, specific region in Canada gained significance in the

consolidation of ethnic identity, although regional boundaries carried different meanings for and had different impacts on different groups. This section argues that region, both physical and imagined, as a component of ethnic identity was another factor that made Ukrainian ethnic consciousness distinctive, especially compared to the Japanese, focusing on the following issues: how region was related to the ethnic group's concept of time and progress, how region was tied to an imagined homeland, and how the ethnic group was incorporated into the region both by ethnic and mainstream elites.<sup>58</sup>

Region was strongly intertwined with ethnic elites' own perception of time and progress in various ways. More precisely, it symbolized a certain era in the history of each ethnic group. Ukrainians exhibited the deepest sense of attachment to a particular region among the three groups, so that the progress of the prairies and Ukrainian communities were often seen side by side, and region thus symbolized their long continuous history in Canada. The concentration of the Ukrainian population in the three prairie provinces for more than half a century without any major interruption and their contribution to the Canadian economy through the cultivation of the land stimulated a profound sense of roots. The Japanese, in contrast, perceived the geographical boundary between the West Coast and the rest of the country as the dividing line between the difficult "past" and the prosperous "future." The mass evacuation from the West Coast to the interior camps in 1942 and subsequent resettlement east of the Rockies after World War II broke Japanese-Canadian ties with British Columbia. For Scots, region was also strongly intertwined with their sense of time, and Nova Scotia, as Ian McKay has pointed out, symbolized the romantic past of Highland Scotland. The Scottish elite's efforts to ethnicize the entire province of Nova Scotia around Scottishness was a project to go back

to the past, reflecting “anti-modernism,” resistance to “the products of twentieth-century modernity [urbanization, professionalization, and the rise of the positive state].”<sup>59</sup>

For Ukrainians, the prairies symbolized their entire period in Canada, since Ukrainian farmers entered Western Canada in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A sense of “struggle” during the settlement period and of “achievement,” especially in agriculture, over many years on the prairies where immigrant farmers had been in a great demand produced a conviction that the region belonged particularly to Ukrainians. Ukrainian attachment to the prairie region was often highlighted, particularly in comparison with other groups. P. I. Lazarovich, a Ukrainian lawyer and teacher, for example, emphasized the exceptional role that Ukrainians played in pioneering the West at the second congress of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee in 1946:

I took the Alberta statistics as an example. . . . Our farmers cultivated more land than Anglo-Saxons where there was mixed population. I know such regions very well, where in 10-15 years the British had mixed with us. Today, there are no British in general in Ukrainian areas, or will be no British very soon. Our people cultivated their lands without exception. Therefore our possession grows every year, covering a large amount of land.<sup>60</sup>

Obviously, for Ukrainians, the claim that they were involved in province building more than others was the key factor that Ukrainianized the prairie provinces. This belief was further illustrated on the occasion of the golden jubilees of Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1955, when such landmark events served as a great chance for Ukrainians to demonstrate their cultural and economic contributions to the two provinces. *Ukrainskyi holos*, for example, stressed the Ukrainians’ commitment to these two specific provinces, arguing: “With the possible exception of Manitoba, there are no other provinces in Canada where Ukrainians have made a greater contribution to development.” Economic foundations were the major focus, as the article continued: “Ukrainians have full right to feel that



they were productive participants in these fifty years of progress” and “the present condition of growth and prosperity of both provinces” was a “product of their effort.” It added that “when Saskatchewan and Alberta became provinces in 1905, Eleniak and Pylypiw had already been farming in Alberta for many years.”<sup>61</sup> For Ukrainians, then, Western Canada embodied a claim to both influence and rights that they deserved as builders of Canada, and was a symbol of economic progress for both Ukrainians and Canada.

For the Japanese, moving from the West Coast of British Columbia to east of the Rockies identified the province with the unappealing “past” and lingering racial discrimination. In the late 1940s the memories of racial and political marginalization in the province before the war remained vivid and some wartime measures and restrictive prewar policies, including the denial of fishing licenses and the franchise to the Japanese, were still in practice. As such, the Japanese elite excluded British Columbia from “democratic” Canada as well as from citizenship which symbolized the bright future. More precisely, the zone within one hundred miles of the Pacific coast, where the interwar Japanese population was concentrated, became the darkest symbol of the Japanese past. The equation of the West Coast with the past reflected Japanese determination that they would not return to the region, and was well illustrated by the following statement in the *New Canadian*:

*The New Canadian* believes that the great majority of those who have moved east of the Rockies will not return. They are relatively well established or becoming so with the assistance of placement officers and friends. . . . The coast offers the advantage of a milder climate and certain familiar fields of employment as in gardening, fishing, berry-farming, etc. But the coast also retains its deep-rooted discrimination in the broad field of economic activity, which older Niseis and Isseis [sic] will remember.<sup>62</sup>

The new lands on which the Japanese had resettled or were resettling, in contrast, were seen as representing democracy, justice, and economic prosperity. Immediately after the end of the war, the *New Canadian* expressed the optimism associated with east of the Rockies:

Now, however, they [the evacuees] are made to realize that there is little discrimination in eastern Canada, and that the termination of the war has resulted in no heightened ill-feeling against the people of Japanese race. Nor does serious depression threaten in Canada in the foreseeable future—on the contrary Canada stands at the threshold of a period of great economic expansion. . . . It is worth noting that a number of Niseis, and Isseis [sic] too, have tackled the problem of re-establishing themselves in the east with remarkable success.<sup>63</sup>

A sense of hope was expressed not only in political and economic terms, but also in terms of the productivity of the land and the potential for permanent settlement. The *New Canadian* maintained that farming in Alberta looked very promising, writing: “For anyone who decided to establish roots on the soil of Canada, Alberta would offer great opportunities, with its rich natural resources such as sugar, grass, livestock, lumber, fish, crops, oil and coal.”<sup>64</sup> Such a paradisiacal portrayal of an area east of British Columbia, even with some exaggeration, symbolized a bright future which might erase bitter experiences of the past completely. Furthermore, the Japanese elite argued that the arrival of the Japanese *en masse* in the camps, including the ones in the interior of British Columbia, created a great economic impact on somewhat deserted places, and thus benefited those small towns as well. Celebrating the golden jubilee of Greenwood in the interior of British Columbia in 1947, the *New Canadian* pointed out that before the influx of Japanese in 1942, Greenwood was a “ghost town,” but the Japanese evacuees “revitalized the town, renovating houses and cleaning up the streets.”<sup>65</sup> The article was filled with success stories, showing how the town resumed local activities such as the

exploration of gold mining and the production of insulation. Japanese participation in anniversary events in Greenwood illustrated both their determination to plant roots, and their aspirations for the future life, as the titles of two Japanese floats showed: “the arrival of Japanese evacuees” and “towards a goal.”<sup>66</sup> Intriguingly, such commemoration indicated that the Japanese did not treat the evacuation as taboo; they rather took a positive approach to the worst event in their history, exhibiting these floats as public statements of moving on from the painful memories of the past.<sup>67</sup>

For the Scots, identification with Nova Scotia represented a bygone and romanticized past, focused on the Gaelic language and entirely symbolic elements like Highland Gaelic music, dance, and poetry, which had been threatened by modernization.<sup>68</sup> Gaelic was most relevant for its exoticism, rareness, and antiquity. Scottish folklorist, J.L. Campbell, for example, stressed how Gaelic spurred the memory of the remote past, saying: “This [Gaelic] literature was of enormous extent, including heroic folktales dating back to pagan times, so-called Ossianic ballads about the wars of the Gaels with the Vikings in the 9th century.”<sup>69</sup> By celebrating and promoting in Nova Scotia the preservation of the Gaelic culture and language, Scottish leaders tended to imagine that the province, or at least Cape Breton Island, maintained the good qualities, namely, folk traditions of the premodern era. Such a romanticized and fictional vision of Cape Breton was strengthened, for example, by Dunn’s account of the Scots in Nova Scotia when he wrote, describing the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: “Gaelic folk-culture played an important part in the everyday activities of the Highlanders” in Cape Breton, despite the spread of “modern scepticism.”<sup>70</sup> Dunn further associated such preservation of folk culture with pioneering, when he maintained that the

Highlanders in Cape Breton overcame hardships in the settlement era with singing their songs, which “were centuries old.” Yet for Dunn, such culture was not only imported from Scotland but also created in Cape Breton, thereby making Nova Scotia unique and “the last strong-hold of the old Gael.” A number of Gaelic poets and musicians, according to him, emerged, as “the stress of pioneering life” prompted such creativity.<sup>71</sup>

This sort of identification of one place with the past was also reflected in ethnic groups’ reminiscences about and idealism towards their homeland—particularly for Scots and Japanese. Scots’ romanticism for the past always went back to the old world and Highland Scotland where they, for the most part, had not themselves lived, while Japanese collective memory returned to the West Coast, where virtually all postwar Japanese had once actually lived. Thus, both places evolved as lost homelands to which neither group could go back in reality. Ukrainians exhibited a somewhat different tendency in this regard. While Ukrainian nationalists often saw themselves as refugees who were “persecuted” in their homeland, they kept fighting for the independence of Ukraine and it therefore was real. A lost homeland was thus a phenomenon unique to the Scots and the Japanese.

For Nova Scotian Scots, romanticized Highland Scotland was a creation of individuals, reflecting the postwar idealization of and desire for an ancient landscape unaffected by industrial development.<sup>72</sup> The Highlands were depicted as a poetic and idyllic land and incorporated into Scottish identity in the province. This merger between homeland and Nova Scotian landscapes was unique in light of the fact that both Ukrainians and Japanese did not identify their region with their homelands. The fact that Highland Scotland and Cape Breton Island especially had common natural features of

island ocean, and hills, which were seen favourably, helped the Scots fantasize both places together. If Scotland was “a country of wondrous natural beauty, a land of rugged mountains and shadowed glens, of brooding lochs and leaping streams, of dark forests and of stormy seas,”<sup>73</sup> Nova Scotia obviously matched the scenery, as the province was a “land of entrancing beauty, this glory of mountain and glen, of lake and river, of forest and sea.”<sup>74</sup>

The Japanese exhibited a unique case in which they created a “lost homeland” in Canada because of the mass evacuation from the West Coast. Although the Japanese identified the West Coast with the memory of injustice and discrimination in the past, they also developed a somewhat favourable vision of a “home” in which they had settled for a long time. Clearly, the fact that the West Coast could evoke both negative and positive images appears paradoxical, yet it only reflected the complexity of the evacuees’ collective memory. No matter how problematic life in the past, the homeland, which had once been a core of Japanese-Canadian cultural activities and business, was viewed with nostalgia and fantasized. The Japanese elite often depicted Powell Street as a symbol of success, emphasizing the good aspects of Japanese life and detaching them from the province’s discriminatory politics. Thus, in their memory, the street existed on its own as Japanese space. A college student in English, for example, called Powell Street “their [the Japanese’s] main street, dream street, wall street, park avenue, [sic]” and the “nucleus of a grander scheme, of a better world to come.”<sup>75</sup> Such comments reflected the sorrow and longing not just for the street itself, which had been ruined, but also for a sense of neighbourhood and ethnic community. Another Japanese, “Gone was the heart, the heart of Little Tokyo.”<sup>76</sup> The street, then, was a symbol of Japanese ethnic bonds, which had

to be maintained in peoples' minds or imagination. The sentiment was reflected in an essay by a regular anonymous columnist in the *New Canadian*, saying: "I shall never revisit Powell Street. I want to leave it intact as I knew it—a gay, courageous and colorful thoroughfare which was part of me."<sup>77</sup>

How region was identified officially with a particular ethnic group differed and reflected Canada's ethnic hierarchy. Only Scottishness could be promoted to define official space and regional identity. For the Scots, the regional boundary had been drawn as a provincial project of Nova Scotia since the interwar period, despite the fact that Nova Scotia was ethnically diverse—a type of project which neither Ukrainians nor the Japanese had.<sup>78</sup> For Ukrainians, region strengthened the bond of ethnic community by setting the space to which the majority of Ukrainians felt attached. Unlike Scots, their regional boundary was not official, yet was recognized by mainstream leaders. The Japanese case was the opposite of the Scots; postwar Canadian policies, which prohibited the Japanese from going back to the West Coast and intended to disperse them east of the Rockies, were part of an official and deliberate plan to prevent the Japanese from concentrating in a specific region and thus wipe out British Columbia's racialized image. Yet this scheme was not just a geographical or political measure, but had a great psychological impact on both the mainstream and the Japanese population. It hindered the Japanese elite from identifying with any specific region, depriving it of a sense of roots, particularly in British Columbia. For mainstream Canadians, it removed a sense of burden and promoted assimilation of the Japanese. For the Japanese, then, region was used to undermine their identity. For this reason, the Scots and Ukrainians are the focus here.

The Scots and Ukrainians make an interesting comparison, as both ethnicities were incorporated into their respective regions positively. Yet the prairies was historically more relevant to Ukrainians than Nova Scotia was to the Scots. As Ian McKay has pointed out, the Scottish elite led by Angus L. Macdonald publicized their ethnicity in part for the sake of tourism, and thus the targets of his scheme were both the Scots and the general population outside the province.<sup>79</sup> While they did help attach to Scottish identity a concrete purpose and meaning, including advertising the province, Macdonald's frequent addresses were full of rhetoric, emphasizing more visible cultural symbols such as folk songs, music and tales, and place names than direct contributions to the province's history or development.<sup>80</sup> In this context, McKay argued that the enshrinement of Flora Macdonald, whose plaque was unveiled by the premier in Windsor Nova Scotia in 1951, commemorating her short stay in the province, was irrelevant to the history of the province.<sup>81</sup> In contrast, Ukrainianness was promoted neither as an official identity of any province nor as an artificial project, but a link between the two rather evolved more naturally. Ukrainianness in the cultural sphere, particularly in folk arts, music and dances, was celebrated in various places and recognized as elements in the region, yet the focus was more on economic contributions. The Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba, R. F. McWilliams, for example, told the fourth congress of the UCC that Ukrainians "are contributing greatly and will in the days to come contribute much more greatly to the up-building of this province."<sup>82</sup> But although such comments recognized Ukrainian contributions as significant they were directed towards the Ukrainian community rather than the general public.

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The postwar period was characterized by idealism and optimistic attitudes towards the future, reflecting the end of World War II, the introduction of Canadian citizenship, and renewed ties with ethnic groups' homelands. Scots, Ukrainians, and Japanese all produced or redefined myths and collective memories, reflecting the consolidation of pan-Canadianism. In this context, a merger between Canadian and Ukrainian and Japanese myths and collective memories occurred, as both Ukrainian and Japanese elites tied their homeland symbols and myths to Canada, and incorporated Canadian or regional elements into their own collective memories. For Scots, such an overlap had always been the case, but they often tried to ethnicize Canadian identity, thereby making ethnicity an important means of self-expression in Canada. At the same time, both Ukrainian and Japanese elites sought to consolidate their ethnic communities, thus keeping ethnic diversity as an integral part of Canadian identity. One of the major results was the production of formal Ukrainian- and Japanese-Canadian histories which placed their experiences at the centre of Canadian history. Despite these similarities, homeland, Canada, and region all had a different impact on the three ethnic groups. Above all, Ukrainians were most equipped to develop their ethnic myths and collective memories to enhance their ethnic identity effectively, mainly for the continuity of homeland and Canadian myths and symbols, and stressing the relevance of the prairie provinces as the core of their imagined community. The Japanese, in contrast, needed to invent a new way of associating with homeland and region, which never carried the same meaning as they did in the interwar period. Scots also highlighted their ethnicity, producing



Scottish-Canadian history, promoting Scottishness as Nova Scotia identity, and fantasizing their Highland roots, thereby resisting being just Canadians.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> For example, see “Burns Glorified Scotland,” *Globe and Mail*, 24 January 1947, 6; J. V. Mcakee, “Burns Not Bobby, But Rab or Rabby,” *Globe and Mail*, 25 January 1947, 6; “A Tribute to Burns and His Poetry,” *Globe and Mail*, 24 January 1948, 6; J. V. Mcakee, “Aberdeen Newspaper Two Centuries Old,” *Globe and Mail*, 29 January 1948; and “Robert Burns,” *Winnipeg Free Press*, 24 January 1953, 19.
- <sup>2</sup> Ian McKay, “Tartanism Triumphant: The Construction of Scottishness in Nova Scotia, 1933-1954,” *Acadiensis* 21: 2 (Spring 1992): 46-7.
- <sup>3</sup> “I nesytyi ne vyore na dni moria polia,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 7 May 1947, 4.
- <sup>4</sup> “Bohdan Khmelnytskyi,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 4 June 1947, 9, and 11 June 1947, 9. For Cossacks as “freedom fighters” and the role of the grand mother of Volodymyr the Great in Ukrainian-Canadian women’s mythology, see Frances Swyripa, *Wedded to the Cause: Ukrainian-Canadian Women and Ethnic Identity, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 103-42.
- <sup>5</sup> “Velych Shevchenka,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 7 March 1956, 4. See also “I nesytyi ne vyore na dni moria polia,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 7 May 1947, 4; “Sviato Tarasa Shevchenka,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 26 February 1947, 4; “Obrikhuvachi Shevchenka,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 20 June 1951, 4; “Nastilna knyha ukraintsia kobzar T. Shevchenka,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 26 September 1951, 4-5; and “Pamiatnyk Shevchenkovi,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 16 December 1959, 4.
- <sup>6</sup> “Sviato Tarasa Shevchenka,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 26 February 1947, 4.
- <sup>7</sup> “I nesytyi ne vyore na dni moria polia,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 7 May 1947, 4.
- <sup>8</sup> The tendency of the Scots in Nova Scotia to stress their superiority as a founding race and part of the British Empire is discussed by McKay, “Tartanism Triumphant,” 19.
- <sup>9</sup> For Scots’ mission to built peace in the postwar world, see also PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 437-4, Angus L. Macdonald, address to the St. Andrew’s Society of Philadelphia, 30 November 1948.
- <sup>10</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 438-1, Angus L. Macdonald, “Response to the Toast to the Immortal Bard before the North British Society of Halifax, Nova Scotia, on the Occasion of Burns’ Anniversary,” 25 January 1951. On both Taras Shevchenko and Robert Burns, see also Frances Swyripa, “History, Ethnic Legitimacy, and Public Space: The Shevchenko Statues in Winnipeg and Washington” (paper presented at the conference, Cross-stitching Cultural Borders: Comparing Ukrainian Experience in Canada and the United States, University of Toronto, Toronto, 29-31 October 1998).
- <sup>11</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 441-12, J. Keiller Mackay, “Response to the Toast to Scotland before the North British Society of Halifax Nova Scotia on the Occasion of Its One Hundred and Eighty-Third Annual Festival of St. Andrew,” 30 November 1950, 5.
- <sup>12</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 437-4, Angus L. Macdonald, address to the St. Andrew’s Society of Philadelphia, 30 November 1948.
- <sup>13</sup> McKay also stressed the significance of the Uprising of 1945 to the Scots in Nova Scotia, while he does not relate it to the postwar context. “Tartanism Triumphant,” 27-9.

- <sup>14</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 444-3, letter from John A. Y. Macdonald, Deputy Attorney General, Nova Scotia to all members of the Clan Donald, 30 July 1952. See also Moray McLaren, "Flora Macdonald and the Island of Her Heart," *The Piper and Danrer Bulletin* (October 1952): 11-3.
- <sup>15</sup> The relationship between Scots and racism was explored by Michael Vance. According to him, an influential Scot, the Reverend Duncan McDougall, promoted an anti-Asian movement in British Columbia in the 1920s. See his "A Brief History of Organized Scottishness in Canada," in *Transatlantic Scots*, ed. Celeste Ray (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), 106-7.
- <sup>16</sup> "Kokoro no hata o kakage hôgei junbi naru," *New Canadian*, 4 April 1953, 5.
- <sup>17</sup> "Nikka yûkô zôshin nozomu," *New Canadian*, 15 April 1953, 6.
- <sup>18</sup> "The Visit of Prince Akihito," *New Canadian*, 22 April 1953, 2.
- <sup>19</sup> "Nihon prinsu o mukaeta kimochi de nikkeijin no kanada kikan o yuruse," *Tairiku jiho*, 28 April 1953, 4. Racial discrimination in the entry of immigrants remained until the Immigration Regulations of 1967, designed to recruit skilled labourers. For changes in immigration policy, see Donald H. Avery, *Reluctant Host: Canada's Response to Immigrant Workers* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995), 186.
- <sup>20</sup> "Ippen no hanabira to ha o," *Tairiku jiho*, 28 April 1953, 2. For the enthusiasm of the Japanese in Canada for this occasion, see also "Jûichinichikan no gonittei hajimeraru," and "Ensen de gokangei," *New Canadian*, 11 April 1953, 6; "Shûji egao de gorippa na taido," *New Canadian*, 15 April 1953, 6; "Mimei demo okirarete," and "Nikkei senamari ga sôgei," *New Canadian*, 18 April 1953, 5.
- <sup>21</sup> "Prince Akihito, Heir Apparent, Will Spend Eleven Days in Canada, Arrives on April 11," *New Canadian*, 28 March 1953, 1.
- <sup>22</sup> *Tairiku jiho*, 17 April 1953, 4.
- <sup>23</sup> Paul R. Brass, "Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity Among the Muslims of South Asia," in *Political Identity in South Asia*, ed. David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (London and Dublin: Curzon Press, 1979), 41.
- <sup>24</sup> "Obrikhuvachi Shevchenka," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 20 June 1941, 4.
- <sup>25</sup> "The Legacy of Taras," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 February 1953, 4.
- <sup>26</sup> "Why Shevchenko Lives in Our Hearts," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 March 1951, 5.
- <sup>27</sup> "USSR—Cornerstone of Slav Unity," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 January 1953, 7.
- <sup>28</sup> "Ukraine's Birthday," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 December 1952, 4. Much of this argument reflected the fact that Khmelnytsky's Cossack state had no choice but sign the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654 with Moscow, facing frequent attack from the Russians, Poles, and Tatars. For various interpretations of the treaty, see Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1997), 6-7.
- <sup>29</sup> For politicization of Shevchenko by both nationalist and communist Ukrainians and the controversy over the monument, see Swyripa, "History, Ethnic Legitimacy, and Public Space: The Shevchenko Statues in Winnipeg and Washington."

<sup>30</sup> "A Great Triumph," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 July 1951, 1. See also "Jubilee Festival And Shevchenko Monument, Museum and Park," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 April 1951, 9; "Festival Concert Was Well Performed," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 August 1951, 2; "5000 at Eastern Canada Celebration," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 July 1952, 2; "True Canadian Spirit," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 July 1954, 4; "Bard of Ukraine: Taras Shevchenko," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 March 1955, 7-10; "Towards A Memorable Jubilee," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 September 1959, 3; Mitch Sago, "What Will the National Shevchenko Festival Be Like?" *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 October 1959, 5; and "AUUC Issues Call for Stronger Peace Effort: Plan Shevchenko Festival in Palermo for July 1961," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 October 1959, 1.

<sup>31</sup> "Nastilna knyha ukrainsia—kobzar T. Shevchenka," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 26 September 1951, 4.

<sup>32</sup> Paul Yuzyk, "A New Monument on the Legislative Building Grounds," *Manitoba Pageant*, 7: 1 (September 1961): 11. My ideas about the two Shevchenko statues draw on Swyripa, "History, Ethnic Legitimacy, and Public Space: The Shevchenko Statues in Winnipeg and Washington."

<sup>33</sup> *Tairiku jiho*, 24 April 1953, 4.

<sup>34</sup> Ethnic elites' strategy to combine their historic heroes with mainstream landmark events in order to position themselves in Canadian history was pointed out by Frances Swyripa in her "Ethnic Loyalists and Selkirk Settlers: The Ukrainians Rewrite Canadian History" (presented at the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association Biennial conference, Winnipeg, 23-6 October 1991).

<sup>35</sup> "Iak vidbuvalosia sviato hromadianstva," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 22 January 1947, 5. For the symbolic significance of Eleniak to Ukrainian Canadians, see also "Wasył Eleniak," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 18 January 1956, 4. For his message at the sixtieth anniversary of Ukrainian immigration to Canada, see "Pryvity z hahody sviatkuvan 60-littia ukrainskoho poselennia v Kanadi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 19 September 1951, 5.

<sup>36</sup> Vera Lysenko, *Men in Sheepskin Coats: A Study in Assimilation* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1947), 299. For communist enshrinement of another first Ukrainian to Canada, Ivan Pilipiw, see "The Pioneers' Long Trail to the Homestead," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 December 1950, 2; and "Ivan Pylypiv—The Trailblaser," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 April, 19. On the role of Eleniak in the Alberta golden jubilee in 1955, see Frances Swyripa, "1955: Celebrating Together, Celebrating Apart: Albertans and their Golden Jubilee," in *Alberta Formed, Alberta Transformed*, ed. Michael Payne, Donald Wetherell, and Catherine Cavanaugh (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2006; Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2006), 604-5.

<sup>37</sup> "Editor, Publisher, Exporter, Lumberman, Farmer, Chosen As Outstanding Japanese," *New Canadian*, 1 March 1950, 1.

<sup>38</sup> "Dokusha ga eranda 'kôsekisha' sanjû roku mei kaku hômen o hukunda tokuhyôjun no kaobure," *New Canadian*, 1 March 1950, 5.

<sup>39</sup> "Kôsekisha ni ageta riyû," *New Canadian*, 4 March 1950, 5.

<sup>40</sup> “Z iuvileinykh sviatkuvan u Vynypegu,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 24 October 1951, 3. For the sixtieth anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada, see also “Sviato ukrainsiv-pioniriv,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 16 May 1951, 4; “Skilky nas?” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 23 May 1951, 4; “Vanky z ukrainskymy prizvyshchamy,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 30 May 1951, 4; “Sviato ukrainskykh pioniriv u Prezent Hom, Man.,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 8 August 1951, 1; “Iuvileine sviatkuvannia 60-ykh rokovyn ukrainskykh pioniriv v Alberti,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 15 August 1951, 4-5; “60-littia ukrainskykh pioniriv,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 22 August 1951, 11; “1891—60-littia poseleattia ukrainsiv v Kanadi—1951,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 5 September 1951, 1; “Iak ia pochav hospodariuvaty v Kanadi,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 5 September 1951, 6; and “Urochysto vshanovano ukrainskykh pioniriv,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 12 September 1951, 1.

<sup>41</sup> “Thoughts on Canada Day,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 July 1956, 4. For the story of progress by communists, also see “Alberta—Land of Our Pioneers,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 July 1952, 2; and “Saskatchewan’s Jubilee,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 June 1955, 3.

<sup>42</sup> “Kaitaku seishin to shikyô,” *New Canadian*, 21 October 1950, 5. For pioneer stories, see also “History of the First Arrivals to Canada from Japan,” *New Canadian*, 22 March 1950, 1; Toyo Tanaka, “Saga of the Earliest Issei,” *New Canadian*, 23 December 1950, 1, 16; “Ups & Downs of an Issei Pioneer,” *New Canadian*, 12 May 1954, 2; “130-150 Issei Have Lived 50 Years in Canada,” *New Canadian*, 24 December 1955, 9; and George Tanaka, “The Issei Generation,” *New Canadian*, 24 December 1958, 5.

<sup>43</sup> Alexandra Kruchka Glynn, “Vera Lysenko’s Men in Sheepskin Coats,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 16: 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1991): 223.

<sup>44</sup> Vera Lysenko, *Men in Sheepskin Coats: A Study in Assimilation* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1947); and Alexandra Kruchka-Glynn, “Reinforcing Vera Lysenko—Ukrainian Canadian Author,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 15: 1 (Summer 1990): 66.

<sup>45</sup> Paul Yuzyk, *Ukrainians in Manitoba: A Social History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953). See Frances Swyripa, *Ukrainian Canadians: A Survey of their Portrayal in English-language Works* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1978), 77.

<sup>46</sup> “What is the Japanese Canadian?” *New Canadian*, 2 October 1957, 8.

<sup>47</sup> Frank Moritsugu, “The Years of Change,” *New Canadian*, 9 August 1958, 1.

<sup>48</sup> “National JCCA Commissions Adachi to Write JC History,” *New Canadian*, 17 June 1959, 1, 8. On the Japanese-Canadian history project, see “Dôhō no rekishi o hozonseyo,” *New Canadian*, 4 April 1951, 5; “Announce Winners of National JCCA History Contest,” *New Canadian*, 6 December 1958, 1, 8; “National JCCA Launches History; Make Appeal for Funds, Adachi to Tour Canada,” *New Canadian*, 19 September 1959, 1; “Urge Nation-Wide Support,” *New Canadian*, 19 September 1959, 1; and “Nikkeijinshi no igi,” *New Canadian*, 23 December 1959, 1. For people’s response to the JCCA history project, see Jesse Nishihara, “Re: National JCCA Hopes for a History,” *New Canadian*, 29 July 1959, 8; Sally Kamikawaji, “Re: National JCCA Hopes for a History,” *New Canadian*, 1 August 1959, 8; and Hiroshi Takashima, “Nikkeijinshi ni tuite kibō,” *New Canadian*, 16 September 1959, 5.

<sup>49</sup> “Hope for History,” *New Canadian*, 22 July 1959, 8.

<sup>50</sup> Ann Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1981), 1.

<sup>51</sup> “Nature of the History,” *New Canadian*, 19 September 1959, 1.

- <sup>52</sup> Ken Adachi, "History of Japanese Canadians in B.C., 1877-1958," *New Canadian*, 25 July 1959, 1.
- <sup>53</sup> This tendency did not begin during this period, however. In 1911, two scholars published what could be categorized as Scottish ethnic histories. See John Murray Gibbon, *Scots in Canada: A History of the Settlement of the Dominion from the Earliest Days to the Present Time* (Toronto: Musson, 1911); and Wilfred Campbell, *The Scotsman in Canada* (Toronto: Musson, 1911).
- <sup>54</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 441-5, Angus L. Macdonald, address to Caledonian Clubs on St. Andrew's Night, 30 November 1949.
- <sup>55</sup> Charles W. Dunn, *Highland Settler: A Portrait of the Scottish Gael in Nova Scotia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953), 11-23.
- <sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 74. For the story of Highland Scots in Nova Scotia, see also Neil Macneil, *The Highland Heart of Nova Scotia: An American Peace* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948).
- <sup>57</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 150.
- <sup>58</sup> See also, for example, Frances Swyripa, "The Construction of Ethnic Identity in Canada: Comparing Asian and European Immigrant Peoples" (presented at the University of Tsukuba, Tokyo, Japan, 20 February 2004).
- <sup>59</sup> Ian McKay, *The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 39.
- <sup>60</sup> P. I. Lazarovych, "Ekonomichni dociahnennia ukrainytsiv v Kanadi," in *Druhyy vse-kanadyiskyy kongres ukraintsiv Kanady*, ed. Ukrainian Canadian Committee (Winnipeg: Ukrainian National Publishers, 1946), 106. See also Lysenko, *Men in Sheepskin Coats*, 296.
- <sup>61</sup> "Pivstolittia postupu," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 27 July 1955, 4. See also Swyripa, "1955: Celebrating Together, Celebrating Apart: Albertans and their Golden Jubilee," 604.
- <sup>62</sup> "Return to the Coast," *New Canadian*, 11 January 1947, 2. See also "Discrimination in Vancouver," *New Canadian*, 15 August 1951, 2. See also Acadia University Archives and Special Collections, Watson Kirkconnell Collection. vol. 26, file 56, Watson Kirkconnell, "Scotland and Things Scottish." Address to the Celtic Society, Wolfville, February 1950.
- <sup>63</sup> "With Courage and Vision," *New Canadian*, 20 April 1946, 2.
- <sup>64</sup> "Gojûnensai kaneta rôdôsai," *New Canadian*, 13 September 1947, 5. See also, "Sôidô no yoimen," *New Canadian*, 7 June 1952, 5; and "So. Alta. JC's Live in and with Community," *New Canadian*, 5 January 1955, 2.
- <sup>65</sup> "Gojûnensai kaneta rôdôsai," *New Canadian*, 13 September 1947, 5. Japanese were increasingly incorporated into the collective memory of Greenwood. Having one of the internment camps, the town of two hundred became home to 1,177 Japanese after 1942, many of whom stayed after World War II. See Michael Kluckner, *Vanishing British Columbia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005; Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2000), 81.
- <sup>66</sup> "Gojûnensai kaneta rôdôsai," *New Canadian*, 13 September 1947, 5.

<sup>67</sup> The tendency to look at the wartime internment positively particularly among some *nisei* as the basis of postwar success and the opportunity to get away from the *issei* community in British Columbia was criticized as “the blessing-in-disguise rationale” by Ann Sunahara. According to her, economic development among the Japanese during the postwar era had nothing to do with evacuation and internment. Although this argument is convincing, these *nisei* were rather using the positive myths to promote their status in new settlements. See Sunahara, *The Politics of Racism*, 148-50.

<sup>68</sup> McKay, *The Quest of the Folk*, 25.

<sup>69</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 443-19, the Collection of Gaelic Folklore and the Foundation of a Gaelic Folklore Archive, Dialogue between M. MacDonnell, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, N.S., Canada, and J. L. Campbell, Isle of Canna, Scotland, broadcast by Station CJFX, Antigonish, 7 June, 1953.

<sup>70</sup> Dunn, *Highland Settler*, 44-7.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 37, 58, 138.

<sup>72</sup> McKay, *The Quest of the Folk*, 25.

<sup>73</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 438-5, 11, Angus L. Macdonald, address to St. Andrews Society, New Glasgow, 30 November 1951.

<sup>74</sup> PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 438-7, 6, Angus L. Macdonald, address to St. Andrew’s Day Celebration in Winnipeg, 29 November 1952.

<sup>75</sup> “The Changing Times,” *New Canadian*, 24 December 1952, 2. See also “Familiar Van. Landmarks Changed or Vanished,” *New Canadian*, 30 July 1952, 1, 8; and Tom Shoyama, “As I Remember a Bit of It –,” *New Canadian*, 31 May 1958, 1, 2. *New Canadian* also published a poem by Mark Toyama, which had been written in 1940 and romanticized Powell Street; see “Powell St Knows,” 31 May 1958, 1.

<sup>76</sup> Ken Mori, “Only Ghost-Like Memories Remain,” *New Canadian*, 18 July 1953, 1.

<sup>77</sup> “So Let Me Sing My Tender Requiem,” *New Canadian*, 29 July 1953, 8. See also “Powell Street of Ghosts,” *New Canadian*, 8 March 1947, 7; Toyo Tanaka, “The Weekly Habit,” *New Canadian*, 14 July 1951, 1; “Lil Tokyo Shifts from Powell,” *New Canadian*, 19 August 1953, 2; and “Vancouver! Here We Come!” *Nisei Affairs*, 28 August 1945, 7.

<sup>78</sup> A similar kind of provincial scheme can be seen in Manitoba, when the premier of the province announced Ukrainian Week on 15 January 1968, but his gesture does not match the scale with which Angus L. Macdonald promoted Scottishness in Nova Scotia. See LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 33, file 1, City of Winnipeg, proclamation of Ukrainian week, 15 January 1968; and the Province of Manitoba, proclamation of Ukrainian week, 15 January 1968. On the Japanese, see also “Toronto Proclaims Thursday, May 12th, as ‘Japan Day,’” *New Canadian*, 11 May 1966, 1; and “Nihonê no gyôji,” *New Canadian*, 11 May 1966, 5.

<sup>79</sup> Ian McKay, “History and the Tourist Gaze: The Politics of Commemoration in Nova Scotia, 1935-1964,” *Acadiensis* 22: 2 (Spring 1993): 106. See also his “Tartanism Triumphant,” 26.

<sup>80</sup> For the production of Scottish culture, see Jonathan Dembling, “You Play It as You Would Sing It: Cape Breton, Scottishness, and the Means of Cultural Production,” in *Transatlantic Scots*, 180-197.

<sup>81</sup> McKay calls the enshrinement of Flora Macdonald as the premier's "filiopietistic view of Scottish history," and argues that it was irrelevant to the province's history; "Tartanism Triumphant," 27-8. PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 444-25, Angus L. Macdonald, address at the unveiling of the plaque for Flora Macdonald, Windsor, Nova Scotia, 13 September 1951. Macdonald also stressed the connection between Flora Macdonald and Nova Scotia; see PANS, MG 2, vol. 1507, file 444-25, Angus L. Macdonald, letter to Hugh M. Macdonald, 18 February 1953.

<sup>82</sup> Ukrainian Canadian Committee, *Chetvertyi vse-kanadiiskyi kongres ukrainsiv Kanady* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian National Publishers, 1953), 21.



## **Chapter 6**

### **The 1960s: Ethnic Movements and the Road to Multiculturalism**

The 1960s witnessed a dramatic transformation in the situation surrounding ethnic groups in Canada. Influenced by increasing international awareness of the need to protect fundamental human rights, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker adopted the Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960, which, for the first time, officially banned discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, race, or sex. By then, both the Ukrainians and the Japanese had already had an impact on Canadian ethnic pluralism and democracy, trying to insert their agendas into mainstream politics. Yet major changes occurred in ethnic politics during the first half of the 1960s connected to the rise of French nationalism in Quebec, which coincided with the modernization of the province in fields such as education, politics, and the economy. French Canadians began challenging the federal government for the removal of unequal treatment as well as the protection of their cultural and linguistic rights as the equal partners of British Canadians. Results included the appointment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B&B Commission) in 1963 and the introduction of the Official Languages Act in 1969.

These new developments gave Ukrainian and Japanese elites another opportunity to gain more influence within their communities and in Canadian society. Recognizing the fact that the mainstream Canadian elite, then still dominated by those of British origin, could no longer ignore the voices of ethnic minorities and their impact both within and outside Canada, Ukrainians in particular intensified their ethnic activism in pursuit of equal partnership. They launched a vigorous campaign against the B&B Commission's initial reports, which defined Canada as a bilingual and bicultural rather

than a multicultural nation. The B&B Commission understanding that the British and the French only were co-builders of Canada fuelled such resistance. Their lobby led the B&B Commission to publish its fourth report, *The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups* in 1969 and recognize their participation in Canadian cultural and economic life.

This chapter's goal is to construct the evolution of multiculturalism from Ukrainian and Japanese eyes, highlighting the differences between their views. It argues that ethnic input was fundamental to the birth of the federal policy of multiculturalism, yet the Ukrainian definition dominated the period. The first part of the chapter focuses on the different political goal that the mainstream, Ukrainian, and Japanese elites attached to multiculturalism. It examines why Ukrainian nationalists led the multiculturalism movement as opposed to the lack of enthusiasm among the Japanese, and argues that multiculturalism that was designed to guarantee collective rights was more relevant to Ukrainian nationalists than the Japanese. Although it became an accepted fact that "the multicultural movement was spearheaded largely by Ukrainian Canadians,"<sup>1</sup> the reasons why they and not other groups led the lobby have not been fully explored. Political scientist Bohdan Bociurkiw, one of the founding members of the Ukrainian Canadian University Students' Union (UCUSU) and a lobbyist for multiculturalism, outlined some of the possible reasons. They included Ukrainians' "historical aversion to assimilation," "strong sense of collective responsibility for the preservation of the group's ethnocultural values in Canada," "the lasting commitment of Ukrainian churches to the preservation of the national cultural-linguistic heritage," "the group's highly developed capacity for grass-roots organization," and "the nature of Ukrainian settlement in the Prairie provinces."<sup>2</sup> While these points all seem convincing, some preconditions, which created

these features, deserve closer examination. Ukrainians' constructed distinctiveness as an influential ethnic minority can be best highlighted through comparison with a more marginalized racial group, just as looking only at Ukrainians would hide other groups' input into the policy of multiculturalism.<sup>3</sup> The second part of this chapter argues that despite differences between Ukrainians and Japanese and between mainstream Canadians and both ethnic elites in terms of how they viewed multiculturalism, all parties promoted the concept as Canada's new identity. "Unity in diversity" was widely celebrated, for example, during the Canadian Centennial in 1967. For both the Ukrainians and the Japanese, the federal implementation of multiculturalism in 1971 was the culmination point of a long quest. As part of mainstream British and English-speaking Canadian society, the Scots were not active in the multicultural movement and rather supported bilingualism and biculturalism. This chapter thus focuses Ukrainians and Japanese.

### **Defining Canadian Multiculturalism: Ukrainian Leadership and Priorities**

The divergence between Ukrainian nationalists and both the Japanese and their fellow communist Ukrainians resulted from a number of things. First, the rise of Ukrainianism was due to a few Ukrainian nationalists who were appointed or elected to high-level offices in the federal government. The Japanese, in contrast, did not possess such leaders, and thus their voice was quite limited if not silent, and communist Ukrainians were associated mainly with the marginalized Communist Party of Canada. Second, French Canadians' demand for rights equal to the British, based on the conviction that they were a founding people of Canada, prompted Ukrainian nationalists to claim that they were also participants in Western Canada's nation building. In addition to their numbers in the West, the cultivation of the prairies, in which Ukrainians took part,

made them feel fundamental to Canada's economic development. This view was also advocated by communist Ukrainians, although for democratic equality rather than for multiculturalism. The Japanese, in contrast, neither had a large population nor established the same sense of roots in Canada after resettlement, and thus tended to acquiesce British and French leadership. Third, French-Canadian nationalism, which stressed linguistic and cultural rights, provided the impetus for Ukrainian nationalists to insist upon the preservation of their own language and culture because of both their whiteness and the lack of homeland which promote such distinctiveness.<sup>4</sup> However, in the Japanese case, marginalization based on race hindered any campaign for collective linguistic and cultural rights, convincing them that their ethnocultural boundary was permanent. Rather, as in the years immediately after the war, they were more interested in individual rights, hoping to be liberated from their often negative image. Finally, Ukrainian nationalists continued to have their homeland cause—the independence of Ukraine—into the 1960s, while the Japanese no longer possessed any clear homeland political agenda tied with nationalism. Ukrainians' fight for liberty, quite naturally, was tied to the principle of human rights, and called for scrutiny into the protection of rights in Soviet Ukraine. For these reasons, this section inevitably focuses on Ukrainian nationalists, with some comparisons with the Japanese and communist Ukrainians.

By the 1960s, a number of Ukrainian nationalists had been appointed and elected to high-level federal and provincial offices<sup>5</sup> where they could influence mainstream policies and try to insert their own interests. Scholars have often attributed the success of the multicultural movement to Ukrainian individuals such as Paul Yuzyk and Jaroslav B. Rudnyckyj, linguist and professor of Slavic Studies at the University of

Manitoba. Rudnyckyj was appointed to the B&B Commission, and Yuzyk to the Senate, in 1963. The fact that they appeared on the mainstream political scene at this time was not a coincidence. Given the mounting pressure from the French and ethnic groups like Ukrainians, the Canadian government needed to show the ethnic diversity of the policy makers. That Rudnyckyj was among ten commissioners who were mainly French and British in origin, yet included a Ukrainian and Pole,<sup>6</sup> indicated the government's scheme to include, at least in the public eye, the voices of other ethnic groups. These prominent individuals, both strongly identified with the nationalist camp, were supported by influential organizations such as the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) and the UCUSU.

Behind such considerations towards ethnic minorities lay the fact that mainstream politicians were concerned with ethnic votes, which constituted another factor that distinguished the Ukrainians from the Japanese. Ukrainians were still concentrated in particular constituencies on the prairies, which made their vote desirable to count,<sup>7</sup> while the Japanese, despite their enfranchisement in 1948, never had ethnic blocs which could produce or appear to produce a collective vote. The relocation policy after World War II only made the situation worse. Whether or not Ukrainians, particularly after the war, voted automatically or in large numbers for their "own" candidates was another issue, but the fact that the mainstream leaders believed that voting behaviour was affected by ethnicity is more important here.<sup>8</sup> Such a belief was promoted, to some degree, by the Ukrainian elite, which claimed that it represented its people. Yuzyk, in a letter to Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, just one month before the federal election in 1963, stressed how successful he had been in the campaign to woo Ukrainians on

behalf of the Progressive Conservative Party.<sup>9</sup> He wrote that he had enticed Ukrainians to a meeting by speaking to “14 priests and many leaders of organizations, who made enthusiastic announcements in the churches and halls.” “The response of the Ukrainians was good,” he continued, “as about 3,000 were in the Auditorium or in the large crowds outside.”<sup>10</sup> While Yuzyk utilized his ethnic origin to sell himself to Diefenbaker, he was well aware that his strong commitment to Ukrainian affairs, particularly those beyond Canada’s jurisdiction, would not benefit him in front of mainstream politicians. He thus presented himself as primarily an enthusiastic Progressive Conservative member, writing: “I have actively worked for our Party in every federal and Manitoba provincial election since 1957, and have received acknowledgements.”<sup>11</sup> His stance of putting the party before his ethnicity, at least in communications to his leader, was made clear when he stated:

You may hear the criticism that I am involved too much in “Ukrainian” affairs. I do keep in close touch with the leading Ukrainian organizations, both secular and church, for I believe that this kind of involvement helps to produce sympathy and support for the Conservative party. It is a good way to promote a broad and dynamic Canadianism. But as you are aware, I am constantly active in general Canadian affairs.<sup>12</sup>

Such a comment suggests that a dichotomy between Canadian and ethnic issues persisted. His own political campaigning thus required an adroit negotiation between the party and ethnicity, showing ethnicity as a means to the mobilization of Ukrainian voters but otherwise downplaying it.

The Ukrainian nationalist elite, however, had to be perceived more as Ukrainian representatives than as party officials by their fellow Ukrainians, in order to win the competition within their own circles. It was a necessary step towards gaining influence in Canadian politics to collect as much support as they could inside the ethnic

community. The interdependency between people such as Yuzyk and the Ukrainian community was quite obvious. When the senatorship in Manitoba became available, Basil Kushnir, president of the UCC, wrote to Diefenbaker, clarifying the UCC's official request "to reserve this position for a Ukrainian candidate." It supported Yuzyk, stating that he "would treat their positions with seriousness" and "would be associated with their organized life." Kushnir also argued that his opinion and support represented "the Ukrainian community in Canada," suggesting that the entire masses were behind him.<sup>13</sup> Obviously, for Kushnir and the UCC, having an ethnic Ukrainian in the Senate was seen to be important or even necessary, in order to have Ukrainian voice heard. Kushnir thus made it clear that once Yuzyk was appointed, both he and Progressive Conservative leaders must listen to Ukrainians and their demands. For example, he wrote: "If any party would wish to exploit the UCC exclusively for its own advantage or use its platform to gain political influence that would result only in a loss both to the party and to the UCC."<sup>14</sup> Such comments indicated that Kushnir was also using ethnicity as a negotiating tool to build his influence, making most of his leadership at the UCC. Yuzyk, on the other hand, regarded the support from Kushnir and other leaders of the UCC as the key to his success as it gave him a collective power. "Mr. W. Kochan, Executive Director of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee which unites the activities of some 28 dominion-wide organizations," he wrote, "was kind enough to notify me that a letter was sent to you last week in the matter of the Manitoba senatorship." "I am very happy," he added, "that the President of the UCC, Monsignor Dr. W. Kushnir, is giving me his full support."<sup>15</sup>

Once appointed to prominent positions, Ukrainians like Yuzyk always placed a priority on agenda that had an appeal to many Ukrainians, speaking on behalf of the UCC

and its member organizations. This decision points out the extent to which ethnicity provided the elite with strength when it competed with other politicians for further influence and power. Yuzyk advocated the notion of a multicultural Canada, while Rudnycky on the B&B Commission pushed the principle of regional bilingualism and linguistic rights for major ethnic groups. Both men were particularly concerned with collective rights, which Ukrainians should get as a group and which should be equal to those of the British and French. Yuzyk's maiden speech in the Senate in 1964, entitled "Canada: A Multicultural Nation," stressed the contribution of the "Third Element ethnic groups" as "co-builders of the West and other parts of Canada."<sup>16</sup> It acquired a symbolic status as an address that established the foundations on which Canada and Ukrainians should stand. In a similar vein, Rudnycky became a key figure in claiming cultural and linguistic rights for the "other groups" in the British- and French-led B&B Commission. Although these two men only confirmed the view that Ukrainian nationalists had nurtured since the interwar period, the significance of their roles lay in the fact that their claims were officially made, and were perceived in the context of rising ethno-nationalism in Canada.

That the Japanese elite, during the same time, had to spend much space in the *New Canadian* stressing the need for the National Japanese Canadian Citizens Association (NJCCA) and its branches, in response to the general decline in membership and lack of interest, is quite suggestive. The promotion of Canada as a bilingual and bicultural country seemed, to a greater or lesser degree, acceptable to the Japanese, or at least not something that stirred up a Japanese collective demand as nation builders. While the *New Canadian* supported Yuzyk and his activities, it tended to just cover what was



happening and look at it favourably but not to express its stance.<sup>17</sup> The fact that the Japanese represented the only non-white racial group that presented a brief indicated both the lack of interest from other racial groups. The sheer number of Ukrainian conferences, seminars, meetings, and printed materials which examined the status of Ukrainians and multiculturalism, and of Ukrainian proposals that were submitted to the B&B Commission, suggested that the whole issue was basically a Ukrainian one. For example, in response to the first volume of the B&B Commission's report, the UCC issued a White Paper in 1968, calling for the inclusion of the other ethnic groups' rights in the Constitution.<sup>18</sup> Besides many UCC meetings, one of the most notable events was the Thinkers' Conference on Cultural Rights held in Toronto in 1968. Organized by Yuzyk, the conference was a public demonstration of resistance against bilingualism and biculturalism. Furthermore, out of fifty-three briefs submitted to the B&B Commission by ethnic groups, thirty-nine came from Ukrainian organizations, including seven from various UCC branches and two from the AUUC, while the Japanese and other groups submitted one each.<sup>19</sup>

Ukrainians were more apt than the Japanese to react to the idea that Canada was an "equal partnership" between the British and the French, as their past experiences were less marginalized. Resenting the B&B Commission's mandate to investigate "what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races," while "taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada,"<sup>20</sup> Ukrainians stressed their accomplishments, emphasizing the celebratory side of their past from immigration to community building. The Japanese, in contrast, because of long-term

marginalization, had not developed positive myths. Also, as they had established a new life after relocation, the immediate postwar tendency to try to look at the future with hope rather than at the past gradually faded away. Instead, the 1960s witnessed a growing emphasis on injustice and racism in the past. It was particularly difficult, under such circumstances, for the Japanese to claim a part in Canada's "national" experience. There were many differences in the way the two groups remembered their past in Canada during this period. The focus here will be on myths of immigration and settlement as well as the two world wars, which represented "integration" into Canada for Ukrainians, but "exclusion" for the Japanese.

To begin with, the fact that the Canadian government needed Ukrainian immigrants but not the Japanese in the late nineteenth century created a gap in terms of how they produced myths and collective memories. Although recognizing that their people had been categorized as ethnically "undesirable" immigrants, Ukrainian leaders often stressed the fact that Canada had been in need of farmers who could settle and cultivate the land on the prairies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, the brief to the B&B Commission from the UCC national headquarters emphasized how "the Canadian Government discovered the great potential value of Ukrainian settlers and in many ways directed their movement to Canada."<sup>21</sup> Another brief stated that the influx of Ukrainian immigrants was a result of "the insistent call from the Government of Canada who badly needed hard-working people to open up the West and develop the land."<sup>22</sup> The fact that Canadians had also had doubts about Ukrainians was ignored for the moment, as the history of "inclusion" was more relevant in pursuit of full partnership with the British and the French. The Japanese collective

memory of the immigration, in contrast, did not have a celebratory side, as they were considered racially “undesirable” and unnecessary economically. The Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1908 between Canada and Japan, which limited Japanese male immigrants to Canada to four hundred annually, indicated that they were never wanted. The fact of “prejudice and discrimination inflicted upon the people of Japanese ancestry from the time they arrived,” and that British Columbians hoped to keep British Columbia a “British society” now, became a common start to their immigration story.<sup>23</sup> The Japanese elite thus tended to believe that they were fortunate just to enter Canada and never could or would be equal to the British and the French.

The scale of settlement in the West and the impact it had on Canada’s economic growth were other factors that made it easier for Ukrainians to promote themselves as equal partners than the Japanese. Undoubtedly, the fact that the Ukrainian population was one to seven times larger than its Japanese counterpart in the first half of the twentieth century would always have been likely to render Ukrainians the greater contributor to Canada’s economy. Yet the gap was the result of the Ukrainian elite’s tactics and myth making as well as sheer numbers. Ukrainian leaders adroitly overestimated the scale of their settlements and cultivation of the prairies, while the Japanese rarely developed such a psychology of mass contribution, both because their participation in Canadian society had just begun and because the relocation severed the Japanese roots in British Columbia. Eloquent and exaggerated statements of the Ukrainian role in developing the nation’s economy could be found in Yuzyk’s speeches and book, which compared the acres that Ukrainians had cultivated with the French and listed their subsequent involvement in the economy such as owing small stores.<sup>24</sup> These

accomplishments were due to the Ukrainians' physical and mental attributes. According to Yuzyk, Ukrainians' "centuries-old background of farming in their native land and their devotion to hard work and their families" made them achieve "the most spectacular progress in agriculture," and "the size of the average farm" was still increasing. Ukrainians thus were uncontroversial "builders of Western Canada,"<sup>25</sup> and "unquestionably 'founders' in their own right just as much as British or French settlers of earlier vintage."<sup>26</sup> Communist Ukrainians also adopted this position that "the Ukrainians were the spearhead of the great human army that was to conquer the Prairies and open the West," which earlier groups had failed to do.<sup>27</sup> In contrast to the firm determination of Ukrainians to claim equal partnership with the British and the French, although Japanese leaders did emphasize their part in Canada's economy, such comments were rare compared to Ukrainians. A brief which the NJCCA submitted in 1960 to Ellen L. Fairclough, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, for the removal of restrictions on Japanese immigration provides a good example of how the Japanese elite positioned their people in Canada:

In times of peace, too, Japanese Canadians can claim to have helped in strengthening the structure of Canada as a nation. Japanese immigration began about the time that Western Canada entered into a period of rapid expansion and development. New rail lines pushed through the mountains to the Pacific, and the rich resources of the coastal area—were being tapped. Manual labor was in high demand and the immigrants for the Orient met this demand. . . . the contribution of these immigrants towards the early economic development of the West cannot be regarded as small.<sup>28</sup>

Obviously, such a comment indicated the Japanese elite's attempt to incorporate its contribution to the nation's collective memory. Yet the Japanese differed from the Ukrainians in that their point of such comments was to demand the end of discrimination rather than equal partnership.

While the idea that Ukrainians could be a “third nation” in Canada had already been launched in the interwar period, Yuzyk in particular tried to incorporate other ethnic groups into one collective entity in pursuit of equal status with the British and French. Yuzyk often acted as a coordinator of non-British and non-French peoples, whom he referred to as the “Third Element” despite the fact that ethnic groups had rarely cooperated or communicated with each other. According to his theory, there were “three elements” in Canada—the British, the French, and the rest, “consisting of all the other ethnic groups, including the Indians and Eskimos.”<sup>29</sup> While categorizing Natives and others as one group, the special reference to Natives was significant. They were not in the B&B Commission’s frame of reference, but Yuzyk recognized that they had been in Canada before the British and the French, and were thus considered to be entitled to rights. In the same speech, Yuzyk pointed out the decline of the British population in Canada between 1901 and 1961, to less than fifty per cent since 1951, before arguing: “The Third Element ethnic groups, now numbering approximately five million persons, are co-builders of the West and other parts of Canada, along with the British and the French Canadians, and are just as permanent a part of the Canadian scene.”<sup>30</sup> Ukrainian organizations tended to adopt his viewpoint, and repeated it especially in their briefs to the B&B Commission pushing for multiculturalism. All the same, the “Third Element” was a concept which targeted the mainstream elite more than the ethnic groups. The lack of reference to it in the *New Canadian*, for example, indicated that the “Third Force” did not catch the Japanese imagination.<sup>31</sup> While Yuzyk did try to promote some communication among ethnic groups, organizing a number of meetings, he was more engaged in dialogue with the British and the French. The Thinkers’ Conference, which

was attended predominantly by mainstream leaders and Ukrainians, for example, stated in a rather tentative tone: “The Conference should in no way be considered a formation of a third political force, but rather the expression of a serious concern by those citizens making up the third element of Canada’s population in the cultural development of our country.”<sup>32</sup>

Participation in the world wars was the factor both the Ukrainian and the Japanese elites regarded as proof of their contributions to Canada, yet it created greatest gap between the two, stressing inclusion among the former and exclusion among the latter. In both wars, Ukrainians were not without problems, facing suspicion from mainstream Canadians. The fact that in World War I many of them, as Austro-Hungarian subjects, became enemy aliens and were interned showed that Ukrainians were also marginalized.<sup>33</sup> World War II also imposed on them a test of loyalty, yet it provided them with the first decisive moment in which they were expected to join other Canadians for a common cause.<sup>34</sup> Despite this discrimination, the Ukrainian elite, once again, tended to emphasize the better side of the story—Ukrainians’ participation in the war as historical evidence of their equal partnership. For the Japanese, in contrast, the fact that they, except for special cases, were not only banned from enlisting in the Canadian military forces in the latest war but also interned delayed the emergence of a heroic and glorious story of wartime achievements.<sup>35</sup>

Despite the fact that their loyalty had been often divided during the wars, nationalist Ukrainians promoted heroes and stories from the wars that stressed patriotism for Canada. A typical statement, like the one that appeared in the brief of the Ukrainian

branch of the UCC presented to the B&B Commission, commented on equal partnership and a sense of unity in the struggle:

Many of the comrades of these Ukrainian Canadian veterans gave their lives on the fields of battle. They believed that their sacrifice was for the full democratic equality of all Canadians. No distinction was made in battles between a Ukrainian-Canadian soldier, a French-Canadian soldier, or a soldier of British racial origin. It would be manifestly unjust to make that distinction now among these same veterans or their children or their languages and cultures.<sup>36</sup>

Obviously, the history of the Second World War was being rewritten as an event of cooperation and full participation among all Canadians—especially the British, the French, and the Ukrainians. The fact that it intensified suspicions against certain ethnic groups was completely erased. In this context, Philip Konowal, who had been awarded the Victoria Cross for his accomplishment during World War I, became a symbol of “bravery” and “the extreme sacrifices” of Ukrainian soldiers who fought for “Canadian freedom and democracy.”<sup>37</sup> In contrast, the Japanese turned more towards stories of segregation and persecution to revitalize ethnic consciousness during the 1960s, which had declined to a large degree after the postwar removal of restrictions and the acquisition of the franchise.<sup>38</sup> The *New Canadian* illustrated the tendency to focus on the tensions among Canadians rather than on the cooperation:

World War II then overshadowed this tense local confrontation—but set events in motion which involved the whole of white Canada in the destruction of our community. The conquerors of the Indian now declared war on their Asian cousins. . . . The perceived threat was eliminated by destroying the Japanese community through internment.<sup>39</sup>

Such a memory became a drive for the Japanese to continue fighting against racism, as *Tairiku jiho* encouraged them not to “forget the inhumane treatment” and to work against “discrimination” and for “racial equality.”<sup>40</sup>

Integration versus marginalization also created a gap between Ukrainian nationalists and the Japanese in terms of how they defined and envisioned multiculturalism. The first difference appeared in how the two elites perceived the role that the federal and provincial governments could play in the promotion of ethnic identity. Ukrainian nationalists tried to define the mainstream by incorporating themselves into the leading groups, while the Japanese still sensed their separateness from mainstream Canadians, always waiting for recognition. For Ukrainian nationalists, multiculturalism involved “official” intervention in the preservation of their ethnicity, while the Japanese chose to express their ethnic distinctiveness and contribution by their own means. Consequently, Ukrainian nationalists were more active in terms of negotiating with governments.

The policy of multiculturalism as Ukrainian nationalists envisioned expanded on bilingualism and biculturalism to include the institutionalization of ethnic languages and cultures as an official Canadian identity. For them, it was the legitimization of the ethnic pluralism that they had nurtured since the interwar period. Formal support for the Ukrainian language and culture had to be encouraged through public infrastructures such as the schools and the media on the grounds that it was their natural right as equal partners of the British and the French. The UCC, together with other groups such as the Poles and the Germans, submitted a brief to Ottawa in 1962 criticizing “the fact that the CBC ignores the interest of a quarter—and sometimes even a half—of the Canadian population.” Yet these Canadians, according to the brief, fulfilled “all the duties flowing from their citizenship,” which once again included clearing the land, founding industries, and serving in wars. The brief then stressed the government’s responsibility, arguing that



“much more could be done in music, literature, the arts, theatre and variety shows to give a wider view of the contributions and activities of the ethnic groups.”<sup>41</sup> A similar claim was made with regard to language education in public schools. Ukrainian nationalist organizations all saw both secondary and post-secondary education as the main vehicles in this field. While Ukrainian instruction in Manitoba’s schools continued to be on the agenda,<sup>42</sup> the recommendations sent to the B&B Commission by the USRL included the teaching of Ukrainian “as a credited, second language subject on an optional basis” in schools and universities,<sup>43</sup> instruction in Ukrainian “wherever a sufficient number of students”<sup>44</sup> could be expected, and the standardization of the level “according to accepted academic requirements for French and English.”<sup>45</sup> The fourth volume of the B&B Commission’s report never satisfied Ukrainians, as it did not provide any concrete plan for the promotion of ethnic culture and language. For example, Bohdan Krawchenko, president of the UCUSU, criticized the report, arguing that the recognition of ethnic groups’ cultural contribution to Canada was not sufficient, and that more public money should be brought into Ukrainian programs at school, the National Film Board, and the CBC.<sup>46</sup>

The Japanese, in contrast, had not yet reached the stage of claiming their linguistic and cultural rights within the public infrastructure, given the fact that the government had always discouraged them from remaining distinctive. They chose to showcase the virtues of Japanese culture and language in the first place by their own means and resources, relying on their own ethnic organizations and trying to attract participation from mainstream Canadians. As always, they tried to eliminate racial discrimination, exhibit the best parts of the Japanese cultural heritage, and bolster mutual

understanding with other Canadians, as an article in the *New Canadian* argued: “The ideal form for an ethnic group is one that allows free access to Canadian citizens of different ethnic origins.”<sup>47</sup> The NJCCA’s role in this area was emphasized frequently in the *New Canadian*, which contended that the organization had been “most active in presenting to the public, the culture and beauty of the Japanese people.”<sup>48</sup> The NJCCA brief, submitted to the B&B Commission encouraged the promotion of non-English and non-French languages, saying that “the study of other ethnic languages be encouraged whenever and wherever possible.”<sup>49</sup> But it wanted such encouragement as a means of furthering communication among ethnic groups rather than a right or through public funding. The priority on unity and cooperation was clear when the brief maintained: “We further believe that the emphasis should be placed, not on multi-national or racial origin, not on the hyphenated Canadian, but on ‘Canadianism’—one and indivisible.”<sup>50</sup>

Such an ambition did not exist only at the theoretical level, and was reflected in the construction of the Japanese Canadian Centre in Toronto in 1964. While built as a meeting place for Japanese, it was more than a recreational facility. As the first large-scale Japanese project since the end of World War II, the centre symbolized how the Japanese were now incorporated into mainstream Canada and reflected how they conceptualized their role in the context of multiculturalism. For them, according to an article on the new Centre, multiculturalism was more a matter of harmonious coexistence and understanding between mainstream society and the Japanese community than a guarantee of collective rights. As a manifestation of “Canadianism” that was not confined to cooperation between the British and the French, it also recognized “the composition of the Canadian population” and challenged the B&B Commission’s notion that “two

languages and cultures only, or two solitudes” made Canada.<sup>51</sup> A second article on the Centre made its view of multiculturalism and its own role clear. “A prime position” among the Centre’s activities, it said, “is given to the cultural aspects of exchange and contribution to Canadian society, which can only be achieved by opening the door wide to the Canadian public.”<sup>52</sup> In addition to opening themselves to Canadians, the Centre was a means to join with them for the creation of Canadian identity as it was called a “belonging through participation” project.<sup>53</sup> The Centre thus was highly politicized as a statement of improved relations between the Japanese and mainstream society. Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, in return, admitted at the opening ceremony that the evacuation was “a black mark against Canada’s traditional fairness and devotion to the principles of human rights.” However, he continued, there was “one compensation” in that “relocation brought to the attention of other parts of Canada the strong character and the fine qualities of our Japanese citizens and settlers.”<sup>54</sup> Although Pearson’s speech was appreciated by Japanese as the first official statement that admitted Canada’s fault, it met with criticism from mainstream Canadians, who felt that Canada’s wartime action was justifiable.<sup>55</sup> Such a conflict showed that the Japanese goal to build a better relationship with mainstream society had just begun.

The second difference in how the Ukrainians and the Japanese defined multiculturalism was seen in the kind of rights each group attached to it. Ukrainian nationalists, as “white ethnics,” saw multiculturalism as a means to protect their collective cultural and linguistic rights, stressing their participation in Canadian society on the one hand and safeguarding their distinctiveness as an ethnic group on the other.<sup>56</sup> In contrast, the Japanese, whose racial visibility would always hinder their integration

into Canadian society, avoided highlighting their ethnic boundaries.<sup>57</sup> For them, multiculturalism was another form of democracy, which guaranteed individual rights and freedom regardless of cultural, linguistic, or racial background. The legacy of the federal government's postwar resettlement scheme, which rejected the creation of any identifiable Japanese communities, dominated Japanese mass psychology, making the establishment of ethnic compartments something negative.<sup>58</sup>

Provoked by the federal government's launch of bilingualism and biculturalism, Ukrainian nationalists developed their own theory of a cultural and linguistic territory belonging to Ukrainians. Their argument was twofold. First, the French Canadians' cultural and linguistic privileges should be kept within Quebec; and second, other ethnic languages and cultures should be promoted alongside English in the rest of Canada.<sup>59</sup> By drawing the line between French-speaking and English-speaking territories and referring to the basic French rights which the British North America Act guaranteed, Ukrainian nationalists recognized "the fact that Canada's official languages" were "English and French, in the restricted sense."<sup>60</sup> The UCC vigorously denied the constitutionality of the Official Languages Act, arguing, "The attempts by the federal government to pass the Official Languages Act Bill C-120 and to amend the entrenched language provisions of the British North America Act are not only unconstitutional but also without historical foundation."<sup>61</sup> Ukrainians' biggest concern was the fact that the special status of English and French would once again make those who spoke other languages second-class citizens. Thus, the UCC argued:

It is submitted that the term "official" in itself suggests a superior status. It is further submitted that to brand two of our Canadian languages as being "official" places other Canadian languages in an inferior secondary connotation

and one which, we feel, will eventually lead to varying degrees of discrimination. All languages used in Canada are Canadian.<sup>62</sup>

Outside Quebec, the UCC argued, bilingualism should mean “the use of the mother language plus the dominant language of the respective province.”<sup>63</sup> Such attempts to draw territorial boundaries for ethnic linguistic and cultural privileges were expanded further by Rudnyckyj. His position, which divided ethnic groups into language families—Germanic, Latin, Slavic, and Eskimo-Indian—refuted the idea of a “third force” which categorized non-British and non-French groups into one group.<sup>64</sup> For him, such a categorization overestimated the superiority of English and French and ignored the hierarchy among the other languages. He argued instead that Ukrainian, “as representative of the Slavic group,”<sup>65</sup> not only deserved an official status with English and French but also should be recognized on the prairies as a “regional language” as it was “used by 10% or more of the population of a province or territory,” according to the 1961 census.<sup>66</sup> The status of “regional language” should include privileges in “education,” “media,” and “usage in the internal organizational life of the given group.”<sup>67</sup> Rudnyckyj’s view gained popularity among other Ukrainian leaders as a new interpretation of bilingualism.<sup>68</sup>

The Japanese elite avoided any attempt to territorialize the Japanese ethnic community or to create a closed Japanese society in Canada. Facing a dilemma between the race and ethnicity often regarded as inseparable by mainstream Canadians, they saw multiculturalism as a solution for racism and a key for promoting an individual’s fundamental human rights. The *New Canadian* clearly suggested that the human rights issue began preoccupying the Japanese elite.<sup>69</sup> For them, the promotion of ethnic identity through the NJCCA was still valuable for the upward mobility of the Japanese in

Canadian society, but community leaders were well aware that overemphasis on ethno-racial distinctiveness would only accelerate the alienation of their own grassroots from the organized Japanese community. The masses' general indifference to the NJCCA and multiculturalism and the tendency of not wanting "to be reminded of their Japanese-ness" were quite apparent by the 1960s.<sup>70</sup> The NJCCA felt it had to justify and explain its activities and *raison d'être*, advertising the roles that it had played or could play in the field of fundamental human rights. The *New Canadian* published one appeal, which pointed out lingering discrimination against the Japanese in employment, and argued that the NJCCA was still needed "to meet the challenge of prejudice."<sup>71</sup> The NJCCA, according to its advocates, was "a single link in a strong chain of minority organizations, which find their legal outlet in the Human Rights Commission [of Ontario]" in their pursuit of civil liberty and freedom.<sup>72</sup> Influenced, to some extent, by the Japanese American Citizens League, the NJCCA assigned itself a role to work "so that all Canadians may enjoy the full measure of citizenship and opportunity that should be the birthright of every Canadian."<sup>73</sup> While it was not as vigorous as its American counterpart in this regard, it kept in close contact with mainstream groups such as the Ontario Human Rights Commission and the Ontario Royal Commission on Civil Rights.<sup>74</sup> Its activities were quite moderate, focusing on issues like the ban of the term "Jap" and the elimination of discrimination in employment and housing.<sup>75</sup> It also emphasized the necessity of cooperation and organized activities for human rights by pointing out "the problem of 'just being human,'" without any ethno-racial affiliation.<sup>76</sup> Lucien C. Kurata, Reeve of Sawnsea, Ontario, for example, criticized the lack of interest in the NJCCA's general meeting in 1964. "The greatest problem within racial

minorities,” he said, was “the basic selfishness of human beings, being exemplified by their ignorance, intellectual dishonesty, and sometimes the problem of an inferiority complex.”<sup>77</sup>

Communist Ukrainians took a slightly different approach to multiculturalism from both nationalist Ukrainians and the Japanese. Although their arguments had less impact on policy making than those of their nationalist rivals, they were unique in that they represented the voice of Canadians still facing prejudice for their political ideology. Rather than defining multiculturalism, communist Ukrainians tended to refute others’ definitions and activities. While they obviously advocated the preservation of the Ukrainian language and culture as a means to the promotion of communism, their stance differed from that of the nationalists, as they supported neither cultural and linguistic collective rights nor the notion of the “third force” and took a moderate approach to Quebec sovereignty.<sup>78</sup> In their view, following the communist position, ethnicity was transient, and in a brief submitted to the B&B Commission together with the communist organizations from eleven other ethnic groups, they criticized the notion of the mosaic as making ethnicity “static” and creating “permanent little islands of immutable cultural values.”<sup>79</sup> In addition, they argued that the “third force” implied “identity of a homogeneous power,” which had never existed.<sup>80</sup> Communists envisioned a Soviet type of federalism in Canada, and criticized Anglo-Saxon chauvinism.<sup>81</sup> Implicitly, they were sending a message to nationalist Ukrainians that the idea of Ukrainian independence in Europe was equally dangerous. Their multiculturalism had some similarities with the Japanese demands, in terms of placing civil rights and an end to discrimination over collective rights, but communist Ukrainians were more concerned about discrimination

on an ideological basis.<sup>82</sup> They stressed the promotion of fundamental human rights, and argued that the only way to solve Canada's ethnic conflicts could be found in the policies of the Canadian Left that represented "the labour and democratic base in our society."<sup>83</sup>

Although the mainstream elite and organizations could not ignore the political pressure and activism of Ukrainian nationalists, their understanding of ethnic pluralism leaned more towards equal rights for all Canadians and national unity. Facing the French-Canadian separatist movement in Quebec, they had to avoid divisions within the rest of Canada. The B&B Commission's fourth report, which demonstrated the historical contributions of other groups to the Canadian economy and culture, was intended to recognize non-British and non-French peoples—particularly Ukrainians—without promoting further ethnic divisions. As such, the report did not propose any future plans, especially for protecting collective rights.<sup>84</sup> For example, Rudnyckyj's proposal for the "constitutional recognition" of "regional languages" was rejected by the B&B Commission, and widely criticized as something that might "Balkanize" Canada.<sup>85</sup> The Canadian Citizenship Council also provided a good example of how the mainstream elite saw collective rights, when it pointed out that they were "not the rights listed in the Declaration which have preoccupied the United Nations in recent years." "The revolutionary doctrine of collective rights," it continued, "is the one which is threatening our unity."<sup>86</sup> The Council's work, as it declared, was limited to fields such as "the maintenance of human rights" which "should be the basic objectives of the citizens of Canada."<sup>87</sup>

Mainstream policy makers faced another dilemma in multiculturalism, namely, the extent to which they should take into account ethnic groups' homeland politics. For



the mainstream elite, “culture” did not include much of the politics that defined ethnic groups’ identity. For ethnic elites, in contrast, multiculturalism was a principle that recognized not only their cultural traditions but also their roots and identity that stretched beyond Canada. Obviously, then, their homeland politics were inseparable from the “culture” that determined who they were and multiculturalism should include official recognition of their dual loyalty to Canada and their respective homelands.

Yet only Ukrainian nationalists, because of Ukraine’s lingering statelessness, were actively involved in homeland politics and their expanded definition of multiculturalism. While the Japanese and communist Ukrainians both kept their loyalty to Japan and the Soviet Union respectively, international politics, to a large extent, were left to their formal homeland delegations in Canada and elsewhere. Ukrainian nationalist leaders, in contrast, tried to increase their scope of activity both as self-appointed diplomats on behalf of their homeland and as Canadian representatives, believing that Ukrainian independence would benefit Canada by destroying communism.<sup>88</sup> Their activities took on a new outlook in response to international developments in the cooperation of nations in postwar organizations like the United Nations and NATO.<sup>89</sup> Yuzyk and Kushnir, for example, frequently discussed the problems in the Soviet Union in government and international circles. Yuzyk, having served as part of the Canadian delegation to the eighteenth General Assembly of the United Nations in 1963 and as chairman of the Human Rights Commission for the World Congress of Free Ukrainians since 1961, was a devoted activist for Ukrainian independence. The UCC also was active in trying to influence the United Nations on behalf of Ukraine’s right for sovereignty, submitting several memoranda to this effect to the assemblies in the 1960s.<sup>90</sup>

The representation of Ukraine by Ukrainian-Canadian leaders often conflicted with the interests of Canadian politicians. Although Canada, as part of the West in the ideologically polarized world, stood against communism, it tried to maintain peaceful relations with the Soviet Union in order to prevent a nuclear war. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who endeavoured to strengthen the Soviet-Canadian relationship in particular, often needed to reconcile these two contradictory priorities. One of the most significant encounters between Ukrainian nationalists and the federal government occurred in 1971, when Trudeau signed the USSR-Canada Protocol, which approved scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other exchanges between the two countries. In the same year, Trudeau visited Moscow and Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin spent several days in Ottawa. Such actions clearly demonstrated Trudeau's indifference to the sensitivity of the issue to Ukrainian nationalists, and provoked the Ukrainian-Canadian community. Yuzyk criticized Trudeau strongly for failing to "bring up problems regarding particular nationalities within the Soviet Union, which have been deprived of certain freedoms," in his conversations with Kosygin.<sup>91</sup> Nationalist Ukrainian anger peaked when Trudeau, on his return to Canada from Moscow, made a comparison on the CBC between the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), a left-wing terrorist organization that demanded the independence of Quebec from Canada, and imprisoned Ukrainian dissidents in the Soviet Union. For them, Trudeau's comment not only supported the Soviet Union, but also ignored the fact that the FLQ possessed an opposite ideology from Ukrainian nationalists. Yuzyk introduced into the Senate a memorandum submitted by the UCC to Trudeau, saying that the community "was deeply hurt by his failure to acknowledge the legitimate aspirations of the Ukrainian people."<sup>92</sup> At the same time, the UCC and Yuzyk used this

opportunity to bring up the Ukrainian question, asking the government to work on behalf of Ukrainians' rights in the Soviet Union.<sup>93</sup>

In this context, Ukrainian nationalists paid much attention to civic rights and freedoms in Soviet territory, as the immediate postwar optimism for Ukraine's independence faded with the increasing power of the Soviet Union. Such a humanitarian approach, they believed, would be more effective in the current context, because they could suggest that the Ukrainian national question was no longer simply "their" problem, but more a Canadian and even universal issue. In doing so, they became leading activists for the promotion of fundamental human rights. They actively petitioned the federal government about and reminded their masses of the "injustices" experienced by Ukrainians under the Soviet regime. Yuzyk, for example, brought the question of fundamental human rights before the Senate very frequently, emphasizing the role that Canada could play in this field "as a signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."<sup>94</sup> In 1968, Kushnir submitted a memorandum on behalf of the UCC to Pearson, arguing:

The observance of the International Year for Human Rights is followed by all Canadians of Ukrainian origin with special attention, as we are all greatly concerned with the new wave of violations of the fundamental human freedoms in Ukraine under the Soviet Regime. Thousands of letters received from relatives and first hand reports brought over by Canadian tourists confirm beyond any doubt the revival of secret police rule in today's Ukraine, which consequently results in an open breach of basic human rights such as the freedom of opinion, freedom of religion, the right to personal security and to public trial, the right to equal education and employment as well as the right to use the Ukrainian language and to participate in developing Ukrainian culture—not to mention the freedom of speech, of assembly and association and the sacred right to self determination and national independence.<sup>95</sup>

Another of Yuzyk's speeches, entitled "Canadian Freedom and Ukrainian Freedom," highlighted and even exaggerated the difficulties that Ukraine faced in comparison with

the paradise-like image of Canada. While Canada inherited “civilization and the democratic forms of government” from Britain, Ukraine’s experience was full of hardship, injustice, and humiliation. Ukraine, Yuzyk explained, “fell victim in the seventeenth century to a backward, tyrannical and ruthless Muscovite Russia” and then to “the communist regime” which “continued the policy of an indivisible monolithic Russia.”<sup>96</sup> Such a view of the struggling homeland, in part, reflected the current positive developments towards the recognition of Ukrainian culture and language in Canada.

The multiculturalism movement, as a form of resistance to bilingualism and biculturalism, thus began under the initiative of Ukrainian nationalists. Having representatives in the Senate and on the B&B Commission who were motivated by cultural and linguistic survival as well as pride as nation builders equipped them for this leadership. While both communist Ukrainians and the Japanese also joined the movement, they understood it in terms of ending discrimination and prejudice.

### **Making Multiculturalism Pan-Canadian: The Canadian Centennial**

Multiculturalism, while interpreted variously by Ukrainian and Japanese elites to meet their own political agendas, was also a uniting force at another level. Internationally, multiculturalism enhanced a sense of distinctiveness and pride among Canadians, as the introduction of such a policy was one of the first attempts in the world. Domestically, when incorporated into Canada’s hundred-year history, the policy was believed to promote a sense among its peoples of being rooted in the country. “Unity in diversity” entered the popular vocabulary as the phrase which could bridge the two contradictory forces in Canadian identity. While the federal government did not necessarily have a definite vision of how the policy could be developed as distinctively

Canadian, they tried to elevate it to something more dynamic and inclusive than the earlier cultural mosaic so that it appealed to all Canadians. Such Canadianism was expected to overcome ethnic elites' hidden or unhidden political agendas. Undoubtedly, landmark occasions such as the Centennial in 1967 and its supplement, Expo 67, helped define pan-Canadian identity based on multiculturalism, while they were also politically manipulated by both ethnic and mainstream elites.<sup>97</sup>

The incorporation of multiculturalism into Canada's origins had international implications, implying that Canada was different from the United States where ethnic identity was expected to blend into one. This Canadian self-image, in contrast to the American "melting-pot," was not new but it was particularly significant in the 1960s when Canada's national unity was in question. The *Globe and Mail*, for example, quoted Lester B. Pearson from when he was leader of the Opposition, claiming, that the Canadian Confederation "meant the rejection not only of political and economic annexation by the United States, but also of the American melting-pot concept of national unity," and "a settlement between the two founding races of Canada."<sup>98</sup> Similarly, the newspaper cited E. C. Manning, Premier of Alberta, speaking at Alberta Day at Expo 67: "I am against special status for any province. I am also against the melting-pot concept. Each area has its differences and these should be fostered and preserved."<sup>99</sup> Obviously, his comment was directed to Quebec, yet it indicated his belief that the ethnic rights movement did not always have to take a form of regional separatism.

Ukrainian nationalists also rejected the American "melting-pot" theory as a source of racial conflict in the United States, and stressed Canada's uniqueness in pursuit of multiculturalism. Walter Tarnopolsky, a professor of law at the University of

Saskatchewan and a human rights activist, argued that the melting-pot theory, which claimed “the superiority of ‘the American way of life,’” created both “intolerance internally” and “many of the difficulties in foreign policy as well.”<sup>100</sup> As Canada differed from both the “assimilationist” United States and “totalitarian” Soviet Union, Ukrainian nationalists thought it could become a leader of the world in terms of the peaceful coexistence of multiple ethnic or national groups. This perspective was best illustrated by Yuzyk, when he exaggerated Canada’s ethnic pluralist stance:

If we succeed, and we are well on the road to succeeding, to evolve the pattern of unity in continuing diversity through the application of the principle of Confederation and compromise, this will serve as precedent for other states in the world having similar population and cultural problems. . . . In Canada we have the world in miniature. World peace and order could be achieved if the principles of unity in continuing diversity, brotherhood, compromise and the recognition of the freedom and dignity of individuals and nations are honestly applied.<sup>101</sup>

As Canada reached its Centennial year, the idealism of and aspirations for “unity in diversity” were projected back into Canadian history since Confederation, thereby giving multiculturalism historical roots. This interpretation of history asserted that Canada was a multicultural nation from the beginning and had maintained such traits for a hundred years, a vision that it was hoped would help promote a pan-Canadian spirit for the Centennial celebrations and reduce the conflicts of identities. The Canadian Citizenship Council wrote as if multiculturalism had evolved in Canadian history without any major problems when it described Canada as “a country in which its people of diverse traditions, racial origins, religious beliefs and stations of life have learned to live with one another on the basis of equality and mutual respect.”<sup>102</sup> Interwar and wartime racism and British dominance were erased from the past. Such idealization could also be seen in some Ukrainian writing during this period. *Ukrainskyi holos*, for example,

stressed “unity in diversity,” calling it a “fundamental philosophy of our nation building, (which) should not be a propagandistic phrase of cheap politics.”<sup>103</sup> Tarnopolsky went further, arguing:

Our pluralistic society became a necessity for Canada more than a century before Sir Wilfrid Laurier. It became inevitable in 1763, when, following the defeat of the French by the British on the Plains of Abraham in 1759, New France was ceded to Great Britain. From that time on, when the British conquerors realized that they could neither liquidate nor assimilate the French-speaking population on the banks of the St. Lawrence, it became clear that this land would not be unilingual and homogeneous. Once that the Quebec Act of 1774 recognized that a person did not have to be English-speaking Protestant to participate in public life, these same rights had to be granted to others as well. Once these “others” started to enter Canada later in the nineteenth century, it became clear that there was not going to be just one way to be Canadian.<sup>104</sup>

Obviously, history was rewritten so that Canada might appear uniquely successful in the coexistence of ethnically diverse populations, despite the fact that in the early part of the twentieth century “Anglo-conformity” had hoped to create a homogeneous nation. In this context, distinguished politicians from the past and interwar advocates of the mosaic such as Watson Kirkconnell and Governor-General Tweedsmuir became multiculturalist.<sup>105</sup> Yuzyk also elevated one of the Fathers of Confederation, Hector L. Langevin, to “a prophet of multicultural Canada,” quoting his statement from 1865 that “under Confederation, there will no longer be domination of one race over another, and if one section should be desirous of committing an act of injustice against another section, all the others would unite together to prevent it.”<sup>106</sup> The fact that late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century immigrants were not in Langevin’s vision at that time was ignored. Yuzyk also made Wilfrid Laurier an advocate of multiculturalism, calling him “a great Canadian leader who could foresee the shape of things to come” and “had the vision of a multicultural Canadian nation.”<sup>107</sup>

Ukrainians' own version of Canada's one hundred years, which situated their efforts at the center of the story, exhibited a contrast with the official vision by emphasizing that the political activism of ethnic groups had created ethnic pluralism. *Ukrainskyi holos*, for example, talked about the peoples who were neither British nor French in origin: "In an effort to preserve them [ethnic traditions and values], these groups of citizens hoped to lobby and help two levels of governments, federal and provincial."<sup>108</sup> This statement suggests that Canada was not born multicultural, and that it was ethnic groups' activities that provided the catalyst. Furthermore, nationalist Ukrainians implied, Ukrainian consciousness, which became the basis of multiculturalism, would not have been maintained without their efforts. *Ukrainskyi holos* argued that "the fundamental idea of the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League was to keep Ukrainians in Canada conscious Ukrainians, and to create the healthy foundation of Canadian citizenship among them."<sup>109</sup> Despite the fact that communist Ukrainians had just recently converted to multiculturalist views, they joined this self-applause and emphasized the ULFTA's and later the AUUC's contribution in the promotion of Ukrainian heritage and identity in Canada for a century.<sup>110</sup>

The Japanese, also looking back on Canada's and their own past in the Centennial year, stressed that their campaigns against discriminatory policies had built a foundation of ethnic pluralism. Japanese-Canadian history was interpreted as a history of struggling for civil rights, reflecting both the discrimination that they had faced in the past and a feeling that they were finally included in Canada's mainstream event. The Japanese franchise movement was highlighted as something that made contemporary civic rights and multiculturalism, and, thus, the fight for full citizenship would continue



to be their focus.<sup>111</sup> The *New Canadian* also related the Centennial to the recent developments in Canadian immigration policy, which had recently removed all racial restrictions on selection criteria, and argued that the policy was “won by the continuous fight of the Japanese and the JCCA.”<sup>112</sup> Clearly, such comments suggest that the Japanese, too, saw the growing consensus towards multiculturalism as the product of their work, and not as the mainstream society’s design for Canada.

Canada’s Centennial thus incorporated the multiethnic nature of Canada into its programs, but at the same time, national unity was a top priority. The Centennial served as a meeting place for all ethnic groups, and obligation to participate was emphasized in the Centennial Commission’s declaration of 1964, which stated that the purpose of the Centennial was “to stimulate and promote a pride in Canada by Canadians, a greater sense of unity between all Canadians and a personal involvement in the celebrations by every citizen.”<sup>113</sup> Use of the term “Canadian” without distinguishing ethnically one from another in the declaration well illustrated that the mainstream leaders hoped that there would be no tensions among Canadians of different ethnic origins on this occasion. Ethnic groups’ participation was strongly encouraged as far as they would exhibit their ethnic heritages as components of the Canadian mosaic. At the conference which established the Folk Arts Council in 1964, Pearson, now prime minister expressed his hope that the Council “ensure that full and vibrant participation of all our ethnic groups in our Centennial celebrations” to make it “an active force for national unity.”<sup>114</sup> On another occasion, Judy LaMarsh, Secretary of State, for example, stressed that the primary goal of the Centennial was to bring Canadian nationhood to another level, resisting any forces that might divide Canada politically or ethnically.<sup>115</sup>

The largest ethnic contribution to the Centennial was made by the Canadian Folk Arts Council, which included ethnic groups' cultural performances in music, art, dance, and food in the celebrations. The occasion was designed to showcase Canada's multicultural nature and welcomed with enthusiasm by Ukrainian nationalists and the Japanese as an opportunity to develop all-inclusive Canadian identity. The Folk Arts Council was established in 1964 as an organization for ethnic, religious, and cultural associations throughout Canada, in order to encourage ethnic groups' participation in the Centennial. Leon Kossar, Ukrainian in origin and the founder of the Council, stressed the significance of ethnic folk arts and their incorporation into Canada's birthday, arguing: "The vigorous growth of the folk arts throughout the country in the past three years has been a source of pride and pleasurable surprise to the many community church and ethnic organizations that have done so much throughout Canada's history to preserve the valued cultural traditions of the past." Quoting the Folk Arts Council's brief to the Centennial Commission, he continued: "We have seen recently how much interest there is across our land in the multicultural composition of the nation. We also feel that this would be directly translated into Centennial programming that will make Canada's birthday one of close personal identification with every citizen of our country."<sup>116</sup> His comments indicated how members of the ethnic elite also adopted a somewhat rhetorical "unity in diversity," recognizing that folk arts would be the best route to reflect their peoples' dual loyalty in the Centennial. The Japanese elite also valued the invitation to the Canadian Folk Art Festival and the Canadian Pavilion at Expo 67, on the grounds that ethnic groups would make a "kaleidoscope of color, music and fun."<sup>117</sup> Yet such celebration of the mosaic was also translated into their mission as an important component of Canadian

identity, and active participation was encouraged. Edward Ide, president of the NJCCA, acknowledged the work of Kossar, and called for the active involvement of all Japanese organizations in the Folk Art Festival, regarding such an opportunity as a “privilege.”<sup>118</sup> For the Japanese, who had been focusing on their own means to promote culture, the Council provided a great chance to expand and show their cultural traditions to others.

For ethnic groups, Canada’s Centennial was an opportunity to display the harmony between their ethnic and their Canadian identities, and served as a test case of how multiculturalism could or would be depicted on special public occasions. Ukrainian nationalists saw it as another great opportunity for group performances that would show the federal government how ethnic elements could prevent the Centennial from being monotonous and thus that these cultures should be preserved through state funding. Nationalist Ukrainians held various concerts, exhibitions, and dances and participated in the Folk Arts Festivals in many cities. In Saskatchewan, for example, a special committee of the UCC organized a children’s concert to commemorate Canada’s birthday at which two hundred fifty children appeared in traditional Ukrainian costumes and sang in both Ukrainian and English.<sup>119</sup> On another occasion in 1967, also under the leadership of the UCC, Ukrainian youth groups got together for an assembly on Parliament Hill in Ottawa and met with Pearson for Ukrainian Youth Day, in conjunction with the government’s tribute to the Ukrainian contribution to Canada.<sup>120</sup> The focus on children and youth had a political purpose in that the UCC tried to demonstrate that Ukrainian culture and language were not only retained among the pioneers and older generations, but also vital for younger people. In this sense, while the Centennial tended to stress the

past and historical contributions of Ukrainians as nation builders of Canada, it also carried messages for the future, in terms of the preservation of languages and tradition.

Participation in the Centennial provided a special mission and responsibility for the Japanese and communist Ukrainians who had not yet overcome marginalization. It was the first time since the end of World War II that the Japanese were asked to take part in a mainstream landmark event, while communist Ukrainians felt politically stigmatized during the Cold War. Both groups tried to show their enthusiasm for participation, and a sense of being part of Canada. For the Japanese, it was a “special year” when they renewed their “pride” and “awareness” as a “model element, which constituted Canadian society.”<sup>121</sup> A sense of cooperation was publicly demonstrated through various projects such as floats on Dominion Day, Japanese gardens in Alberta and Ontario, and the Canada’s Expo Pavilion. The Nikka Yuko Centennial Garden built in Lethbridge in 1967 was unique in the sense that it commemorated both Canada’s Centennial and the sense of roots of the Japanese—both pre-World War settlers and evacuees—in the area. Built as a project of with local Japanese and the City of Lethbridge, it symbolized the fact that Japaneseness had already been a part of local identity in southern Alberta before the focal point of ethnic identity shifted from old British Columbia. Explaining why Lethbridge had chosen the Japanese project for the Centennial, a local Japanese stated that the garden was “evidence of how much economic contribution Japanese made in the area.”<sup>122</sup> Communist Ukrainians also pointed out how important their participation was in the Centennial, regarding the occasion as the biggest chance to merge both Canada’s and Ukrainians’ experiences. The AUUC, which regarded its celebration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada as “an integral part of the

Canadian centenary,” organized a number of concerts by over three hundred fifty performers at Expo 67 as well as ceremonies at the Shevchenko Memorial Park in Ontario.<sup>123</sup> The *Ukrainian Canadian* also stated: “The Ukrainian Canadian contribution to the events of this historic year can be summed up as worthy of our Canadian heritage and a further stepping stone to future successes.”<sup>124</sup>

Both communist Ukrainian and Japanese elites saw the Centennial and Expo 67 as opportunities to show their ties to Japan and the Soviet Union, respectively. The fact that homeland pavilions and delegates were incorporated into the Canadian event symbolized the compatibility of their dual identity. The Soviet exhibition at Expo 67 showcased both who was the real representative of Ukraine was and “Soviet technology, science, culture, education and other achievements, both economic and spiritual.”<sup>125</sup> Together with the performances by the AUUC, the National Day of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic at Expo 67 was also a celebration of Ukraine as “one of the top ten industrially developed nations in the World” as well as a country with a rich cultural heritage, as opposed to the totalitarian image that it had.<sup>126</sup> Likewise, Japan’s pavilion was designed to present Japan’s merits, contrasting its developing industries with its traditional high culture, such as *ikebana* (flower arrangements), *kabuki* (drama), and *nihon teien* (gardens). Yoshiharu Takeno, director of the Japan External Trade Organization, made this goal clear, stating that visitors to the pavilion would get “a greater understanding of Japan’s love of things beautiful, her way of life, and her foremost place in world technology and science.”<sup>127</sup> For Japanese Canadians, it was particularly useful to detach themselves from undemocratic and backward images that had always been associated with their community, and to promote the traditional culture

and spirit that they really represented. Such effort was well illustrated by the Nikka Yuko Centennial Garden's focus on authenticity, when the organizers invited the Tadashi Kubo, an architect from Osaka Prefecture University in Japan, imported construction materials from Japan, and adopting traditional Japanese landscaping.<sup>128</sup>

The promotion of the positive images of their homelands, both communist Ukrainians and the Japanese believed, would also strengthen ties between Canada and their respective countries. Such political messages were further reinforced by the participation of official homeland delegations. Communist celebrations at the Shevchenko Memorial Park at Palermo were attended by the Soviet ambassador to Canada, Ivan F. Shpedko, while the Japanese pavilion was visited by the Japanese Prince and Princess Takamatsu, who also attended the official opening of the Nikka Yuko Centennial Garden in Lethbridge. Shpedko, together with AUUC members, laid a wreath at the Shevchenko monument and made an address, hoping that "the peoples of Canada and the Soviet Union" would "strengthen their bonds of friendship and act together in the interests of world peace."<sup>129</sup> Communist Ukrainians could emphasize in public that even if the Cold War had seen the relationship between communist and Western countries deteriorate, Canada had nonetheless recognized the Soviet Union officially. For the Japanese, the royal visit was not the first since the end of World War II. Yet the incorporation of the delegates from Japan into the Centennial had a special meaning, as it symbolized that the two countries had finally normalized their relationship.

Yet "unity in diversity" had its limits, especially when homeland politics were involved. Ideological conflict reared its head on some occasions and divided ethnic communities. Illuminating Ukrainian examples included the exclusion of communists

from the Folk Arts Council and its program for the Centennial and the Soviet representation of Ukraine at Expo 67. Neither the Council nor Expo organizers wanted to attach conflict to the Folk Arts Festival and Expo 67, yet homeland politics affected the situation. The fact that the Council was established under the leadership of Kossar, a nationalist Ukrainian, who regarded the UCC as the representative organization of Ukrainians in Canada, explains the communists' exclusion. Communist Ukrainians expanded the issue beyond the Ukrainian community, criticizing the government appointment of the committee members as "shameful" and claiming their "right" to have their representatives on it.<sup>130</sup> For them, such resentment was based on solid grounds, as the Council was funded by the federal government to promote ethnic cultures in the Centennial. Kossar's deliberate exclusion of the communists, AUUC members argued, both violated the "spirit of co-operation" that should characterize the landmark Canadian event and discriminated against "progressive, democratic-minded Ukrainians" who "played a tremendous role in winning civil rights and recognition for Ukrainians on an equal basis with other fellow Canadians in the social, economic, and cultural life of the country."<sup>131</sup> Obviously, this comment suggested that folk arts had become politicized and the main vehicle for ethnic groups to show their contributions to and participation in Canada beyond the cultural realm. After the first national conference which gave birth to the Folk Arts Council in 1964, the AUUC formally appealed to the federal government in writing, stressing the AUUC as nation builders of Canada and as the AUUC members' country of citizenship.<sup>132</sup> Nationalist Ukrainians, in turn, were not pleased with the Soviet Union's representation of Ukraine at Expo 67. They believed that Ukraine should be included in Expo 67 independently. The UCC criticized the Soviet pavilion, arguing

that it demonstrated the “complete domination of Soviet Russia” over Ukraine, yet pointing out that the exhibition of Ukrainian arts and dance performances also indicated that Ukrainian identity survived under the Soviet Union.<sup>133</sup>

While ideology was not as obvious as in the Ukrainian case, the Japanese celebration was not completely free from politics. Conflict sometimes appeared between Japan-led Expo 67 and Japanese-Canadian events in terms of how they presented Japan. Japanese Canadians placed a strong focus on Japanese cultural traditions, for example, featuring an *ikebana* headmaster from Japan at the Cultural Centre in Toronto, and organizing a *Obon Odori* (folk dance) festival. Recognizing the Centennial as a celebration of the mosaic, they were well aware that such presentations were best relevant to the occasion. Japan, however, understood Expo 67 more as a scientific show, and emphasized more on economic development of Japan, demonstrating how Japan rebuilt itself as an economic power. An article in the *New Canadian* criticized how “poor” the Japanese Pavilion was, exhibiting “cars” and “motorcycles” at the entrance and not showing any traditional sense of pride.<sup>134</sup> Attacking a Tokyo reporter’s point of view that the Japanese-Canadian exhibitions belonged to “amateurs,” a Japanese Canadian wrote: “It was a Canadian Japanese voice speaking for the Centennial Celebrations for Canada’s birthday. It was not a Japanese voice.” The Centennial, she continued, was “to show our feelings as Canadians of Japanese extraction and as Canadian citizens, expressing our joy and gratitude for Canada’s hundredth birthday.”<sup>135</sup>

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In the 1960s, Canada experienced a dramatic transformation in terms of its identity, facing two contradictory realities. First, the rise of nationalism in Quebec and



subsequent lobbying by other ethnic groups led by Ukrainian nationalists divided the nation, thereby making formal policies addressing ethnic cultures and languages a pressing task for the federal government. Canadian leaders were threatened by both Quebec separatism and other ethnic groups' protests as they tried to define Canadian identity in their own ways. In this process, Ukrainian nationalists were by far the most active group in pursuit of multiculturalism and collective ethnic rights for many reasons: integration of prominent individuals at a high rank, enthusiasm for linguistic and cultural survival, and the statelessness of Ukraine. Groups such as the Japanese and communist Ukrainians, in contrast, tended to stress basic human rights regardless of race, ethnicity, and ideology, while they also valued their cultural traditions as the means to expression of their identity and negotiation with mainstream society. Second, although Canada witnessed mounting ethnic tensions within its boundaries during this period, the Centennial, which promoted a pan-Canadian identity, made both Ukrainians and Japanese, to a greater and lesser degree, feel part of Canadian "mainstream."

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Manoly R. Lupul, in *Multiculturalism and Ukrainian Canadians: Identity, Homeland Ties, and the Community's Future*, ed. Stella Hryniuk and Lubomyr Luciuk (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1993), 8. Manoly R. Lupul was an active promoter of Ukrainian multiculturalism. He helped lead the movement for bilingual programs in public schools in Alberta, served on the Alberta Cultural Heritage Council and on the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, and was the first director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta. See his *The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2005).

<sup>2</sup> Bohdan Bociurkiw, "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian-Canadian Community," in *Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism, and Separatism: An Assessment*, ed. Manoly R. Lupul (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1978), 101.

<sup>3</sup> Many of the issues discussed in this chapter were first raised by Bociurkiw in *ibid.* Building on his framework of events, this chapter analyzes these issues in more depth and in comparison with the Japanese.

<sup>4</sup> On Ukrainian Canadians' long obsession with culture and language for both reasons, see, for example, Bociurkiw, *ibid.*, 101; Manoly R. Lupul, "Multiculturalism and Canada's White Ethnics," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 15: 1 (1983): 105; and Frances Swyripa, *Wedded to the Cause: Ukrainian-Canadian Women and Ethnic Identity, 1891-1991* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 49-52.

<sup>5</sup> By the 1960s, Ukrainians had three senators: William Wall (1955-1962), John Hnatyshyn (1959-1967), and Paul Yuzyk (1963-1986), as well as numerous MPs and MLAs; the first Japanese MP was elected only in 2004.

<sup>6</sup> The B&B Commission was co-chaired by A. Davidson Dunton, president of Carleton University, and André Laurendeau, editor of *Le Devoir* (after 1968, replaced by Jean-Louis Gagnon, a Montreal journalist). Members included Clément Cormier (president of Saint Joseph's University in New Brunswick), Royce Frith (Toronto lawyer), Paul Lacoste (professor at l'Université de Montreal), Gertrude M. Laing (Sorbonne female student from Calgary), André Raynauld (professor at l'Université de Montreal), F.R. Scott (professor at McGill University), and Paul Wyczynski (University of Ottawa professor, Polish).

<sup>7</sup> On the values ethnic votes, Bociurkiw argues that the Opposition and minority government, in general, were particularly active Ukrainian and other ethnic constituencies on the prairies. See Bociurkiw, "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian-Canadian Community," 101.

<sup>8</sup> This question was explored by Bohdan Harasymiw, who convincingly suggests that ethnicity did not necessarily determine Ukrainians' voting patterns between 1904 and 1990. According to him, electors were much more influenced by circumstances, policies, and ideologies which varied over time. See his "Looking for the Ukrainian Vote," in *Canada's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity*, ed. Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 362-76.

<sup>9</sup> Yuzyk campaigned for Diefenbaker actively, calling him "a defender of the underdog, the forgotten and the neglected, a friend of the minority groups and fighter for justice and fair-play." See LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 17, file 4, Paul Yuzyk, "The Right Honourable John George Diefenbaker – Champion of Freedom and Justice," 24 January 1970.

- <sup>10</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 17, file 2, Paul Yuzyk, letter to J. G. Diefenbaker, 20 March 1963.
- <sup>11</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 17, file 2, Paul Yuzyk, letter to J. G. Diefenbaker, 12 January 1963.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>13</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 17, file 2, W. Kushnir, letter to J. G. Diefenbaker, n.d.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>15</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 17, file 2, Paul Yuzyk, letter to J. G. Diefenbaker, 20 September 1962.
- <sup>16</sup> Paul Yuzyk, "Canada: A Multicultural Nation, Delivered in the Senate of Canada, March 3, 1964," in *For a Better Canada: A Collection of Selected Speeches Delivered in the Senate of Canada and at Banquets and Conferences in Various Centres across Canada by Senator Paul Yuzyk* (Toronto: Ukrainian National Association, 1973), 30.
- <sup>17</sup> See, for example, "Bunka kenri o shuchô shite," *New Canadian*, 19 December 1968, 4; and "First Thinkers' Conference on Cultural Rights Slated Dec. 13, 14, 15," *New Canadian*, 13 November 1968, 1.
- <sup>18</sup> "White Paper on the First Volume of the Final Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 7 February 1968, 2-3.
- <sup>19</sup> The number of briefs submitted to the B&B Commission were as follows: 118 from the French, 39 from the Ukrainians, 3 from the Mennonites, and 1 each from the Germans, Jews, Japanese, Icelanders, Belarusians, Poles, Italians, Hungarians, Estonians, Czechs, and Scandinavians. Bociurkiw also stresses Ukrainians' enthusiasm on the submission for submitting briefs; see "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian-Canadian Community," 105. See also "NJCCA to Submit Brief to Bicultural-Bilingual Meet," *New Canadian*, 13 March 1965, 1.
- <sup>20</sup> Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, *The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups*, Book IV (1969, reprint, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1976), 3.
- <sup>21</sup> Ukrainian Canadian Committee, headquarters, brief submitted to the B&B Commission, 1964 (Toronto: Micromedia, 1972).
- <sup>22</sup> Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Women's Council, brief submitted to the B&B Commission, n.d. (Toronto: Micromedia, 1972).
- <sup>23</sup> Kazumi Miyata, "Part One: A Capsule History of the Japanese Canadians By Kazumi Miyata," *New Canadian*, 13 August 1971, 1. See also T. Umezuki, "Long History of JC Suffering at Hands of Canadian Immigration Policy," *New Canadian*, 3 March 1965, 1; "Akumu no ato," *New Canadian*, 22 December 1965, 1; and "The Tojin & the Riot," *New Canadian*, 9 March 1966, 1, 8.
- <sup>24</sup> Paul Yuzyk, "The Ukrainian Fact in Canada, Article in Program of the Montreal Conference, June 9, 10, 11, 1972," in Yuzyk, *For a Better Canada*, 50-3. Yuzyk's comparison between French and Ukrainian contributions to Canada was pointed out by Frances Swyripa in her "Ethnic Loyalists and Selkirk Settlers: The Ukrainians Rewrite Canadian History" (presented at the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association Biennial Conference, Winnipeg, 23-6 October 1991).
- <sup>25</sup> Yuzyk, "The Ukrainian Fact in Canada," 50-2.
- <sup>26</sup> Ukrainian Self-Reliance League, brief submitted to the B&B Commission, 1965 (Toronto: Micromedia, 1972).

- <sup>27</sup> "Tribute to Our Ukrainian Pioneers in Canada's First Century," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 April 1966, 10. See also "1966—A Special Year for 500,000 Canadians," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 January 1966, 1; and "Ukrainian Values in the Canadian Identity," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 May 1966, 9, 11-13. The AUUC also kept enshrining and honouring pioneers. See, for example, "A Message from Kin of Settlers from Neviliw," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 May 1966, 12-3; and "Honour Ukrainian Pioneers on Canada Day," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 July 1966, 3.
- <sup>28</sup> "National JCCA Brief," *New Canadian*, 3 August 1968, 8.
- <sup>29</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 45, file 16, Paul Yuzyk, "Are All Ethnic Groups Becoming English Canadians?" speech at the University of Toronto Conference on "The Changing Face of English Canada," 30 October 1964.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>31</sup> The Toronto JCCA, however, looked at the possibility and necessity of working with the Chinese, organizing meetings with the Chinese Canadian Association to deal with racism. See "Toronto JCCA Discuss Closer Ties With Chinese Canadians," *New Canadian*, 13 January 1966, 1.
- <sup>32</sup> "Report of the Resolutions Committee," in *Concern: A Conference to Study Canada's Multicultural Patterns in the Sixties*, ed. Canadian Cultural Rights Committee (Ottawa: Canadian Cultural Rights Committee, 1968).
- <sup>33</sup> Approximately 6,000 Ukrainians were sent to internment camps during World War I. See Peter Melnycky, "The Internment of Ukrainians in Canada," in *Loyalties in Conflict: Ukrainians in Canada During the Great War*, ed. Frances Swyripa and John Herd Thompson (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983), 1.
- <sup>34</sup> Swyripa, *Wedded to the Cause*, 182.
- <sup>35</sup> Heroism and sacrifice by Japanese-Canadian soldiers emerged much later in the 1980s. See, for example, Roy Ito, *We Went to War: The Story of the Japanese Canadians Who Served during the First and Second World Wars* (Stittsville: Canada's Wings, 1984).
- <sup>36</sup> Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Winnipeg Branch, brief submitted to the B&B Commission, 1964.
- <sup>37</sup> Yuzyk, "Are All Ethnic Groups Becoming English Canadians?" On Ukrainian Canadians' commemoration of Konowal, see Lubomyr Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 303-4.
- <sup>38</sup> Evidence suggests that the Japanese also commemorated World War I veterans, but the memory of internment overwhelmed such heroism during this period. See "Issei WWI Veteran Commemorates 50th Anniversary of Vimy Ridge Battle," *New Canadian*, 15 April 1967, 1.
- <sup>39</sup> A. B. Hotta, "The 'Nation' That was Lost in British Columbia 28 Years Ago," *New Canadian*, Holiday Issue, section III, 31 December 1970, 1.
- <sup>40</sup> *Tairiku jiho*, 8 December 1967, 4.
- <sup>41</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 22, file 11, official representatives of the ethnic groups in Canada, brief on Radio Television and Films in Canada submitted to the federal government, Ottawa, 1962. See also "Osnovy iednosti," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 20 May 1964, 4. The dilemma that the CBC faced in terms of ethnic programs and federal funding after 1971 was discussed by Bociurkiw in "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian-Canadian Community," 112-5.

- <sup>42</sup> See “Sprava ukrainskoi movy v Manitobi,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 8 February 1961, 4; “Uriad Manitoby i ukrainska mova,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 12 April 1961, 4; “Ukrainsna mova v Manitobi,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 22 May 1963, 4; “Dopovid pro ukrainsku movu v shkolakh Manitoby,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 27 March 1963, 4; “V spravi ukrainskoi movy,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 8 April 1964, 4; and “Ukrainska mova,” *Ukrainskyi holos*, 13 March 1968, 4.
- <sup>43</sup> Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Vancouver Branch, brief submitted to the B&B Commission, 1964 (Toronto: Micromedia, 1972).
- <sup>44</sup> Ukrainian Women’s Association of Canada, brief submitted to the B&B Commission, 1964 (Toronto: Micromedia, 1972).
- <sup>45</sup> Ukrainian Self-Reliance Association, Alberta Branch, brief submitted to the B&B Commission, 1964 (Toronto: Micromedia, 1972).
- <sup>46</sup> LAC, MG 28 C 67, vol. 103, file 47, Bohdan Krawchenko, “Toward a Development of Multiculturalism,” address at the Multicultural Conference, Toronto, 8 August 1970. For a Ukrainian-Canadian reaction to the B&B Commission report, see also Lupul, *The Politics of Multiculturalism: A Ukrainian-Canadian Memoir*, 112-3.
- <sup>47</sup> “Jinshu tōgō no mondaiten,” *New Canadian*, 22 April 1961, 5.
- <sup>48</sup> Thomas Hara, “Necessity of the JCCA,” *New Canadian*, 29 September 1962, 2.
- <sup>49</sup> “NJCCA Reveals Royal Commission Bi & Bi Brief,” *New Canadian*, 26 January 1966, 8.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>51</sup> “Future Role of the Centre...” *New Canadian*, 6 June 1964, 8. See also Kunio Hidaka, “Future Role of the Centre,” *Tairiku jiho*, 5 June 1964, 1.
- <sup>52</sup> “Japanese Canadian Centre, Its Philosophy and Purpose,” *New Canadian*, 3 February 1960, 1.
- <sup>53</sup> Fred D. Kondo, “The Growth of an Idea,” *Tairiku jiho*, 5 June 1964, 1.
- <sup>54</sup> “Pearson Says ‘JC Evacuation Black Spot’ in Canadian History,” *New Canadian*, 10 June 1964, 1. See also “Icchi kyōryoku shite,” *New Canadian*, 6 June 1964, 5.
- <sup>55</sup> *Tairiku jiho*, 12 June 1964, 4. For criticism, see “PM Says ‘Black-Spot-Evac.’ Speech Received Criticism,” *New Canadian*, 30 October 1965, 1.
- <sup>56</sup> “Lupul, ‘Multiculturalism and Canada’s White Ethnic,’” 99-107. Ukrainians as white ethnics was also theorized by Vic Satzewich in comparison with the Irish in his “Whiteness Limited: Racialization and the Social Construction of ‘Peripheral Europeans,’” *Histoire sociale / Social History* 33: 66 (2000): 280-9.
- <sup>57</sup> In the 1980s, when discussion of visible minority rights became heated, the Japanese challenged 1971 multiculturalism which was designed to secure the cultural and linguistic rights of ethnic groups. According to them, visible minorities needed a combination of multiculturalism and human rights. See, for example, Laverne M. Lewycky, “Equality Now: The Issue of Japanese Canadian Redress and Multiculturalism,” in *Asian Canadians: Contemporary Issues*, ed. K. Victor Ujimoto and Josephine Naidoo (Manitoba: University of Manitoba, 1986), 125. See also K. Victor Ujimoto and Gordon Hirabayashi, eds., *Visible Minorities and Multiculturalism: Asians in Canada* (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980).

<sup>58</sup> On the impact of internment on Japanese identity, see Roy Miki, "Turning in, Turning out: the Shifting Formations of 'Japanese Canadian' from Uprooting to Redress," *Changing Japanese Identifies in Multicultural Canada*, ed. Joseph F. Kess, Hiroko Noro, Midge M Ayukawa, and Helen Lansdowne (Victoria: University of Victoria Press, 2003), 25-45.

<sup>59</sup> Bociurkiw calls it "multiple bilingualism," which means English and mother tongue; see his "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian-Canadian Community," 105. Almost all briefs submitted to the B&B Commission support this type of bilingualism outside Quebec.

<sup>60</sup> Ukrainian Canadian Committee, Edmonton Branch, brief submitted to the B&B Commission, 1964 (Toronto: Micromedia, 1972). See also "Mnohomovna Kanada," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 29 May 1963, 4; "Ukrainske zvernennia v movno-kulturnii," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 15 January 1964, 2; "Dvomovnist u derzhavnii cluzhbi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 5 February 1964, 5; "Zminy v Ottavi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 29 January 1964, 4; and "Promova Premiera Pirsona," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 11 March 1964, 4.

<sup>61</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 35, file 6, Ukrainian Canadian Committee, brief to the Government of Canada on the bill of rights, 14 December 1968, 5.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 6. See also "Pered oblychchiam novoho roku," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 10 January 1968, 4.

<sup>63</sup> The Curatorium of Ukrainian Catholic Schools, Winnipeg, brief submitted to the B&B Commission, 1964 (Toronto: Micromedia, 1972). See also Bohdan Bociurkiw's view in "Bilingualism and Biculturalism as Seen by Western Canadians of Other Ethnic Origins," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 1 July 1964, 4.

<sup>64</sup> LAC, MG 31 D 58, vol. 6, file 9, J. B. Rudnyckyj, "Vision Globale du Canada: Un essai—'devoir de vacances,'" 1965.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> LAC, MG 31 D 58, vol. 7, file 14, J. B. Rudnyckyj, Regional language: first draft, 1967.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> See, for example, LAC, MG 31 D 58, vol. 7, file 8, Ukrainian Canadian Council of Learned Societies, blueprint for the BNA Act, section 133: a simplified version of B & B Rudnyckyj's formula, submitted to the Government of Canada, 22 January 1968.

<sup>69</sup> For example, see "'End Race Bias' Vote Gets Solid U.N. Backing," *New Canadian*, 27 November 1963, 1; "Nat. JCCA Issues Pamphlet to Obliterate Racial Epithet," *New Canadian*, 14 July 1965, 1; "Toronto JCCA Group Effort Needed for Human Rights Fight," *New Canadian*, 20 July 1966, 1; "Fed. Manpower Offices Accept Discrimination Reveals Alan Borovoy," *New Canadian*, 19 April 1967, 1, 8; and "JCCA Supports Human Rights Inquiry Board," *New Canadian*, 4 July 1969, 1.

<sup>70</sup> "No Real Answer to Racism?" *New Canadian*, 26 September 1969, 8.

<sup>71</sup> Thomas Hara, "Necessity of the JCCA," *New Canadian*, 29 September 1962, 2. See also "JCCA—a Personal Point," *New Canadian*, 16 November 1960, 1, 8; "Why We Should Support the Toronto JCCA," *New Canadian*, 1 October 1960, 1; "Hope and Progress for 1961," *New Canadian*, 1 December 1960, 1; George K. Fujisawa, "Is the JCCA Necessary?" *New Canadian*, 28 June 1961, 7; and "Public Responsibility and Courage—JCCA," *New Canadian*, 15 February 1964, 1.

<sup>72</sup> "The JCCA and What It Stands for," *New Canadian*, 20 April 1963, 1. See also "JCCA Membership Drive Vital for Human Rights Fight," *New Canadian*, 23 July 1966, 1.

<sup>73</sup> JCRC, Box 7, file 6, E. Ide, report on eighteenth biennial national JAACL convention, Detroit, 4 July 1964. In the 1960s, the NJCCA sent delegates to the Japanese American national convention. These representatives gave a report on the speeches and resolutions presented in the conference to the NJCCA's executive meeting. As the Civil Rights Movement was well under way, Japanese Americans focused on the human rights of racial minorities. Masako Iino discusses American influence on Japanese-Canadian decision making in the context of redress movement in *Nikkei kanadajin no rekishi* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1997), 147-65.

<sup>74</sup> The Ontario Human Rights Commission was established in 1961 to carry out Ontario's Human Rights Code which was passed in 1962. It collected complaints and appeals from people who faced discrimination because of their background, which included race, sex, colour, and religion. Ontario was the first province to introduce this kind of code in Canada. See Carmela Patrias and Ruth A. Frager, "'This Is Our Country, These Are Our Rights': Minorities and the Origins of Ontario's Human Rights Campaign," *Canadian Historical Review* 82: 1 (March 2001): 1.

<sup>75</sup> See, for example, "Nat. JCCA Issues Pamphlet to Obliterate Racial Epithet," *New Canadian*, 14 July 1965, 1; "JCCA Supports Human Rights Inquiry Board," *New Canadian*, 4 July 1969, 1; and "Human Rights Comm. Kills Epithet 'Jap' Advertising," *New Canadian*, 12 February 1971, 1.

<sup>76</sup> A. B. Hotta, "A Question of Ethnicity?" *New Canadian*, 25 July 1969, 8.

<sup>77</sup> Lucien C. Kurata, "Human Relations," *New Canadian*, 22 February 1964, 1, 8.

<sup>78</sup> Bociurkiw points out that the AUUC conceptualized Quebec sovereignty in Stalin's framework of nations, recognizing its right of "self-determination" but opposing separatism. See Bociurkiw, "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian-Canadian Community," 106.

<sup>79</sup> "On the Crisis of Confederation, Submission to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism by Canadian Council of National Groups," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 February 1965, 5.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.* See also, "National Groups and the Crisis in French-English Relations," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 January 1967, 19; and "The 'Third' Element," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 May 1968, 9-10.

<sup>81</sup> See, for example, "The Canadian Dilemma," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 August 1967, 4-6.

<sup>82</sup> See, for example, "Launch Drive for Citizenship Rights of Foreign-Born," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 February 1962, 9-10; "Memorandum to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 March 1962, 5; "Citizenship Rights Vital to Freedom, Progress," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 August 1962, 2; "Memorandum to Minister Bell and MP's," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 November 1962, 11-3; and "Stress Human Rights on Canada Day," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 July 1965, 3.

<sup>83</sup> "Only the Canadian Left Offers Goals and a Real Alternative," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 June 1968, 5.

<sup>84</sup> For example, Bohdan Krawchenko stressed in 1970 that the report was not a finished work; see his "Toward a Development of Multiculturalism."

- <sup>85</sup> Harry Schachter, "B & B Commission prof wants Ukrainian, German as regional languages," *The Manitoban*, 12 December 1967, 1. See also LAC, MG 31 D 58, vol. 8, file 18, Mark MacGuigan, "Constitutional Aspects of Ethnic Identity in Canada," Inter-University Committee on Canadian Slavs Symposium on Languages and Cultures in Multi-Ethnic Society, Ottawa, 22 May 1971.
- <sup>86</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 22, file 15, Arthur Stinson, Interim Executive Director, Multilogue reaction paper, no. 1, Canadian Citizenship Council, 1967.
- <sup>87</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 22, file 15, Canadian Citizenship Council, "Declaration of Objective and National Purpose And Programme of Action," 1 October 1964.
- <sup>88</sup> "Samovyznachennia dlia vsikh, tilky ne dlia Ukrainy," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 8 July 1964, 4.
- <sup>89</sup> Although the Ukrainian SSR was one of the initial members of the United Nations, its delegate did not have a separate voice from the Soviet Union.
- <sup>90</sup> See, for example, Ukrainian Canadian Committee, memoranda to the United Nations General Assembly, fifteenth session, September 1960; sixteenth session, November 1961; seventeenth session December 1962; and eighteenth session, November 1963, MG 32 C 67, vol. 35, file 6.
- <sup>91</sup> Paul Yuzyk, Senate, *Senate Debates*, 26 October 1971, 1390.
- <sup>92</sup> Paul Yuzyk, Senate, *Senate Debates*, 28 June 1971, 1224.
- <sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 1224-5. See also Paul Yuzyk, "Trudeau's Apology to the Ukrainians?" in Yuzyk, *For a Better*, 253.
- <sup>94</sup> *Ibid.* See also "Senator Iuzyk demaskuie sovietskyi imperiialism," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 3 June 1964, 4.
- <sup>95</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 35, file 6, B. Kushnir, memorandum to Lester B. Pearson, 16 April 1968. For the violation of human rights and democracy in Ukraine by the Soviet Union, see also "Ha porozi novoho pivstorittia," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 18 May 1960, 4; "Za ody n moralnyi pryntsyf," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 24 August 1960, 4;
- <sup>96</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 35, file 5, Paul Yuzyk, "Canadian Freedom and Ukrainian Freedom," 2 February 1974.
- <sup>97</sup> For the discussion of the Centennial and Expo 67 as vehicles for spreading multiculturalism, see Bociurkiw, "The Federal Policy of Multiculturalism and the Ukrainian-Canadian Community," 103-4. For the incorporation of ethnic diversity, see also Gary Miedema, "For Canada's Sake: The Centennial Celebrations of 1967, State Legitimation and the Restructuring of Canadian Public Life," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 34: 1 (Spring 1999): 139-61; his *For Canada's Sake: Public Religion, Centennial Celebrations, the Re-making of Canada in the 1960s* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005); and Peter H. Aykroyd, *The Anniversary Compulsion: Canada's Centennial Celebration: A Model of Mega-Anniversary* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992).
- <sup>98</sup> "A Crisis of National Unity: The Quebec Viewpoint for Mr. Pearson," *Globe and Mail*, 21 December 1962, 7.
- <sup>99</sup> "Across the Land: Alberta," *Globe and Mail*, 14 October 1967, 7.
- <sup>100</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 30, file 10, W. Tarnopolsky, "Multi-culturalism: A Logical Choice for Canada," 1971, 6. See also Yuzyk, "Are All Ethnic Groups Becoming Ethnic Canadians?" 11.
- <sup>101</sup> Yuzyk, "Are All Ethnic Groups Becoming Ethnic Canadians?" 15.



- <sup>102</sup> LAC, MG 28 I 85, vol. 7, file: Centennial Commission, R. Elliott, J. Fisher, etc, 1963-67, Canadian Citizenship Council, brief to the Centennial Commission, September 1965. See also "Promova P. Martina pry vidkryti pamiatkovoi tablytsi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 30 August 1967, 2.
- <sup>103</sup> "1867-1967," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 11 January 1967, 4.
- <sup>104</sup> Tarnopolsky, "Multi-culturalism: A Logical Choice for Canada," 6.
- <sup>105</sup> For Tweedsmir, see LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 30, file 12, Paul Yuzyk, "Holovna tsil isnuvannia ukrainsiv Kanady," [1967?].
- <sup>106</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 45, file 16, Paul Yuzyk, "Are All Ethnic Groups Becoming Ethnic Canadians?" 15.
- <sup>107</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 113, file 3, Paul Yuzyk, "The Emerging New Force in the Emerging New Canada," Thinkers' Conference on Cultural Rights, 13-5 December 1968, 7.
- <sup>108</sup> "1867-1967," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 11 January 1967, 4. See also "Na svitanku druhoho storichchia," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 5 July 1967, 4.
- <sup>109</sup> "Pislia zizdu," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 26 July 1974, 4.
- <sup>110</sup> Myron Shatulsky, "Our Contribution To Canadian Culture," *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 May 1967, 11.
- <sup>111</sup> T. Umezuki, "Early Settlement and Full Citizenship for Immigrants," *New Canadian*, 25 January 1967, 1.
- <sup>112</sup> "Kenkoku dainiseiki no hajimeni," *New Canadian*, 14 June 1967, 16.
- <sup>113</sup> LAC, MG 28 I 85, vol. 7, file: Centennial Commission, R. Elliott, J. Fisher, etc, 1963-67, Canadian Citizenship Council, brief to the Centennial Commission, September 1965.
- <sup>114</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 25, file 3, Lester B. Pearson, address to the Conference to establish a National Council for the Folk Arts, Ottawa, 8-9 November 1964.
- <sup>115</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 22, file 14, Judy LaMarsh, Secretary of State, speech prepared for delivery to the 6th annual meeting of the Canadian Centenary Council, Ottawa, 26 May 1966.
- <sup>116</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 24, file 7, Leon Kossar, "Canada's Newest and Oldest Cultural Movement," paper at the Second National Conference on Canadian Slavs, Ottawa, 1967.
- <sup>117</sup> "Ethnic Groups Invited to Participate at 1967 World Exhibition," *New Canadian*, 23 April 1966, 1.
- <sup>118</sup> "Ethnic Units Form Arts Council," *New Canadian*, 14 November 1964, 1. See also "Ethnic Groups Invited to participate at 1967 World Exhibition," *New Canadian*, 23 April 1966, 1.
- <sup>119</sup> "Ukrainskyi dytiachyi festival v Saskatuni," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 5 July 1967, 7.
- <sup>120</sup> "Ukrainska propamiatna tablytsiia v Ottavi," *Ukrainskyi holos*, 16 August 1967, 1.
- <sup>121</sup> "Kanada hyakunen to nikkeijin," *New Canadian*, 14 June 1967, 16. See also "Kanada hyakunen iwau," *New Canadian*, 4 January 1967, 6; "\$100,000 Budget Set by JC Centennial Committee," *New Canadian*, 18 January 1967, 1; and "Nikkei kanada shimin kyôkai no shimei, 1-5" *New Canadian*, 18 January 1967, 5, 21 January 1967, 5, 25 January 1967, 5, 28 January 1967, 5, 1 February 1967, 5.

- <sup>122</sup> “Nikkei kanada shimin kyôkai no shimei,” *New Canadian*, 1 February 1967, 5. Albertan Japanese were often admired as “model” people for the Japanese elite, showing a “wonderful integration” with the local culture after the war. See “A-shû zaijû sanzenyomei no nikkeijin no migotona yûgô,” *New Canadian*, 10 June 1959, 6.
- <sup>123</sup> “Ukrainians Will Light a Candle. . . at Canada’s Birthday Party,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 January 1967, 11.
- <sup>124</sup> “Centennial Summer,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 September 1967, 4.
- <sup>125</sup> “USSR at Expo,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 June 1967, 5.
- <sup>126</sup> “Greetings yo Our Kinsmen on the National Day of Ukraine at Expo,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 August 1967, 8.
- <sup>127</sup> “\$2 Million for Japan’s Expo 67 Pavilion,” *New Canadian*, 2 March 1966, 2.
- <sup>128</sup> Robert Hironaka, “Japanese Garden in Lethbridge,” in *Nishiki: Nikkei Tapestry, a History of Southern Alberta Japanese Canadians*, ed. Lethbridge and District Japanese Canadian Association (Lethbridge: Lethbridge and District Japanese Canadian Association, 2001), 121-6.
- <sup>129</sup> “Celebrate Centennial in Shevchenko Park,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 July 1967, 3.
- <sup>130</sup> Peter Prokop, “Time to End This Discrimination!” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 March 1965, 5.
- <sup>131</sup> *Ibid.* See also, “Delegates to Ottawa Arts Conference Unaware That Organizations Barred,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 November 1964, 1, 3; “We Ask Members of Parliament: Is the Centennial for All Canadians?” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 15 May 1965, 8; and “Discrimination,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 October 1965, 4-5.
- <sup>132</sup> “AUUC Protests to Lamontagne, Condemns Discrimination in ’67 Policy,” *Ukrainian Canadian*, 1 December 1964, 4-5.
- <sup>133</sup> LAC, MG 32 C 67, vol. 35, file 10, S. J. Kalba, Executive Director of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, activity report 1966-1968 of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 25 September 1968.
- <sup>134</sup> “Montreal Nisei Raps Japan Consulate Officials,” *New Canadian*, 23 August 1967, 1. See also “Hyôban ha yokunai,” *New Canadian*, 15 July 1967.
- <sup>135</sup> M. Asasuma, “Letter to the Editor,” *Tairiku jiho*, 17 October 1967, 1.

## Conclusion

This study examined the transformation of Canadian identity from Anglo-conformity to multiculturalism through five decades, regarding ethnic elites' initiatives for ethnic pluralism and democracy as major factors in the intellectual shift. Such a change involved a complex interplay between the political motivations of mainstream Canadians and ethnic elites as well as a complex interaction among various boundaries, including mainstream, ethnic, ideological, and regional. It analyzed how two ethnic elites in particular, Ukrainian and Japanese, envisioned Canada and their own ethnic communities in comparison with mainstream Canadians, identifying similarities and differences in their views. For the most part, the study dealt with Scots differently, regarding them as an integral part of mainstream Canadian society and introducing Scottish ethnicity to compare with Ukrainian and Japanese ethnic identity only where it highlighted when and why people needed to emphasize their ethnic backgrounds.

The analytical framework was twofold, in order to understand ethnicity as a dynamic political phenomenon defined not by common culture, language, and origin alone but by ethnic elites' interaction with Canadian society. First, this study focused on instrumental negotiations in which Ukrainian and Japanese elites used ethnicity to gain more political power, influence Canada's official identity, and change the legal position of ethnic minorities. In this process, ethnic elites made ethnicity both a significant negotiating tool in Canadian politics and a component of Canadian political decision making. Second, it examined the unofficial merger of Canadian and ethnic identities, building on Anthony D. Smith's ethno-symbolist theory, and placing a particular

emphasis on the role that historical myths, memories, and symbols played in maintaining strong ethnic consciousness and identity. In the process of negotiating with mainstream society for full participation in Canadian life, both Ukrainian and Japanese elites relied on a number of homeland-made and Canadian-made collective memories, symbols, and myths both to inspire their masses' emotional attachment to their ethnic communities and to make ethnicity an integral part of Canadian identity. Some influential Scots, despite the fact that Scottishness was usually indistinguishable from Canadian identity, occasionally highlighted Scottish identity in order to emphasize their superiority as a people who came to Canada with a lofty mission to establish a world-wide empire defined by high ideals. In this sense, ethnicity was always a means to gain power and influence and to retain them. In the final analysis, some conclusions can be made about changing attitudes towards ethnic groups, shifting Canadian identity, and the transformation of ethnic boundaries.

Generally speaking, mainstream-ethnic boundaries declined over this period, as mainstream and ethnic elites became much closer in their thinking, and ethnicity became a more integral part of Canadian identity. At official levels, significant changes occurred in how mainstream society (including the Scots) saw the roles that ethnic groups had played or could play in Canadian society. As ethno-racial hierarchy and deep-rooted discrimination which dated from the early twentieth century and favoured the Scots, while making the Ukrainians and the Japanese second-class citizens, peaked during World War II. The end of World War II was a turning point after which ethnic groups, to a greater or lesser degree, became recognized in Canada. The loyalty question that was raised with both Ukrainians and Japanese, the evacuation and

internment of the Japanese in British Columbia, and the racism of Nazi Germany in Europe made mainstream Canadians more aware of human rights issues. At the same time, ethnic Canadians like Ukrainians were expected to participate in Canada's war effort. Both the marginalization and the integration of ethnic groups thus had a great impact on the shift in how people viewed Canada from being a British dominated nation to being a multicultural one. As a result, the postwar era witnessed a number of changes, including the gradual abolition of discriminatory policies against former British Columbian Japanese and the introduction of Canadian citizenship in 1947. The Cold War served to increase awareness of freedom and democracy among Canadians who felt threatened by the expression of communism led by the Soviet Union. In the 1960s the rise of French-Canadian nationalism which agitated other ethnic groups, was another turning point. Once again mainstream Canadian leaders faced a crisis in national unity, which forced them to think that a new perspective would be necessary to govern an ethnically diverse Canada. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism appointed in 1963, the Official Languages Act of 1969, and federal multiculturalism introduced in 1971 reflected this change, and, for the first time, recognized ethnicity as an official component of Canadian identity.

Such a transformation would have never occurred had it not been for ethnic activism for ethnic pluralism. Both Ukrainian and Japanese elites—nationalist Ukrainians and *issei* Japanese in particular—had seen Canada as a multicultural nation since the interwar period, both to retain a sense of their loyalty to their respective homelands and to gain full recognition in Canadian society. The notion of ethnic pluralism thus emerged as an expression of resistance to prewar and interwar

Anglo-conformity, which recognized British Canadians' superiority and their special dual loyalty to Canada and Britain that had been nurtured for a long time. The Ukrainians and the Japanese both pressured the Canadian government to introduce multiculturalism, which would guarantee the equal rights of people of all ethnic origins as the official identity of Canada, while also pursuing their own group goals. For Ukrainian nationalists, the desire for upward mobility and for cultural and linguistic survival in Canada as well as the independence of their homeland were the driving forces behind their lobby for multiculturalism. For both *issei* and *nisei* Japanese, the acquisition of the federal franchise was the major cause attached to multiculturalism before 1948. Both Ukrainian nationalist and Japanese activism gained momentum in the postwar period, as the end of World War II and the Cold War made democracy and human rights main political principles in Canada. Ukrainian nationalists worked on opening Canada's doors to Ukrainian refugees while the Japanese sought compensation for the wartime evacuation and internment, both on the grounds of democratic ideals and the protection of fundamental human rights. Communist Ukrainians, while increasingly marginalized with the start of the Cold War, also joined the lobby for multiculturalism after World War II, in pursuit of their own notion of democracy based on equality among all classes of people. For Ukrainians and Japanese, the federal multiculturalism policy announced in 1971 was a goal that they had long envisioned and finally reached.

At the unofficial level, ethnicity began an imprint on Canadian identity in the interwar period. Most mainstream politicians, scholars, and commentators, concerned about Canada's ethnically diverse nature and facing difficulty in building a single

national identity, focused actively on the assimilation of ethnic groups to British standards. Yet individuals like Watson Kirkconnell and John Murray Gibbon launched the notion of a Canadian mosaic, suggesting that ethnic cultural traditions such as folk art, music, and literature could enrich Canadian identity. In this context, Scottish poets like Robert Burns and cultural symbols such as Gaelic songs and music were also celebrated as a significant part of Canadian culture. Both Ukrainian and Japanese ethnicity had started to influence regional or local identity by the war. Ukrainianness was increasingly recognized as a component of prairie identity, while the Japanese, despite political marginalization, were to some extent culturally integrated into local communities in British Columbia before World War II. The fact that ethnicity had become a celebrated aspect of Canadian identity was well illustrated by the effort to make Scottishness an official identity of Nova Scotia, regardless of its actual ethnic composition.

In the postwar period, the Ukrainian and the Japanese elites tried to stress their groups' importance, incorporating British symbols into their collective memories, Canadianizing their homeland symbols of their own. Both ethnic groups, for example, enshrined the British monarch as a figure that represented pan-Canadian values such as freedom, cosmopolitanism, and democracy. They also attached Canadian political ideals to their homeland myths and symbols; for both nationalist and communist Ukrainians this process began between the wars with their heroes such as Taras Shevchenko and Bohdan Khmelnytsky who championed democracy and equal rights. For the Japanese, Emperor of Japan was a liberator of oppressed Asia before the war but became a symbol of internationalism and democracy after the war. In this regard,

Scots, particularly in Nova Scotia, also attached democratic ideals to Robert Burns and their Highland myths. For them, the continuity between Canada and Scotland helped to maintain their superiority over others as a founding race of the empire and Canada. Meanwhile, both the Ukrainians and the Japanese nurtured their Canadian self-images as respectively, a founding people of the prairies who had cultivated the land and were the main force behind agricultural expansion of Canada, and a community that had contributed to the local economy in Vancouver and fishing villages in British Columbia.

Yet despite the narrowing gap between mainstream and ethnic elites in the definition of Canadian identity as a democratic country in the post-World War II era, mainstream-ethnic boundaries persisted. Mainstream Canadians had always acted as “first-class” citizens even though they valued democracy. In fact, they defined democracy more narrowly than the Ukrainians and the Japanese as a British-born principle that guaranteed basic freedom and equality among Canadians under the constitution as opposed to communism or totalitarianism. Their priority was always on maintaining and promoting national unity at home through ensuring ethnically diverse people equal rights and, after 1947, Canadian citizenship, and on securing an international reputation and influence as part of the democratic West. Ethnic agendas that were closely intertwined with Canadian democracy from an ethnic elite point of view received attention only when they were considered relevant to Canada. For example, mainstream leaders rarely worked actively on foreign issues such as the independence of Ukraine, while they did show interest in things within Canada’s boundaries, such as compensation for Japanese internees after World War II. Ethnic



elites, for their part, rejected a narrowly defined Canadian democracy and broadened its definitions so that the principle would encompass their own interests.

Such a gap between how mainstream and ethnic leaders envisioned Canada was reflected in ethnic myths, collective memories, and symbols. While Canadianizing their homeland myths and symbols, the Ukrainian and the Japanese elites did not wish make them Canadian completely. For Ukrainian nationalists, Shevchenko and Khmelnytsky, for example, fought for Ukrainian independence, while for communists, they represented the proletariat's pursuit of equal rights and the establishment of a larger Slavic communist world. For the Japanese, the Japanese Emperor and the Yamato myth symbolized an expanding Imperial Japan and a strong colonial power before and during World War II, and the rebirth of Japan as a democratic nation after the war. Ethnic ideals like these were not always compatible with the mainstream image of a mosaic that celebrated the cultural diversity of Canada yet avoided including homeland ties or issues. The Ukrainian and the Japanese elites also tried to detach their Canadian-made collective memories and myths from mainstream ones, rejecting a complete merger between the two. The institutionalization of such myths and memories as part of the official ethnic histories that groups wrote after World War II reflected the desire to protect their history as an independent category.

Other boundaries concerned ones that defined or separated ethnic communities from each other. This study identified factors that created differences between Ukrainians and Japanese in how they interacted with Canadian society and consolidated their ethnic communities. The Ukrainian nationalists maintained their ethnic community more consistently and had greater influence on Canadian politics

than the Japanese (*issei* or *nisei*) throughout the fifty years for a number of reasons. First, Ukrainian leaders, whose masses had been granted the franchise much earlier than the Japanese and dominated a number of constituencies on the prairies, learned quickly how to manipulate their collective power and how to negotiate with the federal and provincial governments to gain recognition. The Japanese, disenfranchised until 1948 and numerically small, did not have such a foundation from which to work with mainstream leaders particularly before and during World War II. Such complete marginalization hindered them from positioning themselves in Canadian society as a minority group. Second, Ukrainians were divided between communists and nationalists ever since the 1920s, and thus more actively competed among themselves to mobilize their people than the Japanese did. The Japanese elite was also divided between the *issei* and *nisei* since the 1930s, but the fact that such categories were determined by birth and often interdependent made the two less competitive and less active in terms of influencing their masses. In addition, new developments in the postwar period, especially the influx of Ukrainian nationalist refugees into Canada and the start of the Cold War, intensified the ideological competition between Ukrainian nationalists and communists. The rivalry between *issei* and *nisei* among the Japanese, on the other hand, lost intensity after the war, as the *issei* population declined. The role that internal competition among ethnic leaders played in the promotion of ethnic identity can be illustrated by comparison with the Scots, who, unlike the Ukrainian and the Japanese elites, did not have first to become the official or unofficial representatives of their ethnic communities in order to become mainstream leaders. As a result, they neither mobilized the Scots as part of a nation-wide ethnic community nor competed strongly

among themselves to control the representation of their people. Third, Ukrainian nationalists remained strongly tied to their homeland, perceiving Ukrainian independence as their most important cause, while the Japanese, who tried to unite themselves behind Imperial Japan in the interwar period, were increasingly detached from homeland politics after the war.

These differences were well reflected in the maintenance of ethnic myths, symbols, and collective memories. Ukrainians maintained their homeland myths and Canadian collective memories more consistently than the Japanese. Ukrainian nationalists in particular always tied their fight for the independence of Ukraine to homeland heroes throughout the five decades and continuously cultivated the myth of common descent that promoted ethnic consciousness. Shevchenko, for example, as a poet who could enrich the Canadian mosaic just like Robert Burns, was a great choice for their symbolic figure in Canada. The intense conflict between nationalists and communists over what Shevchenko represented—whether the struggle for Ukrainian independence or the proletarian fight against imperialist oppressors—also contributed to the consolidation of Ukrainian ethnic consciousness. The Japanese elites, in contrast, did not maintain homeland symbols like the Emperor. He was always regarded politically irrelevant in Canada, and after the fall of Imperial Japan the impact of the Emperor as a core of ethnic identity obviously declined. Furthermore, Ukrainians benefited from the fact that they had been concentrated in and built roots in the prairies. Their collective memories associated with the prairies were nurtured positively, focusing on their contributions to nation building. Yet Japanese regional myths were

often painted with stories of discrimination and marginalization and thus grew negative over years.

All these factors contributed to the reasons why Ukrainian nationalists fostered a strong ethnic consciousness, initiated resistance to the federal attempt to define Canada as a bilingual and bicultural nation, and became the most vocal group in the multicultural movement of the 1960s. Multiculturalism, which stressed ethnic groups' collective right to preserve their languages and cultural traditions through public funding and programs, was particularly significant for Ukrainian nationalists who felt that their linguistic and cultural survival was threatened both in Canada because of accelerating assimilation of the younger generation and in Ukraine because of the Soviet policies. Unlike Ukrainians who tried to protect their ethnic distinctiveness by all means, however, the Japanese, having faced long-term marginalization because of their race and concentration in British Columbia, did not always emphasize their cultural and linguistic uniqueness. They emphasized more openness to the outside than on themselves and regarded multiculturalism as a principle which ought to secure individual rights to maintain their ethnic identity without any legal barriers and discrimination because of their racial background. In the 1960s, Ukrainian multiculturalism won over other definitions, and became more common than the Japanese one, making the promotion of different languages and cultural traditions as a top priority of the policy.

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