The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

Canada
THE FAILURE OF PEACE:
AN ECOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Eric Laferrière
Department of Political Science
McGill University, Montreal
August 1995

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

© Eric Laferrière, 1995
The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

ISBN 0-612-12409-6
Pour Stella et Berc Mazlum
PREFACE

This work took long to come. I began thinking about the relationship between "environmental issues" and "international relations" in the summer of 1990, with no background whatsoever in the science or philosophy of ecology and, similarly, little awareness of the new debates in international relations theory. My initial doctoral dissertation project was not deliberately focused on theory. Although already seeking a contribution to the field of "international environmental politics" from the perspective of new social movements, I had aimed essentially at describing the orientations and strengths of the "global environmental movement"; I wanted to know how this "new actor" on the global scene had shaped, and was shaping, patterns of cooperation and conflict between North and South.

However, through the course of researching and writing, I became not only overwhelmed by the breadth of the project (mea culpa), but also increasingly dissatisfied with International Relations' inability, as it dealt with the ecological crisis, to say something really new. Becoming painfully aware of International Relations' reluctance to acknowledge its philosophical roots, I experienced an intense intellectual crisis which led me to interrupt a thesis two-thirds written, and to begin -- à la grâce de Dieu -- this new project under new supervision. I have come to Political Theory through the back door, and discovered a world unknown to most of my young North American colleagues in International Relations. I hope to have demonstrated the possibility for a self-disciplined retour aux sources and, more importantly, the immense theoretical value of a philosophical appraisal of international relations "theory".
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I probably would not be writing these words, were it not for the help of several wonderful people. My wife, Patricia Romano, supported me unconditionally as I labored my way through the doctoral programme; trained, as well, in Political Science at McGill, she understood the pressures associated with my status and activities and, especially, gave me good reasons to believe in my own work -- Pat, you're the best!! Jim Tully, who was not in any desperate need for more students (!), gladly accepted to supervise this thesis: for this, and for his caring and respectful approach, I will always be grateful. Eugenio Bolongaro, Ravi Chimni, Bob Collins and Éric Darier were (and still are) colleagues of uncommon intellect, reflective individuals of rare integrity; I am honored to admit their profound influence on me. Peter Stoett, likewise, but at a distance (Canada is big!), impressed me with his academic skills and, as my closest friend in International Relations, showed me that I could contribute something to the field. Au-delà des cercles académiques, je ne peux oublier l'appui moral de mes parents, Guy et Magali, et celui d'amis très chers: Misko Cvopa, Janko Cvopa, Marie-France Bélanger et Michel Tolédano.

Pat, Jim (of course!), Éric and Peter all contributed specific comments to this work; particular thanks to Peter's thorough and thoughtful review -- I am still amazed. I must also thank Mark Brawley for his patience in supervising the initial project on global environmentalism; Nadia Burger and Jodi Jensen for providing me with helpful material; and Rex Brynen, Myron Frankman and
Paul Noble for their care and respect as faculty members at McGill. Usual disclaimers apply.
ABSTRACT

The restricted approach to peace in theories of international relations (peace as the absence of war or state survival) is not conducive to the long-term alleviation of human suffering. This thesis uses the philosophy of ecology, with its holistic approach to "positive peace", as a means to critique the peace conceptions and prescriptions in the realist and liberal strands of IR theory. A review of ecological thought stresses the convergence of deep ecology and social ecology under a radical umbrella. Inspired from anarchist/naturalist philosophy, radical ecology seeks peace by defending an ethic of detachment and cooperation, a decentralized polis and economy, and a holistic epistemology; such prescriptions are shaped by a reading of nature emphasizing finiteness, wholeness, diversity, and long age. Realism is criticized for its ontology of conflict and aggression, its hierarchical view of nature, its elitist view of the polis, its endorsement of political and/or cultural homogeneity, and its materialism. Liberalism's emancipatory framework is likewise hampered by policies favoring homogeneity, materialism and "order"-through-technicity. In both cases, non-ecological (and peace-threatening) values are reinforced by positivism. The thesis concludes with a review of current challenges to IR theory, assessing their compatibility with ecological precepts. We argue that critiques from the WOMP, feminism, neomarxism, structurationism and postmodernism do play an important role in reconstructing the bases of a new "peace theory" in International Relations, but that an ecological approach can subsume such contributions under a distinctly coherent framework.

RÉSUMÉ

Les théories courantes des relations internationales se contentent d'une conception restreinte de la paix: l'absence de guerres, la survie de l'État -- rien qui ne prévienne, à long terme, la souffrance de l'être humain. La pensée écologique, par contre, conçoit la paix de manière "totale". Tirées de philosophies anarchistes et naturalistes, l'écologie "profonde" et l'écologie "sociale" s'unissent sous une bannière radicale, et prônent une éthique de détachement et de coopération, un corps politique et une économie décentralisés, et une épistémologie "engagée" (non positiviste); la "nature" inspirant ces préceptes défie le temps, et se veut limitée, indivisible, et
diversifiée. Cette approche écologique permet tout d'abord d'évaluer le discours du réalisme politique: l'on y critique ses axiomes (présumant conflit et agression), sa conception hiérarchique de la nature, l'élitisme de ses préférences politiques, ses tendances vers l'homogénéité politique et/ou culturelle, et son materialisme. Passant ensuite aux théories libérales, l'on y déplore une vision (bien qu'émancipatrice) minée également par des politiques homogénéisantes, matériastristes et "technicisantes". La philosophie positiviste se manifeste dans les deux cas, et soutient ainsi un ensemble de valeurs portant atteinte tant à l'écologie qu'à la paix. Cependant, de nouvelles théories semblent offrir des perspectives intéressantes, d'un point de vue écologique. Le message du World Order Models Project, et ceux aussi des féministes, des néo-marxistes, des structurationnistes, et des post-modernes, semblent construire les bases d'une nouvelle "théorie de la paix" en relations internationales. L'approche écologique, à ce titre, englobe ces contributions variées au sein d'un programme éminemment cohérent.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract/Résumé</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: An Ecological Conception of Peace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Ecology&quot; and the Rejection of Positive Peace</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Ecology: Converging Influences toward Positive Peace</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Ecological Framework for Positive Peace</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Realism and Peace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Evolution of the Realist Worldview</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selecting Realist Authors</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Realist Ontology of Conflict</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism and Hierarchy</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism and Homogeneity</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immutability and Materialism</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism as Reductionist Epistemology</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion: Toward an Ecological Critique of Realism</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Liberal Peace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selecting Liberal Authors</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Liberals' Uniting Peace: Roots</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniting Peace: The Contemporary Literature</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Utilitarian Dimension</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State, Technicity, and the Enlightened Peace</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Toward an Ecological Peace for International Relations Theory?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ecological/Environmental Theme in International Relations</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ecological Dimension of Alternative Security Proposals and Futures Designs</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ecology and Global Process 159
Ecology and the Emancipatory Critique of International Relations 171
Conclusion 180

Conclusion 183

Bibliography 189
INTRODUCTION

An essential objective of political theory is to understand why most human societies have failed to sustain a peaceful order. The question of peace, however, has been largely appropriated by theorists of international relations, who have restricted the notion of peace to a "negative" dimension, i.e. peace as merely the absence of war. As Johan Galtung emphasized, however, a "peace" that will effectively ensure the long-term security and freedom of human beings can only exist in a "positive" sense¹. Indeed, the absence of war between sovereign countries does not necessarily indicate the eradication of societal (and intersocietal) violence. The conditions for "non-peace", for violence and suffering, often exist behind the façade of diplomatic stability: such conditions blur the boundaries of state sovereignty (and of political studies, of course), and are expressed in general relationships between humans and non-human life. Galtung, and his followers, can only accept a total view of

peace, dependent on interrelated objectives of demilitarization, equalization of economic status, and ecological balance.

This is, likewise, the position adopted in this work. The historical record will easily confirm that individuals and nations have rarely lived at peace; in fact, "national" consciousness has been indissociable from war, while the "peaceability" of non-warring classes or groups has fully depended on stringent relations of domination, sowing the seeds of an eventual breakdown of "order". Evidently, then, the "conventional" theories of peace have proved inadequate. Not that they have been ignored: the narrow peace discourse has been most palatable to the elite, precisely demonstrating how theory and practice are fundamentally inseparable. The result, as we stand today, is of a planet marred by violence.

There is a need, therefore, to understand what is wrong with conventional peace arguments. This entails two things. Surely, a particular body of mainstream theorizing must be targeted for analysis: our focus here, in chapters 2 and 3, will be on the realist and liberal strands of international relations theory. But first, a critical perspective on peace must be elaborated: our intention is to build on Galtung's approach and stress the ecological dimension of positive peace. In fact, we want to argue that the philosophy of ecology, in and of itself, can provide the necessary critique of mainstream approaches: as discussed in chapter 1, ecological thought may be synthesized so as to provide a coherent framework for sustainable, freeing peace. In chapter 4, following the critique of realism and liberalism, we will review the contemporary challenges to the main "paradigms" in the field of international relations, and explain how they may agree with, or benefit from, the ecological approach.
The choice of ecology as a critical perspective on international relations theory should not come as a surprise; not only are there precedents in the field, but "environmental issues" are also used widely now as case studies in International Relations. The key, however, is to use ecological thought as a means to reassess the value framework of International Relations. The latter, as a component of Political Theory, says many things about the nature of humankind, the desirability of various political structures, and the relative importance and content of fundamental normative goals (peace, security, freedom, justice, growth); as an established field in the social sciences, International Relations also conveys (essentially positivist) assumptions about the role of theorizing in generating knowledge and improving the condition of humankind. Ecology, likewise, encompasses many reflections about how the world works, how it should work, and how we can make it work. As a

---

2Cf. the discussion on the Sprouts and Dennis Pirages in chapter 4.
3The quotation marks are deliberate. This study will indeed stress the artificiality of environmental-issue conceptions, as euphemisms for consumptive resources. To divide nature into solvable problems may be analytically convenient (and, at times, politically useful), but conceals both the holistic aspect of nature and the status of ecology as a general approach or philosophy. Environmental issues exist for managers, engineers, and other specialists in quest of an identifiable focus for their problem-solving expertise. If they exist for ecologists, they do only as symbols of a global crisis and as a bridge to the language of the mainstream. The "environmentalization" of ecology is then often a first step toward the cooptation or the marginalization of ecological activists. This is not to trivialize the work of illustrious individuals (or groups) who have fought celebrated battles for specific causes (national parks, dams, endangered species, etc.). The point, rather, is that piecemeal approaches or decontextualized battles have arguably done little to disseminate an ecological consciousness proper -- is the United States, for example, in spite of sweeping environmental legislation since the early 1970s, that much more on the road, today, towards an ecological society?
4This work will use interchangeably the capitalized "International Relations" and the expression "international relations theory"; the former should actually refer more precisely to "the field of" international relations, but, for our purpose, this "field" will be restricted to its theoretical component.
philosophy of life, it is necessarily political theory and "international theory" (to use Martin Wight's phrase).  

Chapter 1, therefore, will seek to capture this philosophy: the aim is to demonstrate that ecological thought is, precisely, a *bona fide* field of study, with its own understanding of the major human values, and its own treatment of epistemology. Ecology stands as a (critical) reflexion on the violence of the modern project and on historical patterns of domination. The killing of nature, at the root of ecological thought, serves as the essential testimony of things gone wrong in the social world. In part, then, ecologists study nature scientifically, learn how it is "structured" to sustain life indefinitely, and explain how human projects have upset the natural balance. However, many ecologists also seek nature as a path to inner peace and freedom: here, ecological thought devises its own projects for humankind, meant to eliminate biases towards aggression and control, to reconstruct relationships in favor of (diverse) life, and to recover, through harmony within the species and with nature as a whole, spiritual meaning for individuals. Ecology thus challenges much of social theory by offering a "reading" of nature as finite, whole, diverse, and "timeless". But, just as importantly, it also positions itself as an emancipatory framework, calling on theorists not merely to devise new structures for better living, but, as well, to move towards subjectivity, to cease detaching themselves from a supposed "object" of study.

"Peace" thus becomes, in many ways, the *raison d'être* of ecological thought. The same may be said of international relations theory: as a concept and a general norm, "peace" encompasses the objectives of order, security and

---


6This reading of nature is likewise discussed in chapter 1; the terms are not new, yet carry specific meaning for ecologists.
freedom which have motivated the discipline and even inhere in its non-normative literature. The concept of peace may be used, therefore, as an effective focal point for a debate between ecology and mainstream theories of international relations.

But what are those "theories"? The analyst here must contend with both epistemological and substantive debates in the field. There is no consensus, in the first case, concerning the "labelling type": "theories", "paradigms" and "approaches" are the favorite terms, and no attempt will be made here to solve this epistemological problem. The conundrums are only slightly less pressing in the second case. The realist school, a fixture in the discipline and traditionally contrasted with idealism, has also been part of trichotomies: in one recent version, realism is compared to pluralism and globalism, while in Martin Wight's classic analysis, it is opposed to rationalism and revolutionism. An apparently straightforward categorization compares realism to liberalism and socialism (or Marxism), yet, in a different argument, realism is basically fused with liberal thought as part of a "classical" tradition and in opposition to Marxist-type (essentially dependentista) writings. The realist school has been further measured against various strands of "institutionalism" (liberal and neo-

---

7See for example Stanley Kober, "Idealpolitik", Foreign Policy, No.79 (Summer 1990), pp.3-24. For the classic statement, see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1946).
liberal). And in Wight's philosophically-inspired reformulation, the Machiavellian paradigm is distinguished from Grotian and Kantian alternatives.

Why settle, in chapters 2 and 3, on realism and liberalism? Traditional appeals are difficult to resist, undoubtedly because the "old" labels have a way to capture a wide ontological spectrum. Chapter 2 discusses realism as an identifiable, pessimistic "body of thought", comfortable in a "what is" of conflict, and proposing security policies based on an elitist and materialist ethic. "Idealism" may well have been substituted for "liberalism", but the latter term better conveys the palpable, moralist relationship between this optimistic school and realism. Liberals share with realists an ethic of growth. But one is out of passion, and the other out of necessity. Liberalism thus must be separated from realism on account of its emancipatory mission, and, for this very reason, and in contrast with realism, directly invites rebuttals from ecology; in chapter 3, the discussion focuses particularly on the cosmopolitan, utilitarian, and "technicist" paths to peace. In sum, there is much value in dividing the mainstream between pessimistic and optimistic outlooks on peace and the human condition; in the modern context, however, and particularly

---


through shared uses of positivist epistemology, realism and liberalism must be precisely considered as complementary, especially on the issue of peace\textsuperscript{14}.

As for the other labels, the "pluralist" and "institutionalist" variants may arguably be covered by our two schools, for they represent either an empirical refining of political process (e.g. actors in the decision-making process) or, more simply, a concern with particular sub-issues (such as cooperation under regimes); similarly, the entire "Grotian" perspective and its emphasis on legal order may be ascertained as a bridge between power politics and individual freedom, while "rationalism" does pervade both established traditions.

The position of "globalism" and Marxism is more problematic, however. Many self-defined globalists are indeed unabashed liberals (James Rosenau is the paradigmatic example), while (neo)Marxists do share the modernist outlook on peace of the mainstream. This said, there is today a "globalist" literature in International Relations seeking a break with mainstream theorizing; some contributions (especially by Robert Cox), in their historicism and dialecticism, are epistemologically in line with an ecological approach, while their notable emphasis on transnational new social movements are directing the critique of international relations theory precisely towards the realm of ecology. Likewise, the Marxist perspective, under the wing of dependency analysts, rejects the ahistoricism of the mainstream and is concerned with deliberately using theory as a tool for emancipation. These are two recent departures from conventional thinking which are discussed in chapter 4, along with the contributions of the World Order Models Project (with whom Galtung is associated), feminist scholars, and contemporary philosophers familiar with either the critical theory

\textsuperscript{14}As will be discussed later, positivism, from an ecological perspective, has played a key role in voiding the (convergent) peace prescriptions of realism and liberalism.
of the Frankfurt School or the French school of postmodernism. In each case, ecologists can recognize an attempt, although often unspoken, at breaking free from the minimalist peace of mainstream International Relations.

In sum, the ecological critique of peace conceptions and prescriptions is part of a more general current towards a fundamental re-thinking of international relations. Mainstream theory still remains a prisoner of positivism and enlightenment modernity. In many cases, utopian thought is considered pointless, and theory seems only to document (and hence perpetuate) an ugly past; and if a higher good can be postulated and constructed, it remains paradoxically contingent on a (quantitative) utopia which, apparently, makes perfect, "rational" sense. Ecology here both issues a warning and radiates hope: liberating peace for all individuals is possible, but it requires a large package; peace is holistic, and thus requires a combination of normative, analytical, and hermeneutical theory, as well as social action.
CHAPTER ONE

AN ECOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF PEACE

Introduction

What does ecological thought have to say about peace? How is a concern for nature necessarily conducive to peace? Is peace a "natural" and "good" thing? What are ecology's "peace principles", and how are they derived? Such are the key questions to ask here, and some preliminary answers could be offered intuitively. Arguably, the love of nature should inspire respect for life and a need for contemplation, introspection and freedom. Ecologists deeply worry about nature dying; thus, they seek a simple life, where they can remain close to nature; they cannot but deplore expressions of greed and power quests, which lay the planet to waste and curtail the right of all individuals to a fulfilled life close to nature. Intuitively, then, ecologists would seem fundamentally committed to individual and social peace; they would also consider peace natural and possible, for humankind presumably exists as a natural species, hence in harmony with nature, and if in need of sociability, presumably only in limited (communitarian) fashion -- so as to facilitate survival and fulfil communicative instincts.

Are we merely constructing a stereotype of the ecologist? Not necessarily. But the association between ecology and peace is not so simple. There is a less idyllic, even 'darker side to ecological thought, practice and appeal, which will be discussed in the first section of this chapter. The second
section, however, will revert to the more "promising" -- radical -- view of ecology, reviewing its various schools and their converging contributions to a thinking on positive, freeing peace: the issue of freedom is indeed key to an ecophilosophical view on peace in modern times. In the final section, we will attempt to formally integrate the various branches of radical ecology, offering a framework for ecological peace based on a "consensual" reading of nature and upholding a series of ecological values necessary for positive peace at the global level. The general effort at synthesis may be the most controversial aspect of the chapter, as ecological philosophers have traditionally stressed divisions, rather than commonalities, within the field.

"Ecology" and the Rejection of Positive Peace

As we will discuss below, and as mentioned above, a peace-serving ecological philosophy must also serve the cause of freedom. Ecological thought is indeed emancipatory thought. While the term "ecology" was initially coined, in the late nineteenth century, as a mere scientific description of interrelationships within "ecosystems" (itself a scientifically laden term), it also came to represent the focus of discrete efforts at recapturing a more humane society. Wild nature, particularly in the vast expanse of the New World, became a refuge from industrial society, but its degradation also stood as a symbol of the violence of modernity. In other words, wilderness initially attracted those marginals who sought freedom from the complexity and alienation inherent in the "modern project". Later, the unrelenting assault on nature was understood as the necessary culmination of domination structures at the service of modern ideals of growth: freedom from these anti-nature structures became necessary, so as to both instill individual peace and restore humankind to its natural habitat.
Conceived, and not so paradoxically, as a modern reaction to the excesses of modernity, ecological thought aims at recovering inner peace and freedom for all individuals through a communion with nature and, necessarily, through a restructuring of social institutions based on non-utilitarian valuing of all natural beings. The point is, then, that an appeal to nature as such cannot be considered "ecological" in the modern sense unless it relates to a project of positive peace. In this section, then, our aim is to discuss (and lay to rest) three lines of thought/practice with ecological appeal, but with dubious or no pretense for a liberating peace; these include "ecofascism", "hierarchical peace" and conservationism.

The concept of ecofascism is dismissed by most ecological thinkers as a perversion of ecological ethics; unarguably, fascism is an imperial doctrine of anti-peace/freedom, fully committed to extracting any "resource" which nature may provide in pursuit of military conquest. However, that nineteenth-century German romantics and, later, the Nazi regime appealed to an organic bond with nature does compel us to pause for a moment. The fact is that: a) reactionary doctrines lend themselves very well to a nihilistic "return to nature", fully compatible with a forceful ("cleansing") rejection of the "other"; b) human violence can be legitimized as a mere reflection of violence in wilderness (brute force can indeed hold fascinating appeal to some nature lovers); c) (from a different perspective) a visceral reaction to the killing of nature, and certain animal species in particular, may prompt a rejection of politics and, along the way, a loathing of the political species (i.e. humans). These are arguments seeking to explain philosophies of aggression based on deeply emotional reactions to nature: indeed, not all romantics show distaste for violence. A
A good contemporary example may be found in the radical preservationist group Earth First! whose members, using Malthusian logic, have once suggested that "nature take its course" amongst victims of the Ethiopian famine, and have even called for the extinction of the human species. The latter call is admittedly unusual, but does reflect the danger posed by one-sided and fanatical ecological views. While most warring romantics would at least ensure that their own kind survive and thrive, it is important to remember how nature may be "read" for its violent, bloody "purging" cycles.

Similarly, ecofascism may be "deromanticized" but still appeal to a non-ethical form of rationality. In other words, and as briefly hinted above, various forms of violence or repression may be advocated on the basis of natural laws of "carrying capacity". Here, Malthusian thinking operates in conjunction with social Darwinism, slanting the reading of nature towards preeminent violence and the survival of the fittest, and either propagating an ethic of competition (under the highly legitimate aura of "nature") or ordering the involvement of a supreme authority, mandated to enforce the necessary requirements for ecological sustainability. From murderous passion, ecofascism is rationalized.

---

1Preservationism may be distinguished from conservationism: the latter is "wise-use" management, while the former refers more specifically to the protection of species and habitats for their own sake. Cf. also the discussion below.


4Referring again to Hardin, one can see how a Leviathan may "solve" the "tragedy of the commons"; cf. Hardin's famous piece, "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science, Vol. 162 (1968), pp. 1243-1248.
and transmuted: elites take control by directing and stabilizing society's use of "resources".

"Hierarchical peace" is one way to describe that particular ecological view content with sustainability, but indifferent to the centralizing human project upholding such ecological balance. Authors such as Ophuls or Heilbroner have been attacked on that point, although, in Ophuls' case, and as discussed in chapter 4, the imposition of a steady state is merely a first step towards a democratic decentralization of political authority at the communal level. This in itself is highly idealistic, for in practice, in the modern world, the philosopher-king tends to follow the capitalist and industrialist trend, with negative implications for peace, freedom and ecology. However, the idea of an ecologically stable, hierarchical (and non-positive) peace is not in itself fanciful, if unappealing to many ecologists. If ecological sustainability is pursued narrowly, then it is by all means not incompatible with tyranny. This is indeed one of Murray Bookchin's most emphatic points, as he dismisses the facile longing of some ecologists for an unqualified return to ancient or medieval societies.

The key question then is: Why not? Why is the stable "peace" of feudal Europe unsatisfactory? With all the admiration expressed by Westerners for Eastern religions, why is the "peace" imposed by the Hindu caste system equally unfulfilling? Structured patterns of domination do not exist in nature;

5Cf. Rajni Kothari's critique of Hinduism in *Footsteps into the Future* (New York: Free Press, 1974). As we will see in chapters 3-4, Kothari is a leading Southern theorist on positive peace. His critique of Hinduist hierarchy and
and so we can oppose hierarchies on that basis. This line of defense is instructive but not foolproof, for reasoning capacity (and not merely instrumental) does command humans to develop "projects" (above all, moral) which do not exist elsewhere in nature. So what of the "project" of hierarchy? All hierarchies are meant to repress freedom, but only in the modern era have they also produced violence and ecological disaster on such a large scale. Yet is a loss of individual freedom acceptable even in a small-scale, peaceful, "ecological" community? Again, "ecology" cannot be dissociated from the modern, emancipatory project whose essence is respect and freedom for all forms of life. It may upset the "peace" of the strong, but so does offer peace for all human beings. The point, in sum, is that the clock cannot be turned back: dominated groups seeking freedom, who form the backbone of the ecological movement, cannot possibly accept a return to domination for the sake of either ecological sustainability or social appeasement; unless one is ready to accept domination based on religious creed (which is a possibility), the inner peace sought by ecological thought demands freedom.

Conservationism is yet another social project with ecological appeal. It is perhaps the most significant of the three discussed here, largely because of its revisionist approach to Hindu history (stressing its conflictual dimension) is most striking; here is a Southern scholar committed to his country and traditions, but fully able to contextualize them with the help of Western political philosophy. On the other hand, some Eastern religions are much more appealing to radical ecologists. Anticipating the discussion on deep ecology below, cf. Richard Sylvan and David Bennett, "Taoism and Deep Ecology", The Ecologist, Vol. 18, Nos. 4/5 (1988), pp. 148-159.

8Scale is the key term: few people ignore today that empires, through history, have fallen in great part as a result of ecological degradation wrought by massive depletion of biotic richness (and often precipitated by vast engineering projects). Cf. Clive Ponting, A Green History of the World (New York: Penguin Books, 1991).
central role in contemporary debates on and practices of "environmental protection". For our purpose, the key point about conservationism is its lack of an articulated political theory: it does not reflect on the sources and expressions of suffering and aggression, on the various power relationships underlying the killing of life, and, in general, on peace or freedom. However, as a utilitarian form of ecology, it does carry particular values with implications for peace.

"Conservationism" is not a controversial label, and is rooted in the same historical epoch which also provoked a critical appraisal of ecological degradation. It is the best example of the "shallow ecology" criticized (notably) by Arne Naess and Edward Goldsmith. Its purpose is proper resource management and its language is precisely that of the cautious, scientifically prone manager. As much is obvious from the roots of conservationist thought, which date back at least to nineteenth-century America and to the concerns of its first Forestry Department head, Gifford Pinchot. The vastness of the American wilderness had invited over a century of plunder, with seemingly little impact on ecosystems. Crises were becoming increasingly apparent, however, in the second half of the nineteenth century, prompting an articulated (intellectual) defense of nature along both preservationist and conservationist lines. In the latter case, the prevalent utilitarian mentality of the time supported the managerial approach to environmental protection, leaving untouched the commodifying understanding of nature and the messianic confidence in market imperatives.

Conservationism is thus a scientifically-based approach to resource management. Its scientific grounds do allow it to claim status, in the eyes of

---


15
many, as a school of "ecology": it is not ignorant of the workings of ecosystems, indeed recognizing the fundamental interdependent links within nature. Yet it remains an apology for current patterns of consumption and human mastery over nature: conservationism may moderate the hunger of some industrialists, yet it actually legitimizes the activities of most by offering assurances that the liberal-materialist utopia may be sustained -- especially if the "science" of ecology continues to develop.

The latest version of conservationist thought is undoubtedly expressed in the discourse on "sustainable development"¹⁰. Shaped by neo-Malthusian analyses of "limits to growth"¹¹, and thus very popular in Northern elite and (shallow) environmentalist circles, it has been "exported" to Southern countries (in the form of various commodity agreements), has faced understandable charges of neo-imperialism, and has contributed little to the alleviation of suffering amongst the poor. In other words, both the ideology and the political expression of conservationism (in addressing the rich-poor gap) have scarcely helped identifying ecology as a peace- or freedom-oriented endeavor. Its globalizing tendency, mirroring the Western liberal ideology, has essentially denied the diversity and social renewal on which a long-term peaceful order depends.

In sum, our essential objective here was to demonstrate that not all appeals to ecology can serve the purpose of a positive peace -- an equalitarian peace, which ensures both social harmony with nature and inner, individual


¹¹Cf. particularly Donnella Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1972), and Barbara Ward and René Dubos, Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972).
freedom. The naturalist ethic of violence may promise a return to nature, but shuns the aim of global peace (except, perversely, in the "post-catastrophic" or "post-climactic" long-run). Stable hierarchies may offer peace and sustainability, but, in all their obsoleteness, are impracticable and undesirable in this (post)modern(izing) world. Conservationism perpetuates the very forces of domination and destruction (capitalism, statism, industrialism) for which positive peace is an antidote; as a hypocritical "eco-environmental" doctrine, it effectively fuels resentment among the poor who legitimately perceive conservationism as yet another tool of control.

Radical Ecology: Converging Influences toward Positive Peace

We established above ecology's reactionary and utilitarian approaches to peace. In its utilitarian, "shallow" expression, ecology is mere environmentalism, treating the ecological crisis as "externalities" of production to be managed on a per-issue basis, often through capital-intensive expertise. In such mainstream ecology, by definition, there is no need to reflect on the political sources of the crisis or on the fundamental implications it may suggest for the political, ethical, intellectual, and spiritual future of humankind.

Many ecologists, however, are concerned with those issues. But their commitment to a radical approach will vary. There is, on the one hand, a rather vast branch of environmental ethics seeking to formally reconcile environmentalism with utilitarianism -- i.e. performing the philosophical work

12"Hypocritical" is not an exaggeration, considering the lectures on "environmental protection" addressed by the rich to the poor and the rich's own minimal commitment to frugality. Much is obvious from the last two decades of North-South relations on both the "New International Economic Order" and "sustainable development".

13Lorne Evernden makes this very point in The Natural Alien: Humankind and Environment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 149.
left implicit in conservationism or policy statements on sustainable development. The ecological thought propounded here remains shallow. On the other hand, some important, left-leaning ("ecosocialist") literature has also attempted to fundamentally safeguard an anthropocentrist approach to ecological sustainability and social peace. Here, "mastering" nature is eminently acceptable, as long as its benefits are not confined to a minority; this is a literature rather uninterested in "inherent value" arguments about nature, for "value" is presumably defined by human thought and political thought is to serve the human condition -- "our" species, one for which (and legitimately) only we may care ourselves.

A truly radical ecology, however, will seek a (political) theory of domination -- of individuals and nature in the broad sense -- yet remain essentially attached to an ecocentric (or biocentric) ethic. Inspired in part from non-Western philosophies and practices (such as Taoism and First Nations cultures), extensively from Western critiques (Marxism, Critical Theory, feminism, postmodernism), and most essentially through a direct rapport with (and scientific knowledge of) wild nature, radical ecology seeks freedom for all life forms and peace for all human beings. Not all radical ecologists have equally theorized the socio-political aspects of ecological peace: to some extent for this reason, a disconcerting rift has emerged between "deep" and "social"

---

15Cf. William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (New York: G. Braziller, 1972), pp. 197-198; David Pepper, Eco-Socialism: From Deep Ecology to Social Justice (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); as well as André Gorz, Ecology as Politics (Boston: South End Press, 1980). Pepper neatly captures the ecosocialist school by claiming that "we should proceed to ecology from social justice and not the other way around" (p. 3).
ecologists, or between supposed ecocentrists and anthropocentrists\textsuperscript{16}. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to argue for a fundamental unity within the radical stream. The recent intellectual "entente" between social ecology's most famous spokesperson, Murray Bookchin, and deep ecology's most famous activist, Dave Foreman, underscores the philosophical and practical links between "saving nature (for nature's sake)" and "freeing man/woman"\textsuperscript{17}. Several analysts have since given credence to the convergence argument. Michael Zimmerman, for instance, concludes that "despite their sometimes heated debates, deep ecology and social ecology have much in common"\textsuperscript{18}: they both value nature intrinsically, reject a facile human-nature dichotomy, insist on nature's complexity and the need for wilderness preservation, and are very critical of the hierarchical, centralized and plundering character of the modern project\textsuperscript{19}. Zimmerman also quotes Bill Devall, a central figure in deep ecology, who indeed defends his adherence to social ecology, in view of his own interest

\textsuperscript{16}As hinted above, the distinction between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism can be useful, but only if properly applied. Robyn Eckersley, in \textit{Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach} (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), chapter 7, incorrectly categorizes Bookchin as anthropocentrist and, in fact, underestimates her own anthropocentric confidence in an "enabling state" (cf. p. 175). Pepper, on the other hand, is an avowed anthropocentrist -- and similarly at ease with the concept of the enabling state (cf. Pepper, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 233). Bookchin has responded to Eckersley's attacks in "Recovering Evolution: A Reply to Eckersley and Fox", \textit{Environmental Ethics}, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Fall 1990), pp. 253-274, reinforcing a divide within the field which dates from his own attack against particular statements by deep ecologists which, unfortunately, were conflated as representative of the entire school. The components of deep ecology are reviewed below.

\textsuperscript{17}Cf. Bookchin and Foreman, \textit{op. cit.}


\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 152.
in (and denunciation of) capitalism as a cause of ecological degradation\textsuperscript{20}. Likewise, the ecosocialist David Pepper acknowledges the essential coexistence of deep and social ecologists under the anarchist umbrella\textsuperscript{21}. Even philosopher Bryan Norton, who is primarily concerned with the rapport between American conservationists and preservationists, appeals to a convergence argument linking, amongst others, deep ecology and ecofeminism\textsuperscript{22}.

All radical ecologists, irrespective of their battlehorse (animals, the poor, humanity, women, forests, etc.), are concerned about ending organized, structural violence against exploited life forms; in most cases, this will specifically entail the search for a rekindled bond between human and nature; in all cases, but often implicitly, the goal of ecological peace/freedom will dictate a rejection of the conventional methods of "knowing". Radical ecology is then based on an alternative "reading" of nature, which the science of ecology has already helped elaborate; from this reading, and as detailed below, emerges a series of ethical, political and epistemological arguments which all support the goal of positive peace.

As we know, radical ecology must be understood as an emancipatory critique of modernity, tending toward inner peace, and advocating non-violent, yet active, methods of resistance. In this sense, much of radical ecology -- and hence not merely the preservationist school\textsuperscript{23} -- can bear the popular label of

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 169.
\textsuperscript{21}Pepper, op. cit., writes: "If red-greens would like to push ecocentrism towards Marxist analysis, green-greens often remain stubbornly rooted [sic] in anarchist principles. Most of the latter do not often acknowledge their anarchist roots, for instance those here described as 'mainstream' greens [sic], including the 'deep ecologists' (Gaians)"; cf. p. 152.
\textsuperscript{23}Preservationism evolved particularly from John Muir's battles to save the American wilderness in the nineteenth century. In its most simple expression, it
"deep ecology”, an "ecology" that understands the fundamental incompatibility between growth-oriented, top-down ideologies of power and the type of order suggested by nature. All "non-shallow" ecologists, then, at the very least, would favor an organic understanding of life, and be wary of the mechanical metaphor. Life here has intrinsic worth: the ethics of "what to save" may be debated, but all will agree that no forms of life should be exploited, and that conveys a "national park" mentality and is associated with many reputable environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, the World Wide Fund for Nature, the Sierra Club and many others who fight specific battles to protect certain species or ecosystems. We should not forget, however, the eminently spiritual dimension of preservationist thought, at least as expressed by Muir, who could not accept the mind-matter duality of much of Christian thought and sought spiritual fulfillment in communion with nature. Preservationism is indeed contemplative, even if such motivation appears lost in the hierarchical structures of modern environmental groups and the legal battles in which they have become embroiled.

24 The distinction between organicism and mechanicism has been particularly popularized by the ecofeminist Carolyn Merchant (Lewis Mumford made the same points much earlier). A mechanical understanding of natural processes obviously dispiritizes nature, and is usually the first step towards instituting (in the literal sense) instrumental rationality; the organic metaphor is, rather, designed to capture the self-renewing and life-giving dimensions of nature. Cf. Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (New York and Toronto: Harper and Row, 1980). While the basic associations machine-control-death and organum-freedom-life are defensible, one must be careful not to overexploit the dichotomy (even ecologists cannot resist them). Janet Biehl is quite persuasive on that point, in her review of ecofeminist debates and their tendency to conflate organum into mysticism -- and to mythicize sustainable communities who did not reject all uses of the mechanical metaphor. Her warning is pertinent, especially if one recalls how organicism can be used for authoritarian purposes. Cf. Biehl, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics (Montreal and New York: Black Rose Books, 1991), pp. 89-90.

25 The debates always surface on this issue. Does "intrinsic worth" entail not fighting viruses? Does it forbid killing an individual member of a plentiful species? There is a sense of wisdom lost in many such debates. Intrinsic worth has to do with an ethic of care, respect and responsibility towards nature. Viruses are usually created by human tinkering with nature. Carnivorous diets are not ethically wrong per se, but become so in an industrial era and are, in any case, unnecessary when plant-based protein may be found.
any large-scale intervention in nature will trigger an ecological imbalance of potentially dangerous proportions. Radical ecology thus manifests four sorts of concerns: to present an alternative picture of nature (scientifically and ontologically); to reverse historical tendencies toward domination; to undermine the political project of mainstream science; and thus to uphold a different ethic of life -- frugal, egalitarian, respectful of life, and spiritual. This is the "depth" of ecology.

Admittedly, however, some ecologists have more clearly emphasized the political dimension of ecological degradation: as we know, they include ecosocialists, but also ecoanarchists (mostly Murray Bookchin\(^{26}\)) and ecofeminists\(^{27}\). In the first case, nature dying is understood as a particular


byproduct of capitalism, and as its most telling flaw. Bookchin's ecoanarchist critique is similarly formulated, but shies away from the essentially reformist alternative of ecosocialism ("redistribute and slow down")\textsuperscript{28}, expanding the call and advocating the modern anarchist utopia of confederal municipalism (see chapter 4). Both ecoanarchists and ecofeminists insist on the central relationship between social domination and the domination of nature: both people and nature are controlled by the same forces -- forces that seek to extract productive value from life. Ecofeminism, of course, stresses the domination of women as part and parcel of the process. Women are traditionally associated with a giving Mother Earth -- whether the analogy is praiseworthy or insulting is a (very serious) debate which should not necessarily concern us here; the important point is that ecofeminism is able to elucidate the social process of ecocide with reference to an identifiable group.

Taken together, and even accounting for the contribution of ecosocialists, those "social ecologists" do offer a complementary ethic of positive peace -- denying any value to the wasteful folly of militarization, condemning the marginalization and domination of social groups, and resisting the modernist temptation of emancipating humans at the expense of nature (again, broadly conceived). Ecosocialists, however, are unconvincing on the latter point, and so we must part from them here. We are then free to retain the anarchistic streak within the tradition, emphasizing low-level community work in a decentralized world, and standing as the pillar of a socially theorized, ecological peace. That George Woodcock explicitly associated ecology with

---

\textsuperscript{28}Bookchin's critique of the ecosocialist André Gorz is especially stinging. Cf. \textit{Toward an Ecological Society}, pp. 289-313.
anarchism is far from coincidental. Here, social ecology is able to build on the conventional definition of positive peace, so as to stress its ecological dimension and establish the fundamental contradiction between high-level devolution of power and a bottom-up, freeing peace.

Social ecology, thus understood, has paid an essential tribute to at least four "historic" authors: Thoreau, Kropotkin, Gandhi and Mumford. All have strong anarchist leanings, and must be mentioned in any attempt at grasping the multidisciplinary convergence around ecological peace. This said, a contemporary -- Schumacher -- should similarly be discussed as a "signpost" for ecology, both in view of his thinking on ecological peace and as a recent, effective bridge between the related worlds of social ecologists and deep ecologists.

Thoreau is our first "signpost": social ecologists share with less politicized preservationists an admiration for Thoreau's expressive naturalist writings, yet Thoreau also wrote a pamphlet on civil disobedience which influenced the entire anarchist tradition. Thoreau, the eccentric recluse of Walden Pond, precisely understood the alienating and destructive power of the state -- as an empirical phenomenon: "I please myself with imagining a State at last which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with

30Bookchin correctly emphasizes freedom over justice. The latter value remains key to all strands of Marxism, including Galtung's. Justice cannot be an end goal, yet will stand as a byproduct of ecological peace. Cf. The Ecology of Freedom, p. 148: "Rarely has it been possible to distinguish the cry for Justice with inequality of equals from the cry of Freedom with equality of unequals. Every ideal of emancipation has been tainted by this confusion [...]"; and on p. 166: "The inequality of equals still prevails over the equality of unequals. What is so stunning to the careful observer is that if justice never came to compensate but merely to reward, its spirit has finally become mean and its coinage small". 
respect as a neighbor [...] A State which bore this kind of fruit [...] I have imagined, but not yet anywhere seen"31. Ecology thus becomes a special form of libertarianism. Thoreau asks: "Must the citizen ever for a moment resign his conscience to the legislator?"32 The response is scathing, a striking presage of Mumford: "The mass of men serve the state [...] not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies"33. By "quietly declar[ing] war with the State"34, Thoreau denounced its adventurous schemes, at home and abroad, for control and profit; Thoreau's ideal is thus, clearly, that of a "local life", close to nature, and untrammeled by far-off commitments which can only serve a globalizing elite.

Kropotkin is another key impact figure on contemporary social ecology. While Thoreau's anarchism is imputed, Kropotkin's is self-declared, following a long line of famous "anti-statists" (from Godwin to Bakunin), but articulating the anarchist ideal in an eminently ecological, peaceful manner. As with Thoreau, the biologist Kropotkin developed an ethic of non-violence based on his love for and knowledge of nature. The key to his thought, however, is a particular reading of nature emphasizing mutual aid rather than ontological conflict35. In a crucial historical period (the late nineteenth century) where Darwin's research was increasingly appropriated by proponents of the "conflict model", Kropotkin sought to rescue Darwin's own insistence on the sociality of beings — their "natural preservation", a term which Darwin wished he had

---

32 Ibid., p. 86.
33 Ibid., p. 87.
34 Ibid., p. 100.
favored over "natural selection". Kropotkin, through his many travels, indeed read nature as a cooperative cycle of life, and also extended his observations to the social world -- where he could effectively document efforts by local groups at bypassing the state in furthering particular projects. Politically, the logical conclusion was to formally defend the system of anarchy, requiring cooperative (thus decisional) input from the grassroots in all social construction: "No ruling authorities, then. No government of man by man; no crystallization and immobility, but a continual evolution -- such as we see in Nature. Free play for the individual, for the full development of his intellectual gifts".

Kropotkin could not completely shun the modernist pressures of the time, and surely underestimated how new projects, stimulated by the new technologies, could actually void in the long run the ethic of cooperative peace that he embraced. Indeed, Kropotkin's language is often utilitarian, while his emancipatory aim was still very much related to Marx's. But Kropotkin's contribution should not be deemphasized on that account -- and indeed Bookchin owes much to him. The logic of Kropotkin's argument and its naturalist base were leading to peace, even if the cosmopolitan Kropotkin did not share Thoreau's frugality and "locality".

Gandhi, on the other hand, stood very close to Thoreau on this latter point, and readily conceded his influence upon him. Gandhi, the ecologist, anarchist and peace activist must then be considered as another pillar of

---

37Ibid., p. 59.
38Cf. this quote from *Evolution and Environment*, p. 55: "The question put by Anarchism may be expressed in the following way: 'Which social forms best guarantee in such and such societies, and in humanity at large, the greatest sum of happiness, and therefore the greatest sum of vitality?' [...] which, by the way, gives us the formula of progress" (emphasis in original).
contemporary social ecology. Gandhi's philosophy is well known, and details need not concern us here. Our point is merely to stress how the Gandhian ethic parallels much of the contemporary discourse about anarchistic peace and emancipatory ecology. This includes notably the advocacy of non-violent resistance to imperial aggressors, which defuses the spiralling cycle of negative energy and prevents the growth of hierarchical structures and capital-intensive apparati; the insistence on community life, grassroot involvement and basic-need production; the reliance on simple (empowering, creative) tools, rather than sophisticated machines\(^{39}\).

Gandhi did not write political treatises \textit{per se}, and while his wisdom literally laid bare the problems of modernity, social ecologists did have to look elsewhere for theoretical guidance; moreover, his essentially patriarchal rapport with women has understandably bothered many feminists, even in the ecological tradition\(^{40}\). But the social ethic, the palpable utopia, has stood there for many ecologists to vindicate. The most striking examples are in Schumacher's writings (see below) and in the work of Southern ecologists, particularly Vandana Shiva and Ramachandra Guha\(^{41}\); yet Gandhi's presence is no less fundamental in deep ecological texts, attesting to his spiritual commitment to self-realization in a communal setting and, obviously, to his intellectual bond


\(^{40}\)Cf., \textit{inter alia}, the passages in Pam McAllister (ed.), \textit{Reweaving the Web of Life: Feminism and Nonviolence} (Philadephia: New Society Publishers, 1982).

with Thoreau\textsuperscript{42}. That Gandhi's philosophy reflected the ideal of positive peace is, then, truistic; that his legacy remains so imposing in Western thought is, on the other hand, one of the most pleasant discoveries of this literature review.

By contrast, Lewis Mumford, one of the most prolific ecologists of this century, has gone largely unnoticed by social and political theorists\textsuperscript{43}. However, his writings remain of utmost importance, both for the chosen theme (organum vs. machine) and for its bold, imaginative treatment. For instance, there is much of Mumford in Bookchin and Merchant, although no real recognition of him. He did not specifically partake in ecological debates; his discussion of technics and urban design, however, yielded powerful eco-anarchist statements on peace. He deserves inordinate space here, both for what he said and for his otherwise mysterious absence.

Mumford's ecological statement, and its meaning for peace, can be gleaned from a review of his \textit{Pentagon of Power}, the second part of his master treatise, \textit{The Myth of the Machine}\textsuperscript{44}. The basic message is not altogether original: overtaken by the mechanical model of Newtonian science, contemporary society has drifted toward a non-organic anti-culture of power, speed, and limitless pursuits. However, Mumford's genial contribution stands elsewhere, in his characterization of mechanization as myth. The "myth" is not to be understood merely as "illusion" or "falsity", though Mumford obviously


\textsuperscript{43}Guha, \textit{op. cit.}, is an exception.

agrees that the apparent achievements of mechanical society are essentially expressions of anti-life. The myth is, in fact, to be understood in the literal sense, as the construction of a cult, as a new religion -- paradoxically, as the embodiment of genuine human feelings (fear of death, desire for power), and not as the pinnacle of rationality. The mechanical metaphor is indeed so pervasive that Mumford is able to describe society itself as a "megamachine": a gigantic operation, composed of human parts, destined to serve the gods of power.

Mumford comes to his conclusions through a very personal, and highly original, reading of history and philosophy. The parallels established between the "Pyramid Age" and the Enlightenment society are very suggestive -- in both cases, instances of human entrapment in the pursuit of irrational heights through a formidable, technics-based harnessing of human reason. While many authors have analyzed the modern paradox pitting instrumental reasoning against irrational ends, Mumford clearly established its historical precedents; ancient Egypt might have been governed by a powerful dictator, but the centralization of energy in the quest for absurd objectives is no less observable today -- such energy is simply channeled through vested interests in the science-government-business triad.

In sum, Mumford denounces the thoroughly anti-organic make-up of a power society. The attack is not against science and technology per se, both of which can contribute to an ecological design of "plenitude". He does insist, however, on the doomed reductionism of mechanical thought, this despiritng and erroneously teleological caricature of life:

No machine (...) can even theoretically be made to replicate a man, for in order to do so it would have to draw upon two or three billion years of diversified experience. This failure to recognize the
importance of cosmic and organic history largely accounts for the imperious demands of our age, with its promise of instant solutions and instant transformations — which turn out too often to be instant destructions and exterminations. 45

The machine model, the eminent misreading of organicism, thus commands particular political structures and societal objectives which cannot serve the cause of peace. Hierarchical (elitist) systems are devised so as to release organic energies in pursuit of quantitative utopia: more, better, faster. The centralization of power becomes a *sine qua non* for this anti-ecological project — be it in its blunt totalitarian form (bolshevism, fascism, corporatism) or in its subtler expression (capitalist technocracy). Rejecting the steady state, intolerant of cultural diversity (which slows the process of expansion) 46, the totalizing megamachine is inherently geared to conquest. Warfare is merely the ugly culmination of this relentless drive toward change, toward the extraction of energy and the transformation of matter: "imperialism, which resulted in the temporary subjugation of the major territories of the planet by Western industrial and political enterprise, had its ideal counterpart in both science and technics" 47.

In Schumacher, finally, we find a contemporary statement of Gandhian ethics, yet in a language of uncommon clarity and passion. The importance of *Small Is Beautiful*, for our purpose, is indeed in the application of ecological

---

46 Mumford's ecological creed is, quite correctly, inherently anthropological. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 379: "Never was the ecological balance of nature, and even more the integrity of cultures, so violently upset as during the last two centuries" (emphasis added).
thought to the issue of peace. Schumacher's is one of the most lucid statements on the virtues of ecological guidelines for social organization. The entire book, with empirical examples to bear, is a scathing attack on the common wisdom of liberal economics, correctly described as a profoundly anchored metaphysical creed (yet devoid of all spirituality), whose inherent logic leads to the destruction of the natural capital upon which the totalizing capitalist system is upheld. The famous essay (chapter 4) on "Buddhist economics" neatly summarizes Schumacher's blueprint for a better world: a world of humane proportions (a "globe of villages"), minimizing wants and consumption, using progressive technologies only for the well-being of all members of the community.

Perhaps surprisingly, Schumacher does not provide a precise definition of peace. Yet few could misread his line of thought. In his critique of technology, he accepts that peace is indivisible: "how then could peace be built on a foundation of reckless science and violent technology?" Quoting Dorothy Sayers: "War is a judgment that overtakes societies when they have been living upon ideas that conflict too violently with the laws governing the universe". Peace, then, is scarcely a function of appropriate power distributions,

---

49I.e. such technologies that are cheap, applicable in the small scale, and eliciting creativity on the part of the operator; cf. Schumacher, ibid., p. 34. This definition is very important, for very few authors have succeeded in transcending the "technology debate" and offering a specific definition and specific examples of good and bad technology (Schumacher, for instance, approves of the loom but not of the power loom). In other words, following Mumford, Schumacher resists extremist approaches to technological development, while remaining critical of the "value neutrality" of science.
50Ibid.
51Ibid., p. 38.
centralized leadership, or material growth. The ecological understanding of peace compels an examination of all forms of violence, locating their sources at various societal levels; war is but one expression of violence, and not a sui generis phenomenon. Ecological thought thus suggests that assaults on peace will necessarily flow from violations of those natural laws favoring permanence, and which are best captured by the question of size.

Size is not an end in itself, but a prerequisite for peace. The point is to shed those ideologies which favor or are conducive to large constructions, which necessarily entail disempowerment, marginalization, and impoverishment. Capitalism is of course at stake, for it is a totalizing economic system, dictated by greed and envy. As any totalizing device, it creates artificial (hence dangerous) distortions in a society, simplifying what should be complex and complicating what should be simple. In our modern societies, survival appears contingent on forces totally out of one's control; securing basic needs inevitably requires violence.

Small scale alone, however, is not a guarantee of non-violence. Schumacher stresses ethics and metaphysics as much as physical nature. Thus, there cannot be peace amongst members of the reason-endowed human species without a sense of higher purpose, a commitment to goodness and respect. Peace is basically an activity (and eventually a state of being) that must be learned: peace does depend on natural laws, but human beings must understand

---

52 For instance, simple ("efficient", mass-market-oriented) monocultures will replace delicately balanced mixtures of crops. Conversely, highly complex power plants will be required to provide energy for modern societies' highly complex (and unending) sets of "needs".

53 Schumacher, *op. cit.*, p. 59, offers one example amongst many: "people who live in highly self-sufficient local communities are less likely to get involved in large-scale violence than people whose existence depends on world-wide systems of trade".
how they have relentlessly challenged those laws through their faculty of reason, and so must become at ease with their special reasoning power and pursue harmony with nature. Science can provide us today with a better understanding of the fragility of nature. Yet, "our reason has become beclouded by an extraordinary, blind and unreasonable faith in a set of fantastic and life-destroying ideas inherited from the nineteenth century. It is the foremost task of our reason to recover a truer faith than that."^{54}

Most quarrels with Schumacher stem from his emphasis on size. Yet the Gandhian argument within Schumacher clearly indicates a wariness of hierarchy and "superstition" which fits in well with anarchist thoughts on positive peace. If anything, some deep ecologists would probably more object to his modernist faith in reason and his (dualistic?) acceptance of a deity. Nonetheless, as a renegade economist, thus as an outsider to the "formal" ecological literature, he stands as a formidable influence on the development of an ecological approach to peace.

To recapitulate, then, the five authors surveyed above have laid quite well the bases for a politically sensitive theory of ecological peace. Those are admittedly five among many, but their choice may be particularly defended in regard to their originality as naturalists and/or political thinkers on peace. Yes, they may all be considered anarchists, deriving preferred political structures and economic relations from "natural laws": whether their "essential" commitment is to wildlife, humans or God, they all believe in complementary ethics of sustainability, individual/social equality and non-violence, and are all conscious of the dangers thus imposed by capitalism, statism and other forms of domination. Moreover, as a logical but fundamental corollary for a theory of

^{54}Ibid., p. 93.
peace, they are all careful not to embrace a "scientistic" approach to knowledge/wisdom: science is important to appreciate the vulnerability (and resilience) of nature, but true knowledge of the good can only come from a bonding with nature (emotional and physical) -- from a "total", holistic experience of life. As ecologists, they knew that "specialization leads to extinction".

In light of the above, our main concern is to reiterate the convergence between social ecology and deep ecology under the radical, anarchist wing. Bookchin, who as late as 1987 virulently attacked deep ecology, would indeed relent: "One of my goals is to foster the development of a non-hierarchical ethics of complementarity among humans and between humanity and non-human life. This should be the fundamental starting point [...] of the radical ecology movement". As a matter of fact, most deep ecologists always agreed. Arne Naess, who first coined the term "deep ecology", has stated that "supporters of the deep ecology movement seem to move more and more in the direction of nonviolent anarchism". Bill Devall and George Sessions, also key figures of the movement, praised Bookchin in their landmark book, and offered an anti-dominant "worldview" which indeed combines references to both "intrinsic worth" and appropriate husbandry of nature.

The "problem" with deep ecology had always seemed related to politics. For those who see "ecology as politics" (to use Gorz's expression) and correctly

---

55Cree leader James Bobbish made this exquisite statement in an address to McGill University students and faculty, in November 1990.  
56Cf. Bookchin and Foreman, *Defending the Earth*, p. 133.  
57Cf. again Naess' path-breaking article in *Inquiry* (1972).  
59Cf. Devall and Sessions, *op. cit.*, p. 69, fig. 5-1. References to "material goals serving the larger goal of self-realization", "appropriate technology" and "recycling" all demonstrate how deep ecology goes beyond mere preservationism.
insist that an ecological society be theorized politically, the central principle of biospheric egalitarianism seems to both wish away the human dimension of ecology and uphold a ruthless (non)ethic of "human irrelevance". James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis' depiction of the world as Gaia\textsuperscript{60}, a self-regulating ("unicellular") entity that does not "require" human presence, has been particularly criticized as politically dangerous. Bookchin, profoundly influenced by the Frankfurt School, has been precisely concerned by the anti-modernist implications of Gaian thought\textsuperscript{61}.

If deep ecologists, for obvious reasons, have been indeed wary of modernity, there is actually little in their writings that would suggest an indifferent acceptance of ecological "barbarism"\textsuperscript{62}. Various preservationists may focus on a specific political cause, but this is part of a larger ethic of


\textsuperscript{61}The relationship between Critical Theory and social ecology must be emphasized here. While Eckersley, \textit{op. cit.}, chapter 5, may have deplored the alleged "failed promise" of Critical Theory, the Frankfurt School has nonetheless played an important role in shaping Bookchin's thinking and in spurring the growth of an ecological counter-culture, especially through the works of Herbert Marcuse (whom Bookchin later repudiated) and, indirectly, Theodore Roszak. Cf. Marcuse, \textit{One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964); Roszak, \textit{The Making of a Counter Culture} (New York: Anchor Press, 1969); and Roszak, \textit{Person/Planet: The Creative Disintegration of Industrial Society} (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1978). The ecological appeal of Critical Theory lies in its critique of instrumental rationality and its emancipatory focus on new social movements. More will be said about Critical Theory and postmodernism in our review of alternative theories of international relations, in chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{62}Naess writes, in \textit{Ecology, Community and Lifestyle}, p. 170: "The principle of biospheric egalitarianism defined in terms of equal right, has sometimes been misunderstood as meaning that human needs should never have priority over non-human needs. But this is never intended. In practice, we have for instance greater obligation to that which is nearer to us. This implies duties which sometimes involve killing or injuring non-humans".

35
responsibility to life that is fully compatible with an ecoanarchist, politically theorized (positive) peace\(^6^3\). What social ecology has done here, and must continue doing, is to internalize the "peace theory" inherent in the "land ethic", explicit in Thoreau and Muir and formalized by Leopold. If one may consider Leopold's *A Sand County Almanac* as a classic preservationist text and a building block to contemporary deep ecology, one may also discern the argument that transgressions to peace among individuals and nations are rooted in human violence against the land. As Leopold wrote: "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community"\(^6^4\). From this general statement with seemingly little political guidance has developed a contemplative, deep ecology that is far from insensitive to the political dimension of individual action and, by extension, to the importance of a politically theorized individual peace. Naess' work is more than suggestive in this regard: heavily influenced by the Gandhian ethic of nonviolence, Naess understands that "power analysis is necessary"\(^6^5\) and that the long-term peaceful future of the planet is inescapably tied to autonomous, non-violent struggle against oppression\(^6^6\).

In sum, there is little doubt that (radical) ecology can stand as a consensual approach to positive peace. As we will elaborate in the framework below, an ecological peace is based on a particular reading of nature, and on the assumption that peace requires deference to "natural principles" and, therefore,  

\(^{6^3}\)See for instance the writings of animal liberationist Peter Singer, in *Animal Liberation* (New York: Avon Books, 1990 [1975]). Singer's "anti-speciesist" version of Bookchin's "equality of differences" can be discerned on p. 2: "The basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration" (emphasis in original).


\(^{6^6}\)Ibid., p. 148.
that it relies on an ethic and an epistemology in line with such principles. If peace, freedom and ecological sustainability are fundamentally intertwined, then the ecological approach must be ecocentric. This not only allows for an (anarchist) political theory of ecological peace, it compels it. Furthermore, ecocentrist (radical) ecology not merely tolerates anthropocentric considerations, it is the necessary basis for a peace theory of the individual -- lest we forget that peace is a human, reflexive condition. However, an (ecosocialist) anthropocentrism clinging to developmental, statist and eminently materialist objectives would seem *ultimately* illusory from the perspective of ecological peace -- even if its reformism may be acceptable (and indeed useful) in the short run.

*An Ecological Framework for Positive Peace*

Our obvious assumption, in this work, is that an emancipatory peace for the individual necessarily requires a respect for nature. The progressive loss of biodiversity indicates individuals at war with themselves -- or, rather, with their larger Self. In other words, nature dying is reflective of a culture of death\(^{67}\).

There are many social theories with a "peace dimension". The question is: what sort of peace do they offer? Peace for whom, and at what long-term cost? In the field of International Relations, for instance, many are satisfied with a stable balance of power which will control the risk of interstate war, but will say little about other threats to individual "security"; alternatively, the "freeing peace" of liberal internationalism may secure material growth and pleasure for elites, but, again, at a heavy price for the long-term security and

\(^{67}\)In a very interesting chapter to her book, Val Plumwood explores the historical roots of such culture in the writings of Plato. Cf. *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, chapter 3.
happiness of all. Proponents of positive peace do provide a larger package, but even they underestimate some of the negative implications of their "global humanism".

Ecologists believe that nature can provide clues for an ethic of peace. But then again, anyone may read nature in any particular way so as to justify various ethical codes and political systems. The point would be, rather, to posit individual peace and freedom as necessary ends, yet ensure that they may be sustained within an ecological context -- for, in any matter, it cannot be otherwise. An emancipatory ecology of peace thus commands a particular reading of nature that can be related to a particular value framework -- translated into ethics, policy and epistemology\textsuperscript{68}. And so is any philosophy. The previous section should have weaved into the literature review the essential lines of a radical philosophy of peace -- what Arne Naess has called "ecosophy". Let us be a bit more systematic here.

The "ecosophical" reading of nature will stress its finiteness, wholeness, diversity, and very long age; it will also insist on its dynamic stability, complexity and cooperativity. Ethics and policy will revolve around the small scale, decentralization, heterogeneity and democracy, as well as spiritization, organicity and inherent value. The accompanying epistemology must be non-positivist -- historicist, subjectivist, and non-linear. None of these claims are terribly new, formally expressed, as they are, in the radical ecology literature (again, especially in Naess and in Bookchin). Yet, to our knowledge, never have they been systematically and thoroughly invoked as part of a critical approach to peace conceptions, in international relations theory and elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{68}Epistemology is an integral part of peace theory, for the process of "knowing" is capital to any social project -- and may fundamentally oppose the goal of peace.
The ontological portrait of radical ecology may begin with finiteness. All ecologists, and most lay people, will agree that permanent-growth ideologies make no physical sense; nature may withstand some human intervention, some of its "capital" may be "used", but proportions cannot expand forever. Finiteness is obviously the Damocles' sword of liberalism. But must freedom be forsaken on its account? Finiteness, as "scarcity", may well be used as a pretext for conquest and control -- or then again, in a conservationist mode, as a solvable puzzle for the ideology of plunder and nature objectification. More appropriately, however, and as well expressed by Sale's bioregional vision, finiteness should foster an ethic of modesty and caution tending towards detachment and contemplation as well as communitarianism. Finiteness repudiates material growth as an individual and social goal, but the Malthusian argument must not be appropriated by an elite; and if finiteness is to be a non-elitist, democratic concept, then modern "epistemologies of rule"69 must also be abandoned.

Wholeness is a second fundamental principle of ecology. It is at the core of the Gaia hypothesis, of course, but even moderate approaches to ecology would accept that "everything is interconnected" in nature70. Yet, as with finiteness, the concept of wholeness is susceptible to cooptation by authoritarian forces -- as witnessed particularly by the entire discourse on globalization (cf. also chapter 4). Wholeness cannot be invoked without the concept of diversity (detailed below), lest the ontology of "the one" lead to global control,

69This is Bookchin's inspired title to chapter 4 of The Ecology of Freedom.
70For all the braying to which Barry Commoner has been exposed within ecologist circles, he still has played an essential role in awakening the lay audience to the realities of physical interrelationships, particularly through his use of thermodynamic laws. Cf. Commoner, The Poverty of Power: Energy and the Economic Crisis (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), and The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).
homogeneity and ossification. Still, in and of itself, wholeness can serve the
cause of emancipatory peace by fostering an ethic of humility and cooperation,
for wholeness also compels assumptions of complexity, cyclicality and mutuality
in nature; in other words, at the very least, an ecological understanding of
wholeness voids a stiff hierarchical view of nature and, therefore, undermines
social projects based on institutionalized domination. The same holistic notions
should also, necessarily, be retained in epistemology: here, wholeness strikes a
telling blow to linear thinking\textsuperscript{71} and rejects extremism and excessive
specialization (as reified simplicities) in scientific thought and social practice.

In other words, while holistic assumptions have also been appropriated
by mainstream thinkers (for whom complexity and cyclicality are still treated in
mechanical terms), an ecological interpretation of wholeness is precisely geared
towards an organic reformulation -- towards subjectification, and not merely
across space, but through time. Wholeness is particularly central to the deep
ecologists' emphasis on the expanded self\textsuperscript{72}. While "realizing the greater Self"
may not reflect genuine altruism and may, in principle, endanger diversity\textsuperscript{73},
there is little in the deep ecological conception to actually serve the interests of
instrumental reason. Peace and the acceptance of freedom emanate from
empathy, from the understanding that nothing is owned yet that all is indeed
"ours".

Thirdly, an ontology of nature will also stress its diversity. Indeed, the
richness of life on Earth and its enduring character are directly related to the

\textsuperscript{71}Including systems theory which, despite its insistence on cyclicality, is still
based on reductionist causality.
\textsuperscript{72}Cf. for instance Warwick Fox, \textit{Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing
\textsuperscript{73}On that point, see Val Plumwood's discussion of "Deep ecology and the denial
of difference", chapter 7 of \textit{Feminism and the Mastery of Nature}. 
high level of biodiversity: the millions of plant and animal species are not only constitutive of the sheer splendor of our planet, but they also ensure nature's survival in the midst of change and, sometimes, catastrophe. Diversity, then, in conjunction with wholeness and the principle of "timelessness" (to be examined below), points to a reformulated conception of stability -- away from static homogeneity and toward dynamic, re-creative heterogeneity (a stability of evolving differences).

If diversity entails stability (or sustainability, Schumacher's permanence, Mumford's plenitude), then the lesson for human affairs is clear: all policies tending toward homogeneity must be, if not discouraged, then at least carefully handled so as not to sacrifice those particular differences which ensure vitality and stability to a community. Put differently, the political expression of pluralism must be reexamined, so as to reestablish this noble principle which most societies today claim to uphold. This is, however, a monumental task, for homogeneizing and centralizing tendencies (concurrent developments) are pervasive and expanding. Their ecological impact is at times direct: the best example is the degradation of soils through monocultures, eliminating natural nutrients and regulatory checks. Yet this is, more fundamentally, reflective of current tendencies towards concentrations of capital and power -- monopolies fuelled by perverse notions of efficiency and standardization. If the principle of diversity is to hold any meaning, it will not tolerate that human affairs be conducted so that key decisions fall increasingly in the hands of a small global elite whose wisdom is yet to be demonstrated.

In sum, there is little doubt that a stable and rich community will need to develop qualities of respect and tolerance, which will foster (and, presumably, will be reinforced by) life-enhancing patterns of diversity. But pluralism and decentralization are not panaceas: such structural attributes may easily cause
sclerosis and chaos if they remain unaccompanied by a cultural and psychological shift away from the "interest group" mentality and toward a transcendance of differences. This, in turn, represents a formidable challenge, in view of the fine line between transcendance and the assimilation of the weak.

A final "descriptive principle" of nature is what could be awkwardly called its "timelessness", which is much related to the principle of wholeness. The normative dimension of ecological thought, which does emanate also from other descriptive principles, is arguably most influenced by the humbling recognition of nature's age -- of the incalculable number of years through which current ecosystems took form. Once the observer is able to fully come to grips with this fact -- in other words, to return microscopic man and woman to their legitimate place in the temporal cosmological order -- he or she will be more easily swayed by ecocentric, non-utilitarian philosophies.

Understanding the power of time is an awe-inspiring experience, akin to a spiritual conversion. Its most immediate impact is to change the meaning that may be attributed to life and to living beings. The commodifying treatment of nature just does not make any sense when it summarily wipes out plant and animal forms that are the product of millennia of existence. Likewise, no machine, however well designed, may operate for so long and demonstrate the long-term creativity of organum. As the test of time sets the arrogance of modernity in clear perspective, it plays an essential role in subjectivizing nature -- not merely or necessarily granting non-human life forms certain rights under positive law, but, most importantly, recognizing the intrinsic value of species. Viewed especially from the perspective of geological time, the success (survival) of non-human life demonstrates an autonomy which humans should respect: non-human life evolves in a variety of worlds in which we do not belong and which we can hardly understand, yet their subjects are fully
functioning beings whose presence on Earth makes as much sense as ours, whose life purpose is no less legitimate, and whose "performance" is impeccable.

In sum, as much as a study of history will refine one's understanding of human affairs, an awareness of the depth of natural history seems necessary to temper the mechanical world view and reassert the organic counterpart. Timelessness, however, does have more specific implications. An important one is the assumption of mutuality, also derived from the principle of wholeness, and which yields a fundamentally cooperative reading of the world. Why should the ecologist side with the optimist in this big debate about human nature? In part because even a static observation of the natural world will reveal evidence of "mutual aid" within and among species; Kropotkin's work, as we know, went a long way in explaining how much more there is to nature than the struggle between predator and prey. Mutuality is even more plausible, however, from the standpoint of ecological time and of the concomitant, increasing diversity and richness of nature: presumably, a mere struggle for domination and survival would entail a rarification of species and the impoverishment of nature.

This fundamental immutability of nature, always beautiful and lively, and understood only longitudinally, then reinforces certain assumptions about stability and order derived from principles above. Stability is decidedly a dynamic process; interaction is essential, energy must be released, plurality is vital. Likewise, the interdependent and diversified order underpinning such stable patterns did not merely withstand the test of time, but, rather, actualized its power through time. Such observation thus points to the value of a bottom-

---

\[74\text{Sale, op. cit., also refers to the works of many anthropologists, including the Leakeys, whose research has confirmed the "cooperative hypothesis"; cf. p. 82.}\]
up, spontaneous, and slowly anchored ordering process which can stabilize a community, in the most optimal sense: endowing it with life, rather than controlling and ossifying it to death.

Ultimately, the timeless appearance of nature may explain why ecological thought is so keenly interested in issues of freedom and peace, and, especially, why it pursues them in a utopian, "idealistic" manner. As a reaction to the humbling experience of nature's resilience, the ecologist's search for freedom and peace is literally an acceptance of, and a quest for, his or her own belittlement. No negative connotation is implied here. In admittedly libertarian fashion, this pursuit seeks the capacity to retain control over one's life and to develop beyond (yet in harmony with) the state of nature.

In a nutshell, the nature ontology proposed above emphasizes moderation, caution, humility, respect. These are, admittedly, elastic concepts, but they begin to draw meaning when opposed to their antonyms: excess, boldness, arrogance, dismissal. The point is, presumably, to develop an ethic (and a body politic) which would be ecological, but not "conservative" -- emancipatory, but not brash. No real freedom or peace may be gained by applying an ideology of control over life forms. One may call this ideal of detachment a postmaterialist hypocrisy -- David Pepper considers the new social movements "bourgeois"75. If such an ecological peace seems too "utopian" to the economic "pragmatists" and the political "realists", then so be it. But utopias are as "real" as the ugly "reality" -- one that has lost touch with spirit, beauty and tolerance. Aware of the rebuttals, let us nonetheless reiterate the

75Cf. Pepper, op. cit., p. 247. Pepper may have a point, but, in the case of ecology, only if it is construed as environmentalism -- and, indeed, there are plenty of "environmental groups" whose practices and ideology are far from ascetic.
main points of an ecologically centred, liberating, peace-creating -- anarchist -- ethic/politics.

The first point is of power diffusion. Politically, this obviously entails an authentic democracy, inextricably tied to the small community, and opposed to the principle of representation (no political body should be so large that representation become favored as the pragmatic option for smooth governance). Such a democracy is not constructed to be inherently confrontational. The idea of "public debates" may suggest that a "rational" elite will control those who "know" less and/or are less able to express and defend their points. But this does not have to be the case, for the principle of power diffusion, pushed to its limit, opposes any such hierarchy and allows for other types of knowledge and experience. Societies structured on power diffusion may not "run" very quickly, but slow pace has never been a problem (to the contrary) for an emancipatory, ecological peace. For that matter, the economics of power diffusion would favor small-scale, organic agriculture and husbandry, aim production at the family or the local community, and forbid subservience to an accumulation system; creative work, art and intellect could presumably be sustained, yet divested from their elitist pursuit. Living within such possibilities should elicit a modesty of wants, maximize a diversity of talents, elevate wisdom, and return the Earth to all its subjects.

Power diffusion also stands as a cardinal principle in structuring the regional and the global. Clearly, a global ecological peace is incompatible with power-concentrating structures such as the (nation-)state and the multinational corporation, which thrive on exploiting life forms and/or obliterating cultural diversity. Non-local structures are surely more difficult to design, for a necessary balance must be struck between local sovereignty and humanist conscience, avoiding both parochiality and absorption. The municipal-
confederal model proposed by Bookchin is most seductive in this regard, stressing the importance of inter-local management without undue devolution of power to poorly accountable "representatives" (cf. chapter 4).

Of course, the idea of diffused power will appeal only if the thirst for power is replaced by something else, namely the need to recover spiritual consciousness within the beauty and grandeur of free nature. This is, again, the ethic of frugality and detachment, expressed both in political structuring and in day-to-day behavior. Spiritual recovery need not translate into mystical forms of animism or paganism. While there is always a risk in "putting God too high up in the sky"76, the belief in a deity may not necessarily entail a separation between mind and matter, between nature and soul. That much is clear from the traditions of many First Nations, locating in nature (say, in an animal of prey or a river) the many expressions of a great creating essence. Yet even Christian theology is known for its important naturalist writings, from St. Francis' ode to Brother Sun and Sister Moon to Aquinas' own appreciation of the divine character of nature. On the other hand, as we learn from Taoism, deity and Creation could still be dispensed with in a no less "spiritual" cosmology of nature-as-order commanding an ethic of frugality and non-violence77.

76Witness the full comment by Maximo Kalaw Jr, president of the Haribon Foundation in the Philippines: "The Lumads in Mindanao tell a story. They say that the reason for all this environmental degradation is that when the foreigners came to the Philippines, they put God too high up in the sky. We have suffered here because we can no longer see the sacred in the trees, flowers and our fellow man." Quoted from Steve Lerner, *Earth Summit: Conversations with Architects of an Ecological Sustainable Future* (Bolinas, CA: Common Knowledge Press, 1991), p.127.

77Cf. Sylvan and Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-152. There are some clear parallels between Taoism and anarchism, explored in that article and also in Sale, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.
From a diffused power structure to a non-materialist, life-caring ethic, this peace framework must also encompass epistemology. The holistic and subjectivist ontology of (radical) ecology suggests that "the way to know" is not control or manipulation, but, rather, a more general inquiry into the evolution of humanity. This is very important for a study of peace, which invariably draws from the social sciences (and, particularly, from theories of international relations). While the field of ecology has substantially relied on Newtonian science so as to understand the "mechanisms" of nature, the philosophy of ecology can only reject such lenses as a path to a more general meaning of life. Ecology does not disavow science, but will find most value in post-Newtonian, quantum physics, which describes the physical world in non-linear terms and as an expression of "gray zones".

The relativity of science then serves as a useful benchmark for the social world. Ecology, in its holism, is about understanding power fields, and, in its subjectivity, is about endowing life forms with meaning. By "power fields", we have in mind the Foucauldian concept -- that domination and marginalization, in the modern world, are best explained as outcomes of subtle patterns of control over the masses, located in main institutions (hospitals, schools, jails, etc.), and conditioning a "pastoral" willingness to "fit in". While not an ecologist, Foucault understood that the "way to know" is not to isolate instances of visible, top-down power and thus construct a human history of kings and presidents, but to appreciate the insidiousness of global, hidden control over the mind. The hunch behind power fields is eminently holistic and, in that sense,

---

"ecological"79. The epistemological holism of ecology extends more generally, then, to historicism -- a form of inquiry stressing the historical contextuality of the present condition and, more generally, the continuing contact between current practice and historical legacy. History is not a mere background, nor an indiscriminate source of data, but an evolving account with myriad ramifications, always changing and, yes, always putting in perspective the uniqueness and the possibilities inherent in the present.

Ecological thought thus rejects the certainty associated with positivism in social sciences, irrespective of the social scientists' self-declared interest in mere "tendencies". What is "certain" is the messianic confidence in the control approach, the belief that "systematic" investigation will, block by block, yield nature's secrets (and, of course, isn't "man" part of "nature"?). Ecology's distinct commitment to subjectivity then cannot but oppose the objectifying ideology of positivism (particularly in its hypothetico-deductive method), treating humans and their behavior as so many "factors" in a mechanical reaction. Ecology must be normative theory, and cannot be detached from the subject: it accepts theory as a means for change, and not merely as an analytical reflection of "reality".

Conclusion

This chapter could have examined in greater detail the various debates surrounding ecological thought. Yet the main objective was to stress the common ground, the basic guidelines for a philosophy of peace built on individual freedom and an ethic of ecological care. The resulting focus is on an

79For a good synthesis of Foucauldian concepts and, as well, a rare application of these to ecological thought, cf. Éric Darier, L'environnement au Canada: une approche Foucaultienne (Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1993).
ecological adaptation of anarchist thought, critical of the modern project, and in agreement with the deep ecological commitment to wilderness preservation. Thus formulated, and inescapably inspired from an organic and cooperative reading of nature, the ecological approach to peace stresses bottom-up (necessarily decentralized) structures for the polity, minimal production (and maximal distribution) goals for the economy, and non-positivist "lenses" for the thinker/practitioner.

In this sense, ecological thought answers effectively to the minimalist, pessimistic peace conceptions of the school of "power politics", and to the optimistic utopias of growth, cosmopolitanism, and elite cooperation upheld by liberal internationalists. Lasting, freeing peace, conceived holistically and attainable through painstaking political action and individual detachment, is indeed possible, but very difficult to achieve. In a work of theory such as this one, the limited objective is to expose the anti-ecological values inherent in mainstream peace formulations. The decentralized, anarchistic, and non-materialist approach of radical ecology is the benchmark against which may be assessed the centralizing, hierarchising, and materialist conceptions of international realism and liberalism.
CHAPTER TWO

REALISM AND PEACE

Introduction

Realism is the most firmly established tradition in international political theory. Its proponents choose to emphasize an ontology of groups pitted against one another in an eternal struggle for survival and/or domination. In this reality, a positive peace is impossible. At most, one can hope for the temporary repression of war between sovereign units: so is the result of skilled bargaining, alliance, military defeat, or sheer exhaustion among contenders.

Under the realist umbrella coexist a set of values and a certain epistemology which eminently dictate a conception of negative peace, and which abruptly clash with (emancipatory) ecological proposals for positive peace. Weeded from its authoritarian tendencies, ecology stresses the possibility and the necessity of a "total" peace. The end (elimination of institutionalized violence and suffering for all living beings) is possible, for there is presumably nothing in the human condition which compels domination and violence. The path to a (peaceful) ecological world is, however, littered with obstacles, for contemporary societies (and their predecessors) have violated basic laws of nature, shunning a particular ethic which stands at the core of an ecologically-informed peace: an ethic of prudence, tolerance, care, modesty, and humility. Politically (and economically), this ethic translates into systems favoring heterogeneity, small-scale production, decentralization, self-consciousness,
spirituality, and holistic awareness. Intellectually, such values may be found only through a patient and lengthy "reading" of the human condition (historically and anthropologically).

In many ways, then, the realist tradition is incompatible with the ecological approach suggested here. Admittedly, some skeptics will note that many realists value "prudence"; yet, while this is a key ecological term, it can remain nonetheless attached to an ethic of force. Similarly, some may suggest that many realists' endearment with nationalism does point to the communitarian value in much of ecological thought; however, nationalism is perhaps the most powerful embodiment of, again, an ethic of force and atomism. Finally, others will look favorably at the historicist traits in classical realism, so as to cushion, at the very least, the ecological critique; yet historical awareness not only is a minimal step toward ecologism, but may well serve as an indiscriminate "source of data" for pre-established conceptions about force-in-history/man.

Realism then may be assessed according to the following criteria: 1) its ontology is one of conflict and aggression, which entails the basic existence of hierarchies and compels an atomized world; 2) it is a fundamentally elitist approach to the polis, fueling an authoritarian, technocratic, and centralizing practice; 3) likewise, it pictures and designs the world in homogeneous forms, stressing overwhelmingly the immutability of history and man/woman; 4) it is necessarily a materialist world view; 5) in its contemporary expression (yet following early signs in the classical literature), it supports a positivist, reductionist epistemology. Realism thus seems strikingly incompatible with ecology, on almost all counts.
The Evolution of the Realist Worldview

Before examining systematically the anti-ecological aspects of realism, it seems in order to provide a summary view of the "paradigm", so as to understand its evolving essence and to introduce its key proponents. The picture will not be comprehensive, yet the selected authors of reference are arguably central to the tradition.

Younger students of international relations theory are usually content to identify realism according to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's "classic" distinction between realism and "complex interdependence": realism is said to be essentially preoccupied with (unified) state actors in international politics and with military security issues (the use of force still very much relevant as a technique of statecraft). This depiction is not inaccurate, yet it does exaggerate the divisions within international theory while omitting necessary references to the origins of realism; the young theorist is left with the distended impression that realism is purely a (neat) intellectual construct. In fact, realism can only be understood historically and philosophically. In this sense, contemporary paradigmatic analyses which neglect the traditional (yet not straightforward) opposition between realism and idealism tend to obscure the fundamentally moral roots of the discipline; this is unfortunate, for critical theory (including ecology) is precisely concerned with the moral and ethical content and sources of decision, rather than a mere evaluation of process.

Realism is a somber description of inter-group relations in the absence of community. Heavily influenced by momentous (bloody) events in human history, it represents largely a capitulation to a so-called "reality" of material power -- perpetual physical threats, energies released in the construction of

---

social projects (with unpredictable, often hazardous effects). While the roots of realism are usually traced to such key authors as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes (in each case, whose advocacy of power politics did not reflect the philosophical mainstream of the time), its etymology and, arguably, its most lasting influence, derive from the Realpolitik school in Bismarckian Germany -- a Realpolitik which should not necessarily entail Machtpolitik, but with which it has been intimately associated. In other words, and in a most fascinating yet poorly understood manner, the popularization of a power-politics-under-anarchy" doctrine arose at a time where both liberal and authoritarian approaches to national unification contended for philosophical acceptance in Europe.

Comparing the lives and writings of two key figures in nineteenth-century Europe, Giuseppe Mazzini and Heinrich von Treitschke, one may in fact appreciate how nationalism attracted both centralists and democrats. "Realists" and "liberals" may have differed in their conception of the ideal polity, yet, learning from the British experience, both accepted values of unity, strength, and cohesiveness as a path toward national greatness. In fact, and most paradoxically from our contemporary perspective, nineteenth-century nationalism and the doctrine of Realpolitik represented a form of idealism which, today, is associated only with some liberals, socialists, or other "progressists".

---

2It is understood that the term "anarchy" has a distinctive ring to realist scholars, describing the absence of authoritative government over states and divested from any peaceful or emancipatory connotation.
3Cf. Treitschke's Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963 [1916]), and Mazzini, Selected Writings, ed. by N. Gangulee (London: Lindsay Drummond, 1945) Treitschke will be discussed later in this chapter, while the liberal Mazzini will be assessed in chapter 3.
4Raymond Aron, quite appropriately, described Treitschke as an "idealist realist". Cf. Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York:
The "realism" that sounds so "real" today was, then, the product of a power-based utopia, which may have sought inspiration from Machiavelli or Thucydides, but which was scarcely divorced from historically specific norms and emotions: a nationalism exulting the success of culture and science. After all, the "reality" out there could have been very different: Europe did toy with the idea of a class-based reality, the possibility and the presumed necessity of social equality, and, as we know, even with a scientific description of reality stressing cooperation and mutual aid. But the reality of national power, fused with scientific progress, military discipline, rapid economic growth and bureaucratic autonomy, was to predominate.

With time, this framework for change transformed into a status quo, and realism became the bastion of conservatism for which it is known today. This evolution did not occur abruptly, however. Up until the launching of the behavioral revolution in the social sciences after the Second World War, most "pessimistic" theorists of international relations cautioned against a rigid reading of reality which might empty political theory of its moral dimension. On the one hand, such sophisticated realists were struggling between their sympathy for scientific analyses of human phenomena and their wariness of mechanistic and fixed assumptions about the nature of politics; E.H. Carr, especially, turned


5Treitschke precisely distances himself from Machiavelli: "It is not so much his total indifference to the means by which power is attained which repels us ... but the fact that the power itself contains for him no deeper significance." (op. cit., p. 47) Even Morgenthau, half-a-century later and in a striking (but rarely quoted) passage, stated that "the history of political thought is the history of the moral evaluation of power, and the scientism of Machiavelli-Hobbes is, in the history of humankind, merely an accident without consequences"; cf. Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 169.
away from "pure" realism while attributing moral character to states whose behavior could, presumably, be scientifically investigated. On the other hand, however, major military and economic conflagrations were bound to influence negatively the perception of political man/woman. Reinhold Niebuhr thus warned that the fundamental morality of the individual could not be projected at the wider societal level, while Hans Morgenthau asserted the "biopsychological roots" of power, however checked by existing societal norms or by more general balancing mechanisms at the international level.

By the 1950s, realism underwent a form of "dephilosophisation", whose effects are still lingering. The symptoms were, admittedly, not generalized, especially in Europe where such scholars as Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and Raymond Aron ensured that "international theory", to use Wight's expression, remain political theory. Yet even Wight and Bull were victims of a facile paradigmatic classification encouraged by positivism. Aron's historicity was eminently more grounded -- a training which benefited his student, Stanley Hoffmann, perhaps the last true American classicist in the field of international politics. In the United States, then, other than in Hoffmann, classical realism

---

7This is the main thesis of Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960 [1932]), immediately laid out on p. ix. Cf. also p. 268: "Every effort to transfer a pure morality of disinterestedness to group relations has resulted in failure."
10Hoffmann's arguments are indeed very close to his mentor's, and do not receive specific attention here.
was mostly represented in the writings of John Herz and Arnold Wolfers, neither of whom, however, approached Aron, Morgenthau or Carr's depth and breadth in scholarship.

All in all, in the behavioral era, self-described realists, largely eschewed questioning about fundamental assumptions regarding man/woman and the state (other than debating the extent of its cohesiveness). This disembodied realist shell, so feared by Carr, turned toward considerations about process, both from systemic and rational-choice perspectives. In fact, a seemingly perplexing fusion between realism and liberalism gradually developed. Morgenthau had already castigated the "peace scientists," whose depoliticization of politics rang much more hollow in the bland "process literature" than in the ebullient writings of, say, David Mitrany. Yet this fusion seems unmistakable. Herz, already in 1951, had called for an awkward "realist liberalism," where "realistic" means would serve "pure" liberal ideals -- an advocacy of balance in policy, rationally (!) attained by positing an "opposite danger" in any situation requiring political action; Herz understood quite well the "security dilemma" which he helped popularize, yet his writings were already much preoccupied with an unsatisfactory form of "political

11Cf. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) and Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962); only the former will be reviewed here.
14Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 42-43.
16Herz, op. cit., p. 170.
engineering". This realo-liberal mix would find more insidious examples in later works by (especially) Gilpin and Keohane, all deeply influenced by neoclassical economics and its formal logic.

The defining characteristics of realism, as for any world view, are thus a product of historical evolution and cultural predisposition. From a modern perspective, at the very least (thus in the post-just war period), the Rousseauian state-of-war assumption about international politics formally reappeared as realist doctrine in the twentieth century, following several decades of a German idealism of force-in-nation (and in parallel with a liberal tradition, to be discussed later). Realism is usually equated with a necessary, strategic deployment of physical force between cohesive groups, yet this world view cannot be divorced from a practical, cultural experience of force as the expurgation of the soul -- a morality in force, but not merely in the defensive (power-balancing, "life-securing") sense.

Understanding the realist tradition as both a "what-is" of force-based survival in anarchy and a "what-should-be" of force-based assertion of (national, personal) glory or honor, it is no mystery that the realist conception of peace is so anathema to the ecologist's. Long-lasting, empowering peace appears impossible or undesirable -- realism is not a general emancipatory framework. The non-ecological vision of peace does emanate from this basic ontology of aggression and conflict, but, as mentioned earlier, also from other

---

18 For this reason, force has been seen and used by many as a means to ensure the organic development of a society. Cf. the discussion in chapter 1. As organicism is conceptually very close to ecology, and as the Nazi ethic spread a return to organic farming and a love of wild spaces, many strands of ecological thought have been viewed suspiciously as authoritarian orthodoxy.
characteristics which are associated with this ontology and which have been inspired by the historical context.

Thus, while the state of war may suggest a confrontation of "like units"\(^{19}\), the necessity/desirability of war (as an organized display of power) must entail local/national hierarchies -- which themselves feed on exploitation of man/woman and nature\(^{20}\). Hierarchies, in turn, approve of elitist structures, whose authoritarian, centralizing tendencies give free hand to technocratic power in a technologically complex era; needless to say, these are hardly favorable to a respect for life and to an ecologically-informed peace. Realism thus displays homogeneizing tendencies, obsessively reducing human motives to power needs and condoning or demanding the melting of differences for purposes of power exertion; again here, from an ecological perspective, short-term power surges are usually accompanied with high rates of entropy and with disastrous long-term consequences for the community (however large it may be conceived).

Furthermore, realism is by definition a defense of immutability in nature; this is not ecologically wrong per se, but it does understate the extent to which nature evolves (while remaining "nature"). In a sense, this rigidity in world view does not agree well with the enlightened ideology of progress in which realism developed, and, in fact, we recall immediately that modern realism's (German) "heroic" tradition did fight the liberal conception. But realism's materialistic framework, yet another of its characteristics (which arguably overshadows its moral dimension), has operated with much ease within this

\(^{19}\)This is Waltz's (1979) famous (and fundamentally misleading) description of states in the international system.

\(^{20}\)Cf. the excellent article by Howard Hawkins, "Ecology", in Robert M. Jackson (ed.), Global Issues, 93-94 (Guilford, CT: Dushkin Publishing Group, 1993).
specific historical epoch. In fact, much can be said of the argument that is logically posited by realism -- that international relations have remained essentially mercantilistic, with realism's perennial forces of state power feeding hungrily on the staggering resource-development capability of the modern (liberal) era. While this may well describe the current state of affairs, it offers little hope that an ecological peace of the steady state may be achieved.

Finally, the reductionist epistemology in the contemporary realist literature clearly reveals the continuing influence of positivism. This "realism" which most scholars of international relations discuss today might be a caricature of the old, but does carry tremendous intellectual weight and poses a serious problem for ecological peace. Contemporary realism (and, in fact, mainstream international relations in the broad sense) are all about process, actions and reactions, bargaining, cognitive or affective limits on rationality -- mostly, one form or another of utility calculation and mechanical operation. The ahistoricism of modern realism and much of international relations theory has condemned reflexions on the meaning of peace, and has perpetuated the mechanical world view inherited from the enlightenment and virulently decried by ecologists. In sum, this "realism" which we are about to scrutinize orders a "pragmatic" approach to world affairs, which is nothing but a deliberate choice in a reading of nature and of history. In this intellectual choice, the essence of life is (happily or not) the channeling of high energy through fixed structures of domination for purposes of survival and civilization. In a minimalist sense, realism underlies a fear of loss, a fear of death -- surely understandable, yet both paralyzing and destructive. In a maximalist sense, "realism" turns to idealism, away from calculating policy to missionary ideology; if realism is still to refer to some "realistic" assessment of human nature, it is that human nature must realize itself through the same displays of energy mentioned above, but
precisely for the purpose of such "human" emotions as honor or glory. Minimalist realists will be content with an international peace framed as the absence of war, however temporary; maximalists, however, will not even consider peace as an essential political objective. Yet the fate of humankind is inevitably compromised by even the minimalist position, and an ecological critique is precisely aimed at redressing the "abdication of peace" inherent in the realist tradition.

Selecting Realist Authors

Which authors or texts are most revealing for our purpose? The roots of realism are usually traced to such immortal scholars as Kautilya, Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. However, there will be no attempt here to provide yet another exegesis of the Arthashastra, the Peloponnesian War, the Prince, or the Leviathan. Undoubtedly, realist precepts such as anarchy, power politics, or the immutability of humankind, are all central to those texts. Yet our concern was more to sound those thinkers standing closer to this generation of students and practitioners, thinkers who have spoken in a modern age to which we relate directly and, therefore, who have more immediately influenced the development of contemporary scholarship in international relations.

From a list of recent scholars, then, the oldest is Heinrich von Treitschke, a fervent German nationalist of the nineteenth century, whose stirring lectures and powerful exposition of far-right arguments attracted a wide audience, won many adherents, and bequeathed a legacy of militarism which, as we know, lasted through the first half of the twentieth century. Treitschke is important, for his Politics presents in clear, passionate, and erudite language a popular current of thought (authoritarian nationalism) whose legacy, on the field, directly stimulated the re-birth of "rational realism" in contemporary
international relations theory. Treitschke can be frightening, essentially because of a scholarly depth which could easily convince many a reader that, indeed, the spirit of humankind is to be realized through the powerful nation, glorified, dignified and acculturated by military success.

Chronologically, Treitschke is followed by E.H. Carr and Reinhold Niebuhr. The latter is, sadly, a forgotten figure today, though most students of politics, through the 1960s, were familiar with his writings. Niebuhr, however, remains perhaps the most lucid exponent of realist thought, and also perhaps the last scholar of reasonable fame to approach international relations from a humanist Christian perspective. In the process, in his *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, he painted a fundamentally optimistic picture of the morality of man/woman while upholding the Rousseauian image of society as a state of war -- a form of structural analysis which became very popular in later years. Moreover, in both *Moral Man* and in *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, he brilliantly explained how the humane ideals of liberalism and utopianism will often mask political realities\(^{21}\) and, therefore, prompt serious errors in policy; liberalism may then appear dangerous or even fraudulent -- a lesson eventually learnt by such realists as Hans Morgenthau or Inis Claude\(^{22}\), whose roots, however, were well exposed by a Marxist tradition which Niebuhr was not afraid to integrate to his thought\(^{23}\).

Carr, on the other hand, is still often mentioned (even if few still read him) as the father of twentieth-century realism -- much more so than Niebuhr, essentially because of Carr's detailed accounts of foreign policies and international relations in the inter-war period and of his specific reference to the


debate between realism and idealism. *The Twenty Years' Crisis* is indeed a
classic in its *genre*, as Carr lays out the two ideal types and attempts a synthesis
which, however, still vindicates the power of realism. Carr's importance thus
resides in three things: his effort at synthesis, which, despite its shortcomings,
eminently sought to retain the moral dimension of international politics: his
strong philosophical and historical perspective on humankind and its polis,
admirred even more in hindsight, as a vestige of an epoch where rigor, depth and
imagination could still be mustered in scholarship; his tenacious belief in a
science of international relations, praised by modern positivists and shrugged off
by critical theorists as, again, a sign of times.

Following Carr is Morgenthau, another towering figure in contemporary
international relations theory who needs little introduction. Contrary to Carr,
Morgenthau has been read at one point or another by the younger student of
international relations, even if in a limited fashion -- usually the six principles of
political realism discussed in *Politics Among Nations*, which have established
the so-called "mainstream" of international relations theory. However, the
rich and provocative (and somewhat forgotten) Morgenthau is rather to be
discovered in his *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*. The classicist and the

---

24While Carr described realism as "the impact of thinking upon wishing" (*op. cit.,* p. 10), he chastised realists notably for eschewing the duty of moral judgment (*ibid.,* p. 89). His solution was to discuss international politics in terms of "moral states", not as strictly emotional entities, but as actors performing otherwise immoral acts (such as killing) and eliciting a whole gamut of individual emotions which would not otherwise exist (e.g. giving one's life for an abstract cause); cf. Carr, *ibid.*, pp. 157-162.

25Cf. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 4-13: politics is governed by objective laws; interest-as-power is the key concept in realism; types of interest vary according to context; the state is moved by the moral principle of national survival, which requires prudence (as cost/benefit analysis); there is no knowable good and evil, as pertains to state interests; realism is based upon a pluralistic conception of human nature.

62
scientist are much more at odds in this slightly older book than in the textbook-like *Politics*. In *Scientific Man*, in fact, while Morgenthau displays some sympathy for the social scientific tradition\(^{26}\), he fundamentally denounces the metaphysical bankruptcy of scientism\(^{27}\). This is, then, Morgenthau the artist and moralist, comfortable with his trademark, pessimistic view of humanity, and skeptical of liberal attempts at peace engineering. Such themes would resurface in *Politics*, yet not with the same passion and surely not with this quasi-vitriolic attack on a scientism of which, sadly, he was to be perceived as a supporter.

John Herz's book on realism and idealism does not have the same stature as the works of Carr and Morgenthau, yet references to Herz are important, for several reasons. Herz was a serious student of the history of international political thought; as stated earlier, the realist in him seized on the image of the security dilemma facing autonomous actors in anarchy, an image which he did not himself invent but which, more than anyone else, he helped popularize. Yet, like many of his fellow Americans, Herz believed in liberal values and in the liberating power of science, both of which he sought to integrate with his realist "reading" of the world. The "realist liberal" hybrid which he constructed was not wholly convincing, for reasons mentioned above. Still, Herz must be read for what he represents: arguably the main, mid-century bridge between classical and behaviorist approaches to international relations.

\(^{26}\) Cf. the strikingly Durkheimian reference to controllable "social facts"; *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, pp. 128, 218-219.

\(^{27}\) In a fascinating (and completely neglected) passage, Morgenthau declares: "Circumstances are infinite, are infinitely combined; are variable and transient; he who does not take them into consideration is not erroneous, but stark mad, ... metaphysically mad"; *ibid.*, p. 220.
Kenneth Waltz is, similarly, an unavoidable roadmark in this transition. Few contemporary theorists of international relations have been as analyzed and criticized as Waltz, largely, we suspect, because of his impeccable classical training and his simultaneous elaboration of a rigid, mechanical, yet powerful systemic theory of international politics (formalized in 1979, yet amply suggested in *Man, the State and War*, in 1959). Waltz, in a sense, betrayed a cause, abandoning all references to political theory and embracing a form of economic reductionism which even the mainstream found distasteful. Is he then worth consideration here? By all means so. Waltz has articulated the clearest defense of structuralism in international relations, and remains a symbol of a positivist pathology which has spread insidiously beyond the strict realist literature. While few agree with Waltz today, few as well have failed to rethink the discipline after reading him.

Raymond Aron's classic *Peace and War*, released in the 1960s, and Hedley Bull's *Anarchical Society*, published a decade later, never enjoyed in North America the popularity which they attracted in Europe, yet neither ought to be omitted here. Aron's is undoubtedly the better book, the magnum opus of an author whose breadth of scholarship is equalled perhaps only by Carr, in twentieth-century international relations theory. Aron's realist assumptions were not merely tools for an elegant theory, but, rather, the fruits of intense philosophical reflexion and historiographic research. Yet his work is inescapably modern, committed to a science of international relations which, however, he approached with all the flexibility derived from his scholarship. 

28As he mentions, "no scientific discipline possesses distinct boundaries" (Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 5); yet each is formed around a nucleus which validates the scientific enterprise -- understood, again, in a flexible sense, with a stress on rigorous empirical validation of hypotheses rather than on formal modeling or superficial quantitative studies.
Bull was, similarly, trained in a classical tradition whose epistemology he defended in a famous exchange with Morton Kaplan. Yet the Australian scholar had more in common with North American counterparts than he ever cared to admit: *The Anarchical Society* more than hints at the scientific approach, for which a general emphasis on order (the theme of the book) is not inimical. While Bull's work is perhaps overrated, he remains a fixture of Australo-English scholarship and, in contrast with his famous colleague, Martin Wight, took a clear stand on theoretical debates, leaving a legacy which can be systematically analyzed.

This list of authors seems already interminable, and, frankly, barely accounts for the string of prolific and popular scholars of the past thirty years. Two main problems must be faced. First, how is a tradition to be adequately represented? The optimal balance between breadth and depth cannot be struck by formulas. In this case, the mentioned authors show overlap, yet they do form a minimal etching of the field's development; furthermore, none has displayed the scope of scholarship associated with the classics of political theory and warranting exclusive attention.

Second, why not be even more exhaustive? Caution is advised here. On the one hand, there are reputable realist scholars whose contributions to political

---


30Wight's scholarship is more creative and incisive than Bull's, yet Wight could never be identified with either one of the three paradigms that he had popularized (realism, rationalism and revolutionism). Bull suspects that he was a rationalist, yet admits that "the essence of his teaching was that the truth about international politics had to be sought not in anyone of those patterns of thought but in the debate among them". Cf. Bull's prefatory chapter, "Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations", in Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991).
theory remain limited, irrespective of the quality of their empirical work; these
may include Inis Claude, Arnold Wolfers, Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner31,
and even Morton Kaplan. On the other hand, the evolution of international
relations theory toward an emphasis on process complicates or, at times, voids
the effort at classification. Gilpin and Keohane are two such scholars whose
liberalism, for example, is very much entwined with realist axioms: both are
fond of an economistic methodology which is typically utilitarian, yet neither
would decry an emphasis on power politics in international affairs. As well
Krasner, a self-avowed realist32, later associates himself with a "regime
literature" which, in the minds of its proponents, stands outside the realist
tradition33. And what is there to say about the respected Ernst Haas, who
quashed the optimism of the functionalist school with a dose of political realism,
and whose main career preoccupation was precisely to unveil the parochial
political networks within international organizations34? Haas said it himself:
"What matters is process"35 -- a sentiment echoed as well by James Rosenau,
whom we will discuss in a later chapter.

In sum, the main realist themes are adequately covered by the major
authors introduced above. A more nuanced appreciation of realism would stem,

31Cf. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and
U. S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) and
Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley:
32Krasner's realist thesis is well articulated in his 1974 volume.
33Cf. Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1983), including the qualifier by Susan Strange.
34Cf. particularly Haas' Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and
35Haas, "Words can hurt you; or, who said what to whom about regimes",
in fact, from a personal reading of history, and not necessarily from reviewing
more works of international relations theory -- a task for the future.

*The Realist Ontology of Conflict*

Political pessimism is not the purview of realism. In fact, we would
precisely expect that political theorists be preoccupied with the power "games"
which, by definition, characterize political relations. Politics is about conflict:
on this, realists, marxists and critical theorists agree. But is politics "natural"?
And if so, should this be changed? Further yet, what are the relevant
competitors? These are the distinguishing questions, the answers to which shed
light on a conception of peace.

The realist ontology runs as follows (and here, we restate a series of
points firmly established in the literature).

A) One strand of realism maintains that: the main (survival) impulse of
humankind is associational; political associations are finite and, therefore,
exclusionary; finite bodies eventually collide; precautions against collision are
necessary and justified. This is a structural argument (except perhaps for the
initial premise), to which most realists would adhere.

Waltz upholds the argument in its bluntest form\(^{36}\), resisting any
theorizing on the sources of motivations: "there is a constant possibility of war
in a world in which there are two or more states seeking to promote a set of
interests and having no agency above them upon which they can rely for
protection"\(^{37}\); or, to use an analogy, "if it were easier to rob banks, such desires

\(^{36}\)It is following the publication of his *Theory of International Politics* in 1979
that a school of "structural realism" (or "neo-realism") was first identified. Cf.
the various critiques of Waltz in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its

\(^{37}\)Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, p. 227.
would lead to much more bank robbing". Favoring the Waltzian "third image" to its extreme, as Waltz does himself, is of course replete with dangers: most importantly, it expurgates morality from the study of international politics (the system is a machine), legitimizing deceit and/or the use of force in foreign policy as "a reasoned response to the world about us". Waltz is not a complete determinist, cautioning that his analysis cannot predict the timing of specific wars or the identity of specific contenders. Yet war is an aggregate necessity, an inevitable escape valve for systemic energy; the callous (and unstated) policy recommendation is, presumably, that great powers should manipulate this systemic "need" to their advantage and, inevitably, to the disadvantage of the weak. We could discuss Waltz at further length, yet the simple objective here was to illustrate the structuralist assumption in realist thought -- which, incidentally (and anticipating later discussion), is laden with negative implications for a theory of peace.

Structuralist arguments are also present elsewhere, though usually in conjunction with reflections on human nature. Morgenthau offers a good example, although his logic is, to some extent, contrived. He accepts the basic Aristotelian axiom of association, claiming as well that humans are morally obliged to treat each other unselfishly. Yet the moral obligation seems to struggle with the (selfish) impetus of survival in scarcity: at once, "individual egotisms, all equally legitimate, confront each other". Selfishness...

---

38Waltz, *ibid.*, p. 231.
41Waltz writes, interestingly, that "peace is the primary goal of few men or states"; *ibid.*, p. 236.
42That word is never mentioned as such; Morgenthau rather refers to "poverty" (yet the message is essentially the same). Cf. *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, p. 191.
43Ibid., p. 191.
wins over altruism. But is the ensuing confrontation purely structural, only scarcity-based? There, Morgenthau pulls out another key assumption, namely the desire for power, which emerges (presumably within some, but not all, individuals) once survival has been secured, and which ensures the permanence of conflict\(^{44}\). Its permanence, indeed, for both the target of hegemonic violence and third parties must respond to the "evil" of power: this isn't a mere game of chicken, but the fulfilment of a moral duty -- the duty to protect the national interest\(^{45}\).

This compelling (but not reductionist) influence of structure is also apparent in Herz and in Aron. Herz’s insistence on the security dilemma underscores his belief in the "universality" of the struggle for power, which is, however, purely based on mutual fear\(^{46}\) and could be overcome through rational means. Likewise, Aron sees the state system as a state of nature, in which conflict and aggression predominate: "the necessity of national egoism derives logically from ... the state of nature which rules among states"\(^{47}\); yet this structural logic may not be divorced from the "intoxication of ruling" characterizing state leaders\(^{48}\) (which, presumably, is as much a product of statism as an outcome rooted in human nature per se).

Carr and Niebuhr, however, do not follow the same line. For Carr, structuralism is not something to be opposed to "inherent" human drives, for political associations precisely mute the "nature" in man/woman and instill notions of both power and morality in their evolution\(^{49}\). In this sense, Carr is

\(^{44}\)Ibid., pp. 191-193.
\(^{45}\)Morgenthau, ibid., pp. 201-203, and Politics Among Nations, p. 12.
\(^{46}\)Herz, op. cit., p. 4.
\(^{47}\)Aron, op. cit., p. 580.
\(^{48}\)Aron, ibid., p. 73.
\(^{49}\)Carr, op. cit., pp. 95-98.
surely the most problematic realist, seeking a "mature thought combin(ing) purpose with observation and analysis", shunning the "exuberance of utopianism" and the "barrenness of realism". Almost necessarily, then, there is no apparent ontological predominance of conflict in politics, international or otherwise. It is not that anarchy induces conflict or that humans seek power. History is the application of power for both moral and immoral ends (and here, realism reaches Carr), but power itself may be displayed in cooperative and conflictual modes -- for politics entails both; and international politics is merely an outcome of a large community, a community of states, which might be imperfect and suffer from moral shortcomings, but which is not amoral.

Niebuhr, on the other hand, is much more categorical, affirming that "conflict is inevitable", that power must be used against power. Yet this is not a reflection of human nature, for man/woman is naturally unselfish, but of an immoral society which projects the (thwarted) ego of the human being and, essentially, unites the ununitable "by momentary impulses and immediate and unreflective purposes". In other words, the finiteness of man/woman does not allow them to coexist within the large group, unless the leaders of that group are able to channel the negative energies inherent in this state of affairs into outward, conflictual projection; universal peace is then clearly impossible.

Niebuhr, therefore, and contrary to Carr, does not believe that group relations may be governed by moral rules, and therein lies his realism. But he is not a structuralist, in the mechanical, Newtonian sense, for conflict is reducible to

---

\(^{50}\) Carr, *ibid.*, p. 10.

\(^{51}\) Carr, *ibid.*, p. 162.

\(^{52}\) Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. xv.

\(^{53}\) Niebuhr, *ibid.*, p. xi.

\(^{54}\) Niebuhr, *ibid.*, p. 48.
aspects of the human condition, yet necessarily mediated through artificial constructions.

In sum, while almost all our realist authors would agree that the history of humankind is one of constant contention between states, nations, or whatever groups, this basic conflictual dynamic should not necessarily be construed in mechanical, rigidly structural terms.

B) Thus, another strand of realism specifically endows political conflict with purpose and cognition: domination is a human need (for, at least, some members of the species); political associations necessarily require dominators; dominators will dominate wherever else domination is deemed possible and/or sustainable (i.e., in the international arena).

This, in many ways, is really the crux of the entire realist tradition. When Bull, surely inspired by Niebuhr, urges the reader to "recognise the darkness rather than pretend to see the light"55, he expresses what most realists would share: the belief that power drives are innate to and/or systematically developed by, in an institutional context, human beings -- at least those men and women who aspire to lead (and leadership is obviously not limited to states).

The basic point of agreement, then, is that power is omnipresent and relatively visible. Thus, in fact, two points are made. First, not all realists would necessarily agree with Morgenthau's contention that power is biologically rooted56, especially when the assumption extends to all human beings57. But they will all accept, as an essential premise, that politics is

56Morgenthau writes: "The drives to live, to propagate and to dominate are common to all men"; cf. *Politics Among Nations*, p. 37.
pervasive -- that "the important things" performed in a society or internationally are outcomes of conflictual relationships (rarely is there harmony of interests; cooperative acts entail conflictual backgrounds). So domination may or may not be "natural", but it is quickly actualized in a political system destined to maintain order or build a civilization. Treitschke's Nietzschean exaltation of war, moral and noble,\(^8^8\) may not be shared as such by moderate realists. Yet the latter will not only treat that political programme (adopted by many contemporaries and descendants) as a warning that power and conflict are inescapably tied to the human "character", they will also accept that power and conflict can serve a moral function, as we saw above with Carr and Morgenthau.

Secondly, as stated, the "power" and "conflict" uncovered by realists remain visible. One may need to dig a bit, yet soon enough, one will observe palpable attempts at manipulation or coercion by one identifiable party over another, using "classic" types of resources (arms, money, status, etc.); while the "power politics" associated with realism tends to suggest an overwhelming preoccupation with military security issues, a true realist will, above all, be interested in this constant background of coercion, irrespective of issues. For historical reasons, however, this approach to power is expressed strictly in "royal" terms\(^5^9\), bypassing an entirely different (yet no less real) dimension of power, and conditioning a particular kind of top-down thinking which, ultimately, may be self-defeating. The realist conception of power-in-conflict thus is intricately tied to other aspects of the paradigm, which we will address

\(^5^8\)Cf. Treitschke, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40: "War is the one remedy for an ailing nation... Heroism, bodily strength, and chivalrous spirit are essential to the character of a noble people... God above us will see to it that war shall return again."

\(^5^9\)This is, of course, the Foucauldian concept, to which we will return below.
below. (We have also anticipated our ecological critique, which will be articulated below as well.)

As a whole, then, realists believe that power drives are natural, that political associations (states or similar finite groups or entities) are natural, and that power drives are served by political associations. In this "nature", the strong pursues the weak, the weak is fearful of the strong, and both weak and strong use physical resources to (alternatively) survive or fulfil their natural "mission". In fact, survival also animates the strong, who know not only that their life essence is in fighting, but that the weak may grow to be strong. So, while nature may design actors of varying physical strength, the same actors, in a given setting, may be of equal strength; in this case, fighting may be delayed, but power drives and fear-induced drives are immanent (though less easily distinguishable), in what amounts to be an anarchical system -- yet still a political system, i.e. a system based on scarcity.

What distinguishes realists from other pessimists (marxists, in particular) is, then, the ultimate purpose of domination -- and, therefore, the preeminent logic of history. As we know, for marxists, history is the transformation of productive "techniques" (tools and power structures) for the purpose of elite domination; in capitalism, elitism is class-based and devoted to unceasing accumulation. For realists, while elite domination is also the historical engine, conflict specifically serves a representative purpose: in marxism, capitalists fight for themselves, and the state fights for capitalists; but for the realist, state leaders fight for the vertically integrated constituency (usually the nation), either to fulfil personal ambitions or to serve the constituency's cause (usually the former).

In sum, the realist ontology of conflict makes key assumptions about power needs, fear of death, and the political state of nature. This state of affairs
is not to be liked or disliked, but to be accepted and managed -- for varying objectives, however: hegemony, justice, equality, or mere survival (yet rarely peace). This ontology is clearly manifest in the writings surveyed here. This will come as no surprise, although a review does remind us how the realist tradition should not be merely caricatured as a heartless advocacy of military spending. In fact, we come to realize that almost none of our reputed realist scholars defends the "pure" realist approach defined in the writings of the "great quartet" -- Kautilya, Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes -- and upheld by a minority of modern scholars (whose propositions may be theoretically weak yet politically influential). Still, while our authors will tend to nuance and qualify realist arguments, they will all believe in the fundamental existence of power struggles in a context of anarchy amongst similar types of political units (which tend to be states -- essentially an empirical choice, but easily motivated by the international relations scholar's traditional interest in war).

Realism and Hierarchy

An axiomatic account of history emphasizing conflict and aggression is bound to yield an elitist, hierarchical theory of international politics, with necessary implications for a definition (and the failure) of peace. The argument is predictable; in fact, for some time now, feminist scholars have maintained that history-as-war/conflict reflects a purely patriarchal reading. The point is well taken; many revisionist historians and philosophers, who have researched the role of women in history, may now attest to the systematic historiographical

---

60 Cf., for example, John Mearsheimer's arguments longing for a return to the cold war, in "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War", *Atlantic Monthly* (August 1990).

erasure of women's attempts at creating a more peaceful world and challenging the warring culture of patriarchy.

Realism is, of course, fully imbued of hierarchical and elitist conceptions, which extend well beyond the domination of woman by man. Its messianic version, whose normative outlook is not necessarily shared by the twentieth-century political scientist, remains indicative. Treitschke would write, thus, that "the features of history are virile, unsuited to sentimental or feminine natures...the weak and cowardly perish, and perish justly"; unsurprisingly, we further read that "all democracy is rooted in a contradiction of nature, because it premises a universal equality which is nowhere actually existent." The latter statement, while still wholly arguable, is not at all disputed by modern realists. Aron returns to the broad systemic level (a state of nature, for him), and argues that "no international system has ever been, or ever can be, equalitarian." Niebuhr did not praise hierarchies, but was forced to recognize their presumably natural existence. Herz, likewise, endorsed the argument, although rather uncritically; in fact, and to anticipate another aspect of our discussion, Herz understood that realism engenders a self-renewing form of elitism, as realist descriptions become prescriptions and favor "the aristocracy" and authoritarianism.

So is the "reality" of conflict, then. Nature separates the strong from the weak, as discussed above. But as the strong must remain strong, it must devise

---

63 Cf. Treitschke, ibid., p. 31. Similarly, he writes: "The masses must forever remain the masses. There would be no culture without kitchenmaids" (sic); cf. p. 24
64 Aron, ibid., p. 641.
65 Niebuhr, op. cit., p. xiv.
66 Cf. Herz, op. cit., p. 19
67 Herz, ibid., p. 29. Yet, inexplicably, he interpreted this as merely "coincidental"; cf. p. 30.
a system of accumulation and control which ensures that energies are channeled to a focal point, at the top, so as to protect the vertically integrated entity (the nation-state) against a hostile environment of functional equals. The necessary state, the good state, will not survive without entrenched hierarchies -- this is where realist description becomes policy prescription. In its mildest expression, realism merely warns against the omnipresence of power exertion. But the realist logic effortlessly and understandably extends to a theory of omnipresent war and death, which legitimizes the power apparatus in its most perverse, and anti-ecological, guise.

Realism therefore commands technocracy, centralization, and authoritarianism: as lugubrious modern realists, such as Kissinger or Brzezinski, would agree, such are the necessary requirements of "national security". Morgenthau provided a moral defence for "prudence" -- a cost/benefit analysis of the requirements for national survival\(^{68}\); yet even his secularization of Niebuhrian principles pales in contrast with the practical legacy of realist thought in the modern military-industrial-statist complex.

In sum, two distinctive points may be stated in a discussion of realist hierarchy. The first is that domination is the \textit{raison d'être} of realist thought. This compulsion of hierarchical thinking is initially rooted in a specific (and biased) understanding of nature -- the survival of the fittest; this conception precedes Darwin and is also shared by many liberals and marxists. Once the analyst (or the activist) accepts a law of nature based on the preeminence of physical strength, then both a conflictual reading of history and the ontological supremacy of violence-organizing forms of association are likewise accepted (or praised, in some cases). This, in turn, condones or vindicates the supremacy of

\(^{68}\)Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations}, p. 12.
the political association and its elite (knowledgeable, productive, warring) over the individual. In fact, this is performed in two ways: by granting largely unpublicised privileges to the elite (a resource distribution from poor to rich, to which we will return), and by elevating the myth and the glory of the particular abstraction (nation-state, religion, ideology) which already commands legal and moral authority and which can now elicit devotion from the (useful, troublesome) individual.

In its heroic form, realism extolls the authoritarian ideal, belittling -- but not obliterating -- the individual in a quest for civilizing greatness, while still surely marginalizing groups whose genetic make-up positions them at lower levels in the "natural" ranking order. In its analytic and moderate form, as one can see from Aron, realism still believes in the imminence of war and is forced to condone the disciplining power of "royal" authority for purposes of national interest and survival. Here too, then, the individual interest yields to the general interest, in what turns out to be a fictitious symbiosis which trivializes human life and applauds the artificial life of the construct.

Finally, the second main point to highlight here is that realist hierarchy is also compelled by the vicious circle of description-as-prescription. We will not belabor this point, which was stated above and which is a recurrent feature of critical thought in international relations. Yet, from an ecological perspective of positive peace, it is difficult to overemphasize how the current hierarchical order within states was created by men who thought that "survival" and "progress" deserved nothing less.

Realism and Homogeneity

An ecological conception of peace would cultivate the flowering of differences in a community, as an essential guarantee for stability and renewal.
Realism, however, dictated by its own approach to peace and stability, is forced to uphold the reverse. Again, here, the logic is foreseeable. As history and nature are fundamentally conflictual, the constant war effort demands a high level of discipline which, as discussed above, hierarchy provides, and which is necessarily accompanied by an ironing of differences -- for obvious purposes of efficiency, predictability, and control.

The argument is not always clearly expressed in realist writings. In fact, one may be misled by some references which appear to fundamentally support heterogeneity. Consider, for instance, Treitschke's rejection of universalism and imperialism. This, of course, should not be construed as a form of humanism or anarchism, but as one particular expression of bourgeois nationalism. Treitschke, after all, bathed in a glorious epoch of German art and literature, and understood that culture (to which he attached tremendous value) had historically emanated from national strength. Culture had to be respected, and so were national differences to be respected -- in fact, both for general cultural reasons and so as to ensure that German glory and honor be regularly purified through war; engulfing Europe or the world would sully German hands and weaken the cultural impulse of humankind.

Seemingly favorable positions on heterogeneity also surface in such authors as Carr and Niebuhr. With Niebuhr, in fact, one may read a type of discourse usually not associated with realism. So he writes that "a genuine universalism must seek to establish harmony without destroying the richness and variety of life." This is a qualitatively very different deviation from the realist credo than in the case of the German nationalist. Niebuhr, after all, displays his

---

69 Cf. Treitschke, *op. cit.*, p. 12: "The idea of one universal empire is odious".
own brand of idealism, which he knows to be unattainable except through a
transcendence of realist "cynicism" and idealist "sentimentality", both
considered spiritually weak; the divine hand pursues a Christian morality of
frugality, justice and mercy, and not national glory or honor. But Niebuhr, the
democrat and Christian moralist, still accepts physical force as the necessary
accompaniment to political life and immoral society. In this sense, he cannot
escape the homogeneity argument: motives of large groups are reducible to
power, and the need to meet power with power compels the predictable, orderly
system of production and accumulation which feeds on a homogeneizing
"rationalization" of society. So appears Niebuhr the rationalist, as we will see
below.

Similarly, Carr is a bit disorienting for the analyst seeking to uncover his
realist face, especially on this particular issue of homogeneity. Carr, in fact,
explains the failure of the League of Nations by its own failure to recognize the
"diversity" (but also the paucity) of states, whose behavior, therefore, may not
be standardized and rationalized according to legal formulas. Yet one
wonders how deeply Carr would commit to an ethic of diversity. He fully
accepts a statist ordering of the world which, however infused with moral
standards (as Carr seeks to elaborate), supports a power ethic ("aggression is
not necessarily immoral") and condones societal efficiency. Thus, for Carr,
the policy of autarky would have nothing to do with related objectives of
"beauty-in-smallness" and diversity; rather, it is "an instrument of political
power ... primarily a form of preparedness for war."

---

\(^7\text{1Carr, } op. cit., p. 28.\) The "diversity" of states is presumably both
organizational and cultural.

\(^7\text{2Carr, } ibid., p. 208.\)

\(^7\text{3Carr, } ibid., p. 121.\)
It appears somewhat futile, overall, to uncover specific statements regarding diversity within the theoretical corp.: at hand, largely because most of our authors are not realist extremists and, in any matter, because diversity is both a popular value and a vague enough term to conceal even the most homogeneizing tendency. Still, the search is not altogether fruitless. Quoting Waltz, we read with little surprise about "the illusion that people and cultures are so very much different"\textsuperscript{74}. Waltz may have a point, yet his writings demonstrate that, for him, an understanding of the world and an acceptable approach to policy both overwhelmingly emphasize a "functional likeness" which likens humanity to a precision machine. Nothing of the kind, on the other hand, would be expected from Herz. The liberal Herz, who believes in the "dispersion", the "mitigation" of power\textsuperscript{75}, also states the need to "fight against the injustices and discrimination inflicted upon minorities and for an improvement of their status"\textsuperscript{76}. Yet the overall picture is still pleasing to realists (and underscores the modern link between liberalism and realism), for Herz's diffusion of power is merely equated with the separation of powers in a presidential system\textsuperscript{77}, while his defense of diversity is admittedly only a fall-back position: "ideally", realist liberals ought to pursue minorities' "full integration in the body of the main group"\textsuperscript{78}.

An ecological critique of realism, in sum, must establish realism's essential bias against the respect of fundamental diversity in society (nationally and globally). While textual analysis is a bit erratic here, the homogeneizing tendencies of realism may usually be deduced from its "power politics"

\textsuperscript{74}Waltz, \textit{Man, the State and War}, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{75}Herz, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 176.
\textsuperscript{76}Herz, \textit{ibid.}, p. 198.
\textsuperscript{77}Herz, \textit{ibid.}, p. 176.
\textsuperscript{78}Herz, \textit{ibid.}, p. 198.
framework: reducibility of motive (to power quests, physical growth), likening of units (by emphasizing a statist ontology), defense of nationalism, and, often, an aculturalism which reinforces the sense of similarity (no wonder that, of all social science specialists, political realists are surely one of the least influenced by anthropological research).

**Immutability and Materialism**

These are two more issues characterizing realism, on which an ecology of peace has reflected. The materialist dimension may be discussed summarily. As we all know, the ecological principle of finiteness necessarily entails a respect of natural physical proportions for sustainable (thus peaceful) living. Ecologists must worry about matter, but do not treat matter as lifeless resource; for that reason, ideologies of growth are anathema to their world view. The argument seems well laid-out for an eventual critique of liberal progress, yet applies just as well to realism, whose policies order the constant development of military might. While not all realists would advocate territorial expansion (i.e. imperialism, essentially a self-defeating form of idealism), all will accept it as a political possibility, against which defense is necessary. In principle, a purely defensive military policy might be designed, so as to simply neutralize aggression without retaliation, to convey the message that the energies of attack will simply turn against the initiator; even ecological communities would adopt this scheme, if it could prove feasible. But warfare and war preparation usually blur -- and void -- the distinction between offence and defence, giving free rein to institutionalized interests to pursue a "status quo" policy of military renewal/growth.³⁹

³⁹This said, several progressive authors, espousing the "alternative security approach", would take slight issue with the argument, invoking the potential of
Realist logic then condones a materialist framework for the organization of society and the conduct of international relations. Indeed, both classical and contemporary scholarships have constructed a materialist narration of history, centred on a conception of power inevitably defined by (quantitative) measurements of physical capabilities. Such materialism expresses a form of amoral secularism which, however, does not characterize the entire realist tradition. Niebuhr, for instance, is representative of a realist strand whose acceptance of physical power is mixed with an ethic of restraint: in theory, power may be wisely wielded so as to contain violence and sustain moral or religious values. However, there is no evidence that prudent, moral realism can effectively be implemented in a statist, nationalist and/or capitalist context. Perhaps more than anywhere else in our analysis, a complete appraisal of the twin dimension of political thought — theory vs. practice — must be invoked to reveal the anti-ecological (and peace-avoiding) undercurrent in realism.

The (materialist) emphasis on physical force stems directly from a specific "immutability thesis" dear to realists, to which we more than alluded in our discussion of aggression-in-nature. While any philosophical perspective (including ecology) must offer insights on both stable and dynamic dimensions of the social world, realism heavily stresses all-powerful natural laws which, granted, do leave room for original decision-making, but nonetheless condition both an ethic of military force (as those laws emphasize conflict) and an epistemological obsession with recurrent patterns (more on this below); Gilpin has summarized the realist immutability thesis by bluntly stating that "the

such defensive strategies as non-offensive defense, civilian-based defense, or world peacekeeping federations. Cf., amongst others, Robert Johansen and Gene Sharp. We will indeed return to this literature in a later chapter, seeking to critique it and complement it from an ecological perspective.

fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia; ...(this consists of a) struggle for wealth/power among interdependent actors in a state of anarchy."81.

Our point here is not to reiterate the substance of the immutability thesis, but merely to underline its presence and emphasis. It remains perfectly legitimate to identify alleged constants in the history of humankind; and, while a preoccupation with perennial forces may instill a rather unconvincing form of determinism in theorizing, more and more thinkers are careful to avoid that trap. However, from a perspective of ecological peace (and as will be explained later), there is much to fear from an immutability thesis which steadfastly refuses to allow for the creation of a truly better world.

Realism as Reductionist Epistemology

A holistic approach to peace would naturally scrutinize the position of a paradigm vis-à-vis the generation of knowledge. Reductionism is usually expressed as a form of scientism, with atomistic and ahistorical tendencies characteristic of modern social science. Is realism such a modern credo? If so, is it precisely ensconsed in scientistic thought? If not, does it necessarily avoid a reductionist fallacy? The answers are not straightforward, yet still cannot sustain an epistemology of positive peace.

The fact is that, historically, realism cloaked itself with a "progressive" veil of objectivity, positioning itself against moralist or religious tradition. Thucydides was eminently modern in this sense, and there is probably little coincidence that he elaborated a "scientific" approach to war at the very time where another Greek modern, Democritus, sought to popularize a conception of

81 Gilpin, op. cit., p. 7.
being as a succession of atoms. The parallel with post-Renaissance realism is decidedly striking. Machiavelli had barely tempered the ardor of Renaissance humanism that Descartes and Hobbes were joining hands in formalizing a revolution in political thought, insisting on mechanical cause-effect relationships in a largely despiritized, atomized world.

If realism is reduced to an advocacy of "what is", it follows the modernizing current of science and much of its simplifying, reductionist logic. The realist tradition, however, is also immersed in idealist calls for glorious war, "prudent" advocacies of power policies, and pessimistic forecasts for long-term peace and freedom. Must reductionism and atomism necessarily flow from warring ethics and glum acceptance of violent death?

A general appraisal of contemporary realist texts seems to uphold the reductionist thesis. Yet, again, the evidence is at times contradictory, and if the logic of power commands a sympathy for military science and hierarchical approaches to problem solving, one does not escape the thought that contemporary realism may have evolved purely coincidentally in an era dominated by logical positivism and social scientific behavioralism. If this were the case, however, then one would also argue that realism could outlive modernity, that power politics could be exerted wisely and humanely, and that realism could be an instrument of positive change, perhaps emancipation; this seems indeed unlikely, in light of our general discussion.

The "classic" realist authors of the twentieth century are still read and praised, for they still impress by their philosophical and historical awareness. Carr, Niebuhr and Aron cannot be lightly accused of an ahistoricism celebrated by Waltz's 1979 volume and, more generally, by the various strands of the "process" literature. Many such realists, in fact, viscerally attacked what they perceived to be science's misguided appropriation of the "peace problem" -- the
Fourierian or Simonian attempts at engineering peace through neat formulas, which would presumably win over a war-torn historical baggage rooted in human nature. Niebuhr jeered such "naive, ... unqualified rationalists". Carr insisted on searching for historical contingencies, for the historical power of ideology, in any analysis of political struggle and success. And who, today, remembers the Morgenthau who declared, in *Scientific Man*, that "scientism is unable to visualize problems, fields of knowledge, and modes of insight to which science has no access", who distanced himself from Hobbes and Machiavelli by describing their scientism as "in the history of mankind, merely an accident without consequences"?

Still, for all such caution, contemporary realism remains imbued of an almost messianic scientific ethos, rejecting "simple" science but faithful to a method which, expectedly, seems best suited for the discovery of "what is". This, then, is the Morgenthau most remember, articulating his foremost principle of political realism -- politics is governed by objective laws -- and maintaining an "autonomy of the political sphere" which precisely serves the atomism of Newtonian science. Carr and Aron, for their part, were quite candid in expressing their belief in a science of international politics. Bull wrote: "there does in fact exist a close connection between order...and the conformity of conduct to scientific laws"; this, conversely, entails "the possibility of finding conformity to scientific law in social conduct that is

---

83Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
85Ibid., p. 169.
disorderly"\textsuperscript{89}. Even Niebuhr could not shed a rationalist ethic, expressing the Christian confidence in scientific progress: "make the forces of nature the servants of the human spirit...the instruments of the moral ideal"\textsuperscript{90}. And Herz's belief in a scientific theory of international politics is easily discerned from his general extolling of science and its promise of progress\textsuperscript{91}.

Overall, then, realism has chosen to focus on historical constants and has slowly fallen victim of an obsession with recurrent processes. This quest for patterns characterizes most of the recent international relations literature, and whether authors label themselves "realists", "neo-realists", "structural realists", or even "liberal institutionalists", they are all concerned with fixed power games (e.g. prisoner's dilemma, chicken, stag hunt) whose theoretical underpinning stems from the realist tradition.

In sum, the essential point is that realism, while originally inspired by historical analysis, has developed a series of arguments about politics which became easily captured by reductionist social science; Morgenthau's ambivalent position (urging that historical differences be recognized yet ultimately insisting on historical similarities) is indicative of the epistemological pressure within the tradition. This is somewhat of a paradox for the classical realist who associated modern "expertise" with liberal utopianism\textsuperscript{92}; however, there is no need to

\textsuperscript{89}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{90}Niebuhr, \textit{Moral Man and Immoral Society}, p. 256.
\textsuperscript{91}Here emerges Herz, the American liberal as much as the intellectual realist: "atomic energy and other discoveries [...] have [...] opened up almost limitless possibilities. With the achievement of material abundance -- [...] now apparently in the realm of the possible -- a major obstacle in the way of the solution of the vicious circle of power and security competition would have disappeared"; \textit{op. cit.}, p. 251.
\textsuperscript{92}Cf. Herz, \textit{ibid.}, p. 162: "Political realism shows that it is very unlikely that experts in any society would be allowed to retain at any length of time the amount of power which they request for the fulfilment of their aims."
repeat the argument precisely linking realist thought to the creation of a modern technocratic class, whose problem-solving mentality leaves little room for critical suggestions for a better world.

Conclusion: Toward an Ecological Critique of Realism

A political theory allowing for positive peace would, in our view, accept basic ecological premises, in both its ontology and epistemology. The realist tradition never claimed to pursue this goal; this, we fully recognize. However, it remains important to explain the grounds on which realism rejects the ecological utopia, for realism is concerned with "peace" and serves as a politico-intellectual tool designed to convince thinkers and policy makers alike of the legitimacy and goodness of a mere negative peace.

This chapter covered many key dimensions of realist thought which, we knew, did not favor ecological peace. Some points are now obvious, and will not require further explication: realist materialism clearly runs counter to ecological finiteness; homogeneity stands contrary to the principle of diversity; hierarchy, elitism and atomism violate ecology's holistic world view. Yet how are we to interpret other arguments, such as the preeminence of conflict, the insistence on power, the value of prudence, or the immutability thesis?

It may appear, at first sight, that ecology and realism could agree on such themes. But let us beware of observations which may eventually condone the perpetuation of the status quo. On the one hand, Kropotkinian ecologists and Hobbesian realists may disagree on their reading of nature; and truly, skepticism regarding the thesis of mutual aid need not entail the conclusion that men and women are destined to fight. Similarly, the diagnosis of a "power pathology" and a cautionary attitude vis-à-vis the stranger should not necessarily order a warring ethic or the dispossession of individual freedom to the benefit of
a construct, such as the nation-state. On the other hand, to suggest a timeless stability of (pessimistic) human nature may paralyze too easily the quest for a better world.

Stated differently, the ecologist would caution the realist on at least four points (in addition to the remarks above). First is the entire issue of moral aggression, a slippery slope if any. Yes, ecologists would be uneasy to partake in a debate on just war, a centuries-old theme appropriated by realists and misappropriated by anyone seeking to defend any form of aggression. Call it perhaps a dialogue of the deaf: the realist's necessity of battle versus the ecologist's absurdity of battle. Granted, some might describe this ecological position as extremist, as pointlessly anarchistic; such "moderating" influence could be ascribed, notably, to Robyn Eckersley, who maintains an essential role for the state in establishing ecological balance\textsuperscript{93}, and, by logical extension, would presumably accept that an "ecological state" participate in defensive, preventive -- moral -- military action. This, however, merely (and arguably) reanimates the Platonic ideal of a philosopher-king, and curiously exemplifies a form of realism which, just as well, could be dismissed as idealistic. In sum, an ecology of peace is better served by maintaining the possibility of an ontology of cooperation, which is as plausible as (and surely more comforting than) the realist's "reading" of inter-human domination.

This said, as a second point, the ecologist appreciates the realist's obsession with power, and the realist's scolding of the liberal's trivializing of power. However, as mentioned earlier, the realist conception of power is

\textsuperscript{93}Cf. Eckersley, \textit{Environmentalism and Political Theory} (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 175: "the case for an 'enabling State'"; and, on p. 144, she writes about the need for a "concerted ecodiplomacy resulting in a comprehensive array of treaties providing for macro-ecological controls and standards".

88
essentially top-down, visible -- royal, in Foucauldian terms. Here, the ecologist dares the realist to broaden such a conception to account for the various types of constraints on human freedom, which all play a role in perpetuating the anti-ecological status quo of negative peace. The danger of modernity resides precisely in a normalization of power which masks the anomaly of domination and discourages redress. In the language of realist international relations theory, this "conservative" approach to power merely exposes a military chain of command or offers a quantitative approximation of physical resources: here, peace is furthered when a battle ends, when the balance works, when the billiard balls neatly bounce, when A and B decide to cut n% from their arsenal. The ecologist is emancipatory, and seeks hidden power fields; the realist is not only unfamiliar with such critical pursuit, he or she is threatened, as an intellectual and a decision maker, by the exercise.

Thirdly, the ecologist will need to qualify the realist position on immutability, which effectively discourages change. The ecologist's perspective on timelessness is, admittedly, of a resilient nature, yet a nature in constant motion; the spiritual impact of timeless continuity is not to contradict the impulse for a dynamic evolution of differences, for the openness of the future. Ecology, as critical thought, precisely feeds on possibility theorems, on evolving structuration (to use Giddens' term\(^{94}\)). Ecology, then, is a means of empowerment, denied by the realist approach to unchangeability. It is important to mention, in this respect, that realists are not awed or even fascinated by nature. The state of nature is either a datum, to be treated as fact, or an impediment to survival, to be circumscribed by political association and power devolution.

\(^{94}\)We will return to Giddens and the theory of structuration in chapter 4.
Finally, it seems absolutely essential to conclude with the general issue of death in political theory. Many feminist authors have explained how mainstream international relations theory (even liberalism) has trivialized, sanitized the most important dimension of life\(^{95}\) and, by the same token, has utterly forgotten the original purpose of all philosophy. Ecological thought agrees with the critique; in fact, ecology, as a paradigm for peace, is preeminently concerned with valuing death as a seed for life -- accepting the normality of aging and dying yet celebrating the beauty of life. This symbiosis of meaning and experience is completely lost in a realist language focused on strategy, comparative weights, and collateral damage. And, lest we equate realism with the cold jargon of Defence bureaucrats and game theorists, we ought to remember just as well the same coldness and detachment expressed by most classical scholars. A theory of positive peace must consider the organized killing of human and non-human life, in the name of the nation-state or any construct, as a patent absurdity, for mass murder under the epithet of "war" has nothing to do with the normal cycle of life and death. For the scientific realist, there is no such absurdity -- just a historical fact, a datum, a quantitative inevitability. For moral realists, however, death is palpably feared, but no less rationalized as a political ill -- imposed upon societies as a political imperative, or, alternatively, "vanquished" through hierarchical control and material growth.

\[^{95}\text{A good example of this scholarship is Carol Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals", in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Summer 1987), pp. 687-718, and "Wars, Wimps and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War", in Myriam Cooke and Angela Wollacott (eds.), Gendering War Talk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).}\]
CHAPTER THREE

LIBERAL PEACE

Introduction

In this chapter, we must assess the peace proposals and assumptions of a rather vast body of international relations literature, usually labelled "idealist" or "liberal". The normative aims are not uniformly explicit, yet all proponents of this school are ultimately concerned with peace as an ethical and/or instrumental good. Granted, many (if not most) realists would also value peace over war; yet they are more interested in devising stabilizing mechanisms and in exploring a peace imposed by the ("good" actor's) exertion of power. Adhering to classic conceptions, the liberals (if they may be designated as such) cling to a wider notion of peace than the realists' -- admittedly still framed as the absence of war between states, but designed to ensure individual freedom and open channels of communication and exchange.

The objectives of "peace" and "cooperation" then become tightly linked: while liberals may accept the argument that "restricted" demonstrations of peace can increase conflict (i.e. as a security alliance between selected actors), most would also argue that "cooperation" for "legitimate" ends is inherently valuable and inherently "contagious". Obviously, there is a palpable "cooperative culture" characterizing this line of thinking, rooted in the Enlightenment and expressed in objectives of economic progress and the rule of (positive) law: cooperation is a good thing, undertaken by people who seek general creativity
and production, and who trust the arbitrative powers of a neutral court. Cooperation is to part from power, in pursuit of a common good: it is a demonstration of sacrifice and good will, eminently reflective of a love and respect for human life. As international relations theorists, many self-described liberals might refrain from articulating normative concerns, yet their acute interest in "cooperative processes" belies this underlying commitment to peace-through-cooperation (however reified this cooperation might be).

Our goal here, predictably, is to provide an ecological critique of both liberal peace prescriptions and general liberal assumptions, as evidenced in international relations theory: clearly, we must establish whether liberal theorizing is amenable or not to an ecological peace -- the only peace respectful of life, broadly conceived, and necessarily so conceived for the attainment of human peace. Of course, we may already have the answer: the core of ecological thought is, after all, precisely devoted to a refutation of liberal keystones -- growth, science, progress, etc. Still, there is value in performing the exercise in this particular context: at the very least, we will be introducing a body of critical theory to a community of scholars presumably interested in genuine peace, yet apparently unaware of ecological debates.

Liberal international relations theory has pursued several paths in solving the peace problem. While all such paths originate from basic liberal assumptions (progress, reason, unity), they have been followed rather separately by international relations theorists. The first strand in the literature, then (and in no particular order), is that of peace-through-cosmopolitanism, emphasizing a cultural or natural convergence of individuals and nations. The second is that of peace-through-growth; this includes the traditional materialist assumption and the more specific "war-does-not-pay" argument, rooted in observations of interdependence and advocating free trade as a route to global peace. The third
main argument is of peace-through-technocracy -- commanded (perhaps unwittingly) by functionalist thought, and centred on a depoliticization of problem-solving dynamics in an essential context of mutuality of interests. Fourthly is the advocacy of peace-through-rules: in the most optimistic sense, here, a flexible, yet meaningful, international legal framework will minimize discord amongst well-intended actors; in a more "realist(ic)" version, international institutions will enmesh political actors within routinized patterns of cooperative behavior. Finally, many liberals will insist on peace-through-education. These last three paths arguably revolve around a common theoretical core (knowledge and order), and will be discussed as a group.

In sum, aside from (perhaps even embracing) the economistic streak in their argument, many liberals will display necessary characteristics of an "idealism" traditionally opposed to realism: differences may be ironed out through talk; contact spreads understanding; human beings are intrinsically good (sociality does not change that); politics is about effective management, not power quests; good laws will be effective in maintaining order as people are educated in (or socialized into) accepting them.

The ecological critique, in turn, will be articulated along several lines, many of which, admittedly, have been explored before. These will target, among other aspects of liberalism, its materialism, depoliticization, cosmopolitan homogenization, and rule neutrality.

Selecting Liberal Authors

From its origin, the liberal school has been specifically associated with the issue of peace, as witnessed by the various projects for perpetual peace popularized notably by Bentham, the Abbé de St-Pierre, and especially Kant. While Martin Wight extended the "Kantian school" to all revolutionary
doctrines (therefore, including Marxism), Kantianism in international relations is usually understood to refer to the main argument of *Perpetual Peace* (1795) - that war may be averted in the long term, providing that liberal principles are followed by the main actors in international politics. Kant specified certain conditions and proposals which many contemporary liberal authors do not necessarily follow strictly: peace as a function of the inviolable state; republicanism as an essential condition of peace; the peaceful world by no means united under a single jurisdiction; peace feeding on the freedom of commerce and the general ideology of (rational) progress. Still, the basic Kantian message did reach the succeeding generations of international relations scholars: war is an evil which, if sometimes necessary, may be largely prevented through creative engineering -- both in a structural sense and at the level of public opinion.

The aim here, as was the case in the previous chapter, is not to provide yet another exegesis of such an "essential" classic as *Perpetual Peace*; the task has been performed numerous times by recognized Kantian specialists and classically-trained philosophers of international relations. In fact, again, the objective is more to sound those liberals, specifically identified as international relations theorists, who may legitimately capture this particular tradition; some

---


3Some latitude is expected here, for the post-War normative scholarship on peace and world order is not always taught as "international relations literature". While most mainstream theorists of international relations will deny its appurtenance to the field, its proponents have sought entry by first critiquing their positivist colleagues and then calling for a broadening of international relations *qua* interstate to a world politics encompassing states, transnational movements, and value-oriented debates. In sum, the "politics of the global
of them are poorly known to younger scholars, yet they did pioneer many of the ideas explored by contemporary scholarship. The reviewed authors, then, as a whole, will approach peace according to one or several of the "paths" mentioned above, exposing a tradition to be critically assessed from an ecological perspective.

Chronologically, our first references will be to two towering nineteenth-century figures, Richard Cobden and Giuseppe Mazzini, both of whom made their mark as scholars and practitioners. Cobden is important for the lucidity of his writings on free trade and his concurrent impact in repealing protectionist legislation in England (especially the Corn Laws), thus setting the stage for the golden age of British imperialism; the ideology of free trade, so basic to liberal thought (even in the positivist literature, however veiled), is indissociably and historically related to the academic and political work of Cobden. Likewise, but a few decades later, Mazzini exerted a tremendous dual influence on the spread of liberal ideas. He is better known for the political movement of Italian unification which he founded and piloted, at times in exile. Yet the movement was squarely constructed upon "modified" liberal principles, passionately defended by Mazzini in his many writings. Mazzini's essential contribution was to popularize the idea of organic nationhood as the vehicle for human freedom and social peace. At the same time, this was to form the basis of twentieth-century state-based internationalism: a modern celebration of the Grotian ideal, fully endorsed by contemporary liberal theorists of international relations as a background for process-oriented arguments derived from social-choice theory.

The early twentieth century belonged above all to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, whose universalist outlook and concurrent political power
helped construct the League of Nations. The first three decades of the century were quite propitious to liberal ideas, especially in the wake of the First World War, and while no single book by Wilson may summarize his thought on international relations, he did leave numerous speeches which may be used as evidence (though this chapter will exclusively rely on the Fourteen Points Address). On a strictly academic level, however, the liberal argument of the early century was expressed most reputably in 1911 by England's Norman Angell. His *Great Illusion* is a bona fide classic of international relations theory, provocatively and cogently arguing the case of interdependence in modern global society: the contemporary interdependence literature is no more than a refinement (if not merely a restatement) of quite an old text.

The functionalist work of David Mitrany follows, some thirty years later. The belief in a science of peace, so decried by Morgenthau, is perhaps most celebrated here, at least in this century. Mitrany's importance is not gauged by the list of disciples to his work⁴; in fact, the technocratic, depoliticized argument of functionalism was embraced only in part by the founders of European integration, who did not subscribe to the optimistic automaticity of functional cooperation. However, the functional logic, as defended by Mitrany, most certainly played a key role in ushering in the new era of international organization, turning to technical experts and to codified law for a solution in containing conflict.

The theory had to be qualified and refined, however: a better sense of process and a dose of political realism in the main assumptions were both wanting. As a result, functionalism evolved through neo-functionalist,

---

⁴As we will see below, functionalism did particularly impress, nonetheless, on the normative literature of the 1970s and 1980s. Functionalist thought also has predecessors, mostly in Harold Laski, to whom we will also refer.
integrationist and institutionalist variants. The key authors here are Ernst Haas, to whom the ("realist") political qualification of functionalism is credited; Karl Deutsch, who focused empirically on the communicative dimension of integration and international community-building; and Robert Keohane, whose thirty years of scholarship have rekindled the notion of interdependence in international relations theory and restored the importance of institutional analysis.

To this list must be added one book, one name, and one project. The book is the plan proposed by two legal specialists to reform the United Nations: known as the "Clark-Sohn Plan" (1958), it is often quoted as an example of the potential of peace-through-law -- even if some aspects of the plan are progressive enough to warrant its classification into the final chapter of this thesis; indeed, the plan was revolutionary enough to be dismissed out of hand when presented to the Eisenhower administration.

The name is that of James Rosenau. Rosenau himself would resist the epithet of liberal, preferring the "globalist" label for which he worked very hard and with which he is often associated by the scholarly community. Admittedly, Rosenau's eclecticism immensely complicates any classification exercise, and his name ought to reappear later in this work as an example of the "new" scholarship in international relations. However, the liberal bend in Rosenau's writings is unmistakable and should be exposed. He is an imaginative scholar with tremendous influence, yet with palpable limitations. He is a prolific writer, yet his thought may be legitimately captured through a close reading of his last major book, *Turbulence in World Politics* (1990).

The "project", finally, refers particularly to the World Order Models Project (WOMP), but may also extend to the general tradition of peace studies and peace research. The contemporary search for a "peace formula", so
criticized by Morgenthau, dates back to Lewis Richardson’s mathematical work in the 1920s⁵, and has since influenced peace research in pursuing a scientific understanding of the conditions of war and peace; its "liberal"-positivist character, quite transparent, *inter alia*, in Kenneth Boulding’s oft-quoted *Stable Peace* (1978), has trickled down to the regime literature of the past twenty years.

The WOMP, however, is very different: launched in 1968 by an international community of scholars, its purpose was (and still is) to understand peace in the broadest, positive sense, and to devise blueprints (and, sometimes, transition scenarios) for a better world, where objectives of equality, non-violence, justice, and, yes, ecological soundness, may all be realized in the global system. The WOMP will figure prominently in our last chapter as a concrete step toward an ecological critique of international relations theory. However, a liberal bend is clearly visible in the writings of key authors linked to the Project: these are the WOMP caveats which will require discussion in this chapter.

*The Liberals’ Uniting Peace: Roots*

As discussed several times above, an ecological approach to social organization (i.e. an ecological prescription for peace) requires that the diversity of a community be respected. To repeat what is now cliché, the long-term vibrancy of a community depends heavily on its ability to recognize competing approaches to the good *and* to prevent differences from necessarily turning into an endless series of political battles; ecologists are acutely aware of politics, yet

will relish depoliticization *as long as* it does not serve as a mask for entrenched political hierarchies.

Setting aside depoliticization for the moment, what is the liberal position on heterogeneity? A tension is clearly palpable. Liberalism is, of course, built around the atomistic dimension of heterogeneity. The historical purpose of liberal thought was to recognize the inviolability of the individual, and to uphold a productive and progressive social system set in motion by the (more or less regulated) competitive energies of pluralized forces. Any political theorist who is, today, merely interested in the orderly settling of conflict will often be dubbed with the liberal label.

The pluralistic streak in liberalism does contend, however, with the cosmopolitanism embraced by the tradition. Part of the liberal project, of course, is to build bridges between nations and cultures, so as to realize both the utopian conquest of nature and material security (through global comparative advantage) *and* the more romantic ideal of human unity. The paradoxical liberal reflex is to be wary of differences "in the big scheme of things" (i.e. to posit an ontological harmony of interests), while encouraging differences within that context of harmony (for purposes of efficiency and renewal). The logic is not particularly false: too much differentiation is either paralyzing or conducive to multi-edged conflicts; too little is, simply, stultifying. For ecologists, especially for those whose libertarian prescriptions are indebted to the liberal tradition, the challenge is to specify what type of differentiation is exactly to be encouraged, and for what purpose.

In the next two sections, however, we must stress the liberals' essential quest for peace through "unity". As McKinlay and Little have pointed out, the
liberal tradition is inherently globalizing, and the goal of unity elicits both geographical convergence and presumably natural human impulses toward rapprochement. The liberal ontology is, thus, as expected, one of cooperation, with definite logical implications for cultural and political unity at the regional and planetary levels. While cooperative ontologies do appeal to the ecologists, the latter are obviously wary of assumptions of global culture and proposals for world government which are inevitably associated with a cosmopolitan outlook.

The purpose of these sections, then, is to discuss the theme of "unity", as it is optimistically expressed in liberal international relations theory. The concept mostly reflects an anthropological (cultural) understanding of the community of humankind: the focus is on the individual, his/her home (the Earth), and his/her peace. However, it has also served as a springboard for a modified version of liberalism, focused on the nation-state: as we will see below, the nineteenth-century romantics, personified here by Mazzini, closely linked the fate of man/woman to that of the nation, paving the way for a sacralization of state sovereignty which, today, is the (unemotional) flagship of the "institutionalist" literature.

Rather predictably, the cosmopolitan theme runs consistently through the various writings surveyed: it is either advocated as a norm or "read" as part of the unfolding "reality" of world politics. As mentioned, the cosmopolitan value of global unity is quite reflective of a "moderate", optimistic approach to power.

Cf. R. D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems and World Order (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), pp. 44-45. McKinlay and Little offer an excellent treatment of the realist, liberal and socialist approaches to world order, reviewing the models' foundations and applying them to security and economic issues; they divide liberalism into "pure" and "compensatory" streams, corresponding roughly to popular images of the conservative right and proponents of the welfare state.

We borrow directly from the French "sacralisation" and "sacraliser", "to render sacred, to attribute qualities of the sacred".
Cobden, for instance, while not directly claiming a cooperative nature for human beings, condemns the traditional advocacy of balance of power as overlooking the possibility of peaceful growth. For all intents and purposes, then, and with all its bourgeois flaws, Cobden's approach to power and to human nature is that of an idealist -- yet one whose idealism is much more a function of liberal rationalism than of Christian ethics. Thus, we may read, on the one hand, that:

this "rule" [the balance of power] would, if acted upon universally, plunge us into a war of annihilation with that instinct of progression which is the distinguishing nature of intellectual man. It would forbid all increase in knowledge, which [...] is power. It would interdict the growth of morality and freedom, which are power.9

Yet the rationalist assumption becomes more limpid further on:

[The need for defense] arises from a narrow and imperfect knowledge of human nature, in supposing that another people shall be found sufficiently void of perception and reflection -- in short, sufficiently mad -- to assail a stronger and richer empire, merely because the retributive injury [...] would be delayed a few months by the necessary preparation of the instruments of chastisement.10

"Rational peace" is thus the cornerstone of the Cobdenite approach to international relations, whereby the possibilities for global unity are found in the individual. Part and parcel of an ideology of growth (for which no apologies

---

9Ibid., p. 205.
10Ibid., p. 235.
are offered\textsuperscript{11}, yet not quite the cultural argument proposed by later thinkers, the Cobdenite scheme reaches for "the best" within humanness, unfettered by the reactionary demands of governments -- artificial entities, if anything. Cobden thus enunciates his maxim: "As little intercourse as possible betwixt the Governments, as much connection as possible between the nations of the world"\textsuperscript{12}. In later times, liberals would not be so strict as to reject intergovernmentalism as a legitimate path to peace, growth, and security. But in the early nineteenth century, intergovernmental contact was usually associated with war.

Of all the authors consulted here, Mazzini was the only one prepared to embrace war with a passion\textsuperscript{13}. While Cobden might have accepted a just cause, his utilitarian ethos would have him write that "(o)ur object has...been to deprecate war as the greatest evil that can befall a people"\textsuperscript{14}. As discussed in the previous chapter, Mazzini would appear to echo the most frightening calls of Germanic heroism: "War, like death is sacred; but only when, like death, it opens the gates to a holier life, to a higher ideal. I hail the glorious emancipating battles of Humanity"\textsuperscript{15}. Yet the key term is precisely that of emancipation, of revolution directed by the holy nation: Mazzini's totalizing liberalism seeks a new world order, to be forged from below against established

\textsuperscript{11}"We shall offer no excuses for so frequently resolving questions of state policy into matters of pecuniary calculation. Nearly all the revolutions and great changes in the modern world have had a financial origin"; \textit{ibid.}, p. 238 (footnote).
\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 216 (emphasis in original).
\textsuperscript{13}As we will see below, Woodrow Wilson did not shy away, as well, from the duty of war. Yet, while ideals of freedom and justice were undoubtedly important to Wilson, he was above all the practical politician in defense of American economic interests. For a realist appraisal of Wilson, see Inis Claude, \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{14}Cf. Cobden, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 194.
\textsuperscript{15}Cf. Mazzini, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 92 (emphasis in original).
castes. Cosmopolitanism easily finds its reserved niche. Witness first the
economic realist: "(H)umanity is one sole body. Think you that it will suffice
to improve the government and social conditions of your own country? No, it
will not suffice. No nation lives exclusively on its own produce at the present
day"16. Then the moral philosopher:

I abhor that which is generally called politics... I abhor everything
which separates, dismembers, and divides; everything which
establishes different types independently of the great ideal to be
followed; everything which implicitly denies human solidarity...

[T]here is only one real scope: the moral progress of man and
humanity... Italy matters little to me, if she is not to accomplish
great and noble things for the good of all.17

Ultimately, with the simultaneous passing of the nineteenth century and
Mazzini himself, a particular brand of cosmopolitan theory would effectively
come to an end. Many aspects of Mazzini's liberalism would not be echoed by
mainstream theorists, in his century and ours, for he expressly rejected the
utilitarian perversion of liberal thought18 while grounding his critique of realism
on specifically moral, religious grounds19. Yet Mazzini did contribute

16Ibid., p. 117.
17Ibid., pp. 117-118 (emphasis in original).
18It is worth quoting Mazzini at length here: "Materialism has perpetuated our
slavery by poisoning our souls with egotism and cowardice. Materialism [...] substituted for the idea that life is a mission and duty to be fulfilled, the idea
that it is a search after happiness; [...] even this idea of happiness was
corrupted into an idea of pleasure, of the happiness of a day or hour, to be
bought by gold [...] Materialism broke asunder that social bond [...] to make the individual the center, end, and aim of our every endeavor, and substituted
for the idea [...] of a providential educational design and common progress, the
cold lifeless conception of a fatal alternation of triumph and ruin, life and
death"; ibid., p. 218 (emphasis in original).
19Witness Mazzini's analysis of world events in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries: "the great problem of the day was a religious problem. [...] That
substantially to the liberal current of intellectual history. As we will see below, he remained a product of the Enlightenment, fully endorsing a progressist path to peace based on popular education. International unity, however, formed the crux of his belief. He may not have suggested that such advocacy be used to translate imperialistic, homogenizing designs20. However, by legitimizing the nation-state as an instrument of the good, he did open the door to influential arguments in the liberal international relations literature, globalist and statist in kind, whose contribution to positive peace remains dubious.

Mazzini’s legacy was much more apparent (even if still in a partial way) in the writings of Wilson than in those of Angell. Beginning with the latter, however, we see a resuscitation of the Cobdenite argument and the renewed exposition of classic liberal views on human nature and human relationships. The influential concept of interdependence is clearly laid out in The Great Illusion (thus decades before the "complex interdependence" school of the 1970s), derived specifically from economic observations and reflective, presumably, of the self-interested nature of humans21. Thus, while Angell does not portray human beings as altruistic or necessarily good, they do appear as reasonable creatures who should understand the benefits derived from

which others called the theory of Machiavelli, appeared to me to be simply a history, the history of a period of corruption and degradation"; ibid., p. 50 (emphasis in original).

20Indeed, according to Ganguli, Mazzini’s "radical liberal-nationalist solution" specifically aimed at the "self-determination of peoples, [the] creation of republican governments on the basis of popular sovereignty, [and the] confederation of free nationalities"; ibid., p. 29 (emphasis added). Decentralizing schemes, however, do stop at national boundaries, where the dissemination of authority centres is deemed improductive. Mazzini thus wrote: "Federalism implies a multiplicity of aims [...] and resolves itself, sooner or later, into a system of aristocracies or castes. Unity is the only security for equality, and the due development of the life of the people"; ibid., p. 67.

cooperation -- mutual progress and peace. Humans' sociality is, then, both necessary and constructive, at all levels of aggregation: herein lies the foundation of cosmopolitanism.

Angell's views on cooperation are particularly interesting, as he articulated, in powerful language, undoubtedly one of the first "psycho-historical" arguments for peace in the international relations literature. Consider this particular rejection of realism:

We are all [...] losing the psychological impulse to war [...] How, indeed, could it be otherwise? How can modern life, with its overpowering proportion of industrial activities and its infinitesimal proportion of military, keep alive the instincts associated with war as against those developed by peace?\(^\text{22}\)

The eruption of the Great War, shortly after the release of the book, would seem to indicate the fallacy of Angell's cosmopolitanism\(^\text{23}\), to which he gave status of natural law\(^\text{24}\) and which he built on questionable assumptions about morality and power. The point is not to criticize unduly Angell's optimism about peace; quite correctly, he refused to believe that political divisions and ensuing violent conflicts are the natural fate of humankind. The problem lies in Angell's facile alternative:

The greater economic interdependence which improved means of communications have provoked must carry with it a greater moral interdependence, and a tendency which has broken down profound

\(^{22}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 205.}\)

\(^{23}\text{Angell refuted criticisms by claiming never to have argued for the impossibility of war -- only that war would be the path of the unenlightened, the emotional.}\)

\(^{24}\text{Cf. Angell, }\text{op. cit.}, \text{p. 246: "Natural laws are thrusting men irresistibly towards co-operation between communities and not towards conflict".}\)
national divisions [...] will certainly break down on the psychological side divisions which are obviously more artificial.\textsuperscript{25}

Unity amongst \textit{a priori} similar beings is then easily stimulated by apparently neutral technological forces. The process is not explicitly teleological, yet there is an unmistakable impression of a world evolving "naturally" towards unity -- a welcome unity of individuals (not of states) sharing the bounties of nature and frolicking in the advances of science. Angell would never have advocated an enforceable unity under a world state, and was careful to address the problematic nature of military power\textsuperscript{26}. Yet he surely underestimated, as the enlightened liberal, what powerful armies and navies can do to ensure a cultural hegemonic victory, posing as a moral good for humankind\textsuperscript{27}.

Angell's universalizing vision of peace was meant as the logical extension of a process of interdependence based on non-military factors -- namely, financial credit. Angell believed in an economics of peace (as we will see again below) and understood the rising influence of non-state, transnational actors (namely, financial institutions). However, while he did not seek formal,

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., p. 314.
\textsuperscript{26}Quite correctly, Angell wrote that "men will work best when left to unseen and invisible forces"; \textit{ibid.}, p. 268.
\textsuperscript{27}Thus witness Angell's rather simplistic argument: "It is evident that the foreigner does not buy England's products and refuse Germany's because England has a large navy"; \textit{ibid.}, p. 69. While the key to the successful British enterprises was, admittedly, a high level of quality and efficiency, these were obviously developed, through time, under the protective umbrella of military power. One does not escape the mercantilist argument: force and material growth are historical twins; and culture is their legacy. This is not to say, of course, that military power is always a successful or constructive means of influence, especially in this century -- and, indeed, as mentioned, both Angell and ecologists are aware of the problematic nature of military power. Yet Angell's search for alternative power fields proves unconvincing: basically, if behavior is altered through non-military means, then it is ethically acceptable. This is precisely what an ecologist would reject, for the argument then sanctions most attempts at homogenization.
centralized political structures, he offered no suggestions on the means to safeguard human diversity; he may have advocated decolonization, but did so purely according to a cost-benefit analysis (favoring Britain, obviously, although he would have argued that the financial security of Britain is India's gain -- and the world's) 28.

Of course, none of the above comes as a surprise. The aim, here, was merely to state the classic, non-mercantilist cosmopolitanism expressed by the British school of international relations. Could the Cobdenite view sustain a legacy in the twentieth century? Should we have expected international relations theorists to continue defending the "fundamental reality" (and goodness) of a benign, largely stateless, and convergent world of traders and bankers? Our discussion of realism does provide a good part of the answer. As for liberalism, it did not die, of course, but its globalizing outlook wavered between statist and non-statist poles. This could be construed as a dichotomy between a confederal advocacy of international organizations and a functional/cultural path to a world government-society. Yet it should not conceal the solid endorsement, by all liberals, of international law and freer trade as paths to peace.

Thus Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points Address to the U.S. Congress (January 8, 1918) reflected a much toned-down -- "realist" -- version of Mazzini's world-order vision based on the nation-state. The birth of the League of Nations may well be traced to Point 14: "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." 29 And so the commitment to the sanctity and equality of

28 Ibid., p. 35.
nations may be inferred from the other Points, most of which called for the evacuation of occupied territories and the creation or strengthening of nation-states, such as in Poland and the Balkans. However, as the core of Wilsonian peace is located in free-trade policies, it is doubtful that a formal recognition of state equality could provide the basis of a diverse world. In fact, one should not forget Wilson's commitment "to fight and to continue to fight," so as to impose the definitive American version of "unity-in-diversity".

The "Grotian" view embodied in Wilson's Points does converge, to some extent, with the functionalist school; as we will elaborate later, both approaches are firmly based on the assumption of peace-through-law and on the positive role of international institutions. But Grotians and functionalists do not necessarily convey the same globalizing message. Admittedly, functionalism is not a monolithic school. It evolved from the writings of the "Red Professors" (especially Harold Laski) to those of Mitrany, from an essential concern with capitalist exploitation -- which sharply contrasts with Wilsonian liberalism -- to a narrower focus on inter-group politics. Yet functionalists, from Laski to Mitrany, appear united in proposing a social internationalism qualitatively

\[30\text{Cf. Points 6-13; ibid., pp. 537-538.}\]
\[31\text{Ibid., p. 538.}\]
\[32\text{The teleology is strong, and revealing of the particular intolerance of this version of totalizing liberalism: "The programme of the world's peace [...] is our programme [...] the only possible programme"; and, further, "the culminating and final war for human liberty has come"; ibid., pp. 536, 539.}\]
\[33\text{David Long has pointed this out very effectively; cf. "International Functionalism and the Politics of Forgetting", International Journal, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 356-379. Harold Laski would write, in his Grammar of Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967 [1925]), p. xx, that "given the class-relations of the modern state it is impossible to realise the ideal of an effective international community": rejecting here the transcendental character of law (as a mere expression of dominant economic interests), he rather believes in the institutionalized (and ongoing) process of "rational discussion" across borders, conditioning a "habit" of cooperation.}\]
different from the Grotian model of (formal) state equality. Does this entail a world state? The functionalists, seeking international peace through the efficient delivery of "services", would only rule it out as an unpractical alternative.

The important point, however, is that states get in the way, politicizing exchanges to an unbearable extent. Whether the ultimate goal is freedom or happiness, it will depend on what Mitrany defends as "practical tasks" -- again, that of providing social services. Surreptitiously, or perhaps unwittingly, the idealist Mitrany slips into a politico-cultural form of imperialism, wishing for the day where small states will surrender some of their formal equality for the haven of efficient services: "All the efforts to devise an international system, all the demands for restraining national sovereignty, center upon this issue of how to bring about the voluntary and progressive evolution of world society."

Frontiers are to vanish, the functional approach "overlaying them with a natural growth of common activities and common administrative agencies." The commonalities in question are not detailed specifically, yet, if the logic is applied globally (and there is no reason for it not to be), they are sure to translate Western modes and values.

Mitrany was committed to find a formula which would secure unity in diversity. The goal is indeed essential. Yet what Mitrany did achieve is to demonstrate, once more, the inherently totalizing objective of liberal thought. Liberal international relations theory, more or less subtly, would continue pursuing the task after the Second World War, inspired by both the Grotian

---

36Ibid., p. 35.
37Ibid., pp. 62-63.
38This was his declared aim in *A Working Peace System*; cf. p. 27.
realism of Wilson and the socio-technical approach of Mitrany, yet also heavily
influenced by the rise of behavioral science.

*Uniting Peace: The Contemporary Literature*

Behaviorism indeed did tinker with the liberal school. The "unity
arguments" to be gleaned from neo-functionalists, integrationists, and regime
theorists do not appear as straightforward as in the writings of idealists, for that
particular strand of scholarship abandoned much of the prescriptive intent of
international relations theory\(^39\). The post-War "liberal institutionalists" (to use a
broad generic) have been identified as liberals largely by default, interested as
they were in the so-called "low politics" of economic and social relations. Thus
Keohane admits candidly that "although I subscribe to [the] belief [in individual
freedom], this commitment of mine is not particularly relevant to my analysis of
international relations"\(^40\). Liberalism is thus squarely associated with
institutional process, with the *mechanisms* by which power bows to the forces of
law and by which institutions shape political behavior: "liberalism [...] serves as
a set of guiding principles for contemporary social science; [...] it stresses the
role of human-created institutions in affecting how aggregates of individuals
make collective decisions"\(^41\).

Returning to the question, then, how does the positive (non-normative)
liberal theory of international relations contribute to the general cosmopolitan

---

\(^{39}\)Of course, prescription did not disappear altogether, as policy studies in
international relations commanded a strong following. Yet there is a difference
between prescription in the "broad" sense, asserting new values and preferred
world orders, and "problem-solving" prescription designed to shape decisions
according to the immediate environment.

\(^{40}\)Cf. Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in

\(^{41}\)Ibid.
argument for peace? As a process-oriented literature (a study of "what is"), very little is advocated specifically; one must usually recognize an indirect impact, as legitimizing the use of particular axioms, concepts, or methods. This said, there does exist, in that literature, an underlying interest in peace, understood as the regulation of interstate conflict in some confederal context. Some declarations by key authors are worth noting. Deutsch et al., for instance, stressed their normative concerns at the outset of their landmark publication: "We undertook this inquiry as a contribution to the study of possible ways in which men some day might abolish war; [...] we are seeking new light with which to look at the conditions and processes of long-range or permanent peace."42. In the same vein, Etzioni opens his oft-quoted book as follows: "the rise of regional communities may provide a stepping-stone on the way from a world of a hundred-odd states to a world of a stable and just peace. Such an achievement seems to require the establishment of a world political community [...] yet not a world empire."43.

Haas, for his part, is much more reserved -- much impressed, in fact, by the daunting obstacles set by political conflict. There is no grand peace formula for Haas, not even a longing for peace; at most can we welcome some level of integration through painstaking engineering. And the same realism, the same caveat stressing the culturo-economic background of homogeneity for integration, may be found in the "transnationalist" literature pioneered by

---

Rosenau (in early works\textsuperscript{44}) and Nye and Keohane\textsuperscript{45}, and developed by regime theorists.

In sum, the sundry institutionalists (or "neo-liberals") cannot be criticized for overtly articulating a universalizing and homogenizing agenda. However, if there are no grand schemes revolving around world government or even an explicit defense of global capitalism, neo-liberals do not totally escape some form of cultural imperialism. In particular, the "transactionalism" usually associated with Deutsch et al., but integrally part of the entire interdependence literature, does reflect well the cultural globalism of liberal thought. As we know, Deutsch et al. were interested in communicative ability as both an indicator and a necessary condition of integration, and this general emphasis on multiplicity of channels was to permeate later studies of cooperation among Western societies\textsuperscript{46}. As neutral as the tone of the argument may be, and without imputing particular motivations to authors, only a fine line separates mere observation of communicative integration from the ethical defense of that observed reality. Integration theory is cultural theory: it follows a path to peace according to international exchanges destined, precisely, to integrate modes of living, with all the dangers for assimilation which this may entail.

Integration theory would (hastily) be pronounced "obsolete" in the 1970s\textsuperscript{47}, in view of repeated common-market failures in the South, but


\textsuperscript{45}Cf. particularly their early publication, \textit{Transnational Relations and World Politics} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

\textsuperscript{46}The first major work of international relations to follow in the wake of Deutsch was Ernst Haas, \textit{The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

\textsuperscript{47}Cf. Haas, \textit{The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory} (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975). For an
reemerged under different labels and arguably achieved a synthesis in the writings of Rosenau, where expressions of cultural globalism are rampant. Hints of Rosenau's thought have already been offered, yet a few more details are pertinent here. Culminating with *Turbulence in World Politics*48, Rosenau's works have essentially focused on "world politics" as processes within a large (global) polity, where the relationships between political actors necessarily transcend state boundaries and evolve along the historical current of modernization. Rosenau begins with a dynamic ("cascading") concept of interdependence, and, drawing particularly on insights from organizational theory, investigates the learning capabilities of actors as they associate and dissociate in an increasingly complex world. Rosenau's chief interest is precisely in the integrative and disintegrative tendencies of the contemporary world, although his work is scarcely a critique of modernity49. As a liberal, Rosenau embraces modernity, and is more concerned with describing the erosion and assertion of various actors within the modern context. Thus, seeking (legitimately) to demarcate himself from statist theories of international relations, he uncovers a "bifurcated" world of states and non-state actors (for an effective, succinct assessment of that research program, cf. Roger D. Hansen, "Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts", *World Politics*, Vol. 21 (1969), pp. 242-271.


49Cf. particularly Rosenau's discussion of "sources of change" in *Turbulence*, pp. 12-13. Except for his reference to technology, his ontology is disappointing, as many of his "sources" are essentially symptoms of change: these include such elements as "transnational issues" (pollution, disease, etc.), decreased governmental problem-solving ability, "organizational decentralization" (or "subgroupism"), and the increase in individual skills and self-consciousness.
which he assigns new labels), and analyzes their respective roles in what amounts to a gigantic, open-ended system.50

In line with neo-behaviorist social science, Rosenau painstakingly resists specific value commitments in his scholarship. Yet he is not entirely "successful". Behind the "neutral" description of global centralization and decentralization lurk certain assumptions about the good, a "good" which is presumably associated with a particular remedy for peace. The clearest normative position is his confidence in expertise (to which we will return). Yet, admittedly, he seems much more careful on the issue of homogenization, selecting as preferred world a continuation of the bifurcated status quo, balancing evenly the centralizing and decentralizing forces which he sees as most important (namely, states and NGOs); this is a middle-of-the-road position, which Rosenau describes himself as merely "pragmatic"51.

However, this is not where our reading of Rosenau-the-cosmopolit should linger. Aware that Rosenau's works do not advocate specific peace-


51Cf. Table 16.1 in *Turbulence*, p. 447, and also p. 461: "[T]he bifurcation of world politics appears to be a structural arrangement worth defending. It has the potential for a creative reconciliation of all the great antitheses of politics". The point is, however, that his view of the great dialectic is arguably uninteresting. His focus on states and NGOs, referred to as "sovereignty-bound" and "sovereignty-free" actors, not only caricatures the debates on sovereignty but also avoids the entire economic dimension of global power -- i.e. its Marxist and neo-Marxist aspect. Rosenau rarely manages to convince the reader about the loss of authority from "above" to "below" when he neglects to discuss how the "above" is merely changing form and how much the "below" has really achieved. Of course, Rosenau would reject the criticism, brandishing his selected evidence to support his thesis; yet that evidence is, arguably, largely impressionistic and self-supportive.
inducing structures or values, yet aware, just as well, of the influence of Rosenau's thought on international relations theory (especially on the field's positive valuing of globalization), we rather become interested in the globalizing dimension of Rosenau's cultural message. The reference to culture is indeed deliberate, partly because cultural arguments are vital to liberalism and partly because Rosenau often couches his own arguments in specifically cultural terms. Indeed, in Turbulence, Rosenau often invokes a "global culture" or a "culture of world politics". Yet, while Rosenau is right in discerning a certain elite (and mass) convergence toward both rationalism and Western cultural products, his argument makes two mistakes, underestimating both the existence and the benefits of cultural diversity while attributing an unwarranted pacifying power to Western cultural hegemony.

As a whole, then, the Rosenauian world looks very good to the author. Consider the following: "it is exactly at such times [of high complexity and dynamism ...] that individuals are most free [...] to make choices that previously might have been made for them through their links to macro structures and processes"; "the decay of ideology [...] in a decentralized world [...] overarching ideologies are out of place"; "shifts are occurring in the underlying culture of world politics which may eventually lessen the intensity

---

52 As hinted above, the South holds a very minor place in Rosenau's scholarship: it is a glaring omission in his uniquely eclectic and thorough references.
53 In fact, Rosenau does subscribe to the view of declining hegemony, a concept which he does not use in cultural terms: "the emergence of the multi-centric world has sharply reduced the possibility that any single collectivity can dominate global politics [...] with publics more analytically skillful and more ready to question authority, hegemons have found it increasingly difficult to exercise political control"; cf. Turbulence, p. 289.
54 Ibid., p. 150 (emphasis added).
55 Ibid., pp. 414-415 (emphasis added).
and reshape the nature of global conflicts"; "cultural variety can fragment what might otherwise seem like an obvious focus of shared global norms"; "global culture seems likely to undergo transformations toward a broadened conception of self-interest and an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of interests pursued by others"; "television overall is politically neutral, merely a channel through which the cascades of postinternational politics pulsate."

These quotes are, arguably, representative of the normative undertone of the book, illustrating both the liberal optimism and, consequently, the liberal approach to globality. Thus: modernity is liberating (and so the world is finding new sources of freedom); the oppressing, totalizing "ideologies" are disappearing (the people of the world may now breathe more easily, empowered as they become with the universal discovery of rationalism and the apparent death of Big Brother); there actually is a world political culture (and so the people of the world may finally understand each other, shedding the pettiness of local interests); finally, globalization is occurring largely by itself, with scarce help from the powers controlling the means of communication.

Our objective was not to vilify Rosenau, but simply to offer an interpretation of his seemingly "neutral" description of globalizing processes, and to emphasize his indirect contribution to a liberal theory of peace based on global unity (Rosenau does not claim that the "turbulent" world which he describes is either actually peaceful or conducive to peace). Rosenau's liberal work does verse, sporadically, into new conceptualizations of international processes. Similarly, peace researchers and WOMP adherents straddle the

56Ibid., p. 420.
57Ibid., p. 421.
58Ibid., p. 421.
59Ibid., p. 346.
boundary between liberalism and "something else" (the latter more than the former), and thus deserve a brief reference here, as we conclude this section.

The liberal character of that scholarship is particularly apparent in its approach to globality, usually insisting on some form of (supposedly benign) world government as a path to a better world; peace may be located anywhere on the continuum, from the absence of war to an approximation of the positive ideal\textsuperscript{60}. The unifying concept is undoubtedly that of "global humanism", popularized by Robert Johansen\textsuperscript{61}. Global humanists articulate a value structure aiming at a proper balance between the commonality and the differences in humankind: global institutions are to secure a peace framework based on demilitarization, material well-being, human rights, social justice, and ecological health. Global human "interests" and a global community are both immanent and good\textsuperscript{62}. Even Southern contributors to the WOMP share this global outlook, and while they may be more sensitive than Northerners to the cultural imperialism of Western liberal thought, they still favor some form of overarching authority as an essential path to peace; Ali Mazrui, for instance, torn between his Africanity and his Western training, seeks solace in an awkward (and unconvincing) advocacy of a "world federation of cultures"\textsuperscript{63}.


\textsuperscript{63}Cf. Mazrui, \textit{A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective} (New York: Free Press, 1976). To his credit, Mazrui's quest for a "world culture"
We will return in greater detail to this branch of scholarship as we analyze the liberals' path of peace-through-law, for a strong belief in the potential of positive law animates the peace and world order researchers. The mere point, here, was to draw attention to the homogenizing potential of the global humanist approach: assimilation of the weak and supremacy of Western values may not be the conscious or intended objective, yet the practical proposals are by no means benign in this respect.

The Utilitarian Dimension

Historically, liberal peace has been indissociable from a belief in material progress -- in other words, from a domination and use of nature by human beings. This basic liberal flaw has been analyzed extensively by ecologists64: quantitatively, the growth assumption violates the finiteness principle of nature, while qualitatively, separating the human from nature, it violates the principle of interconnectedness among species; the (qualitative) misunderstanding of nature provides a rationale for the (quantitative) abuses of nature which, ultimately, destroy humankind.

would ensure that "Western culture [...] be infiltrated by non-Western values to help make the global pool of shared cultures less Eurocentric and more diversified" (p. 11). Yet, practically, the objective will likely remain elusive, as Mazrui not only favors the sustainance of (Western-style) economic growth, but both reduces the concept of culture to selected languages (five) and ends up proposing, as a political structure, basically a reformed UN (with all its bureaucracy and centralization). Rajni Kothari, in Footsteps into the Future (New York: Free Press, 1974), also directs some efforts toward a reformed world governmental structure, yet is much more critical of Western thought and much more clearly aware of the importance of diversity; despite a few reservations toward his book, we must consider it as one of the closest approximations to an ecological approach to peace in the literature on world politics. (We will return to Kothari in the next chapter.)

64The ecological critique extends particularly to the literature on "sustainable development" -- a contradictory concept invented by liberals.
Clearly, then, growth-oriented peace prescriptions in international relations theory should receive attention here. A thorough review of works by mainstream trade theorists, while seemingly imperative, would quickly become redundant, and, in any matter, would venture far beyond those works selected here for their location in the genealogy of international political theory. The objective, then, is to document the utilitarian penchant of authors studied here. In some cases, and in line with the cosmopolitan world view, this will translate into an open advocacy of free trade. In basically all cases, free(r) trade will be understood as a necessary component of interdependence.

Open commercial lanes, thus, are presumably to improve the chances for peace by increasing material bounty, directly reinforcing (political) rapport of friendship, dissuading enmity by increasing its "opportunity cost", and, therefore, instilling an element of "stability" in international relations. However, the argument does not hold from an ecological perspective. While trade can be positive, excessive specialization, dependence on foreigners for essentials (whose definition keeps expanding), uneven terms of trade, and high yields are all seriously threatening: either bioregions (or ecosystems) suffer directly, with necessary political impacts, or, conversely, political conflicts erupt from adverse economic conditions and jeopardize both individual security and surrounding nature. This panacea called trade-based growth, then, is misleadingly stable (depicted nomothetically by theorists, fostering regional uniformity) and inappropriately dynamic (releasing unbearable energies, upsetting local lifestyles too drastically).

Radical, non-statist critiques of trade theory are very recent. The nineteenth- and early twentieth-century demands for liberal trade, in all their optimistic ebullience, reflected a historical context unfamiliar with ecological crises and global social injustice, and so the point here is less to pillory Cobden
and Angell and more to trace the evolution of an idea in international relations theory. Cobden's stance, to begin with him, is indeed quite transparent: war does not pay, trade does, and trade is brought (and reinforced) by peace. Thus Cobden made points about the fiscal burden of militarization and the counterproductive influence of sea power, unequipped for commercial diplomacy and arousing foreign resentment: "these vile feelings of human nature [...] have been naturally directed [...] to thwart and injure our trade." The general tone is not necessarily callous, though, demonstrating the genuine desire for peace, as much for its own sake as an instrument to riches: "free trade [...] arms its votaries by its own pacific nature, in that eternal truth -- the more any nation traffics abroad upon free and honest principles, the less it will be in danger of wars.

The same line of argument is, basically, also upheld by Angell. As mentioned above, the core of Angell's thought is based on a recognition of mutual vulnerability in a modern world linked by financial capital: war, in this case, literally means a marked, global reduction in standards of living -- a repudiation of progress. The utilitarian approach to peace is apparent in Angell's frequent discussions of the capital costs of war and, in fact, of the

---

65In modern times, state leaders would learn that war can actually pay handsomely and that foreign markets may be richly tapped through other means than the trade in goods.
66"Our object has not only been to deprecate war as the greatest evil that can befall a people, but to show that we have no interest in maintaining the status quo of Turkey; and, consequently, that the armaments [...] might be reduced, and their expense spared to the taxpayer of the British Empire"; cf. Cobden, op. cit., p. 194.
67Ibid., p. 229.
68Ibid., p. 222; cf. also the reference on p. 194 mentioned above: "war as the greatest evil...."
actual benefits of selective conquest. Of all authors surveyed here, Angell is perhaps the least committed to peace for its own sake. The focus is overwhelmingly on material progress as the key to happiness, and Angell provides us with the most striking anti-ecological statement in our study of liberal international theory:

Struggle is the law of survival with man, as elsewhere, but it is the struggle of man with the universe, not man with man [...]

*The planet is man's prey.* Man's struggle is the struggle of the organism, which is human society, in its adaptation to its environment, the world.  

No such radical language is readily gathered from our (admittedly) restricted review of Woodrow Wilson. The latter's decisive commitment to trade- and growth-based peace is nonetheless famous, as reflected in Points 2 and 3 of the January Address: "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war..."; "the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace [...]"  

The same assumptions are no less essential to the functionalist school. While functionalists concentrate their theorizing effort on the (depoliticizing and self-fulfilling) process of technical cooperation, it is clear that the purpose of cooperation is to ensure the efficient, global delivery of "tangibles" -- goods, but especially services. Thus, related objectives of trade and growth are unavoidable here. Even Laski, the social democrat, would write plainly that "a tariff *for revenue only*, as opposed to tariffs which attempt to protect the

---

69 Thus, conquest can pay, as long as its purpose is to instill *order*, through policing, in the conquered territory; cf. Angell, *op. cit.*, p. 138.


71 Cf. Link (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 536-537.
domestic industries of a given State, seem [sic] to me a clear path to international peace"72. And Mitrany specifically tied international services to a higher human ideal, "contribut[ing] to the achievement of freedom from want and fear [...] broaden[ing] the area of free choice for the common man"73.

The post-War, non-normative liberal literature would, of course, steadily refrain from uttering such statements. Certainly, not much textual evidence may be excised from our texts to directly uphold the utilitarian argument for peace; at most, one may assume that the confidence in modern technology, expressed above all by Rosenau, must logically extend to a support for freer trade and innovative means for (mass) production. Still, as a whole, the detached neo-liberal literature has played an important role in perpetuating the assumption regarding peace-through-growth, precisely by not questioning this particular foundation of contemporary "institutionalism". The various regimes analyzed by neo-liberals (mostly in trade, finance, and resource management) are the very breath of the international, growth-oriented order urged by the classical liberals and implemented through U.S. hegemony. The international cooperation clearly valued by positivist liberals is eminently destined to support the principles of peace-through-growth.

More than hints of the argument also seep through the peace and world order literature. The strong academic relationship between peace research and neo-behavioral institutional analysis, exemplified notably by Russett, necessarily commands a commitment to growth; in one particular piece, Russett insists on the unprecedented "prosperity" of the modern age, and includes "moderate growth" and a "high level of economic activity" among several necessary

72Cf. Laski, op. cit., p. 614; emphasis added.
73Cf. Mitrany, op. cit., p. 96.
conditions for peace\textsuperscript{74}. This partiality for growth also characterizes the Southern literature within WOMP\textsuperscript{75}, heavily influenced as it is by the South's "inferior" political position and, more pertinently, its incapacity to fulfil the basic needs of many of its people. The equation is that of peace-through-equity-through-growth, and the acceptance of the liberal competitive credo. Thus Mazrui writes that "in their [the South's] relations with the developed world the task should remain one of increasing the competitiveness of at least a region as a whole within the southern hemisphere\textsuperscript{76}; and the "reciprocal vulnerability" advocated elsewhere merely restates the assumptions of classical trade theorists and, even, some deterrence theorists! Mazrui's position is far from marginal, encompassing evidently the dependency literature, but also extending to even more radical WOMP scholars, such as Kothari\textsuperscript{77}.

In sum, the liberal theory of international relations, as sampled here, draws a near consensus on the possibility of peace through material growth which, according to the liberal formula, is best attained through open-door policies of trade. The noted exception is Mazzini, who specifically condemned

\textsuperscript{74}Cf. Russett in Stephenson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 188, 191.
\textsuperscript{75}Yet even Northerners associated with WOMP or sympathetic with the WOMP agenda will often resist omitting "growth" as a path to peace. Of course, the advocated policy of growth will be qualified and presumably "understood" not as a defense of limitless or unpurposeful growth; but rarely do such authors specify when growth should stop, who should grow, what should grow, and how the products of growth can ensure some approximation of a positive peace. Cf. particularly Gurtov, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 172: "Economic growth that creates jobs and enhances life can proceed along with protection of the environment and conservation of resources"; the language clearly preserves some of the basic commitments of the modern managerial society.
\textsuperscript{76}Cf. Mazrui, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 293.
\textsuperscript{77}In his otherwise admirable book, Kothari insists on agriculture as a "catalyst for growth" in the South and endorses the "green revolution" -- which has since proven an ecological curse. The green revolution has also skewed landholding patterns: Kothari recognizes this, but believes that the technology can be used rather harmlessly. Cf. Kothari, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 59.
the utilitarian and materialistic approach to social progress. Mazzini is not a marginal footnote in the history of international liberalism, and should not be easily dismissed. His fading legacy as a revolutionary liberal, of tremendous appeal to many Southern intellectuals, and with all its flaws, rather serves as a reminder of the divisions within liberal thought and of the successful cooptation of liberalism by secure bourgeois groups.

*State, Technicity, and the Enlightened Peace*

As much as liberalism is pulled between plurality and homogeneity, it is also torn between equality and hierarchy, between empowerment and depoliticization, between individuation and technicity. The tensions may not be easily abated, in spite of liberal claims. In International Relations, liberal theory has stressed the importance of "expertise" in solving those common problems which may obstruct peace. Liberals assume a fundamental convergence of interests in society, even in a "society of states": the point is to educate parties into "seeing the light" and/or to use rational skills in identifying the "location" of a mutually acceptable agreement. A problem-solving, liberal peace will thus rely on international functional agencies and their technical experts, on international law and its "impartial" authority, and on a global education of masses toward one or the other version of the truth.

Law, education and rationality have evolved as basic liberal themes towards which ecologists, especially in an international context, have manifested a substantial degree of skepticism. As hinted above, an essential tension lies between the emancipatory and managerial dimensions of liberal thought. In principle, "managerism" is alien to liberalism, which was developed as an emancipatory framework and should presumably reject the centralization, discipline, and relative disempowerment associated with managerial order. A
more "realistic" ("Grotian"?) appraisal of the political environment would seek to maintain the liberating core of the theory, yet develop policies in line with the "reality" of power and hierarchy in a system of states. The "sacralization of states" defended by Mazzini thus takes a very different perspective in twentieth-century international relations theory, for while the romantic Mazzini theorized for the sake of the people, contemporary liberals see mostly the state -- its interests and its presumed rationality.

In other words, peace-through-experts, peace-through-law, and peace-through-education may become all contingent upon the reality (indeed, the necessity) of states, interacting as rational actors and expressing the fundamentality of peace. Ecologists will thus point out the limitations of this liberal peace. First, as we know fully well, interstate peace does not guarantee individual peace; here, liberals and realists converge. Secondly, the reliance on experts, despite Mitrany's optimism, is not amenable to a participatory peace: a functional separation of issues and politics, unwittingly of state and society, effectively disempowers those for whom peace really matters. Thirdly, this same reliance on experts eschews the necessary creativity for peace: experts are efficient problem solvers, yet agreeable contracts (which merely formalize power relationships) go only so far in fostering peace. Finally, while enthusiastic calls for education do project an appealing future of general, elevated wisdom, they may revert to the same type of missionary activity decried here in an earlier section, while serving the interests of the elite; the same conservative scenario may also be associated with law.

The argument linking peace to functional depoliticization has been suggested several times above. Actually, in its pure version, indeed its truly liberal version -- that of Mitrany --, depoliticization was meant to transcend the state system which the post-War liberals accepted as given. To his credit, then,
Mitrany understood the limitations of Burkean democracy; ecologists would sympathize with Mitrany's longing for a "working democracy", to replace a mere "voting democracy". Aware of the divisive, parochial, and, indeed, disempowering, influences of states, Mitrany would have them integrate in some form of super-state -- yet one not prone to tyranny, but serving as a problem-solving centre, staffed by experts presumably appointed apolitically. What would appear as a formalized separation between state and society would be, in fact, a (liberal) withdrawal of the bureaucratized state at the service of an integrated global society.

Can peace be secured by "fine-tuning" modernity, or even by entrenching modernity -- finding opportunities in the new tasks it imposes? Both Haas and Rosenau have believed so. While Haas exposed Mitrany's political naïveté, and while he avoided a specific focus on peace, he did emphasize the integrative possibilities inherent in functional organizations.

The process is to be laborious, in view of both the complexity of issues and the political interests involved. However, the essential message is that of recognizable contract zones, accommodation of interests (not harmony), and organizational learning through time. From the early neo-functionalism evolved a flurry of theoretical variants, including Peter Haas' focus on "epistemic communities", Oran Young's description of "institutional bargaining", and Haas' own work on learning. Again, the various neo-neo-functionalists will

---

78Cf. Mitrany, op. cit., p. 36.
79This is Mitrany's "social view of peace [...] the idea and aspiration of social security taken in its widest range"; ibid., p. 92.
80Cf. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p. 35: "integration remains possible within the context of task-fulfilling international organizations".
not claim a direct relationship between technical cooperation and world peace; yet, clearly, they do see such cooperation as a building block to peace. From an ecological perspective, however, the institutionalists' depoliticization poses a problem not because it suggests political naiveté, but because it detracts from the more important issues at hand -- for which technicity can do little.

The (again, indirect) relationship between expertise and peace is also expressed by Rosenau; in fact, this is the domain where Rosenau's account of process most readily yields to normative statements. Early in *Turbulence*, for instance, in a discussion of the "underlying order" which apparently exists objectively, he states rather innocently that "human intelligence is capable of resolving or at least ameliorating problems"\(^8^2\). But the specific preoccupation with problem-solving ability is more fully conveyed later on, when we read rather astonishingly that "[the] frequency and scope [of errors and misjudgments] seem destined to diminish as the microelectronic technologies become standard equipment in foreign offices"\(^8^3\) and that "human intelligence cannot take full advantage of artificial intelligence"\(^8^4\). Rosenau may nonetheless caution repeatedly against technological havens, yet most such statements are immediately followed by an optimistic counterresponse\(^8^5\).

The legacy of functionalism has even extended to the post-war normative literature. Thus Johansen specifically identifies "depoliticization" as a path to the reduction of war, and, as with Mitranv, links the concept to a focus on

---


\(^8^2\)Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, p. 49.

\(^8^3\)Ibid., p. 323.

\(^8^4\)Ibid., p. 332.

\(^8^5\)*Turbulence* is literally replete with pro-con arguments giving an initial impression of neutrality, but ultimately settling for the liberal, optimistic version.
global constituencies. The role of experts is no less crucial for Johansen, as he advocates a "centralization of functional control and planning" as one of two directions of "power diffusion", along with the "decentralization of political structures". Hence, while Johansen seeks to foster a global society with shared values, he holds it contingent upon the enforceability of law—the law of states, at the outset, but ultimately the law of the world state.

Evidently, then, the theme of functionalism, conveying the favorable liberal assumption about objective knowledge (and the scientific bias for systemic order), may be logically related to those other themes of law and education: experts guide the legislative process, while the "necessity" for experts elicits widespread training; each element plays a crucial role in maintaining the ordered, peace-inducing liberal system.

This said, it would be unfair to depict the entire liberal literature according to the conservative (and ecologically dubious) framework enunciated above. The global humanist tradition, particularly, approaches the role of law from the specific perspective of the individual: legislated peace, here, is aimed at ensuring minimal welfare and security conditions for the planetary citizen, rather than merely entrenching the sovereignty of states. This tradition has been inspired by the seminal defense of peace-through-law in the contemporary literature, articulated by Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn. Refining an argument dating back to Wilson and, in fact, surely to Grotius, Clark and Sohn stressed that "there can be no peace without law". However, as mentioned, this law is not necessarily designed to preserve a rigid state system, whose multiple and unaccountable jurisdictions have directly contributed to war and suffering. The

emphasis is thus on world law, "uniformly applicable to all nations and all individuals in the world and which would definitely forbid violence or the threat of it as a means for dealing with international disputes."^{88}

From an ecological perspective, positive law remains an ambiguous solution to the problem of peace. Proponents of law can scarcely avoid the critics' pointing to the dependence of law on power -- in fact, to the expression of law as power. Surely, the international law of great powers, defended by both liberals and realists, can only promise the peace of the strong -- an interstate peace and the global imposition of certain values usually associated with the successful economic system.

Yet what about the world law advocated by the normative liberals? Is there any way that such law could truly reflect a sui generis global consensus on peace, and be implemented independently from the global power structure? Why would the law "work", and why would it further positive peace? These are not easy questions. Most proposals are essentially based on the United Nations format, which, in fact, is already structured as a world government, issuing and feebly enforcing "legislation"; those proposals seek to sharpen both enforceability measures and the sheer "peace values" embraced by the UN (disarmament, economic equity, individual dignity, "sustainable" resource management, etc.). The Clark-Sohn Plan, for instance, lists six "basic principles" and three "supplementary" ones, demonstrating the authors' understanding of the economic, social, political, and military dimensions of peace^{89}. The intention is clearly to remove powers from sovereign states to the

---


^{89}Principles include: enforceability; the use of force only in self-defense; world judicial tribunals and organs of mediation/conciliation; a permanent world police force ("fully adequate"); complete disarmament of all nations; effective
benefit of the world authority, and to implement effectively the basic liberal values mentioned above (which are all progressive). Yet, again, can the proposal lead anywhere but to a new form of statism -- of "machinery"? And may a reformed UN conceivably arise from a clean power slate?

Similar questions may be addressed to the more recent generation of global humanists. Johansen realizes that a world government is very difficult to implement, but does not seem unfavorable to the idea. He himself proposes a world "governing machinery", with all the predictable elements: assembly, council, administration, security and economic agencies, human rights commission, environmental authority. Can this machinery indeed merely "coexist with [a] global populism [...] transcending the limits of class and national boundaries"? Gerald and Patricia Mische also want to assert the centrality of the individual in global politics, and global legal structures play an indispensable role in that matter. Again here, the description is familiar: assembly, constitution, judiciary, executive, monitoring system, enforcement system, fiscal powers, grievance system. Similar approaches may also be found in Mazrui and Kothari; in fact, in the former case, the model seems even less progressive than the Clark-Sohn Plan.

---

world machinery to bridge the world economic gap (cf. their World Development Authority); an active, virtually universal participation in the world authority; world law (on war prevention) to apply as well to individuals; restricting (for the moment) the powers of the world organization to issues of peace maintenance. *Ibid.*, pp. xi-xiii.

90This is the expression used by the authors; *ibid.*, p. xii.


Finally, liberal theorists of "world politics" are usually fond of stressing education as a (complementary) path to peace. This was a theme favored by Mazzini, who urged to "recognize no privilege except the privilege of high-minded intelligence as designated by the choice of an educated, enlightened citizenry to develop talents and social forces". The same preoccupation is evident in recent prescriptive scholarship. Gurtov argued that "education will be a crucial source for promoting global awareness and Global-Humanist values"; Patricia Mische stressed that "the importance of education cannot be overemphasized"; and Mazrui wrote that "a world which is governed on the basis of a federated system of cultures has to put a special premium on education and training".

It may be argued that a discussion of education takes us away from the specific dynamics of "international" politics. Admittedly, this is at best a public policy issue, around which there is no readily identifiable problem of (international) collective action; liberal institutionalists do not theorize about education (and would certainly not object to "better education"), and if the issue must be debated, we should perhaps solicit the input of the numerous scholars working on the topic in fields totally different from international politics.

At that rate, however, the already uneasy relationship between the normative and positive literatures in international relations would surely turn into a dialogue of the deaf. More to the point, the theme of education may be legitimately invoked in view of its relationship to science-expertise and law-order. Yet caution is required again, as in the discussion on law, for not all advocacies of "education" are elitist, obsessed with high technology, and

---

96Cf. Mazzini, op. cit., p. 32.
98Cf. Mische, op. cit., p. 75.
otherwise aiming at the solidification of the anti-ecological, peace-threatening industrial/capitalist structure; Kothari, for instance, is well aware of the different edges to education as power tool and source of social renewal, and his own advocacy is specifically tailored to the reinsertion of the marginalized individual in his/her community\textsuperscript{100}. However, without disputing the motivations of authors quoted above, not all ambiguity may be shed. Education should not be confused with yet another globalizing attempt, however unintentional, at imposing modernity on (typically Southern) people who actually know better. Global humanists may be given the benefit of the doubt and Mazzini, writing in different times, is understood as such. Education takes its place on the liberal path to world peace, oscillating between the blinding future of modernity and its often sorry past.

Conclusion

Is the liberal tradition to be as ecologically problematical as realism? In principle not. After all, liberalism has emancipatory roots and does believe in the permanence of peace. The authors surveyed here might overlook the negative repercussions of a liberal order, yet they are all optimistic enough to believe in cooperation as more than a strategy of political or military domination. As we know, liberalism has directly influenced ecological thought, providing a conception of individual autonomy and spiritual freedom that is necessary for ecological living. Several of our liberal authors are indeed ecologically aware, at various degrees.

However, liberalism, perhaps less bluntly, is guilty of many of the excesses characterizing realism. In fact, following an ecological analysis such

\textsuperscript{100}Cf. Kothari, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 62-65.
as this one, with its focus on basic assumptions, realism and liberalism appear much more closely related than usually assumed\textsuperscript{101}. Already, at first glance, there is much "realism" in the integrationist and institutionalist literature, which is fully aware of the political obstacles to cooperation; Keohane himself confesses to being both a realist and a liberal. And while the normatively-oriented liberals may not call themselves realists, many among them (especially in the South) clearly appreciate the realities and the potentialities of power. None of this should come as a surprise, for realism has not evolved as a philosophical tradition \textit{per se}; as a conservative policy framework driven essentially by fear, it offers no positive design for the future, no "utopia". Realism is best opposed to idealism, etymologically and theoretically, yet idealism itself does not carry sufficient weight as a philosophical tradition. Modern realism evolved concurrently with liberalism: Locke did not shed Hobbes, Rousseau was not unenlightened, Angell was not a pacifist at heart, and both Carr and Herz sought a liberal morality in a harsh world of power.

Ecologically, then, liberalism is especially vulnerable to charges of homogeneity and materialism -- two points already discussed at length. As captured by theories of international relations, and despite its advocacy of social equality, liberalism also lends support to a certain form of social hierarchy jeopardizing the very freedom it claims to defend: this is the logical corollary of policies designed to depoliticize issues through functional means, and entrenching the power (and not merely the wisdom) of knowledge-holders in society. Law and education, while similarly assigned an emancipatory role, may just as well reinforce the hierarchical structure. In sum, liberal

\textsuperscript{101}K. J. Holsti makes a similar (though not identical) argument, subsuming part of the liberal school in the "classical" paradigm of power and states. Cf. \textit{The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory} (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), chapter 1.
international relations theory offers no guarantees that its approach to
depoliticization and its focus on knowledge will effectively foster equality. By
masking the ugly reality of politics, liberals in effect instill a false consciousness
of security and discourage genuine movements for reform. Admittedly, the
liberal school of international relations is also associated with a
"transnationalist" literature which, itself, flows into the literature on new social
movements. As we will see later, the evolution of the field toward an analysis
of (system-challenging) movements is to be welcome. As it stands, however,
transnationalism remains a descriptive analysis of process, theoretically
proximate to that of interest groups and scarcely concerned with the issue of
peace.

The statism still clinging to much liberal scholarship thus poses
problems. Setting aside the relationship between statism and technocracy,
already explored above, a basic point should be raised concerning the link
between statism and epistemology. The remark has already been addressed to
realists, and applies here especially to the positivist strand in the liberal school.
Simply put, the point is that liberal positivists, endeared with rational-choice
approaches to historical development, use the state as a perfect tool for the
"cooperative models" with which they are interested. In other words, liberal
positivists need the state system so as to learn about cooperation, i.e. about
peace. As we know, of course, ecologists cast severe doubt on the capacity, for
that type of epistemology, to generate knowledge that is both interesting in itself
and valuable for peace.

Liberalism's main advantage over realism lies in its optimistic belief in
human nature. Although the debate is not totally conclusive in ecological
thought, most ecologists would be sympathetic to a view of nature as
fundamentally cooperative; in this sense, liberals do give hope for peace. But
can this be carried further? Here, ecologists are particularly wary of the "game" devised by liberals, that which (like any other game) allows for competition between opponents within a cooperative infrastructure. Freedom, renewal and change are presumed to follow from this friendly and/or "fair" clash. Yet much of this sounds hollow to the ecologist. Can progress to a better world really emerge from competition, as opposed to internal struggle or resistance to an oppressor? Is the liberal game as harmless as its organizers pretend? And isn't liberal "change" a form of immutability that is, in effect, extremely rigid?

Liberalism, however applied to relationships between states or nations, retains foundations of universality, individuality, equality, and progress. A liberal theory of international relations, then, will advocate global unity as an inherent good, endorse policies of growth that fit the globalizing principle, rely on knowledge-holders in order to facilitate international relationships and weed out political resistance, and favor the interchangeable ("equal") actor in its epistemology and policy. While ecologists accept that some commonality unites humankind, that peace must be experienced by the individual, that hierarchies can forbid the attainment of peace, and that the necessary freedom for peace depends on some form of progress, they cannot applaud the peace proposals and assumptions articulated by their distant liberal cousins.

\[102\] This depiction of liberalism is defended, among others, by John Gray; cf. Liberalism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986), p. x.
CHAPTER FOUR

TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL PEACE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY?

Introduction

The realist and liberal perspectives to international relations have been steadily challenged over the last three decades, particularly since the mid-1970s, and more radically since the mid-1980s. The most interesting attempts have aimed at instilling a normative globalist discourse, refining the integrated processes of domestic and international governance, and deliberately introducing various types of critical theory. The field now offers a wider range of possibilities for a more differentiated understanding of political process and of the stakes involved in contemporary global life; for the first time in quite a while, International Relations is poised to be interventionist (politically, socially) and an active participant in multidisciplinary debates.

The formulation of an ecological approach stands to benefit from many of those changes in theorizing. The aim, for international relations theory, is not merely to legitimize the death of nature as a substantive issue of concern, but especially to favor an ontology and an epistemology in line with ecological thought. Only the latter will allow International Relations to alter its understanding of peace and reconsider its hands-off approach to the political world under study. The key to an ecological approach is indeed to eliminate the concept of "environmental problems" from our language: problems, by
definition, are to be "solved", and problem-solving approaches, by definition as well, tend to reproduce the status quo. The ecologist is interested in creating a world where all individuals and communities alike may not only survive, but thrive in their freedom and self-actualizing potential. There is an inescapably "international" dimension to this project, which will be formulated only when international relations theory can shed its ontological and epistemological baggage inherited, in great part, from the enlightenment: in other words, it must accept a shift away from mere problem solving and toward both a bona fide reflexion on the human condition and an active role in political change.

Ecologists are able to explain the absence of peace through critiques of domination; deep ecologists and social ecologists alike will argue that the killing of nature is symptomatic of a general sanctioning of domination, whereby natural human tendencies toward some form of environmental appropriation extend to large-scale patterns of control and expansion. The modern project has played an essential role in legitimizing and strengthening social/environmental control: the central relationship between ecological critiques and Marxian/post-Marxian critical theory thus emerges without surprise. However, if ecology is to become synonymous with freedom and peace, it is also to transcend the modern critique -- for the killing of nature is not exclusive to modernity.¹

The challenge for international relations theorists, as they seek to understand how "otherness" can entail organized violence and unnatural suffering, is to account for both the essentialism of human nature and the historicity of human practice. Human essentiality would appear elusive: the human as either fearful of others, or aggressive, or cooperative; the human as a...

¹An "ecology" that would sanction the torture of individual living beings or the "pacification" of lower castes -- but still sustain ecosystems -- would also embody a dubious ethic, and is to be ultimately rejected; still, it is less offensive than the imperial alternative, modern or non-modern.
mere survivor, or as builder and/or controller; the human as instinctual animal or rational being. The basic postulate, however, would be to recognize the human's biological need for harmony with nature (not necessarily wild, but not reduced to aesthetic appendage), yet rationally empowered to construct schematas, institutions, and ethical codes designed to infuse meaning in his/her relationship with other beings. Meanwhile, humanness cannot be divorced from its historical existence: to understand war and suffering, and to prescribe liberating scenarios, is to pass a judgment on the possibilities offered to humankind in light of its temporal experience -- which is destined for continual change.

Thus, an ecological theory of international relations must be constructed on both analytical and normative grounds. Yes, it must be, above all, a tool for human improvement: a discursive construct seeking a respect and acceptance of the "other", conceived in the broadest sense, and hence encompassing the "other" community, society or nation; a theory of international relations here contributes to the quest, in political theory, for the individual's peace, freedom, and the like. But ecology goes beyond utopian discourse, seeking a historical understanding of the related assaults on the human and non-human "other". Such understanding, however, cannot be attained by techniques associated with the objectification of the "other" -- namely, the tools of Newtonian science and logical positivism.

On what recent theoretical efforts, then, can we build an ecological project for international theory? Several trends and some key authors are mentioned below.
The Ecological/Environmental Theme in International Relations

At the outset, we should put in perspective the direct references to ecology in international relations theory. Quite appropriately, most accounts of the ecological/environmental theme in the international relations literature identify its source in the work of Harold and Margaret Sprout, who analyzed the relationship between "man" (unit) and "milieu" (environment) in foreign policy and international relations and, to that effect, specifically used the expression "ecological approach".2 The Sprouts' work, however, while (eventually) concerned more directly with the global ecological crisis, cannot be usefully integrated in our particular exercise. Indeed, while the Sprouts were (at least) twenty years ahead of their time in formally associating the concepts of ecology and international relations, they remained unquestionably entrenched in the mainstream of shallow ecology and systems theory.

In the Sprouts' early work, in fact, actual references to natural ecology are almost absent. Their chief interest was to sensitize readers of international relations, then deeply immersed in the behavioral revolution, to the relevance of "external factors" in decision making. The "ecosystem" provided a useful analogy in this quest for a broader approach; yet "system" was the key term, in a string of concepts rolling, almost interchangeably, from "environment" to "milieu" and "ecology". Obviously, then, and aside from the utilitarian approach to nature whose axiomatic status is not even discussed, the Sprouts adhered to a disaggregated conception of the ecosystem positing boundaries between agent and context. To their credit, they sensed the impending problem:

"It may [...] be practically impossible to determine when certain environing

---

factors cease to environ”3. But this is left as an afterthought, indeed perhaps as an obstacle of such monstrous proportions to their argument as to warrant its deferral to future generations.

The Sprouts’ later work is only slightly more suggestive for our purpose, effectively retaining many of the limitations outlined above. The Sprouts did hint at a more appropriate use of the “ecological approach”, quoting a reference to the ecological perspective as a “distinctive way of seeing” which, applied to international politics, describes “a system of relationships among interdependent, earth-related communities”4. But the narrow systems approach and the unit-environment dichotomy would still predominate5. In fact, while the Sprouts had shifted to a more specific discussion of environmental problems, they had also shirked from theoretical debates, opting for a policy-oriented textbook whose essential objective was to alert readers to global resource scarcity and to the need for global approaches to problem solving (such was their more palpable contribution to the poorly theorized field of international environmental politics). Predictably, the ecological problematique is squarely resourcist, while the main policy recommendation for global reform reveals a facile cosmopolitanism: the current, “archaic” international system “survives from an era when the human population was not one but many”6. Indeed, and in line with conventional thinking in international relations, the source of the problem is to be found in Westphalia7: this is where history begins -- a diplomatic history of the states system, to be apparently understood separately

---

5*Ibid.*, p. 15: "The focus is on individuals or populations interacting with the environment in patterns that constitute a system".
7Cf. chapter 3, *ibid.*
from other historical watersheds (such as the enlightenment, which receives no mention in the book).

By all means, this critical assessment of the Sprouts was not meant to depreciate their work, whose shortcomings merely reflected the academic current of the time. For better and for worse, the Sprouts deserve the substantial space granted them here, in this mapping exercise. They did spawn an important concept and launch an essential inquiry, however awkwardly and, at times, misleadingly. The Sprouts once held a central position in international relations theory. Today, while their name is infrequently quoted, its legacy is more than palpable.

The most interesting (though short-lived) effort to build on the Sprouts has come from Dennis Pirages, whose 1983 article in *International Studies Quarterly* still represents the most audacious theoretical attempt at devising an ecological approach to international relations theory\(^8\). While incomplete, the article went beyond the Sprouts in hinting toward an emancipatory critique\(^9\); it also surpassed Pirages' own earlier effort, more widely quoted, but of little theoretical interest\(^10\). Granted, Pirages did not refer to critical theory, used the resourcist language characteristic of shallow ecology, and refrained from a systematic critique of the modern project; yet his call for harmony between

---

\(^9\)"Hinting" is the operative word, here: "the development of the ecological perspective in the social sciences represents a liberating step forward"; ibid., p. 254.  
\(^10\)Cf. Pirages, *The New Context for International Relations: Global Ecopolitics* (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1978). This is a policy-oriented book, of liberal-reformist orientation, and focusing on ecology *qua* scarcity. To its credit, it anticipates much of the 1980s literature on sustainable development: indeed, note the call for a "sustainable modernization", i.e. modernization without heavy industry (p. 249).
nature and institutions\(^1\), along with his skepticism of modern experiments with
nature (specifically, the Green Revolution\(^2\)), cannot go unnoticed. Pirages may
not have been concerned directly with peace, but his fleeting article must be
appreciated, today, as a distinct contribution toward multidisciplinarity and
normative commitments in international relations. It still stands as the last
published work of reasonable fame to have deliberately suggested an ecological
approach to international theory.

In contrast, the field has witnessed an abundance of scholarship on
environmental issues since the early 1980s, approaching ecology as
"environmental problems", and using realist/liberal frameworks to analyze
either the political impact of such problems or the political mechanisms for their
solution. In the literature on environmental regimes, for instance,
environmental issues become case studies for international collective action, the
display of political power by knowledge holders ("epistemic communities"), or
the process of international norm diffusion by interest groups\(^3\). Alternatively,
the literature on "environmental conflict" builds on traditional preoccupation
with "resource wars" and investigates the international political ramifications of

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 253.
\(^3\)Cf., *inter alia*: Peter Haas, *Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of
International Environmental Cooperation* (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1990); Oran Young, *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for
Natural Resources and the Environment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1989); Ethan Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of
Norms in International Relations", *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 4
(Autumn 1990), pp. 479-526; Linda P. Shields and Marvin C. Ott, "The
Environmental Crisis: International and Supranational Approaches",
*International Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 6 (1974), pp. 627-648; Per Magnus
36, No. 3 (Summer 1982), pp. 511-536; Fen Osier Hampson, "Climate change:
building international coalitions of the like-minded", *International Journal*,
degrading/changing ecosystems, particularly migration\textsuperscript{14}. Again, here, the "environment" encompasses a series of tangible, specific obstacles to "peace": those exist, undoubtedly, but they are also treated as givens and as part of a large puzzle which, however interdependent, may be tackled piece-meal.

The literature on environmental issues is, therefore, avowedly interested in contractual dynamics (and contractual breakdown), not in pre-contractual reflexions on modernity and change. As with the Sprouts, it can be acknowledged, in this mapping exercise, for having contributed to the general legitimization of ecological degradation as an "international relations issue". However, there is an obvious two-edged sword to that literature, which has tended to overlook the ethical, epistemological and ontological complexities inherent in the ecological crisis. To the dismay of most ecologists, yet ever so predictably, the ecological problematique has been appropriated by mainstream scholarship and addressed from a largely managerial perspective. Arguably, as a direct consequence of this normalization, the ecological crisis has had little impact in fundamentally reorienting thinking in international relations.

This said, we cannot overlook some parallel theoretical attempts to the more formal literature on international environmental affairs. The less radical among them have found a (precarious) niche in International Relations, particularly as extra-disciplinary contributions from environmental group officials reasonably at ease with the concept of sustainable development\textsuperscript{15}.


\textsuperscript{15} Those officials, and other specialists working for mainstream groups, are usually highly educated and drawn from management, legal, and scientific fields. They are bureaucrats and researchers, not "activists" in the classic political sense. Their employers are (mostly) highly structured (American)
These include the modest (liberal) efforts at "redefining security"\(^{16}\) and the more systematic attempt at formally bridging the fields of environmental law and international relations\(^{17}\).

That literature has allowed the field to become more cognizant of the global stakes involved in the ecological crisis (costs, political rivalries, Northern vs. Southern perceptions of the problematique), the likely success of various international problem-solving devices (taxation, regulation, tradable pollution permits\(^{18}\)), and the wide range of participants on the global eco-political scene (IGOs, NGOs, INGOs)\(^{19}\). As a whole, then, it has provided a sympathetic environmental groups, often working with government, and performing think-tank-type research on ecosystem degradation and environmental economics. Such groups include, among others, the World Resources Institute, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the National Wildlife Foundation. More formal research institutes also contribute to environmental debates; in Canada, the Institute for Research on Public Policy is quite prominent.


voice to environmental activism, albeit with one consistent message: governments, corporations, and interest groups are fully empowered to solve the crisis and will likely come to a rational understanding of the problems at hand and of the necessity for global cooperation; the rather optimistic assessment usually extends to the evaluation of global conventions and declarations, which all come to represent some step in the right direction.

That material has thus remained inextricably tied with policy advice, directly stimulating governmental discourse and action, and acting mostly as a data pool for international relations theorists. It has indeed provided useful summaries of intergovernmental activity on specific environmental issues\textsuperscript{20}, and, at times, insider's analyses of political processes\textsuperscript{21}. But the point remains: despite its welcome role as "environmental sensitizer", its precise ("pragmatic") emphasis on environmental problem solving (as opposed to ecological critique) sheds little light on new theoretical avenues in International Relations and, in fact, may well discourage critical thought.

On the other hand, the theme of ecology has also influenced a more progressive trend of scholarship, whose link with International Relations is, however, usually considered peripheral. While the formal status of that scholarship may be of concern to us at this stage, its content remains suggestive


and provides hope for a future reconstruction of the field. More importantly, there is no reason why that ecologically sensitive literature should not be legitimately considered as part and parcel of international relations theory.

The network of theorists considered here is quite integrated, and representative of both North and South. Many of them have been associated with the World Order Models Project and its World Policy Institute. The WOMP and WOMP-related scholarship, initially critiqued in chapter 3, may now be reappraised.

The point established earlier does remain valid: the WOMP writings of the 1960s and 1970s did not wholly succeed in shedding a questionable universalist ethos and in eschewing the growth models which they were debunking. Northerners appeared overly confident about the benign character of "global humanism", while the Southerners' legitimate quest for global economic justice compelled them to advocate dangerous growth policies in their home countries.22

But the world order literature, along with peace research, is not to be dismissed. The WOMP, specifically, evolved from its legal-functionalism of the 1960s to a more elaborate discourse, in the 1970s and 1980s, focused on the rights of the oppressed and buttressed by extensive empirical study of the global system. This evolution is succinctly documented by Richard Falk and Samuel Kim, two central figures of the Project23. While the ecological problematique would be tackled more seriously only in the late 1980s24, the ecologist remains

impressed by the early references to ecological balance as part of a more general
normative framework for a peaceful future.

Ecology is thus essential to the crucial concept of positive peace, popularized by peace researcher and WOMP scholar Johan Galtung. Among other WOMP or WOMP-type scholars, it receives attention from Mazrui: "The value of ecology is still derivative, linked too directly to the needs of man [...] There may still be one more step to take. The step does imply going back to totemism, and investing in the environment a value independent of man"25. Gurtov, for his part, articulates an ecological awareness throughout his well-known book, relating it specifically to positive peace26. Johansen lists "ecological balance" (along, namely, with disarmed peace) as one of four key global problems, "also [...] stated as world order values"27. Patricia Mische moves beyond the conventional literature by advocating a cultural basis for a global ecological peace28. The radical Kothari, for all the contradictions inherent in his policy proposals, is perhaps most aware of the relationship between ecology, peace, freedom, and local self-management29; readily acknowledging his debt to Gandhi, he states his opposition to "the incipient

consumerism and the growing giganticism of both the state and the modern economy"^30.

Actually, the list of authors specifically concerned with ecology, ecological peace and global socio-politico-economic processes could be extended almost ad infinitum. As we now know, peace and world order theorists, through references (sometimes only occasional) to the formal jargon of International Relations, have received passive recognition (and frequent dismissals) in the field. Their work, oscillating between normative proposals for a better world and eclectic assessments of the global crisis, represents essays in political or social theory, in the classic sense^31. Were they formally considered as essays in international relations theory, they would completely transform the curriculum. The same must be said for the works of ecologists (or "eco-theorists" of all backgrounds) whose analyses matter to international relations, but whose names are never associated with the field. Thus, many "new" names could appear here, but, for the sake of convenience, will be saved for the next section. Yet, to conclude here, if one such name may be imposed on the discipline, at least in view of her distant rapport with WOMP scholars, it should be that of Vandana Shiva.

Shiva's main contribution to international relations theory is her ecologically-informed critique of Northern domination over the people of the South. Trained as a natural scientist, and once working for the Indian nuclear program, she has come to understand how Western capital and Western science have allied with Southern elites to flood Southern lands with dangerous products.

^30Ibid., p. xxi.
^31Admittedly, such theoretical efforts are often of a limited range, poorly aware of their philosophical baggage, and formulated as pragmatic policy recommendations. Yet they do remain theoretical works: they tell us what is good, what is wrong and why, and what there is to be done.
(particularly in agriculture). In its open criticism of modernity, the critique is substantially different from dependency theory (to be reviewed later). In her first major book\textsuperscript{32}, Shiva lucidly explains the disastrous effects of the Green Revolution in the Punjab, showing how apparent political conflict between distinct nations was, in fact, directly stimulated by the skewed landholding patterns emanating from high-yield monocultures -- as rich Hindus, exploiting foreign markets, gradually took control of the land and expelled the dispossessed Sikh farmers. She notes how monocultures increase local dependence on Western know-how and capital, and how global market forces necessarily create a wage gap amongst farmers. She draws the evident link between genetic engineering, "improved strains", and centralized research -- never to the benefit of local people\textsuperscript{33}. And, of course, she testifies to the ecological absurdity of monocultures and non-leguminous, water-hungry cash crops such as rice or wheat.

None of this would seem too terribly original. Yet Shiva is one of the few political writers to have clearly understood the relationship between Western global hegemony, ecocide, and internecine violence amongst the poor. Her activist work with the Chipko movement\textsuperscript{34} has not only allowed her to


\textsuperscript{34}Chipko is India's (and one of the world's) best-known environmental group, based on Gandhian ideology and mostly composed of rural women. Cf. Shiva, "People's Ecology: The Chipko Movement", in Saul H. Mendlovitz and R.B.J. Walker (eds.), \textit{Towards a Just World Peace: Perspectives from Social Movements} (London and Boston: Butterworths, 1987). Chipko, in fact, may be the most important activist movement in the entire South, in view both of its success and its Gandhian approach to localized ecological peace. A growing literature already exists on Chipko; the best book to date is Ramachandra Guha,
articulate community-based solutions to corporate domination, it has especially sharpened her appreciation of the fundamental clash between local peasants (especially women) and the elite cartels within state apparati, research institutes, and the military-industrial complex. As a Southern ecofeminist and an astute political analyst, it is fundamentally her critique of modernity which must be appreciated by international relations theorists. For our purpose, then, Shiva must be particularly remembered for demystifying the notion of "the global" as a heavily-laiden term, popularized by the North, and denying the existence of "the local" -- best embodied in Southern rural life: as Shiva argues so well, through globality, the North exists in the South, but not conversely.

Shiva's work is an excellent example of radical international relations theory -- reinterpreting international process, questioning the ontology of concepts (and the epistemology of science), and courageously suggesting alternatives for a better world. Inevitably, this discussion already impinges on later sections, and so we shall stop here. A reference to Shiva, as both a declared ecologist and an international theorist par défaut, nonetheless seemed


35Shiva gives the example of nitrogen, manufactured for explosives during the Second World War and in sudden need for a market after the war -- in this case, as a fertilizer; international agencies played a key role in subsidizing the product, giving it away in some cases. Cf. Shiva, The Violence of the Green Revolution, pp. 69-70.

36Cf. Vandana Shiva, "Global Bullies", New Internationalist, No. 230 (April 1992), p. 26. The same point is made by Neil Middleton et al., in Tears of the Crocodile: From Rio to Reality in the Developing World (London: Pluto Press, 1993), p. 5; this is not a book on international relations theory per se, but the critical arguments on development and "environmental imperialism" are very similar to Shiva and Kothari; in fact, an entire critical literature on sustainable development could be discussed here and formally integrated in an ecological critique of international relations theory; but the scope of the discussion is arguably wide enough.
imperative, especially so as to provide contrast with the resourcist and positivist literature particularly valued in North America.

*The Ecological Dimension of Alternative Security Proposals and Futures Designs*

Thinking about the possibility of an ecological peace between nations (or otherwise sovereign groups), we may reflect on the particular techniques of conflict resolution and peace creation as well as the various "end-states" in international design. In other words, two classic questions may be posed: 1) How are disputes to be resolved without recourse to mechanisms which would simply ensure new cycles of suffering? 2) What type of global structure may sustain positive peace, and under what conditions may it prosper? Such questions, indeed related in a framework of ecological peace, have also been answered in the past, with various degrees of success.

We may deal with conflict resolution quite summarily. While "ecology" and "defense" might appear irreconcilable concepts in a world of nuclear weapons, sophisticated conventional weapons, and contemporary experiments with both, ecologists will not refrain from theorizing about resistance to invaders and general conflict resolution. Admittedly, one would be hard-pressed to find specific works on the "ecology of defense". Yet any complete philosophy, such as ecology, must provide with the ability to deal effectively with foreign displays (or threats) of force. Logically, such a defense capability would seek resistance and the general achievement of foreign policy goals through ecologically respectful means: avoiding violence and, more specifically, the development of a "force apparatus" (institutionalized military, first-strike capacity). In other words, the key is to construct a defense policy and a defense infrastructure which would neither alter the foundations of an ecological society.
nor compromise its principles. "Fighting fire with fire" is the realist solution, already dismissed. Non-resistance (or docile cooperation, rather) may radically eliminate the security dilemma, but does seem besides the point -- after all, the ecological society is decidedly worth defending.

Quite unsurprisingly, then, the ecologist is left somewhere between the Swiss militia model and Gandhi's philosophy of non-violent resistance. The Swiss experience is not unappealing, a priori, based as it is on a purely defensive approach to the military security of a small, neutral state with a high sense of community; in other words, it is an example of a civilian-based defense, the conceptual antithesis of the hierarchical, socially detached, and resource-hungry military machine. Yet Swiss-type resistance can be violent, while a militia system does institute a militarized ethic which usually conflicts with an ecological ethic; furthermore, the Swiss' strategic position in the world capitalist system (not merely financial) casts doubt as to their ecological propensity.

While some ecologists may condone an ethic of physical combat as perfectly "natural" (the often extravagant accusations of ecofascism may now be heard), most would agree that the Gandhian ethic of non-violent, civilian-based defense stands perceptively closer to the principle of positive peace. Gandhi's ecological credentials are, of course, as impeccable as can be imagined from a political activist; non-violent civilian resistance becomes a logical complement

---


38To be fair, such militarization has yet to translate into inordinate civilian aggression or Swiss involvement in the global arms trade.
to the frugality of the (decentralized) village economy and the personal doctrine of abnegation.

Waiting at the turn of this lengthy introduction, then, is indeed a body of international relations theory dedicated to "alternative defense" proposals, of various degrees of radicalism. Several of them are, actually, concerned with global structures (such as found in the Clark-Sohn Plan), and should be reviewed below. As a whole, alternative approaches to security seek to minimize the chances of armed clashes, and are necessarily sympathetic to various forms of disarmament and multilateral checks on military activity. Few theorists, however, advocate the community-based philosophy of non-violence cherished by Gandhi, obviously considered almost impossible to implement in a nuclear world of states: such civilian strategies do require time to institutionalize, and time is scarce on the nuclear brink. Yet, from a perspective of ecological peace, defense strategies must aim at two objectives: that of minimizing capital costs and avoiding the perpetuation of professional military structures in society (which many "defensive" projects still favor). Defense must become fully integrated in a philosophy of non-violence, through which community members are fully empowered to exercise their "civic" duty to defend.

Among a handful of authors upholding this ecological approach, we must particularly cite Gene Sharp and Beverly Woodward. Sharp is the foremost theorist of civilian-based, non-violent resistance, whose prolific writings adhere closely to the Gandhian scheme; his discussion is often more technical than philosophical, but he thus demonstrates that non-violent resistance is a complex

---

(yet usable) tool which can yield long-term results. Woodward is not as well known, yet her eminently clear and simple article published in *Alternatives* has done much to summarize the holistic philosophy of non-violence, which she deliberately associates with ecology; that much is clear from her list of "prerequisites of institutionalization of nonviolence", which includes "the development of alternative technologies" (and due references to Schumacher) and "the building and strengthening of communities" (an attack on statism).

A local and national "ecology of defense" must, of course, also exist in a global context. Does international relations theory provide ecologically suggestive proposals for global peace? And what kinds of global order does ecological thought propose? Much of the debate revolves around the extent of (de)centralization of powers, the types of interacting units, and the preferred type of global economic system: on the latter case, we have already discussed the ecological implications of free trade under liberal globalism. From an ecological perspective, one would expect some structure allowing for both local popular control of production and global regulation of peace-threatening activities (such as pollution or physical violence). Ecologists would fundamentally reject an overly centralizing approach, for reasons explained earlier; skeptics might point to the classic writings of William Ophuls and Robert Heilbroner as to the contrary, but this both misunderstands the democratic element in Ophuls' argument and exaggerates the ecological

---

42Ibid., pp. 68-69.
credentials of Heilbroner (whose concern for environmental degradation is largely articulated from the perspective of shallow ecology)\textsuperscript{43}.

Still, if the global ecological structure of peace must be decentralized, if the base unit must be the ecological community, is this reconcilable with a global regulatory machinery -- an apparently statist approach to global cooperation? As we know, Eckersley, as a "realist ecologist", stresses transition scenarios and creates room for an "enabling state"; she also fully accepts a "humane" market economy. Is she fundamentally at odds with Bookchin? Not really. She displays, undeniably, less pessimism toward the "state" than does the ecoanarchist. But her vision remains minimalistic and does accord with Bookchin's celebrated confederal model of municipalities\textsuperscript{44}. In Bookchin's vision, which he sees as fully realizable, local communities must indeed interact so as to avoid the parochialism of autarky (and the actual restrictions on freedom often imposed by the closed community); and such interaction is indeed to take place in a regularized fashion, according to democratic (non-Burkean) international institutions. Similarly, Bookchin does not denigrate the principle of non-barter economic exchange; there is a far cry, indeed, between local markets for essentials and a global economy of monopoly capital geared toward high-capital goods. In fact, while Bookchin may dismiss


Schumacher by stating that "small is not necessarily beautiful"⁴⁵, his municipal-confederal model is scarcely at odds with Schumacher's call for a "globe of villages"; indeed, Schumacher's affinity for Buddhism, and his deep conviction in spiritual transcendence and moral growth, cannot possibly portray him as the unquestioned autarchist.

Bookchin, Eckersley and Schumacher, along perhaps with Ophuls, essentially delineate the parameters of an ecological vision for international relations; few ecologists are indeed concerned with this topic. How does this confederal solution compare with futures designs and alternative security proposals in international relations theory?

There is actually little in the literature which may convey an appreciation of the related needs for non-statist, community control and international (intercommunal) interaction in quest of global understanding and moral renewal. Of course, some ecologists could argue that a globe of autarkic villages, despite all of its parochialism, superstitions and ethically questionable conduct towards various groups and forms of life, would constitute an ecologically sustainable framework; the same ecologists, however, might ignore anthropological evidence that autarky is no guarantee for peace and freedom. Still, despite the limitations of autarky, local self-sufficiency may be legitimately considered as a necessary condition for global peace, particularly if one believes in the fundamental "peacebility" of humankind and "cooperativity" of livingkind. In the theory of international relations, the early and authoritative defense of the argument is in Rousseau. Rarely cited by contemporary theorists (save for his parable of the stag hunt)⁴⁶, Rousseau nonetheless articulated a theory of global

---

⁴⁶Two very useful pieces on Rousseau are in Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: Praeger, 1965), chapter 3 ("Rousseau on War and Peace"), and Grace G.
peace based on the agricultural self-sufficiency of the village; that much is clear from his *Projet de constitution pour la Corse*[^47], which allies well with his skepticism toward the glorified assessment of interdependence in the Abbé de St-Pierre's project for perpetual peace. Interestingly, then, as Hoffmann mentions, Rousseau ends up supporting the concept of confederation, but as a practical, and not genuinely peaceful, alternative to his utopia, which he sees as unattainable in humankind's (statist-artificial) age of lost innocence[^48].

Closer in time, and as mentioned earlier, alternative designs for global peace/security in the international relations literature have hovered around "soft" liberal (internationalist) solutions. The various schemes all try, in their own way, to strike a fair balance between national and global concerns, although retaining the "necessary presence" of the state and, therefore, limiting their ecological potential. Still, having already discussed the problems with this particular internationalist literature, it is best to stress here its more positive dimensions -- essentially, the careful tone in which global humanism is expressed, the central importance attached to denuclearization and demilitarization, the general understanding that checks on state sovereignty should be enhanced in sensitive areas (with effective global policing powers), the call for global redistributive mechanisms (already explicit in the Clark-Sohn Plan), and the encouragement extended to grassroots movements for change[^49]. These are salvaging elements from peace frameworks whose appreciation for

[^48]: Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.
[^49]: Patricia Mische in Stephenson (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 82: "It is not only necessary to build a grassroots movement for world order, but [...] the time is very ripe".
global decentralization remains bounded by a more "practical" trust in state power and, at times, perhaps contradicted by a research emphasis, from well-known scholars, on "global policy"50.

To conclude, however, a suggestive exception to the literature discussed above may be found in Falk, whose thought progressively shifted from international-legal approaches to world order to more philosophical considerations about the state. The later Falk, then, has become avowedly "skeptical of direct approaches to global reform by way of strengthening the United Nations and the like"51. More strikingly, he has spoken of his "conviction that stability and hierarchy are no longer reconcilable in politics no matter what the scale of inquiry"52, and has characterized fellow WOMP scholars as generally "wary by now of centralizing solutions of the sort implied by world government [...] It is probably a greater mistake these days to associate world order studies with world federalism than with libertarian

50Cf. particularly the work of Soroos, especially his Beyond Sovereignty: The Challenge of Global Policy (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1986). Soroos is particularly interested in describing various global regimes. Behind the descriptive analysis, however, lies a commitment to world-order values quite similar to the global humanists' and, therefore, a skepticism toward the positivist literature in international relations. Soroos is also more specifically concerned with "environmental issues" which, in fact, he does tend to approach from the managerial perspective of global policy. He is, in this way, quite representative of a particular trend in North American scholarship, increasingly critical of positivist social science but nonetheless trained with a problem-solving mind-set and, therefore, somewhat unable to secure a philosophical footing; that much is evident from his generous account of Garrett Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" in "Environmental Policies", in Dahlberg (ed.), op. cit., pp. 86ff, and, later in the book ("The Future of the Environment", op. cit.), his favorable reference to Schumacher (cf. pp. 132-133).


52Ibid., p. 16.
anarchism"\textsuperscript{53}. While Falk used a cautious negative to project on colleagues an intellectual affiliation which he embraces (and which they never articulated as such), he also raised, distinctively, the possibility for a fundamental (and ecological) reappraisal of the field of international relations. In chapter 12 of his book, he took a few steps towards uniting anarchism and world order:

Anarchist thought draws inspiration from both prestatist (Kropotkin) and poststatist (Goodman) possibilities by moving dialectically toward decentralizing bureaucratic power while centralizing human function; [...] the state is understood to be both inhumanly large in its bureaucratic dimension and inhumanly small in its territorial and exclusionary dimension.\textsuperscript{54}

While the approach, as stated above, may leave room for debate, the sheer attempt by a famed globalist to achieve a more sensitive understanding of the dialecticism in the global is surely worth noting. Falk, a prolific writer marginalized by International Relations, was nonetheless (partly) responsible for reorienting thinking in the 1980s toward normative debates and reassessments of global process.

\textit{Ecology and Global Process}

For at least twenty years, but especially over the past decade, international relations theorists have seriously examined sociological debates and attempted their integration into the field. Dissatisfied with much of the "problem-solving" approaches to behavior in international relations (inspired by economists), they have sought more refined descriptions of political process that would allow, precisely, for a more historically-grounded understanding of the

\textsuperscript{53}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 36, emphasis added.  
\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 294.
evolving global polity. In other words, many theorists of international relations could not accept the misleading simplicity of the popular, ahistorical and unidirectional approaches to (regularized) behavior: the need to understand change, as much as repetition, became crying in the midst of fundamental shifts "on the field" (the debt crisis, global unemployment, the waning of the cold war, and, of course, the ecological crisis).

In this section, then, we need to consider the possible contributions of this "globalist" literature to the elaboration of an ecological theory of global peace. Its inspiration is both Marxist and non-Marxist, yet it is dedicated in all cases to a social, dialectical and/or historically-rooted understanding of global politics. That particular work, not avowedly normative, is also not interested per se in issues of peace and ecology (references are not altogether absent, but tend to be indirect). Yet, as we know, an ecological approach to global peace is predicated upon a certain way of reading the world, of knowing about the world. Thus, the organicity and the complexity of nature would indicate that nature cannot be understood according to the simplistic assumptions and reductionist methods of positivism, and, as well, that the death of nature itself is facilitated by the use of positivist tools: in other words, if social science is so keen to adopt the methods and assumptions of natural science, then it is precisely sanctioning those practices of "objectivity" which have debased and killed nature. If political theorists are to interpret process "correctly", if they are to obtain a particular wisdom which will grant nature intrinsic worth and humankind a sustainable future, then they will need to delve into the more complex -- blurring the line between knower and known, creator and created, past and present.

The task, then, is to construct a more responsible approach to "international relations", approximating more closely the spatial and temporal
connections between agents, institutions and life events, and using such knowledge for the emancipatory purposes which liberal academics formally support. A critical theory of international relations should indeed be "critical" of both the mainstream analysis of process and of its contribution in maintaining the political status quo. However, not all theorists concerned with the crisis of positivism have applied themselves to this dual task. Process is our specific focus here; the next section will examine the broader attempt at critical theory in International Relations.

As hinted, then, a (non-shallow) ecologist will aim beyond the reductionist approaches to process exemplified by both rational choice and the depiction of closed systems: neither the conception of the powerful agent nor the automaticity (even relative) of the system can elicit the necessary combination of flexibility, reflexivity, and holistic awareness that may ensure the long-term survival and happiness of humankind. In sum, a global (or "globalist") approach is required, so as to maximize prudence in decision and highlight paths of hope.

Several versions of "globalism", most of them convergent, compete for attention in international relations theory. Rosenau's has been discussed, and criticized for its liberal bend. More pertinently, here, nowhere in Rosenau's language may the reader discern a rejection of positivism; as explained earlier, Rosenau still pursues "objective" descriptions of reality (though he would resist the criticism) and is very fond of the literature on organizational theory. Unsurprisingly, then, Rosenau's name literally never appears in the new debate surrounding critical theory in international relations55. The question, then, is

---

55This is usually dubbed the "third debate" in the field, following earlier debates between, on the one hand, idealism and realism, and, on the other, scientific and traditional approaches. Cf. Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the
whether Rosenau's globalizing ventures actually hinder the evolution of the field towards a dialectical, historicist, and normative reassessment. At best, "postpositivists" would judge them as irrelevant, yet this would still be harsh. While Rosenau's contribution to general multidisciplinarity in International Relations may be readily ascertained merely through his editing work, his own, daring ventures in global analysis, however partial, have sent a clear message to the scholarly community: let your imagination run, always look at the big picture, and don't forget that world politics is in constant flux.

The same basic message is echoed in other globalist writings. One particular approach, still modernist, is that of structurationism, popularized by sociologist Anthony Giddens and formally introduced to International Relations, in the last decade, by Alexander Wendt, along with John Gerard Ruggie and Raymond Duvall. As a sociological theory, structurationism seeks


57Cf. Alexander E. Wendt, "The agent-structure problem in international relations theory", *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-370; Alexander E. Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order", in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method", in Rosenau and Czempiel, *ibid*. Cf. also Roland Robertson, "Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept", *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol. 7, Nos. 2-3 (June 1990), pp. 15-30; and Albert Bergesen, "Turning World-System Theory on Its Head", *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol. 7, Nos. 2-3, pp. 67-81. Wendt's inspiration comes more from Bhaskar and Thrift than Giddens, leading to a more sustained emphasis on "scientific realism" as a (retroductive) approach to causation; Giddens would not disagree with this basic idea, but would be more careful in upholding the power of science in social study (although he does declare himself a sociologist and not a philosopher). Bergesen does not use the concept of structuration: yet his "globological" critique of Wallersteinian structuralism is
an explanation for the (re)production of social institutions. The approach is
eminently dialectical and holistic, resisting an explanation of behavior based on
the ontologically reducible "actor" or "system". To the contrary, structuration
designates a process by which agents and structures ontologically coevolve,
mutually shaping one another through the routine activities of daily life. The
structurationist does not believe in the possibility of identifying a "first cause",
since social "events" can only exist in an extensible "locale" of time-space. By
definition, a dialectical ontology of agents and structures compels a reappraisal
of time and space in political thought, neither of which can now comfortably
support specific delineations.8

The implications of such globalism for ecological thought and
International Relations are thus serious. For one, as a purely analytical
framework, structurationism serves an explanation of ecological degradation as
a discrete, repetitive and globalizing process of change in the modern era.
Giddens writes that "one of the key features of modern institutions [...] is that
they 'disembed' social relations from local contexts of action"; this is indeed a
process of globalization, reflecting "dialectical ties between the global and

reminiscent of Wendt, while he also specifically endorses a conception of
process based on reciprocal influence between structure and agent (cf. p. 77).
8This is perhaps the main point of R.B.J. Walker's inspiring book,
Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993); cf. particularly pp. 128-129. As a
postmodernist, Walker is especially known for his deconstructionist efforts. Yet
it would be unfair to ignore the more constructionist dimension of his
scholarship, particularly as he endorses the critical attempts at globalizing the
"view" of international relations; the same may be said of Richard Ashley.
89Structuration theory is not substantive. Wendt (1987), op. cit., p. 355, states
the point well: "[Structuration theory] does not tell us what particular kinds of
agents or what particular kinds of structures to expect in any given concrete
social system".
local". Through this interaction between individual agents and global(ized) structures, a routinization of ecological abuse not only takes place, but even becomes acceptable.

In the case of International Relations, structurationism may well obliterate all distinctions between the field and that of Comparative Politics, leaving in its place a globalized social system reproducing globalized institutions and practices. Wendt does try to salvage the field by describing states as social entities, constituted by social structures of either "domestic" or "international" dimension, and of either "economic" or "political" character. Whether such dichotomies, along with Wendt's insistence on a scientific approach to social change, can effectively capture the holistic and postpositivist character of structurationism is highly debatable. Yet there is little doubt that structurationism remains a powerful tool in understanding a "global politics" which the liberals had barely begun to explain with the concept of transnational relations.

The basic structurationist idea of (global) institutional reproduction at the local level has been shared, in fact, by other theorists. Recalling the Hegelian and (especially) Marxian roots of dialecticism and historicism, we can point, without surprise, at dependency theory as the initial contemporary contribution

---


to a critique of international relations theory. Ecologists will appreciate therein the work of philosophically and normatively inclined sociologists and economists in understanding global processes of domination. Dependency theory has effectively adapted Marxian concepts and precepts to the global system, documenting the systematic impoverishment of the Southern poor by the Northern power elite (commercial, financial, scientific) in alliance with Southern collaborators.

While the substantive focus of dependency theory may be debated, both its ontology and epistemology can be readily appreciated by the critical globalist. Cardoso and Faletto write of their "historical-structural method" that "it emphasizes not just the structural conditioning of social life, but also the historical transformation of structures by conflict, social movements, and class struggles." Thus, echoing Cardoso's earlier dismissal of positivist attempts at appropriating dependency theory, Cardoso and Faletto insist that "the basic

---

63Dependency theory is a neo-Marxian analysis of "underdevelopment" in the South, or, more precisely, of (systematic) Southern marginalization in a global capitalist system controlled by Northern agents. It is the work mainly of radical economists in Latin America (R. Prebisch, F. H. Cardoso, T. dos Santos, O. Sunkel) and elsewhere in the South (S. Amin), with specific debts to American and French Marxists (P. Baran, P. Sweezy, S. Bodenheimer, A. Emmanuel); it parallels, to some extent, Immanuel Wallerstein's treatment of the world capitalist system. Dependency theory is not constructed, as such, as a critique of international relations theory, with which it holds no dialogue. However, there is no doubt that International Relations can learn from the neo-Marxian critique and that the latter can be construed as critical theory; in the former case, cf. V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank, Marxism and International Relations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), and in the latter, cf. Stephen T. Leonard, Critical Theory in Political Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).


methodological steps in dialectical analyses require an effort to specify each new situation in the search for differences and diversity, and to relate them to the old forms of dependency". Likewise, Samir Amin rants against the economism of social science thinking:

The very search for unilateral causalities between 'independent variables' and 'dependent variables' is characteristic of mechanistic economism and is diametrically opposed to the dialectical method where the whole, i.e. the reproduction of the conditions of the mode of production, determines the parts, i.e., the 'variables'.

Some differences do remain between dependency theory and the theory of structuration. The latter is much less concerned with normative issues and, especially, much more agnostic as to the outcome of the evolving global system: Giddens' world, according to David Jary, is of "competing social movements and competing nation-states as well as a world of capitalism, with no predictable outcomes". The individual motivations of structurationists may well tend towards various forms of emancipation, and their ontological assumptions may well serve that goal, yet their discourse on process is articulated above all in a detached and scientifically propitious manner; this, of course, is not to portray dependency theory as a non-rigorous stream of literature, but rather to emphasize its political role and, as well, the importance it continues to attach to the liberatory mission of unionized labor and state forces.

---

Still, it seems more important to stress the convergence of dependency theory and structuration than their differences. From an ecological perspective, the key is their common rejection of functionalism and structuralism. This said, however, the same ecological perspective would benefit from a more systematic (empirical) debate concerning the locus of power and change in global society. We leave this issue to the next section. At this juncture, however, it is worth remembering how the Marxian analysis of capital played a key role in clarifying the hidden process of domination and historical change at the global level; and it is the same Marxian influence, through Gramsci, that brings us to Robert Cox and to his contribution to globalism.

Cox is now a fixture in the discipline. Admired particularly by the younger generation of political economists, he is also the principal reference point of many reviews of critical theory in international relations. As "critical theory" is usually understood as the post-Marxian attack of the Frankfurt School against instrumental rationality, Cox's Gramscian analysis of world order surely constitutes a "critical" turn in international relations theory.

Cox already established his epistemological position in his landmark article of 1981, dividing the field into "critical" and "problem-solving" approaches and, therefore, arguing, as he would a few years later, that modern theories of political science (process-oriented) may focus either on the decision machinery or on the (necessary historical) path leading to the sheer creation of

---

71Cf. Cox, "Production, the State, and Change in World Order", in Rosenau and Czempiel, op. cit., p. 37.
deciding agents. To use an analogy suggested earlier in our work, theories are interested either in contractual or pre-contractual dynamics, and Cox leaves little doubt as to the latter's superiority in achieving general wisdom and opening doors for change.

In his major work\textsuperscript{72}, then, Cox precisely delves into the historical roots of American hegemony, using Gramsci's model of the evolving historic bloc: modifying Marx, and partly echoing the \textit{dependentistas}, it locates capitalist hegemony in a (global) structural alliance between state elites, monopoly capital and science. The key to this squarely historical argument about hegemony is undoubtedly its cultural element, eminently emphasized by Gramsci, and most directly responsible for the routinized and relatively unforceful acceptance of order. Political acceptance and historical change, then, become a function of culturally-grounded (historical) structures. Cox and Giddens, the Gramscians and the structurationists, speak here with one voice: Cox defines historical structures as "the cumulative result of innumerable often-repeated actions", revealed intersubjectively, and thus rendered "objective independently of individual wills"\textsuperscript{73} -- an argument strikingly similar to Giddens' discussion of "practical consciousness".

In sum, Cox stands as a major critical theorist of international relations precisely in view of his empirical work, deliberately linked to a broader theoretical argument about hidden power fields and routinized behavior in the global economic arena; Cox is indeed one of the rare theorists from this tradition to ground theoretical propositions into historical analysis (Giddens is


\textsuperscript{73}Cf. Cox in Rosenau and Czempiel, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 38.
another\textsuperscript{74}). Critical theory, however, has had a few other adepts worthy of mention, whose source of inspiration derives from French postmodernism. The work of Foucault, for instance, has become influential. Admittedly, there are fundamental differences between the rationalist, modernist positions of the Frankfurt School and the deconstructive project of postmodernism. However, both are equally critical of positivism, and both, again, are concerned with "elusive" processes of social control and institutionalization; in each case, then, we may find alternative approaches to power and historical change, based notably on Wittgensteinian language games, but extending more generally to the relationship between knowledge and power. Foucault notably develops the concepts of "governmentality", "power-knowledge" and "pastoral power", which effectively describe the subtle hold of elites on deviant masses, namely through the means of (social) science research and the spread of cultural exemplars.

The Foucauldian themes are appealing to an ecological approach to global peace: they command a globalized reading of politics and an examination of power fields eminently serving the existing anti-ecological order. Foucault thus would seem to belong to International Relations, and it is to James Keeley's credit to have attempted a Foucauldian analysis of international regimes\textsuperscript{75}. Keeley's objective was avowedly limited, introducing the concept of power-knowledge and pointing at the relationship between regime maintenance and the "sharing" of discourse. Yet his essay, unfortunately still unrecognized, may be

\textsuperscript{74}Cf. Anthony Giddens, \textit{The Nation-State and Violence}, Part II of \textit{A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

truly considered pathbreaking, particularly in the realo-liberal world of regime theory which he has consistently criticized\textsuperscript{76}. Interestingly, as well, Keeley does see his argument converging with Gramscian notions of hegemony\textsuperscript{77}, attesting to a general wave in twentieth-century critical scholarship against the traditional conception, and construction, of "reality".

The postmodern current, for all its insistence on textuality and deconstruction, thus can set itself constructively in this multifrontal attack on positivism. Postmodernists may not be empiricists, but their language is not necessarily incompatible with a new type of empirical work geared toward uncovering global processes of (dis)order. Ashley's call will now ring familiar:

"The poststructuralist wants to know what is repeated, what structures and practices reappear in dispersed sites, and how these replications can be accounted for [...] She wants to speak of effects [...] She wants to understand the workings of power in the most general terms, and she wants to understand power's relationship to knowledge".\textsuperscript{78}

Overall, however, postmodernism's contribution to international theory does lie essentially in its emancipatory critique rather than in its discussion of process, which remains at a very high level of generality.


\textsuperscript{77} Cf. Keeley, "Toward a Foucauldian analysis of international regimes", \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 92-93.

Ecology and the Emancipatory Critique of International Relations

This work has insisted on the emancipatory objective of an ecological critique. Ecological thought does not merely describe the malignant processes of the modern global system, but articulates and pursues, on the field, an alternative normative framework. The ultimate goal of ecological thought, at least in one compendium version, is the achievement of a sustainable peace, respectful of nature and committed to individual growth and security within a community of human scale. This does entail a personal, intellectual, and political effort toward radical change, away from established credos. Specifically, ecology seems vitally dependent on rethinking a "reality" embodied in various hierarchies, misleading dualities, and misleading uniformities as well. For a theory of international relations, the liberatory critique entails three things: a) taking a skeptical stand towards foundationalism in the discipline; b) exploring those hierarchising, dualising, and uniformizing instances embedded in the conceptual apparatus of international theory; c) gauging the same discrepancies on the field and examining therein the possibilities for bottom-up reforms, across geopolitical frontiers, towards an ecological society.

The essential question that ecologists and other critical theorists must ask, then, revolves around the issue of universality. The question is age-old, admittedly, yet it remains unanswered. How much can a theory allow for a patterned conception of "what is"? How can a policy of universalism genuinely reflect commonality, and not disguised domination? How can a policy of particularism be framed so as to enrich the collective life of the species, and not, hypocritically, impose local tyranny? And how can a theory of the particular stand as a theory?

The ecologist is somewhat torn on the issue. He or she will clearly dismiss the universalist extreme, for reasons amply discussed earlier. The
particularist extreme, however, might be unsuitable as well: a rejection of extremes, and hence the elaboration of a delicate balance between the poles, does make intuitive sense -- an intuition surely derived from the recognition that ecology deals as much with biological essentials as with varied constructions of reality (including "nature").

This slight tension between ecology and at least one strand of critical theory may well appear in the postmodernist critique of international relations theory. On the one hand, ecologists would agree wholeheartedly with R. B. J. Walker's and Richard Ashley's antifoundationalist critiques. Walker's argument runs through his many writings, and is particularly apparent in his famed rescue of Machiavelli from realist clutches: "Machiavelli struggled [...] to speak about lo stato against a discursive hegemony of scholastic universals"79. In Ashley, the antifoundationalist point is stated very directly as follows: "The task of poststructuralist theory is not to impose a general interpretation [...] It] eschews grand designs, transcendental grounds, or universal projects of humankind"80; "one must be prepared to give up the time-honored dream that theory, in constructing knowledge, can plant its feet in some absolute foundation [...] beyond history and independent of politics"81; a hegemonic version of reality thus must be avoided, "as if all people everywhere", Ashley cynically adds, "would necessarily agree as to what their real dangers are"82.

80Cf. Ashley in Der Derian and Shapiro (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 284.
82Ibid., p. 287.
While Ashley is right, he offers little guidance for solving the dilemma between universalism and particularism. From an ecological perspective, his rejection of Thoreau as a foundationalist is particularly disquieting, for Thoreau probably best captures the parallel ecological concerns for the sustainability of life and the anarchistic structuring of community life. Similarly, Ashley’s resistance to arguments favoring transcendence may explain his own rejection by some radical feminists, who would precisely appreciate transcendence as a negation of gender duality.

The feminist literature thus offers its own contribution to an emancipatory critique of International Relations. The main lines of criticism are well known and are adequately summarized by Tickner, who notes, *inter alia*, that: the language of international relations theory is sexist; International Relations offers a male reading of world history, ignoring the role of women; instrumental rationality is a typically male construct. Intern...  

---

83Ibid.
86Cf. Tickner, *op. cit.*
indeed appears as the male bastion *par excellence*: its tradition is heavily influenced by military studies, legitimizing assumptions about incessant conflict and power quests, at ease with the description of hard-nosed ("calculated") negotiations, and endorsing the sexually demeaning language of war; the field of "cooperation" may seem more tolerant, *a priori*, but rational-choice approaches or the emphasis on legal-institutional aspects do not convey a radically different ("less male") reading of the world. In sum, International Relations marginalizes the role of women in historical development and favors an ontology and an epistemology constructed by men.

Feminism itself is as diverse a body as ecological thought, and also displays its conservative and progressive extremes. The feminism of concern to us here is not the "liberal" type, whose rights discourse does not contribute a fresh intellectual perspective and merely coopts women into the power elite and into male rationality. Feminist critics of international relations theory, however, can essentially be inserted within a critical stream whose main interest, to quote Jean Elshtain, is to "deviriliz(e) discourse", not in favor of a "feminization" which would perpetuate gender duality, but towards a political awareness of hegemony in its many forms. This is very much a (non-foundationalist) feminism of transcendence, concerned with positive peace: it is a feminism ready for politics, but also ready to end the growth ethic of man-history and its marginalization of "physically different" groups. The relationship with an ecology of peace is thus unquestionable.

In sum, the feminist critique of International Relations does not necessarily purport to satisfy demands for a Lakatosian "research programme".

---


On the one hand, as hinted above, there is some limited ground for empirical research, explored notably by Cynthia Enloe and Carol Cohn, and focused on the exclusionary practice and language of theorists and officials alike. Yet the key role of feminism is in its pure theoretical critique, in demonstrating how a discipline, by its sexism, reifies itself and sustains particular ontologies and epistemologies with devastating impact on "the weak". Feminism may not yet be able to explain how inter- (and intra-)community relations may be reconstructed so as to effectively transcend gender duality, and so as to solve the dilemma between commonality and difference. But at the very least, and informed by ecology, it has turned the defense of a specific constituency into a wider critique of foundationalism in one of the least flexible fields of social studies.

The unity-diversity dilemma has also been examined from a "classic" constructionist perspective by a no less "critical" theorist of international relations, Andrew Linklater. He stands in partial contrast to Ashley and Walker, as he pursues an emancipatory framework for humanity based on a (non-rationalist) recovery of the cosmopolitan ideal. As a critical theorist, he understands the historical contingency of rationality and appreciates the contemporary exhaustion of the state, and of the idea of citizenship, as a rationalist solution to the dilemma; Vattel's society of states eventually clashed with the particularism of nineteenth-century "historicists" and, today, with the impediments posed by territorial sovereignty to the recovery of a planet mired in global crises.

---


90Cf. Linklater (1990 [1982]), *ibid.*
Linklater's liberal argument (and ultimate goal), that "moral development involves the progressive universalization of norms"\textsuperscript{91}, does reflect an avowed foundationalist concern\textsuperscript{92} and will raise suspicions from both ecologists and postmodernists; indeed, the global crises invoked by the author are not theorized and, therefore, eschew a discussion of the very universalism from which they have emanated. However, at the same time, and as much as Linklater's call for emancipation-in-order (echoing Giddens)\textsuperscript{93} may sound rebarbative, he deliberately steps beyond the bounds of mainstream international relations theory, entrusting the individual human being with the necessary power toward freedom. In the final analysis, Linklater may well sound unconvincing, for as much as international relations theory made "citizens" out of "men", his attempt to replace "man" amongst his global peers raises more questions than it answers. Yet his discussion has played (and is still playing) a vital role in supporting a key development in international relations theory: the increasing attention devoted to new social movements as \textit{bona fide} actors in the global process and as \textit{potential} agents for radical, progressive change on the field\textsuperscript{94}.

The relationship between social movements, social change and social theory is the essence of a critical theory. In International Relations, of course, the enterprise dates back at least to Marx, and was revived by dependentistas. However, for all the positive aspects of dependency theory outlined above, its emancipatory mission is hampered in two ways. First, it remains committed to a modernist (and materialist) ethic of economic development, whose ecological limits (and implications for global peace) need little explication. Many

\textsuperscript{91}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 211.  
\textsuperscript{92}\textit{Ibid.}, p. xi.  
\textsuperscript{93}Cf. Linklater (1990), \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 31-33.  
\textsuperscript{94}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 26. The debt to Habermas is particularly acknowledged here.
dependency analysts are intricately tied to Southern (mostly Latin American) reformist projects, and while they may articulate a "basic needs" discourse, they are overwhelmingly motivated by the (political) quest for global justice based on economic and international state power; this is not to deprecate their commitment to the Southern poor and/or marginalized, but, rather, to emphasize the inevitable limits to advocating Northern modernity for the entire planet. Second, and as a corollary, the emphasis on middle- and lower-class economic justice does not carry the analyst to the depths of critical theory articulated elsewhere. Dependency theory does remain associated with the "old" social movement, and has not really widened its analytical scope beyond narrow economic relationships.

The case is different with Cox. His central interest in the relationship between productive forces, state formation and world order does follow the Marxian tradition, yet his approach does not convey the normative overtones associated with Marxism; in this sense, Cox's work remains essentially focused on process alone. Yet Cox also opens more doors for emancipatory change, perhaps because he recognizes the divisiveness of class-based approaches to the good life. While Cox's historical approach allows no teleology, it is sufficiently informed to appreciate the continuing cooptation of income-based groups in the globalized economy and the potential alternative offered by new social movements. In sum, the emancipatory potential of Cox's theory is a function of his flexible historical approach, his insistence on uncovering the economic dimension of order (thus his reluctance to reify either "the state" or "political man"), and his transparent shunning of a materialist ethic. Cox does not have a blueprint for a better world; but he explains very well why humankind has

---

arrived at a historical threshold and why the hope for a revolutionary, broad-based social action, however difficult to perform, may not merely constitute wishful thinking.

A critical peace-searching theory of international relations is well advised, then, to explore the role of new social movements in world politics. The idea makes sense, for new social movements do remain an important vehicle for collective emancipation and systemic change: ecologists, feminists, peace activists and native rights advocates each (and collectively) defend the vision of a better world, less aggressive to people and to nature; the possible implications of their battle, for humankind and its societal infrastructure, are indeed very wide.

The challenge, for theorists and activists, is to determine how movements may "connect" and "survive" in the global arena, while performing the necessary political work to actually alleviate individual suffering and promote sustainability. The task is by no means simple. The analysis of movement activity may easily fall prey to rational-choice approaches, exploring in very circumscribed ways how a (readily identifiable) "movement" operates to deliver the "goods" to its constituents, how it can succeed in overcoming problems of collective action and maximize (quantifiable) interests. The movement here becomes indistinguishable from the interest group, acting as a utility maximizer in a finite system; this understates or altogether misses the more diffuse composition and impact of social movements, which, rather, ought to be understood, arguably, for their long-term role in transforming conceptions and practices at the very micro level. In other words, movements are not groups, but currents. They may be spearheaded by formal groups, but are expressed in the individual mind and are reinforced by daily activities -- be it a boycott or the writing of a book. The point is to understand the relationship
between routinized actions of protest, the transformation of discourse and the political efforts of organized groups, and to gauge the limits of the current; this can indeed refine our understanding of process at the global level and help us ponder any hope for change.

As Falk mentions, very little work has been done on the link between new social movements and global reform. At the sheer descriptive level, it appears important to document the strength of the various currents as well as the direction of their flow. The political "game", however, would seem to sustain a plethora of organizations, focused on specific issues and constituencies, and competing for attention and resources; global NGO fora are apparently confirming essential divisions within and among movements.

Does this mean that new social movements have no real emancipatory potential, that they cannot escape the pressures of "divide and rule" inherent in the modern concept of finite space (embedded in states, political parties, corporations, etc.)? Falk's observation would seem to merely confirm the absence of any "global reform" worth studying. Yet however constraining the rules of the game may be, and however ossified and hierarchised flagship groups may have become, the field of International Relations must still look into

local cases of sustainable redress (as with the Chipko movement in India) and explain how these could be used by other communities for similar purposes. Emancipation can only start locally, and can only fructify globally, i.e. at its ultimate and yet unattained stage.

Contemporary globalization is a terrifying experience, rapidly homogenizing, centralizing and ravaging the planet in the name of efficiency and on account of a "natural" process of selection; at the very least, International Relations must seize its social dimension, and use its formidable temporal and spatial reach to expose cases of emancipatory success. Bookchin's "unity of differences" may appear either hopelessly utopian or derisively oxymoronic; yet so should it be the aim of a critical theory of "international relations", oscillating between the local and the global, shedding its reified existence yet thriving in the colliding world of modernity.

Conclusion

Is there room for an ecological peace in international relations theory? This chapter suggests some potential. Yes, the field has already raised, formally, the possibility of an "ecological approach". But the most encouraging signs lie elsewhere, in policy proposals more in tune with an ecological society, in debates on process whose complex dimensions better suit the equally complex relationships of nature, and in questions about the role of International Relations in perpetuating patterns of domination.

What ecologists want is a theory of international relations at the service of a sustainable global peace, a peace which not only respects non-human nature but also ensures the growth, security, dignity, and self-control of the individual. International Relations is thus called upon not only to propose "pertinent" political structures and transitional policies, but also to reflect on its ecologically
damaging ontologies and epistemologies. Stated specifically, and with due debt acknowledged to recent scholarship, such a theory would insist, at the prescriptive level: on reining the local community as base unit while committing it to an intricate intercommunitarian network of democratic (delegated) bodies; on endorsing a basic-need, sustainable ideology of (global) production; and on using demilitarized techniques of active resistance. Ontologically, we admit that an ecological theory knows more what to reject than what to accept. It is not yet clear whether it can step beyond mere agnosticism about human nature and its destiny, but it can at least insist on the dialectical and open-ended "nature" of "life activities" (thus agreeing here with structurationism); a sustainable and freeing peace requires such a flexible and subtle conception about "how the world works". Finally, epistemologically, and not to belabor the point, it is obvious by now that an ecological peace is incompatible with the cosmology and the method upheld by positivism.

Recent trends in international relations theory suggest the growing influence of critical theory and postmodernism on the discipline. An ecology of peace must applaud such attempts at rejecting the anti-ecological values of modernity; likewise, it will support inquiries into the emancipatory potential of new social movements. This said, ecology has its own objective and, indeed, its own foundations. It has no specific human constituency to defend -- its program is irescapably holistic. But its "reality" is not completely open-ended; ecology cannot consider nature to be completely constructed. Therefore, an ecology of peace dares ask for the apparent impossible: a constructive effort at devising a "loosely foundationalist" conception of nature, humankind and the polis, one that will recognize both the "laws of nature" and the possibilities of humanness.
McGill

Memorandum

From

To

Date

Subject

There is no "page 182"
CONCLUSION

Our overriding objective, in this work, was to formally integrate two fields of study -- (radical) ecological thought and international relations theory -- which have hitherto stood apart. Much of the exercise depended on the particular delineation of "ecology" as a philosophy and a political theory. Our essential concern with positive peace necessarily emphasized the emancipatory strands within "ecosophy": to live "ecologically" is not merely to impose sustainability from above, but to individually understand, and freely accept, an ethic of care for the biotic community.

The focus on peace was deliberate, but not self-serving. Upon reading the literature in International Relations, one is struck by the continuing quest for some sort of "peace" -- yes, often framed as "order", but decidedly interested in ensuring the security of individuals and societies. Yet, while International Relations has sought peace as order/security, it has never procured the individual fulfilment which should accompany that end-goal. While humankind may have been spared (yet) an all-out nuclear war, while (some) tyrannies and wars have been brought to an end, and while scientific and material growth have prolonged human lives and helped fulfil creative instincts, this "peace", partly inspired and sustained by mainstream international relations theory, carries overwhelming costs: exploitation of an (engineered) lower class, alienation of large sectors in modern society, and, of course, alarming degradation of our Habitat. Unarguably, violence and suffering are still the lot of most societies on Earth.
A conception of peace which muzzles people into accepting a structure of domination is unappealing; one which can allow for a collective form of suicide is patently absurd. Critics of mainstream international relations theory have long recognized its fundamental flaws, and have sought various correctives which would indeed return "peace" to the common individual; such was the contribution of the World Order Models Project, for instance. Yet Habitat remains the key: there can be no life, no peace in a burning house. Peace theorists must therefore pay heed to an ecological literature which is eminently concerned with popularizing ontologies and devising structures in accordance with the objective of sustainability. As a result, if International Relations is to listen to Ecology, it must accept a profound attack on its own ontological and epistemological make-up, and on its very status as a (sharply defined) field of study.

In order for Ecology to serve as a critique of International Relations, we first had to provide an integrated framework for ecological peace. This was performed by bridging the sub-fields of deep ecology and social ecology, in each case an ecocentric approach constructed upon an anarchist worldview; the anthropocentric, utilitarian and authoritarian strands of ecological thought were dismissed as incompatible with the goal of sustainable, emancipatory peace. We thus retained a radical view of ecology, upholding an ethic of detachment and cooperation, a decentralized polis and economy, and a holistic epistemology; such prescriptions are shaped by a reading of nature emphasizing finiteness, interconnectedness (or "wholeness"), diversity, and long age (or "timelessness").

Our second step was to discuss the two main traditions in International Relations, realism and liberalism. Realists view peace, at best, as a minimal condition -- the absence of war, the continual possibility of war. Based on an
ontology of conflict, fixed in time, realism "prepares for war so as to ensure peace". Since realism is also the doctrine *par excellence* of the nation-state, it elicits policies of state survival which enforce domination, uniformity and material growth: the war effort depends on a chain of command (favoring the top echelons), has little tolerance for "dissent", and voraciously consumes natural "resources". Realism's obsession with objective laws and its focus on the state as unit of analysis have also made it an easy target for positivism. Realist peace, then, is obviously antithetical to the maximalist, emancipatory peace of radical ecology. The liberals, on the other hand, with all their optimism about human nature, have pursued the related goals of freedom and peace. But the varied emphases on material growth, cosmopolitan "blending", and technocratic expertise all conspire to provide only an illusion of peace/freedom -- imperialistic, disempowering for all but an elite, and as disrespectful of nature as any other "enlightened" doctrine. As a mere "process" (non-normative) literature, liberalism also fell prey to the reductionist formulas of positivism.

Finally, we completed our study by investigating both the literature on "international environmental affairs" and the recent critiques of international relations theory. Much of the ecological/environmental material was found wanting, inspired essentially by a shallow form of ecology, and unconcerned with the problématique of positive peace. On the other hand, the critical literature has demonstrated the potential for a full-fledged ecological approach to international relations. Gravitating around international relations theory are, for instance, proposals about non-violent resistance and decentralized global structures which fundamentally agree with ecological thought. Within the field itself may be found original explorations of global processes, uncovering the complexities of hegemonic rule (cf. Cox) or refining the understanding of social
reproduction (cf. the structurationist approach). Furthermore, an increasing number of scholars are now concerned with exposing the constraining influence of international relations theory and, therefore, with using theory as a tool for social change; feminists, postmodernists, neomarxists and Habermasian critical theorists all seek to shake the foundations of international relations theory, to recover the human being behind the state and the method, and to explore the possibilities for global, grassroot initiatives towards a freer and more peaceful world. The new literature, to various degrees, accepts holism, dialecticism and normative considerations as legitimate approaches to, and foci of, international relations theory.

Some final reflexions now seem appropriate, as we conclude this work. How may this critique contribute to scholarship on politics, international relations and ecology? First, we sought to give credence to a minority viewpoint in ecological thought by stressing the commonalities within the field, particularly within radical ecology. Admittedly, many nuances may be overlooked in the process, but cross-disciplinary comparisons, such as the one performed here, do require some synthesis. In this case, the strong rapport between ecocentric ecology and anarchism effectively permitted the elaboration of an "ecopolitical paradigm", to be used for a critique of (international) political theories. For all the criticisms that may be levelled against our treatment of "ecology", then, our effort at cross-disciplinarity should serve to propagate the message, and the credibility, of Ecology as a serious contender in (international) political thought.

Secondly, the literary review of international relations theory, however (and inevitably) selective, hopefully succeeded in rekindling interest for the field's modern pioneers. Young scholars of international relations, at least in North America, have, at best, cursory (and indirect) knowledge of the pre-War
scholarship. As a result, mainstream International Relations has steadily reinforced the disciplinary barriers erected against Political Theory and Philosophy, to the benefit of a mechanical and dispassionate understanding of human life. The great authors were a product of classical training, aware of the fundamentally normative purpose of their work; many of them may have been blinded by "science", but, surely, no one amongst them would have applauded the dispirited shell in vogue today. To read Carr or Morgenthau, and to understand them as contemporaries to their own epoch (notwithstanding their confidence -- especially Morgenthau's -- in perennial forces), is to appreciate the evolving, historical nature of thought and human life.

Finally, we must draw attention, again, to the effort at juxtaposing ecological thought and international relations theory. In an era of growing multidisciplinarity, it is still puzzling to see so few attempts at relating two bodies of thought with such palpable normative overlaps (irrespective of the actual divergence in orientation). Admittedly, the emancipatory critique of international relations theory probably needed to evolve gradually, beginning with pure deconstructionism and approaches (such as feminism) from a specific constituency. The merit of Ecology, however, is to subsume much of the critical literature surveyed in chapter 4, to offer a tangible alternative for change that can address the suffering of all exploited life forms. As Cox and Walker have understood so well, the fundamental goal of critical international relations theory is to expose the logic of global hegemony, in all its forms. Radical ecology, as an eclectic social and epistemological critique, serves this goal cogently, working from a solid ethical base: slightly qualifying Leopold, a "good thing" must not merely benefit the "biotic community" in an indiscriminate sense, but must secure, in fact, the fulfilment of individuals as members of the biotic community.
As a philosophy of nature, Ecology is precisely able to challenge International Relations at its very roots, in its most basic assumptions about how the world "is". In all its ethical simplicity, it is also sophisticated enough to be considered as a political/international theory: as a holistic philosophy, it seeks complex processes and can offer judgment on all aspects of theory. Beyond international relations theory, Ecology stands as a most appealing alternative to the bankrupt ideology of material progress and global control. International Relations must do its part, then: for the sake of peace, it must welcome a frank examination of its traditional parameters and reorient its discourse toward the weak and oppressed.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}Granted, not all ecologists would agree with this.}\]
BIBLIOGRAPHY


-----, The Limits of the City (Montreal and New York: Black Rose Books, 1986 [1973]).


-----. "Recovering Evolution: A Reply to Eckersley and Fox". Environmental Ethics, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Fall 1990), pp. 253-274.


-----, "Production, the State, and Change in World Order", in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempicl, Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989).


----- and Sheila TOBLA (eds.), Women, Militarism, and War (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1990).


-----. The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975).


HERZ, John. Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951)


HOLSTI, K. J. The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987).


