

**ON THE PRODUCTION OF GUILT
SCIENCE, MYTHOLOGY, RELIGION**

A CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS' ORIGINS OF GUILT AND AN INQUIRY INTO ITS SOCIAL PRODUCTION

A Thesis Submitted to the Committee on Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Masters of Arts
in the Faculty of Arts and Science

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METHODOLOGIES FOR THE STUDY OF WESTERN HISTORY AND CULTURE

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ABSTRACT

ON GUILT: SCIENCE, MYTHOLOGY, AND RELIGION

Howard Grant Timms

The thesis is a study of the history and evolution of the social production of guilt. The work relies mainly on the writings of Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari to offer a critique of Freud and classical psychoanalysis, comparing the underlying conceptual assumptions of psychoanalysis with those found in Judeo-Christian theology or 'biblical religion'. The thesis attempts to construct a genealogy of social coding and mnemotechnics to form an analysis of the mechanisms whereby the concepts of obligation, debt and the 'sense of guilt' condition regimes of social production. The thesis adopts the position that guilt, as conceived by classical psychoanalysis, is neither ontologically innate nor a phylogenetic necessity, but is a re-configuration of foundational positions of Judeo-Christian and western metaphysics predicated on the concepts deprivation, lack, or an absence of being conceived as the fundamental condition of the immanent world, organic life, and human ontology.

Keywords:

Guilt, social production, psychoanalysis, mnemotechnics, sense of guilt, bad conscience, debt, Nietzsche, Deleuze, Guattari, Freud, mythology, religion, schizoanalysis, territorialisation, social code, inscription, Bible, Judaism, Christianity.

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ON THE PRODUCTION OF GUILT

Science, Mythology and Religion

A CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS' ORIGINS OF GUILT AND INQUIRY INTO ITS SOCIAL PRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Guilt. — Although the shrewdest judges of the witches and even the witches themselves were convinced of the guilt of witchery, this guilt nevertheless did not exist. This applies to all guilt.¹

1. SITUATING THE WORK

Nietzsche's "death of God" is a meditation on the discontinuity in the western philosophical and epistemological tradition that marks not only the transition from the modern to the 'postmodern' but the break with all western tradition hitherto. Nietzsche locates 'the modern' within the continuum established by the western Judeo- and Platonic-Christian tradition.² The possibilities and potentialities of the post-modern discontinuity represented by the death of God establishes the tasks of philosophy as the overcoming of western metaphysics, Christianity, the 'theologian' or priestly instinct, and thereby the 'errors' of human ontology that create the subject 'Man'. The foundation for this human ontology, in its Christian aspect, are the concepts of sin and 'original sin' which create the basis for the existential doubts and anxiety related to concepts of being-as-lack and 'slave' morality. Overcoming through re-valuation ("INCIPT ZARATHUSTRA") is the overcoming of 'bad conscience', characterised by feelings of deprivation and *ressentiment* that are the products of western cultural inscription and social coding. Overcoming involves the re-valuation of guilt and the *sense of guilt* that are socially re-produced as the western cultural mnemonic *par*

excellence. Insofar as guilt and the sense of guilt remain, bad conscience, deprivation and *ressentiment* also remain, configuring of a system of inscription and coding that, as yet, remains all too Christian.

Nietzsche represents the death of God as a socio-psychological catastrophe, laceration and trauma. The death of God is the collapse of a foundation that has consequences not only for social categories, but also for 'Man' as subject. Socially, the death of God represents the death of univocity, of homogenising tendencies, its normalising morality and moralising discourses. The death of God is therefore the breakdown of certainty that devolves from a socially inscribed subjectivity 'guaranteed' by God.³ The effects include a radical de-centring, a feeling of shifting sands, and perhaps even the *erasure* of the face of 'Man' from these sands.⁴

However, the death of the (Judeo-) Christian God also represents liberation. It represents the liberation of human life (indeed all life) and the apparent world from 2000 years of accusations that life is *less*, that it *lacks*, that life is deprived of reality and being, is dependent on and indebted to Transcendent Being and stands morally and ontologically condemned as a result. The synthesis of Jewish theology and Platonic philosophy in Christian theology produces a trajectory that further devalues the value of the apparent world and diminishes the efficacy of human self-assertion while increasing the human sense of debt and obligation to God. In effect, debt related to lack becomes an ontological category.⁵ Human activity dedicated to a reduction of debt is considered a sin, and a denial of the need for Grace. Debt becomes infinite. Fundamentally, then, the death of God is the death of guilt, of bad conscience, and *ressentiment*, the products of feelings of deprivation, lack, and the diminishing of the power of human self-assertion in the face of debt to this God. The death of God is the liberation from infinite, un-repayable debt. The death of God is the death of the Law of the Father and univocity. The molar and its regime of judgement are replaced by the molecular; the flows of productive desire are liberated in affirmation of

being and becoming. The death of God is the moment of re-birth and recurrence. Humankind is to awaken out of its long slumber in the dark age of the error of life negation into the bright light of the great noontide of life affirmation. Humankind overcomes itself in a 'yes-saying' to life, to the forces of life as *desire* and will-to-power.⁶ Humankind thereby overcomes itself as 'Man' the subject-ed Subject and becomes 'overman'.

Notwithstanding contemporary theory's elevation of multiplicity, diversity, and plurality to the status of ontological categories (and radical perspectivism), notwithstanding theory's announcement that universals, meta-narratives and meta-theory (like God) are dead, we continue to be subjected to *social* conditions that are the repetition of the relations of production of a regime that remains, in terms of its ontogenetic and sociogenic assumptions, configuration and coding, all too 'Christian.'⁷ The project of nihilism is, as yet, incomplete. Consequently, we remain in a 'pathological, transitional' stage.⁸ However, elements of modern and post-modern thought under the influence of the secularised theology of psychoanalysis perceives the transitional as permanent, the pathological as intrinsic and inevitable. Human ontogenesis and sociogenesis are deemed inherently neurotic and problematised in theory as such.

Freudian psychoanalysis borrows heavily from Nietzschean psychology and its deconstruction of the Subject only to re-configure Nietzsche's project of the overcoming of 'Man' as the subject of western metaphysics. Psychoanalysis agrees with Nietzsche that the modern human is a *sick*, neurotic animal. But psychoanalysis claims the illness that Nietzsche wants to cure is intrinsic to human ontogeny and cannot be overcome. Psychoanalysis disregards Nietzsche's distinction between 'the human animal' as the organic machine of will-to-power and 'Man' as the subject of social construction. Thus, for psychoanalysis, Man cannot be overcome because Man and the human are the same; Man is the human in its modern, civilised form; Man is culmination of psychology's history of instinct repression, the product of suppression and domestication of the human through the internalisation and

increase of guilt. Notwithstanding Freud's concerns that guilt may increase too much and become intolerable for Man, Man *qua* Man is guilty man, and guilty Man is civilised Man. For psychoanalysis, the overcoming of Man would then represent the end of 'civilisation'. The end of civilisation is the end of Man, and the end of the human. The human cannot overcome itself—should not overcome itself—but the human can, and the human must repress itself. The human must be guarded against, tamed and domesticated *for its own good*. In its self-repression, the human becomes Man and realises its true essence. The 'therapeutic' project of psychoanalysis has as its end the reconciliation of the human to the need for repression and domestication through the normalisation of the sense of guilt as the *a priori* internalised condition. Psychoanalysis' project thereby appropriates that of the *priest* and is the subversion and negation of Nietzsche's re-valuation.

Psychoanalysis may be placed, broadly, within the continuum of a western metaphysical dualism that devalues the apparent world and locates responsibility for this deprivation within the individual, while at the same time devaluing human being.⁹ Psychoanalysis abstracts and reifies the ontological 'errors' of western metaphysics and theology, rendering them axiomatic.¹⁰ Psychoanalysis' theory of the conscious and unconscious and their relation to the functioning of desiring production, and as a theory of how desire *should* or *ought* to function, are re-occupations of theological positions. Psychoanalysis appropriates Judeo-Christian ontology and morality as the basis of its theory and is therefore the secular re-occupation of the territory of the Bible.

For psychoanalysis, it is the unconscious, and its genetically predetermined coding in its essence that configures civilisation and is responsible for sociogenesis.¹¹ The configuration of the conscious/unconscious is determined ontologically, and ontogeny determines sociogenesis. Ontogeny and sociogenesis are determined by the original, primeval crime of the father's murder. Similarly, for theology sociogenesis—or history—is the consequence of

ontogeny. For theology, the human ontogenetic condition is innately corrupt, depraved, and deprived, for the human *lacks* being.¹² The human lacks being, and is therefore prone to error and sin. Yet, the human is responsible for its condition as a sinful being, as a being that lacks, because the human has a will (free will); because the human has free will, it is implied that the human is responsible, in some measure, for overcoming sin and lack. The human is thereby placed in an ontological 'double-bind.' The human suffers from an ontic *lack* due to the crime of original sin. Ontic lack should be experienced as a 'sense' of guilt because lack, ontically, *is* guilt. Human ontogenesis is determined by the original human error. Without the aid of God's Grace, human production of error and lack, both organically (in terms of human reproduction) and socially (in terms of social production) is axiomatic. Psychoanalysis diagnoses the human condition as neurotic or pathological, conceived as the intrinsic (and thus necessary), predetermined (and thus predictable) essence of human ontogeny. The divination of necessity and predictability serve as the basis of the scientific empiricism of psychoanalysis. For psychoanalysis error and lack are products of geneticism that pre-determines sociogenesis. The 'sense of guilt' that results from error and lack is socially reproduced and configured but is not sociogenic. Rather, human ontogeny demands, as its natural emanation, the nuclear family that then serves as the model for social institutions, social production and the coding of desire. Error and guilt as the noumena of ontic lack produce sickness (neuroses, pathologies) but nevertheless *must* be socially reproduced, for sociogenesis that is inconsistent with ontogeny only deepens the sickness and becomes a threat to existence.

Psychoanalysis, no less than theology, creates a double bind for the individual and society. The production of culture (civilisation) is the inevitable and necessary consequence of the original crime. Only the human being has the need to produce culture. Culture is the 'original' need; it is the first consequence of theology's original sin and psychoanalysis' primeval crime. The necessity of culture is a reminder of the original sin (Genesis 1-3); for theology, the existence of culture is the reminder of man's alienation from God. However,

only Man self-conscious of the guilt of original sin has the capacity to produce the 'good' society. For psychoanalysis, only the human being configured by guilt has the capacity to produce 'civilisation'. Culture is the external representation (reification) of Man's guilty essence, and culture, in its essence, is the means employed to assuage Man's guilty conscience. Civilisation is the reification of the 'return of the repressed'.

2. THESIS.

Insofar as psychoanalysis agrees with theology, both provide an answer to a universalised, a-historical version of the Frankfurt School's orienting question: 'why do people continue to submit to regimes that manifestly work against their needs, interests, and desires?' For Freud and theology, the answer is clear. Without guilt, Man's unrepressed, un-coded libidinal desires run free, destroying not only culture but destroying Man. Culture is the means to survival predicated on both the inscription and the reification of guilt in all social institutions and relations of production and anti-production. All culture, all civilisation is therefore the social production and reproduction of guilt. The Law of the Father is conceived as the only basis for civilisation. According to both Freud and Judeo-Christian theology, the Father is at once the total field of cultural activity, the limit concept (law) that inscribes and represses activity, and the essence (Numen) of the total field. The father is the predetermined Absolute. Psychoanalysis and western, Judeo-Christianity are in agreement that guilt, as the 'sense of guilt' or 'original sin', is innate, and fundamental to human ontology and ontogenesis.¹³ The Absolutism of the Father necessarily implies that obligation is permanent, debt is infinite, and guilt cannot be expiated. Guilt and infinite debt are inscribed as the essence of the human and therefore determinative of human sociogenesis (phylogenesis) as social coding.

The thesis will articulate an opposite point-of-view.

The work is framed by the theme of Deleuze's 'anti-Christ Project', and by Nietzsche's attempt to overcome western metaphysics through an exploration of the relationship between metaphysics and *ressentiment*. Following Deleuze and Guattari, I will argue that Freud's sense of guilt is neither innate nor primary or originary, and that Oedipus is not the primary form of desire and its repression.

The thesis is a genealogy of the social production of guilt. The work represents an attempt to read Nietzsche through Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia in order to offer a critique of Freud and classical psychoanalysis, comparing the underlying conceptual assumptions of psychoanalysis with those found in Judeo-Christian theology or 'biblical religion'. The thesis attempts to construct a genealogy of social coding and mnemotechnics as the basis of an analysis of the mechanisms whereby the concepts of obligation and debt condition and become guilt and the sense of guilt. The thesis adopts the position that guilt, as conceived by classical psychoanalysis, is neither ontologically innate nor a phylogenetic necessity, but is a re-configuration (secularisation) of foundational positions of Judeo-Christian theology and biblical religion.

The work focuses on the first two of Deleuze and Guattari's three 'territorialisations', the primitive and the despotic, as regimes of coding and examines the relation between them with respect to the development of guilt. However, in that Freudian psychoanalysis hypothesises an 'originary' moment, a determinative, ontological 'in the beginning' for the repression of desire via guilt, the thesis will inquire into the character of desire. I will not, however, attempt to answer the question 'what is desire?' but instead will address myself to the question 'how does desire function?'

I have attempted to concentrate on the *social production* of guilt, debt and obligation and their function as mnemonic devices of social organisation. As a result, except where necessary, the thesis does not deal with those areas of psychoanalysis related to individual 'identity' or subject formation through the stages of infancy and early childhood,

notwithstanding the fact that these matters pertain to, and have an intimate relationship with the notion of guilt and are critical to psychoanalytic theory. I have attempted, furthermore, to resist the impulse to foray into a number of related areas, including the origin of religious sentiment, examination of the death-instinct and approaches to death, the formation or 'character' of the ego, and the implications of Oedipus and guilt (and their overcoming) on subject formation. Much research into ethnographic psychoanalysis, 'primitive' mythology, and, in particular, the socio-economic and political milieu of early Christianity has been excluded from the present work.

Joseph Campbell describes a process of "mythic dissociation" that distinguishes Occidental religions of Mesopotamia as religions of 'mythic relationship' in contrast to the more ancient practices of 'mythic identification'. Deleuze and Guattari identify a fundamental discontinuity represented in the shift from primitive territorialisation and savage coding to despotic territorial regimes. Blumenberg, in Legitimacy of the Modern Age provides a genealogy of withdrawal of 'the good' from immanence and life characteristic of western metaphysics, thereby providing a detailed analysis of Nietzsche's 'history of an error', and demonstrating the discontinuity, or break, between the Platonic, Judeo-Christian cosmological view and that of 'pagan' antiquity. Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality describes the break in terms of the triumph of reaction, *ressentiment*, life negation and slave morality over noble morality, life affirmation, *noblesse oblige* and action. In his Genealogy Nietzsche does not attempt to historicize the discontinuity and re-configuration. In The Antichrist, however, he provides a brief account of what is, for him, the historical linchpin for the break. Nietzsche remarks on the shift in Judaic religion associated with the conquest of the Israelite kingdoms, marking the transition to priestly religion through a falsification of history and production of a dogma of *ressentiment*. The descriptions of discontinuity and re-configuration presented by Deleuze and Guattari, Campbell, Blumenberg and Nietzsche provide points of entry for the present work.

3. OUTLINE

I am aware that many commentators on Freud, while noting that Freud's insistence on holding to a theory of genetic inheritance of behavioural characteristics and dispositions is problematic (to say the least), attempt to either overlook or explain away Freud's 'Lamarckism'. In an attempt to distance them from Freud's Lamarckism, critics refer to Freud's primeval horde theory for its "symbolic value" (Marcuse), or attempt to emphasise the 'developmental' (both individual and social) aspects of Freud (Whitebook). However, Freud's Lamarckism should not be viewed through the lens of psychological science, philosophy or critical theory but as a residue of theology and metaphysics.¹⁴ Lamarckism is the 'scientific' (however dubious) tool that allows Freud a basis for his origin theory as the re-occupation of the biblical origin theory. It is the tool that allows him to bridge the gap between the modern oedipalisation and Freud's Moses, and to legitimate his view that Mosaic religion is in fact the primeval father religion of the original brother-horde. However, positing a scientific, biological basis for Oedipal guilt creates internal contradictions for psychoanalytic theory.

In Chapter 1, I will attempt to lay the groundwork for an argument supporting the contention that the basic elements of psychoanalytic theory and its underlying assumptions are biblical and have striking affinities with metaphysical thinking in general. A brief explication and critique of the primal horde theory will establish a basis for a Deleuzian-Guattarian 'internal' critique of Oedipus which will argue that psychoanalysis' theory is consistent only if it posits that guilt and the sense of guilt are coded genetically as human ontogeny. I will then attempt to construct an alternative genealogy of primal, archaic desire and social coding. This genealogy is not an attempt to posit an alternative to the Freudian or Judeo-Christian 'origin' theory. Instead, the genealogy is an attempt to demonstrate that

human (and pre-human) desire is molecular, plural, and plastic, that human activity and the development of culture can be explained as precisely desire's *breaking free* of the molar coding and repression (characteristic of Oedipus) in favour of new and multiple desiring connections, disjunctions and conjunctions. *Conscious multiplicity rather than unconscious univocity* coupled with collective activity and social coding are the strategies adopted by the pre-human and human as the functional means to deal with its environment ('where it is') and the 'problem' of what it is (ontogeny). I will argue that Freud's reading of the primal drama as the originary moment of human ontogenesis and sociogenesis is flawed, that the primeval configuration of debt and obligation is not linked, and cannot be related to the law of the Father, but must be linked to the Full Body of the Earth usually symbolised and gendered as 'Mother'.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the argument is not simply an inversion of Oedipus, wherein a primeval matriarchy is substituted for a primeval patriarchy. In Chapter 2, following Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari, I will argue that the production of 'guilt' is sociogenic process. The coding of debt and obligation as the precursors of 'bad conscience' and guilt are socially created and configured as mnemonic *tools* of cultural inscription, crafted as the means to mark and *dedicate* bodies and organs as desiring machines at once to the *socius* (mesocosm) and to the mega-machine (macrocosm) that is the production and reproduction of life. Primitive territorialisation and savage coding — whether 'coded' under the goddess as 'imaginary figure' or not — does not, *contra* Freud, represent a 'relaxation' of repression or a liberation of libidinal desire. However, I will attempt to demonstrate that, guilt, as such, is not necessary to inscription, or to the creation of memory associated with debt and obligation, and therefore not necessary to the formation of a socio-moral code.

Notions of obligation and debt are intrinsic to culture and as old as human social production, insofar as culture involves the social inscription and coding of desiring production. Debt and obligation are the basic elements of *mnemotechnics*. But notions of debt

and obligation are not the same as 'bad conscience' or guilt. An examination of pre-history—and non-western, Judeo-Christian history in general—reveals fundamentally different configurations of debt/obligation from those found in western secular-modern and religious codes. Indeed, within these 'archaic' or savage configurations, we do not find psychoanalysis' 'guilt' or the 'sense of guilt'. The mnemotechnic devices of guilt, the sense of guilt, and bad conscience appear in conjunction with the re-configuration and abstraction of debt and obligation consistent with the requirements of despotic territorialisation.

Despotism is a radical break involving deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation through the decoding and recoding of myths and practices linking the individual and socius to the Full Body of the Earth. The link with the earth is severed through the insertion of the despot as the full body. The introduction of despotic codes represents both a crisis and a response to a crisis. The 'break', however, does not involve de-coding and re-coding resulting in the total replacement of savage code by the despotic. Rather, despotism is a process of *over-coding*, which results in a tendentious synthesis, co-existence and inter-dependency of despotic and savage forms of production. That is, savage forms are not supplanted by the despotic. Savage codes are not re-coded and absorbed. The savage form does not produce the despotic out of itself as an evolutionary development. The civilisations of the High Neolithic, Bronze and Iron Ages produce variations of despotic and savage interdependency, resulting in various degrees of local autonomy. The form, 'style' or tactic of despotic over-coding is characteristic of the 'pagan' world, in which 'empires' over-code vast geographical territories but permit local customs, practices, and religions to exist. The interdependence of despotism and savage forms of production militates against the possibility that despotism becomes absolute. The preservation of local/savage forms of production serves as a practical limit against the infinitisation of debt, and against the transition of bad conscience into guilt internalised as the sense of guilt.

One culture only in antiquity attempts to de-code and re-code *all* the codes, to replace or repress both the archaic forms of savagery *and* the barbarian form of despotism in the project of bringing all the codes under a single, unitary code. The attempt is made in the construction of biblical religion and in the codification of the Father's Law in the Bible.

Chapter 3 will narrow the application of the work in the attempt to examine the socio-historical phenomenon of the biblical consolidation of codes through a genealogical analysis of pre-Hellenistic Judaism, seen as critical by both Freud and Nietzsche. The chapter offers a brief examination of the pre-exilic (First Temple) period before focussing on the exilic and post-exilic (Second Temple) periods of Judaism. For reasons primarily of thesis length, the analysis ends with the period of Persian hegemony in Judea. However, it can be said that Freud assumes that the essential 'character' of the religion and its people is well established; the sense of guilt and the law of the father have become the collective unconscious, and the hegemonic (if not unitary) code governing the social production of the Jews by the early post-exilic period. To this limited extent, Nietzsche and Freud agree: guilt or bad conscience as the fundamental element of the theology is established in biblical religion during the Persian period — but here the agreement ends. Nietzsche, in my view, does not suggest that guilt is collectively inscribed among 'the Jews.'¹⁶ Nietzsche claims only that 'bad conscience' is fundamental element of Second Temple *priestly* theology, which theology attempts to impose on the population. The formulation of ontological guilt as the foundation of theology is an element of the process of decoding and recoding consistent with the falsification of history and the re-invention of religion.¹⁷ For Nietzsche, the Jewish priestly project 'succeeds' only in Pauline Christianity. Freud, on the other hand, assumes Oedipal guilt is collectively inscribed, has become normative, and has been internalised, encoded and embedded as *the* Jewish identity through the traumatic events of the Babylonian conquest and exile. For Freud, the Jewish priestly project succeeds not as an abstract over-code, contrived by and imposed 'from without' by the priestly authorities. Rather, the religious

code is the process of making conscious what is repressed and unconscious. The project of the priestly code succeeds precisely because it is the product of latent and repressed material. It succeeds because the repressed *must return* — in the cause of psychological ‘health’, as *ethos*, and as historical necessity. Indeed, given the existence of primeval guilt, the priestly project is *a fait accompli*.

CHAPTER I: SCIENCE

The body and physiology as the starting point: why? — We gain the correct idea of the nature of our subject-unity, namely as the regents at the head of a community (not as ‘souls’ or ‘life-forces’), also of the dependence of these regents upon the ruled and an order of rank and division of labour as the conditions that make possible the whole and its parts ...¹⁸

To what extent even our intellect is a consequence of conditions of existence—: we would not have it if we did not *need* to have it, and we would not have it *as it is* if we did not need to have it *as it is*, if we could live otherwise.¹⁹

1. ONTOGENESIS AND SOCIOGENESIS: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

The territories of theology and psychoanalysis on one hand, genealogy and schizoanalysis on the other, are marked by their respective theoretical preoccupations, and their application of theory to culture. Theology and psychoanalysis are concerned with instinct and the innate as the pre-conditions and determinants of culture, whereas genealogy and schizoanalysis are concerned with cultural coding, practice, and contingency. Thus, the two possibilities present themselves as dialectical opposites, representing (as Joseph Campbell notes) the contrasting points of view of social science, psychoanalysis, structuralism, philosophies of the concept and theologians on one side, genealogy, schizoanalysis and post-structuralist philosophy on the other. The one possibility is *ontogenetic* and *psychological*, the other *sociogenic* and *mythological*. The one possibility is metaphysical/teleological and the other is genealogical/historical. The one possibility privileges the transcendent and the other the immanent. The one searches for or posits an ultimate foundation or ground of being — and finds it, alternatively, in the Ideal, in the Transcendent, in God, in the *human qua human*, or in the Subject. The other seeks no ultimate ground, but instead contemplates function, immanence, experience and becoming.

Psychoanalysis aligns itself with metaphysics, theology, and the social science of the innate. The methodology employed by Freud in *Totem and Taboo*, *Civilisation and its Discontents*, and *Moses and Monotheism* reflects the approach taken by psychoanalysis, medicine and much science of the mind. The analyst first studies the idea or concept itself. A structure of the psyche, which predetermines its primary functions, is assumed. Geography and climate, the cultural and sociological influences that give rise to variation are the objects of secondary or tertiary studies.

Psychoanalysis as history and historicisation addresses itself to Norman O. Brown's question: "how can there be an animal which represses itself?"²⁰ The answer is supplied by finding that the impulse to create culture is inherent.²¹ Culture is not merely, or even most importantly, the means to humanise nature, but is a system of mnemotechnics designed to 'humanise' (domesticate, civilise) the hominid animal. Culture is a product of psychological spontaneity. The innate and the natural are externalised. That which is given by Nature is culturally manifested and must therefore take on determinate forms or structures. The primary social form given by Nature is the Family; the nuclear family is at once ontogenetic and sociogenic, predetermined by the human child's long period of dependency.²² The assumption of structure then presumes a certain *human qua human* uniformity, homogeneity and essence of the species and species being, from which science can distil psychological 'laws' and pre-coded behavioural traits (like a moral sense) innate to the body and mind, and which, (Campbell remarks) "has not radically changed since the period of the Aurignacian caves and can be as readily identified in the jungles of Brazil as in the cafes of Paris, as readily in the igloos of Baffin Land as in the harems of Marrakech."²³

On the other hand, if *paideumic influences* (environment, climate, geography, topography) and social forces are privileged over the innate in shaping human ideas, ideals, fantasies, emotions, and desire, then an opposite philosophical —and psychological— position may be

taken up.²⁴ The post-structuralist critique of 'Man' is, to a degree, pre-figured in the work of social anthropologists like AR Radcliffe-Brown, who claims individual psychology is dependent on the social system of sentiments into which the individual is inserted.²⁵ Any and all social factors, practices, and beliefs that ensure the well-being and cohesion of the group become the object of the system of sentiments and form the social code inscribed onto and into the individual. Radcliffe-Brown asserts "*In human society the sentiments in question are not innate but are developed in the individual by the action of the society upon him.*"²⁶ Systems of sentiment are recorded on a body-without-organs, and marked on the bodies and in the minds of members of a social group.²⁷ Such inscription serves the dual purpose of identifying members of the group as such (distinguishing them from other groups) and fastens the individual via the group as constituent elements of the earth, land, and 'territory.'²⁸ The first, earliest, or most 'primitive' systems of sentiment are recorded on the body-without-organs as *myths* which include codes pertaining to ceremony, ritual practice, initiation 'law', and therefore to techniques of repression and recording as 'memory'. The methods of recording cohere symbiotically. Together they serve "both to maintain it (the system of sentiments) at the requisite degree of intensity in the mind of the individual and to transmit it from one generation to the other", for "without such expression the sentiments involved could not exist."²⁹ The configuration of desiring production, the establishment of connective syntheses, their disjunction and recording, and their conjunctive syntheses of consumption and consummation all become the stuff of *social production* manifested in primitive (archaic) societies' spectacle of religious rites and festivals. In addition, the spectacle is the product of *mnemotechnical practices*. Mnemotechnic practices include not only the infliction of physical pain in particular, but are contrived to produce states of hyper-stimulation and 'sensory overload' in general as the means to engineer the intensity required for the inscription of memory, and the inscription of the sense of obligation or debt to the group and its traditions.³⁰

However, an either/or of the two possibilities presents a false dichotomy. 'Man', 'Humanity' or 'Subject' as ontological categories may be considered social constructions, but the human as *organism* cannot.³¹ The danger presented by the ontological or 'Nature' argument is its affinity with metaphysical positing of essences, as noted above, but the hazard inherent in the sociogenic position is no less serious. Radicalisation of the sociogenic or 'Nurture' argument is a descent into radical perspectivism and relativism, wherein uncertainty, difference, alterity and contingency become concepts or thing-in-themselves. The sociogenic position taken to its extreme makes the human organism as 'being' or 'subject' totally dependent on a particular culture. The nurture position must conceive of culture as infinitely plastic, thereby abstracting both the human organism and culture from any and all grounding. Culture thereby is conceived as intellectual and affective activity related only *casually* to the earth and the body.

But the socio-cultural, the environmental-paideumic and the biological-genetic are *all* the territory of human activity. The biological body is the human as organ machine. The human is a body. Bodily existence is the innate — indeed the only — form of existence. The human lives *as* a body and not merely 'in' a body. Thought may imagine life outside the body or beyond the body, might imagine a life 'freed' of the bodily prisons and transcending the body's limits, but such thoughts are nevertheless the products of a bodies. Systems of sentiment, whether theology, philosophy, psychoanalysis, or popular culture, all impact on and to a degree predetermine how the body is conceptualised—but again these are products *of* bodies. All experience is bodily experience; all action is the action of a body; all thought is the thought of a body. All life is a body. Life as a body is *the limit of the form*, but the absolute limit is deterministic neither of the individual body nor of its capacities and tendencies, or its "relations of tension... between dominant and dominated forces."³² That is, the body is capable of prodigious variations of configuration — tall, short, white, black, male, female, infant, adolescent, adult — but the body-as-body and the organs, organisms, and biological processes that construct the body represent a limit; thusly, all humans are a 'body'.³³

Correspondingly, the world that appears to be external to the human body as 'Nature', with its environmental, organic and biological systems and resources likewise is a body, and each environment of the earth is a body representing the full body of the earth. And the Earth as full body presents the human with a limit. In Blumenberg's terminology, this limit is the "Absolutism of Reality", and both the (human) body and its organs and the full body of the earth are part of the limit concept.³⁴ However, the absolute limit of reality contains within it fields of forces capable of an inexhaustible number of variations, relationships, and configurations, so that the limit is also Deleuze's and Guattari's the *Virtual*.³⁵ It is a limit that produces environments that are temperate, tropical, and arctic; it is a limit that produces deserts, boreal forests and fertile river floodplains—and, among the latter, some rivers flood as predictably as the rise of the sun, while others are more irregular. It is a limit that generates the paramecium and the diplodocus, the earthworm and the golden eagle, the blade of grass and the giant redwood tree.

Each environment of the earth contains forms of life that are the product of that specific environment, that are adapted to it and exist in a symbiotic relationship with it. But no biological system is static. Within the limits of its own form and the relations of tension that define its body, each bio-system, species and discrete forms of a species (individuals) are capable of variation and adaptation.³⁶ The body as organ-ic machine does not predetermine the configuration of desiring activity but places limits on desire, and influences the configuration of desire. Human culture, insofar as it develops as a life affirming activity, develops in reference to, in interaction with, and as a constituent of both the body and the full body. The variables, contingencies and differences possible in social configuration and physical being (including mental capacity), individually, collectively and in combination with paideumic factors, create the prospect of incalculable if not infinite possibility. However, both theology and psychoanalysis foreclose on these possibilities.

2. CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AS BIO-HISTORY

Psychoanalysis argues that the organisation of civilisation, at all times in all places, including modern, western industrial capitalism, is largely determined by the *archaic heritage* of the human animal. The archaic heritage is human pre-history — forgotten, Freud says, but not unknowable, for we have before us contemporary ‘primitive’ societies and primitive religious practice that provide insight into the typology of human pre-history. Given that primitive religion, to Freud, appears neurotic, he concludes that it is safe to say that human pre-history in general is neurotic; indeed, “such a conclusion has almost the significance of an axiom.”³⁷ Furthermore, the primal horde theory is universal pre-history. For Freud, the “essential part of the argument” in favour of ontological guilt, “is that all primeval men, including, therefore, all our ancestors, underwent the fate I shall now describe,” namely, the drama of the primeval murder of the father.³⁸ Marcuse concludes that the Freudian origin hypothesis is the assertion that human ontogenesis and phylogenesis are, at their very roots, pre-determined by the events of the intergenerational pre-historical practice of parricide, and therefore “includes ‘not only dispositions, but also ideational contents, memory traces of the experiences of former generations’. Individual psychology is thus *in itself* group psychology in so far as the individual itself still is in archaic identity with the species. The archaic heritage bridges the ‘gap between individual and mass psychology’.”³⁹

On a *physiological level* the ‘preservation’ and ‘descent’ (in the genealogical sense of *Herkunft* = ‘stock’ and ‘descent’ as *Erbschaft* = ‘heritage’) of genetically encoded characteristics is indisputable.⁴⁰ Heritage through descent is that which is attached to and refers to *the body*, inscribed into the digestive system, skeletal structure, configuration of the spine, spinal cord, and nervous system, etc.⁴¹ The genetic code is carried by DNA, which determines the colour of eyes, the amount of melanin in the skin, body type (ectomorph, endomorph, mesomorph), longevity and the predisposition toward certain diseases. The brain too is an

organ, making it plausible (at least) that there may be a genetic basis for a *bias* (at least) toward the formation of particular neural connections which in turn favour certain modes of thought, types of ideas, behaviour and temperament. The preservation and descent of particular neural-connection tendencies may support Freud's claim of the inheritance of 'traces' in the unconscious.⁴²

Yet, the 'trace', for psychoanalysis, is not to be understood as a mere crumb, hint, tinge, or scintilla, but precisely as the delineation, the map, and the reproduction of a universal substratum for the content of the unconscious. The 'traces' are embedded in the genetic code as a given of human nature as *animal symbolicum*.⁴³ The trace also refers to the *inherited image* of the archaic, collective unconscious, understood not merely in the sense of a Kantian 'category' of perception/apperception or even a Jungian archetype, but as an image that carries with it content and meaning.⁴⁴ The trace contains pre-determined biases toward certain modes of social coding and behaviour. Specific desiring connections, conjunctions and disjunctions are pre-recorded, tending toward particular desiring restrictions and exclusions that in turn create a bias toward certain modes of satisfaction and repression conceived as the *values* of the social, moral or ethical code. The trace 'draws around' the unconscious, providing the architecture, framework and enclosure of an unconscious that is pre-territorialised by Oedipal guilt.

Notwithstanding the vicissitudes of human instinct and social coding allowed for by psychoanalysis, notwithstanding the seemingly inevitable tensions between individual instinctual desire and its entrapment, repression or sublimation by society, psychoanalysis attempts to establish a fundamental link between the ontogenesis and the sociogenesis (phylogenesis). Furthermore, psychoanalysis telescopes time and history, establishing Oedipus as its *Alpha* and *Omega*, showing that the beginning is the end. The repressive hypothesis argues that the originary, the archaic and the modern are, *in essence*, the same. Thus, as Marcuse remarks,

The quest for the origin of repression leads us back to the origin of instinctual repression, which occurs during early childhood. The superego is the heir of the Oedipus complex, and the repressive organisation of sexuality is chiefly directed against its pre-genital and perverse manifestations. Moreover, the 'trauma of birth' releases the first expressions of the death instinct – the impulse to return to the Nirvana of the womb – and necessitates the subsequent controls of this impulse. It is in the child that the reality principle completes its work; with such thoroughness and severity, that the mature individual's behaviour is hardly more than a repetitive pattern of childhood experiences and reactions. But the childhood experiences that become traumatic under the impact of reality are *pre-individual*, *generic*: with individual variations, the protracted dependence of the human infant, the Oedipus situation, and the pre-genital sexuality all belong to the *genus* man. Moreover, the unreasonable severity of the superego of the neurotic personality, the unconscious sense of guilt and the unconscious need for punishment, seem to be out of proportion with the actual 'sinful' impulses of the individual; the perpetuation and (as we shall see) intensification of the sense of guilt throughout maturity, the excessively repressive organisation of sexuality, cannot be adequately explained in terms of the still acute danger of individual impulses. Nor can the individual reactions to early traumata be adequately explained by 'what the individual himself has experienced'; they deviate from individual experiences 'in a way that would accord much better with their being reactions to generic events,' and in general they can be explained only 'through such an influence'.⁴⁵

Modern, postmodern, Western (and not only Western!) *homo sapiens* is hereby linked directly to its pre-historical, proto-human ancestors. The primitive patriarchal, Oedipalised family-troupe becomes the template for the modern bourgeois family and its social institutional projections. The circle is complete; there is no escape. Any and all attempts to re-configure the family, social or cultural code that are *non-oedipal* or *anti-oedipal* are deemed neurotic or pathological and must produce both individual and social dysfunction. Anti-oedipalised desire will meet not only with social resistance, but will confront the unorganised, pre-repressed instincts and eons of genetic conditioning by Oedipus.⁴⁶ Franz Alexander, in *The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality* claims that the moral principles of which the child imbibes from parents, guardians, adult authorities "reflect 'certain phylogenetic echoes of primitive man'."⁴⁷ Marcuse, explicating Freud, goes further. The "disturbing implications" of Freudian theory relate to psychoanalysis' dissolution of the ego and personality into its "primary components", which in turn "bares the sub-individual and pre-individual factors which

(largely unconscious to the ego) actually *make* the individual.”⁴⁸ The domination of the universal within and over the individual is revealed, and the “autonomous personality appears as the *frozen* manifestation of the general repression of mankind,” through the operation of what the Freudian Otto Rank terms the “*biological sense of guilt*” (italics mine).⁴⁹

Freud’s construction of the origin of ontogenetic guilt and its sociogenesis is psychoanalysis’ benchmark. He posits the existence of a primeval horde, presided over by the patriarch who enforces a rigorous incest prohibition against subordinate males and females. Subordinate males are denied access to and sexual pleasure with females of the group. The patriarch is possessed of superior power (physical strength, economic skills, &c.) and aggression. The horde is utterly dependent upon his skills and protection for their survival. Obedience to the father’s dictates, arbitrary or impractical, is not only necessary but also assumed as the ‘natural’ order of things.⁵⁰ The brother’s feelings toward the father are characterised by ambivalence. They love him as father/protector, but hate him as the cause of the frustration of their (sexual) desire.⁵¹ The father’s domination is ensured by real, direct, immediate threats against the life of anyone who transgresses his prohibitions. Freud’s primal father is ubiquitous as both a material and a psychic presence.

In Freud’s model, the brothers’ productive desire is channelled into sexual desire and invested in the mother as the object-cathexis. Yet, the desiring flows of all members of the horde are entrapped and contained within the rigid patriarchy and channelled as both production and anti-production for the satisfaction/consummation of the father’s desire; the father serves as counter-cathexis and anti-cathexis. Freud must therefore allow that the process of *primary repression*, by which the initial emergence of the instinctual impulse is prevented, is already entirely successful. For, Freud tells us nothing of the brothers’ need, or even their capacity, to discharge impulses through hallucinatory wish-fulfilment or some other means, which would indicate an absence or lack of primary repression. Nor is there a need for *secondary repression* manifested as the need to disguise irruptions of the return of the

repressed. Nevertheless, the amount of psychic energy invested in the counter- or anti-cathexis is clearly *less* than that invested in the object-cathexis (the mother). That is, neither primary nor secondary repression accounts for all the brothers' libidinal desire and psychic energy. Consequently — inevitably — the permanent frustration of desire creates a build-up of unreleased, un-release-able libidinal and psychic energy. Repressed sexual desire is released as murderous aggression against the father. The brother's sexual desire is discharged and consummated (however temporarily) in the act of violence.⁵²

Now the brothers comprehend that they have experienced a 'loss' —of father-love and father-protection— at their own hands. They experience overwhelming anxiety, alarm, *angst*, a sense of remorse, bad conscience, and finally *guilt*. They consume the father in an act of cannibalism in an attempt to (literally) 'internalise' his power, but discover this act alone does not satisfy the need for reparation or atonement.⁵³ Furthermore, they discover that the total liberation of desire is inconsistent with the horde's desire for peace, tranquillity, and orderly or stable economic production and human reproduction. The reality principle triumphs over the pleasure principle. The organisation and repression of desire, in some form, is necessary. Consequently, *desire* —as the sex drive and aggression— is introjected, internalised, and "sent back to where it came from".⁵⁴

Freud informs us that the ego is first and foremost a 'bodily ego'.⁵⁵ The body-ego becomes self-conscious and aware of itself and its libidinal desires. The body-ego releases sexual desire as aggression, thereby 'betraying' the self through the commission of the crime. The brothers associate sex drive and aggression, establishing a nexus; indeed, it would seem that no distinction is made or can be made between or among various desires as qualities and quantities of force, between or among various object-cathexes as relations of tension. Libidinal desire *as such* is conflated with the sex-drive and aggressive instincts. Sex-drive-as-aggression is turned inward and becomes undifferentiated *self-aggression*. Self-aggression directed against the ego is self-aggression against the *body-ego*; self-aggression is internalised

and anthropomorphised as superego “and which now, in the form of *conscience*, is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh form of aggression that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals.”⁵⁶ The result is *the sense of guilt* imposed on the ego by the superego. The tension between the ego and superego “expresses itself as a need for punishment.”⁵⁷ Punishment, however temporarily, assuages the sense of guilt. Formerly, a brother who transgresses the father’s law expects to be punished by the father. Now self-punishment is achieved through an internalisation of the father-code, which becomes the template for all subsequent ‘civilising’ regimes in the regulation, repression and domination of desire.

Psychoanalysis proposes to establish Oedipus as the power of the universal via its ‘origin’ theory; it establishes the credibility of its ‘origin’ theory by citing the universality of Oedipus. The paralogism is characteristic of psychoanalysis and demonstrates its psychological and theoretical affinity with religion. Both are fond of the inescapable *double bind*.⁵⁸ According to the Bible, Man has free will (unlike other animals) because Man alone is created in God’s image. Free will is nothing if not the will to produce and consummate one’s own desire. But God expels man from Paradise as soon as Man exercises free will; Man’s consummation of desire is his disobedience to God. Because the first Man *qua* Man commits the first act of disobedience, both the act itself and the will that motivates the act are declared guilty; that is, God’s punishment adheres not only to the act, but also to the will of the being that committed the act. All humanity (‘humanity’ as universal) is forever (universal time) condemned (universal condemnation).⁵⁹ It is not the individual who sins; sin is committed by the *essence* of the individual (*qua* human). That which places each individual in a state of alienation from God and condemned by original sin is, to use psychoanalysis’ terminology, “sub-individual”, “pre-individual”, or “generic”.⁶⁰ Man’s innate guilt and state of alienation from God is “largely unconscious to the ego” — unless and until it is activated by religious

training or indoctrination, Bible reading, or by the secular modern oedipalised nuclear family structure and social milieu, as the case may be.

Marcuse argues that the perhaps insurmountable difficulties for historical verification of the Freudian origin theory are “reinforced by taboos which the Freudian hypothesis so effectively violates: it does not lead back to an image of paradise which man has forfeited by his sin against God but to the domination of man by man, established by a very earthly father-despot and perpetuated by an unsuccessful or uncompleted rebellion against him.”⁶¹ Marcuse suggests that Freud’s theory differs from the biblical in that the brothers’ ‘original sin’ is not a sin, because the murder is committed against a father who is himself ‘guilty’.⁶² In psychological terms, however, Marcuse’s distinctions are irrelevant. The father’s own guilt is of no account, for the key factor, according to Freud, is the fact that the murderers *felt* guilty, believed themselves guilty of a crime, and coded the unconscious accordingly. The social order is configured as if the brothers shouldered the entirety of guilt for the crime, without mitigation, without any alibi, without any shifting of blame to the ‘victim.’ Marcuse’s assignation of guilt to the father, however defensible as an ethical position, inverts the position of theology while remaining on theology’s ground. Life in the pre-fall, pre-primeval murder era is ‘paradisiacal’ or not, depending on one’s ‘ontological’ or social position. The biblical authors speak from and advocate the dominant (God’s) not the subordinate (human) position, while Marcuse speaks from the subordinate (brothers’) perspective, and Freud appears to be either undecided or ambivalent.⁶³ From the perspective of the primeval father, unchallenged patriarchal despotism and exclusive sexual access to the females, inscribed and internalised by subordinates in the horde, all as ‘historical right’, surely must seem like paradise! Stripped of its ethical or theological, rhetorical or ideological connotations, the term ‘paradise’ simply refers to an ‘original’, primary, and pre-historical state disrupted by human action. For psychoanalysis no less than theology, *that* humanity does not live in its original state, and that humanity as a whole (as the essence of humanity) is debarred from

existence in the primary or pristine condition through crime and sin, are the primary elements of human ontology.

In exercising free will, and partaking of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, Man, created in God's image, threatens God. Man and Woman are expelled from Paradise — because, through her initiative and his willingness to follow her lead, humans threaten the position of God. Humans must be expelled from Paradise before they partake of the fruit of the second Tree, that of Life and Death, and before (God says) they “become like one of us” [Gn 3.22]. Reflecting a similar concern, Freud writes, (to Romain Rolland) “everything unfolds as if the essential were to go beyond the father, as if going beyond the father were always forbidden.”⁶⁴ History begins with the exercise of human free will. Without the attempt to ‘go beyond the father’, there is no history. History begins with the ‘original sin’ of attempting to go beyond father, which, as a necessary first step, includes usurping father, becoming ‘like’ father, occupying his position and displacing him from this position. The drama of usurpation, displacement and re-occupation is played out in many if not most mytho-religious systems of sentiment: Zeus replaces Cronos who replaces Uranus (Greece), Marduk replaces Anu (Babylon), Amun replaces Ptah (Egypt), and Shiva displaces Indra who displaces the Brahmin (India) as the active principles of creation. Frequently, the religious system sanctifies a parallel socio-political process of replacement and usurpation. Thus, in ancient Egypt, the son is invested as the embodiment of the divine Pharaonic principle; the son not only replaces his father, but the son ‘becomes’ all preceding Pharaohs. The new Pharaoh is expected to both incorporate and go beyond his father, just as the nation's prosperity and achievements are to increase, built on the foundation of all that has gone before.⁶⁵ Only in the religion of the Judeo-Christian west — and in psychoanalytic theory — does the displacement of the father take on the aspect of an ontological ‘crime’ and the configuration of a psychological double-bind.⁶⁶ For, in both the biblical and the psychoanalytic view, the punishment for the use, ‘misuse’ or ‘abuse’ of free will is not the

eradication or total repression of free will with a return of the human, ontologically, to an animal state of unconsciousness and dependence on instinct. Rather, the human retains free will primarily to use will to repress and deny desire and will-to-power according to the father's law. Brown's question, "how can there be an animal that represses itself," is answered by recourse to the double-bind: there is an animal that represses itself because the human 'animal' has free will. Without free will there is no repression; without free will there is no need for repression, therefore repression is necessary because of free will. The doctrine of free will offers the prospect and possibility that Man *might* choose a regime other than that of the father's law, that she/he might have the capacity to create alternative modes of identification and processes of differentiation. However, the law of the father holds that the possible alternatives exist only as *temptation* and will be forbidden by the law. The historical project of mnemotechnics is to teach the human animal to fully internalise the father's law, thereby teaching desire to desire its own repression in an act of free will.

The double-bind of psychoanalysis represents the foreclosure of desire by Oedipus; indeed, the sole purpose of Oedipus is to foreclose. Deleuze and Guattari say, "Oedipus is completely useless, except for tying off the unconscious;" the unconscious becomes a sausage link, tied off on both ends.⁶⁷ The ends function as the two poles of Oedipus/religion.

The first pole is characterised by *imaginary* figures (transcendent use) "that lend themselves to a process of identification."⁶⁸ The internalised primal father becomes, according to the Freudian teleological development, first the proto-superego, then proto-god or revered ancestor, then Zeus, Yahweh, Holy Father. The second pole is characterised by *symbolic* functions (immanent use), "that lend themselves to a process of differentiation." But differentiation as restriction and exclusion under regimes of transcendent identification is reinforced as 'dogma'. And dogma, according to Freud, is present in both primitive totemic ritual praxis, and, as a later development, the more abstracted and rationalised version of the

father-code found in Mosaic religion. But there is no way out of Oedipus, just as there is no way out of 'original sin'; "... in any case we are oedipalised: if we don't have Oedipus as a crisis, we have it as a structure."⁶⁹

The imaginary figure is the symbol of the Oedipal double-bind and its foreclosure as the *Absolute*. Either one submits to the domination of the imaginary or manifest father as *absolute* 'external' principle or one represses oneself *absolutely* internally. The alternative to Oedipal repression may be the liberation of desire, but liberation is chaos and catastrophe. According to Freud, the rule of matriarchy prior to the return of father religion with Moses is a period of pre-historical un-civilisation.⁷⁰ Apostasy or alienation from the one true God, according to the Bible, is *always* represented as a crisis culminating in catastrophe: the Tower of Babel collapses, the Flood destroys the world, the Moses-led Israelites are condemned to wandering for forty years in the wilderness. Human failure to install worship of the one true God (Oedipus) as a structure results in crisis, and "the crisis is passed on to others, and the whole movement starts all over again" — as in Israel's 600 year failure to institute the Mosaic-oedipal code. The Oedipal *crisis* that 'resolves' itself in the father's murder precipitates a second crisis that is the *loss* of the father, and the crisis, in turn, is resolved only by re-creating Oedipus as a *structure*.⁷¹

The structure, according to Freud, is internal, psychic, and psychological; it is a revolutionary re-configuration of the architecture of the human mind. The structure is internalised as the generic form of the symbolic order; the unconscious is indeed structured 'like a language.' The structure is externalised as the code and practices governing *material* social and cultural relations, conceived as a *moral* praxis that becomes axiomatic as a result of a thoroughgoing internalisation and identification with the Father principle. Indeed, conflict (doubt, uncertainty, the prospect of the un-oedipalised undifferentiated, etc.) arises only to the degree that the Father principle has not been made the object of thoroughgoing identification. Possibilities suggested in prophetic strains of Judaism (related to 'wearing Yahweh's Law in one's heart') become realised in Pauline Christianity's imperative of

'emptying' of the self-willing ego as such via a dissociation of 'self' from 'ego-body' and its desires.⁷² One becomes an empty vessel to be filled by the 'will' (*ru'ah*) of Yahweh or the Holy Spirit, and one becomes thereby truly a member of the people (*'am*) of Yahweh.⁷³ The Christian aspires to fuse with the body of Christ and achieve the state of 'being-in-Christ'.⁷⁴ One fully identifies with the idealised object: the true believer wears Yahweh's law in his heart (Jeremiah), and walks humbly with his God (Micah), or puts off his 'perishable' body for the imperishable body that is Christ (Paul).

Oedipus as both internal and external structure is the restoration of the original state of things. Psychoanalysis also insists that the image of the Father (Oedipus) serves as the Reality Principle that is opposed to the Pleasure principle. However, the religious antecedents of secular Oedipus show the opposite. Oedipalisation as innate tendency is the unconscious "unary trait" that serves as a magnet, drawing us back to 'God', to Christ, to paradise or heaven, as patriarchal religion's surrogate for the womb or breast.⁷⁵ The Spirit of God and the condition of 'being-in-Christ' produce precisely Freud's "oceanic feeling".⁷⁶ The unary trait draws us toward Death — and toward the substantiality, pre-existent whole-ness, the ultimate ground of meaning and being that are tragically lost to consciousness in the world of reality and significations as the result of the original sin of the ego.⁷⁷

With a focus on the *function* of Oedipus, it becomes clear that Freud's double-bind points to the artificiality of the 'internal/external' distinction of the repressive hypothesis. Freud assumes the primeval father is dominant and that the dominance is total. Total dominance is the entrapment of desire. All possible avenues of escape for the desiring flows are cut off — save for one: the murder of the father. However, the assumption that the primeval father enjoys complete dominance implies that the brothers (and sisters) are thoroughly oedipalised *prior to* the murder of the father, and that the Oedipal structure as the regime governing production, consumption, and recording is pre-existent. We know this because Freud tells us that the brothers not only possess a sex drive among the multiplicity of drives, but also have

recorded *all* their libidinal drives as 'sex drive'. The coding and recording of all drives as 'sex drive' indicates that Oedipal triangulation predates the murder. The brothers' libidinal desire is coded and recorded as sex-drive, and sex drive is coded and recorded as desire for 'mother', consistent with the incest-taboo. Desire for the mother is the object-cathexis and father is the anti-cathexis, but this is not all. For the brothers, Mother has also become the *object-representation*. Mother as object of sexual gratification is taboo, but so too are all the other females of the troupe. The father has *exclusive* sexual rights with all females. The taboo has been extended and made inclusive, requiring that the brothers *abstract* 'Mother' as the prime symbol representing all the females of the troupe. Through the transcendent use, the abstraction 'Mother' becomes an imaginary figure that predetermines and over-codes the immanent use of the symbolic function. Sexual relations with any of the females is identified with or cathected to sex with the mother and therefore subject to the incest taboo. All the same, the recording of the multiplicity of possible configurations of libidinal drives as sex drive invested in the mother indicates a perpetuation of polymorphous perversity and psychoneurosis. It indicates the functioning, however, of a 'unary trait' that acts as a magnet, pulling polymorphous desire to itself and reducing the possibility of multiple, or at least *other* desiring connections to just the one. The unconscious may be structured like a language, but the language is Oedipus —over-determined Oedipus and pre-determined Oedipus, Oedipus over-determined *because* Oedipus is predetermined. Simply put, the brothers are unable to distinguish *any* 'I want' from desire for the mother. Moreover, it is likewise implied in Freud's theory that neither mother (or more ominously) father distinguish any 'I want' — either their own, or that of their children — from sexual desire for the mother, suggesting that all members of the primeval horde suffer acutely from narcissistic deprivation.⁷⁸ Freud's implication, that any expression of 'I want' from one of the brothers/children becomes an immediate and fundamental threat to the father's authority, is therefore comprehensible. Oedipus is revealed in all its paranoiac glory.

Freud perceives internalised self-repression at once as a *change* from the pre-murder structure of the unconscious, and as the *origin* of the ‘human’ unconscious as such. The element of coding that marks the transition from pre-human to human, the element that allows for the formation of a properly ‘human’ unconscious, and that creates the capacity for self-repression is *guilt*. Yet again, in terms of function, the brothers’ self-repression is merely the repetition of father-repression. Functionally, in terms of the external organisation and structure of social production/consumption and human reproduction, *nothing changes*.⁷⁹ The syntheses of production, recording and consumption/consummation, as they apply to sexual desire specifically and libidinal desire generally, have been pre-recorded as exclusive, restrictive, and negative and the syntheses function accordingly both before and after the murder of the father. In terms of *function*, the regime of self-repression with the father as the figure of the “two poles” of Oedipus precedes the father’s murder.⁸⁰ The absolute nature of the patriarchal domination demands the *permanent* and *total* frustration/repression of the brothers’ desire, and the brothers may consume/consummate only with father’s permission. Prior to the father’s murder, a significant degree of self-regulation and discipline on the part of the brothers is necessary, implying that the *capacity* (at least) for self-repression is inherent. For, we cannot imagine that the father is, immanently, everywhere at once, or that he is able to keep all the subordinate males and females of the horde under constant surveillance. In societies of the ‘higher’ apes (especially chimpanzees), subordinate males ‘steal’ intercourse with females—with the females’ encouragement and co-operation. The practice not only relieves sexual tension and abates aggression within the troupe, but also serves to diversify the gene pool thereby ensuring the physiological health of the troupe and the species. If the primeval brothers fear of the father prevents even ‘illicit’ sexual activity—if the brothers believe the father has ‘eyes’ everywhere—Freud must allow that a degree of *abstraction* of the ‘father principle’ has already taken place. The father is on course to godhood before he is murdered.

Psychoanalytic theory achieves internal consistency only if it allows that the subordinate members of the primal horde are thoroughly oedipalised prior to the murder of the father lest the profound disjunction represented by father's murder leads to an *other than* oedipalised conjunctive synthesis (of consumption/consummation), alternative differentiations, and alternative connective syntheses of production and anti-production. For Freud, the murder of the father is the most profound and significant disjunction producing trauma and the threat of 'absolute deterritorialisation.' The murder of the father is a crime against the inherent, or at least pre-established social code that threatens the life of the human troupe. The murder of the father at once transgresses the established code and represents its overcoming. Thus, *as a first premise*, the murder opens up the "possibility of living *beyond* the father's law," indeed "beyond all law", but is a premise the brothers reject.⁸¹ The fact that the brothers immediately move to invoke the father's code, and move to re-establish a regime based upon the father's code implies the pre-existence of oedipal recording and with it the existence of the exclusive, restrictive and *negative* use of the disjunctive synthesis — which is in fact represented by the father's murder. The self-repression of *eros* and an internalisation of the father's code do not begin with the father's murder, but is merely reinforced through further abstraction and reification in the aftermath of the murder. In other words, Oedipus is not a consequence of the father's murder. Instead, the murder of the father is a *consequence* of oedipalisation, and the murder merely reinforces and embeds oedipalisation. Oedipus produces/re-produces the murder and the murder produces/re-produces Oedipus. The repetition compulsion is simply a consequence of genetic predisposition. The repressive regime of domination by the father is *biologically determined*. The repetition of the Oedipal drama indeed produces the human unconscious, the capacity for recording as memory, etc., and ultimately produces what Freud calls 'civilisation'. Nevertheless, socialisation techniques are the products of biological determination. Innate Oedipus is Oedipus as instinct, thus social configuration is a product of instinct. It is the innate coding of the unconscious rather than conscious 'organisation' that determines the character of civilisation.

Psychoanalysis' primal horde theory is internally consistent only if it posits that the primeval father is 'all-father' *prior to* his murder. The Father's Law has been internalised by the brothers, and the Father principle has been mythically inflated into 'God'. Indeed, Freud's hypothesis implies that the father is 'all-mother' as well. Father protects and nurtures, threatens and punishes, thereby serving as the principles of both *eros* and *thanatos*. He represents both the pleasure principle — insofar as life as the horde serves as a surrogate 'womb' and 'breast' — and reality principle. Father is both imaginary figure (transcendent use) and symbolic function (immanent use), both crisis and structure. Freud's depiction of primeval father is all but indistinguishable from the biblical, theological depiction of God (Yahweh or El) as both all-father and all-mother. Correspondingly, psychoanalysis' hypothesis concerning the pre- and post-murder conditions of the primal horde and the consequences of the murder are biblical. The era of the primeval horde is a-historical and timeless, analogous to biblical (and other) creation stories as mythical 'in the beginnings'. It is a time before time, a time before crime, and it through a crime against God/the father that sin and guilt enter the world. In psychoanalysis' version of the Garden of Eden sexual repression replaces, but nevertheless preserves, sexual innocence. Social production does not exist; therefore, the social code is unnecessary, because sexual desire is repressed. The repression of sexual desire is innocence insofar as the technics of repression remain unconscious, and unconscious existence is a-historical. Prior to the murder, some rudimentary form of 'culture', in terms of symbolic coding and 'work' imposed on the subordinate members of the horde might be a necessity, but coding is innate, therefore unconscious, and therefore 'innocent'. Innocence does not require complete inactivity. Even Adam and Eve are not totally idle in the Garden. Adam is set the task of naming other creatures, and both he and Eve must gather their food. However, in the wake of the father's murder, culture as 'work' is institutionalised, the product of the need to re-organise and 'distribute' both sexual repression and satisfaction. For the first time production (sexual

production and reproduction) becomes *conscious* activity: Man has partaken of the tree of (carnal) knowledge and now knows good and evil. Because the brothers have given into temptation (of their desire for woman, displaced as murderous aggression) and have partaken of the 'forbidden fruit', the reality principle/voice of God says: "By the sweat of your face you will earn your food, until you return to the ground" [Gen. 3:19:a]. Innocence is lost; man must repress his desire and go to work. Man establishes 'culture' as a regime of labour designed to at once displace, consume, and repress excess libidinal energy.⁸²

The death of the father is the expulsion from the Garden. The murder of the father results in radical exposure to the world. The fraternal group is confronted by, and becomes conscious of, for the first time, an unmediated *reality principle* as the absolute limit and fundamental condition of existence. Exposure to the world demands a re-configuration of social practice to functionally compensate for the loss of the father as mediator of the reality principle. Freud and the Bible agree that, in this effort, and notwithstanding the travail man endures in earning his food, he is successful. Man is fruitful and multiplies. Man creates 'civilisations' or centres of civilisation of diverse characters; for the Bible this is the era of Babel, Egypt, Canaan, Sodom and Gomorrah, while for Freud it is the era of matriarchy. But the creation of material 'civilisation' in and of itself speaks only to immanent use and symbolic function, the second pole of Oedipus. In terms of the transcendent use, the murder precipitates psychological and ontological crises. The brothers' crime deprives the horde/humanity of the 'real presence' of father, for he had been the 'as-good-as-god' who had literally walked with them in the Garden. The Father's 'rightful' place as the imaginary figure (transcendent use) of identification is usurped by the female (Goddess) or a plethora of minor and local deities of polytheistic pantheons. For the Bible this is apostasy and sin against the Father, while for Freud it is the repression of the father and the latency period of the father, but the Bible and Freud agree that the condition is a crisis that may be resolved only through a return of the father and the restoration of his 'historical' —religious, social, juridical, familial—rights of domination over production and reproduction.

The axiomatic foreclosure by Oedipus in the primeval drama demands the conclusion that Oedipus and the process of oedipalisation are inherent and instinctive; they pre-exist the father's murder, as noted above. Instinctive Oedipus, including its regime of repression and identifications, and its axiomatic production of ambivalence, would then include the father's murder as a routine, instinctual manifestation of Oedipus. Thus, for psychoanalysis, the murder of the father is not a *cause* of oedipalisation but an *effect* reinforcing the Oedipal double-bind. Freud is rescued from his Lamarckism: the desire to murder, the desire to repress the instinct to murder father is no longer a characteristic of a specifically *human* ontological and phylogenetic *becoming* but is a part of pre-human, anthropoid, perhaps even mammalian *being*. After all, do not most mammalian species feature a hierarchy dominated by an *Alpha* male? And is it not the case that younger males are forever contesting the elder for dominance, in the effort to overthrow Father? Psychoanalysis need not rely on a theory that posits that Oedipus becomes genetically encoded through (repeated) human behaviour. Rather, Oedipus is the human manifestation of something encoded in the deepest topographical layer of the mammal or animal 'unconscious'. Behavioural conditioning through cultural coding and social practice merely reflects and reinforces the genetic precondition. That the Oedipal murder is *routine*, occurs axiomatically, and is therefore a product of genetic predetermination is in fact implied by Freud's insistence that such murders recurred over 'many' generations. Cultural development as history (sociogenesis) is the teleology of the human struggle to come to terms with Oedipus as the essence of human being and the human predisposition toward Oedipal repression and the sense of guilt. The Freudian Otto Rank understands the implications of Freudian theory when he posits the operation of a "*biological sense of guilt,*" (italics mine) related fundamentally to the process of ontological becoming, to individuation and assuming one's place in the biological-social order of one's species.⁸⁵

By arguing that the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego, Freud affirms the association between ego and sensuous being. However, sensuous being is ‘erogenous being’ and is thus to be identified with libido, which psychoanalysis in turn identifies with the sex instinct (however ‘pre-genital’) as the exclusive drive. Libidinal drives as functions of physiognomy automatically are linked to — in fact are indistinguishable from — the un-socialised, uncultured, pre-linguistic archaic material of the id.⁸⁴ For humans any “extra-Oedipal” (schizophrenic) lesson is thereby precluded; the *transcendent* use of the disjunctive synthesis — which Deleuze and Guattari claim is preferred and reinforced by psychoanalysis — demands that the exclusions and restrictions upon desire which “makes the unconscious swing over to Oedipus” is *innate*. Thus, the immanent use of the connective synthesis (and its symbolic function) is also innate. Both the primal horde and all subsequent social configurations are driven to organise themselves axiomatically as a patriarchal, Oedipal regimes. The overthrow of the father is not de-territorialisation. Non-Oedipal differentiation and re-territorialisation, following the father’s murder, is not possible.

The exclusive relation of the pre-existent Oedipus comes back into play firstly between the various disjunctions (e.g., severing of the links between father and each female in the troupe) conceived as differentiations (e.g., the possibility of each brother having multiple sexual partners). Oedipus’ exclusive relations come into play, secondly, “*between the whole of the differentiations that it imposes and an undifferentiated (un différencié) that it presupposes.*”⁸⁵ Oedipus informs the brothers (and the mothers/sisters), “if you don’t follow the lines of differentiation daddy-mommy-me, and the exclusive alternatives that delineate them, you will fall back into the black night of the undifferentiated.”⁸⁶

The murder of the father is not, then, properly, a *disjunction* at all, but one of two options in the continuum of the restricted, exclusive oedipalised connective and conjunctive syntheses of production and consummation. The father-dominated primal horde is the regime of a unitary, univocal code. The murder, for psychoanalysis, is the *break*, the disjunction that marks the beginning of ‘history’ through the inscription of guilt. The first

murder is presented as something totally, radically new, without which *nothing happens*; that is, the primal horde remains a father-dominated primal horde in perpetuity. The murder is the profound disjunction that causes a re-coding of the code and the formation of a fundamentally new order. But what has changed? The father's code rules before and after his murder. The father rules either in the flesh or as imaginary figure. The brothers do not break with and overcome Oedipus as the means to murder father. They do not deterritorialise the father's code in order to murder father. The brothers do not murder the father and become oedipalised, but murder the father and remain oedipalised. They murder father precisely because they are oedipalised. The murder only intensifies (rather than 'originates') reactivity in the brothers leading to the reinforcement of paranoiac inscription consistent with the pre-existence of *ressentiment* and bad conscience. 'Man' (represented by the brothers) is essentially *reactive*.⁸⁷ *Ressentiment* and bad conscience become fundamental human ontology; the 'sense of guilt' becomes a genetic, biological *fact*.

3. GENEALOGY OF EMERGENCE AND THE RE-CONFIGURATION OF DESIRE

The psychoanalytic model will be countered not by offering an alternative 'origin' theory, but by hypothesising a genealogical 'descent' from 'emergence'.⁸⁸ The term 'emergence' (*Entstehung*) is applied here generally to the movement of pre-human ancestors from the forests into the open spaces of the savannah documented in the fossil record.⁸⁹ Palaeontology and genome mapping help to trace the physiological descent of the pre-human and human and the selection of characteristics, but a scientific analysis of this type is beyond the scope of the present work. However, even if questions relating to the mechanisms and processes of 'evolution' are bracketed out, one can say with some certainty that evolutionary transfiguration does occur, and that human emergence and descent are products of evolutionary processes. One can also say, given the existence of numbers of

species that remain unchanged over tens of millions of years (e.g., crocodiles and other reptiles, sharks and other fishes, arachnids and insects) that physiognomic evolution and related behavioural changes do not occur axiomatically as a character of organic life; organic life has the capacity to change but physiognomic mutation is not *necessary*. Organic transformation—whether physiognomic, behavioural, or psychological—need not and invariably will not occur if the conditions under which the organism lives comprising its *biological niche* do not change.

One can say, in addition, that a process of hominid evolution has occurred that privileges certain physical and behavioural characteristics over others. But whether increased intelligence and related changes to behaviour cause physical adaptation, or whether physical changes are the cause of behavioural modifications that in turn produce increased intelligence are all extraneous considerations for genealogical analysis. Furthermore, that *Homo sapiens* is the product of descent (*Herkunft*) from a moment of emergence (*Entstehung*) implies a process of adaptation, but adaptation does not imply necessity.⁹⁰ Positing teleological development and an uninterrupted continuity beginning from a particular pre-hominid ancestor that becomes the human (with all other species representing evolutionary ‘dead-ends’) is the secularisation of metaphysics’ lofty or miraculous origin theory (*Wunderursprung*).⁹¹ Analysis begins with the fact that re-configuration has occurred. Re-configuration as adaptation relates to the operation of species as organ machines in specific environments and should be seen as life’s *technique*, its invention (*Erfindung*) and artifice (*Kunststück*).

An organ-machine is a desiring machine. Both physiological re-configuration and behavioural adaptation of an organ machine—whether ‘caused’ by environmental conditions, competition from other species, physiological change, conscious choice or accident—implies the re-configuration of productive desire.

In the closing sections of Chapter One, I will argue that instinct cannot have played the role assigned to it by psychoanalysis in human ontogenesis and sociogenesis. Freud states that the conservative ('molar') nature of the instincts that manifests itself in repetition is central to the psyche.⁹² It will be argued here that the emergence of the human organism is predicated on a radical reconfiguration of 'instinct'. The innate coding of desire must be overcome, repetition must be overcome. Desire must be capable of new differentiations and connections; desire must become "molecular". Any and all hitherto 'known', experienced, determined connective syntheses of desiring production must be severed. All modes of organisation of productive desire and reproduction (including any instinctually determined domination of a social group by an *Alpha* male) must be suspended. Human (or proto-human) emergence involves radical *discontinuity* and radical *disjunction*.

Palaeontology's fossil record indicates the appearance of smallish, hominid ape-like pre-human species that are physiologically ill adapted for the open spaces of the African savannah. The species appear to be better adapted for forest life, indicating that the pre-human is evicted from the deep forests, run out to its margins and finally to the open savannah by competition from anthropoids better adapted to the biological niche of the forest. Genealogy describes this as a moment (or moments) of *Enstehung* or "emergence."⁹³ Multiple accidents of evolution have produced an ape-like body that can no longer compete with its relatives. Yet this same body has the genetic potential for further physical adaptation in terms of the potential to walk upright, develop an opposable thumb and tool-grasping hands, to lose much of its thick covering of body hair, and to evolve ever larger, more sophisticated brains. Above all, the pre-human has the *potential* to become 'conscious' in the sense that consciousness is the layer of the ego effected by the external environment.⁹⁴ It has an intensified degree 'self-awareness' of its own desire and of its existence as a discrete entity, distinct from its environment. Intensified self-awareness allows it to differentiate impulse from action, and to consciously identify impulses that are, for other animals, fully

‘unconscious’ and instinctual.⁹⁵ Yet, consciousness as such, or an awareness of a distinction between organism (‘self’) and environment, is not a uniquely human characteristic.⁹⁶ All life forms, as Deleuze maintains, create a distinction between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside,’ and consciousness is the mechanism whereby the organism relates the inside to the outside. In this regard, human ‘consciousness’ is not an innovation. Apart from any metaphysical considerations of ‘quality’ or ‘ontological difference’, human consciousness may be said to represent simply an *intensification* of the inside/outside distinction — resulting (for example) in intensified affective reactions relating to alienation and angst.⁹⁷ In terms of function however, differences in the quality and quantity of pre-human and human consciousness *vis-à-vis* animals are manifested, notably, in an amplification of hand-eye-brain connections related to adaptations such as the flattening of the face, opposable thumb, rotation of the hip joints and erect posture.⁹⁸ Consciousness and ‘intelligence’ are adaptations of the body no less than the loss of body hair and speak to the capacities of bodies and the development of organic *tactics* of survival. However, none of these adaptations would occur had the creature been able to maintain a biological niche consistent with the genetic selection of characteristics and adaptation achieved hitherto; chimpanzees and gorillas have not mutated into ‘higher’ organisms. At the same time, none of the subsequent mutations and adaptations of the pre-human and human organisms would have been possible without the specific combination and configuration of anthropoid characteristics inherited by the pre-human as ‘preparation’ for subsequent forms and which, combined with environmental factors, produce human organ-machines.⁹⁹ That is, in the animal world, the human is different; this difference, in terms of being and becoming, relates to ontological differences, but not to a difference in ontological essence, for the ‘stuff’ of life is everywhere the same. Hominid heritage (*Erbschaft*) and descent (*Herkunft*) are unstable assemblages of faults, strengths and weaknesses, accidents of evolution and adaptation representing the combination and recombination of quantities, qualities and forces of the life stuff.

At the moment of emergence, the proto-human organism is confronted by environmental conditions over which it has no control, no influence, and little or no experience. Psychologically, the actuality presented by the open savannah, coupled with the understanding (however pre-cognitively) that return to the forest is impossible – is the moment of ‘emergence’ and the confrontation with the (or at least a new) “Absolutism of Reality”.¹⁰⁰ The absolutism of reality is nothing but the total environment, the ‘full body’ of the Earth representing at once the only means to existence and the threat to existence.¹⁰¹ The absolutism of reality as Full Body is therefore at once the “Virtual” and the “limit concept”.¹⁰² The pre-human experience of this condition is total and totalising. Confrontation occupies the total field of sense experience; its impact is pre-conscious, pre-linguistic and pre-rational. It produces a mental, or psychological state that Blumenberg calls *Angst*: an overwhelming anxiety defined precisely as psychoanalysis’ “intense fear or dread lacking an unambiguous cause or a specific threat.”¹⁰³ The open savannah represents an abyss, the total field as an ‘infinity’ that is unknown and undifferentiated. Reality is an absolute causing intense anxiety lacking a specific cause because the creature has no ‘internal’, pre-cognitive, instinctual system of signs with which to code, interpret or read the reality. Reality as the Virtual is ‘absolute’ precisely because it is un-coded and un-marked. The psychological experience of *angst* recalls Rudolf Otto’s description of the apprehension of the numinous (Numen) as the root of mythology and ‘origin’ of religious sentiment.¹⁰⁴ Otto considers “this mental state is perfectly *sui generis* and irreducible to any other; and therefore, like every absolutely primary and elementary dictum, while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be strictly defined.”¹⁰⁵ The apprehension of the Numen is the experience of the Absolute as the *sublime*, a moment of aesthetic arrest, ‘revelation’, or seizure by the *mysterium tremendum*.

Freud hypothesises that the conscious mind serves as a ‘filter’, or a kind of ‘fire-wall’ against stimuli, to protect the always and all-too vulnerable unconscious (the ‘inside’) from over-stimulation of exposure to the environment (the ‘outside’).¹⁰⁶ He posits that stimuli

(energy) that are permitted to pass directly to the unconscious are processed by the unconscious as trauma.¹⁰⁷ An increase in exposure to stimuli leads to the hypertrophy of the consciousness characteristic of 'modern' humans.¹⁰⁸ It follows then that at the moment of emergence the pre-human lacks the hypertrophied conscious or the topographical layers of conscious filters possessed by the modern human. The ancestor thus lacks the capacity to 'mask', filter, or cushion the confrontation with the absolutism of reality, and has no defence against seizure by the *mysterium tremendum*. A state of *angst* is the product of profound exposure to the undifferentiated. It is the experience of *trauma* that passes, unfiltered by hypertrophied consciousness, directly into the mind/body and fundamentally forms the unconscious and conscious. Psychologically, the experience recalls both the 'birth trauma', and Lacan's 'mirror stage' but here the organism consciously experiences a 'second' birth. It is shocked into a waking consciousness by a profound 'separation.' However, shock, trauma and *angst* are not eased, for there is no remedial, instinctually pre-existing or socially pre-formed constellation of signs or differentiations into which the individual can emerge.¹⁰⁹

Instinctual determination is the body-without-organs fully 'internalised'. Desiring production is scripted, coded, or hard-wired. The conservative nature of the instincts is biological determinism. Instinct demands that satisfaction or pleasure be had primarily, if not only, by repetition.¹¹⁰ Instinct pre-determines modes of making connections, and precludes the capacity for disjunctive recording necessary for significant, and sudden behavioural adaptation. Until the emergence of the pre-human, with all other species, the lack of a biological niche implies the 'death' of the species.¹¹¹ The combination of a lack of biological niche and continued domination by instinct would require the pre-human to withdraw into the 'full' body-without organs and chaos. If the conservative nature of the instincts is allowed to prevail in the new reality, the organism will become 'neurotic'. Anti-production will prevail and the organ-machine will shut down, becoming paralysed or catatonic.¹¹² Deprived of a biological niche, and barring a miraculous physiological transformation, an

organism must have or must generate (and rather quickly one thinks) the capacity to break free of instinctual desiring connections and modes of satisfaction, *or it will die*. The fact that hominid species survives at all testifies to the re-configuration of instinct.¹¹³

Survival is predicated on the re-configuration of desiring production and the satisfaction of desire through 'unorthodox' organ-connections requiring that desiring production become a calculating and 'technical', rational and 'empirical' activity. Confrontation with the absolutism of reality is confrontation with the possibility of absolute deterritorialisation resulting in the catastrophic collapse of coding, in turn resulting in catatonic breakdown and death. Becoming 'conscious' of the threat, and confronting the threat consciously or 'empirically' demonstrates that a mutation, or adaptation has already occurred indicating that the absolutism of reality as the Virtual represents a possibility *other than* catatonic breakdown and death. Granted, the possibility of consciousness is created by the accidents of 'evolution' and adaptation; anthropoid adaptation must produce an organ-machine that has the capacity to 'think', to make conscious its own desire. However, as Nietzsche notes, "we would not have it if we did not *need* to have it".¹¹⁴ The conscious confrontation with the absolutism of reality is made possible by adaptation, but made necessary by the failure of 'animal instinct' as the primary (or sole) means of organising the organ machine. The failure of instinct is a transcendental moment. It is the moment of profound *angst* that opens on to the possibilities of the Virtual.¹¹⁵ The failure of instinct requires the destruction of the organism's molar configuration 'pre-existing' ideas, images, associations, and cathexes representing the instinctual, biologically determined stasis in the coding of desire. The failure of instinctual coding in the service of *Erms* is therefore the collapse of instinctual coding as encoded 'signs' that comprise the animal's "system of possible permutations among differences."¹¹⁶ The organ-machine is forced to break free from pre-established instinctual connections and modes of satisfaction that are no longer available to it. Becoming conscious, then, is the necessary precondition for breaking free of instinctual determination.¹¹⁷

However, there is nothing metaphysically necessary or essential in the disjunction that produces consciousness. Becoming conscious/self-conscious does not imply an ‘essence’ of human ontology — for, it is almost certain that the pre-human Pithecanthropus and Neanderthals were likewise (to whatever degree) conscious/self-conscious.¹¹⁸ Consciousness does not imply a ‘soul’ or a *conscience*. Rather, becoming conscious should be regarded as nothing more than a survival ‘strategy’, a technique made possible by the organic *technics* of the particular configuration of the organ-machine, but nevertheless the ‘last resort’ of the will-to-power as *Eros*. Moreover, the profound, perhaps *total* disjunction does not imply the necessity of *repression* of the instincts. Desire itself, as the various quantities and qualities and forces of will-to-power, is polymorphous.¹¹⁹ Insofar as desire is the desire for ‘organ connections’ of organs to organs and organs to ‘part objects’ (e.g., mouth to breast, eye to face, stomach and intestines to meat) the connections involve the organs themselves and therefore involve instinctual, biological desires. Desire itself — or rather the various energetic quantities and qualities of the will that comprise ‘desire’— are not repressed, but are reconfigured.¹²⁰ Desire for a particular object represents a configuration, coding and recording of the qualities and quantities. Thus desire *for* a particular object can be frustrated or thwarted, particularly by the unavailability of a connection to a preferred object of desire, but frustration as such is always temporary, never permanent. The qualities and quantities of force re-align, reconfiguring desire, and desire seeks out new objects of potential satisfaction; if I cannot eat a banana I will try a mango; if I cannot obtain meat from monkeys I will try to scavenge meat from a wildebeest or catch a fish; if I cannot get warmth from mother I will try brother or sister. Desire itself is not transfigured, for there is no ‘essence’ of desire, but only the multiplicity of qualities and quantities of forces that comprise desire.¹²¹ It is possible to define the process as ‘sublimation’, insofar as desire is will-to-power and sublimation refers to the relationship of desiring forces in terms of *quantity*. As Deleuze writes,

This is what the will to power is: the genealogical element of force, both differential and genetic. *The will to power is the element from which derive both the quantitative difference of related forces*

and the quality that devolves each force into its relation. The will to power here reveals its nature as the principle of the synthesis of forces.¹²²

Desire is re-configured or re-organised and seeks alternative satisfactions resulting in new syntheses.¹²³ Consciousness and unconsciousness, impulse and instinct reconfigured consciously and functionally become mechanisms and means in the configuration and organisation of desire.

Consistent with biological need, the organisation of organs (including the brain), and environmental conditions, the proto-human, through conscious activity, becomes what Freud might call a 'pervert'. The conservative nature of the instincts is overcome. The prescribed satisfaction of desire through repetition is overcome and replaced, if not by multiplicity then at least by possibility of seeking gratification via 'new' or 'other' desiring connections. Desire becomes "*and that, and . . . and*".¹²⁴ Here, instinctual desiring production ceases, anti-production begins, and with it a new process of disjunctive recording of conjunctive syntheses (or consumption/consummation), wherein the deterritorialised absolutism of reality serves as the *tabula rasa* recording surface of the body-without-organs. Here, genealogy becomes history.

Human ontogenesis and sociogenesis are thus inextricably linked to human biology, to evolution and human 'descent.' Emergence refers to both the appearance of the proto-human in a new environment and the creature's 'awakening.' The process of human sociogenesis is predicated on and is in fact indistinguishable from the coding of reality by a system of signs. Proto-human and human modes of social organisation and social production—culture and civilisation—are employed as the means to 'humanise' nature. *Homo sapiens* become *homo faber*. The humanisation of nature is the survival strategy developed in lieu of a biological niche. Yet, the humanisation of nature is not *qualitatively* different from the generic life processes that change one thing into another thing, for human activity is no more and no less than life activity. Human life activity differs from animal life activity in that change is not only passive, and not only involves as *primary production* the

production/reproduction of the organism on the organic level. Human production *also* includes the social organisation of desire.¹²⁵ Sociogenesis is the human *active* response, the alternative to *reactive* panic and catatonic breakdown associated with *angst* produced by the severing of all connective syntheses of desiring production and their disjunctive recording as instinct.

Emergence then, and the 'conscious' confrontation with absolute deterritorialisation experienced as trauma and *angst* should be preferred to Freud's primeval drama as the 'moment' of human ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Freud's primeval drama assumes the existence of a social territory already recorded by a system of consciously explicable and readable signs that have coded the Absolutism of Reality as the father's territory and reduced the Full Body of the Earth to the father's body.

The psychoanalyst might be tempted to speculate that the condition of *angst*, associated with profound feelings of exposure and traumatisation relating to lack of a biological niche, may provide a basis for the concept 'desire-as-lack' as an ontological category. Yet, all life — plant, animal, viral — 'lacks' in this absolute, abstract sense. Evolution selects certain characteristics adapted to the occupation and exploitation of a particular biological niche. No species is adapted to function in, let alone dominate the variety of ecosystems. Individual organisms and species are perceived as distinct from their environments, or as distinct beings in an environment, but distinction or separateness are relative terms; no organism can exist apart from its environment.¹²⁶ One can say then that each organism is in a condition of 'ontological lack' when removed from, or distinguished from its eco-system. This does not prove, however, that desire-is-lack. It proves only that organism lacks the means to satisfy desire when (or if) the organism is deprived of its environment; the organism has been deprived of (possible) desiring connections. In functional terms, ontological lack is nothing more than a deprivation of the means to life, a lack of sources of energy with which the

organism can connect, and/or the inability of the organism to process energy/nourishment (which amounts to the same thing).

Ontological lack is the closing off of one of the two points of perception and life's "double articulation"; desire cannot flow in the direction of the organism's limited form.¹²⁷ Likewise, pre-human and human consciousness, and the resulting humanisation of nature, is not indicative of 'lack' in the ontological and metaphysical sense. The lack of a biological niche, as noted above, means only that desire, in seeking successful production and consumption/consummation, must break with instinctually determined modes of production/satisfaction. Desire is empirically configured as the pre-human and human means of adapting, coping and in general dealing with *what it is* (as organism, as body, as a 'limited form') and *where it is* (deterritorialised territory). Humanisation is precisely the breaking free of instinctual desiring connections and modes of satisfying desires; the human as desiring machine engineers non-instinctual, and consciously contrived connective and conjunctive syntheses of production/consumption via his/her capacity for disjunctions and their recording on a body-without organs.

'Lack' as such, is not 'desire' as such, if desire-as-lack is conceived as desire for the irrecoverable 'lost object' as conceived by psychoanalysis or metaphysics. In terms of material desiring production and consumption, desire-as-lack is contingent given that it relates to conditions of contingency. Lack is a temporary condition that exists only so long as it takes the will-to-power to re-align relations (qualities and quantities) of forces. Lack, in the most fundamental ontological, *organic* (plant and animal) sense, is that which induces, spurs, or forces an organism to initiate adaptation via genetic mutation. The necessity of adaptation is imposed by environmental conditions and causes 'trauma' to the organism. Trauma is internalised to the greatest possible biological degree. That is, the organism, its organs and organic processes, on the molecular level, and within the genetic, DNA code, experiences trauma and 'lack'. Trauma produces the dis-organisation (death) or re-organisation of the organism through mutation in the interest of producing longer claws,

bigger teeth, or a grasping hand with an opposable thumb, as required, within the limits imposed by the present gene sequencing, and within the limits of the time permitted by the rate and degree of environmental pressures.

The fact that humans become conscious and capable of producing non-instinctual organ-machine connections may be reduced to two main contingencies. The conditions of the environment in which the organism is obliged to change so radically and abruptly that organic life's *preferred* method of adaptation — genetic mutation — is precluded. Radical and abrupt environmental change invariably results in the extinction of a species.¹²⁸ But extinction violates the principle of *Eros*, the first 'rule' of evolutionary biology and primal aim of all life forms. Extinction violates the aim of preservation and reproduction of particular gene sequences that code biological material in particular configurations as organ-machines.

Preservation of the organism *as is* requires that it successfully compete in or dominate a biological niche. Adaptation through mutation is a form of 'failure'; mutation or evolution means that the organism is no longer precisely *that*. According to such a perspective, most life has 'failed' in that nearly all animal (and plant) forms are the products of adaptation and mutation. Evolution is therefore not the 'survival of the fittest' but the adaptation of the 'weaker'. Evolution is the process of becoming *this* through the extinction of *that*. The strongest and fittest forms of life are those that have changed *least* through geologic time (e.g., single-celled organisms, fungi, sponges). By becoming conscious, the pre-human/human detours from the preferred method of adaptation but succeeds biologically. Life does not produce closed forms; the fossil record indicates that humanoid mutation continues.¹²⁹ Deprived of a biological niche, the pre-human is not extinguished. It succeeds firstly by forestalling species-death. It succeeds secondly by inventing 'culture' to 'cushion' the impact of environmental 'trauma'. The organisation of desire as social production through cultural activity allows the species to produce, *for itself*, however temporarily or

contingently, a stratum or relatively stable plane that slows the flow of difference.¹³⁰ The process of interaction among the physiognomic capacities of particular species forms, cultural production and conditions of the environment combine to form the 'virtual' for each form of pre-human. Culture at once eases the need for sudden, traumatic genetic mutations, and creates a time frame to allow for subsequent genetic mutations resulting in a still larger brain, more upright posture, etc. Consciousness and conscious activity therefore serve not only as a protective filter for the unconscious mind (as psychoanalysis posits), but also serve as the defence of genetic integrity.¹³¹

The pre-human and human 'states of nature' at the moment of genealogical emergence are not the Freudian condition.¹³² Freud theorises that the human in a state of nature, in the primal horde, is 'animal-like' or 'brutish'. Freud assumes a condition of more or less permanent scarcity, the cause and consequence of another double-bind. The objects capable of satisfying desire are limited in number not only by the environment, but also by instinct and the repetition compulsion, which restricts the objects that can or will be sought out as potential sources of satisfaction.¹³³ However, the condition of environmental scarcity is taken as a given. Competition between and among individual humans is regarded by psychoanalysis as the chief obstacle to survival. The human is ruled by instinct, and instinct brings individual humans into conflict *with one another*. Survival is therefore predicated on the repression of the aggressive instincts requiring the creation of a repressive social code in response to scarcity. This repressive social code involves domination by the father and the coding of libidinal desire as sexual desire. The establishment of sexual domination by the father serves as the template for organising all production, distribution and consumption and is the remedy against conflict that threatens survival.

But this is absurd. Psychoanalysis tells us that the organisation of primal horde is instinctual, implying that instinct, not socialisation, regulates competition. Furthermore, while a condition of scarcity is assumed, the perpetuation of the 'natural' mode of social

organisation implies that the horde is not, in fact, placed in a condition of *in extremis*. If scarcity exists it has always existed, thus scarcity as a cause of crisis is a relative condition; scarcity is a matter of degree. The organism's instinct has adapted to conditions of relative scarcity, to organise production and regulate competition — hence the primal horde. Members of the horde have not been forced to break with traditional, instinctual modes of satisfaction, indicating that the primal horde has not been deprived of its traditional biological niche. *Nothing has changed.*

However, I argue that something has changed, that something must have changed to induce the process of 'humanisation'. That change is the deprivation of a biological niche, which is the first, and chief threat to survival. The lack of a biological niche is radical deterritorialisation. Competition from other humans as the chief problem of survival presumes that the pre-human/human has, to some degree already overcome its ill-adaptation *vis-à-vis* its environment through the establishment of a regime of desiring production. The establishment of a regime of production (culture) in an environment that is not 'natural' implies that instinct has been overcome.

Deleuze and Guattari, and Blumenberg, each in their fashion provide a corrective to the Freudian hypothesis. The Deleuze/Guattari "plane of immanence", in its first "plateau" as chaos (chaosmos) and the realm of "absolute deterritorialisation" compares with the *status naturalis* of Blumenberg's absolutism of reality.¹³⁴ The first plateau or *status naturalis* is a 'state' or condition in which being 'natural-as-animal-like' and governed by instinct *contradicts* the 'natural' desire for survival.¹³⁵ Blumenberg's pre-human creates 'symbolic forms' — the rudiments of myth, language, and culture — in order to overcome an equally self-contradictory natural state as a creature lacking instincts fit to occupy a specific biological niche. The human invention of symbolic forms is 'natural' to the extent that the capacity for, and use of symbolic forms are 'archetypal' or common to all humans. To this degree, the creation of symbolic forms may be thought of as an aspect of human nature, but only to the extent that coding, de-coding, re-coding and recording are the adaptations necessary for

survival by the animal lacking a biological niche. The invention of symbolic forms is a mode of imaging the virtual; it is a mechanism of *becoming* that is conducive to coding, de-coding and recording, and therefore 'artificial'. However, symbolic forms are artificial only in the sense that they are *socially* rather than genetically/biologically produced.¹³⁶ Their relevance and character is not to be found in metaphysical postulates and givens, such as the Cartesian *cogito* or by interrogating the ontology of the human as 'subject'. Rather, the relevance and character of symbolic forms is determined by interrogating their *function*. As Blumenberg remarks, "we can only understand why they exist by interpreting them, not as 'givens', but as solutions to an antecedent problem."¹³⁷ The 'problem' is the contradiction between pre-human, pre-determined instincts as "strata" and the deterritorialising effect of the environment as a new plane of immanence.¹³⁸ The invention of the symbolic form and cultural praxis as the result of disjunction is evidence of the solution to precisely this problem.

The human becomes conscious, and develops an 'empirical' form of consciousness that is at once 'abstract' and 'pragmatic' as the means of breaking with instinctual coding.¹³⁹ The invention of symbolic forms allows for the production and recording of multiple desiring connections with no need to rely on instinctual repetition and may be regarded as a form of 'transcendental reason'. The invention of symbolic forms and realm of the symbolic (myth) as the coding or naming of differentiations and their recording as memory is indicative of the use of transcendental reason and therefore 'empirical' insofar as symbolic coding is functional. The coding of differentiations determines not 'what is it,' or 'what is its nature', but 'how does it work', 'how does it (or does it) function *to satisfy desire*? Symbolic/pragmatic consciousness allows for alternative differentiations, and the beginning of cultural practice and its recording on the body-without organs as a function of *memory* in place of genetic coding.

One might reasonably posit that a conscious/self-conscious pre-human or human is aware, and is able to observe that—on some level, to some degree—it differs from other animals (including its forest ape cousins) — and this difference relates to its fundamental problem of dealing with *what* it is given its lack of a biological niche.¹⁴⁰ As Blumenberg states, this fundamental problem is experienced, psychologically and affectively, as *angst*.¹⁴¹ A condition of overwhelming angst creates the potential for a state of catatonia or paralysis. Angst producing paralysis is the cessation of desiring-production and the connective syntheses of production and therefore a condition of anti-production, which, if not overcome results in the death of the organism. One cannot speculate as to the precise means (psychological and/or practical) employed to overcome *angst*.¹⁴² Rather, given the fact that the pre-human and human organisms survive one can only presume that *something* is done to ‘cope’. That is, the human-animal becomes aware that its activity must be oriented toward solving its fundamental problem and begins to act accordingly. But coping is not an innovation. Deleuze maintains that all life opens in two directions, firstly toward chaos and absolute deterritorialisation, and secondly toward its own limited form.¹⁴³ The latter demands that the human-animal *compensate* for its lack of adaptation; it begins to take from ‘nature’ what nature does not automatically (from the organism’s point of view) *unconsciously* grant to it.

The pre-human and human ancestors both succeed and fail by taking up a ‘third option.’ Evolutionary biology encodes disjunctions and differentiations on and in the animal body via genetic mutation consistent with the animal’s mode of desiring-production/consumption within its biological niche. The organism and its environment establish a nexus—but this takes time. What differs for humans is the capacity to *also* record disjunctions and differentiations as *memory*. The organism becomes conscious and develops *culture* as the strategy for overcoming its lack of a biological niche, thereby preserving and perpetuating its genetic code while creating time and space for the engineering of ‘natural’ processes of genetic mutation. Where a lack of culture means death and extinction, cultural practice

creates, quite literally, 'breathing space'. Culture as symbolic, empirical, and pragmatic activity creates a new territory for productive desire through the multiplication of imaging of the plane of immanence. As Blumenberg notes,

The organic system resulting from the mechanism of evolution becomes 'man' by evading the pressure of that mechanism, which it does by setting against it something like a phantom body. This is the sphere of his culture, his institutions—and also his myths . . . The conditions of selection no longer reach and have an effect upon man as a physical system to the extent that *he has learned to subject his artefacts and instruments, instead of himself, to the process of adaptation* . . . It is to these, rather than to their producer, that the 'survival of the fittest' applies.¹⁴⁴

Culture, in the most generic sense, relates to the psychic capacity to record disjunctions on a body-without-organs as networks of relations recorded as *signs*. Signs (as noted above) comprise a system of possible permutations among differences, repetition with differences, and repetition as such. A system of signs registered on the surface of the body-without-organs is the basis of culture, supplementing if not replacing the physiognomic evolutionary process of genetic recording and instinctual coding on the organ body. Signs (language, symbols, body markings) of organ-machine connections enable the repetition of previously 'successful' connections producing satisfactions, but also permits variation and difference, freeing desire to make new, multiple, heterogeneous, and continual connections. As an inducement to memory, the pre-human and human develop mnemonic practices to inscribe the body. The development of a rudimentary system of signs pre-figures the creation of phonetic speech, pictorial and written languages and mythology as developments of the techniques of recording signs.

Systems of signs are contrived not as "a spontaneous expression of man's (apparently 'given', unproblematic) 'nature' as the *animal symbolicum*", but (as Blumenberg states) as a *solution* to a *problem* that is inherent the human configuration as an organ machine. The pre-human and human construct themselves as *animal symbolicum* in order to make up for the lack, inadequacy, or failure of biologically adaptive instincts. There is no dichotomy between

'nature' and 'nurture', no human essence that precedes and exists in an oppositional relationship with culture, no idealised ontology, human mode of existence or pure form of desire that is can be conceived as an *a priori* to culture. Rather the 'nature' of human nature is its plasticity. The 'nature' of human nature is the capacity to create culture, to become *homo symbolicus* as the solution to the life-threatening problem posed by human biological nature.¹⁴⁵

CHAPTER II: MYTHOLOGY

If we consider those millennia *before* the history of man, we may unhesitatingly assert that it was precisely through punishment that the development of the feeling of guilt was most powerfully *hindered* ...¹⁴⁶

1. MYTHIC GUILT

Marcuse claims Freud's theory of ontogenesis and phylogenesis represents a 'historicisation' of instinct repression. Freud's theory regarding the primeval organisation of the first human *socius* as a 'horde' dominated by a patriarch or *Alpha* male is suggested by a Darwinian extrapolation from the social organisation observed in other 'higher' mammalian species including the anthropoid apes (gorillas, chimpanzees); these species, it was determined, organise according to sophisticated social hierarchies featuring a dominant male with exclusive sexual privileges.¹⁴⁷ Otherwise, an account of the historical 'origins' of the Oedipus complex, documented 'scientifically', cannot be had. There is no confirmation of primal or primitive patriarchy in the fossil record. Likewise, the fossil record contains is no evidence of murder, or a series of murders of patriarchs over many generations. And while palaeontology has uncovered evidence of cannibalistic practices among both pre-humans and humans with a suggestion of a connection to ritualistic practice, there is no evidence to support Freud's view that the practice is related to a primeval murder of the father, or that the body of the primitive horde's patriarch is the founder of the feast.¹⁴⁸ The most ancient *historically documented* models resembling a ritual slaying and 'consumption' of a 'patriarch' are to be found in the practices of ritual regicide associated with the first civilisations of Sumer and Egypt.¹⁴⁹ However, the attempt to interpret ritual regicide as evidence of an oedipalised psychology in antiquity is problematic, at best. As will be shown later in this chapter, neither the archaeological and historical record, nor the mythology accompanying the rituals,

demonstrates that ancient civilisations were concerned with, let alone dominated by preoccupations with the rights of the father. What is more, there is no evidence to suggest that the practice of ritual regicide and cannibalism (actual or symbolic) were accompanied by or generated feelings or a sense of *guilt*.

In the view of the genealogist, the historicisation of instinct repression might lead psychoanalysis to conclude that the Oedipus complex is fully a *social product*. For, does not the science of psychoanalysis discover Oedipus in the *modern* unconscious, and is the modern unconscious not an historical phenomenon? Given modernity's privileging of the nuclear family (Daddy-Mommy-Me), and given socialisation processes that favour internalisation, self-surveillance, and the increase in the sense of guilt — all of which are necessary, Freud says, to the progress of civilisation — and given, then, bourgeois-capitalistic society's predilection for Oedipus, psychoanalysis might posit that the history of Oedipus complex is the history of instinct repression in modernity.¹⁵⁰ Thus, psychoanalysis might argue that Oedipus is a product, or even an invention, of modern culture and social relations. If, on the other hand, a psychoanalytic genealogical analysis finds indicators of Oedipal repression in pre-modern society, historicisation would demand analysis of both *sameness* and *difference*, comparing the modern and pre-modern manifestations of Oedipus.

However, 'historicisation' is not meant in the genealogical sense. Psychoanalysis' history of instinct repression does not document how repression functions differentially to produce different social relations; psychoanalysis does not conduct a study of the psychologies and repressive regimes of historical cultures.¹⁵¹ Rather, 'historicisation' refers to the production and re-production, within *history*, of Oedipal guilt as the universal principle of instinct repression. For psychoanalysis, historicisation is the history of Oedipal guilt as necessity and inevitability: the increase of the sense of guilt is necessary to civilisation, and guilt is inevitable because it is a law of nature. The historicisation of instinct repression naturalises Oedipal guilt and presents history as the teleology of Oedipus. Psychoanalysis' history is

therefore mythicisation in Roland Barthes' sense, but not only this.¹⁵² Historicisation is achieved also through psychoanalysis' reliance on mythology.¹⁵³ Mythology is subjected to psychoanalysis, and historicised as both as the surrogate for documented history and as the historical content of the unconscious.

Psychoanalysis claims the modern unconscious is linked with, and possesses the same content as, the archaic unconscious. What is the link? How does psychoanalysis establish the link? Lacan tells us that the unconscious is structured like a language. Freud informs us that the language of the unconscious is *myth*. Guilt and Oedipus as the content of the unconscious can be described only in mythical terms. If it is determined that the mythic unconscious proposed by psychoanalysis is generic and universal, a mythic foundation can be described as pre-social and pre-individual — and myth becomes history. Moreover, positivistic science says that myth is more primitive than religion, and religion is more primitive than science. The socio-historical process of civilising man parallels the individual's maturation process from infantile to juvenile to adult mind. Yet Freudian mythicisation is not the attempt, *à la* Jung, to posit a 'lattice-work' of myth, according to which the discovery of universal archetypes serves as myth's version of the Kantian categories (of perception/apperception). Jung, at least, studies the *universe* of myth, interrogating primeval, Neolithic, Polynesian, Mesoamerican, Oriental as well as Occidental (Jewish and Christian) myth; Freud knows only the latter. Nevertheless, not only does Freud demand that myth be generic (as sign and signifier), but that its content and meaning (signified) be also generic.¹⁵⁴

In Freudian myth, which is at once the Freudian reading of myth and Freudian theory *as* myth, the core of the mythic coding of desire relates to the primeval murder (producing guilt), and the repression (coding) of sexual desire (human re-production). Thus, in addition to myth as 'naturalisation' in Barthes sense, Freud's mythology of Oedipus attempts to function 'properly' as myth; that is, it proposes itself as the foundation of a system of

sentiments, both the *is* and the *ought* of the social code.¹⁵⁵ The two forms of mythicisation are mutually supportive, and foreclose on alternatives by limiting choice: *either* father's law is the 'essence' of the social code which serves as the mnemonic device of manifest repression *or* the father's law is repressed and becomes latent resulting in matriarchy and the 'liberation' of desire — and all is as it should and must be. This is, however, a misunderstanding of the purpose and function of myth. Myth indeed relates to the coding of desire, but as Eliade says, "this desire means many things at once."¹⁵⁶ Myth is the desire "to re-enter into the bliss of living Matter that is still unformed" the latter being the Virtual which contains all possible cosmological, anthropological, sexual and cultural lines of development. Myth serves to differentiate the possibilities, and to code them according to usefulness and function in the production and reproduction of the socius, but without foreclosing on possibility. "For," says Eliade,

...images by their very structure are *multivalent*. If the mind makes use of images to grasp the ultimate reality of things, it is just because reality manifests itself in contradictory ways and therefore cannot be expressed in concepts. (We know what desperate efforts have been made by various theologies and metaphysics, oriental as well as occidental, to give expression to the *coincidentia oppositorum*—....).¹⁵⁷

Polyvalent desire produces polyvalent meaning, or "a whole bundle of meanings", all *of which and none of which are 'true'*. Polyvalent desire produces multiple frames of reference and frameworks of meaning, and thus "to translate an image into a concrete terminology by restricting it to any one of its frames of reference is to do worse than mutilate it—it is to annihilate, to annul it as an instrument of cognition."¹⁵⁸ Oedipus characterises the primary (infantile) drive as sex drive, and then represses it in favour of a socially coded, 'useful' activity in the form of social production. Oedipus thereby separates social production from human reproduction, subordinates the latter to the former. Human reproduction is allocated to the private, 'family' domain, and social production is allocated to the 'public' domain.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, Oedipus privileges production (the production of production) over

consumption/consummation, denying satisfactions/gratifications to all those who are subordinate to the Father. However, archaic myth and praxis reveal the error of psychoanalysis' formulation. Under primitive territorialisation, there is no distinction between 'public' and 'private' in the realm of human reproduction (as Deleuze and Guattari remark); there is no distinction between human reproduction and production in general.¹⁶⁰ Human reproduction is a social activity and fully a part of the 'general economy'. Indeed, distinctions are made, but not of the 'modern' kind. Socialisation, coding and inscription of desire involve 'marking' individual members of the social group for 'roles' having a 'biosocial' basis and bearing *paideumatic* influences.

Echoes from the bottom of the well of human ontogenesis and sociogenesis are not to be heard in the depths of the modern unconscious, plumbed by psychoanalytic regression into the infantile layers, but from the depths of human social practice reflected in their supporting, legitimating mythologies. For, if universal or generic myth is the content of the unconscious, then we should expect to find confirmation of the psychoanalytic primacy of the Oedipus-debt-guilt complex in the mythologies of primitive cultures. Mythological cycles, stories, and narratives, as the basis and legitimation for systems of social production/consumption and anti-production, would represent manifestations of the *unconscious made conscious* as a system of signs in language, religious rites, pictorial images, sculpture, and architecture. Desiring production of the pre-rational (pre-monotheist!) societies of pre-history would be configured according to the unconscious wish-images of the collective unconscious pre-configured by Oedipus. That is, if Oedipus is the 'core' of the unconscious, and — as psychoanalysis insists — unconscious forms are made manifest in social relations and regimes of social production, then the *manifest* or actual forms of social organisation, *and their legitimating codes* (myths) will be expressions of Oedipus, either as actualised Oedipus (neurotic patriarchy) or repressed and latent Oedipus (pathological matriarchy). The unconscious coded oedipally will be revealed particularly, or most tellingly, in terms of the *hierarchical organisation of regimes, and their coding in terms of obligation/debt/guilt*

expiation. Then we might reasonably expect to see manifestations of oedipalised practice in all forms of ‘savage’ or ‘primitive’ social production, including the hunter-gatherer, the primitive planters, and the early ‘military-agricultural complexes’.

2. MYTHIC ELEMENTS OF CODING

The Earth as ‘whole’, as the Virtual “is the primitive, savage unity of desire and production.”¹⁶¹ The human animal emerges into this world, perceived at the first moment as something continuous, an “indivisible entity,” an Absolute, a world that is, as Bataille says, “still, in a fundamental way, immanence without a clear limit (an indistinct flow of being into being — one thinks of the unstable presence of water in water).”¹⁶² It is thus “the full body that falls back on the forces of production and appropriates them for its own as the nature or divine precondition.”¹⁶³ Any attempt on the part of the human organism entering this ‘infinite’ and indivisible territory to ‘take it all in’ will result in the organism being ‘overcome’; the individual organism is but a drop in the ocean. Psychologically and physiologically, the attempt to deal with the whole earth as absolute unity results in paralysis, catatonia, for, functionally (as well as psychically), desiring connections/conjunctions cannot be made with the whole. Just as “universal history is the history of contingencies,” of “ruptures and limits,” the accident of emergence of the human animal, itself a rupture, results in contingent existence on the basis of always changing desiring connections. But the basis of connections and conjunctions is the capacity to first attribute to the full body of the unified earth as absolute the quality of a *thing*, and secondly to *fragment* the unity of the thing into parts, individual objects, qualities and quantities capable of becoming the objects of desire and appropriation.

Deleuze and Guattari say, “The Earth is . . . the element superior to production that conditions the common appropriation and utilisation of the ground,” and whether

production is that of primitive hunter-gatherers or of high-tech offshore oil drilling the superior element of the Earth remains as the ultimate 'limit concept'.¹⁶⁴ Likewise, the Earth is "the surface on which the whole process of production is inscribed, on which the forces and means of labour are recorded, and the agents and the products distributed."¹⁶⁵ However, for the human animal, the earth must immediately cease to be "the great unengendered stasis" as soon as fragmentation begins — and fragmentation is the precondition of differentiation. That is,

The full body of the earth is not without distinguishing characteristics. Suffering and dangerous, unique, universal, it falls back on production, on the agents and connections of production. But on it, too, everything is attached and inscribed, everything is attracted, miraculated. It is the basis of the disjunctive synthesis and its reproduction: a pure force of filiation or genealogy, Numen. The full body is the ungendered, but filiation is the first character of inscription marked on this body. And we know the nature of this intensive filiation, this inclusive disjunction where everything divides, but into itself, and where the same being is everywhere, on every side, at every level, *differing only in intensity*. The same included being traverses indivisible distances on the full body, and passes through all the singularities, all the intensities of a synthesis that shifts and reproduces itself. It serves no purpose to recall that genealogical filiation is social rather than biological, for it is necessarily biosocial inasmuch as it is inscribed on the cosmic egg of the full body of the earth.¹⁶⁶

Nevertheless, the Earth is, from the moment waking consciousness emerges, the 'mega-machine' of life. The earth is that from which life germinates and is created. It is the embodiment of germination and creation itself. Confrontation with the absolutism of reality is not confrontation with an 'idea' or a 'concept', or even a 'principle'. Bataille's metaphor of water in water provides the sense that the absolutism of reality as the un-graspable, and as such it is the Numen. For the absolutism of reality to be grasped as 'concept', or for the Virtual to become tangible, a system of signs, coding or language — myth as metaphor — must be developed. Myth as metaphor, specifically the *naming* of the earth as absolute, is, first and foremost, a means to *mask* the *tremendum*. Masking the absolute via metaphor hides the 'face' of the Numen (God).¹⁶⁷ Naming the earth is the first step in the movement from the plane of absolute territorialisation to the second plane of immanence, and the first action of

the point of perception that creates differentiations.¹⁶⁸ However, as noted, first this absolute must be reduced to a 'thing', an object; conscious activity must develop signs to represent the object.

The development of a system of signs, as designations, language and myth is the product of disjunction and facilitates recording on the body-without-organs, which exists, in this sense, alongside of and always in relation to the Earth as full body. However, early peoples cannot 'know', or 'take in' by way of conscious activity and sense perception the *whole* of the full body. The Earth, to one extent or another, always remains 'the great unknown,' the virtual, which implies (or threatens) the possibility of a 'return' to chaos. In other words, the full body of the earth as totality of actuality is the primary *object* of desire, but the human organism as desiring machine cannot connect with the whole of the Earth as the means of satisfying desire.¹⁶⁹ Thus, the full body must be fragmented, divided into multiple objects, some of which may be appropriated, some which may not, some of which will consummate desire, others of which will not. Indeed, lived experience shows that certain objects (e.g., poisonous plants, snakes and insects alongside the more obvious predatory reptiles and mammals) instead produce pain, trauma, or even death. And yet it will immediately be recognised (if not implicitly understood) that all objects, both 'good' and 'bad', those which consummate desire and those which do not, those which serve the human organism's limited form and those which threaten it, are, finally, of the Earth. Lying behind any valuations of 'good' and 'bad' are the two points of perception, the two possibilities of two movements toward chaos and undifferentiated flows, and toward the organism's limited form — hence the *implicitly dual nature* of the dynamic forces of Earth as the basis for the dualistic nature of 'primitive' notions of the Sacred, and the dualistic nature of the Goddess. The Earth — nature — is implicitly 'dualistic' because it provides life and takes life, nurtures and destroys, may be consumed and consumes. But this dualism obtains only from the perspective of the

discrete, individual form and is therefore a perspective that is 'temporary' and contingent, and overcome through practices of inscription.

All the organs and organisms of the full body are implicitly (unconsciously) 'pre-inscribed' by instinct or their 'nature'. Organisms exist in symbiosis with the biological niche they occupy and are therefore part of an implicit unity — except for the human-animal. Pre-inscription entails, in Bataille's terms, "intimacy" with the plane of immanence.¹⁷⁰ Emergence implies that the pre-human and human appear as the *un-marked*. Emergence implies a loss of intimacy. The loss of intimacy is implied in both the fragmentation of the unity and in the creation of signs (language), for "intimacy cannot be expressed discursively."¹⁷¹ The human-animal is un-coded; the lack of a biological niche means that the creature, as a *discrete* organ-machine, is not inscribed and therefore not *integrated* within the Earth's mega-machine of desiring production. If not a part of the unity of desire and production, the human animal certainly cannot, contrary to the demands of psychoanalysis, be inscribed and coded or in any fashion implicated by a *socius*, regardless of how much we degrade a *socius* with the name 'horde'.

Re-integration, re-connection and re-inscription into the full body of the earth become the first task of empirical consciousness and the system of the recording of disjunctions. Consciousness posits distinct objects, designating, inscribing and marking parts and pieces of the full body. The 'parts' include individual human-animals as organs of the Earth's full body. There are human-animal organs, grass-organs, tree-organs, mammoth-organs, bear and bison-organs. The latter must be coded, inscribed, marked through *conscious* cultural activity and thereby permitted —and/or required— to participate in the circulatory flows of production.¹⁷² Even the earliest examples of hominid culture discovered by archaeology and palaeontology demonstrate that production becomes the "*territorial representation* of the primitive *socius*."¹⁷³ As Deleuze and Guattari say, "the germinal influx of intensity conditions all representation: it is the *representative* of desire."¹⁷⁴ The primitive *socius* is indeed

limited and creates limits. Nevertheless, limits are not the product of ‘repression’ in the psychoanalytical sense, but merely represent the limit of coding and recording, and the limit is precisely the territory of the *socius*.¹⁷⁵ “The method of the primitive territorial machine is in this sense the collective investment of organs; for flows are coded only to the extent that the organs capable respectively of producing and breaking them are themselves encircled, instituted as partial objects, distributed on the *socius* and attached to it. A mask is such an institution of organs.”¹⁷⁶ The mask is coded desire as social production/consumption; the mask serves as the symbol or metaphor that not only ‘mediates’ between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ but also demonstrates the symbiosis between mundane, everyday production and the unengendered stasis of the *Numen*. The coding of social production is its sanctification through mnemonic practices of inscription. The earliest archaeological evidence relating to the arts of ritual mnemonic practice demonstrates that social production is conceived implicitly and explicitly as a form of ‘reproduction’, insofar as reproduction is the cycle of life and death, the emergence of life from the body of the Earth to which it must return.¹⁷⁷

The human-animal compensates for its lack of instinctual and biological adaptation by appropriating from the Earth what nature does not automatically (from the organism’s point of view) unconsciously grant to it. Fragmentation, differentiation and objectification accompany appropriation. Objectification and appropriation demand re-configuration and therefore represent a *violation* of the unity of the Full Body. Bataille says, “there is every indication that the first humans were closer than we [are] to the animal world; they distinguished themselves perhaps, but not without a feeling of doubt mixed with terror and longing” — or *angst*.¹⁷⁸ “The sense of continuity that we must attribute to animals no longer impressed itself on the mind unequivocally (the positing of distinct objects was in fact its negation).”¹⁷⁹ Discontinuity is disconnection and disjunction. Fragmentation as the positing of distinct objects is the *transgression* of continuity, the Earth as unity, the ‘purity’ and innocence of that which remains both ‘whole’ and unconscious. Here the deep well of pre-

history echoes with a presentiment that will configure itself as a sense of 'debt' and obligation.

The lack of a biological niche presents the human with a condition of absolute deterritorialisation. *Human* (or pre-human) *territorialisation* begins with fragmentation and differentiation, which is in turn marked and recorded symbolically as myth. This reveals the psychological function of myth: myth forestalls, if not overcomes, *angst* engendered by the confrontation with the absolutism of reality by 'rationalising' the Absolute (the Numen) into 'named', specific agencies or

more or less personalised powers, whom we can address and (to that extent) deal with. It is important that these powers, which are often theriomorphic in the early stages, are plural, so that each has only a limited domain—there is a 'separation of powers' among them, so that none of them can present the kind of all-encompassing threat that *Angst* portends... the continuing polytheistic 'separation of powers' prevents the new 'supreme god' from causing a relapse into *Angst*.¹⁸⁰

However, dividing the unity into pieces and parts of the body — again with mythic corollaries, personalised and anthropomorphised as 'aspects' of the deity — reflects the material (cultural) practices of social production.¹⁸¹ That is, production and consumption are themselves fragmented or segmented; there is not a 'whole' or a 'unity' of production but a *series* of productions as organ machine connections, disconnections and reconnections. Division of the unity in its transcendent use reflects division in its immanent (symbolic) function, and is therefore a positive response to *angst* produced by the confrontation with the Numen as Absolute. The coding and inscription of material practices relating to production, consumption, anti-production and unproductive expenditure bind organs to the socius and the earth, and is therefore the sanctification of cultural activity. The socius, its members and its activity are territorialised into the mega-machine. Inscription as *religio* ('linking back') as a function of territorialisation (again) operates at once transcendentally and immanently: production is *literally* linked to the full body (and the Numen) via unproductive

expenditure. The issue of debt and sacrifice will be dealt with more fully below; here, it is necessary only to note that fragmentation and differentiation, the coding and naming of objects implies the creation of *finite blocks* of debt. Debt is finite because desiring production is segmented and the territory of the socius is limited. Angst is eased as an *effect* of the processes of differentiation and coding associated with the construction of mythic systems and the collective investment of organs, thereby demonstrating the links between inscription, sacrifice, amelioration of angst — and ‘good conscience’.

3. MYTHIC TERRITORIALISATION

The earliest mythological complexes are unreserved totalities that imply unity; the Earth remains “the great unengendered stasis,” at once transcendent and immanent, as exemplified in the New Guinean Marind-amin concept of *Dema*, the Australian aborigines’ ‘Dream Time’, Hindu *dharma* and Egyptian *maat*.¹⁸² Explicitly the earth is gendered (differentiated) as ‘Great Mother’, and fragmented, and increasingly so.

‘Gendering’ as a metaphor of fragmentation relates to cultural practice and the coding of production as the creation of both ‘home’ and ‘space for breath’.¹⁸³ Gendering the Earth ‘female’ is the metaphor for the full body of the earth that is fragmented, objectified, and made a *thing* for the purposes of cultural production. Coding the Earth as Mother is the first step in the inscription of discrete bodies into the territorial machine (the collective investment of organs). The desiring flows of individual bodies are coded to ensure that discrete bodies —which are capable of ‘un-coded’ desire— are encircled, which in turn guarantees that the “full body of the goddess Earth gathers to itself” all the implements and organs of production.¹⁸⁴

Psychoanalysis agrees that gendering of the earth (and matriarchal dominance) does take place, but maintains that matriarchy comes into being in association with the development of agricultural societies. Psychoanalytic historicism allows that as 'settled' agricultural organisation displaces the more primitive hunting and gathering and nomadic cultures, matriarchy and goddess mythology supplants patriarchy and god mythology.¹⁸⁵ But anthropomorphising the Earth as goddess appears not only in conjunction with the beginnings of agricultural or planting society but predates them. Archaeological finds from the ancient Near East, Southern France to Siberia, associated with not only Cro-Magnon but even (perhaps) Neanderthal and Pithecanthropus sites point to an understanding of the earth as the full body and germinal principle. Nevertheless, at the earliest stage of *Homo sapiens* development, *circa* 30,000 BCE (the Aurignacian and Perigordian periods), it is clear that the female body is associated with the earth and the life generating power as precisely the absolutism of reality and the virtual. In this sense then —but only in this sense — the 'goddess' pre-dates the 'god', and the mythic generation of the god(s) assumes the pre-existence of the goddess.

A cautionary note is in order here before proceeding. The primacy of the Goddess as an *imaginary figure* (transcendent use) is *not* evidence of a univocal *symbolic function* (immanent use) determining that matriarchy is to be privileged over patriarchy as a structure of social domination, let alone the original or natural structure.¹⁸⁶ Certain feminist 'revisions' (e.g., Barbara Walker, Monica Sjöö) of 'origin' mythology undertake processes of 'mythic inversion' which merely replicate the errors of psychoanalysis.¹⁸⁷ Unlike psychoanalysis, the feminist mythographers reject oedipalisation as the means of separating economic production from sexual reproduction through repression of the sex drive. Matriarchal repression codes all productive desire as sexual reproduction, resulting (it is argued) in a libidinal economy that is in ecological harmony with the earth. Like psychoanalysis, however, myths of a primal matriarchy assume the primacy of the sex drive; polyvalent libidinal desire

is reduced to sexual desire. Thus, like classical psychoanalysis, feminist inversion cannot bring itself to the admission that that sexuality is never 'pure', with an originary 'purpose' or 'meaning'. In terms of mythology's immanent use of sexuality, "everywhere and always it is a polyvalent function," says Eliade, "whose primary and perhaps supreme valency is the cosmological function."¹⁸⁸ Eliade's critique of Freud's mythological reading of the Oedipus complex applies equally to feminist mythic inversion:

It is the Image of the Mother which reveals—and which *alone can reveal*—her reality and her functions, at once cosmological, anthropological and psychological. To 'translate' the images into concrete terms is an operation devoid of meaning: the images comprise, it is true, all those allusions to the 'concrete' that Freud has brought to light, but the reality that they are trying to signify cannot be reduced to such 'concrete' references.¹⁸⁹

The historicisation of mythic imagery by feminist mythic inversion is the reduction of goddess imagery to a concrete references. Concretising the imagery by relating it to a specific social structure merely recreates psychoanalysis' foreclosure by inserting the figure of the Mother in place of the Father at the two poles of the double-bind.¹⁹⁰

Palaeolithic 'erotica', representing 'Our Lady of the Mammoths' provides the archetype of the goddess that will re-appear in subsequent mythologies. Female figurines are the earliest examples of the 'graven image' and the first objects of worship for *Homo sapiens* as early as 30,000 BCE.¹⁹¹ The female body exists in profound, intimate connection with the macrocosm; the human comprehension or 'understanding' of the female/macrocosmic connection represents a first and perhaps primary over-coming of the disconnection implied by the lack of a biological niche. It shows that the human is not so disconnected, 'alien' or alienated after all. The female body is the 'site' of prodigious power, and is the collection of organs through which the power flows. The body and its parts are nevertheless differentiated, fragmented, and *objectified*; individual organs (genitals, breasts, etc.) are coded, inscribed, marked as 'belonging.' Nevertheless 'belonging' does not indicate that the goddess

or her objects in any sense are in the possession much less the control of the socius. Rather, the opposite is the case: inscription connotes that the members of the troupe belong to the goddess. Male bodies are likewise objectified, fragmented, marked and dedicated. Legends that later appear in connection with 'primitive' hunting races where there is a dominant male shaman-warrior chieftain derives from an earlier time, "in which the women were the sole possessors of the magical art."¹⁹²

For archaic peoples the mysteries of menstruation and childbirth are *natural* manifestations of power which link the female body (via the menstrual cycle) to the lunar cycle, to the seasons, and thence on to the generative life-giving power of the earth — and that for the males of the group, this profound connection is noted, observed, and regarded as a deep mystery.¹⁹³ "The natural mysteries of birth and menstruation are as directly convincing as death itself, and remain to this day what they must have been in the beginning, primary sources of religious awe."¹⁹⁴ Thus, the earliest archaeological evidences provided by goddess statuettes and cave paintings point to the *ancillary* or *supportive* role of the male hunter-shaman in the drama of life and death.¹⁹⁵ Only later, with the rise of planting societies, will male fecundity as the 'father' principle become an element incorporated into the mythical-religious drama.¹⁹⁶ And it is to be further observed that, in addition to ritual representations of the goddess and the earth as 'female', the earliest indications of *male* participation in ritual practice have to do with a) paying homage to the mystery, and b) attempting to create for themselves a purposeful, functional, meaningful role in the process.¹⁹⁷

For women, menstruation, conception and childbirth involve rites of protective isolation (which find echoes in biblical proscriptions). The rites are *not* indicative of some kind of 'moral' taboo, but rather of their relationship to the universal generative principle, which in turn is associated with the full body of the Earth as the *angst* producing Absolute. The processes are 'unknown', and yet related intimately with the life-death cycle, rooting (for males) the notion of mysterious danger. Female rites protect the individual woman as

'person' as a particular pattern of organ-isation. For, in childbirth particularly, the individual comes closest to the intersection of chaos and differentiation; indeed, she traverses the 'border' between the two. "Woman, as the magical door from the other world, through which lives enter into this, stands naturally in counterpoise to the door of death, through which they leave."¹⁹⁸ The rites are designed to ensure that both she and the new child emerge into the realm of differentiation. Differentiation as 'birth' is the assemblage of biological material as organ-machines brought into the realm of social (human) production and therefore into the world of *things*.¹⁹⁹ Conception and childbirth are not the 'creation' of life, but its re-assemblage as a 'part' that will require inscription into the *socius*. Germination, and the instruction to "be fruitful and multiply" is the multiplication of parts through fragmentation (this indicated in archaic myth-creation cycles: multiplication by division). Emergence is differentiation and fragmentation, the separation and the detachment of parts from the unity.²⁰⁰ Thus, emergence is *anguish*; it can hardly have passed the notice of archaic peoples that women (and most mammals) suffer a degree of pain and anguish in giving birth that resembles the death throes.²⁰¹ Pain and anguish signals the breakthrough of the force of the Numen into the world of differentiations. Pain and anguish in association with the generation of life serve as the primary *mnemotechnics* of primitive pedagogy.

The isolation aspect of female rites is conceived primarily to protect males from the 'daemonic', absolute deterritorialising, or 'cannibalising' aspects of the goddess. The Numen of the generative principle, exists, always exists, and is ever-present, but is 'closer' during menstruation and childbirth. Moreover, the Numen is a contagion. As the unitary principle of change and life process, it does not 'differentiate' between life and death, death and life, the assemblage or dis-assemblage of organs. Life and death represent the subjective perspective of a temporarily organised organ-machine. For those not ritually protected, the breaking through of the Numen is a profound danger, resulting in 'death': they become, or return to the state of 'water-in-water'. Social inscription is thus (in part) a product of

resistance to the full return to the plane immanence as the dissolution not only of the individual but the 'human' form through the dis-assemblage of the organs.

Just as female rites ensure that mother and child re-emerge into the realm of differentiation, male rites are designed in reference to the earth as "the unique, indivisible entity, the full body that falls back on the forces of production and appropriates them for its own as the natural or divine precondition."²⁰² "But if man surrendered unreservedly to immanence, he would fall short of humanity; he would achieve it only to lose it and eventually life would return to the unconscious intimacy of animals."²⁰³ Human reproduction is related to material production, but material production takes place within the world of *things* and differentiation. Ritual mnemonics serve to inscribe males into the regime of social production of the socius via a dedication of their organs that in turn provides the intimate connection to the germinal principle and the body-without-organs.²⁰⁴ Thus, rites for boys and men are a *social* affair, involving initiation into fraternities of specialised knowledge and practices (and as such they are those that later become abstracted and rationalised in religious cults, monkish orders and systems of theology) but always with reference to, and within the territory of the female and the full body of the goddess.²⁰⁵ Females, by virtue of their birth and their sex are organically linked and therefore (to a degree) 'pre-initiated' into the mysteries of germinal life, whereas the males of the species must be initiated, socialised and deliberately inscribed by the *mnemotechnic* practices of the social group as the guarantee of their 'reliability' in the regime of social production. The mark of their filiation and "inscription on the cosmic egg of the full body of the earth" is the primitive form of 'making promises'.²⁰⁶ The danger remains, for the earth/mother gives life, and can take it. Males must understand the codes, the 'secrets', always approaching the Mother with the proper respect and deference, always with caution in the right state of ritual purity, and bearing the inscriptions of their initiation in the codes.

4. PRIMITIVE TERRITORIALISATION

Primitive regimes—and/or those that retain elements of primitive practice and savage coding—practice rites that from time to time allow the *full intensity* of the Numen to break through the masks. Rituals are conceived as the means to, at once, permit the breakthrough and contain it. “The impossibility of being human without being a thing and of escaping the limits of things without returning to animal slumber receives the limited solution of the festival.”²⁰⁷ The Numen is the primary force of generation and filiation. The rites and practices of savage coding are those of *mythic identification*. Rituals involving the Numen are the most dangerous (literally!) and are therefore the *primary mode of inscription*. As Deleuze and Guattari say, on the full body of the earth “everything is attached and inscribed, everything is attracted, miraculated. It is the basis of the disjunctive synthesis and its reproduction: a pure force of filiation or genealogy, Numen.”²⁰⁸ Inscription links or connects the individual body to the full body, re-establishing a confirming filiation with the full body and its Numen. “It is the surface on which the whole of production is inscribed, on which the forces and means of labour are recorded, and the agents and the products distributed. It appears here as the quasi cause of production and the object of desire...”²⁰⁹ Inscription and marking involve *cruelty*.²¹⁰ The social code in savagery duplicates the relations of material production. Material production alters, marks, or ‘scars’ the earth; the human body is altered, marked, or scarred in kind, indicative of the fact that “it is on the earth that desire becomes bound to its own repression”.²¹¹

Filiation and marking are not the products of abstract symbolism but differentiate and mark intensities. Deleuze and Guattari refer to the work of Griaule and Dieterlen, who posit that there are different markings to represent the varying levels of intensity. There are signs of filiation, guide-signs, master-signs, signs of desire, “intensive at first, which fall back in a spiral and traverse a series of explosions before extending into images, figures, and

drawings.”²¹² The Full Body falls back on productive connections that are inscribed on a network of intensive and inclusive disjunctions. However, material production must reanimate *lateral* connections in a network “and it must attribute them to itself as though it were their cause”.²¹³ Thus, there are two aspects of the full body. Firstly, there is the “fantastic law” which serves as the enchanted surface of inscription, or the ‘apparent objective movement’ of desiring-production, and the source of filiation.²¹⁴ The first aspect may include the use of a fetish or totem, but as a ‘quasi-cause’.²¹⁵ The second aspect or characteristic of inscription is *alliance*. Alliance is imposed on productive connections in the “the extensive form of a pairing of persons, compatible with the disjunctions of inscription, but inversely reacts on inscription by determining an exclusive and restrictive use of these same disjunctions.”²¹⁶ Alliance therefore involves a “derailment” of disjunctions, meaning they are no longer inclusive (as in the first aspect) but are exclusive and produce a ‘dismembering’ of the socius and the full body.²¹⁷ However, ritual then involves a re-composition of the full body according to the new model of connection or conjugation, “an articulation of bodies for and between themselves, a lateral inscription with articulatory stones of alliance, in short, a whole *ark* of alliance.”²¹⁸ Thus, “it is ... inevitable that alliance be mythically represented as supervening at a certain moment in the filiative lines (although in another sense it is already there from time immemorial).”²¹⁹

The two aspects of the full body reflect two points of view, one mythical and religious, the other economic and political. The latter conceives alliance as being there from time immemorial, “combining and declining itself with extended filiative lineages that do not exist prior to alliances in a system assumed to be given in extended form”.²²⁰ The former shows how extension of a system takes form and delimits itself “proceeding from intense and primordial filiative lineages that necessarily lose their inclusive or non-restrictive use.”²²¹ The mythical ‘extended’ system is like a memory of alliance and words,

implying active repression of the intense memory of filiation. For, if genealogy and filiations are the object of an ever vigilant memory, it is to the degree that they are already

apprehended in an extensive sense that they certainly did not possess before the determinations of alliances conferred it on them. On the contrary, as intensive filiations they become the object of a separate memory, nocturnal and biocosmic—the memory that indeed must suffer repression in order for the new extended memory to be established.²²²

Readings of archaic, primitive, or pre-monotheistic mythology in general are in error when they variously place a male or female deity as the ‘high’ god, or variously gender the most *active* of the divine principles as female or male, and then interpret this privileging as evidence of ‘matriarchal’ or ‘patriarchal’ *domination* in the realm of social production. Primitive regimes of coding, as reflected in the mythologies, understand implicitly what western theory only recently comes to realise: that *sex* is a function of biology, but *gender* is a social construction. As noted above, the full body of the Earth is not ‘female’ intrinsically or bio-cosmically, but is *gendered* ‘female’. Gendering is part of the social code. Gendering is mimesis. Gendering is indicative of the *function* of social production, to both create a territory for human activity/production, and also to link social production to the full body, to the Ancestors, to the Numen and the ‘time-before-time’. The purpose of coding is to create a regime of social coding that brings production/anti-production and unproductive expenditure into alignment with the ‘biocosmic order’. Alignment preserved through ‘payment of debt’ via sacrifice and unproductive expenditure of ‘surplus code’. For, primitive society is not a milieu of exchange, but of *inscription*, and in a society of inscription, the essential thing is to *mark* and be *marked*.²²³

Initiation societies compose pieces of a body, which at the same time are sensory organs, anatomical parts, and joints. Prohibitions (see not, speak not) apply to those who, in a given state or on a given occasion, are deprived of the right to enjoy a collectively invested organ. The mythologies sing of organs—partial objects and their relations with a full body that attracts or repels them: vaginas riveted on the woman’s body, an immense penis shared by the men, an independent anus that assigns itself a body without anus.²²⁴

The process of collective inscription—not the Freudian collective unconscious—explains why fantasies are group fantasies. Primitive production resembles, duplicates and is idealised as the *mirror* of ‘natural’ production and organic processes.²²⁵ There must be a series of connections, disjunctions, conjunctions of organs, and a collective investment of organs that plug into desire, plug desire into the socius and assemble social production.²²⁶ Fantasies, encoded as mythic narratives of both cosmological or ancestral/cultural ‘origin’, are myths constructed and preserved by the *socius* for the socius as the products of collective experience. There must be a series of connections, disjunctions, conjunctions of organs, and a collective investment of organs that plug into desire, and in turn plug desire into the socius thereby assembling social production and unproductive expenditure. For this reason “the primitive territorial machine codes flows, invests organs, and marks bodies.” Organ-bodies as desiring machines are inscribed into the socius; the socius is in turn the earth’s product and must be marked as such. Exchange certainly takes place, but is a secondary activity, and to such a degree “that circulating — exchanging — is a secondary activity in comparison with the task that sums up all the others: marking bodies, which are the earth’s products.”²²⁷ Marking — “tattooing, excising, incising, carving, scarifying, mutilating, encircling, and initiating” — is the ‘real meaning’ of recording, defined by Nietzsche as the “*morality of mores* (. . .)”.²²⁸ Marking is the labour performed by the human upon herself/himself during the greater part of the existence of the human race. The humans’ entire ‘*prehistoric labour*’ is a system of evaluations possessing the force of law inscribing the various members of the socius and parts of the body into the socius and into the full body.²²⁹

Through sacrifice and the pain and anguish associated with the mnemonics of coding, *social* inscription establishes the profound link between material production and human reproduction and hence to the full body of the earth. Inscription implies identification, or (to employ the religious term) at-one-ment. With identification and at-one-ment, *a priori guilt* and *the sense of guilt* are precluded. Debt and obligation are discharged through sacrifice; sacrifice is

the return of things fragmented and differentiated by material cultural activity to the plane of immanence. But sacrifice, in the actual material sense, implies only *equivalence* — for, what is sacrificed is only that which *has been differentiated previously*, made a thing, and accorded thereby a utility. Debt and obligation are therefore *limited*. Debt is limited, at the extreme upper limit, by that which has been differentiated and coded by the regime of production. Sacrifice is both anti-production (bringing ‘useful’ desiring production and consumption to a halt) and unproductive expenditure’. In terms of sacrificial rites, no distinction is made between objects of production as ‘things’ and the human as ‘thing.’ Through rites of sacrifice, the individual identifies with the ‘victim’, but the victim is *thing*, which, through sacrifice, is restored to immanence, thus *assimilated* into immanence. The human individual is of the same nature as the thing. “Or rather,” as Bataille notes,

the anxiousness to remain personally alive that establishes the person’s individuality is linked to the integration of existence into the world of things. To put it differently, work and the fear of dying are interdependent; the former implies the thing and vice versa. In fact it is not even necessary to work in order to be the *thing* of fear: man is an individual to the extent that his apprehension ties him to the results of labour. But man is not, as one might think, a thing because he is afraid. He would have no anguish if he were not the individual (the thing), and it is essentially the fact of being an individual that fuels his anguish. It is in order to satisfy the demands of the thing, it is insofar as the world of things has posited his duration as the basic condition of his worth, that he learns anguish. He is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things. Death disturbs the order of things and the order of things holds us. Man is afraid of the intimate order that is not reconcilable with the order of things. Otherwise, there would be no sacrifice, and there would be no mankind either. The intimate order would not reveal itself in the destruction and the sacred anguish of the individual . . .²³⁰

5. FROM PRIMITIVE TO DESPOTIC MACHINE

The primitive territorial machine does not refer to geography, geographic distribution, or ‘residency;’ in these respects, the primitive machine is not ‘territorial’ at all. The concepts of territory as geography, the preoccupation with boundaries and their expansion, and with

residency reflects the conception of the State apparatus as 'territorial.' Primitive territorialisation subdivides people, organs, and organ-machines; the socius is marked, and organised according to kinship alliances, affiliations, and by *rank*.²³¹ The despotic regime subdivides territory in land. Geographic organisation (as Engels notes) replaces organisation by *gens*.²³² Deleuze and Guattari's observation is critical. It provides a tool by which to see through the superficial 'skin' of royal over-coding to discern actual material social relations and the political relations upon which they are based. Thus, we are able to determine that ancient Egypt, even in the Rameside New Kingdom period, remains 'primitive', whereas the Mesopotamia empires of Akkad, Sumer-and-Akkad, Babylon, Assyria and Persia are 'despotic'. The Egyptian preoccupation with local 'nome' divinities is reflective of the organisation and subdivision of *peoples* on an indivisible earth ('the land of Egypt' or 'house' of the goddess Hathor) "where the connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive relations of each section are inscribed along with other relations (thus, for example, the coexistence or complementarity of the section chief and the guardian of the earth)."²³³ By contrast, "when the division extends to the earth itself, by virtue of an administration that is landed and residential, this is not to be regarded as a promotion of territoriality; on the contrary, it is rather the effect of the first great movement of deterritorialisation on the primitive communes." The consequences are at once political-economic and mythical-religious.

The early civilisations of the High Neolithic are not despotic but are highly elaborated form of primitive territorialisation. Early Sumerian and Egyptian practices remain within the territory of savage coding and sacrificial unproductive expenditure, and the attempt to link to the full body. Extension of affiliations and filiations, multiplication of desiring connections and syntheses, and the coding of production/consumption create a complex regime of production and a 'division of labour.' The division of labour establishes the basis for hierarchical organisation and pre-figures despotism. However, at this stage the prime 'territory' of the social machine remains bodies, and their inscription and coding. The

division of labour is a function of the marking of bodies and investment of organs. Thus, again, “circulating — exchanging — is a secondary activity in comparison with the task that sums up all the others: the marking of bodies, which are the earth’s products.”²³⁴ Both division and hierarchy are only temporary; the accumulation of over-production by the royal court is only temporary. The king/queen serves as the exemplar of the socius, and his organs are “hewn into the socius”, through which she ceases to be an individual and becomes the symbol or embodiment of the full body to which all the organs of the socius become attached, and to which they are attracted and repelled, according to the requirements of the socius.²³⁵ Moreover, the requirements of the socius function mimetically according to the requirements of the biocosmic regime symbolised by mythical-religious order.²³⁶ Over-production and luxury is not the ‘property’ or possession of the king/queen but is merely accumulated as his/her body for the purposes of sacrifice.

The primitive socius dedicates the entire surplus code to local unproductive expenditure. In principle, and in terms of its function in linking to the full body and the Numen, there is no difference between the sacrifice of surplus vegetables, cattle, and sacred persons, or ‘sacrifice’ through monumental pyramid and temple building. Debt is therefore both theoretically and functionally (actually) limited to the entire *surplus value* of code, providing an upper limit on obligation. Obligation, debt, and the actual surplus may vary from season to season, year to year, but always exist (theoretically) in a state of equilibrium. Production is inscribed on the full body of the earth, and coded as ‘earth production’; surplus production is dedicated to the earth in sacrifice and luxurious consumption.

As a general principle, the ‘point of insertion’ for the despot is precisely at the moment of anti-production; now the surplus is dedicated to *him*. But in terms of basic modes of production, nothing changes. Desiring production remains local; production continues to produce a surplus value of code. What is suppressed is not the former regime of lateral

alliances and extended filiations, but these are no longer *determinative* for the entire cycle of production. That is, the production machine does not undergo a revolution or renovation, on the order of a shift from ‘traditional’ economies to capitalism. Rather, the ‘primitive’ forms subsist, “the autochthonous rural communities subsist, and continue to produce, inscribe and consume” but are harnessed by the despot as the source of surplus production.²³⁷

The despotic state, such as it appears in the purest conditions of ‘Asiatic’ production, has two correlative aspects: on the one hand it replaces the territorial machine, it forms a new deterritorialised full body; on the other hand it maintains the old territorialities, integrates them as parts or organs of production in the new machine.²³⁸

The process of *overcoding* constitutes the essence of the State. Under despotism then, the total value of surplus production or surplus code, formerly expended locally as sacrifice becomes the object of despotic appropriation.²³⁹ According to the ‘legitimation theory’ of despotic myth and religion, everything is the emanation of the despot (or the despot’s god). Everything therefore belongs to the despotic state — and the state, in principle, is entitled to appropriate the whole of production. In theory — but only in theory — the formerly limited blocks of debt “become an infinite relation in the form of tribute,” and the despotic state functions as a gigantic debt-creation and repayment machine.²⁴⁰

The process of ‘infinitevitation’ is not to be understood as psychoanalysis, theology, and the philosophy of history have it, as the consequence of the ‘return of the repressed’, the progressive revelation toward monotheistic religion, or a dialectical process of rationalisation and ‘progress’ toward homogenisation and univocity. Additionally, Deleuze and Guattari are correct to suggest that the process of ‘infinitevitation’ cannot be understood as an internal development of a given socius. Despotism is not the consequence of an elaborate abstraction of an interplay of ancestors, profound genealogies, extended filiations, despite the fact that elements of primitive territorialisation, and “the general irreducibility of alliance to filiation, the independence of alliance groups ... the system of primitive rankings, the

mechanism of surplus value,” anticipate the despotic structure.²⁴¹ Rather, it is the case that the interplay that characterises savage coding and primitive territorialisation is short-circuited from the *outside* and it experiences a *break*. Nietzsche’s construction is correct: the break is precisely the sudden appearance of the ‘blond beast’, the barbarian despots that “come like fate, without cause, reason, consideration or pretext, they appear just like lightning appears, too terrible, sudden, convincing and ‘other’ even to be hated.”

As a first consequence of despotic reterritorialisation,

The immanent unity of the earth as the immobile motor gives way to a transcendent unity of an altogether different nature—the unity of the State; the full body is no longer that of the earth, but of the Despot, the Unengendered, which now takes charge of the fertility of the soil as well as the rain from the sky and the general appropriation of the productive forces.²⁴²

The shift to a despotic regime both implies and requires the over-coding (if not decoding and recoding) of kinship relations aimed at their subordination to ‘national’ organisation. The segmentary and horizontal form of kinship alliances is broken and re-established as the new alliance with the despot. Under savagery, indirect filiation is established through the inscription of the individual into the socius (and to ancestors), thence to the full body and the Numen, is challenged by the despot who overturns primitive lateral alliances and extended filiations.²⁴³ The despot establishes himself in direct filiation with the deity — and the people must follow. Under savagery, the emergence of the socius is imaged as the emergence of undifferentiated desire from the earth. Desire is then coded, organised, and linked back to the earth.

Under despotism, there is no ‘emergence’ but instead a ‘bestowing’ from the deity to the despot as the chosen agent of the deity. The barbarian despot creates forms ‘instinctively’ and the form he creates is a *structure of domination*. That is, contra Freud, such a structure is not archaic; the structure is not primitive and does not appear, nor does it re-appear as a return of something ‘internal’, but is a structure that comes from the ‘outside’ and as ‘other.’

The new structure is an ‘overlay’ (at least at first); it creates ‘parts’ and ‘functions’ that are differentiated but co-related, “in which there is absolutely no room for anything which does not first acquire ‘meaning’ with regard to the whole,” reflective of the pyramidal structure of the regime.²⁴⁴ The totality of the ‘meaning of things’ is precisely the despot, the leader of the conquering horde: ‘I Sargon of Akkad am the Alpha and the Omega. All rights emit from me. I own all property, and everything that lives, lives at my pleasure. There is no society, no civilisation except through me...’²⁴⁵

Bestowing is indicative of the radical ‘break’; it is, as Deleuze and Guattari say, “a leap into a new alliance, a break with the ancient filiation ...” The break is expressed, in the legitimating or ‘foundation’ myths, as the institution of

a machine of the strange whose locus is the desert, imposing the harshest and the most barren of ordeals, and attesting to the resistance of an old order as well as to the validation of the new order. The machine of the strange is both a great paranoiac machine, since it expresses the struggle with the old system, and an already glorious celibate machine, insofar as it exalts the triumph of the new alliance. The despot is the paranoiac ...²⁴⁶

The town and city-dwellers he conquers are licentious, soft, despoiled, and ‘sinful’; their towns and cities are the perverted ‘fleshpots’ of Egypt, Babylon, and Sodom and Gomorrah.

The despotic formation should not be related to other formations with which it is in competition temporally and spiritually, but to primitive forms that the despotic supplants through imposition of its rule of law, “but that continues to haunt it.”²⁴⁷ Despotic regimes of different cultural complexes should not be compared to one another (e.g., Babylon should not be compared to Rome, or Assyria to Persia, etc.), in order to calculate ‘degrees’ of despotism. Neither should comparisons be drawn between different despotic regimes within the same regional cultural complex (e.g., within Mesopotamia: Akkad to Babylon, Assyria or Persia). Instead, (schizo-) analysis looks for commonalities under Marx’s definition of ‘Asiatic’ production. That is, the barbarian despotic state is a regime of centralisation that

establishes itself on the foundations of the older primitive regime(s). The primitive socius nominally retains 'ownership' (or at any rate possession) of the soil, "while the State becomes the true owner in conformity with the apparent objective movement that attributes the surplus product to the State, assigns the productive forces to it in the great projects undertaken, and makes it appear as the cause of the collective conditions of appropriation."²⁴⁸

Here, the earth ceases to be the full body. The socius is detached from its filiation to the earth as the full body. The full body becomes the body of the despot himself, the despot as the incarnation of the god, or the despot as the 'agent' of the god.²⁴⁹ *He* becomes a de-facto body-without-organs as the sole *quasi cause* of the apparent objective movement, folding into himself the twin aspects of savagery's full body. By means of divine nomination and election, the despot becomes the 'vessel' of the "fantastic law" which serves as the enchanted surface of inscription, or the 'apparent objective movement' of desiring-production, and the source of filiation.²⁵⁰ The god Marduk chooses Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon, Ahura Mazda chooses Cyrus of Persia, Ashur chooses Ashur-nasirpal II, Tiglath-pileser III and Sennacherib of Assyria, and Yahweh anoints David to lead Israel.²⁵¹ To this extent then, the despotic body becomes fetish or totem, and in the same fashion a 'quasi-cause'. Additionally, the despot becomes the source of re-inscription for the purposes of creating a new system of alliances. Thus, Marduk abandons Nebuchadnezzar in favour of Cyrus, Enlil and Anu abandon the Sumerians in favour of Sargon of Akkad, and Yahweh chooses Nebuchadnezzar as the scourge, Cyrus as the deliverer of Israel. What is produced on the body of the despot is the connective synthesis of the old alliances with the new, and a disjunctive synthesis "that entails an overflowing of the old filiations into the direct filiation, gathering all subjects into the new machine."²⁵² Despotic alliance is super-imposed on productive connections in the "the extensive form of a pairing of persons, compatible with the disjunctions of inscription, but inversely reacts on inscription by determining an exclusive and restrictive use of these same disjunctions."²⁵³ The despot becomes the

fountainhead of the two points of view, the mythical and religious on one hand, the economic and political on the other. However, whereas savagery conceives alliance as being there from time immemorial, “combining and declining itself with extended filiative lineages that do not exist prior to alliances in a system assumed to be given in extended form”, despotic alliances are predicated on the founding of the dynasty.²⁵⁴ Legitimation is conferred, over and against alliances that genealogically link the present generation of the socius to primordial ancestors, through the direct filiation of despot and the deity. And, whereas savage filiation shows how the extension of a system of alliances “takes form and delimits itself “proceeding from intense and primordial filiative lineages that necessarily lose their inclusive or non-restrictive use,” the despotic regime establishes alliances based on *exclusive* and restrictive use.²⁵⁵

Exclusivity and restriction demands that all desiring flows (production of desire and desiring production) converge “into a great river that constitutes the sovereign’s consumption.”²⁵⁶ What is at issue is not the actual body or person of the sovereign. What is at issue is not the extent of the sovereign’s functional power or degree of influence over the institutions of the state (political, military, religious); the despot’s role might be primarily military or primarily ‘religious’ in function. Neither is the despotic regime designated by the size or scope of the geographic territory under state control; the Omride kings of Israel (Northern Kingdom, 9th and 8th centuries BCE) and the Davidic kings of Judah (8th and 7th centuries BCE) are not less despotic than their Assyrian contemporaries despite controlling only a fraction of the territory.²⁵⁷ What counts is that *the social machine has profoundly changed*. The relations of the primitive machine are replaced by the ‘mega-machine’ of the State as an apparatus of appropriation. The horizontal distribution of the primitive apparatus is replaced by a despotic apparatus in the form of a functional pyramid with the depot at the apex, a religious and military bureaucratic apparatus as the ‘lateral surface’ and ‘transmission gears’, and the artisans, merchants and farmers at the base serving as the ‘working parts’.²⁵⁸

As a second consequence of despotic reterritorialisation, and in principle, the subsumption of savage coding by the despotic demands the abolition of rituals of sacrifice and wasteful expenditure. Rituals of sacrifice persist, but are over-coded by the new form. Again, the body of the despot is inserted at the point of anti-production. Sacrifices are made *to* the despot, or *through* the despot as the exclusive representative of the deity and therefore the 'intermediary.' However — and contrary to the implications of Nietzsche — the barbarian despotic machine does not simply appear on the scene as conqueror, appropriator and master of the over-code but the way is paved by *crisis* manufactured by the internal logic of the primitive sacrificial regime.

Increasing social production reflects cultural achievement. Cultural production in its most rudimentary or basic form is the production of the essential means to life indicative of fecundity functioning mimetically as the alignment of social and cosmic forces and the ability of the socius to re-create 'heaven on earth' (Egyptian *du'at*). For the Egyptians culture provides not only food but also 'breathing space' for both humans and the gods; culture is possible because of the reciprocal relationship with the divine. Cultural production is linked back to the full body through practices of luxurious expenditure; the latter is literally 'food for the gods'. The principle of *do ut des* implies that increasing prosperity is the result of increasing sacrifice and luxurious expenditure. The *quantity* of what is sacrificed, compared with that of Marind-amin of New Guinea (as one example) has increased exponentially, becoming a grand and luxurious potlatch, and as 'expensive' as the blood-sacrifices of the Maya and the Aztec, during which dozens, even hundreds of 'victims' are butchered on temple altars.²⁵⁹ The meaning or *quality* of the sacrifice has not changed from that witnessed in the Marind-amin festival: the Sumerian king or Egyptian pharaoh and their queens are mythically inflated (and richly decorated) *ewati* and *iwag*, the adolescents sacrificed and cannibalised by the New Guinean Marind-amin.²⁶⁰

However, a continual increase in the 'expense' of luxurious sacrifice is required to engineer the requisite intensity for fusion with the Numen in a regime of social production of ever-expanding affiliations, differentiations and divisions. The multiplication of desiring connections and the increase on desiring production themselves represent an increase in productive intensity. Social coding becomes more rigorous, detailed, and 'administrative' (e.g., introduction of writing related to accounting and bookkeeping) as the threat of desire escaping the regime of coding becomes more acute, for the repression of desire is to ensure that production falls back on the full body.²⁶¹ The requirement of increasing production, anti-production and unproductive expenditure implies that a decline in production (e.g., bad harvest, plagues, poor outcome in war *vis-à-vis* capture of 'slaves' and 'booty') is a threat to the principle of *do ut des*. Moreover, given the relationship between sacrifice and duration, a series of political-economic crises resulting in a decline in production and unproductive expenditure will be perceived as a threat to the profound connection to the Numen, and thereby a threat to the entire regime of coding and inscription. The issue of duration becomes paramount.

Furthermore, the internal logic of the sacrificial regime is the demand that the multiplication of desiring connections and the increase in production—themselves intensifications—demand an increase in the quantity of sacrifice. Thus, the internal logic of the sacrificial regime is that it imperils itself. A decline in production implies a decline in unproductive expenditure, implying a decline in intensity that imperils the profound connection to the Numen. At the cultural stage of the hieratic-city state and developed agricultural practices (contrary to the most primitive cultures) it cannot be the case that a mere decline in *material* production alone, and a relative though temporary impoverishing of the socius related to seasonal or annual fluctuations (less rainfall, a bad harvest, etc.) will be perceived as a direct threat to existence. However, insofar as cultural production and the link to the Numen are predicated on the manufacture of intensity, and duration is predicated on

the principle of *do ut des*, any decline in prosperity has the potential to be experienced by the socius as a catastrophe.

The abolition of the savage form of human sacrifice severs the profound connection of filiation with the earth. The abolition of sacrifice represents the first ‘death of god’, and marks a fundamental re-configuration of religious psychology and practice.²⁶² The human can no longer participate intimately in and ‘identify’ with the Numen. The human as organism is no longer inscribed by a socius linked directly to the full body of the earth. The inability to link the socius to the Numen threatens the absolute deterritorialisation of desiring production, thereby severing both filiative lineages and the network of alliances. The rupture between production and anti-production is perceived as alienation and a loss of intimacy. The cyclical flows of productive desire are arrested.²⁶³ The intensity of desiring flows, formerly coded for discharge in rituals of sacrificial violence are blocked and inhibited (aim-inhibition). The crisis is ‘read’ psychologically and mythically/religiously as *dissociation* and results in the return of *angst* recalling the moment of emergence.²⁶⁴ The rupture is thus a moment of profound disjunction and a ‘failure’ of both the mythical/religious and political-economic points of view and provides the point of insertion for the despotic re-coding and overcoding of production.

However, despotism configured by either patriarchal polytheism or monotheism is likewise legitimated by filiation with the Numen. The Numen as the transcendent or the divine remains as the foundation for the immanent world, and is that which gives immanency its value. The Numen is not banished by despotism, but access to it is rendered increasingly *exclusive* whereas under the strictly primitive code it is *inclusive*. Exclusivity is established under despotic (patriarchal) coding by fixing of the attitude of ‘turning away’ from the Numen. Individually and collectively, re-configured social practice fixes the mask of the Numen in place; the mask as metaphor is abstracted and read literally; the mask of God is fixed in place as a permanent prophylactic. Neither the individual nor the socius is

allowed to 'see' the face of the god. Despotic theology creates codes of holiness and elitism, institutionalising the savage 'fear' of the daemonic breakthrough of the Numen into immanency. God is confined to his temples, placed behind veils and becomes the 'hidden' god.

The mask of god is always a metaphor, a sign, and a signifier. Rites of incision, inscription and marking under savagery function to "overcome the formal independence" between the plane of immanence as the full body and the world of things, and function "to sanction the 'arbitrary' conjunction" of the two components.²⁶⁵ The rites therefore comprise a system of *connotation*.²⁶⁶ However, when the mask is detached *materially* from its signified it becomes a precisely a 'concept' and an abstraction. Mythic and religious praxis becomes a system of *denotation* and marks the shift from mythic identification (fusion) to mythic relationship (subordination, domination), and from the 'payment' of debt as the means to achieve at-one-ment to the payment of debt as atonement. The 'law of the Father' will not say that the mask *is* the Numen (this would be idolatry), but says that it will have to do.

The permanent masking of the god holds the full 'Dionysian' intensity of the Numen in check through the abolition of sacrifice as the principal effervescent breaking loose of the "contagious movement of a purely glorious consumption".²⁶⁷ The permanent masking of the god — and his subsequent mythic and religious inflation — is contingent upon the abolition of primitive rites of sacrifice, wherein the surplus code is 'wasted' locally. Without the abolition of sacrificial rites, the establishment of despotic and priestly exclusivity is impossible and connotation will again displace the despotic system of denotation. The Israelite prophets constantly rail against the sacrificial practices of the Israelite tribes at their local altars. King Josiah's Mosaic or 'Deuteronomic' reforms include the destruction of the local "High Places" of sacrifice, centralisation of the Yahweh cult in the Temple of Jerusalem, limiting access to the 'Holy of Holies' to the high priest, all of which reinforce the principle of exclusivity. Likewise, Moses and his Levite priests violently suppress the

bacchanalian festival of the liberated Israelites at the foot of the mountain of God.²⁶⁸ Only Moses is permitted to 'see' God, and even he sees only the 'hind parts' of Yahweh, not His face.²⁶⁹

The permanent masking of the Numen 'frees' desire from its binding to the earth but permanently fixes the human organism and desiring production in the world of things *as* things and thereby provides a fundamental precursor to instrumental rationality. The abolition of sacrifice ruptures the link between desiring production as production from anti-production and unproductive expenditure. Desiring production and anti-production are no longer linked to the Numen; desire must be repressed but repressed desiring production no longer falls back on the full body of the earth. Desiring production as human activity is increasingly experienced as 'alienated' activity and linked to existential angst. But social production still requires the coding of desire and its binding to repression, without which the *socius* is impossible. As a consequence, social production is bound to the body of the despot, either as the incarnation of the father god or as the representative (exemplar) of the god on earth. The *need* for the link to the full body is repressed and de-legitimated. Re-configurations of mythical-religious systems through processes of mythic inversion, mythic inflation, and mythic dissociation legitimise the privileged role of the despot and the exclusivity of access to the Numen. Both the *need* for and the *ability* of the *socius* to link to the full-body is de-legitimated and repressed according to the two views, noted above. Re-configuration of political-economical relations is accompanied by mythical/ religious de-coding and re-coding. Desiring production is re-coded through the abandonment of sacrifice. The repression of production now falls back on the despot as full body. The despot as full body replaces the full body of the earth, gendered as Mother. Patriarchal myth and religion displaces the matriarchal through a process of mythic defamation and inversion and lays the psychological foundations for Oedipus.

The multiplications of gods and goddesses characteristic of polytheisms serve as symbols for the ‘fragmentations’ of the full body. The Full Body is the Cosmic and Biocosmic —and whether understood as ‘merely’ the earth, or the totality of the ‘universe’, and whether gendered by myth as ‘female’ or ‘male’, the full body has the potential to be the Absolute, or collapse back into the absolute as absolute deterritorialisation and chaos. The ever-presence of the Numen reflects the psychological condition of *angst* recalling the moment of emergence, and the threat of the Numen implies death and dissolution. It would be remarkable, therefore, if the human *did not* experience ‘fear and trembling’ when confronting the Numen. And it would be remarkable if the tension implicit in the dual need to both differentiate and ‘link back’ were not perceived, at some point, as a ‘dualism’, perhaps even as a conflict between *Eros* and *Thanatos*. However, the primary ‘meaning’ of the tension is not psychological but functional, and the ‘true’ threat to the ‘being’ of human organism is not the threat from ontological lack but from a collapse of coding and inscription that links desiring production to the full body. Severing the link imperils social production, which in turn threatens the organisation of the socius, and which, in the extreme, portends absolute deterritorialisation.

The difference between savage myth and the despotic, between the symbolic gender female and gender male is the perception created and reinforced in myth of the ‘nature’ or character of absolute deterritorialisation and its relation to debt and obligation. Under savagery, the threat is conceived not as an end of *individual* life, or an end to the individual’s life cycle, but as the end of the human socius, to ‘our’ culture. No thought given to other cultures; ‘we’ link ourselves to the full body to ensure *our* duration and prosperity. *Thus, debt and obligation must be limited to material production, and can never exceed the whole of social production as its absolute upper limit.* For, irrespective of what the human organism produces, even if existence is perceived simply as consumption (and a net and total subtraction of energy from the available supply), then debt is limited to the total of energy consumed and no more.

At the other extreme is mature 'patriarchal' monotheism's doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*, which is the logical result of mythical-religious detachment from the organic generative principle (gendered female) and the demand that production fall back on the full body of the earth. The mature monotheism of Nominalist Christianity posits a god who stands independent from creation, can end creation at any moment, thereby establishing — demanding—that God 'gets nothing' out of creation (not even 'happiness').²⁷⁰ Debt is therefore infinite, for debt is no longer related to production/consumption-consummation and anti-production, but to *existence* itself. The 'ontological problem' shifts its emphasis from a problem of 'becoming' to one of 'being.'

The development of theological-political despotism as monotheism is related to the over-coding of 'savage' symbolic codes in the ancient Near East, which in turn is related to mythic (psychological) dissociation and the problematising of existence. Mythic dissociation and the rise of monotheism are phenomena of the collectivity and its social product, and therefore should replace the murder of a primeval father as the source of despotic-judicial codes. Mythic dissociation through the severance of the direct link with the full body and the Numen is the *psychological* precondition for the development of bad conscience but is the product of *material* social conditions (social production and anti-production) connected with the formation of the first despotic 'military-agricultural' complexes.²⁷¹ Positing *life as a problem* is linked with guilt, 'slave' morality, and the development of asceticism, as explicated in Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*, but is a psychological/existential condition related, again, fundamentally to material, socio-political conditions initiated by the barbarian despotic machines.

Violence formerly 'consumed' *internally* by sacrificial production/consumption is dissociated, displaced and *externalised* in the cause of military-territorial expansion (e.g., Akkadians, Hittites, Kassites, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians) and the expansion of the despotic over-code. The implementation of barbarian despotism is the

appropriation/expropriation (e.g., 'tribute') and re-allocation of surplus production requiring the dedication of production (debt) to the despot which is both cause and effect of a 'break' in the link with the Numen as full body of the earth. Over-production and surplus code are no longer returned to the earth *locally* as the source of production. Surplus code becomes 'portable', linked to the despot as full body rather than to the earth or a sacred site.

The Mesopotamian form of barbaric despotism ('Asiatic production') requires the preservation of savage coding and primitive territorialisation as the 'foundation' of production. The preservation of savage code and links to the earth as full body are reflected in the preservation and perpetuation of savage forms of myth and religion. The barbarian despotic machines do not create new myths, yet all and *all* are given religious legitimisation. Savagery's goddess myths related to cycles of the seasons and harvest, agriculture and animal husbandry (death and resurrection, Tammuz and Dumuzi, Isis and Osiris, Ba'al and Astarte) remain intact. However, cosmic creation and foundation myths are appropriated by despotism and configured mythically via dissociation and inversion. Thus, the onset of the barbarian despotic machine is mirrored in mythic revisions symbolically depicting the victory of the despot/deity over the forces of the goddess as 'chaos.'²⁷² The 'mother' is conquered, her generative powers harnessed by the 'civilising' power of the despotic regime. However, in contrast to the late biblical revision, wherein the mother is rendered at once inert and invisible/absent, here the 'mother' is subdued, brought under domination, and perhaps oppressed but not 'repressed' in psychoanalysis' sense. Primitive production, including the worship of the goddess and the preservation of the indigenous mythology, maintains filiation to the full body of the earth and continues to function as the foundational or 'under-code'. In theory, but only in theory, are debt and obligation unlimited; in theory, everything belongs to the despot. Yet, in terms of function and in practice, debt and obligation remain limited to the degree that production is inscribed into the land. Thus, the flows of the barbarian despotic machines — the conquests, rises and declines of empires, shifts in centres of

influence and contests between centres of influences — are competitions for the right to over-code and control the surplus code.

There is no smooth, linear transition from the inscription and mnemonic practices of archaic, primitive or savage regimes of the Palaeolithic and early the Neolithic periods of pre-history, through the culture provinces of the 'high' Neolithic and the founding of barbarian despotic territorial regimes. The earliest provinces of 'high culture' associated with the great river floodplains — the Tigris-Euphrates, the Nile, the Indus — (and somewhat later, those associated with Crete and Greece, China and SE Asia, Melanesia and Mesoamerica) are configurations and elaborations of *primitive territorialisation* and savage coding, albeit in highly sophisticated forms. At intervals in each of these cultural complexes, elements of despotic coding appear as the means of organising a territorial 'state' (e.g., Egyptian Middle Kingdom, Aztec state). However, one must be careful not to conflate 'despotism' with the institution of kingship. As noted above, that a territory is possessed of a king (or Pharaoh) does not mean, necessarily, that the fundamental basis of social coding has shifted, that the relations of production and reproduction are not longer 'savage.' Typified by the relations of production in Egypt (Old, Middle and New Kingdoms), despotism appears as a superficial overcoding that ultimately serves the cause of a highly elaborate and sophisticated regime of savage inscription and anti-production linking production to the full body of the earth (or cosmos) that is variously gendered female, male, or (in the case of eastern religions) un-gendered and androgynous.

In *none* of these high cultural complexes *save one* is there a teleological historical movement toward *exclusively* patriarchal religion. In none of these high cultural complexes *save one* is there a trajectory toward a fully developed *oedipalised* model of despotism. In none of these cultural complexes *save one* does genealogy reveal 'progress' toward the type of monotheistic religion and oedipalised model of repression that Freud sees as necessary to the rise, maintenance and progress of civilisation. Freud's sense of guilt, and the

psychoanalytic model of Oedipal repression, are the reproductions of a specific religious dynamic, itself the product extremely localised material/socio-political conditions, together with an 'a-typical' and acute *reactivity* in response to these conditions, that are to be found in the history of Israel and the Judaic/priestly response and reconstruction of that history.

CHAPTER III: RELIGION

The main contrivance which the ascetic priest allowed himself to use in order to make the human resound with every kind of heart-rending and ecstatic music was — as everyone knows — his utilisation of the *feeling of guilt*. ... Only in the hands of the priest, this real artist in the feelings of guilt, did it take shape — and what a shape! 'Sin' — for that is the name for the priestly reinterpretation of the animal 'bad conscience' (cruelty turned back on itself)...²⁷³

1. OEDIPUS, MOSES AND JUDAISM

Psychoanalysis claims Oedipus is the universal content of the universal collective unconscious and Oedipal guilt is universally necessary for the production of civilisation. Psychoanalysis says repressed guilt over the murder of the father is the universal, archaic, pre-individual content of the unconscious that inevitably and necessarily returns to determine and configure the social code. For psychoanalysis, the primeval father provides the template for god. Guilt over the murder of the primal father is the mnemotechnic device for universal recording of the law of father as the primary social code that in turn is the foundation for patriarchal religion and (the modern) secularised Oedipus. However, Oedipal guilt does not appear universally in history. Guilt, as the latent content of the unconscious does not return universally to determine social coding. God the Father is not the universal god. The Law of the Father is not the universal socio-religious code.

The universal does not come *at* the end but comes *to* an end under conditions determined by an apparently victorious Oedipus and patriarchal repressive regime.²⁷⁴ Rather, the *beginning* of the end of the universal is establishment not only of the patriarchal mythic inversion and

despotic over-coding, but their reconfiguration through restriction, exclusion, and negation as patriarchal *exclusivity* in the form of monotheistic religion.

For psychoanalysis, Oedipal guilt is not universally associated with, nor is it a product of a specific mode of production in antiquity. Furthermore, Freud does not associate the appearance (or reappearance) of Oedipal guilt with a particular 'phase' of cultural or social development. Psychoanalysis does not identify, from the historical record, a universal law of historical necessity, which demands that cultures oedipalise; that is, there is no historical account that would suggest oedipalisation is a result of the internal logic of social development. Furthermore, there is no historical socio-cultural maturation process that parallels that which psychoanalysis diagnoses in the individual (e.g., oedipalisation). Psychoanalysis says Oedipus is innate, and necessary for civilisation, but it is not the case that all the sophisticated cultures necessarily pass through or into Oedipus as a characteristic of their historical progress.

However, Freud does not claim that the return of the repressed and re-institution of the Oedipal religion of the father appears (re-appears) in history as a 'universal' phenomenon. Instead, he understands that the development of the sense of guilt as the core of the religio-social code appears as a highly localised phenomenon, and is the product of a specific *sub*-culture. Freud locates the first return of the universally repressed material of the unconscious in Moses' attempt to impose a 'new' religion on the Israelites.²⁷⁵ Moses uniquely crafts a religious code from the innate and latent content of the unconscious. The first historical civilisation to be territorialised by the sense of guilt is that of Judaism. The Judaic code is appropriated and reconfigured by St. Paul as Christianity.²⁷⁶ Notwithstanding Freud's critique of Christianity, it is only through Christianity that the guilt code is 'universalised'. However, the tools of psychoanalysis deployed in an interrogation of the history of the Jewish religion provide Freud with the link between the primeval events and the modern unconscious. The psychological configuration of Judaism is revealed by its history. In Jewish

literature, Freud discovers evidence of the return of the repressed, the religious coding of the sense of guilt, and the attempt to restore the father to his historical rights as the basis of the religious code. Israelite/ Jewish history, according to the priestly theologies of both Second Temple Judaism and Christianity, is the teleology of human guilt. Freud agrees.

The present chapter continues the theme of problematising Freud's work of the historicisation of instinct repression and domination by focussing on his analysis of Israelite religion.

I end the genealogical analysis of Israelite and Jewish religion, and the accompanying critique of psychoanalysis, with the early Second Temple and the period of Persian domination in Judea. The genealogy ends here because, for all intents and purposes, Freud's own historical-social inquiry effectively ends with early post-exilic Judaism. The repressed has returned; from this point forward guilt will determine the social code. No religious, social or political events in the later Second Temple period will alter this fact. Christianity merely reconfigures, elaborates, and chooses an alternative perspective for a theology of guilt, emphasising the Son over the Father. Freud asserts that in one sense Christianity 'completes' the return of the repressed by 'confessing' to the 'original sin' of the primeval murder, its deification of the Son represents a 'spiritual' and psychological regression.²⁷⁷ Christianity is therefore not a consistent monotheism, not a consistent religious expression of Oedipus, for the Oedipus complex focuses on the Father, not the Son. Nevertheless, Christianity's sense of guilt is for Freud the same innate content of the unconscious that returns to configure post-exilic Judaism.²⁷⁸

I agree, with both Freud and Nietzsche, that the development of the sense of guilt as the core of the religio-social code must be located in Judaism. As Nietzsche indicates, and Freud assumes, one cannot explain modern guilt without Christianity, and Christianity is inexplicable without Judaism. However, the agreement with Freud ends here. Freud's 'Moses

hypothesis', his contentions regarding a latency period for the religion of Moses in Israel, and his assertion that a *second* return of the repressed thoroughly de-codes and re-codes Jewish religion, are highly problematic. Freud oversimplifies the Hebrew, Israelite and Jewish religious experience, reducing it to the teleology of unconscious repression and latency. The experience and memory of the pre-Moses period is ignored. The socio-religious developments of the era of 'the Kingdoms' is relevant only insofar as it is, for Freud, the period of 'latency', when Moses' religion is *not* dominant; the socio-religious developments of the period are ignored. Similarly swept aside are the social and political conditions, the internal conflicts, and the development of diverse expressions of Judaism in the post-exilic period. For Freud, nothing of religious or psychological significance occurs between the cathartic events of exile (which produces the second return of the repressed), and the advent of Christianity. While Freud allows that the sense of guilt 'universalised' by Christianity (Paul) is a re-configuration, he implies the Christian re-configuration is of a Jewish religion of strict Mosaic monotheism, that permits but one interpretation, one meaning. Freud assumes a homogeneous and singular Jewish collectivity. He assumes that the lived experience of member individuals and groups composing the 'Jewish' collectivity has been *successfully* de-coded and re-coded according to the symbolic order created by an orthodox, Mosaic theology.

Freud's 'historicisation' of Judaism, I contend, over-codes the Jewish experience in name of Oedipus. Freud's account is not only flawed, but may be seen as a *falsification*, insofar as it is a repetition of the process Nietzsche attributes to the priestly redactors of the Bible. Freud abstracts the sense of guilt (as 'essence') from lived experience in order to insert guilt as the element that determines experience, the religious code, theology, and history.

Moses and Monotheism completes the Freudian theory of ontogenesis and phylogenesis sketched in Totem and Taboo, Future of an Illusion and Civilisation and its Discontents by filling in the gap between the primeval event and the beginnings of institutional monotheistic

religion. Mosaic monotheism is the form given to the return of the repressed (original) Oedipal trauma. Through Moses and his God Yahweh, patriarchal despotism is given divine sanction. However, the psychological trauma associated with the 'return of the repressed' primeval material compels the Israelites to re-enact the primeval murder (repetition compulsion) upon the person of Moses. The repetition of the original crime results in a repetition of repression. The collective experience of trauma and guilt over the second crime is cathected to the first and re-repressed, providing Freud with an explanation for the seemingly inexplicable fact that the Mosaic Code and its strict Yahwist monotheism are all but *unknown* in Israel for the next six centuries. The knowledge and memory of the murder of Moses as patriarchal-father-type is collectively repressed, taking with it its Yahwist/monotheistic *and* primeval/patriarchal associations.²⁷⁹ During this six century latency period — which includes the periods of the Judges, the Israelite tribal confederacy, the reigns of David and Solomon, and the period of the Two Kingdoms — the utterances of the Prophets speak to the latent material and are seen by Freud as threats of the return of the repressed. The repressed material, however, returns — with a vengeance — during the Babylonian conquest and exile. Israel has failed as a state and has been punished by God precisely because it repressed the Mosaic code. Collective blame and guilt is attributed (theologically) to apostasy from Yahweh and the Mosaic code, but, according to Freud, theological guilt is in reality (psychologically) innate guilt for the primeval murder, its re-enactment on Moses and the repression of the once-returned but re-repressed Law of the Father. Collective guilt is not only consciously acknowledged but also formally adopted as religious doctrine, and internalised by the collectivity as “the sense of guilt.”²⁸⁰ Monotheistic Yahwism emerges triumphant in Israel; indeed, in the songs of Second (or ‘Deutero’) Isaiah, Yahweh is raised for the first time to a universal principle, as the *sole* God. The establishment of Yahwism as the sole religion ensures the domination of the Oedipal patriarchal hierarchy and the final displacement and eradication of goddess worship, matriarchy and the vestiges thereof. For Freud, monotheism, with its all-powerful God-the-father, serves as a corrective

to goddess religions, restoring to the father his “historical rights”.²⁸¹ The reinstatement of the father’s law and the recording of *guilt* (bad conscience) establish the necessary preconditions for becoming civilised.²⁸²

The problems of the psychoanalytic axiomatic are laid bare in Moses and Monotheism. In Moses and Monotheism, Freud establishes Oedipus as the foundation for the whole of ‘Judeo-Christian’ and Western civilisation. By attempting to establish a more or less direct, linear, and *causal* relationship from the primeval murder of the father to Moses to Judaism to Paul and Christianity, Freud legitimates Mosaic Yahwism, Judaism, and Christianity as religious expressions that are faithful to the essence of Oedipus. The unconscious content of monotheistic religion is primeval guilt.²⁸³ The appearance, disappearance and re-appearance of the original father-centred religion can be explained *only* by Oedipal guilt; the sudden and forceful appearance, disappearance and re-appearance of the monotheistic father religion can be explained only by Oedipal guilt. Mosaic religion and its successors thereby preserve guilt as the essence of Oedipus, and Oedipus is seen as the ‘cause’ (indeed the sole cause) of monotheistic religion.

However, Freud breaks all the rules, not only of historical and genealogical analysis, but of biblical exegesis and hermeneutics — and admits it.²⁸⁴ History is read through hindsight and selectively, paying heed only to such history that corresponds to psychoanalytic theory. History is read through the lens of Oedipus in order to establish the historical foundations of Oedipus; in other words, Oedipus is projected *backwards*. The same flawed methodology is employed with respect to Freud’s interrogation of the Bible. The Bible is sifted, using psychoanalytic theory as the filter. The elements of the Bible Freud considers critical to the integrity of the repressive hypothesis are considered ‘historical’ and those that contradict psychoanalysis are discarded as priestly ‘falsifications’.

An interrogation of religion will demonstrate the inverse of the Freudian claims. It will show that *Oedipus does not create religion but is the creation of religion*. Critique will demonstrate that psychoanalysis does not lay bare the unconscious content of religion but instead that the unconscious content of psychoanalysis *is* religion.²⁸⁵

2. THE RELIGIOUS PRE-HISTORY OF GUILT: PRE-EXILIC ISRAELITE RELIGION

Only the briefest outline of pre-exilic Israelite religion may be offered here.²⁸⁶

Outside the biblical text, there is no corroborating evidence for an origin of Mosaic religion in Egypt (as Freud alleges), no evidence for an Israelite mass exodus from Egypt, and no evidence that the religion of Moses attempts to introduce is a fully formed monotheism (consistent with Oedipus), as Freud avows. The bits of text that Freud cites as evidence of Moses' murder contain, at best, a vague allusion.²⁸⁷ Furthermore, outside of the biblical text, no evidence exists for a period of Israelite wandering in the wilderness, for a military conquest of Palestine/Canaan by an Israelite host led by Moses' successor Joshua, or for the existence of a united Israelite monarchy under the kings David and Solomon.²⁸⁸ In other words, there is no evidence outside of the biblical text to support a first 'return of the repressed', that a person named Moses was the provocateur of this return, that the content of Mosaic religion is precisely the repressed primeval content, or that the content of this religion was repressed and remained latent in Israel for six centuries. The combination of archaeological evidence and documentation from Assyrian, Egyptian and Canaanite sources relating to the period 1250-586 BCE indicates, instead, the following:

(1) The biblical tradition, which holds that the patriarchs' nomadic wandering took them into the Egyptian delta region, has echoes in Egyptian 'bureaucratic' correspondence for border outposts. The latter refer to the movement of 'Shasu' tribes. Otherwise, Egyptian documents refer to *hapiru* peoples (meaning 'landless,' 'state-less') which some scholars have related etymologically to the term 'Hebrew'. However, the Egyptian word is not an ethnic, but a 'class' designation.²⁸⁹ While during the New Kingdom Egypt did use prisoners of war for 'forced labour', slavery was a marginal institution. There is no historical account corroborating the Bible of a significant Israelite or Hebrew presence in Egypt during the New Kingdom periods (16th to 10th centuries BCE), let alone evidence of Egyptian enslavement of an entire people. The only documented significant Semitic presence in Egypt was that of the Hyksos ('the Shepherd Kings') who ruled Egypt in the 17th and 16th centuries until expelled by force of arms. But there is no account, however minor or insignificant, which refers to the escape or expulsion of a group of slaves or labourers from Egyptian service that might be considered an 'exodus.' There is no historical corroboration of the existence of a man named Moses, nor a religious leader functioning in Moses' role.²⁹⁰ Extant Egyptian, Canaanite, Hurrian-Mitanni, Kassite and Hittite sources are silent on the matter. The name 'Israel' appears but once in documentation prior to the Assyrian period (9th– 7th centuries BCE). The Egyptian 'Israel Stele', properly the 'Stele of Merneptah', testifies to the Ramessid Pharaoh Mer-ne-ptah's victories over the Libyans and campaigns of pacification in the regions of the Sinai and Syria-Palestine in the 5th year of his reign, *circa* 1220 BCE. The name 'Israel' appears on the list of peoples subdued.²⁹¹

(2) While the region of Palestine/Canaan is the site of numerous 'waves' of migration beginning in the late 3rd millennium BCE and throughout the 2nd, archaeology has found little to support the notion of a conquest and mass occupation by Israelite tribes.²⁹² During the period 1250-900 BCE, 'Hebrew' or 'Israelite' elements, apart from any assimilation into Canaanite towns and city-states in Palestine, occupy the hill country, live in small settlements

of 40-50 families and practice simple agriculture and animal husbandry. The only evidence that speaks to the possibility of identifying these tribal groups as 'Israelite', or that speaks to the possibility that they practice a differentiated form of religion is the fact that the sites show a total absence of pig bones, indicating an abstinence from pork.

(3) The first Israelite 'state' is founded in the late 9th century, encompassing all or part of what the biblical tradition calls the Northern Kingdom of Israel, under the Omride kings. This state flourishes briefly in the 9th century, after which it is reduced to the status of an Assyrian vassal until destroyed by the Assyrians in 722/721BCE.²⁹⁵

The site of Jerusalem is apparently *unoccupied* during the late 11th to late 10th centuries, corresponding to the period of the biblical Davidic, Solomonic kingdoms. It is the capital of the rump state of Judah beginning in the 9th century, but becomes a major regional (and therefore religious) centre only after the fall of the Northern Kingdom.

Jerusalem's resistance to its own status as an Assyrian vassal provides background for the biblical account of King Hezekiah's religious reform (late 8th century) and the Assyrian invasion and conquest of 701 BCE. The subsequent decline of Assyrian power provides the opportunity for Judah's territorial expansion and Yahwist religious reform under Josiah (640-615 BCE). Josiah's policies legitimated (according to the biblical text) by the discovery of the 'Book of Moses' in the Jerusalem Temple. The reform and centralisation of the cult in Jerusalem precipitates the rise of an extreme religious nationalism that challenges the ascendant Babylonian empire and leads to the conquest of Judah, the destruction of the temple, and the deportation of the Judahite upper and priestly classes.

Ancient Near Eastern (Mesopotamian and Egyptian) and Mediterranean cultural complexes evolve social organisations (including religious practices and theologies/mythologies) that in terms of function are *syntheses* (disjunctive/conjunctive) of savage and despotic forms, but at no point do the two modes of territorialisation actually combine or merge into a single code.

Desiring production is not re-coded 'from the ground up.' Despotic codes serve as over-codes that compete with savage forms over the consumption/dedication of surplus production but do not attempt a thoroughgoing deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation through de-coding and re-coding. Domination by despotic territorialisation is in the form of an over-code that appropriates surplus production but social production/anti-production remains both differential and inclusive.²⁹⁴ The point must be emphasised that local production remains primitive as the foundation for despotic production and appropriation. The tension between, and conflict over, the surplus code functions dialectically. Savagery (thesis) and despotism (antithesis) produce an implicitly tendentious yet *functional* synthesis.²⁹⁵ The regimes continue to permit territory for savage (e.g., local) forms that militate against the development of despotic exclusivity and therefore monotheism and absolutism. Conflict and violence is inherent in this form but is limited firstly to the question of who — the local socius and the full body of the earth or the despotic full body — will control the surplus code, and secondly, to the question of which despot — the local petty king of Israel or Edom, the Assyrian king or the Egyptian Pharaoh — possesses the legitimate over-code as the means to control surplus production.

However, in the Israelite/Hebrew/Jewish religio-cultural complex there are three religiously legitimated political impulses and regimes of social coding evident during the pre-exilic period that compete with the over-code of the barbarian despots.

The first regime of coding is the de-centralised system of the tribal confederacy characterised by the dominance of 'savage coding' wherein the chief male deity (*El, Yahweh*) is manifested primarily as a god of war who anoints leaders (*m'šiah yhw*: 'anointed of Yahweh') to unite the tribes on an ad hoc, temporary basis in times of crisis.²⁹⁶ The efforts of these tribal alliances to extend their territory to the more fertile agricultural areas of Palestine (1250-950 BCE) bring them into conflict with the settled region of the coastal plain (Canaanites, Philistines) resulting in a 'war of codes.'²⁹⁷ There is no state, but only a system of extended alliances

among the (twelve) tribes identifying themselves as kinship groups. Each group establishes filiation with the land via its association with a cultic 'high place' (Dan, Bethel, Hebron, Shiloh, etc.) reflecting a particular aspect or 'name' of the deity, usually a variation on the *El* form.²⁹⁸ The association with the cultic place further establishes genealogical alliances to an ancestor (e.g., Abraham, Isaac), and produce the 'heroic' cycles later incorporated into the Book of Judges. Apart from an alliance to Yahweh or El as god of war, the religious code and practice is typical of west Semitic/Canaanite polytheism that includes worship of the goddess.²⁹⁹

The second impulse, running counter to the first and in more or less constant conflict with it, is the monarchical/royal cult of despotic coding.³⁰⁰ Despotic over-coding exists in the region prior to the appearance of the 'Israelite' tribes in the form of external political control by the first Babylonian empire (Hammurabi), Hittites, Egyptians, and Assyrians, supported internally by Canaanite and Philistine city-kings. Israel tribal operations in opposition to despotic coding focuses attention on the latter, never the former, thus all conflicts involving Israelite elements during the period are local.

Israelite despotism appears with the Omride dynasty and the formation of the 'northern kingdom'. The Omride period is characterised not by military territorial expansion; rather the sphere of influence expands as a result of the extension of alliances through marriage and trade, reflected in the state's practice of the syncretic Canaanite Ba'al/Astarte religion indigenous to the region, but which may have used Yahweh in place of Ba'al as the male deity. The employment of syncretic religion is consistent with a period of internal harmony experienced between and among remaining tribal elements, Canaanite elements, and the state apparatus. Prior to the late 8th century, conflicts over the appropriation of the surplus code are limited primarily to ubiquitous disputes between the Israelite state and the Assyrian empire. These disputes intensify in the 8th century in conjunction with attempts to introduce or impose a more rigorous Yahwism (Elijah, Elisha) manifested internally as attempts to

'purify' cultic practices, externally as nationalism and xenophobia, both of which imply resistance to Assyrian hegemony and lead to the destruction of the Northern Kingdom in 721 BCE. The paradigm is repeated, and further intensified in the south (Judah), first under Hezekiah, then under Josiah.

The third impulse is the Deuteronomic or 'Mosaic', or, as designated by Buber, the 'Prophetic Faith' that in principle opposes *both* the despotic and tribal regimes of coding in the cause of Yahwist exclusivity.³⁰¹ Unquestionably, during the pre-exilic period, the Deuteronomist religion is not the fully articulated and elaborated legalism that later biblical tradition attributes to Moses. The tradition is nevertheless present and known, informs the practice of a minority of the population (however small), influences both tribal and royal/priestly practices and is therefore 'repressed' only in the socio-religious, not the psychoanalytic sense; in other words, Yahwism is 'repressed' only in the sense that it is not the dominant cult that certain elements of the population wish it to be. In any case, pre-exilic Yahwism is not yet a 'universalised' monotheism; Yahweh is not yet conceived as the exclusive or only god for the world but is conceived as the exclusive god for Israel.

Insofar as the impulse is rigorously and exclusively monotheistic it is despotic: Yahweh is conceived as heavenly 'king' who gives the land and is entitled to all surplus production and, in theory, to all production.³⁰² In its despotic formulation therefore, Yahwism is a mythic inflation and abstraction of the despotic code wherein the deity displaces the despot as the full body. Deuteronomist theology attempts as well to incorporate, de-code and re-code the savage form. Yahweh is conceived as the full body of the earth and biocosmic principle: He sends the rain, causes the sun to shine, creates the culture, establishes the ancestry and kinship alliances, and protects the people as a collectivity — and thereby, again, is entitled to the surplus code.

Deuteronomic Yahwism attempts to establish itself as the legitimating principle of the monarchy and the authority over the monarchy, reflected in the prophetic practice of

‘nominating’ and ‘anointing’ kings. Yahweh’s support (according to the prophets, speaking for Yahweh) for individual kings is contingent, related to the individual king’s relative success or failure, willingness or unwillingness to impose Yahwism regime as the univocal regime of coding and maintain a strict Yahwist practice — hence the biblical praise/condemnation of individual kings in 1-2 Kings and 1-2 Chronicles. However, the Deuteronomist theological approach to the monarchy as an *institution* is characterised by ambivalence. The work of the prophets is a reflection of countervailing tendencies and tensions. The prophetic faith is ‘ethically’ and socially aligned with the primitive territorial machine as a regime of horizontal (and therefore ‘egalitarian’) distribution but despises savagery’s occasional and/or local, syncretic, henotheistic Yahwism. It therefore urges the formation of the state, and the use of state apparatuses to establish a uniform and exclusive Yahwism. The establishment of a centralised cult under a despotic over-code operating from a central sanctuary (Samaria, Jerusalem) promises homogeneity and uniformity of Yahwist practice. However, in practice, homogeneity is achieved only through state-sponsored violence, repression and murder and the attempted destruction of kinship and tribal alliances.³⁰³ The establishment of a centralised cult creates a royal/priestly apparatus with the political power and theological legitimacy to determine the over-code, to deterritorialise and reterritorialise the savage code and to appropriate, de-code and re-code the Deuteronomist theology itself.

The internal contradictions and tensions are intensified by the political condition of Israel/Judah as petty kingdoms. De-centralised cultic practices through the preservation of tribal alliances and a savage code militates against Yahwist homogeneity within Israel but ironically serves as the best means to preserve a form of Yahwism against the threat of a foreign religious over-code. The vassal status of the Israelite states implies submission to ‘foreign’ gods and the introduction of non-Yahwist elements into the central cults (Jerusalem, Samaria). Centralisation of the cult through the destruction of local forms facilitates the introduction and incorporation of ‘foreign’, non-Yahwist religious elements.

The confluence of the three religious impulses produces irreconcilable internal contradictions. Periods of resistance to foreign domination and the expansion of territory beyond the capitals or aligned towns are predicated on the allegiance of tribal groups, which implies the toleration if not incorporation of savage (syncretic) codes that are in turn resisted by Yahwist 'puritanism'. The demands of Yahwist puritanism entail homogenisation and the destruction of the savage code that can be accomplished only through centralisation and the establishment of an internal royal/priestly despotic code. Homogenisation implies both religious xenophobia and nationalism manifested as resistance to foreign domination. Opposition to foreign despotic over-coding manifested as extreme religious nationalism places Israel and Judah in conflict with empire and leads to their destruction.

The internal contradictions reach a first moment point of crisis in the period immediately following Josiah's reforms. Over and against Freud's emphasis on the psychological nature of the utterances of the pre-exilic prophets (Hosea, Amos, Isaiah, Micah) and his characterisation of the prophetic utterances as threats of the 'return of the repressed', biblical scholarship emphasises above all the prophetic *ethical* demands, especially as these demands relate to socio-economic conditions and practices. Micah and Jeremiah are particularly vehement in their condemnations of the economic patronage afforded by the monarchy and Temple/priestly apparatuses; in other words, the prophets claim despotic over-coding (institution of monarchy, centralisation of both the economy and the cult) are antithetical to the ethical proscriptions of Yahwism [Mi 2:1-5, 8-10; 3:1-4, 9-12; Jr 5:1-6; 22:13-17]. Buber maintains that Josiah's religious programme (c. 622-621 BCE), undertaken in the name of Mosaic Yahwism and the 'prophetic faith', results in the retrenching and intensification of despotic relations.³⁰⁴ Economic and social inequalities are exacerbated through the destruction of local religio-economic cultic centres, increased taxation and small landowner debt.

Religious reform destroys residual horizontal (tribal) distribution, the benefits of which accrue to the monarchy, priestly apparatus and upper classes. Wealthy landowners and the royal/priestly bureaucracy are the most 'nationalistic' elements of the population, and ardently support the Josiah-initiated military territorial expansion. The upper and priestly classes support subsequent kings' policies of territorial consolidation and resistance against Babylonian suzerainty commencing in the late 7th century BCE, and are the target of Babylonian deportation and resettlement policies, to a limited extent in 597 BCE, and more thoroughly (as a response to continued resistance) in 586 BCE.

3. THE PRODUCTION OF GUILT BY RELIGION: EARLY POST-EXILIC JUDAISM

The events of the Babylonian conquest and the exile to Babylon of the population of Judah provide for Freud and psychoanalysis the 'moment' of traumatic catharsis evoking the 'return of the repressed.'³⁰⁵ In this instance Freud does not problematise the biblical account, and assumes that 'the Jews' exist as a homogeneous socius.³⁰⁶ Freud further assumes that the experience of the conquest, the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple, the dissolution of their political and religious institutions, and the deportation and exile of the citizenry are experienced and interpreted collectively and homogeneously as a product of collective *guilt*. The catastrophe is perceived, received and internalised collectively, as collective punishment for the sin of not obeying the 'law of the Father' during the ±600 year interregnum. The people collectively *lament* their profound loss, collectively experience *guilt*, and collectively begin the process of inscribing the sense of guilt as the fundamental element of the religious code. The Jews reject the alternative theological interpretation of the events (Nietzsche's

'healthy' and 'natural' response) that would have demanded a rejection of Yahweh as a god who, if He existed at all, is demonstrably inefficacious, emasculated and impotent. Instead, the Jews *internalise* blame, taking guilt upon themselves for the catastrophe. Freud sums up the Jewish approach:

To the Jewish people fate dealt a series of severe trials and painful experiences, so their God became hard, relentless, and, as it were, wrapped in gloom. He retained the character of a universal God who reigned over all lands and peoples; the fact, however, that his worship had passed from the Egyptians to the Jews found its expression in the added doctrine that the Jews were his chosen people, whose special obligations would in the end find their special reward. It might not have been easy for that people to reconcile their belief in their being preferred to all others by an all-powerful God with the dire experiences of their sad fate. But they did not let their doubts assail them, they increased their own feelings of guilt to silence the mistrust and perhaps in the end they referred to 'God's unfathomable will,' as religious people do to this day.³⁰⁷

Contrary to the claims of orthodox Judaism and Christianity — echoed by Freud in Moses and Monotheism — the destruction of the state and the scattering of some of its peoples (to the Babylonian and Egyptian Gola communities) do not resolve the internal tensions, but leads to their displacement, reconfiguration and further intensification during the post-exilic period of reconstruction. The post-exilic period sees the consolidation of the *biblical* tradition in the compilation, redaction and revision of the literature, the adoption of *guilt* and the sense of guilt as the foundation of the *theological* code and the attempt to impose the theological code as over-code. However, the post-exilic period is not a period of social, political or religious consolidation. There is no evidence of a universal or homogeneous acceptance of the theological guilt code much less its *internalisation*; on the contrary, there is evidence of resistance to the adoption of the theological code.

A brief examination of the sociological conditions of the post-exilic period provides the background for the emergence and configuration of guilt and the sense of guilt as the prime element of the Judaic, monotheistic social code.

Only limited historical knowledge is available for the period of the Babylonian exile. Apart from *Lamentations* and *Jeremiah*, there are no direct accounts of the period immediately following the conquest (587-586 BCE). Alibert and Föhrer correctly note that the *Books of Chronicles* imply that the *whole* population of Judah is deported to Babylon, and that the whole population (though now greater via fruitful multiplication) returns [2 Ch 36.21], supporting Freud's contention that the experience of the exile and return is a homogeneous collective experience.³⁰⁸ Notwithstanding the uncertainty regarding the precise numbers exiled, Alibert states, "we can say with certainty that the deportations affected only a minority..."³⁰⁹.

Consistent with the deportation and resettlement practices of the Assyrians and other Mesopotamian empires, the Babylon deportation policy targets the remaining religious and political leadership and upper economic class. Another segment of the population (including the prophet Jeremiah and his scribe Baruch) exiles itself, voluntarily, to the Elephantine colony in Egypt. The majority of the population, the lower echelons of the priestly and political bureaucracy, the small landowners, artisans and the landless lower classes, are left on the land.³¹⁰ Thus, as a first premise, there is no homogeneity of experience, and "we have to consider the very different social conditions among those who remained in the land and the Babylonian and Egyptian Gola."³¹¹

Deportation and exile partitions the people into three major groups identified by geographic location, including Palestine, Babylon, Egypt. The geographic partition more or less replicates pre-exilic socio-economic divisions, but expose each to significantly different socio-historical conditions. The post-exilic period re-configures and intensifies divisions already present in the pre-exilic period, characterised as both religious (ideological) differences (even among those identified as 'Yahwists') and political-economic and territorial divisions along both tribal and northern versus southern kingdom lines, and sets the stage for conflicts that persist into the Roman/Christian era.³¹²

The Babylonian conquest is the dissolution of Judahite (Israelite) statehood but not all segments of the population lament its demise. The destruction of Jerusalem and the temple, together with the deportation of the upper classes, is the termination of the Judahite Yahwist despotic regime and is perceived as a 'liberation' by those left on the land.³¹³ The vacuum created by the collapse of central authority allows for a resurgence of primitive territorialisation through a revival of tribal organisation.³¹⁴ The return of savage coding includes a resurgence of 'localised' form of religious practice, primarily in the form of syncretic practices that combine elements of Canaanite practice with the religion of the patriarchs and other elements to produce "a popular religion ... with more Canaanite than Yahwist features" thereby re-inscribing and re-establishing links to the land dissolved by Josiah's despotic reforms.³¹⁵ Where the designation "Yahweh" appears, practice does not discriminate between the divine names *El* (including variants and elaborations) and Yahweh but uses them interchangeably.³¹⁶ "Yahweh" or a form of "El" is inserted into the role occupied by Ba'al in Canaanite myth. Otherwise, the remaining population (over and against Freud's conclusions) abandons Yahweh worship. As Föhrer states, "there were probably always doubts about Yahweh among the Israelites (*cf.* Zp 1:12), but the fall of Jerusalem intensified them."³¹⁷ Lamentations [3:34-36] records that some simply deny Yahweh's existence.

For the lower classes, Babylonian rule results in a degree of religious, economic and political emancipation. Economic reorganisation re-distributes property confiscated from exiles but also targets wealthier landowners left on the land. The latter resent compulsory measures and perceive the reorganisation as unjust appropriation.³¹⁸ By contrast, small landowners welcome the changes; slogans contained in Ezekiel [11:15; 33:24] relate that the majority of the population are positive about the Babylonian economic reforms, and have rejected theologically legitimated property claims of the Judahite elite.³¹⁹ Invoking the condemnations of the prophets, the majority of those not exiled justify the reforms theologically, perceiving the conquest and exile of the upper classes as Yahweh's judgement

against their exploitative practices, “and often even a *de facto* liberation from debt.”³²⁰ The land and its economy, devastated by war, soon recovers under what is apparently a rather loose Babylonian administration. The replacement of the Judahite royal/temple authority with a provincial administration results in a lower level of taxation. Furthermore, in that the Babylonians did not send its own upper class and administrators to Judah, the people are permitted to develop a limited form of self-government.³²¹

Judahites exiled in Egypt are not deported but emigrate voluntarily, though over and against the protests of Jeremiah, who is apparently kidnapped by the emigrants and taken to Egypt.³²² Most of the emigrants are soldiers (and their families) who settle in the Egyptian garrison cities of Migdol, Daphne and Memphis, perhaps serving as mercenaries, perhaps forming the basis for the Jewish military colony that develops at Elephantine.³²³ However, the Elephantine colony, which survives well into the Christian era, has its own temple of Yahweh by 525 BCE, maintains what is described as a “conservative religious self-sufficiency” and remains aloof from the Yahwist renewal undertaken by Ezra and Nehemiah during the post-exilic period of Persian suzerainty over Judah.³²⁴

The resettlement of exiles in Babylon beginning in 597 and ending in 586 BCE marks the establishment of a *permanent* Jewish religious community in the city. Nevertheless, the initial experience of deportation and resettlement is one of “a deep social uprooting,” including the loss of home, familial or kinship ties, social status and wealth. By any measure the event may be characterised as *traumatic*, the experience of which serves to inscribe the collective memory of the Babylonian exiled group as a ‘foundational’ or formative event. No doubt, the initial period of settlement presents the exiles with considerable difficulties. Nonetheless, the exiles quickly integrate with Babylonian society without, however, having to sacrifice their religio-ethnic identity “as is shown by the ardent nationalistic religious hopes.”³²⁵ The latter is made possible, in part, by the Babylonian policy of establishing ‘enclaves’ of

deportees and prisoners of war. The Judah exiles settle as a 'national' group in locations around Nippur, form associations (*batru*), are given grants of crown land paid for by performing state service. Though deprived of their former functions, Levites and priests form their own groups [Ezr 2:36ff] and serve along with elders as community leaders [Jr 29:1; Ezk 7:1, 14:1, 20:1] in the construction of a form of limited communal self-government.³²⁶ Thus, the exiles are not repressed or oppressed religiously, politically, legally or economically; on the contrary, it appears that they fare rather well. The majority engage in simple employments (farming, fishing), but some establish thriving businesses. Others (e.g., Sheshbazzar, Zerubbabel, Ezra, Nehemiah), under both the Babylonian and the succeeding Persian regime, rise to the highest political offices.³²⁷

Given the relatively successful integration of the exiled Jews into Babylonian society politically, socially and economically, Albertz suggests that their distress relates to needs "primarily of a psychological and religious kind."³²⁸ Psychological distress relates to homesickness, the fear that the memory of Jerusalem will begin to fade [Ps 137], and to political impotence. The latter relates in turn to *ressentiment* directed against Babylon itself in "wild cries for vengeance", and against the Edomites and the Judahites not exiled who are seen as beneficiaries of Babylonian policy [Ps 137: 7-9]. The exiles resent that they, as the former elites of Judah, must passively accept the confiscation of their property and the rejection, by their 'subjects' in Judah, of the exiled elites' continued claim to leadership [Ezk 11:15; 33:24].³²⁹ The exiles resent that the majority seem to easily and readily get on with their lives and 'write off' the exiles.³³⁰ The exiled elite is aware that their nationalistic Yahwism is cited, by the non-exiles, as the primary if not the sole cause of the calamity.³³¹ Second and third generation exiles are constantly reminded by former political opponents that their fathers and grandfathers are responsible for the catastrophe [Jr 36; 37ff]; the exiles feel unable to escape the guilt of their 'fathers' [Ezk 18.2; 19].

Expressions of fear, anxiety, resentment, hatred, lamentation, remorse and guilt consistent with the experience of a traumatic event are present in the literature, thereby

offering Freud and psychoanalysis documentary evidence concerning the cathartic nature of the event, and its role in the development of the sense of guilt. Ezekiel 33.10 indicates that members of the Jewish community make an attempt to 'learn from' and 'acknowledge' their mistakes, but insofar as they confess culpability in the catastrophe, "they suffered under the excessive burden of guilt and were utterly paralysed by it."³³² However, it must be pointed out again that this experience (as psychological *affect*), and how it is interpreted religiously and recorded theologically *at the time*, is the experience of the minority. Ezekiel refers to the *exiled* community only. Moreover, the sense of guilt, as noted above, is not manifested only as a form 'self-recrimination', but becomes the linchpin for *ressentiment*.³³³ As Albertz writes,

How great the undermining of their self-awareness, the irritation at their own social role and the guilt complex must have been among the exiles becomes evident from the fact that the prophet Ezekiel or his disciples engaged in regular pastoral work among them: they are promised a restitution of their claim to possessions and leadership [Ezk 11:16-21], and in the form of personal conversion showed them a way in which they could avoid the burden of their fathers' guilt [Ezk 18].³³⁴

Pastoral work of this sort among the exiles configures and embeds "the feeling of having been dragged off against their will" and "kept high their hope for a return and of a revision of the facts of history."³³⁵ Religious distress intensifies as promises of an immanent return and restoration linked to 'personal conversion' are unrealised. Babylonian gods and religious symbols are paraded in 'pompous' processions testifying to their 'universal' dominion [Is 46.1f] while Yahweh fails to intervene on the exiles behalf; Yahweh ignores their 'right to live', forgets 'His' city of Jerusalem [Is 40.27; 49.14], and apparently lacks the will or power to intervene in history [Is 50.2].³³⁶ Doubt is therefore linked to 'sin' as non-belief in the promise of return and restoration.

Protraction of the exile produces two reconfigurations of theology and practice of significance, which, combined, are recognisable as elements of the model for oedipalised, despotic religion.

Firstly, for the first time ‘family piety’ is institutionalised, modelled on the Abrahamaic archetype: thus “the family itself joined the ranks of those who handed on official religion.”³³⁷ Josiah’s Yahwist reforms had been responsible for the suppression of family cultic activities in the name of centralisation and homogenisation. Under Josiah, harvest and full or new moon festivals and offerings of the ‘first-fruits’ are banned; likewise the family practice of curtailing work every seventh day (though this was not yet called the ‘Sabbath’). Destruction of the ‘high places’ eliminates local sacrifices and offerings, and the practice of ritual slaughter is taken away from families and local priests. While certain dietary restrictions may have existed in the pre-exilic period (especially for priests, or related to the ritual slaughter of animals for sacrifice), exilic family piety elaborates the restrictions and extends them as normative, everyday practice.³³⁸

Exilic family piety both normalises and elevates the practice of circumcision. Notwithstanding any psychological associations with castration, its significance for exilic Judaism is related to the theological recovery and elevation of the patriarchal tradition to prominence alongside, or in place of, the Mosaic covenant. Pre-exilic Deuteronomist theology claims the Passover as the covenant commemoration event marking the founding of Israel as a people or ‘nation’ [Ex 3; Jos 5.2-9; 2 K 24]. Collective identity and destiny are established through filiative associations to Yahweh via Judah, Jerusalem and the Temple. Yet, filiation is severed by exile, thereby threatening identity. Exilic and post-exilic Deuteronomist-Priestly theological history places commencement of the covenant at an earlier date with Abraham tradition. The privileging of the covenant-making practice of circumcision allows for the inscription of filiation and alliance irrespective of ‘location.’ Religious filiation and links to the Numen are for the first time conceived apart from inscription via cultural practice into the ‘land’ and the earth as ‘full body’, thereby creating the basis for religious ‘abstraction.’ Responsibility for performing the rite of circumcision is given to the father of the family, indicative of the responsibility accorded to the familial

patriarch “for ensuring the cohesion and ongoing existence of the people and the community of Israel.”³³⁹

Secondly, promises of restoration are developed under the prophetic school of ‘Deutero-Isaiah’ (Is 40.55) into a fully developed Salvationist theology. Yahwism is universalised, conceived as the exclusive ‘world religion’ and further abstracted from its filiation to the (‘promised’) land. Zionism is reconfigured, conceived not only as a more or less contemporary promise of return to Judah, but as a ‘cosmic’ event by which Judah/Jerusalem becomes the centre of the world, Judaism the world religion and Yahweh the world god. The sudden, and seemingly miraculous collapse of the Babylonian empire before the armies of the Persian king Cyrus is interpreted by the exiles as proof of Yahweh’s work in and control over history, and His privileging of the Jews as a holy people. Yahweh has raised up the Persian king Cyrus [Is 44.28; 45.4f; 46.1; 48.15], but solely for the sake of “Israel” [Is 45.4].³⁴⁰ Cyrus is depicted in ‘messianic’ terms; the metaphorical language describing Cyrus’ triumphant procession through Babylon [Is 41.2; 44.28; 45.1-7, 13; 46.11; 48.14] provides the priestly ‘kingship’ imagery subsequently applied to Yahweh.³⁴¹ Cyrus’ divinely appointed purpose is to liberate Yahweh’s holy people [Is 43.14f] so that they might return to Jerusalem [45.13]. The period of judgement against the exiles [Is 6.11] is passed, *and their guilt is expiated* [Is 40.2; 44.22].

Cyrus ‘fulfils’ the first promise of salvationist prophecy, permitting the Jews (after a 70 year exile) to return to Judah. However, despite collective trauma, homesickness, the sense of deprivation, and the belief that their guilt is expiated, the majority of the exiles are content to remain throughout the period of the Persian conquest of the Babylonian empire and establish a permanent Jewish presence in the city of Babylon. Indeed, the social, economic and political position of the exiles continues to improve under Persian rule. Only a minority take up the offer of the Persian king Cyrus to depart for Judah, becoming ‘the remnant that returns’. “Their needs,” vis-à-vis the homeland, “were evidently primarily of a religious kind

(Ps 137; Is 40:27, 50:1f)”, according to Albertz.³⁴² Revised Yahwist theology, renewed affluence and political influence provides the upper and priestly classes of the exilic community with the intellectual and financial capital necessary for the renewal of Yahwist religion in Judea.

The Persians privilege the returnees, placing them in positions of political administration in the provincial government itself, and permitting the returnees to establish limited self-government led by a ‘council of elders’ (*horim*) [Neh 2.16; 4.8, 13; 5.7] and a priestly college (*bet ‘abot*) [Ne 2.16; 12.1-7; Ezr 2.26ff]. Despite the formation of a popular assembly (*qahal*) [Ezr 10.1; Neh 5.7,13], the inequalities and lack of solidarity present in pre-exilic society are exacerbated. Post-exilic theology praises the Persians for their tolerant religious policy, but Persian taxation policy is harsh. Ever-increasing taxes coupled with restitution of lands to the returning exiles and Persian favourites drive poorer families and small landholders into misery. Wealthier families benefit from increased trade and loans to smaller holders. “The result of this social gulf,” writes Albertz,

...was that in the college of elders and priests the families from the upper classes set the tone, while the popular assembly, which had had the supreme authority in decision-making in the pre-state period, deteriorated into a purely executive organ; the poorer families in the clans could only assent to what the richer members had already decided (cf. Ne 10.29ff). That meant Jewish self-administration came close to oligarchy... The relative autonomy which the social experiment granted to the Jewish community under Persian rule could be purchased only at the high price of a social and religious polarisation.³⁴³

Divisions are intensified with the exiles’ religio-nationalistic project of ‘restoration’. Despite disastrous economic conditions, the returning priesthood prioritises the re-building of the Temple as the “necessary presupposition of [their] employment and livelihood” and instrument of appropriation of surplus code.³⁴⁴ The Temple project and Persian instability caused by a succession dispute re-kindles nationalistic sentiment fuelled by the ‘prophecies’ of Haggai [2.15-19; 2.23] and Zechariah [8.9, 12; 6,9-14]. Haggai proclaims Zerubbabel the legitimate heir of the House of David [Hg 2.4, 5b]. Zechariah arranges for Zerubbabel’s

coronation as the beginning of the apocalyptic events bringing the entire world of nations under Yahweh's code [Zc 4.14; 6.5] — and, of more immediate and mundane concern, the enthronement will serve as the means to put an end to the troublesome disputes over property [Zc 5.1-4]. The attempt at restoration fails; a securely enthroned Darius I (c. 518) puts an end to prophesy about the immanent end of the Persian Empire. The prophets Haggai and Zechariah and the Davidic claimant Zerubbabel suddenly disappear; however, the temple construction is allowed to proceed, confirming its function as a 'taxation' machine. Thus, despite the existence *formally* of an inclusive religio-political structure that will allow for the toleration of local (savage) codes, in practice political-economic privilege is organised hierarchically and legitimated religiously as such, thereby unleashing "strong forces of disintegration which drove large parts of the population into a social abyss and constantly threatened the community."³⁴⁵

The 5th century crisis briefly recounted in Nehemiah 5.1-5 is the product of environmental/economic conditions, the Persian demand for taxes in silver coin [v.4], socio-religious policy relating to a ban on 'mixed' marriages and the internal contradictions of the religio-political structure. The ban on mixed marriages, and the order to put away foreign wives, targets the lower classes, negating the primitive practice of extending spheres of production and labour power through the extension of kinship alliances. Persian tax policy demands the rationalisation of production and privileges the production of surplus code over the production of 'subsistence' consumed locally. The Temple priestly/bureaucratic apparatus becomes a 'money-changing' machine for the conversion of subsistence production into coin. Poor families are pushed into debt. They mortgage farms and vineyards, and are forced to sell children into slavery. Desiring production is entrapped by ancient debt law that allows a creditor to confiscate the debtor's labour power through the seizure of both the property *and* the family of debtor.³⁴⁶ Nehemiah's general remission of debts [vv. 10-12] is but a one-time response to crisis. The process of suppression of poorer

families continues into the 4th century and includes dispossession by force [Isa 58.4], oppression of day labourers and eviction of widows and orphans [Ml 3.5].³⁴⁷

The internal political structure borrows from pre-exilic period with its college of priests and council of elders, the Judahite king and royal bureaucracy being replaced by the Persian. Formally, the hoped for structure of the Deuteronomist reformers appears to be realised, including a regular ordering of the 'tribes' through a (priestly) reconstruction of population in clan alliances (*bet 'abot*), indicating (Albertz claims) that the ideal of tribal nomadic freedom has never forgotten.³⁴⁸ Albertz says: "it is quite understandable" that the 'reform' groups believed rights of co-determination are now being realised under Persian aegis. Under Persia, Albertz states, "the ordering of state and tribal bodies completely meets the desire for a 'constitutional monarchy'..." and members of the ruling class "were ready to pay the price of alien rule in order to achieve this."³⁴⁹ But the price of constitutional monarchy is higher still, for, as Albertz adds, "the relative autonomy which the social experiment granted to the Jewish community under Persian rule could be purchased only at the high price of a social and religious polarisation."³⁵⁰ Polarisation results from the inherent conflict between the horizontal distribution demanded by savage coding ('nomadic ideals') and the relations of despotism (monarchy). The entrenching of a hierarchical socio-economic structure contradicts the reconstitution of the clan alliances as the basis of the economic structure and indicates that the 'nomadic ideal' is appropriated in the project of despotic over-coding.

The socio-political and religious divisions of the period, examined above, provide context for the 'community renewal' and canonisation of the *Torah* under the administration of Ezra.³⁵¹

The project is the work of Persian imperialism and consistent with Persian administrative policy throughout the empire. The imperial administration selects 'specialists' in the religious

custom and law of each region or 'province', charging bureaucratic commissions with codification of local law that becomes valid imperial law for the administration of the region.

Albertz sums up the process and its purpose as follows:

In all these texts we can see the interest of the Persian administration in offering state support and at the same time controlling the local legal practice of subject peoples — also and indeed especially in connection with their cultic interests. By including local norms in imperial legislation for the nations within the Persian empire, the institution of imperial authorisation offered legal security and in exchange gave the Persian central authority the possibility of exercising effective control over the bodies involved in self-administration, to ensure that their legislation did not go against imperial interests. Here we have a constitutional means, amazing for its time, of securing the loyalty of foreign subjects by reinforcing their cultural and religious identity.³⁵²

In addition to the codification process, the Ezra 'commission' and Persian-appointed administration has the power to appoint judges for all the Jews in the province of 'Transeuphratene' [Ezr 7.25]. The administration is charged with the task of instructing all those ignorant of the law [v.25], ensuring the law is observed, and imposing penalties [v. 26]. Community membership is contingent on 'submission to the law' as the will of Yahweh determined entirely by the self-administrative body; those not observing the 'law' are expelled from the community [Ezr 10.8; Ne 13.28].

The Ezra project resurrects, elaborates and codifies the pre-exilic 'law-book of Moses' [Jos 8.31; 23.6; 2 K 14.6; 24] in combination with other 'laws' and priestly writing brought from Babylonia [Ezr 7.11/]. The entire 'history' of Israel is re-worked.³⁵³ Creation myths are added.³⁵⁴ Patriarchal covenant cycles, formerly indicative only of familial and tribal alliances linking clans to specific 'sacred' cultic sites are re-configured as 'confessional' stories which privilege the theme of faith (over kinship). The Mosaic/Exodus cycle is recovered as the model for collective inscription (and responsibility) and re-configured by the experience of 'bondage' and 'deliverance' from Babylonian exile. The exiled enclave community serves as the model for the theological notion of the selection of Israel as special nation bound by

covenant (*b'rit*) to Yahweh, wherein Israel becomes a holy people (*'am qados* –Dt 7.6; 14.2, 21) and a 'kingdom of priests' (*mamleket kohanim*, Ex 19.6).³⁵⁵ The primitive concept of a covenant relationship related to gift of the land cannot be eradicated from collective 'memory', but theological re-coding emphasises the gift of the Law ('Ten Commandments', Ex 20.1-17 and Deuteronomic Code, Dt 5, 12 ff). Possession of the land is made contingent on adherence to the Law thereby legitimating and reflecting contemporary juridical practice [Ezr 10.8; Ne 13.28]. Biblical law is granted the status of royal law backed by the authority of the Persian state as the condition of provincial autonomy and basis for community 'restoration', *but only after the Ezra administration satisfies Persian authority that the law has been successfully imposed upon or accepted by the disparate groups of the population.*³⁵⁶

Community restoration as a process of de-coding, re-coding, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation may be summarised as follows.

There is no *socius*, as defined by Deleuze and Guattari, in Judah/Israel — not before, and not after the exile. The notion of a homogeneous socius is an artificial, theological construction.³⁵⁷

The *lack* of a homogeneous collectivity, the lack of a homogeneous collective experience (of the Babylonian exile), the persistence and the intensification of pre-exilic socio-religious divisions in the post-exilic period threatens the position of privilege of the Jewish elite and demands a radical process of deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation culminating in the codification of the Pentateuch and the implementation of Biblical Law. The process of 'community renewal' is a theologically legitimated but artificial restoration of an imaginary pre-state social structure aimed at entrenching and legitimating despotic social relations through the destruction of alternative, traditional regimes of production and coding. Israelite 'history' is reinvented as priestly soteriology of collective guilt as the means of legitimating Biblical Law as the foundation of the social code.

The priestly project aims at the annihilation of competing regimes of production and coding through the deployment of imperial power and the destruction of memory as the means to 'reconcile' social divisions and preserve its authority as the legitimate 'ruling class' and agent of Persian authority. Ritual/cultic practice subordinated to obedience to the Law re-configures pre-exilic coding practice and is the abstraction of religion.

Entrenching the Abrahamaic covenant and community membership linked by blood (and the rite of circumcision) gives the appearance of an incorporation of primitive kinship alliances but is in fact a punitive policy aimed at their destruction. The re-coding of the primitive (patriarchal, Abrahamaic) covenant relationship as one based in 'faith' over-codes, submerges and replaces kinship alliance, reinforcing the abstraction of religious practice and mirroring the despotic reterritorialisation of social production by Persian economic and taxation policy. The injunction against 'mixed' marriages, and the order to 'put away' "foreign wives' (and children!) attacks the primitive practice of extending alliances and favours the elite families of returned exiles of the Babylonian "enclave community".³⁵⁸ The theological subordination of the Abrahamaic to the Mosaic *b'rit* (or *b'rith*) coupled with a narrowing of the ethnic designation 'Jew' reinforces the upper-class/priestly privilege while further marginalising the 'people of the land'.³⁵⁹ The restricted ethnic designation 'Jew' is religiously sanctioned and reinforced by socio-economic status as a term of exclusivity.³⁶⁰ Community membership and therefore 'identity' are determined by 'submission to the Law' (of Yahweh/God), extending inscription to both production in general *and human reproduction*; the right to the means of production and participation in the production/consumption of code is restricted and made contingent on submission to the law as a comprehensive political-economic, religious and ethnic precondition.

Religiously and psychologically, community renewal is not to be characterised by a homogenous, collective internalisation of guilt and the sense of guilt. Nor is renewal predicated on the internalisation of guilt *by* the exiles (as the result of trauma and catharsis),

transported back to Judah by ‘the remnant that returns’ and thereupon spread amongst the general population as the dominant social code. Rather, the nature of the religious renewal is characterised by the *assignment* of guilt, *by* the former exiles, primarily to the despised ‘*am haretz*, the ‘people of the land’, who become the theological ‘type’ and living example of apostates from Yahweh and the object of all the pre-exilic prophetic warnings and condemnations.³⁶¹

Despite the existence of expressions of lamentation and remorse, and admissions of guilt during the exile and the early post-exilic period, the dominant sentiments of the exiled group can be characterised as *ressentiment* directed *externally* against a number of groups, all of which are blamed for the exiles’ deprivation. Indeed, members of the exiled community appear, initially, to accept some responsibility for the catastrophe and internalise feelings of guilt, but these as well are projected externally, aided by the ministrations of the priesthood. Rather, what the exiles internalise is their status as the rightful upper class. Experience in exile not only confirms that status, but also lends it further theological justification. Survival at any price becomes a *virtue*. Religious self-justification validates itself as the mechanism of survival. Survival as a minority, enclave culture is religiously coded as ‘a Holy people, set apart’ which serves to assuage, diminish or ameliorate feelings of guilt. Political powerlessness and dependence demands at least partial ‘repression’ of *ressentiment* directed toward the foreign overlord, and provides the theological/psychological template for ambivalence *vis-à-vis* a foreign, despotic authority. However, restoration of the enclave elite to position of power in Judah, under Persia, allows for the reification of *ressentiment* and ambivalence, directed toward the subject population in Judea.

The early post-exilic period is characterised by the spirit of revenge theologically justified as ‘salvation’ through the restoration of the rightful ruling/priestly elite, wherein its authority is to be extended not only to authority over Israel but the world. The failure of these expectations, and the threat against priestly authority from both ‘above’ (the Persian authority) and ‘below’ (Judahite lower classes) intensifies priestly/upper class ambivalence.

Deprivation, resentment and guilt are the repressed that returns, awakened by the 'repetition' of the royal/priestly crime of folly and the new threat of catastrophe. The need for continued support/legitimation from Persian authority, coupled with persistence of competing religio-territorial codes, leads to a project of radical de-coding and recoding which demands the destruction of competing codes and their replacement with a single, totalising code.

The projection of guilt as a theological position covering the entire population provides an ideological basis for a homogeneous *socius* thereby legitimating punitive policies vis-à-vis lower classes and providing the theological justification for priestly authority. However, as noted above, a homogeneous *socius* exists only in theology. The Bible's extension of 'priestly' qualities to the entire population reflects the artificial construction of homogeneity; the claim that Israel does not need priests, but all the people have priestly qualities [Ex 19.6], is solipsistic, and masks the class structure.

Post-exilic experience is homogenised and legitimated in a re-worked story of the Exodus.³⁶² Socio-religious divisions of the pre-exilic and early post-exilic are 'reflected' in the factionalism of the forty-year 'wilderness sojourn' and explained as an effect of disobedience to Yahweh and Moses. The covenant is broken and Israel's existence put at risk [Ex 32.1-10], but dedication of leadership (Moses/Aaron = Ezra administration) succeeds in reducing Israel's 'punishment' from total annihilation to a 'purging' [Ex 32. 28-34] and leads to covenant renewal [Ex 34. 1-10, 28] under Mosaic/Ezraic Law.³⁶³

Guilt is linked to deprivation and resentment as a *theological construction* and *mnemotechnic device of social coding and repression*. Even at this 'late' stage, desire does not desire its own repression. Guilt, deprivation and resentment are not homogeneous elements of the social code, and are not internalised homogeneously as elements of collective experience and memory. Apart from the enclave elite, *guilt* and the sense of guilt are not a 'psychological condition' at all. Rather, guilt is imposed as the basis for the theological-despotic over-code,

and its *reification* in social relations. The theological construction of guilt becomes the ideological weapon and mnemotechnic device of Persian-despotic over-code, and the means to 'reconcile' social contradictions through the disciplining of disparate socio-economic and religious groups. The theological construction of guilt serves as the device used by priestly/upper class elite to both preserve and legitimate its power.

The implementation of the Biblical code as total code is responsible for the impression that the priestly guilt code is experienced collectively and universally.³⁶⁴ Material deprivation and resentment intensifies among the poor as the result of increasing political-economic disparity. The Law as over-code and total code *intends* to provide no escape for desiring flows and therefore no legitimate means for dissent outside of official religious code.³⁶⁵ The revision of 'history' is the revision of 'memory'. Mnemohistory is subjected to a biblical version of the Orwellian device of memory destruction. For, we can *assume* that the compilation, appropriation and codification of various traditions undertaken by the Ezra commission not only preserves but destroys; that is, the 'original' texts of 'J' and 'E', the tribal stories that comprise Judges, and the royal histories that are the basis of the Books of Kings, are 'lost'. Late post-exilic dissent and opposition must now legitimate itself within the framework of official tradition. Thus, in place of tribal kinship alliances and cultic practices, a religion of 'personal piety' develops among lower classes, reflected in Psalmist laments for the *'ebyon* (= poor, appears 28 times), the *'ani/'anaw* (= wretched/humble, appears 38 times).³⁶⁶ Prophetic sects form in the lower classes as a manifestation of alienation.³⁶⁷ The late prophetic sects appropriate elements of salvationist theology, increasingly abstracting it from material or political practice. The process of mythic inflation coupled with the spirit of revenge transforms salvationist theology into a system of sentiments translated into the post-Maccabean period Jewish and early Christian apocalyptic literature, with its characteristic incendiary rhetoric, threats of divine violence and condemnations of the material world.³⁶⁸ The poor are equated with the righteous (*hassaddiq*), privileged by the God of pity over the

wealthy, greedy, powerful and wicked. God alone will very soon bring about an end to the misery of 'the poorest of men' (*'ebyone 'adam*) through an apocalyptic event wherein the mighty will be brought low and the low raised up [Is 29. 17-24].³⁶⁹

The demand for submission to the Law masks actual, material social relations and is the product of priestly subversion. Theology claims Yahweh is despot and entitled to all production, but in fact, the Persian king is despot. Theology claims that the Persian despot serves by the grace of Yahweh, but in fact theology is legitimated by the grace of the Persian despot. Theology claims the Persian authority serves Israel and its priestly authority as Yahweh's agent for the implementation of Yahweh's code, but in fact Yahweh's code serves the Persian authority. Theology claims that Yahweh is the hidden god (*dues otiosus*) whose power is made manifest through his priests and temple, and the 'mask' of Persian imperial authority, but in fact Yahweh serves as the mask for Persian despotism.

The appropriation and re-configuration of the disparate traditional codes and their subsumption beneath the despotic total code de-codes the traditional codes as legitimate or 'possible' modes of production and recording; the new total code ties off production and recording (memory) at both ends. All the syntheses of production, consumption/consummation and recording are de-coded, re-coded and newly coded by the over-code. Yahweh's Law is the pre-condition of crisis, creates the crisis, threatens to create crisis and is the solution to the crisis.

Biblical Law therefore entrenches despotism as both crisis and as structure in the form of theocracy.³⁷⁰ However, configured as a theocracy, the despotic code functions not as a barbarian despotic over-code but as an absolute, univocal, or *molar* code. In terms of *function*, the Law pertains not only to the dedication/appropriation/consumption of surplus code but the coding of *all* production, consumption and human reproduction, and therefore represents the total coding and entrapment of desire.³⁷¹ But entrapment occurs firstly—and not only—in the abstract, through the unconscious coding representing the internal

condition of the psyche, wherein the ‘return of the repressed’ unconscious content manifests itself as the thoroughgoing internalisation of Yahweh’s code — or, in other words, as the ‘super-ego’. Rather, the molar code must deterritorialise and reterritorialise the competing primitive, pre-exilic royal/priestly, and Deuteronomist codes as the essential preconditions for any internalisation of the molar code.

To sum up, Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari link the imposition of despotic over-codes, and the formation of ‘the State’, with the development of *ressentiment* and bad conscience. However, the Judaic sense of guilt develops its specific character as the product not of peoples subjected by the despotic complex from *without*, but of subject peoples *within* the despotic complex. Indeed, the process of ‘subjected from within’ through submission to Yahweh’s Law ideologically masks subjection by the external power as the ‘actual’ despot. Precisely the ideology of Yahweh’s supremacy allows biblical law to function internally as the exclusive repressive code. Peoples subjected by military-agricultural despotisms from the ‘outside’, on the other hand, synthesise despotic and savage forms. The despotic code is received primarily as an *over-code* through *over-territorialisation* rather than as a de-coding, re-coding through deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation.³⁷² Functionally, debt and obligation is limited to the surplus production. The ancient Near Eastern (Mesopotamian and Egyptian) and Mediterranean cultural complexes evolve social organisations (including religious practices and theologies/mythologies) that are *syntheses* (disjunctive/conjunctive) of savage and despotic forms. Domination by despotic territorialisation is in the form of an over-code that appropriates surplus production, but social production/anti-production remains both differential and inclusive. The regimes continue to permit territory for savage (e.g., local) forms that militate against the development of monotheism, absolutism, and nihilism. Despotic codes compete with savage forms over the consumption/dedication of surplus production but do not attempt a thoroughgoing deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation. The ‘universality’ of savage coding and its relation to inscription in the land as full body permits

the continuation of disparate local codes through the translation of mythic symbols.³⁷³ The appearance of despotism has the potential to threaten savage codes, but the limiting of despotism to consumption of surplus code allows for the functional separation of 'politics' and 'religion', notwithstanding the fact that 'politics' receives religious legitimation.

The character of the Jewish code as 'oppositional religion' is not manifested, primarily, as opposition to a 'foreign' over-code. The war of codes is not, first and foremost, a war between 'us' as local socius and 'them' as barbarian despotic overlord, but as an internal conflict among three main competing codes. A minor state (Israel) in the midst of expansionist empires (the Assyrian, the Hittite, the Egyptian) develops a local version of the barbarian despotic code legitimated by theology. Expansionist impulses imply the redirection of desiring flows externally as violence, but the impulses are held in check by (a) status as a petty state, (b) certain ethical-moral limitations of at least one of the religious strains, and (c) the persistence of savage, tribal forms that have no 'state' pretensions. Thus, any and all attempts to homogenise the code are met with resistance internally. Any success in harnessing the production of the divided socius in the cause of externalised violence and territorial expansion requires state violence against the population. Any state success in the project of expansion is met by violence from one or another of the empires. The confluence of forces both internal and external results in the final destruction of the Israelite state. However, this destruction does not end but merely reconfigures and intensifies the historic divisions. The war of codes is internalised, resulting in the priestly code contained in the Pentateuch and post-exilic 'theocracy' under the thumb of empires – first Persia, then Greece, and then Rome.

The Judaic 'slave morality' therefore assumes a peculiar character that is indispensable to the production of the Oedipal form of repression. A synthesis of codes, which incorporates non-monotheistic elements, is theologically conceived as abomination.³⁷⁴ The perception of the despotic code is that of the impure, the foreign, with which there can be

no compromise. The spirit of *ressentiment* and revenge in politically powerless peoples leads to an idealisation and abstraction of the figure (or 'type') of the despot, the despot's power *and* the despot's juridical code, all of which are mythically inflated and projected to 'heaven' as 'God'. The figure of the despot, theologically transfigured as transcendent, omnipotent, and omnipresent provides the religious-theological precondition for the internalisation of guilt. Now theology can begin to conceive of debt as infinite. However, future theological and religious developments occur in relation to material social conditions. Actual/material political and economic powerlessness frustrates revolutionary demands leading to further theological abstraction. Oppositional ideologies in the form of soteriology develop that demand the revolutionary overthrow of the repressive over-code, but tend to focus on resistance to 'foreign' influence and domination.³⁷⁵ The political successes (e.g., the Maccabees) of late Second Temple nationalist movements are temporary due to the persistence of internal conflicts over the code. Independent governments quickly re-form as despotisms and become the focus of internal resistance from the various religious 'parties'. The failure of 'messianic' ideals in the immanent world leads to the retrenchment of bad conscience and its encoding as *a priori* guilt ('original sin'), paralleled by the advance of apocalyptic nihilism. In the Judeo-Christian complex, therefore, 'bad conscience' and slave morality are the products of the chauvinistic perception of despotic over-coding characteristic of subject peoples who choose 'survival at any price' and create exclusivist theologies which foreclose on plurality in the cause of religious purity. Non-members of the religious communion become a demonised 'Other'. Material deprivation and political powerlessness, abstracted as theology, deprives the immanent ('being', 'becoming', 'life') of legitimacy and demands the institution of a *permanent* and *infinite* debt-guilt system as the basis for social organisation and discipline.

CONCLUSION

Guilt towards *God*: this thought becomes an instrument of torture ... he reinterprets these self-same animal instincts as guilt before God (as animosity, insurrection, rebellion against the 'master', the 'father', the primeval ancestor and the beginning of the world) ...³⁷⁶

One is in no better position than Freud, J-J Rousseau, or any other hypothesiser of 'beginnings' to offer an un-problematic theory of human origins. Nevertheless, 'origin' is a traditionally accepted, and occupied theoretical category; credible hypotheses concerning origins and pure beginnings imply authenticity and authority; they establish the innate, the *a priori* and are echoes of revelation and the Word of God. The origin hypothesis is not overcome by ignoring it. The legitimacy of anti-Oedipus as an overcoming of the 'universal history' of western metaphysics lies, in part, not only with its capacity to critique the Freudian origin theory but also with the viability of schizoanalysis as an alternative universal history.

Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality and Deleuze's and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia may formulate critiques of the origins of bad conscience and the Oedipus complex, and dismiss the origin theories of priestly Judeo-Christian theology and psychoanalysis, respectively, as metaphysics. But positing origins in the remote past has the advantage of being difficult if not impossible to disprove. 'In the beginning' and 'once upon a time' stories are attractive; the reduction of complexity, discontinuity and chance to a singular meaning or necessity is seductive. The origin theory provides certainty, and therefore, the comfort of a view of history that involves developmental continuity. In other words, the simplicity of an origin theory provides a foundation for meaning, for a system of sentiments, a code, through which the socius can interpret the world. The construction of

such a system of sentiments is precisely a primary function of myth — and Freud provides us with one. Freud provides us with a mythic origin and a modern system of sentiments that are not radically new or revolutionary. Freud does not attempt mythic inversion. Rather, he crafts a universal myth that is an updated version of western Judeo-Christian theology. The religious framework of meaning is retained, providing the comfort of a sense of continuity after the death of God.

Thus, as Marcuse suggests, while aspects of Freud's classical theory have been challenged and critiqued, his proposition that "civilisation is based on the permanent subjugation of the human instincts has been taken for granted."³⁷⁷ It is taken for granted because the demand for the permanent subjugation of the instincts — or rather, the subjugation of *desire* — has been the *raison d'être* of Judeo-Christian mnemonics; we are used to it; it sounds familiar; it is 'common sense.'³⁷⁸

The present work does not attempt to posit an alternative to psychoanalysis's origin theory of desire and repression. I do not argue that there is a form of desire that exists in a 'pure' state, free from social coding. Rather, following Deleuze and Guattari, it is the case that desire functions always in a social context; the activity of human desire is social production and nothing else. Nevertheless, human (and pre-human) desire is molecular, plural, and plastic. Human activity and the development of culture can be explained only as precisely a *breaking free* of the molar coding and repression (characteristic of Oedipus) in favour of new and multiple desiring connections, disjunctions and conjunctions. Conscious multiplicity, and the possibilities of new desiring connections presented by the Virtual, is indeed contained (repressed) by social coding. However, the recording of disjunctions on the body-without-organs and the socius provides the human with 'plateau', a grounding from which desire as will-to-power may function in the direction of extension, growth, and 'becoming'. Conscious extension through collective activity (sociogenesis) is the strategy adopted by the

pre-human and human as the functional means to deal with its environment ('where it is') and the 'problem' of what it is (ontogeny).

Debt codes bind the desire of organ-bodies to the social body and the full body. The coding of debt and obligation are the precursors of 'bad conscience' and guilt but debt/obligation codes do not necessarily produce bad conscience and guilt. The debt code is socially created and configured as the mnemonic *tool* of cultural inscription, crafted as the means to mark and *dedicate* bodies and organs as desiring machines at once to the *socius* (mesocosm) and to the mega-machine (macrocosm) that is the production and reproduction of life. Primitive territorialisation and savage coding — whether 'coded' under the goddess as 'imaginary figure' or not — does not, *contra* Freud, represent a 'relaxation' of repression or a liberation of libidinal desire.

Primitive forms of social organisation allow for processes of decoding, recoding, and the re-configuration of codes. The introduction of the despotic form of coding represents a break. Despotism introduces a new form of repression, and contains within it the possibilities for an infinitivation of debt, and the development of bad conscience and guilt. Nevertheless, in antiquity, despotic regimes invariably do not undertake a process of radical deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, but superimpose themselves on pre-existing regimes of primitive territorialisation. One culture only in antiquity attempts to de-code and re-code all the codes, to replace or repress the archaic forms of savagery *and* the barbarian form of despotism and bring all codes under a single, unitary code. The attempt is made in the construction of biblical religion, and the codification of the Father's Law in the Bible, which Freud associates with the return of the repressed primeval material.

Freud proposes that the 'return of the repressed' appears as the Father's Law initially, albeit temporarily, with Moses, and again, more strongly (and finally) as the Jewish collective catharsis following the destruction of Judah by the Babylonian empire. Perhaps Freud oversimplifies the Jewish experience of the Second Temple period. Perhaps he goes too far in

reducing Jewish religious and cultural pluralism to a mono-religion. Perhaps he, like Nietzsche, focuses too much on *one* religious impulse among many as the means of proving his hypothesis. Indeed, Freud, like Nietzsche, seems to assume there is but *one* Jewish experience, and this one experience is appropriated by, and translated into Christianity — which is itself a mono-religion. Yet, in the end, psychoanalytic theory renders moot any arguments raised in the names of pluralism and difference and the cause of desiring multiplicity.

Firstly, at no point does Freud argue that the *religious* incarnations of Oedipus are ‘pure’ expressions of the original Oedipus. Indeed, for Freud, the religions of Oedipus are problematic precisely because they are religions. Religion introduces and relies on faith. Religion measures ‘fact’ by the gauge of belief, not by empirical observation. Religion is not science; the determination of truth by faith is bound to produce multiple versions of ‘truth’. Pluralism within the Judeo-Christian complex proves only that religious faith produces far too many versions of ‘the truth’. The differences only obscure the essence of psychological truth that, for psychoanalysis, lies at the heart of all religion. Thus, however much Judeo-Christian religions represent expressions or interpretations of the return of the repressed Oedipal guilt, they are only religions after all.

Secondly, genealogy shows that Second Temple Judaism is not a ‘mono-religion’, governed by a univocal code. Perhaps psychoanalysis can be convinced that, in terms of the social production and the production of code, guilt and the sense of guilt are not collectively inscribed and internalised, as Freud demands. Nevertheless, who can deny Freud’s contention (or Nietzsche’s) that the primary (and primal) element of *modern* social coding, and the mnemonic device that is determinative of modern social coding, is guilt, and that the sense of guilt passes into the modern unconscious via Judaism and Christianity? Freud claims we can sacrifice all aspects, elements and devices of repression save this one. Therefore, priestly Judaism and Christianity have demonstrated their historical utility; they saved civilisation. Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari might lament the more than 2000 year

dominance of Judeo-Christianity's theological Oedipus and its secularised, psychoanalytic replacement, but are not the truth, the necessity, the natural-ness and elective affinity of Oedipus for the progress of civilisation demonstrated by the duration, persistence and indeed, the historical *fait accompli* of Oedipus?

Freud's theory of ontogenesis and phylogenesis represents a 'historicisation' of instinct repression, but only if mythicisation qualifies as 'history' for psychoanalysis in the same way myth serves as history for biblical theology. Religion is illusion that is to be overcome and banished through the deployment of scientific rationality in the cause of psychoanalysis. Yet, the origins of guilt and the sense of guilt, and the colonisation of the unconscious by Oedipus can be described only in mythical terms. The psychoanalytic mythic unconscious is generic; its foundations are pre-social and pre-individual. Myth is generic (as sign), and the content and meaning of myth (signified) are generic. Yet the generic content and meaning of myth appears, in history, in religion, and in religious history only in biblical religion. Psychoanalysis's generic content and meaning are exactly biblical content and meaning – or, as psychoanalysis' might say, the Bible contains the essence of the generic mythic meaning that structures the unconscious. Freud's discovers the foundation for the principles of psychoanalysis precisely in Judeo-Christian ontology, moral pre-occupations and strategies for the repression of instinct. Greek mythical cycles and mythical figures are deployed to mask the re-configuration of Old Testament typology and religious history. The Freudian reading colonises Greek myth with the biblical structure of signification, and the colonisation is inserted as the latent content of a universalised human unconscious and conscience. Biblical history and the history of Oedipalisation run in an exact parallel; as teleology, as psychology, and as morality Oedipus and the Bible are identical. They are their own meaning and purpose, their own *Alpha* and *Omega*: the Bible begins and ends with God, Freud begins and ends with Oedipus; everything in between — 'history' — is nothing but human *guilt* and *lack*.

Judeo-Christian theology grounds the legitimacy of its demand for subjugation in its theory of ontogenetic and sociogenic origins. While psychoanalysis argues that psychoanalysis should replace religion, psychoanalysis retains religion's origin theory, and thereby retains theology's argument for the necessity of subjugation. Psychoanalysis legitimises its claim to replace religion by arguing that to psychoanalysis, not religion, the truth of human ontology been given. Psychoanalysis takes up its position as a successor revelation. Nevertheless, just as Paul assumes and subsumes Judaism, psychoanalysis authenticates theology's patriarchal monotheism and doctrine of judgment against humankind. With psychoanalysis, religion's origin myths are no longer mere myths, mere matters of faith, but are elevated to the status of 'science' as historical-cultural and psychological *anthropology*. Nevertheless, psychoanalysis authenticates religion by inserting myth and religion as the innate contents of the unconscious and the pre-linguistic conscious. Guilt lies at Man's origins. Moses re-discovers it (and becomes its victim); Judaism brings guilt to consciousness in the material social code; Christianity internalises guilt and tames the human with it; psychoanalysis — with its corollary capitalism — completes Man's domestication. Yet, like any contentious priest, the psychoanalyst is concerned about the members of his flock and the human condition in general. The Human is flawed, says the psychoanalyst/priest; the flesh (body, bodily-ego) is weak, even if the spirit (super-ego) is willing. The psychoanalyst/priest is concerned lest the progress of guilt overcome poor Man.³⁷⁹

The Judeo-Christian development of the concept of the soul is the template for psychoanalysis' theory of the subject. The Judeo-Christian development of the concept of the *individual* will, and the demand that this will subject itself to God's will is the basis for the western philosophic and psychoanalytic dialectic of instinct and reason. The desire for heaven as the tragically 'lost object' is predicated on the understanding that the human's ontological condition, or human existence itself, is a *problem*. The human's self-

consciousness of its own individuation and mortality is religion's 'mirror stage'. Human 'being' (and becoming) demands the recognition that one is ontologically separate from God. Separation from God is separation from God's quality as eternal and immortal Being. That Man *is* Man means Man dies. Thus, individuation and separation can only mean alienation from God. Man's ontological condition is 'being-toward-death' and an instinctual double-bind. *Eros* leads to sin and death; *Thanatos* is the death instinct. The fulfilment of eros is thanatos, for death is inevitable. Nevertheless, Man is also condemned to *live*, and therefore Man must depend on eros, and the fulfilment of eros in life is sin, and sin means alienation from God even in death. The permanent subjugation of the instincts is the condition of the health of the spirit/soul and necessary for the soul's entry into heaven. The inability to repress instinct leads one to sin. The ever-presence of 'basic' instinct, associated with un-evolved, a-historical drives and impulses of the body and its needs — the very essence of the *ontic* condition — leads us into temptation. One gives in to instinct and merely confirms one's ontological status as 'fallen' man; human ontology is preconditioned by the fall, and by the act(s) that caused it. The Fall is the *deprivation* of Man; his ontological condition is one of deprivation or *lack*. Lack — whether defined by Jeremiah, St. Paul, Augustine, Luther/Calvin, Freud, Heidegger or Lacan — cannot be overcome through human self-assertion.

Judaism allows a role for human self-assertion in the remediation of evil instinct and the sense of guilt through strict conformance to and a more thorough internalisation of the law of the father (*Torah*). Original sin is the crime of disobedience. Indebtedness to God is incurred through disobedience. One can atone for sin and reduce indebtedness through obedience. One is to wear the Father's law in one's heart and love thy neighbour. Judaism calls this practice 'righteousness'; psychoanalysis calls it 'ego reinforcement' and civilised morality. Others might speak of it as 'ethics' or an 'ontology of the Other'. The condition of Christian man is more serious. He has confessed his guilt over Freud's primeval crime and original sin, but allowed a substitute (an exemplar) to atone for the crime on his behalf.³⁸⁰

Man is now indebted to the Son. Indebtedness is made permanent, and infinite. For, the Son's sacrifice forecloses upon atonement to the father directly: "no one comes to the Father except through me" [Mt., John.]. Obedience to the Father's Law is useless for salvation because only a death will atone for a death.³⁸¹ But the Father's power is undiminished; the Father grants no new power to the Son for this would violate the Unity of God, the Absolutism of God — and the Law of Oedipus. Instead, the Son appropriates his power from Man, depriving him of the last remnant of efficacious self-assertion; the Son becomes the Father's servant to ensure the permanency of Father's domination. Man's will has efficacy only when turned against itself to ensure its repression and denial. The absolutism of the Father's domination is God's repose: God becomes *deus absconditus*. Christian man cannot overcome his ontological condition of *minus esse*, his 'lack of being', via his own efforts; there is no danger that man will "become like one of us"[Gn 2]. He cannot enter heaven, cannot re-enter Eden, and cannot recapture the lost, pre-original sin condition of *esse*. Judeo-Christian man's *esse*, his *ontic* condition — including the certainty that his life will end in death — is conditioned by his guilt.

Religion promises recovery of the lost object, through God's Grace, at the apocalyptic end of history. Psychoanalysis does not promise the recovery of the lost object. Psychoanalysis will only tell us what it is we really desire. The analysand will not permanently recapture the 'oceanic feeling', cannot return to the womb, cannot return to the mother's breast, and cannot commit incest with the mother/father. Thus, psychoanalysis promises to reveal the lost object. But religion has already done this: the lost object is 'God' or what passes for god as the mythic inflation and projection of the archaic, genetically encoded content of the irrational human unconscious. Religion preaches that man cannot recover the 'lost object' through his own efforts; psychoanalysis confirms this doctrine. Psychoanalysis speaks with the priest's Authority; it speaks with the voice of *logos* as its modern/postmodern incarnation — it is the priest of the secular god Oedipus, wherein oedipalisation becomes the secular reconfiguration of 'being-in Christ'.³⁸² Psychoanalysis founds the Church of

Oedipus in a world invested with the Holy Spirit of Capitalism's 'Invisible Hand'. No more and no less than religion, psychoanalysis offers to suffering man diagnoses and treatments for the human condition consistent not only with an ideology of human nature but addressed to human *need* as defined by western metaphysics and its ontological and phylogenetic origin theories.

Nietzsche's dictum demands that Christianity, and western metaphysics, be overcome. Towards this end, God dies; humanity — the western tradition — kills him. Freud and psychoanalysis agree, or seem to. Freud agrees that Christianity, *as religion* and religious belief as such (Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Islam, etc.) must be overcome. Religion is illusion. It is to be replaced, displaced, and in fact is rendered *moot* by the science of psychoanalysis. However, psychoanalysis does not banish religion; psychoanalysis is a re-occupation of the territory of the Judeo-Christian code. God is dead — and God will be dead again; God will continue to die. For psychoanalysis has determined that God-the-Father is the primeval father. Humanity has killed God, and humanity will kill God again, — and again, and again. Humanity is inscribed with the guilt of the crime; guilt is inscribed to the degree that a repetition of the crime in the immanent world, in the present, in actuality, is no longer necessary; we no longer even need form a conscious intent, or wish to murder God/father. We are guilty of the crime of our biological fathers and ancestors, even unto the last generation of humanity.

The "doctrine of judgement presumes that [God gives] *lots* to men, and that men, depending on their lots, are fit for some particular *form*, for some particular organic *end*," Deleuze writes.³⁸³ One should fear lest the deaths of 'Man' and the Social, the retreat of the political, or the 'end of history,' inspired by psychoanalysis' hermeneutics of self-suspicion, indicate the acceptance of this lot.

The thesis has attempted to demonstrate that the era of 'death of God' remains in its transitional stage. Western metaphysics has not yet been overcome. Theology's old wine has been poured into new wineskins of psychoanalysis. With regard to the social production/reproduction of guilt, God is not dead, but merely displaced and repressed, stored as the latent content of psychoanalysis and secular philosophy. This God is embedded in western concepts and the social code, written on and into the modern body and mind through commodity-capitalist relations of production/consumption, reinforced and legitimated by Freudian psychoanalysis. Nietzsche's 'last man' is the culmination of 2500 years of western Judeo-Christian mnemotechnics. Guilt and lack continue to function as the foundational elements in the formation of both the western subject-position and systems of social coding/over-coding as the means of social regulation and discipline. 'The Word' is the metaphysics of guilt and lack that has been 'made flesh', reified as the social code of the modern debt-guilt system.

Notes

Notes for Introduction

¹ FW Nietzsche, The Gay Science, tr Walter Kaufmann, (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1974), #250, 216.

² The continuum is briefly, and abortively broken by the Renaissance, but re-established via the Reformation and Counter-Reformation; the example of the Renaissance provides for Nietzsche a second historical 'model' for the philosophy of the future.

³ Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, tr. DW Smith and MA Greco, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 128. (Hereafter, ECC)

⁴ Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences, tr Allan Sheridan-Smith (New York, NY: Vintage/Random House, 1994), 387.

⁵ That is, debt and its relations, especially lack, become categories or *a priori* 'positions' embedded in western thought. The concept is transfigured and re-configured by 'secular' philosophy and psychoanalysis, of course. 'Lack' as debt and its relation to guilt differs is explained one way in Hegel, another in Heidegger or Ricoeur, another in Sartre. Nevertheless, all assume that lack *is*; indeed, it would be quite difficult to imagine an existential philosophy without a concept of lack. Any philosopher or theorist (like Deleuze) who does not perceive life-as-lack or desire-as-lack must overcome 2500 years of tradition.

⁶ FW Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols and the Antichrist, tr RJ Hollingdale, (Markham, ON: Penguin Books, 1968), 127. There is of course, recognition by Nietzsche that *reactive* nihilism too serves as a creative, value-producing force. Nietzsche distinguishes between *reactive* and *passive* nihilism. See Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, tr. Hugh Tomlinson, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983), 151-152.

⁷ The term 'Christian' is here used in Nietzsche's sense. I am aware, of course, that both Judaism and Christianity have produced significant differences, manifested most notably in the various 'parties', groups, sects, and denominations. However, a comprehensive explication of these differences, as such, would not be relevant to the arguments herein developed. Where practical or necessary to the argument, I will note differences within the broad 'Judeo-Christian' complex. Otherwise, I will use the terms 'Judeo-Christian' and 'Christian' in Nietzsche's sense.

⁸ FW Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr Walter Kaufmann, (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1967) #13, 14.

⁹ Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, tr. T Williams (Indianapolis, IA: Hackett Publishing, 1993) xii-xiii; cf. Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, tr. RM Wallace, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 132-135. Augustine locates the 'bad', in terms of the corruption of living substance, morality, consciousness and conscience, in the human body and mind; being itself is rendered guilty as the consequence of original sin. Freud, likewise, conceives of ego as first and foremost a bodily ego. The desires of the body as ego are responsible for the primeval crimes that forever inscribe both the consciousness and the unconscious of being as guilty.

¹⁰ FW Nietzsche, "History of an Error, or, How the Real World at last became a Myth" Twilight of the Idols and the Antichrist, tr RJ Hollingdale, (Markham, ON: Penguin Books, 1968), 30-31.

¹¹ I prefer the term sociogenesis to Freud's 'phylogenesis'; the latter, according to Webster's, has to do with the development of leaves, not humans. The term 'sociogenic' refers to the social determination, or influence, of human behaviour, and thus more accurately describes the process of social coding, regardless of whether social determination is an 'originary' imprint (via the primal horde), or a plastic process related to 'territorialisation.'

¹² Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 134. Augustine refers to ontic lack as *minus esse*. The human lacks being (both a quantity and a quality of being) as a result of original sin; subsequent evil acts further diminish being. However, human ontic lack is in fact relative insofar as the human condition is compared to God's — and only God is *magnus esse*.

¹³ Here again, with the term 'Judeo-Christian' I follow Nietzsche's usage. Nietzsche uses the terms 'Judeo-Christian' along with 'Christian', 'Christianity', and 'Judaism', and 'Jewish', generically, loosely and, given the multiplicity of forms within each religious complex, inaccurately. The 'inaccuracy', in my view, is intentional. Nietzsche uses the terms as a rhetorical, polemical device, indicating that he is implicating the

whole of the religious complex. However, he in fact is referring to the specific 'spirit' that dominates 'Judeo-Christian' theology; that is, *ressentiment*, 'bad conscience', and the spirit of revenge that, in Pauline Christianity, creates a nihilistic religion of pity. Even more specifically, Nietzsche uses the terms to refer to the religion(s) of *the priest*. The terms are also used to refer to psychological, moral, and valuating *tendencies* in their religious guise that involve *reactivity* and reveal the Judeo-Christian religious character as 'oppositional' religion.

¹⁴ My critique of Freud's 'science', or Positivism, is not based on a concern that it represents 'bad' science — or, like Karl Popper's critique of Hegel and Marx — that it is not 'scientific enough'.

¹⁵ I say 'usually' gendered and symbolised as Mother, because any survey of 'primitive' or 'pagan' mythology results in the conclusion that Earth = Mother. However, I maintain that the content and meaning of symbols, or 'archetypal myths' is not predetermined. The possibility exists that 'Earth' could be symbolised as 'Father'. The seeming universality of the signification relates primarily to 'function' and the practices of primitive social production.

¹⁶ Though a contrary impression, especially if Nietzsche is read selectively, is certainly possible, given his references to 'the Jewish instinct', and remarks that 'the Jews are the most remarkable people on earth,' etc., that imply a reference to the collectivity. Nevertheless, Nietzsche distinguishes between the priestly theology and 'the people' or popular religion. The critical remarks concerning bad conscience, the development of a religion of pity around a God that is 'good', and so forth, refer, in my view, specifically to the efforts of the priests and theologians, and the work of historical falsification. See The Antichrist, #24-27. Indeed, Nietzsche suggests that the 'priestly instinct' is not something indigenous or 'original' to the Jews; rather, the priestly instinct is something *acquired*, e.g., in Babylon. FW Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr Walter Kaufmann, (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1967) #143, 92.

¹⁷ Nietzsche's attempt to distinguish between 'Judaism' or Israelite religion as social and political *practice* and the 'late' priestly theology parallels the distinction, in The Antichrist, between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith.

Notes for Chapter I

¹⁸ Nietzsche, WP #492, 271.

¹⁹ Nietzsche, WP, #498, 273.

²⁰ Eugene Holland, Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: and Introduction to Schizoanalysis, (New York, NY: Routledge, 1999), 9, n19.

²¹ The conceptual distinctions tend to blur somewhat here. By 'inherent', I take this to mean that the human organism is biologically 'evolved' for the purpose of making culture, and that the teleology of evolutionary processes is 'designed' to produce a being capable of culture. And, by 'culture', the human engages in an activity that is qualitatively different from the economic activity of all other organisms. I distinguish this position from the genealogical view, which holds that evolutionary accidents and chance produce an organism that has the capacity for what we call culture-making, but at the same time the organism 'chooses' culture because other strategies fail. Nevertheless, 'culture' still represents a 'survival strategy', which all organisms possess or develop, and is therefore not qualitatively different from the strategies of other organisms.

²² Holland, 9.

²³ Joseph Campbell, The Masks of God, Vol. I: Primitive Mythology, (Toronto, ON: Penguin, 1991), 33. The Aurignacian caves are located in the south of France and are the site of Cro-Magnon art; (hereafter MGPM)

²⁴ The terms *paideumic influences* and the *paideumic model* derive from Leo Frobenius' book Paideuma (1921). Frobenius employs the Greek words for 'pedagogy' (παιδαγωγία, 'education'; παιδευμα, that which is reared up, educated, nursling, pupil, scholar') to describe the pedagogical effect of the environment or environmental conditions (climate, topography, availability or prevalence of certain game animals over others, etc.) on the structuring of human life, thought, symbolic systems, value systems and psychology. See Joseph Campbell, The Historical Atlas of World Mythology, Vol. 2: The Way of the Seeded Earth, Part 1: The Sacrifice, (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1988), 9, 19, *passim*; (hereafter HAWM)

²⁵ The term 'Man' is used here in Foucault's sense, in the chapters "Man and his doubles" and "the human sciences" in The Order of Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences, tr Allan Sheridan-Smith (New

York, NY: Vintage/Random House, 1994). This 'Man' is the subject of the western social sciences. One also thinks of the term "Eternal Man", used by Barthes specifically in reference to the 'naturalisation' of bourgeois man. However, 'Man' also refers to the subject of Judeo-Christian theology.

²⁶ Campbell, *MGPM*, 33.

²⁷ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, tr. R Hurley et al, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 9-16; (hereafter *AO*). There are, seemingly, an endless series of explanations and definitions of the 'Body-without Organs'. My own is this: A body (animal or human body) is composed of organs (brain, heart, liver, intestines, etc.). Lived experience is lived by the organs, and inscribed, or recorded on and in the organs. Experience here refers not only to psychic or mental (conscious and unconscious) 'memory', but any and all 'experience'. The body 'records' the experience of broken bones, concussions, surgeries, cuts and bruises just as it records mental images. The recording of 'trauma' or over stimulation is both psychic and physiognomic, e.g., prolonged 'stress' might result in psychological neurosis, hypertension and stomach ulcers (which in turn influences behaviours). Human practices, and social organisations are also recorded on/in the body. The body-without-organs is an alternative, collective, but 'virtual' recording surface. Simply put, it is not a physical 'body' as in an animal or human body (hence a 'body' without organs), though a physical body (the earth, a king) might symbolically represent the BwO. It corresponds to psychoanalysis' "collective unconscious", and to Durkeim's "pre-existing sentiments", but is more than these, for Deleuze and Guattari have in mind *material* relations and associations. Recording on the surface of the BwO is accomplished through *mnemonic* practices; recording relates memory to the *objects* (including environment) and material practices of lived experience, recalling Proust's 'madelene.'

²⁸ 'Territory' used here as both geographic location ('native land', 'our' land) and in Deleuze's and Guattari's sense as a sphere of production and recording. See Holland, 19-21 and *passim*.

²⁹ Campbell, *MGPM*, 34.

³⁰ Thus employing the broadest possible use of the term, mnemonic practices may be said to include the inscription of the *possibility* of bad conscience or a *sense of guilt*, but only as a social product, and only as a consequence of a failure to fulfil prescribed obligations.

³¹ In the present work, noun and pronoun use designating human beings are employed as a reflection of social versus biogenic constructions. Thus, 'man' and 'Man' are used to indicate social constructions; the latter refers specifically to the biblical/theological construction. To refer generically to the species, I use the word 'human'.

³² Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, tr. Hugh Tomlinson, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983), 40; (hereafter *NP*)

³³ When one considers the vast numbers of identifiable, discrete organisms (e.g., 'parasites', viruses, bacteria) that 'inhabit' the human body, numbers of which have evolved with and exist symbiotically with 'us', it might be appropriate to conceive of each human body as a colony, a aggregate of interdependent organs and organisms.

³⁴ Hans Blumenberg, *Work on Myth*, tr. RM Wallace, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) x, 32; (hereafter *WM*)

³⁵ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* tr Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999), 118, 140, 156-160 (hereafter *WP*); cf. Claire Colebrook, *Gilles Deleuze*, Routledge Critical Thinkers Series, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 30, 53.

³⁶ Deleuze, *NP*, 40-41.

³⁷ Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism*, tr. Katherine Jones (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1967), 101; (hereafter *MM*).

³⁸ Freud, *MM*, 102.

³⁹ Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilisation: a Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966), 56; (hereafter *Eros*); cf. Freud, *MM*, 157-8.

⁴⁰ Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy and History", *The Foucault Reader*, ed Paul Rabinow, tr DF Bouchard et al, (New York, NY: Vintage/Random House, 1984), 81.

⁴¹ Foucault, "Nietzsche", 82.; cf. FW Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, tr Walter Kaufmann, (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1974), #348-349, 290-292; (hereafter *GS*).

⁴² Freud's Lamarckian hypothesis might be compared with the theory of the 'Innate Releasing Mechanism' (IRM) posited by the biological sciences as the means of accounting for the instinctually determined behaviours of animals. It has been observed, for example, that newly hatched chickens do not have to be 'taught', nor do they learn through trial and error the difference between raptors and non-predatory birds. Notwithstanding the fact that hatchlings are dozens (perhaps hundreds) of generations

removed from the lived experience of exposure to predators, they will scurry and hide when confronted with the silhouette of a hawk or falcon, but ignore a silhouette of a pigeon or dove. The capacity to distinguish between hawk-shape and pigeon-shape is innate. Also innate is 'hawk-shape' as sign, signifier, and signified; – the *meaning* of the sign, its ideational content (in a rudimentary sense) is instinctual. The chicken is inscribed with this 'trace', its meaning as instinctual code is predetermined, as is the behavioural response triggered by the code; – everything is hard-wired. The chicken 'knows' that the hawk-shape means danger; it can never be 'taught' that hawk-shape does not signify danger. Campbell MGPM, 137.

⁴³ Blumenberg, WM, 32.

⁴⁴ CG Jung, The Essential Jung, tr Anthony Storr, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 65, 66, 70-71. Cf. Anthony Storr, "Introduction", The Essential Jung, 25-26, and Anthony Stevens, Jung: a very short introduction, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), 46-47 and *passim*. I am aware that Freud disagreed with this description, arguing that the Jungian concept implies that too much 'content' is passed on genetically. However, it seems to me that a comparison of Freud's explication of 'traces' with Jung's description of archetypes demonstrates that there is less 'content' and 'meaning' implicated with Jung's concept. Both Freud's 'traces' and Jung's 'archetypes' are, I think, dependent on Kant's 'categories of perception', but in my view, Jung conforms more closely to the Kantian idea. Archetypes appear as 'structures' into which experience and sense perception are directed or inserted, and categorised according to 'type' in much the same way as Kant's categories distinguish between perceptions of time, substance, quality and quantity, etc.

⁴⁵ Marcuse, Eros, 55-56. Marcuse quotes from Freud's MM, 157.

⁴⁶ Anti-oedipal desire equates with Deleuze and Guattari's schizophrenic desire. The social resistance non-oedipalised desire faces includes, of course, the parental reprimand and punishment of children, and the confinement and medication of adolescents and children invariably diagnosed with 'behaviour' and 'personality' disorders. See Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 13-14, 57-59, cf. Holland, 2.

⁴⁷ Marcuse, Eros, 56.

⁴⁸ Marcuse, Eros, 57.

⁴⁹ Marcuse, Eros, 57.

⁵⁰ Freud, MM, 101-104, cf. Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents, tr James Strachey, (New York, NY: WW Norton, 1983), 92-94, (hereafter CD) and Totem and Taboo: Resemblances between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics, tr. AA Brill (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1946), 13, 143, (hereafter TT).

⁵¹ Freud, CD, 91-92, 94.

⁵² Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 80. Deleuze and Guattari are correct in noting the easily overlooked fact that Freud's brothers, freed of the father's surveillance, do not immediately take the females in sexual intercourse. The consequences of Deleuze and Guattari's finding are interesting. Freud must assume that repressed libidinal desire, in total, has been discharged in the act of murder, but this seems to contradict the theory that primary and secondary repression has not accounted for all desire. Nevertheless, if guilt appears immediately after the murder, and the murder discharges all desiring energy (leaving none for sexual activity), then guilt should be cathected to murder and murderous (aggressive) desire, and not to sexual desire or the sex act.

⁵³ Freud, MM, 104-105

⁵⁴ Freud, CD, 84.

⁵⁵ Anthony Storr, Freud: a very short introduction, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), 62.

⁵⁶ Freud, CD, 84

⁵⁷ Freud, CD, 84.

⁵⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 81-82.

⁵⁹ The objection may be raised that Christianity offers a 'way out' of universal and eternal condemnation through salvation in Christ. However, I am referring here to the 'salvation' of 'Man' in the sense of the human's capacity to overcome guilt *via his/her own devices*, on one hand, as well as offering a critique of the 'original guilt' theory, on the other. In Christianity, human self-assertion alone, or human activity alone (e.g. 'good works') is insufficient to overcome ontological guilt and condemnation; that is, without Grace, the human would indeed remain forever condemned and in a state of sin – both in life and after-life. Similarly, one could argue that psychoanalysis offers a 'way out' —via psychotherapy, of course. But this therapy involves, at bottom, making conscious the unconscious sense of guilt, and acknowledging its origin. Both Christianity and psychoanalysis then involve a 'confession', an ontological admission that the

human is guilty and 'I am *that*' as the essential precursor to their respective remedial therapeutic activities.

⁶⁰ Marcuse, Eros, 59.

⁶¹ Marcuse, Eros, 59-60.

⁶² Marcuse, Eros, 60.

⁶³ One could, as well, assign guilt to God for crafting flaws and creating a double-bind, as Steinbeck suggests in East of Eden, but assigning guilt to God/the father merely creates another set of oedipal issues. It does not produce an anti-Oedipal or an-Oedipal system.

⁶⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 80. The notion of it being forbidden to surpass the father, as presented here, appears as something of a 'Freudian slip', and betrays the notion in its character as a theological speculation and preoccupation!

⁶⁵ The idea of incorporating the past in the present through the religious investiture of the 'divine' Pharaonic principle explains the practice of erasing, or over-writing the name of a previous Pharaoh with the present one. Rameses II (the Great), given his long reign, was particularly successful in this over-writing process. Popular Egyptology, infected with the bias of the West's concern for the individual, sees the practice as evidence of Rameses' 'vanity' or large 'ego'.

⁶⁶ See my Chapter 2; cf. Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality, tr WR Trask, (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1963), 99f. Eliade's work demonstrates Freud's profound misunderstanding of the 'murdered father/divinity' motif. The motif is archetypal, and involves myths of the sacred ancestor or deity as culture or tool-giving figure killed or sacrificed as the precursor to the 'dawn' of culture and history. Such stories seem to be among the oldest forms of the 'father' myth. The existence of the myth itself, together with the rites or rituals supported by the myth indicates that there is no 'forgetting', 'repression' or 'latency', especially in the sense Freud uses when referring to Mosaic religion. On the contrary, the reciting of the myth and the performance of the ritual brings the 'memory' of the killed ancestor into consciousness, making the 'past' present. Moreover, the 'meaning' of the myths does not involve Oedipal repression and guilt. Instead, the myths refer to 'the gift' (gift of fire, a tool, or culture). The socius commemorates the gift through remembrance and ritual, usually a form of sacrifice. In later history, the template is elaborated into rituals of regicide as in ancient Sumer, and, as in Egypt, the ritual passage of the divine Pharaonic principle from 'father' to 'son'.

⁶⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 81.

⁶⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 82.

⁶⁹ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 82.

⁷⁰ Freud, MM, 104.

⁷¹ See my Chapter III, which deals specifically with the attempt to create 'Oedipus' as the structure of the religio-social (biblical) code in post-exilic Judaism. I will note here that one of the main 'incentives' offered to the Jews by the priestly authorities, and the prophets is the promise that, if the people adopt the 'structure', and follow the Father's Law rigorously, there will be no more crises! Adoption of the Mosaic or *Torah* code is thereby associated with stability, peace, and order.

⁷² The biblical references to this emptying of the self, or destruction of the self-willing ego, or becoming God's instrument are too numerous to cite all. See and compare passages in Jeremiah (4:4, command to "circumcise your hearts"), Micah (6:8), Paul's formulae of 'being-in-Christ', 'being in the Spirit' in Romans, I Corinthians, Galatians, etc. There are differences between the Judaic and the Christian demand for suppression of the self-willing ego, differences that, both sociologically and psychologically, are significant. As Professor Wernick has reminded me, Judaism does not have chastity as an ideal, whereas Christianity does. Indeed, in Judaism there is no denial of the *body*. The 'ideal' or goal of suppression/repression of the individual will in favour of God's will is the creation of a community or people of God—but a community made up of fully human, 'perishable' people. The Pauline formula, on the other hand, speaks of putting on 'imperishability', implying a denial of the (human) body and human-all-too-human social relations. Chastity becomes both an effect and a means to an end. Thus, one should say that the destruction or subordination of the self-willing ego is *implied* in certain prophetic formulae in Judaism. Christianity takes this to an extreme and makes it the essential precondition for the reception of Grace.

⁷³ The '*am* of Yahweh, i.e. the Israelites as the 'people' or 'son' of the deity. For example, see Hosea 2:25: "I will sow her in the land as My own; and take Lo-ruhamah back in favour; And I will say to Lo-ammi, 'You are my people,' and he will respond, '[You are] my God.'" תָּבִיבָה (TaNaKh: Torah, Nevi'im, Kethuvim). The Holy Scriptures: the new JPS Translation according to the Traditional Hebrew Text, (Philadelphia, PA: the Jewish Publication Society, 5748/1988), 984.

⁷⁴ The formula “being-in-Christ”, or a variant thereof, is used by Paul in most of his epistles. For example, see Galatians 2: 19-20: “I have been crucified with Christ and yet I am alive; yet it is no longer I, but Christ living in me.” Albert Schweitzer’s work on the theology of Paul remains, in my opinion, the most thorough explication of the theological and psychological implications of Paul’s formula of ‘being-in-Christ’. Albert Schweitzer, *The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle*, ed FC Burkitt, tr Wm Montgomery, (London, UK: Adam and Charles Black, 1956), 5, 8, 10-13 *passim*. Compare Schweitzer’s account of Paul’s formula with Freud’s explanation of ‘pathological narcissism’ in “Narcissism”, *The Major Works of Sigmund Freud*, Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 54 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago and Britannica Inc., 1990), and compare both in turn with Nietzsche’s character analyses of Paul in *Daybreak*, #68 and *The Antichrist*, #42.

⁷⁵ The “unary trait” is a term used by Lacan, deriving from his analysis of Freud’s discussion of Little Hans’ game of *fort-da*. In Freud, *fort* becomes a true signifier, and propels one into the differential universe of signification only when it is paired with a second syllable (*da*). According to Holland, *fort* plays, for Lacan, a role in two registers, the consciousness and the unconscious. In the former, *fort* takes on meaning differentially “within a vast network of other signifiers”, whereas for the unconscious, “it functions as the ‘unary trait’ representing the substantiality of matter ‘before’ the advent of signification, as well as the substantiality of the body ‘beneath’ consciousness.” Thus, the unary trait “serves as a kind of magnet of lost substantiality, drawing all subsequently repressed material into the unconscious where it forms its own matrix of differential relations.” Holland, 30.

⁷⁶ Storr, 114-115.

⁷⁷ The contradiction between Freud’s analysis of Father as reality principle and the theological idea, and the imperative of *religio* as precisely a ‘linking back’ is curious, and has some rather important psychological implications and consequences. A detailed interrogation of these is beyond the scope of the present work, but I can offer brief comments. It may simply be that Freud did not think through the implications. On the other hand, the problem adheres to the internal logic of Judeo-Christian theology. Religion demands that one live in the (material) world, engaging in (profane, mundane) human activity as ‘reality’, thus validating the ‘reality principle’ —which in turn implies the ‘world’ has value’. However, religion also demands identification with a divine principle that also represents ‘reality’ —albeit a ‘higher’ one— which ‘negates’ the mundane world, and can only be reached or attained through the death of the ‘corporeal’ body. Using Freud’s terminology, the Judeo-Christian God-the-Father is *both* Reality Principle and Pleasure Principle, is both *Eros* and *Thanatos*. The unifying principle therefore presents contradictory imperatives. Freud resolves the contradiction by proposing opposing drives (*Eros* and *Thanatos*). *Thanatos* is then associated with the desire to recapture the ‘oceanic feeling’, but this requires that the Mother-principle be re-introduced, implying that the religious drive to ‘link back’ aims at Mother, not Father—a move that runs counter to the theological project.

⁷⁸ Klein and ethnographic psychoanalysis (e.g., Róheim) determine that narcissistic deprivation is a condition applicable primarily to mother, is responsible for much of the ‘bad mother’ behaviour toward the child, resulting in the infant’s ambivalence toward mother. See Werner Muensterberger, “Introduction”, in Geza Róheim, *Panic of the Gods and other essays*, ed W Muensterberger, (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1972), xiv, xv-xvi. Here, Klein’s diagnosis of infant ambivalence toward the mother is cited as the ‘cause’ of myths of the demon goddess (e.g., Hindu Black Kali). See also Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, tr. CV Boundas, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1990), 187-190; (hereafter *LS*)

⁷⁹ There is a change in anti-production, however. During his lifetime, the father is the ‘full body’ of the despot; he is the ‘cause’ of anti-production and all over-production or surplus code properly belongs to him. If, as Freud contends, the internalised ‘father-principle’ as superego is abstracted, idealised, anthropomorphised, mythically inflated and projected as ‘God’, anti-production becomes ‘sacrifice’ as a ‘guilt offering’ to the dead father. This issue is dealt with more fully below.

⁸⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, *AO*, 82. Deleuze and Guattari state that the ‘two poles’ include a symbolic function, which is related to the process of differentiation, and “imaginary figures” related to the process of identification. As noted above, my contention is that Freud’s hypothesis demands that the primal father is already an ‘imaginary figure’ in the flesh.

⁸¹ Deleuze and Guattari, *AO*, 81.

⁸² Marcuse, *Eros*, 81-82.

⁸³ Marcuse, *Eros*, 56.

⁸⁴ Joel Whitebrook, Perversion and Utopia: a Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 115-118. Whitebrook's analysis of Freud, Lacan, the id and the de-centred subject makes much the same point.

⁸⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 78.

⁸⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 78.

⁸⁷ That is, psychoanalysis answers Deleuze's (and Nietzsche's) question, "is man essentially reactive?" in the affirmative. Deleuze, NP, 166-170.

⁸⁸ For a thorough explication of the psychoanalytic model, see Marcuse, Eros, and Whitebrook, Perversion and Utopia.

⁸⁹ And, we should note, there are *multiple* emergences. The fossil record now contains at least eighteen pre-human anthropoid, hominid species, some of which existed concurrently. We should imagine a *series* of emergences. However, 'trial and error' in the Darwinian sense, would not be an accurate description. It is clear that most of these species lived for hundreds of generations, clearly indicating a high degree of adaptation and 'fitness' for survival. See article "Human Evolution", Encyclopaedia Britannica, (Chicago, IL: Britannica Inc., 1988), 980-980.

⁹⁰ The term *Herkunft* is perhaps used here more 'generically', applying not only to particular groups of humans, or to *Homo sapiens*, but to the entire 'stock' of hominid, pre- or proto-human material that possesses the potential to *become* 'human'. Nietzsche uses the term *Herkunft* ('stock', 'descent') along with *Erbschaft* in relation to the ancient affiliations of tribal groups or social ranks (e.g., nobility) or bonds of blood and tradition, and to refer to racial or social 'types'. See The Gay Science, #135, Beyond Good and Evil: a Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, tr RJ Hollingdale, (Markham, ON: Penguin Books, 1990) #'s 242, 244, 260, and Genealogy of Morality, I, #5.

⁹¹ Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History," The Foucault Reader, tr., ed. Paul Rabinow, (New York, NY: Vintage, 1984), 77, 79, 79n15.

⁹² Briefly, 'molecular' refers to objects and part objects, e.g., a human being as an assemblage of organs, parts of organs, etc., the desiring connections between part objects, and thus the possibility of multiple 'meanings' and investments. For example, a breast 'means' mother's milk, but also can mean sexual pleasure, etc. 'Molar' refers to the social organisation and coding of assemblages of objects and part objects reduced to a singular meaning, thus, desire for the breast means desire for mother. See Colebrook, Deleuze, 81-82.

⁹³ Foucault, "Nietzsche", 83.

⁹⁴ Deleuze, NP, 39.

⁹⁵ The terms 'conscious', 'self-conscious' and 'self-awareness' are problematic. I do not wish to imply that there is an ontological difference between human and animal on this level. For clearly, all animals, and even plants, are 'conscious', on some level, of their own desire. The differences between human and animal are related to matters of 'quality' and 'quantity' in the sense Deleuze uses in his explication of Nietzsche's will-to-power. The differences are in terms of both the intensity and configuration of these forces, and in the techniques, or 'strategies' each organism employs to satisfy its desire. See Deleuze, NP, 49-52. On this subject, compare Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, Volume II: Perspectives of World History, tr. CF Atkinson, (New York, NY: Alfred A Knopf, 1928), 5-8, and Georges Bataille, Theory of Religion, tr. Robert Hurley, (New York, NY: Zone Books, 1998), 17f, (hereafter ToR).

⁹⁶ Colebrook, Deleuze 77

⁹⁷ See below: intensification of the 'inside/outside' distinction resulting in angst creates the affective need for social attachments and connections to the full body of the earth.

⁹⁸ Colebrook, Deleuze, 77.

⁹⁹ Deleuze, NP, 39. The reference is to Spinoza's suggestion, taken up by Nietzsche (and Deleuze), that repudiates the "chatter" about consciousness and spirit in the western theological/philosophical tradition, noting that "we do not even know what the body *can do* ... we do not know what the body is capable of, what forces belong to it or what they are preparing for".

¹⁰⁰ The term is Blumenberg's. The "Absolutism of Reality" defined as a situation in which "man comes close to not having control of the conditions of his existence and, what is more important, believes he simply lacks control of them." This is understood as a "limit concept": the human does not have control of the conditions of his existence, a result of a lack of biological niche. Confrontation with the limit produces a mental state *Angst* or 'anxiety', or to paraphrase the psychiatrist, 'intense fear or dread lacking an unambiguous cause or a specific threat', which results in panic, paralysis, or both. Hans Blumenberg, WM, ix-x.

¹⁰¹ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 140; Colebrook, Deleuze, 77-78.

¹⁰² Deleuze and Guattari WP, 118; Blumenberg, WM, x.

¹⁰³ Blumenberg, WM, x. This *angst*, it should be stressed, is not the same as Freud's 'anxiety'. Blumenberg distinguishes the 'absolutism of reality' from psychoanalysis' "absolutism of images and wishes." WM, 8.

¹⁰⁴ The psychological experience of *angst* in this context seems to imply that individuation is presupposed. However, individuation must then be connected to the confrontation with the absolutism of reality as the undifferentiated. 'Generic' (instinctual) coding collapses. The alternatives for the organism are (a) catatonia and death, or (b) 'awakening', and becoming self-conscious of both desire and the problem of how to make desiring connections in a field in which both the 'world' and the individual organism are un-marked.

¹⁰⁵ Campbell, The Masks of God, Volume II: Oriental Mythology, Toronto, ON: Penguin Books, 1991), 45-46; (hereafter MGOrM)

¹⁰⁶ Walter Benjamin, "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire." Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, tr. Harry Zohn, (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 1969), 155-200. Benjamin's deployment of Freud along with Proust, Poe and Baudelaire on this subject is, for me, extremely useful. The full implications of this 'inside/outside' distinction cannot be explored here. However, if Freud's implications are 'unpacked', I think the 'traditional' metaphysical assumptions he employs are evidenced. Indeed, Freud becomes increasingly 'Christian'; that is, and notwithstanding the 'necessity' of the Ego as that part of the psyche associated with the body as a sense organ, it is the Ego that plays the part of 'he 'gentleman' walking in the world'. The Ego effected with *eros* seeks engagement with and in the world. Ego seeks out stimuli, and is the conduit through which Id will receive stimuli. However, to the Id all stimuli are trauma. To the degree that Ego does its job then, it filters out stimuli, protecting the vulnerable Id. Thus, in relation to the Id, the Ego is 'outside'; the relationship of Ego to Id mirrors the Christian Body to Soul.

¹⁰⁷ Benjamin, "Baudelaire", 160-162.

¹⁰⁸ Benjamin, "Baudelaire", 161-162.

¹⁰⁹ Blumenberg, WM, xv.

¹¹⁰ Marcuse, Eros, 24. The instincts are conservative, or fundamentally "regressive". Marcuse notes Freud's insistence that organic life has a compulsion to restore an earlier or 'original' state of things, compromised by external stimuli, pressures or conditions of living. This "inertia inherent in organic life", quotes Marcuse, "would be the ultimate content or substance of those 'primary processes' that Freud from the beginning recognised as operating in the unconscious."

¹¹¹ Species extinction occurs regardless of the nominal 'cause' of the deprivation of a biological niche; the nominal cause could be an inter-species 'survival of the fittest' competition in which one species is the 'loser', but over the course of geologic time, the more common causes of the collapse of biological niches are things like climate change, volcanic eruptions, the shifting courses of rivers, as well as catastrophic events like asteroid or meteor impacts.

¹¹² Holland, 33, 35. "Deleuze and Guattari designate catatonia as a state of zero intensity: total breakdown; the syntheses extinguished completely: no connections, no recording, no subject," 35.

¹¹³ Or, as Blumenberg explains, "Once he has emerged from the regularity of a condition in which his behaviour was determined by his environment, the hominid creature has to deal with the failure of indicators and determinants of his behaviour, with the indeterminacy of what the constituent parts of his reality 'mean' for him. He begins to set up 'significances' [*Bedeutsamkeiten*] over and against the disappearance of strict meanings [*Bedeutungen*]," WM, 168. This implies that *immediately*, the response to emergence and *angst* is the re-configuration of desire through the 'invention' of a new —symbolic— code.

¹¹⁴ Nietzsche, WP, #498, 273.

¹¹⁵ Anticipating the discussion below on 'desire-as-lack', one might say that, viewed from a certain perspective, the confrontation with the absolutism of reality is a condition of 'absolute lack' producing fear. However, this condition is momentary, and merely a perspective, for, as Blumenberg notes, the 'reality' of the pre-human/human condition is merely that "man's potential power is unknown, unexplored, untested." Blumenberg, Myth, 9. Thus desire overcomes fear, just as the Hindu creation myth has it. Desire overcoming fear, on notes, is the opposite of Freud's formula, wherein fear represses desire. Campbell contains a good account of the contrast in MGOrM, 14-15.

¹¹⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 12, Holland, 29.

¹¹⁷ Deleuze, NP, 39. Positing consciousness as the means of breaking free of instinctual determination might imply validation of the traditional western view holding that consciousness and 'reason' are superior to the body, and that conscious thought controls and subdues the body. As will perhaps become clearer below, I am positing the inverse. Consciousness is a *tool* the human employs for dealing with 'what it is' (Blumenberg). However, if one insists upon placing a *value* on it, then Nietzsche's valuation is the

correct one. As Deleuze writes, "In Nietzsche consciousness is always the consciousness of an inferior in relation to a superior to which he is subordinated or into which he is 'incorporated'." Nietzsche relates this to the master/slave dichotomy; here, the 'superior' is not a human 'master', but the absolutism of reality.

¹¹⁸ Campbell describes the Pithecanthropus as the quintessential economic pragmatist and materialist. MGPM, 389.

¹¹⁹ Deleuze, NP, 49-51.

¹²⁰ Deleuze, NP, 49-50.

¹²¹ Deleuze, NP, 50-51

¹²² Deleuze, NP, 50.

¹²³ Deleuze, NP, 49-50. Butler, in her critique of Deleuze, charges that Deleuze (in following Nietzsche) implies an 'originary' form of desire free of social or cultural coding, given that he imagines a "tantalising 'beyond' to culturally instituted desire, the promise of liberation" or nomadic desire totally freed from social coding. Thus Butler claims that Deleuze is not "thoroughly freed of metaphysical aspirations for desire." Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1987), 216. The Anti-Oedipus, I would suggest, argues quite the opposite, showing that human desire is *always* coded — somehow. Deleuze and Guattari say, "*There is only desire and the social and nothing else*", and "Desire always remains in close touch with the conditions of objective existence; it embraces them and follows them, shifts when they shift, *and does not outlive them*." (Italics mine), 29, 27. Deleuze's position is further illustrated in Nietzsche and Philosophy, as noted above. Desire, or will-to-power as the multiplicity of forces, is the energetic life principle and as such is not coded. It is *energy*, power, force and vigour. However, desire operates in a material/organic world; that is, desire is always manifested as desire *for* something. Desire is externalised thereby becoming subject to coding insofar as desire seeks to establish a link, a relationship with the object desired. To this degree, it is possible to say that desire codes (represses) itself. On the other hand, it is possible to say that culture does not code desire itself, but that instead social coding *intervenes* in and attempts to determine the interplay of the *forces* that comprise 'desire'. Butler interprets Deleuze as positing desire free from cultural inscription. But this view demands a concept of desire that transcends, and could function apart from, any conditions of objective existence which contradicts Deleuze's emphasis on *function*, desiring connections, and the insistence on 'desire and the social'

¹²⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, AQ, 5.

¹²⁵ Tamsin Lorraine, Irigaray and Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 118, *cf.* Anti-Oedipus, 3-4.

¹²⁶ Indeed, large numbers of organisms develop interdependencies: plants depend on bees for pollination, monarch butterflies on milkweed, harvester ants 'herd' and 'milk' a species of aphid for their food, while protecting the aphids from predators. One species deprived of the other results in species death for both organisms.

¹²⁷ Lorraine, 77.

¹²⁸ Radical environmental change could be 'global', such as that hypothesised by palaeontology with respect to the meteor collision that led to the extinction of the dinosaurs. Change could be more local, as with the extinction of species such as the sabre-toothed cat caused climatic changes resulting in the deforestation of the American mid and south-west and the decline of the cat's prey animals. On the other hand, environmental change resulting in species extinction, as we now realise, can be human-engineered.

¹²⁹ The process of mutation does not end with *Homo sapiens* but continues within the 'limits of the (species) form' producing abundant variety. Biological science distinguishes species according to their ability to mate and produce offspring with one another. By this definition, there is but one 'human' species. However, within the species and the limits of its form, and over time, there has been and continues to be much variation in terms of height, weight, and physical strength, not to mention skin and hair colour, etc. Much of this variation in modernity is due, it will be granted, to nutrition, especially to higher protein diets and dedicated exercise programs that transform the body. Nevertheless, that modern humans regularly reach heights of over six and one-half feet and weigh over 275 pounds can be attributed to genetic potential (adaptability) and environmental factors.

¹³⁰ Colebrook, Deleuze, 77.

¹³¹ One might argue that hominid evolution speaks to instability and more or less constant change, arguing that all pre homo sapiens species are the 'failures' that were unable to create a stable relationship among genetic adaptation, culture and environment. One might point to *Homo sapiens* as the only successful experiment given that it is the only one of the eighteen or so hominid species that survives. But

this view ignores the fact that, of all eighteen species, homo sapiens is not only the most recent, *but the shortest lived*, appearing less than 100,000 years ago. Neanderthal dominated the hominid world for over 200,000 years, Pithecanthropus for some 400,000 years.

¹³² Wallace, in his introduction to Blumenberg's *Work on Myth*, notes the similarity between Freud's view of the 'state of nature' and that of Hobbes. I would suggest that Hobbes' view is more nuanced than that of Freud, but Wallace is correct insofar as both Freud and Hobbes relate the state of nature to 'instinctual' existence. Blumenberg, *WM*, viii-ix.

¹³³ That is, as noted above, psychoanalysis rejects the Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari view — and my argument — that 'becoming human' is breaking free of the instinctual 'pre-coding', wherein desire is cathected to particular objects as sources of satisfaction. I argue that the human tactic involves seeking out potential new sources of satisfaction.

¹³⁴ Colebrook, *Deleuze*, 76-77.

¹³⁵ Wallace, "Translator's Introduction", Blumenberg, *WM*, xv. In other words, *Eros* remains as an operator; formerly, however, *Eros* operated instinctually, unconsciously, axiomatically to make desiring connections. But the 'natural' state for the pre-human/human is something of a contradiction: if *Eros* continues to operate as formerly, and only thus, the organism's survival is threatened. Put simply, it can no longer connect to objects of satisfaction it knew (e.g., forest fare), and it can no longer rely on re-programmed responses to save it from threats in the environment — there were no lions or hyenas in the forest.

¹³⁶ The privileging of 'social' over genetic or biological factors is not, however, a simple either/or proposition.

¹³⁷ Blumenberg, *WM*, xv, 169.

¹³⁸ Loraine, 77.

¹³⁹ The terms 'empirical', 'abstract' and 'pragmatic', like the earlier note on 'consciousness', present difficulties. The term 'empirical' is here used to denote the process of observation in a purposive-rational sense, as this is related to pragmatism and pragmatic cultural-economic practices. The pre-human and early human observes a thing, asking firstly, 'does it work?' (e.g., to satisfy desire). 'Abstract' here refers to the ability to record (on a body-without-organs) empirical observation in memory, e.g., to recall 'that did not work, but this did, and if it worked once it probably will work again.' See Deleuze on "transcendental empiricism", *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, tr CV Boudas (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1991), and Colebrook, *Deleuze*, 87.

¹⁴⁰ That is, the difference observed between the pre-human/human and other animals goes beyond the rudimentary 'inside/outside' distinction noted by Deleuze and Guattari, and referred to above.

¹⁴¹ Blumenberg, *WM*, x.

¹⁴² I am not offering an opinion on the degree of severity of angst in pre-humans. However, even if one were to assume the most acute angst possible, there is again no evidence to support the view that angst imprints the primitive unconscious *genetically* as 'traces' that manifest in modern humans as 'separation anxiety', agoraphobia or other 'existential' symptoms of neurosis. Regardless of how attractive or seductive such a theory is, it represents simply another version of a metaphysical 'origin hypothesis', and like originary Oedipus, would be pure speculation.

¹⁴³ Colebrook, *Deleuze*, 77.

¹⁴⁴ Blumenberg, *WM*, 165.

¹⁴⁵ Blumenberg, *WM*, x.

Notes for Chapter II

¹⁴⁶ Nietzsche, *GoM*, II, #14, 82.

¹⁴⁷ Marcuse, *Eros*, 56-60.

¹⁴⁸ Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon sites show that cannibalism is practiced on males and females, adults and children. See Campbell, *MGPM*, 171-182. The contemporary Marind-amin of New Guinea practice a form of cannibalism wherein a young man and young woman are selected, killed in the act of coitus, then roasted as food for a type of 'New Years' feast. See Campbell, *HAWM*, 61-69. Other cultures (so-called 'head-hunters') ritually consume captives of a hunt or battle. In addition, on occasion, cannibalism is practised in times of famine; the latter certainly has little connection with Oedipus.

¹⁴⁹ These practices, of course, almost certainly have more archaic antecedents, and similar practices related to a ritual slaying of the 'sacred ancestor', chief, or 'god' are to be found in most primitive cultures.

See Sir James G. Frazer, The Golden Bough: a Study in Magic and Religion, Abridged Edition, (London, UK: Papermac/Macmillan, 1987), 79, 96, 117 *passim*.

¹⁵⁰ I continue to be puzzled by the fact that Freud ignores both Marx and Weber in writings like Civilisation and Its Discontents to offer some insight into the unique character of modern experience, particularly since both Marx and Weber at very least *imply* a re-configuring of the unconscious as the product of changed social relations. The Frankfurt School, of course, combines Marx with psychoanalysis in an interrogation of the psychology of the modern through a comparison with pre-modern experience. However, only with Walter Benjamin's *Arcades Project* is an attempt made to construct a philosophy of history of modernity that includes 'depth analyses' pertaining to the re-structuring or reconfiguration of unconscious experience.

¹⁵¹ Freud studies 'primitive' repression in Totem and Taboo. The book more or less establishes the methodology used thereafter by ethnographic psychoanalysis (e.g., Geza Róheim), wherein the science seeks out primitive cultures untouched by the influences of modern, or other major civilisations, in the attempt to find humans in conditions as close as possible to the 'state of nature'. If one assumes that contemporary primitive societies function similarly to pre-historic *socius*, then the work can be termed 'historical'. However, my complaint is that classical psychoanalysis eschews the study of *documented* ancient civilisations as a test of the Oedipal repressive hypothesis. Using the major civilisation model, ancient Egypt might be compared with classical Greece or the Indian Indus civilisation, or it might compare the 'ancient', and 'medieval' manifestations of Oedipus. Indeed, given Freud's confinement of Oedipus in its specifically *religious* expression to the Judeo-Christian complex, one would think psychoanalysis would find interesting a study of instinct repression that compares pre-Christian with medieval and modern Europe. One cannot rightly construct a 'history' of instinct repression by ignoring most of history.

¹⁵² See Catherine Belsey, Poststructuralism: a Very Short Introduction, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 28-31.

¹⁵³ Marcuse implies as much. Eros, 59-61. Blumenberg is more explicit, stating that Freud's hypotheses and myths relate to one another in a "multiple concentric fashion", WM, 86. The repression and guilt complex is named for a myth, the unconscious functions 'mythically' (dreams, fantasies, etc.). Furthermore, myth serves to 'naturalise' psychoanalytic theory, thus Freud uses myth in Barthes' sense as well (see below). Overall, however, the historicisation of the *pre-history* of instinct repression relies on myth. For Freud, the actual *history* of instinct repression begins with Moses. Everything in between the primeval horde and Moses is 'latency' and therefore not 'history'.

¹⁵⁴ I will deal more fully in Chapter III with the argument that the generic content and meaning of psychoanalysis' theories are precisely the theologically constructed content and meaning contained in the Bible. Of course, psychoanalysis might merely invert this statement by asserting that the Bible contains the essence of the generic mythic meaning that structures the unconscious.

¹⁵⁵ Belsey, 31.

¹⁵⁶ Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism, tr Philip Mairet (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 14-15; (hereafter Images)

¹⁵⁷ Eliade, Images, 15.

¹⁵⁸ Eliade, Images, 15.

¹⁵⁹ Deleuze and Guattari refer to the "segregation of domains", AQ, 3, 360; Holland, 18-19.

¹⁶⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, AQ, 3, 140, 154.

¹⁶¹ Deleuze and Guattari, AQ, 140.

¹⁶² Bataille, Theory of Religion, tr Robert Hurley, (New York, NY: Zone Books/MIT Press, 1989), 33; (hereafter ToR). Bataille's description corresponds, adds weight to Blumenberg's concept of the 'Absolutism of Reality', and helps to support Blumenberg's contention that confrontation with this Absolute produces overwhelming *angst*.

¹⁶³ Deleuze and Guattari, AQ, 140.

¹⁶⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, AQ, 141.

¹⁶⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, AQ, 141.

¹⁶⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, AQ, 154.

¹⁶⁷ Despite the fact that the Earth is described here as a 'unity', I think Bataille is somewhat premature in attributing to early peoples the desire to conceive, behind and beneath the creative unity, some idea of a 'Supreme being', if the emphasis is placed on the word 'being'. Bataille might be read as implying that a monotheistic impulse or 'idea' is conceived at the moment of emergence or 'awakening'; I do not think this

was Bataille's intention. Given his work in attempting to construct a bio-energetic model of production, one might suggest 'force' or 'energy' be inserted in place of 'being'.

¹⁶⁸ Colebrook, Deleuze, 77.

¹⁶⁹ Functionally, in practical terms, the 'return' to the plane of immanence, or fusion with the full body of the Earth implies the dissolution of the organism through its death.

¹⁷⁰ Bataille, ToR, 52-53.

¹⁷¹ Bataille, ToR, 50.

¹⁷² Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 142.

¹⁷³ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 164.

¹⁷⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 164.

¹⁷⁵ This limit, I will concede, might include 'repression' in the form of 'thou shalt not desire *that*, shall not have *that*, touch *that*, consume *that*, etc. In other words, objects can be marked with a negative injunction and still be territorialised by the socius, and therefore be considered *within* the limits of the socius. However, first and foremost the limit is determined by the limits of differentiation. Objects that the socius has differentiated, and marked, are those objects that the socius has determined are necessary to be differentiated and marked. For a thing to become prohibited and desire for it repressed, it first must be differentiated, marked, and coded as such by the socius. Repression cannot precede social coding. Otherwise, any object (or practice) that has not been marked would be considered 'taboo' only in the sense that it is not within the territory of the socius.

¹⁷⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 142.

¹⁷⁷ However, the coding of all production as reproduction 'does not imply that all production is related to' sex drives and incest taboo, as psychoanalysis will have it. See below. The Marind-amin practices outlined by Campbell in HAWM support the Deleuze and Guattari claim that the 'incest prohibition' is *positive*, that is, to encourage the extension of kinship alliances, under primitive territorialisation.

¹⁷⁸ Bataille, ToR, 35.

¹⁷⁹ Bataille, ToR, 35.

¹⁸⁰ Blumenberg, WM, x-xi.

¹⁸¹ Blumenberg, WM, xi. Granting that confrontation with the absolutism of reality is a condition of absolute deterritorialisation producing angst, fragmentation/division then serves a purpose that is at once psychological and practical. Psychologically, angst is not overcome simply by anthropomorphising or personifying the Absolute (Numen); it remains the Absolute, it remains 'chaosmos'. Blumenberg uses the Greek pantheon to illustrate the point, noting that the absolute is divided not only into male and female deities, but fragmented into a rich pantheon. He notes that even the 'high' god Zeus is not omnipotent but shares power with goddesses and lesser male deities. Thus, the human being need not appeal only to Zeus —and Zeus is not expected to be all things to all people at all times —and Zeus is less 'terrible' as a result. Moreover, the fragmentation of the deity into aspects reflects (and may be seen as a product of), actual material conditions of social production — hence, hunter-gatherer societies 'discover' deities of trees, deities that give the gift of and that watch over the home fire, or protect the hunter on the hunt, agricultural societies produce corn gods, the discovery of metallurgy results in blacksmith gods, etc.

¹⁸² I use the Egyptian concept *maat* here as the principle, rather than that of the deity — though one is interchangeable with the other. *Maat* as a personification is an aspect of the 'Great Mother' Goddess. As a principle, *maat*, according to Hornung, "is the order, the just measure of things, that underlies the world; it is the perfect state of things toward which one should strive and which is in harmony with the creator god's intentions. This state is always being disturbed, and unremitting effort is necessary in order to recreate it in its original purity." Erik Hornung, Conceptions of God in Ancient Egypt: the One and the Many, tr John Baines, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 213. On *Maat* as goddess, see Hornung, 46, 74-75. One notes, in addition, that the process of identifying and personifying different aspects of the Goddess (as well as the God) is precisely the process of fragmentation.

¹⁸³ The phrase 'breathing space', or 'space for breath', is I think, conveys the ancient idea of the purpose of culture. An Egyptian Middle Kingdom poem is striking in this regard: divine action creates air, then nourishment, equality of opportunity, intercourse with the realms of the dead and the gods — that is, *life*, symbolised by the *ankh* hieroglyph. Air/breath enters the nose of human beings, dilating and liberating the soul. This is divine action. *The human response* to divine action is the obligation to *create culture* — a territory for the socius — as the means to maintain 'space for breath'. Of course, this formulation also helps explain the preoccupation in most mythic complexes and religions (including the biblical) with 'breath', 'wind', and 'spirit'. See Hornung, 198-200.

¹⁸⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 142.

¹⁸⁵ Freud himself does not make this assumption explicit. However, his examination of primitive culture in *Totem and Taboo* centres on those cultures that remain (more or less) in a hunter-gatherer stage, and of course, the implication is that primal hordes are hunter-gatherers. Furthermore, Freud cannot be totally unaware (having read, and cited, Sir James G Frazer's work) that the goddess dominates the mythologies of planting/agricultural societies — hence, I assume, Freud's contention that matriarchy displaces the original patriarchy.

¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, gendering the earth female—and the primacy of the goddess as a female 'life-giver' and germinal principle— does not indicate that the nuclear family is to be privileged as the template for the socius. Placing the matriarch at the head of a triangle Mommy-Daddy-me, calling this 'natural' and the patriarchy 'un-natural' is simply an inversion Freud's (and Norman O Brown's) notion of nuclear family as the natural social unit. The following sections attempt to make the case for alternative modes of organisation.

¹⁸⁷ I refer to Barbara Walker's *Restoring the Goddess* (New York, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000), and Monica Sjöö's (with Barbara Mor) *The Great Cosmic Mother: Rediscovering the religion of the Earth*, (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1991). Sjöö, in part, bases her contentions on the fact that all human beings, in the foetus stage, are created 'female'. Thus, like Freud, the attempt is made to establish a biological, or 'natural' basis for an ideology of culture and social organisation. Walker's project is ambitious, but its method is nevertheless familiar to the mythologist. Walker appropriates the biblical Genesis template, but then borrows (re-coding and over-coding) elements from diverse mythic complexes (Hindu/Buddhist, classical Greek, and Sumerian-Babylonian, in the attempt to create a new, feminist 'mono-myth.'

¹⁸⁸ Eliade, *Images*, 14.

¹⁸⁹ Eliade, *Images*, 14-15.

¹⁹⁰ See my Chapter I

¹⁹¹ Campbell *MGPM*, 287.

¹⁹² Campbell *MGPM*, 315. The most famous of these statues is perhaps the 'Venus of Laussel', carved in bas-relief as the central figure of a hunting shrine. She is shown with great hips and large breasts. In her right hand, she holds a buffalo horn lifted to shoulder level, while her left hand rests on her protruding belly. Traces of ochre remain, indicating she was once painted red to further symbolise her fertility. A number of other figurines are found at the site, along with rocks carved in the image of female genitalia. A reconstruction suggests a birth scene, which includes a lithe male figure perhaps throwing a spear or javelin.

¹⁹³ Campbell I: 372.

¹⁹⁴ Campbell I: 372.

¹⁹⁵ Marija Gimbutas, *The Living Goddesses*, ed MR Dexter, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 117-118.

¹⁹⁶ In the earliest mythic complexes it would seem that males understand that their bodies cannot germinate life, thus marking a clear distinction between the sexes. But there is no evidence that at this point males of the species find this *fact* particularly problematic. Instead, the aim seems to be to create for them a meaningful role in the drama of the life process — that is, in supporting its generation. For, it is all too obvious that males in hunting societies *take* life. For the attitudes toward death in primitive hunting societies, see Leo Frobenius in Campbell, Vol. 1. However, I note here that the self-consciousness of males pertaining to their *supportive* role in the process of life germination provides a glimpse into the rationale for the later development of mythologies of *ressentiment* that supplant and defame the role of the goddess as Creator.

¹⁹⁷ Gimbutas, 118-119.

¹⁹⁸ Campbell *MGPM*, 389.

¹⁹⁹ Bataille, *ToR*, 28-30, 37-40.

²⁰⁰ This division of the unity idea is similar to themes found in Lacan. See Elizabeth Grosz, *Jacques Lacan: a feminist introduction*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990). However, it is my understanding that Lacan claims the infant experiences itself as 'fragmented body', a result of the loss of symbiosis through entry into the 'symbolic' is with the infant's own mother, suggesting an individualised psychological or psychic condition. The myths, together with a reading of Bataille and Deleuze and Guattari, suggests a 'biosocial' condition, that, apart from cultural inscription, will be experienced by a child first and foremost as a material condition of desiring production. The birth trauma *is* a trauma. Infant dependency *is* a dependency, but again, all depends on how the experience is 'read', and the reading is dependent on the social code.

- ²⁰¹ This same anguish is duplicated in rituals of sacrifice.
- ²⁰² Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 140.
- ²⁰³ Bataille, ToR, 53.
- ²⁰⁴ Here again however, this 're-connection' is not a "retroactive fantasy of pre-oedipal, non-lacking body associated with oceanic bliss of a symbiotic union with the mother . . ." Lorraine, 121.
- ²⁰⁵ For a thorough explanation of how males' rites become elaborated, rationalised and abstracted, see Campbell, MGPM.
- ²⁰⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 154.
- ²⁰⁷ Bataille, ToR, 53.
- ²⁰⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 154.
- ²⁰⁹ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 140-141.
- ²¹⁰ Relates to Nietzsche's mnemotechnics. See Nietzsche, GM, Essay II, #4, 5, 7 *passim*. See also Deleuze, NP, 129-131.
- ²¹¹ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 141.
- ²¹² Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 154.
- ²¹³ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 154.
- ²¹⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 154. ,
- ²¹⁵ That is, Freud and ethnographic psychoanalysis err in their notion that primitives conceive of the totem as the embodiment of the Numen and a 'cause' in itself. The 'primitives' understand —as Freud apparently did not— that the totem too is a 'mask', a metaphor.
- ²¹⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 154-155.
- ²¹⁷ With regard to dismembering, Deleuze and Guattari provide the example of the circumcision of males. AO, 154-5
- ²¹⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 155.
- ²¹⁹ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 155.
- ²²⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 155.
- ²²¹ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 155.
- ²²² Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 155.
- ²²³ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 142.
- ²²⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 142.
- ²²⁵ Again, Egyptian *Ma'at* and Hindu *dharma*.
- ²²⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 142.
- ²²⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 144.
- ²²⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 144.
- ²²⁹ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 144, and 144n3.
- ²³⁰ Bataille, ToR 51-52. Included in the quote, Bataille remarks, "and it is essentially the fact of being an individual that fuels his anguish." One might be tempted to see something of Heidegger here, relating to Dasein's 'thrown-ness' into the world, the agony of being an individual being related to the understanding that 'individuality' is 'being toward death.' Alternatively, given Bataille's close readings of Hegel, the quote might echo Hegel's exploration of 'self-consciousness' in The Phenomenology of Spirit. See John Russon, The Self and the Body in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 54-59. However, I read Bataille's meaning here as specifically referring to the fact that primitive social inscription is designed to eradicate 'individuality' in the modern (liberal) sense. Under savage coding, the individual is precisely the *unmarked* organ-machine. His/her organs are not incorporated into the socius. In sacrifice, the person selected has his/her organs 'disconnected' from the social machine, thus becomes (temporarily) individualised (and objectified) — hence his/her anguish.
- ²³¹ FW Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, ed Keith-Ansell-Pearson, tr Carol Diethe, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), II, #20, 66; (hereafter, GoM). See also Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 144-145.
- ²³² Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 45.
- ²³³ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 145. The Egyptian word 'nome' (*'ndt*) carries the sense of 'name' (nomen) and refers at once to a specific location, or geographic area, but has the sense of incorporating geographic or topographical features —likewise the names of the local deities. The practice is illustrative, in my view, of the impact of *paideumatic* influences as part of inscription practices of territorialisation. For example, the chief god of the town Herakleopolis is *Hrjsf* meaning 'he who is on his lake', and the goddess Pakhet, meaning 'tearer apart' is depicted as a lioness at the mouths of wadis that are dangerous during times of flooding. See Hornung, 72-73.

- ²³⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 144.
- ²³⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 144-145.
- ²³⁶ The mythical-religious order: e.g., New Guinean *Dema*, Hindu *dharma*, Egyptian *Maat* as an aspect of Hathor.
- ²³⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 196.
- ²³⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 198.
- ²³⁹ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 194.
- ²⁴⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 194-195. Deleuze and Guattari seem to imply here that barbarian despotism is the regime that creates infinite debt. But in fact, as they make clear later in the text, certain other transmutations must take place first, specifically, the shift from oral tradition to written law. See AO, 200-216. In terms of how the barbarian despotic regimes actually function, debt remains limited.
- ²⁴¹ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 194.
- ²⁴² Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 145-6
- ²⁴³ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 192.
- ²⁴⁴ Nietzsche, GoM, II #17, 63.
- ²⁴⁵ One can only speculate with regard to what — or rather whom — precisely Nietzsche has in mind with his characterisation of the ‘blond beast’ — historical figures like Attila or Genghis Khan, perhaps. However, history does provide early examples, and surely, Sargon I of Akkad (c. 2350 BCE) is the archetype or the template for the barbarian despot. Sargon’s regime puts an end to and fundamentally reconfigures the earlier Sumerian order, and, thereafter, despite shifts in the Mesopotamian centre of influence from Kish to Nippur to Babylon, to Nineveh and back to Babylon, the *form* of the state as a regime of over-coding remains the same in the region until Alexander’s conquest in the 4th century BCE. For material on Sargon I and his legitimating myth, see JG Pritchard, The Ancient Near East in Text and Pictures, Vol. 1, “The legend of Sargon”, 85, and Georges Roux, Ancient Iraq, 122 *et seq.* The Sargon legend also provides the template for the idea of the ‘hidden’ or ‘disguised’ prince that is re-configured in both the Moses and Jesus stories.
- ²⁴⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 192-3
- ²⁴⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 194.
- ²⁴⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 194.
- ²⁴⁹ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 194.
- ²⁵⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 154. ,
- ²⁵¹ The Mesopotamian or ‘Oriental’ formula — which is adopted and adapted by the pre-Christian Roman empire — stands in marked contrast to the Egyptian, where the living Pharaoh is the embodiment of the eternal Pharaonic principle. The latter is equated with Horus as the divine son-consort of the all-mother goddess Hathor. See Hornung, 43-49, 110-115 *et. seq.*, and Campbell, MGOm, 45-60.
- ²⁵² Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 198.
- ²⁵³ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 154-155.
- ²⁵⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 155.
- ²⁵⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 155.
- ²⁵⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 194.
- ²⁵⁷ The Assyrian empire stretched from the present day Iran/Iraq border into Turkey and Egypt.
- ²⁵⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 154-155, 194-195.
- ²⁵⁹ See Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share: an Essay on General Economy, Vol.1: Consumption, tr. Robert Hurley, (New York, NY: Zone Books), 1991. In Chapter 3, “Sacrifices and Wars of the Aztecs.” Bataille focuses on Aztec practices, and the theory certainly applies; I add the Maya, whose practices were very similar, and just as ‘luxurious.’ This fact would have been unknown to Bataille, as many of the more important archaeological discoveries (and certainly the analysis) of Mayan cultural practices are more recent. If I am not mistaken, during the period when Bataille wrote The Accursed Share, the prevailing view of the Maya held that they were quite different from the Aztecs.
- ²⁶⁰ Campbell, HAWM, 60f.
- ²⁶¹ Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 142.
- ²⁶² I refer to the fact that *literal* sacrifice, particularly that involving the king/queen, their court and all worldly goods, where individual persons are actually killed, is abolished through a form of abstraction. Sacrificial practices involving human figures are not, of course, ‘abolished’ in the mythic or religious sense, in that myth and religion legitimate practices of ‘substitution’. In some cases, a slave or other ‘volunteer’ is sacrificed in the king’s place. Alternatively — as seen in later forms of high Neolithic civilisations (e.g., Egyptian practice from the late Old Kingdom through to the New Kingdom) —

sacrifice (especially ritual regicide) is performed *symbolically*, e.g., the Egyptian rite of "The Secret of the Two Partners" and the Akkadian/Babylonian New Year festival wherein the king (or a substitute) is crowned with thorns, symbolically whipped and slain as representative of his people, in atonement for their sins, thereby ensuring a prosperous new year. See Campbell, *MGO&M*, 75-77, 30-34. Psychologically, substitution may function efficaciously, so long as the observers *believe* it is efficacious. Substitution requires a 'suspension of disbelief', though to be sure even primitive rites linking the socius to the Numen require a degree of suspension of disbelief. The difference, I think, pertains to how the socius is obliged to orient itself with regard to the rite. Rites of *actual* sacrifice involve the physical *participation* of members of the socius, thereby implicating both mind and body; they perpetrate the killing, and partake of the feast. Rites of substitution involving the socius primarily as observers; their participation in the rite is vicarious, and the effect is primarily psychological.

²⁶³ Potentially, the entire system of marking, inscription and linking to the full body is destroyed, precipitating a crisis.

²⁶⁴ However, here *angst* is not the confrontation of newly awakened consciousness with an absolutism of reality that is a hitherto un-coded realm of absolute deterritorialisation. At the moment of emergence, the code that fails is the instinctual code. Here is it the failure of cultural code. It is not the organism as species (species being) that is threatened but the social organism. The socius experiences a failure of 'our' code.

²⁶⁵ Holland, 72.

²⁶⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, *AO*, 203.

²⁶⁷ Bataille, *ToR*, 53.

²⁶⁸ The ordering of events in the text of Exodus places the bacchanalian festival (Ex 32: 1-29) *after* the covenant-making, law-giving event (Ex 20). However, it seems clear that it takes place *before*, and must be associated with a 'threat' appearing in Ex 19:24. The festival holds the promise (and/or threat) of, and is clearly designed to engineer, a breakthrough of the Numen (Yahweh); that is, the festival will allow the people to "come up" the mountain into Yahweh's presence. However, Yahweh commands: "do not allow the priests and people to break through to come up to Yahweh, or he may burst out against them." Yet this 'bursting out', while certainly dangerous, is precisely the point of the festival. Thus the threat (of death) is also a promise of at-one-ment. The promise of at-one-ment is subverted: to prevent the people from 'coming up' Moses introduces the Law. Precisely here there is a shift from "territorial representation" to "despotic representation." Again, see Deleuze and Guattari, *AO*, 200-216.

²⁶⁹ Exodus 33: 19-21. There is a second tradition of 'covenant making' associated with the events at Sinai [Exodus 24.1, 9-11], wherein 70 elders are brought to the summit of the mountain, with Moses and Aaron (the inclusion of Aaron, possibly even Moses, may be a later interpolation), and 'meet' face-to-face with Yahweh, and there partake of a feast with Yahweh Himself. The fact that the Elders 'see' Yahweh, seemingly contradicts the warning Yahweh gives to Moses, "no human being can see me and survive" [Ex 33.20]. Furthermore, the book of Exodus implies that this event takes place after, and is subsidiary to the primary covenant-making events [Ex 19-20] which culminate with the law-giving ceremony (the Decalogue or Ten Commandments). Accordingly, some biblical scholars view the episode with the Elders merely as 'ratification' of the covenant, or merely as an 'alternative' narrative to the Decalogue. See Samuel Sandmel, *The Hebrew Scriptures*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1978), 383. Buber takes a different view. He considers the Elders' ceremony as "no pure cult act but cultic 'pre-state' act." More than a law giving 'contract', it indicates "YHWH unites himself with Israel into a political, theo-political unity..." Martin Buber, *Moses, the Revelation and the Covenant*, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989), 115. The Elders' meal, rather than the events associated with giving the Law and swearing allegiance to Yahweh, is considered by Buber to be the primary, 'primal', or at any rate 'deeper' covenant (*brit*) making event. I agree in this sense. Notwithstanding Buber's contention that the event is *not* a 'pure cultic act', the event resembles savage coding and sacrificial practices in two important ways. Firstly, it involves the *participation* of the socius, who share the 'boon' or gift of the deity, and the gift is distributed *horizontally*. Secondly, the event involves the *breakthrough of the Numen*; the Numen appears *in the midst* of the socius. The issue, then, is not the contradiction between the Elders experience of Yahweh's presence and the text that warns of the danger of seeing Yahweh's 'face', but the fact that the latter gives Moses' *exclusive* access to the Numen. As we have seen, the Numen is always dangerous, a contagion. The acts of law-giving and exclusive access are indicative of the despotic form (as Freud's link between Moses and the Oedipus complex implies), whereas the Elder's ceremony is indicative of the savage form. Mosaic covenant of law-giving is strictly despotic in form. Here then, as in so many other

instances in the Pentateuch, the text retains narratives reflecting traditions and memories of primitive territorialisation.

²⁷⁰ Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, tr. RM Wallace, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 148-154.

²⁷¹ Bataille, *ToR*, 57-59.

²⁷² The prime example is the Babylonian-Akkadian despotic re-configuration of the creation cycle. In its earlier Sumerian form, the goddess Tiamat brings forth all forms, and the forms themselves are 'good' and representative of the order of creation; the high god Anu appears as a more or less passive fertility principle. In the revision/inversion, Tiamat is represented as a monster, giving birth to monstrous chaotic forms; the inefficacious Anu and pantheon of 'father' gods send the 'son' hero-warrior god Marduk to subdue and slay Tiamat. Marduk creates the world and orderly forms from her carcass. See Joseph Campbell, *The Masks of God. Volume III: Occidental Mythology*, Toronto, ON: Penguin Books, 1991), 81-83; (hereafter *MGOccM*).

Notes for Chapter III

²⁷³ Nietzsche, *GoM*, III, #20, 110.

²⁷⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, *AO*, 139-140.

²⁷⁵ For all intents and purposes, Moses is considered the founder, and is certainly the key figure, for Freud's historicisation, notwithstanding his theory that Moses' monotheism itself is 'originated' by the Pharaoh Akhenaten. Freud, *MM*, 22-26.

²⁷⁶ Freud, *MM*, 108-109, 117. To this limited degree, Freud follows Nietzsche. The 'origin' of 'bad conscience', and beginnings of the sense of guilt as the fundamental elements of (modern) social coding (Oedipus), are to be located in the Jewish experience. The agreement ends here, however. For Nietzsche, 'bad conscience' is a product of sociogenesis (genealogy), while for Freud sociogenesis is determined by ontology (psychology). According to Nietzsche's genealogical analysis, Jewish bad conscience, resentment, and the reactive re-valuation of values leading to the Christian inscription of guilt (as 'original sin') and infinite debt are products of Jewish and Christian social history. The product of social conditions, circumstances and accidents of history that might, in fact, be replicated elsewhere.

²⁷⁷ Freud, *MM*, 108f.

²⁷⁸ Of course, no account of the genealogy and social production of guilt is complete without an interrogation of Christianity and its theological transformations. An examination of the Christian sense of guilt must be preceded by an critique of the later Second Temple period of Judaism which takes into account the influences of Persian (Zoroastrian) religion, Hellenistic philosophy, and the socio-economic and political conditions of the Hellenistic, Maccabean and Roman periods. Clearly, the continuation of the genealogy into the Christian era and beyond would make the thesis of an even more unwieldy length. It is my intention, however, to complete the genealogy at a future date.

²⁷⁹ And taking with it too the 'historical' associations between Mosaic religion and its Egyptian origins in the Aten ('Adonai') religion of the Pharaoh Akhenaten.

²⁸⁰ Freud, *CD*, 88.

²⁸¹ Freud, *MM*, 108-109.

²⁸² See my Chapter I.

²⁸³ Once again, one is compelled to remark on Freud's particular use of the *if... then* logic. *If* Oedipal guilt is the universal content of the unconscious, *then* monotheistic religion *must* appear. *If* monotheism appears, *then* it must be due to the return of the repressed unconscious material — though of course, *if* the content is repressed and latent, *then* human beings will always resist the return of the repressed. Thus, *if* all cultures do not produce monotheism, *then* it is due to repression and latency. In any event, as Deleuze and Guattari say, we are all Oedipalised ... and religiously, we are all monotheists.

²⁸⁴ See Freud, *MM*, 30, n1. Freud admits he uses biblical evidence in "an autocratic and arbitrary way", and only draws on it "for confirmation whenever it is convenient." He understands, he says, that he is vulnerable to criticism concerning his method, but defends the method by claiming the biblical material is not trustworthy.

²⁸⁵ As usual in dealing with Freud, this paragraph has 'double meanings'. I will attempt to show that 'Oedipus' is the creation of Second Temple Jewish theology, necessarily implying that Oedipus is the creation of religion, and oedipal guilt is a religious-social product. Additionally, however, psychoanalysis

creates Oedipus as a 'secular' religion — and its attempt is just as deliberate and self-conscious as that of its priestly predecessors. The difficulties in creating a 'mono-theory' of psychoanalysis are the same as attempting to create a mono-religious doctrine. Religion splits into numerous, and warring, sects and denominations, psychoanalysis splits into 'schools'. Additionally, if one were to place Freud in the role of analyst, one might discover that Oedipus is not the Greek Oedipus, but Moses, who stands as a symbol for Freud's own guilt related to his atheism perhaps? Freud rejects his Jewish heritage, thereby murdering Moses; he rejects religion period, thereby murdering God. The psychoanalytic hypothesis of universal guilt is Freud's atonement — "sausage for the goose..."

²⁸⁶ Note: unless otherwise noted, the version of the Bible quoted is The New Jerusalem Bible (NJB) (*Bible de Jérusalem*), (New York, NY: Darton, Longman & Todd and Doubleday, 1985). Abbreviations for biblical books follow the NJB format.

²⁸⁷ Freud relies on Ernst Sellin's 'exegesis' of Hosea, in which Sellin claims to find an allusion to the murder of Moses. See MM, 42-43. Otherwise, a murder of Moses is inferred from the account of a revolt against Moses (and Aaron) contained in Numbers 16.

²⁸⁸ For a more detailed examination of the evidence, see Israel Finkelstein, and NA Silberman, The Bible Unearthed: Archaeology's New Vision of Ancient Israel, (Toronto, ON: the Free Press/Simon and Schuster, 2001).

²⁸⁹ Siegfried Herrmann, A History of Israel in Old Testament Times, tr John Bowden (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1973), 59-62.

²⁹⁰ This is not to say there is not a large body of scholarship on the subject. However, the attempts to reconstruct, and verify, the historicity of the Exodus, Moses and the founding of his religious tradition, the wilderness period, and the so-called 'conquest' of Canaan remains a largely speculative exercise. It is characterised by monumental efforts to take a possibly related scintilla of historical data, or suggestive linguistic traces and read these through the biblical text. The *lack* of historical evidence supporting the biblical claims gives rise to a similar bewildering array of theories to explain the silence —including Freud's own work in Moses and Monotheism. On the whole, the impassive detachment of the historian is abandoned, giving rise to speculative accounts of Moses and the Exodus that are matched in number and imagination only by the quest for the historical Jesus.

²⁹¹ James B Pritchard, The Ancient Near East: a New Anthology of Texts and Pictures. Vol. 1, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 231.

²⁹² Georg Föhrer, History of Israelite Religion, tr David E. Green (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1972), 27-29.

²⁹³ This is "the period of the Kingdom" Nietzsche refers to in The Antichrist as the period in which "Israel too stood in a *correct*, that is to say natural relationship to all things." Nietzsche, AC, #25, 147. This statement might be considered an oversimplification, and, in light of the following genealogical analysis, somewhat inaccurate, as it speaks to but one religiously based relationship to things found in Israel during this period.

²⁹⁴ For example, Egypt of the Middle Kingdom period, following the expulsion of the Hyksôs, reconstituted itself as a despotic regime with a standing army (a first for Pharaonic Egypt), but retained ancient, 'savage' practices. The same pattern, with differences of emphasis, are observed in the Hittite and Assyrian empires.

²⁹⁵ There is an implied inter-dependency, of course, once the despotic regime has formed. Despot A protects local production against the predations of nomads, or worse, Despot B. The creation of an interdependency of this type is responsible, in part, for Nietzsche's (and the Deleuze and Guattari) observation that the fall of one dynasty or despotic regime does not entail a return to primitive territorialisation. Rather, one despotic regime is replaced by another. See Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 215.

²⁹⁶ Föhrer, 349. The term *mšiah yhw*, abbreviated as 'messiah', appears in this form at a later date, and is applied originally to the reigning king. However, the 'process' of anointing, in the Judges period, is more or less the same. The chosen person is seized by Yahweh's spirit as an indication of his election to leadership, and as a consequence, enters into a more intimate relationship with the deity. In later eschatological writings, of course, especially in the Christian interpretation, 'messiah' comes to mean something like 'divine saviour'.

²⁹⁷ See especially 1 K 18 and the 'Elijah Cycle.'

²⁹⁸ Föhrer, 37-38.

²⁹⁹ Freudians —and more conservative religious scholars — might hasten to point out that the patriarchal religion (of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob), antedates the period of the kinship alliance system of the tribal confederacy. The God of Israel is the nomad who goes with the patriarchs but is finally transported into

Egypt, and sojourns there with His people for over 400 years. The Book of Exodus has the God who reveals himself to Moses' claim that He is "the God of the Fathers", known at one time as *El Shaddai*, but here He calls Himself (apparently for the first time, according to Exodus 6.2) by His 'real' name, "Yahweh". In sum, conservative theology says Yahweh and the 'El' forms of the divine name refer to the same deity, thus Yahweh is 'the God of the Fathers' — indicating, moreover, that even the most ancient forms of Israelite religion are 'monotheistic'. I will answer this objection only briefly here.

Firstly, the linking, in Exodus, between the 'El' gods and Yahweh is a later addition to the text — inserted, no doubt, in response to post-exilic claims that the God of Moses was *not* the 'God of the Fathers'. An altogether different impression of the text [Exodus 3.13-15] is made when the Hebrew is examined. Buber states that the sense of the text is a question answered by a question; Moses asks, 'who are you? What is your name?' and the deity responds, 'Who do you think I am?'. In Hebrew, the deity then makes the statement, " 'ehyeh 'âšer 'ehyeh " translated variously as "I am he who is", or "I will be what/who I will be" and less accurately in the English (King James Bible) as "I am who I am. (Tell them I am has sent you.)". See Föhrer, 67-68.

Secondly, the Freudian's interest might be peaked upon seeing 'God' and 'Father' mentioned in the same formula. Like the priestly redactors of the Bible, Freud attempts to link Moses' Yahweh with the patriarchal gods. However, the archaic formula referring to the God of the patriarchs is *not* to be translated as "the God of *the* Fathers", but as "the God of *my* — or your, or his — father" [Gn 31.5, 29; 43.23; 49.25; 50.17]. There are more specific formulae, such as "the God of Abraham" [Gn 31.53] and "The God of Abraham your father" [Gn 26.24; 28.13; 32.10] that are used interchangeably. Thus, as Föhrer notes, the formulae "point to a clan god" or "tribal god assigned to a specific group identified with the name of an ancestor," 37. Furthermore, the variants of the divine 'El' names are linked with specific geographical locations, considered cultic sites or sanctuaries; for example, *El Roi* is associated with Beer-lahai-roi in the Negeb [Gn 16.7-14], *El Olam* with Beer-sheba [Gn 21. 14-19]. *El-Bethel* with Bethel [Gn 28. 10-22]. In each instance, according to Föhrer, an independent sanctuary legend has been appropriated and incorporated into the biblical account in Genesis. Föhrer, 63-64. The deities termed '*elim*' in Genesis with various epithets "were local nature gods." Föhrer, 35-36. In sum, the pre-Mosaic, patriarchal naming and divine formulae conforms strictly to kinship alliances associated with *primitive territorialisation* and savage coding, whereas Yahwism is despotic.

³⁰⁰ The conflict, and concerns over the implications for primitive territorialisation with the installation of an indigenous despotic regime are to be found in I Samuel 8: 1-16. Yahweh, through Samuel, essentially warns the people that having a king will result in the imposition of despotic social relations.

³⁰¹ Representing this 'third impulse' as a singular religious 'position' or element is itself a generalisation. The pre-exilic prophets were a diverse group. Some, it seems, are to be associated with the royal cult (e.g., Samuel, Nathan) even if as critics (Elijah, Amos, Isaiah). Buber posits the existence of a Mosaic, Deuteronomist tradition preserved through the centuries at Shiloh, and presents Jeremiah as the last of the pre-exilic prophets to be associated with this tradition. See Martin Buber, The Prophetic Faith, 159-163.

³⁰² See my Chapter II.

³⁰³ 2 K, 18, 24.

³⁰⁴ Buber, of course, does not use the term 'despotic'. Instead, he refers to the alliance between the monarchy and the Temple priesthood in the project of 'centralisation' of the state cultic apparatus. See Martin Buber, The Prophetic Faith, 155f.

³⁰⁵ Freud, MM, 79-80.

³⁰⁶ That is, for the purposes of crafting his 'Moses' theory, and the relation of Moses' religion to the repressive hypothesis, Freud assumes the 'Jews' are a *socius*, 'a people', from the time of Moses. He is aware, however, that this assertion is not 'historical'. Indeed, he notes that "it is historically certain that the Jewish type was definitely fixed as a result of the reforms by Ezra and Nehemiah in the 5th century BC, therefore after the exile ... according to our reckoning, approximately nine hundred years had then passed since the appearance of Moses ..." MM, 51, n1.

³⁰⁷ Freud, MM, 79.

³⁰⁸ Rainer Albertz, A History of Israelite Religion in the Old Testament Period: Volume II. From the Exile to the Maccabees, 371 (hereafter, Albertz II).

³⁰⁹ Albertz II, 371.

³¹⁰ Albertz II, 371.

³¹¹ Albertz II, 371.

³¹² During the time of Christ tensions exist among the major religious parties (Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, Zealots) reflecting often extreme religious and political-ideological differences. Tensions also exist among discrete religio-ethnic and economic groups within the group identified as broadly as 'Jews' (e.g., Judeans, Galileans, Samaritans, Idumeans, etc.).

³¹³ The sense of liberation persists despite the political-territorial consequences of the state's collapse. The collapse of the Judahite state coupled with the weak Babylonian provincial authority weakens the territorial integrity of Judah/Israel, leading to penetration by neighbouring peoples. Albertz characterises this penetration as acts of aggression on the part of Edomites, Philistines and others. However, it should be noted that these population groups recently are displaced – and oppressed – by Judahite expansion under Josiah and his successors. Albertz concludes that such political and territorial pressures further corrode the sense of "membership of one's own group", but must "be proved time and again by the individual's decision" thus leading to a privileging of individual religious confession over membership in a *socius* as "a guarantee of personal identity," 375. However this might apply to the exiles, it contradicts the implications of the resurgence of tribal affiliations among the 'people of the land', wherein kinship alliances and the re-establishment of filiative ties to the land are privileged, and the particulars of 'religious confession' as a means of distinction are all but irrelevant.

³¹⁴ Albertz II, 375.

³¹⁵ Föhrer, 309-310.

³¹⁶ Föhrer, 309.

³¹⁷ Föhrer, 309.

³¹⁸ Albertz II, 372, see Lm 5:12-13; 4:12, 20.

³¹⁹ Ezekiel 11: 14-15 states: "The word of Yahweh was then addressed to me as follows: 'Son of man, to your brothers one and all, to your kinsfolk and to the whole House of Israel, the inhabitants of Jerusalem have said, "Keep well away from Yahweh. This country has now been made over to us ..." There follows an acknowledgement from Yahweh that, indeed, He has sent the Judahites "far away" and "dispersed them", but Ezekiel is to inform them — and the new inhabitants of Jerusalem — that He will soon collect them, return them, and give them again the land of Israel [11:17]. The second passage is more succinct. Here, the new inhabitants say, "... 'Abraham was alone when he was given possession of this country. But we are many; the country has been given us as our heritage'..." To which Ezekiel responds, "The Lord Yahweh says this: 'You eat blood, you raise your eyes to your foul idols, you shed blood; are you to own the country?'" Again, there follows a promise (a) to lay waste to the current resident population (via plagues, etc.) and (b) restoration of the exiles. It is interesting to note, by way of reinforcing the Albertz observation about the re-emphasis of the 'patriarchal' tradition among the exiles, that here it is the Abrahamaic rather than the Mosaic covenant that is cited (and critiqued) as the legitimization of the Jews right to the land of Israel.

³²⁰ Albertz II, 372.

³²¹ Albertz II, 372.

³²² Some, apparently, leave Judah out of fear of Babylonian reprisals following the murder of Gedaliah, a royal claimant installed as a Babylonian 'puppet' king in Jerusalem. The period prior to the Babylonian invasion and destruction of Jerusalem is characterised by Jewish factionalism. Some elements seek an accommodation with Babylon as a clearly, overwhelmingly superior military power. Other factions attempt to construct, or re-construct alliances with Egypt and neighbouring petty kingdoms to resist Babylonian suzerainty. Gedaliah is not the only casualty among the political leadership. See Hermann, 291-292.

³²³ Until recently, the dating of the Jewish military colony from the early exilic period was assumed. Albertz is not so sure, but does not offer an alternative explanation. Albertz II, 373, cf. Föhrer, 311.

³²⁴ Albertz II, 374.

³²⁵ Albertz II, 373.

³²⁶ Albertz II, 373. One cannot help but take note of the striking similarity, in general form if not in living conditions, degree of coercion (implicit or explicit) employed by the state, or intention/motivation of the state, between the system employed by the Babylonians and that of the Nazis during WWII with respect to the 'enclaves' they created in the ghettos of eastern European cities such as Warsaw.

³²⁷ Albertz II, 373.

³²⁸ Albertz II, 412.

³²⁹ Albertz II, 413.

³³⁰ Albertz II, 373.

³³¹ Albertz II, 413.

³³² Albertz II, 413.

³³³ The textual (Bible) and historical evidence in this instance — as one might expect — supports Nietzsche's analysis over Freud's.

³³⁴ Albertz II, 413.

³³⁵ Albertz II, 373. *cf.* Nietzsche, AC, sec #27.

³³⁶ Albertz II, 413.

³³⁷ Albertz II 407.

³³⁸ Albertz II, 408.

³³⁹ Albertz II, 408. Contrary to Freud's assumption, the practice of circumcision is not 'invented' during this period, but is here given certain of its 'orthodox' Jewish inscriptional connotations as a sign of 'confession'.³³⁹ Circumcision is an ancient practice, known in both Semitic and Egyptian custom, apparently as an apotropaic rite associated with puberty or preparation for marriage [Gn 34; Ex 4.25] but consistent with savage rites of marking. However, it is not practiced in Babylon or Mesopotamia during the period, thereby providing the Jews with a distinguishing characteristic.

³⁴⁰ Given that Second Isaiah writes in Babylon, the term "Israel" is synonymous with the community of the exile, to be distinguished from the 'people of the land', the '*am haretz*'.

³⁴¹ In fact, the Cyrus imagery becomes the 'theological archetype' or 'theological position' for any subsequent legitimization claims for divine kingship, as reflected in Psalms, the 'Son of Man' motif in the Book of Daniel, and the apocalyptic imagery of Christ. The imagery is appropriated and reified by the Byzantine emperors, who are the "king of Kings" made manifest.

³⁴² Albertz II, 447.

³⁴³ Albertz II, 447-448.

³⁴⁴ Albertz II, 451

³⁴⁵ Albertz II, 448.

³⁴⁶ Albertz, 495.

³⁴⁷ Malachi [Ml 3.5f] speaks to conditions in the early post-exilic period, Job to the persistence of such practices in late Persian period. Job assumes widespread oppression of day labourers (e.g., workers dispossessed of their own land) and slaves [Job 7.2-3; 14.6] In 8th century BCE, the term *ebyon* ('poor') had referred to small farmers; by 4th century, equated or associated with '*ani*' ('wretched'), *dal* ('humble') and the new term *obed* ('perishing'). Albertz II, 496-497.

³⁴⁸ Albertz II, 447.

³⁴⁹ Albertz II, 447.

³⁵⁰ Albertz II, 447.

³⁵¹ The Nehemiah regime is dated *c.* 440 BCE. Ezra, receives his royal commission in either 458 or 398 BCE: Ezra 7.1-8 states commission granted in the 7th year of Artaxerxes, and apparently there is some dispute over the precise dating; however, most biblical scholars prefer the later date (398 BCE) for Ezra. Albertz II, 466.

³⁵² Albertz II, 467.

³⁵³ That is, the 'core' sources, J, E, D, and P are combined and redacted. Albertz agrees with other biblical scholars in proposing that the work had already been taken up, in part, during the early post-exilic period by two main groups, the 'official' priestly scribes and groups of 'lay theologians.' For a concise summary of the 'documentary source hypothesis, see Richard Elliot Friedman, Who Wrote the Bible? (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1989).

³⁵⁴ Albertz II, 472. The pre-exilic histories begin, depending on the source, with the calling of Abraham [Gn 12], or, alternatively (e.g., the 'core' Deuteronomist tradition) with Moses. The latter appears to indicate that the Passover is that event which institutes the *socius* as such, preceding the covenant-making ceremony — which is, again, either the sacred meal on Sinai with the Elders, or the Decalogue. The creation myths are added, consistent with the theological view that Yahweh is the sole and universal God, so of course he must have created the heavens and the earth. The *absence* of such a creation mythology in Israelite religion prior to the post-exilic period is, all things considered, remarkable, given that such narratives form a part of Canaanite, Egyptian, Assyrian and Sumerian-Babylonian mythology — all of which the Israelites were exposed to. The absence must have been remarkable to the post-exilic biblical editors too, so they included *two* creation myths in the Book of Genesis. The first [Gn 1-2.4a] is a re-working of the 'generic' Mesopotamian cosmological creation myth, but it has affinities as well with the Egyptian. The basis for the second [Gn 2.4b-3.24] has more specific, or local (Babylonian) antecedents.

³⁵⁵ Albertz II, 474.

³⁵⁶ Albertz II, 466-7.

³⁵⁷ The fact that there is no *socius* does not mean that there is not a shared tradition – or that elements of the tradition are not shared, or that disparate elements of the population do not identify themselves as ‘Jews’.

³⁵⁸ Jan Assmann, *Moses the Egyptian: the Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 32. I have altered the term somewhat – Assmann cites the work of Mary Douglas, who describes the ‘community’ of the Jewish elite —and similar social groups— as “enclave cultures”.

³⁵⁹ The class structure is masked by the theological claim that Israel does not need priests. The priestly document claims all the people have ‘priestly qualities’ [Ex 19.6], and even young people can offer sacrifice [Ex 24.5]. However, post-exilic experience, and the theological doctrine of guilt and punishment are legitimated by story of Exodus, which is re-written (or written) as a parallel prefiguring of the post-exilic concerns: disobedience to Yahweh/Moses = pre-exilic apostasy; the covenant broken and thus Israel’s existence put at risk [Ex 32.1-10] but dedication of leadership (Moses = Ezra) succeeds in reducing ‘punishment’ from total annihilation to a purging [Ex 32. 28-34] and leads to covenant renewal [Ex 34. 1-10, 28]. Albertz II, 475-476.

³⁶⁰ Albertz II, 448-449. The entrenchment of upper class and priestly privilege is achieved at price of alienation of the ‘*am 'haretz*’ or ‘*am 'ha-ares*’ or ‘*ammê ha-âretz*’. For an explanation of the significance of the ‘*am 'haretz*’, see Samuel Sandmel, *Judaism an Christian Beginnings*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978), 166-7. Apparently, these people are ‘scorned by the sages’, and Jesus is placed in this category. The bias against the ‘*am 'haretz*’, Albertz notes, leads to Crüsemann’s opposition to use of the term ‘community’ to describe the Jews of the Second Temple period. Crüsemann objects to the term ‘community’ as strictly an ethnic designation, noting law against ‘mixed’ marriages dissolves ‘voluntary’ ties. Nevertheless, Albertz contends that a “symbiosis of faith community and nation” develops. Thereafter, into Hellenistic and Roman periods, Judaism’s division into sects is indicative of formation into communities that accentuate historical and religious heritage in different ways. Albertz II, 449. Granted, members of the social classes adapt; granted, the impoverished ‘*am 'haretz*’ might consider themselves (over and against the objections of ‘the sages’) to be fully ‘Jews’, and might adopt certain religious or nationalist goals in common with the elite. But this alone is not indicative of the creation of a homogeneous ‘community’. The relations of production that create social divisions in the early post-exilic period persist into the Hellenistic and Roman periods—and should be seen as a primary cause of both the Maccabean revolt and the Jewish War.

³⁶¹ Thus, the beginning —but only the beginning— of what Nietzsche sees as the revaluation of noble values, with *ressentiment* as the primary value. The ‘great politics of revenge’ is encoded in the revised biblical texts. However, one will note the key distinction that Nietzsche makes between Judaism and Christianity, as explicated by Deleuze: during this post-exilic period *ressentiment* says ‘It is *your* fault’; Christianity takes bad conscience a step further and says ‘it is *my* fault.’ See Deleuze, *NP*, 126, 131-132. The post-exilic priesthood says to the people, ‘it is your fault’ — and certainly the priests intended for the people to respond in agreement, saying ‘yes, it is *our/my* fault.’ However, even a cursory examination of Jewish literature from the late Persian Hellenistic and Roman periods, from Malachi to Job through to the Qumran ‘War Scroll’, shows clearly that the emphasis remains ‘its *your* fault’, albeit with fault attributed to those elements, both foreign and domestic, holding the reigns of power. The ‘politics of revenge’ then, does remain a *politics*; it remains, or at least allows for, *activity*, and manifests itself repeatedly in the late Second Temple period, e.g., the Maccabees and the Zealots.

³⁶² Thus, as noted above, it then appears as though the post-exilic experience is ‘pre-figured’ by the Israelite experience of the Exodus.

³⁶³ Albertz II, 475-476.

³⁶⁴ The Bible —or at any rate the priestly revision, and especially the priestly (P) compositions and interpolations— are thus intended to function as part of the despotic code, and the despotic code is implemented and reinforced precisely through the ‘translation’ of pre-exilic oral traditions into *writing*. Deleuze and Guattari exposition on the ‘magic triangle’ relationship between voice, graphic and eye under primitive territorialisation, and the fundamental shift that takes place with writing under despotism, is extremely useful here, and should be explored further in relation to the events of the post-exilic period. See Deleuze and Guattari, *AO*, 199-205.

³⁶⁵ However, as noted (see note 85 above), desire *does* find ways to escape the code, or at least appropriate and re-code the code as the means to legitimate political action and ideologies that subvert despotic and priestly authority.

³⁶⁶ Albertz II, 518.

³⁶⁷ Albertz II, 503.

³⁶⁸ See especially Isaiah 56-57. The imagery forms that part of the Book of Daniel most important to Christians (e.g., the 'Son of Man' imagery). Compare with apocryphal Old Testament books such as Enoch, and the Apocalypse of Moses, the Qumran (Dead Sea Scroll) *War Scroll* (or, "The War of the Sons of Light Against the Sons of Darkness"), and the New Testament Book of Revelations of St. John the Divine.

³⁶⁹ In other words, the situation appears to be precisely as Nietzsche outlines in The Genealogy of Morality and The Antichrist with respect to how a condition of powerlessness produces *ressentiment*, and how acute reactivity produces *values*, particularly as the theory applies to later Second Temple Judaism and early Christianity. It is here that Nietzsche opens himself to the criticism that he oversimplifies, ignoring, in particular, the phenomenon of organised social action and political revolt in late Second Temple Judaism, e.g., the Maccabean revolt against Seleucid Greece and the 'Zealot' uprising against Rome. However, the religious justification for these uprisings may still be characterised as *ressentiment*: the Maccabees, Zealots, etc. target the dominant religio-political order and say "its your fault".

³⁷⁰ See my Chapter 1, pp 25-26 on the internal critique of Oedipus as both crisis and structure.

³⁷¹ In other words, Yahweh as law-giver is the imaginary figure (transcendent use) who determines all code and therefore performs the symbolic function (immanent use) — just like Freud's Oedipus, according to Deleuze and Guattari.

³⁷² Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, Volume II: Perspectives of World History tr. CF Atkinson, (New York, NY: Alfred A Knopf, 1928), 23-32, 189-190. See Spengler's theory of *pseudomorphosis* or 'over-enculturation' (over-coding). In Spengler's view, Alexander's conquests spread Hellenism, which is laid over the Irano-Semitic territory like a cultural 'crust'. As the Hellenistic world 'hardened', a new 'Magian' (Aramaean, Arabic, Jewish) culture breaks through the crust, initially emerging through 'fissures'. Contra most interpretations of Spengler, he did not see this new culture as 'pristine', 'original', or free from other cultural influences. Rather, similar to Deleuze and Guattari concept of reconfiguration and reterritorialisation, Spengler asserts that the new culture re-works and re-interprets elements of the older culture. This process of translation, or *pseudomorphosis* was necessary to render the older culture comprehensible and meaningful to the new — just as French must be translated into English to make French thought comprehensible to the English-speaker. And, similar to language translation, Spengler maintains that certain concepts or cultural forms are 'lost' or altered, their 'original' sense or meaning misinterpreted as a result of translation.

³⁷³ Assmann, 24.

³⁷⁴ However, the theological love of 'purity', with regard to both doctrine and practice, is unrequited. Religious scholarship demonstrates that even while post-exilic Judaism is consolidating the biblical code, Judaism in general is influenced by, and begins absorbing elements of Persian religion. Later, Judaism is influenced by Hellenism and classical Greek philosophy, indicating that despite the efforts of the priestly apparatus, the religious is not a closed system of coding, but remains a 'living thing.'

³⁷⁵ Assmann, 5-6.

Notes for Conclusion

³⁷⁶ Nietzsche, GoM, II, 22, 68.

³⁷⁷ Marcuse, Eros, 3.

³⁷⁸ As one of my students opined and vigorously defended in opposition to Nietzsche's critique of morality as mnemonic of repression.

³⁷⁹ Freud is concerned lest the quantity of guilt necessary to support civilisation become too great for the individual to support. Marcuse, Eros, 80.

³⁸⁰ Freud, MM, 109-110.

³⁸¹ Freud, MM, 109.

³⁸² Rm 2: 12-24; cf. Freud, MM, 109-110.

³⁸³ Deleuze, ECC, 128.

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